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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
Objects of this book—The narrative portion—The effects on Egypt of
the British occupation—Chief point of interest in Egyptian refonn
—Difficulty of ascertaining Eastern opinion.
My object in writing this book is twofold.
In the first place, I wish to place on record an
accurate narrative of some of the principal events
which have occurred in Egypt and in the Soudan
since the year 1876.^
In the second place, I wish to explain the
results which have accrued to Egypt from the
British occupation of the country in 1882.
The accidents of my public life have afforded
me special opportunities for compiling certain
chapters of Egyptian history. From March 1877
to June 1880, and again from September 1883 up
to the present time (1907), I have been behind the
scenes of Egyptian affairs. Besides those sources
of information which are open to all the world, I
have had access to all the documents in the archives
of the Foreign Offices of both London and Cairo,
and I have been in close communication with, I
think, almost every one who has taken a leading
^ I have dealt fully and unreservedly with the whole of the principal
historical events which occurred in E}i;'ypt from 1876 up to the time
of Tewfik Pasha's death (January 7, 1892) ; also with Soudan history
up to the end of 1907. It would, in my opinion, he premature to
deal similarly with events in Egypt suhsequeut to the accession of the
present Khedive.
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part in Egyptian affairs during the period the
history of which I have attempted to write. Thus,
I think I may fairly lay claim to be in a position
of exceptional advantage in so far as the attainment
of accuracy is concerned.
Now, accuracy of statement is a great merit.
Sir Arthur Helps once said that half the evils
of the world come from inaccuracy. My personal
experience would lead me rather to agree with
him. I cannot say that what I have seen and
known of contemporaneous events, with which I
have been well acquainted, has inspired me with
any great degree of confidence in the accuracy of
historical writing. The public, indeed, generally
end, though sometimes not till after a considerable
lapse of time, in getting a correct idea of the
general course of events, and of the cause or effect
of any special political incident. But, speaking
more particularly of the British public, it may be
doubted whether even this result is fully achieved,
save in respect to questions of internal policy. In
such matters, a number of competent and well-
informed persons take part in the discussions which
arise in Parliament and in the press. Inaccuracy
of statement is speedily corrected. Fallacies are
exposed. In the heat of party warfare the truth
may for a time be obscured, but in the end the
public will generally lay hold of a tolerably correct
appreciation of the facts.
In dealing with the affairs of a foreign country,
more especially if that country be in a semi-civilised
condition, these safeguards to historical truth exist
in a relatively less degree. English opinion has in
such cases to deal with a condition of society with
which it is unfamiliar. It is disposed to apply
arguments drawn from English, or, it may be, from
European experience to a state of things which
does not admit of any such arguments being applied
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without great qualifications. The number of
persons who possess sufficiently accurate informa-
tion to instruct the public is limited, and amongst
those persons it not unfrequently happens that
many have some particular cause to advance, or
some favourite political theory to defend. Those
who are most qualified to speak often occupy some
official position, which, for the time being, imposes
silence upon them. There is, therefore, no certain
guarantee that inaccuracies of statement will be
corrected, or that fallacies will be adequately ex-
posed. Thus, even if the general conclusion be
correct, there is a risk that an erroneous apprecia-
tion in respect to important matters of detail will
float down the tide of history. The public often seize
on some incident which strikes the popular imagina-
tion, or idealise the character of some individual
whose action excites sympathy or admiration. It
would appear, indeed, that democracy tends to
develop rather than to discourage hero-worship.
The first stage on the road to historical in-
accuracy is that some half-truth is stated, and, in
spite of contradiction, obtains a certain amount of
credence. It may be, indeed, that the error is
corrected ; but it sometimes happens that, as time
goes on, the measure of fiction increases, whilst
that of fact tends to evaporate. A series of myths
cluster round the original idea or statement. In
India, as Sir Alfred Lyall has shown, the hero
passes by easy stages of transition into a demi-god.^
In sceptical Europe, the process is different. All
that happens is that an incorrect fact or a faulty
conclusion is graven into the tablets from which
future historians must draw their sources of in-
formation.
Turning to the second point to which allusion
is made above, I wish to explain the results which
* Asiatic Studies.
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accrued to Egypt from the British occupation of
the country in 1882.
On March 23, 1876, Mr. Stephen Cave, who
had been sent to Cairo to re])ort on the financial
condition of Egypt, expressed himself in the follow-
ing terms :
—
Egypt may be said to be in a transition state, and she
suffers from the defects of the system out of which she is
passing, as well as from those of the system into which she
is attempting to enter. She suffers from the ignorance, dis-
honesty, waste, and extravagance of the East, such as have
brought her suzerain to the verge of ruin, and at the same
time from the vast expense caused by hasty and inconsiderate
endeavours to adopt the civilisation of the West.
An attempt will be made in the following pages
to give some account of the measures adopted since
Mr. Cave wrote his report, to arrest, and, as I hope
and would fain believe, to remedy the disease,
whose main features are described with accuracy
in the passage quoted above.
I trust that such an account will not be devoid
of interest to the general reader, and that it will
be of some special interest to those of my fellow-
countrymen who are, or who at some future time
may be engaged in Oriental administration. It is
to this latter class that I would more especially
address myself, for they can appreciate the nature
of the problems which have presented themselves
for solution, and the difficulty of solving them,
more fully than those who are devoid of special
administrative experience in the East.
I would at the outset state where, as I venture
to think, the chief point of interest lies.
Egypt is not the only country which has been
brought to the verge of ruin by a persistent neglect
of economic laws and by a reckless administration
of the finances of the State. Neither is it the
only country in which undue privileges have been
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acquired by the influential classes to the detriment
of the mass of the population. Nor is it the only
country in whose administration the most element-
ary principles of law and justice have been ignored.
Although the details may differ, there is a great
similarity in the general character of the abuses
which spring up under Eastern Governments where-
soever they may be situated. So also, although
the remedies to be applied must vary according to
local circumstances and according to the character,
institutions, and habits of thought of the European
nation under whose auspices reforms are initiated,
the broad lines which those reforms must take are
traced out by the commonplace requirements of
European civilisation, and must of necessity present
some identity of character, whether the scene of
action be India, Algiers, Egypt, Tunis, or Bosnia.
The history of reform in Egypt, therefore, does
not present any striking feature to which some
analogy might not perhaps be found in other
countries where European civilisation has, in a
greater or less degree, been grafted on a backward
Eastern Government and society.
But, so far as I am aware, no counterpart can
be found to the special circumstances which have
attended the work of Egyptian reform. Those
circumstances have, in truth, been very peculiar.
In the first place, one alien race, the English,
have had to control and guide a second alien race,
the Turks, by whom they are disliked, in the
government of a third race, the Egyptians. To
these latter, both the paramount races are to a
certain extent unsympathetic. In the case of the
Turks, the want of sympathy has been mitigated
by habit, by a common religion, and by the use
of a common language.^ In the case of the
English, it has been mitigated by the respect
* All the Egyptian officials of Turkisli origin now speak Arabic.
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due to superior talents, and by the benefits
which have accrued to the population from British
interference.
In the second place, it is to be observed that
for diplomatic and other reasons, on which it is
unnecessary for the moment to dwell, the Egyptian
administration had to be reformed without any
organic changes being effected in the conditions
under which the government had been conducted
prior to the British occupation. Those conditions
were of an exceptionally complicated character.
A variety of ingenious and elaborate checks had
been invented with a view to preventing a bad
Government from moving in a vicious direction.
These checks, when brought into action under a
wholly different condition of affairs, were at times
applied, under the baneful impulse of international
jealousy, to hamper the movements of an improved
Government in the direction of reform. " Je suis
sans credit," said the "plumitif " in Voltaire's IngmUy
" pour faire du bien ; mon pouvoir se borne a faire
du mal quelquefois.'* The phrase may rightly be
applied to the working of international government
in Egypt since 1882. It is, indeed, certain that
whatever success has attended the efforts of
reformers in Egypt has been attained, not in
virtue of the system, but in spite of it. Those
who hold, with the English poet, that " Whate'er
is best administered is best," may perhaps find
some corroboration of their theory in the recent
history of Egypt. An experiment under some-
what novel conditions has, in fact, been made in
Eastern administration, and, in spite of many
shortcomings, this experiment has been crowned
with a certain degree of success. It is this which
gives to Egyptian reform its chief claim to the
interest of the })()litical student.
I have lived too long in the East not to be
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aware that it is difficult for any European to
arrive at a true estimate of Oriental wishes, aspira-
tions, and opinions.
Those who have been in the East and have tried to mingle
with the native population know well how utterly impossible
it is for the European to look at the world with the same
eyes as the Oriental. For a while, indeed, the European
may fancy that he and the Oriental understand one another,
but sooner or later a time comes when he is suddenly
awakened from his dream, and finds himself in the presence
of a mind which is as strange to him as would be the mind
of an inhabitant of Saturn.^
I was for some while in Egypt before I fully
realised how little I understood my subject ; and
I found, to the last day of my residence in the
country, that I was constantly learning something
new. No casual visitor can hope to obtain much
real insight into the true state of native opinion.
Divergence of religion and habits of thought; in
my own case ignorance of the vernacular language ;
'
the reticence of Orientals when speaking to any one
in authority ; their tendency to agree with any one
to whom they may be talking ; the want of mental
symmetry and precision, which is the chief dis-
tinguishing feature between the illogical and
picturesque East and the logical West, and which
lends such peculiar interest to the study of Eastern
life and politics ; the fact that religion enters to a
greater extent than in Europe into the social life
and laws and customs of the people ; and the
further fact that the European and the Oriental,
reasoning from the same premises, will often arrive
at diametrically opposite conclusions,—all these
circumstances place the European at a great dis-
advantage when he attempts to gauge Eastern
* Professor Sayce, The Higher Criticism and the Monuments, p. 558.
• I have a fair acquaintance with Turkish, but I do not speak
Arabic
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opinion. Nevertheless, the difficulty of arriving at
a true idea of the undercurrents of native opinion is
probably less considerable in Egypt than in India.
Notably, the absence of the caste system, and the
fact that the social and rehgious fabric of Islamism
is more readily comprehensible to the European
mind than the comparatively subtle and mystical
bases of Hinduism, diminish the gulf which in
India separates the European from the native,
and which, by placing a check on social inter-
course, becomes a fertile source of mutual mis-
understanding. On the whole, though I should not
like to dogmatise on the subject, I am inclined
to think that by constantly seeing people of all
classes, and by checking the information received
from different sources, a fair idea of native opinion
in Egypt may in time be formed.
I would add that it is not possible to live so
long as I have lived in Egypt without acquiring
a deep sympathy for the Egyptian people. The
cause of Egyptian reform is one in which I take
the warmest personal interest. A residence of half
a lifetime in Eastern countries has made me realise
the force of Rudyard Kipling's lines
—
If you've heard the East a'calling.
You won't ever heed aught else.
PART I
ISMAIL PASHA
1863-1879
It were good that men in their Innovations would Jbllow
the example of Tim£ itself, which, indeed, innovateth greatly,
hut quietly, and by degrees scarce to be perceived.
. . . It is
good also not to try experivietds in States except the necessity
be urgent, or the utility evident ; and well to beware that it be
the reformation that draweth on the change, and not the desire
of change that pretendeth the reformation.
Bacon, On Innovations.
It is singidar how long the rotten inll hold together pro-
vided you do not handle it roughly . . . so loth are men to quit
their old ways ; and conquering indolence and inertia, venture
on new. . . . Rash enthusiast of change, beivare ! Hast thou
well considered all that Habit does in this life ofours?
Carlyle, French Revolution.

CHAPTER II
THE GOSCHEN MISSION
November 1876
Financial position in 1863—And in 1876—Suspension of payment of
Treasury Bills—Creation of the Commission of tlie Public Debt
—
Decree ofMay 7, 1876—The Goschen Mission—Decree of November
18, 1876—Appointment of Controllers-General—Sir Louis Mallet
—I am appointed Commissioner of the Public Debt—Ismail's
predecessors— Crisis in the career of Ismail Pasha—Accounts
Department.
The origin of the Egyptian Question in its present
phase was financial.
In 1863, when Said Pasha died, the public debt
of Egypt amounted to £3,293,000. Said Pasha
was succeeded by Ismail Pasha, the son of the
celebrated Ibrahim Pasha, and the grandson of the
still more celebrated Mehemet Ali.
In 1876, the funded debt of Egypt, including
the Daira loans, amounted to £68,110,000. In
addition to this, there was a floating debt of about
£26,000,000.
Roughly speaking, it may be said that Ismail
Pasha added, on an average, about £7,000,000 a
year for thirteen years to the debt of Egypt. For
all practical purposes it may be said that the whole
of the borrowed money, except £16,000,000 spent
on the Suez Canal, was squandered.^
^ Mr. Cave, after making out a balance-sheet for the years from
1864 to 1875, adds : '' Two striking features stand out in this balance-
sheet, namely, that the sum raised by revenue, £94,281,401, is little
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For some while prior to the general breakdown,
it had been apparent that Ismail Pasha's reckless
administration of the finances of the country must,
sooner or later, bring about a financial collapse.
Towards the latter part of 1875 and the beginning
of 1876, money was raised at ruinous rates of in-
terest by the issue of Treasury bills. On April 8,
1876, the crash came. The Khedive suspended
payment of his Treasury bills.
Previous to the suspension of payment, some
discussion had taken place with reference to the
creation of an Egyptian National Bank, which was
to be under the control of three European Com-
missioners. France and Italy each agreed to select
a Commissioner, but Lord Derby, who then pre-
sided at the Foreign Office, was unwilling to
interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt, and
declined to nominate a British Commissioner.
The project, therefore, dropped, but was shortly
afterwards revived in a different form. On JMay 2,
1876, a Khedivial Decree was issued instituting a
Commission of the Public Debt. Certain specific
duties were assigned to the Commissioners, who
were to act generally as representatives of the
bondholders. On ^lay 7, a further Decree was
issued consolidating the debt of Egypt, which
then amounted to £91,000,000.
M. de Blignieres, Herr von Kremer, a dis-
tinguished Orientalist, and M. Baravelli were
nominated to be Commissioners of the Debt at
the instance, respectively, of the French, Austrian,
and Italian Governments. The British Govern-
ment declined to select a Commissioner.
less than that spent on administration, tribute to the Porte, works of
unquestionable utility, and certain expenses of questionable utility or
policy, in all amountins^ to £97,240,966, and tliat for the present large
amount of indebtedness there is absolutely nothing to show but the
Suez Canal, the whole jjroceeds of the loans and floating debt having
been absorbed in payment of interest and ^inking funds, with the
exception of the sum debited to that great worlv."
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The financial arrangements embodied in the
Decree of May 7, 1876, caused much dissatisfac-
tion, especially in England, with the result that
Mr. (subsequently Lord) Goschen undertook a
mission to Egypt with a view to obtaining some
modifications which the bondholders considered
necessary.
Lord Goschen, with whom M. Joubert was
associated to represent French interests, arrived
in Egypt in October 1876.
The arrangement negotiated by Messrs. Goschen
and Joubert was embodied in a Decree, dated
November 18, 1876. The chief financial features
of this arrangement were as follows :
—
The loans of 1864, 1865, and 1867, which had
been contracted before the financial position of
the Khedive had become seriously embarrassed,
and the capital of which amounted in all to
about £4,293,000, were taken out of the Unified
Debt, into which they had been incorporated
under the Decree of May 7, and formed the subject
of a special arrangement.
A 5 per cent Preference Stock, intended to
attract bona-fide investors, w^as created, with a
capital of £17,000,000.
The Daira debts, amounting to about £8,815,000,
which had, under the Decree of INIay 7, been
mcluded in the Unified Debt, were again deducted,
and ultimately formed the subject of a separate
arrangement.
The capital of the Unified Debt was thus
reduced to £59,000,000. The rate of interest
was fixed at 6 per cent, to which a sinking fund
of 1 per cent was added.
So far as the effect produced on the future of
Egypt was concerned, the purely financial arrange-
ments negotiated by Lord Goschen were less
productive of result than the changes which, under
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his advice, the Khedive introduced into the
administration of the country. It was clear that,
however rational any Egyptian financial combina-
tion might be, it would present but little hope
of stability unless the fiscal administration of the
country was improved. It was, therefore, decided
to appoint two Controllers-General, one of whom
was to supervise the revenue, and the other the
expenditure. The railways and the port of
Alexandria, the revenues of which were to be
applied to the payment of interest on the
Preference Stock, were to be administered by a
Board composed of two Englishmen, a Frenchman,
and two Egyptians.
Mr. Romaine was appointed Controller-General
of the Revenue and the Baron de Malaret
Controller - General of Expenditure. General
Marriott was appointed President of the Railway
Board. Lord Derby instructed Lord Vivian, who
was at this time British representative in Egypt,
to inform the Khedive that " Her Majesty's
Government could not accept any responsibility
for these appointments, to which, however, they
had no objection to offer."
About the same time, the Khedive applied to
Lord Goschen to nominate an English Commis-
sioner of the Public Debt, the British Government
having again declined to assume the responsibility
of nomination.
In May 1876, I returned from India, where I
had for four years occupied the post of Private
Secretary to the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook.
I had, in connection with Indian affairs, been
brought much in contact with the late Sir Louis
Mallet, who was then Under-Secretary of State at
the India Office.
I cannot pass by the mention of Sir Louis
Mallet's name without paying a tribute of respect
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to his memory. To myself his death was an
irreparable loss. Whenever I visited England
during the last few years of his life, I always
discussed with him the difficulties of the situation
in which I was placed in Egypt, 'i'hey were at
one time very great. Sir Louis Mallet was not
personally acquainted with the details of Egyptian
affairs, but, besides the intimate knowledge which
he possessed of economic science, of which he had
made a special study, his high-minded attachment
to principle and his keen insight into the forces
in motion in the political world rendered his
advice of the utmost value. He was the best
type of the English civil servant ; a keen poli-
tician but not a political partisan, a trained official
without a trace of the bureaucratic element in
him, and a man of really liberal aspirations
without being carried away by the catchwords
which sometimes attach themselves to what, from
a party point of view, is called liberal policy in
England.
Lord Goschen consulted Sir Louis Mallet as
to whom he should nominate as Commissioner
of the Debt in Egypt. Sir Louis Mallet re-
commended me. Lord Goschen offered me the
post, which I accepted. I arrived in Egypt on
March 2, 1877.
I would here pause in order to make some
observations which are suggested by these appoint-
ments.
This period constituted the turning-point of
Ismail Pasha's career. The system of government
which existed in Egypt during the pre-reforming
days was very defective, but it possessed some
barbaric virtues, and was perhaps more suited to
the country than Europeans, judging from their
own standpoint, are often disposed to admit.
Tlie manufacturers of myths have, of course.
16 MODERN EGYPT pt.i
been at work at IMehemet Ali's career. They often
credit him with ideas and intentions which were
absolutely foreign to his nature. Nevertheless,
the Egyptians are right to venerate the memory
of this rough man of genius, if only for the
reason that to him belonos the credit of having
amputated their country from the decaying body
of the Ottoman Empire, thus giving it a separate
administrative existence. INIoreover, there was
much in JMehemet Ali's character which was really
worthy of admiration. He was a brave and
capable soldier. He had some statesmanlike
instincts, and, though his lights were rude, never-
theless he used them to the best of his ability in
furthering the interests of his adopted country, as he
understood those interests. He proceeded tenta-
tively along the path of reform. He summoned
to Egypt a few Europeans, mostly Frenchmen, of
high professional merit.^ He founded the Poly-
technic School, the School of Medicine, and some
other similar institutions. Under the direction of
JNI. Jumel, the cotton plant was introduced into
the country.
Sir John Bowring, in a report addressed to
Lord Palmerston in 1840, said :—
^
^ One of the predominating ideas in Mehemet Ali's mind was to use
French as a counterpoise to British influence in Egypt, not because he
had any particular love for the French or dislike of the English^ but
because, with the instinct of a true statesman, he foresaw that the
force of circumstances might, and probably would drive England
into an aggressive policy against Egypt. Mr. Cameron {Rfn/pt in the
Nineteenth Century, p. 105) says that when the celebrated traveller,
Burckhardt, visited Egypt in 1814, Mehemet Ali "asked him about
England and our plans in the East. He dreaded lest Wellington
should invade Egypt with the Peninsular Army. 'The great fish
swallow the small,' he said ; ' 1 am afraid of the English, and hope
they will not attack Egypt in my absence.
. . . England must some
day take Egypt as her share of the spoil of the Turkish Empire.'"
2 The whole of this report, which is but little known, is well worthy
of perusal by any one who takes an interest in Egyptian affairs. The
history of the early part of Mehemet Alls reign has been written by a
contemporary, Sheikh Abdul-llahman ol-Jabarti. The Sheikh wrote
from a strongly Egyptian, that is to say anti-'I'urkish point of view.
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Egypt has, indeed, received immense benefit from the
presence of Europeans. They have not onlv rendered direct
services by the knowledge they have communicated, but the
circumstance of their having been so much associated with
all the improvements which have been introduced has
diffused a great respect for their superior acquirements, and
a toleration for their opinions, whose influence has been
spreading widely among the people.
But, although Mehemet Ali dallied with
European civilisation in a manner which was by
no means unintelligent and was far less hurtful
to his country than that adopted by Said and
Ismail, his methods of government were, in reality,
wholly Oriental. Those methods may be illustrated
by the following anecdote, which I give on the
authority of Nubar Pasha.
At the beginning of the war which Mehemet
Ali waged against the Porte, the Admiral in
command of the Turkish Fleet in Egyptian waters,
who was a man of noted courage and ability, was
summoned to Constantinople. He probably had
more to gain than to lose by deserting the Egyptian
cause. He decided, however, to throw in liis lot
with Mehemet Ali. His decision contributed
materially to the eventual victory of Egypt. After
the war was over, the Admiral was again summoned
to Constantinople. To have obeyed at that time
would have meant certain death. The Admiral,
therefore, remained at Cairo, and, for four years,
enjoyed Mehemet Ali's protection, which he had
so well deserved. At the end of that period
—
whether it was that Mehemet Ali wished to
ingratiate himself with the Sultan, who continued
to press his request, or whether he had for other
He does justice to Mehemet Ali's military qualities, but he gives an
unfavourable account of the condition of the country and of the system
of government adopted during Mehemet Ali's time. See also St. John's
Egypt under Mohammed All, published in 1834, and Cameron's Egypt in
the Nineteenth Century, 1898.
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reasons become estranged from the Admiral—he
determined to withdraw his protection. He sent
one of his confidential agents to visit the Admiral.
A short conversation, which it would be difficult
to rival in pathos and dramatic effect, ensued. The
agent, after the usual Oriental compliments, merely
said, ' Life, O Admiral, is uncertain. We must
all be prepared to meet our death at any moment."
The Admiral at once took the hint. He knew
what those fatal words meant. The tenets of his
religion had taught him not to resist the decrees
of fate. Like many a Stoic philosoplier of Ancient
Rome, he had probably at times reflected that a
self-inflicted death was, as a last resource, a sure
refuge from earthly tyranny and injustice, however
galling. He merely asked for time to say his
prayers, and, when these were completed, drank,
without complaint or remonstrance, the poisoned
cup of coffee which was offered to him. On the
following day, it was announced that he had died
suddenly of apoplexy.
Ibrahim, the son and successor of JVIehemet Ali,
was a distinguished soldier, and a man of great
personal courage. It must be added that he was a
half-lunatic savage. He it was who commanded
the expedition sent to Nejd against the Wahabis.
A number of orthodox JNIollahs accompanied the
expedition. When the military operations had
been terminated by the success of the Egyptian
arms, Ibrahim arranged that his INIollahs and the
religious leaders of the Wahabi sect should meet
and discuss the dogmatic and ceremonial points of
difference which separated them. After the lapse
of three days, Ibrahim inquired what had been the
result of their discussions. He was informed that
neither party had been able to convert the other to
its special views. Ibrahim then said that under the
circumstances, although he was no theologian, he
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must decide the matter for himself. He ordered all
the religious leaders of the Wahabi sect to be killed.^
Nubar Pasha once related to me an episode in
his relations with Ibrahim, which did great credit
to his own remarkable conversational powers. He
and others were on board a steamer, which was
conveying Ibrahim and his suite from Constan-
tinople to Egypt. On nearing Alexandria, Nubar
learnt that Ibrahim had suddenly decided that the
members of his suite, including Nubar himself,
should be thrown overboard. Thereupon, Nubar
went to Ibrahim's cabin, entirely ignored the fate
which awaited himself and his comrades, and began
to talk to Ibrahim of his campaigns. Ibrahim was so
much pleased at the flattery which was abundantly
administered to him, and also so much interested in
all that Nubar said, that for the moment he forgot
his recent decision. The conversation continued
until the ship arrived at Alexandria. Thus, Nubar
and his companions were saved.
Ibrahim died, very shortly after his accession,
of pneumonia, brought on, it is said, by drinking
two bottles of highly iced champagne at a draught
when he was very hot.^
Abbas, the next Khedive, was an Oriental despot
of the worst type. The stories of his revolting
cruelty are endless. There does not appear, as
in the case of his predecessors, to have been
' Palgrave, Central and Easte7~n Arabia, vol. ii. p. 68.
2 Mr. Pickthall, writing of Ibrahim Pasha's adminisiration of Syria,
says : **The radicalism of Ibrahim made his rule offensive to the con-
servative notables of Syria. Still, he was the kind of tyrant to appeal
most strongly to Orientals, heavy-handed but humorous, knowing how
to impart to his decisions that quaint proverbial savour which dwells in
the mind of the people, and makes good stories ; and his fame among
the fellaheen is that of a second Solomon."
—
Folk-Lore of the Holy Land,
Preface, p. xvi.
My earliest connection with Egyptian affairs was, as a child, being
one of a large crowd waiting in St. tJames's Park to see Ibraliim Pasha
Eass. This must have been in 184:6 or 1847. The Londoners called
im "Abraham Parker."
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any redeeming feature in his character. It was
altogether odious.
The main defects of Said Pasha, who succeeded
Abbas, were excessive vanity and hopeless in-
capacity in the art of government. His follies
were duly chronicled by Mr. Senior, who visited
Egypt during his reign. Although less ferocious
than his immediate predecessor, he occasionally
committed acts which would be considered
extremely cruel, had their iniquity not been out-
rivalled by the deeds of Abbas.
I hesitate to relate the numerous stories which
have been handed down to posterity about Abbas
and Said. At this distance of time, it is almost
impossible to say how far they are true, and
inasmuch as most of them bring out the characters
of both of these princes in a highly unpleasant
light, it is merely an act of posthumous justice to
their memories not to relate them, unless their
truth can be substantiated by absolutely trust-
worthy evidence. The following, however, sup-
posing it to be true—and it is not at all im-
probable—is relatively innocuous, and, moreover,
is so highly illustrative of the manner in which
Oriental despots occasionally jump from an extreme
of injustice to a prodigality of generous munificence
that I need not refrain from relating it. On one
occasion. Said was coming in a steamer from
the Barrage to Cairo. The Nile was low, and the
steamer stuck in the mud. Said ordered the i'eis
(steersman) to receive a hundred blows Avith the
courbash. These were administered. The steamer
was got off the mud, and proceeded on her journey.
Shortly afterwards, she stuck again. Said roared
out: "Give him two hundred," whereupon the
unfortunate rels made a rush, and jumped over-
board. A boat was put off, and he was brought
back to the steamer. Said asked him why he had
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jumped overboard. The man explained that he
preferred to run the risk of death by drowning to
the agony caused by another flogging. " Fool,"
exclaimed Said, "when I said two hundred, I did
not mean lashes, but sovereigns." And, accord-
ingly, the man received a bag containing that
amount of money. Eastern history abounds with
episodes of this sort. Moreover, the minds of
Orientals are so peculiarly constituted that many
of them would probably be far more struck with
the generosity of the gift than with the cruelty
and injustice of the flogging.
Said occasionally indulged in the most insane
freaks. Thus, in order to prove his courage, which
had been called in question by the European press,
it is said that he caused a kilometre of road to be
strewn a foot deep with gunpowder. He then
walked solemnly along the road smoking a pipe,
and accompanied by a numerous suite, all of whom
were ordered to smoke,— severe penalties being
threatened against any one whose pipe was not
found alight at the end of the promenade.
It was Said who first invited European adven-
turers to prey on Egypt. Nubar Pasha, who could
speak with authority on this subject, used to say
:
"C'est au temps de Said qie le commencement de
la debacle a eu lieu." Intelligent observers on the
spot were already able to foretell the storm which
was eventually to burst over Egypt. In 1855,
Mr. Walne, the British Consul at Cairo, said to
Mr. Senior:
—
Said Pasha is rash and flighty and conceited, and is spoilt
by the flattery of the foreigners who surround him. They
tell him, and he believes them, that he is a universal genius.
He undoes everything, does very Httle, and, I fear, is pre-
paring for us some great catastrophe.^
* Senior's Conversations and Journals in Egypt, vol. i. p. 181. An
account of Egypt under Said F-isha is given in Dr. Stacquey's work
published in 1865, and entitled L'Egypte, La Basse Nubie et le iinai
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These, and many other similar anecdotes which
might be related, serve to illustrate the methods
of government which prevailed in Egypt im-
mediately prior to the accession of Ismail Pasha.
The drastic nature of those methods, and more
especially of the punishments which the rulers of
Egypt were in the habit of awarding during the
first half of the last century, and even at a later
period, did not, indeed, differ very materially from
those of their Pharaonic predecessors. Herodotus
says :
—
King Amasis . . . established the law that every
Egyptian should appear once a year before the governor
of his canton, and show his means of living ; or, failing to
do so, and to prove that he got an honest livelihood, should
be put to death.
^
If the general principles adopted by Mehemet
Ali had continued to be applied, and especially if
recourse had not been made to European credit,
it is just possible that the Egyptian system of
administration would have been gradually reformed
in a manner suitable to the requirements of the
country. But it is one of the commonplaces of
political science that the most dangerous period
for a radically bad system of government is the
moment when some reformer, himself inexperi-
enced in the art of government, has laid a rash
hand on the old fabric, and has shaken it to
such an extent as to make it totter to its fall,
but when sufficient time has not yet elapsed to
admit of an improved system of government
taking root.
In the endeavours, possibly well-intentioned,
* Book ii. p. 177. After remarking that Solon the Athenian
borrowed this law from the Egyptians and imposed it on his country-
men— a statement which, according to a note given by llawlinson,
is incorrect—Herodotus naively adds, **It is indeed an excellent
custom."
CH.II THE GOSCHEN MISSION 23
but certainly misdirected, that Ismail Pasha made
to introduce European civilisation at a rapid rate
into Egypt, he was necessarily obliged to have
recourse to European assistance. The only chance
of introducing the new wine of European ideas
into the old bottles of Eastern conservatism, with-
out producing a dangerous fermentation, lay in
proceeding with caution, and notably in selecting
with the utmost care the European agents through
whose instrumentality the changes might gradually
have been effected. Unfortunately, no such care was
taken. The Europeans into whose hands Ismail
Pasha threw himself, were but too often drawn from
the very class which he should most of all have
avoided.^ Many were adventurers of the type
represented in fiction by M. Alphonse Daudet's
** Nabab," ^ whose sole object was to enrich them-
selves at the expense of the country. Moreover,
few of those who exercised any influence in matters
connected with the government of Egypt possessed
sufficient experience of the East to enable them
to apply wisely the knowledge, which they had
acquired elsewhere, to the new conditions under
which they were called upon to work.
The result was that Europeans acquired a bad
name in Egypt, from which, after years of patient
labour and instructive example on the part of the
many high-minded Europeans of divers nationalities
who were subsequently engaged in Egyptian work,
they only gradually recovered. It was, moreover,
impossible that constant association with the classes
to which allusion is made above should not have
produced a marked effect on the views of an astute,
^ A hifi^hly qualified authority, who wrote under the pseudonym of
"Odysseus," saj^s : " From tlieir first appearance, the Turks displayed
a strange power of collecting togetlier apostates, renegades, and people
who had more ability than moral qualities."
—
Turkey in Europe, p. 02.
2 It is well known tliat the character of the Nabab was drawn from an
individual who existed in Egjpt not many jears ago.
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but superficial cynic such as Ismail Pasha. He
has often been credited with having systematically
based his conduct on the assumption that no
man living was honest,^ and, looking at the
personal experience through which he passed, it
cannot be a matter for surprise that he should
have entertained such an opinion.
The result of Lord Goschen's mission was that
Ismail Pasha had, for the first time, to deal with a
small body of European officials, who were not only
invested with more ample powers than any which
had previously been conferred on European function-
aries in Egypt, but who were also of a different
type from those Europeans with whom he had
heretofore been generally brought in contact. I
do not claim for the European officials who, at or
about this time, came to Egypt any special qualities
which are not to be found in abundance amongst
other members of the civil services of France and
England. We displayed, I conceive, the ordinary
variety of capacity and character which was to be
anticipated from our previous training, and from
the manner in which we had been selected. But
we all possessed some characteristics in common.
We were all honest. We were all capable of
forming and of expressing independent opinions,
and we were all determined to do our duty to the
best of our abilities in the discharge of the functions
which were respectively assigned to us. In one
respect, the position of the British differed from
that of the French officials. The latter had been
selected, and were more or less avowedly supported
by their Government. The British officials could
1 Macaulay says of Charles II. : " According- to him, every person
was to he hought ; hut some people haggled more about their price
than others ; and when this haggling was very obstinate and very
skilful, it was called by some fine name. The chief trick by which
clever men kept up the price of their abilities was called 'integrity'"
(Work.'i, vol. i. p. 132). Tiiis passage probaldy describes Ismail Pasha's
habit of thought with tolerable accuracy.
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not count on any such support. But the distinction
was of less practical importance than might at first
sight appear. It was well understood that, if the
British officials found that their advice was system-
atically neglected, and that they could not, with
a proper sense of what was due to their own self-
respect, carry on their duties in a fairly satisfactory
manner, they would resign their appointments, a
course which would not only have caused a good
deal of embarrassment, but would also have
strengthened the hostile public opinion then
clamouring against the existing regime in Egypt in
terms which were daily becoming more menacing.
Ismail Pasha failed to recognise the importance
of the changes to which he had assented. Had he
succeeded in acquiring the confidence of this small
body of European officials, and in enlisting their
services on his side, it is not only possible, but even
probable, that he would have remained Khedive of
Egypt till the day of his death. But, for a variety
of reasons, which will appear more fully in the
sequel of this narrative, he failed to do so. Perhaps
the difficulties of tlie situation were sucli that it
was impossible for him to do so. The result was
that the officials in question were necessarily thrown
into an attitude of hostility. And the further result
was that a series of events took place which in the
end led to the downfall of the Khedive. In fact,
an opportunity, such as sometimes presents itself
in politics, then occurred, which, had it been skil-
fully used with a true insight into the main facts
of the situation and into the direction to which
affairs were drifting, might not impossibly have
turned the current of Egy})tian history into anotlier
channel, and might have saved the Khedive from
the disaster which was impending over him. Such
opportunities, if they are not grasped at the uK^ncnt,
rarely recur. As it was, the causes which were
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tending: towards the downfall of the Khedive con-
tinned to operate unchecked, and the new European
element introduced into the administration, far
from impeding, hastened the advent of the crisis.
One of the appointments made at this time,
namely, that of Sir Gerald Fitzgerald to the head
of the Accounts Department, calls for some special
remarks.
It is possible for the finances of a country to be
badly administered, whilst, at the same time, the
accounts may be in good order. On the other
hand, it is impossible for the statesman or the
financier to commence the work of fiscal and
administrative reform seriously until, by the organ-
isation of a proper Department of Accounts, he is
placed in possession of the true facts connected
with the resources at his disposal and the State
expenditure.
In 1876, the Egyptian accounts were in a state
of the utmost confusion. The main reason why
the financial settlement made in 1876 broke down
was that the materials out of which to construct
any stable financial edifice were wanting. The
Finance Minister, Ismail Pasha Sadik, who was
exiled in November 1876, and who, shortly after-
wards, met with a tragic death,^ boasted that in
one year he had extracted £15,000,000 from
the people of Egypt. The revenue collected in
1875 is said to have amounted to £10,800,000.
The financial combination of November 18, 1876,
was based on the collection of a revenue amounting
to £10,500,000. There can be no doubt that this
estimate was excessive. Twenty years later, after
a long period of honest and careful administra-
tion, the Egyptian revenue was only about
£11,000,000.
* There can be no doubt that Ismail Paaha Sadik was murdered in a
boat whilst proceeding up the Nile.
CH. II THE GOSCHEN MISSION 27
In 1876, it was, indeed, impossible to arrive at
a true estimate of the revenue. The inquiries of
Messrs. Goschen and Joubert, Lord Vivian reported,
" soon disclosed false accounts, glaring discrepancies,
and evident suppressions of sources of revenue." It
was this which, more than anything else, hampered
Lord Goschen's proceedings. He saw that until
more light was thrown on the facts connected
with Egyptian finance, any arrangement which
could be made would have to be of a provisional
character.
I give one instance of the difficulties which at
that time had to be encountered in arrivhig at a
true estimate of the Egyptian revenue. Relying
on the only figures which were at the time avail-
able, Lord Goschen took the net railway receipts at
£900,000 a year. Some time afterwards, it was dis-
covered that, to the extent of £300,000 a year, these
receipts were fictitious. In the first place, a con-
siderable sum was paid every year for the movement
of troops, an item which, under a well-regulated
system of accounts, would have been shown as an
inter - departmental transaction. In the second
place, it was discovered that any of the Khedivial
family or the friends and boon companions of the
Khedive who wished to travel by rail, rarely went
by the ordinary trains. They frequently ordered
special trains, for which they paid nothing, merely
signing a document, termed a " ragaa," intimating
that the train had been ordered by the Khedive,
and that its cost was to be charged to him. Tiie
money was, of course, never paid to the Railway
Administration. Nevertheless, these book entries
were treated as real receipts in the figures furnished
to Lord Goschen.
It was obvious that, under such circumstances as
these, the first elementary requirement, which would
have to precede any attempt to reform the fiscal
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system, was to introduce order into the Accounts
Department. Tliis work was undertaken by Sir
Gerald Fitzgerald, who, by dint of untiring industry
and perseverance, overcame all the very formidable
obstacles which he had to encounter. The Egyptian
Accounts Department is now thoroughly well
organised. It would be difficult to exaggerate
the importance of this achievement. Of the many
Englishmen who, by steady and unostentatious work,
have rendered good service to the cause of Egyp-
tian reform, there is no one to whom greater merit
can be assigned than Sir Gerald Fitziierald. He
did not take any personal part in the reforms them-
selves, but he performed work which was indis-
pensable to others if the reforms were to be carried
out. The kind of work which Sir Gerald Fitzgerald
and his successors performed in Egypt does not
attract much public attention, but those who have
themselves filled responsible positions will appre-
ciate its value.
CHAPTER III
THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
November 1876-April 1878
Condition of Egypt—The law of the Moukabala—Petty taxes—The
Egyptian public service — The fiscal system— Floating debt
—
Efforts to pay interest on the funded debt—Famine—The coupon
of May 1, 1878—The Commissioners of the Debt—The Commis-
sion of Inquiry— The Khedive proposes a partial inquiry
The Commissioners decline to take part in it— The Khedive
accepts a full inquiry.
The state of Egypt at this time was deplorable.
Estates, representing about one-fifth of the arable
lands of the country, had passed into tlie hands of
the Khedive ; and these estates, instead of being
farmed out to the dispossessed proprietors, were
administered direct by the Khedive and cultivated
to a great extent by forced labour. No single
measure contributed more than this to render the
existing regime as intolerable to the people of
Egypt as it was rapidly becoming to the foreign
creditors.^
In 1872, the law of the Moukabala had been
passed. By this law, all landowners could redeem
one-half of the land-tax to which they were liable
by payment of six years' tax, eitlier in one sum or
'
'' It is certain, so many overthrown estates, so many votes for
troubles. Lucan noteth w ell the state of Rome before the Civil War :
Hinc usura vorax, rapidumque in tempore foenus,
Hinc concussa tides, et multis utile bellum."
Bacon's E.s.sai/x, " Of Seditious and Troubles."
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in instalments spread over a period of twelve years.
'* The operation of the law of the Moukabala,"
Mr. Cave said, "is perhaps the most striking
instance of the reckless manner in wliich the means
of the future have been sacrificed to meet the
pressing needs of the present."
This is quite true, but the explanation is also
very simple. There was never the least intention to
adhere to the engagements taken towards the land-
owners. When the proper time arrived, it was
intended to find means for re-imposing taxation
in some other form, and thus recoup the loss to
the Treasury incurred by the partial redemption of
the land-tax.
Besides the land - tax, which was the main
resource of the country, a number of petty taxes
of the most harassing nature were levied. I gave
Lord Vivian a list of thirty-seven of such taxes,
and I doubt if the list was complete.
The evil consequences, which would in any case
have resulted from a defective fiscal system, were
enhanced by the character of the agents through
whose instrumentality the taxes were collected.
It can be no matter for surprise that they were
corrupt and oppressive, and scarcely, indeed, a
matter for just blame; for the treatment, which
they received at the hands of the Government
whom they served, was such as to be almost pro-
hibitive of integrity in the performance of official
duties. The picture, which Mr. Cave gave of the
position held by the Egyptian officials at this time,
was certainly not overdrawn. " One of the causes,"
he said, " which operates most against the honesty
and efficiency of native officers is the precarious
tenure of office. From the Pasha downwards,
every office is a tenancy at will, and experience
shows that while dishonesty goes wholly or par-
tially unpunished, independence of thought and
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action, resolution to do one's duty and to resist
the peculation and neglect which pervade every
department, give rise to intrigues which, sooner
or later, bring about the downfall of honest officials;
consequently, those who begin with a desire to do
their duty give way before the obstructiveness
which paralyses every effort.^ The public servant
of Egypt, like the Roman Proconsul, too often
tries to make as much as he can out of his office
while it lasts ; and the scandal takes place of the
retirement, in a few years with a large fortune, of
a man whose salary is perhaps £40 a month, and
who has plundered the Treasury on the one hand,
and the peasant on the other."
In fact, the fiscal system of Egypt at this time
violated at every point and in a flagrant degree the
four well-known general principles laid down by
Adam Smith and adopted by subsequent econo-
mists,^ as those on which a sound fiscal policy
should be based. Glaring inequalities existed in
the incidence of taxation. The sums demanded
from the taxpayers were arbitrarily fixed and were
^ I can give a remarkable illustration, the facts of which are within
my personal knowledge, in support of Mr. Cave's statement. Shortly
after the Commission of the Debt was established in 1876, it was noticed
that the Custom-House receipts at Suez, which were applied to the service
of the debt, fell off in a most unaccountable manner ; also, that a new
local director had been appointed. Under the iJecree signed by the
Khedive on November 18, 1876, the whole of the Custom-House revenue
was to be paid direct to the Commissioners of the Debt. No other receipt
than that signed by one of the Commissioners was legally valid. The
suspicions of the Commissioners were aroused, lliey asked why the
director had been changed. They received evasive and very unsatis-
factory answers. They insisted, therefore, on the dismissed official being
produced, dead or alive. A somewhat acrimonious correspondence took
place, with the result that after a delay of several months the official in
question made his appearance at the office of the Commissioners of the
Debt. It then appeared that he had received an order from the Khedive
to pay the Suez Custom-House receipts direct to His Highness. He
demurred, on the very legitimate ground that he would thus be com-
mitting an illegal act. He was at once arrested and sent to one of the
most remote parts of the Soudan, whence he would certainly never hava
returned, had it not been that the Commissioners took up his case.
* Adam Smith, Wealth oj' Nations, bk. v. chap. ii.
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uncertain in amount. Tlie taxes were levied with-
out any reference to tlie time and manner in which
it was most convenient for the contributor to pay,
and the system of collection, so far from being
" contrived so as to keep out of the pockets of the
people as little as possible over and above what the
tax brings into tlie public treasury," was sucli as to
ensure results of a diametrically opposite descrip-
tion. Under such circumstances, financial policy,
instead of being used as a powerful engine of
political and social improvement, had become
merely a means for first extorting the maximum
amount of revenue from unwilling contributors,
and then spending tlie money on objects from
which the contributors themselves derived little
or no benefit.
A system such as that described above would at
any time have been oppressive. At the particular
moment of which this history treats, it weighed on
the people of Egypt with exceptional severity.
The interest on the funded debt, heavy as it
was, was not the only extraordinary charge which
the Khedive had to meet. Large sums of money
were due to contractors and others for goods
supplied to the Egyptian Government. In default
of payment, " orders h;id been given by all foreign
houses trading with Egypt to refuse to furnish the
Government with any supplies except for payment
in cash on delivery." The claims themselves were
*' being hawked about for sale at a depreciation of
50 per cent."
In August 1877, Lord Vivian warned the
Egyptian Government that the creditors "would
certainly fall back upon their indisputable right
to attack the Government before the Tribunals."
"The Government," he added, "will thus find
themselves confronted with a mass of legal
sentences against them, which they must either
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satisfy in full and at once, or it must inevitably
attract the serious attention of the Powers who
contributed to establish the Courts of the Reform."
But the Egyptian Government had no money
with which to settle the claims ; neither, in the
then exhausted state of their credit, could money be
borrowed. Lord Vivian prophesied correctly. The
creditors had recourse to the law-courts. Many of
them obtained judgments against the Government,
and the non-execution of the judgments led to the
interference of the Powers under whose auspices
the Mixed Courts had but recently been estab-
lished. Notably, the German Government ** con-
sidered that the Khedive was acting in a manner
which should not be allowed in refusing to pay
claims when required to do so by the Courts of
Law." The German Ambassador in London in-
formed Lord Derby that *' Prince Bismarck wished
for united action on the subject by all the Powers,
if only to avoid the possibility of separate action
on the part of some of them."
In the meanwhile, everything was being sacri-
ficed in the attempt to pay the interest and sinking
fund on the funded debt. A sum of £1,579,000 was,
in 1877, devoted to the extinction of debt. The
nominal capital paid off amounted to £3,110,000,
but, as both Lord Vivian and the Commissioners
of the Debt pointed out, the operation of the sink-
ing fund was of a delusive character, for a debt,
at least equal in amount to that which was ex-
tinguished, was being created by the non-payment
of the employes and the other creditors, whose
claims had not been funded. On January 6,
1877, Lord Vivian wrote: "The Government em-
ployes are many months in arrears of pay, so much
so that the cashiers of the Caisse are actually being
paid out of the private means of the Commissioners
(although their own salaries have not been paid),
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in order not to expose tliem to the temptation of
handling large sums of money whilst actually with-
out the means of subsistence."
While, on the one hand, the employes were
unpaid, on the other hand, the taxes were being
collected with merciless severity. Lord Vivian,
whose despatches throughout this period do credit
alike to his humanity and his foresight, felt keenly
on this subject. *'I hear," he wrote, "reports that
the peasantry are cruelly treated to extract the
taxes from them, the fact probably being, partly
that the taxes are being collected in advance, and
partly that, as the date of the coupon falls so soon
after the harvest, insufRcient time is given to the
peasantry to realise fair prices for their grain, and
that they are unwilling to make the ruinous sacri-
fice of forced sales." The Khedive, in conversation
with Lord Vivian, " admitted that, in order to pay
the coupon, the taxes were being collected for nine
months, and in some places for a year in advance."
In spite of the rigour used in collecting taxes,
the non-payment of the Goverimient employes, and
the neglect of the judgment creditors, it was with
the utmost difficulty that sufficient money could
be obtained to pay the interest on the funded debt.
During the year ending on July 15, 1877, the
revenue pledged to the service of the Unified Debt,
which had been estimated to yield £4,800,000,
only yielded £3,328,000.
It is well-nigh certain that the financial arrange-
ment made in 1876 would, in any case, have broken
down. As it was, an exceptionally bad Nile, the
Russo-Turkish War with its attendant expenditure,
and the depression of trade, hastened the crisis.
Bad as was the state of affairs in 1877, it was
worse in 1878, for the full effect of the low Nile
of 1877 was only felt in the following year. In
Upper Egypt there was a famine. Sir Alexander
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Baird, who had been a frequent visitor to Egypt
during the winter months, was asked by the
Government to assist in the rehef of the popula-
tion. In the report which he subsequently
addressed to the Minister of Finance, he said :
—
It is almost incredible the distances travelled by women
and children, begging from village to village. ... It is not
possible to state how many died from actual starvation, for
in no instance does the death -register show a death by
starvation, but I am satisfied that the excessive mortality
during the period of scarcity was caused by dysentery and
other diseases brought on by insufficient and unwholesome
food. The poor were in some instances reduced to such
extremities of hunger that they were driven to satisfy their
cravings with the refuse and garbage of the streets.
The nadir both of financial chaos and of popular
misery was reached in the summer and autumn of
1878. On May 1, 1878, a sum of about £2,000,000
was due for interest on the Unified Debt. On
March 31, only about £500,000 was in the hands
of the Commissioners of the Debt. The balance,
amounting to about £1,500,000, had, therefore, to
be collected in the space of one month.
The Commissioners of the Debt were of opinion
that it would have been better not to pay this
coupon. We should have preferred to allow the
financial collapse, which was manifestly inevitable,
to come at once as a preliminary to the establish-
ment of a better order of things. We were aware
that the money could not be paid without taking
the taxes in advance, a course to which we were
opposed as being oppressive to the peasantry, and
also contrary to the true interests ofthe bondholders.
Not only, therefore, did we abstain from putting any
pressure on the Khedive to pay, but we even dis-
cussed the desirability ofprotesting against payment.
Unfortunately, the French Government did not
share this view. French public opinion held that
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the Khedive could pay his debts if he chose to do
so, that the distress alleged to exist in Egypt was
fictitious, and that the arguments based on the
impoverishment of the country were fabricated in
order to throw dust in the eyes of the public and
to excite humanitarian sympathy where no sym-
pathy was deserved. An opinion was also enter-
tained by a large body of the French public that
the Khedive had hidden stores of wealth on which
he could draw if he thought fit to do so. Subse-
quent events showed that this story had no founda-
tion in fact. But there were at the time some
reasonable grounds for believing it to be true. On
December 8, 1876, Lord Vivian reported that "it
was impossible to account for the disposal of the
very large sums of money over which the Egyptian
Government have had control during the last year
;
£4,000,000 for the Suez Canal shares, £5,000,000
advance from the French, and nearly a year's
revenue have disappeared, while the payment of
the coupon of the Unified Debt has been deferred,
all the public employes are in arrears of pay, and
heavy debts remain unsettled." The same idea
was developed more fully in a petition presented
by the French colony of Alexandria to M.
Waddington, who was then Minister for Foreign
Affairs. What, they asked, had become of the
money which had been of late years poured into
Egypt? The Custom -House statistics showed
that a great part of it had remained in the
country.
Comment alors parler de la detresse du pays, et de
rimpuissance de payer ses charges ? Que le Gouvernement
explique ce qu'est devenu tout cet or ! II est done bien
evident que le Gouvernement Egyptien est inexcusable de
ne pas remplir les engagements qu'il a pris solennellement k
la face de TEurope, et c'est sur lui que retombe la lourde
responsabilite des ruines qu'il accumule en Egypte et qui
frappent pour la plus grande partie la colonic Europeenne.
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The cause of the bondholders was warmly
espoused by the French diplomatic representative
at Cairo, Baron des Michels, who turned a deaf ear
to all arguments based either on the necessities of
the Khedive or the misery of the Egyptian people.
The result was that, on April 16, 1878, the French
Government, through their Ambassador in London,
informed Lord Salisbury, who, on April 2, 1878,
succeeded Lord Derby at the Foreign OfRce, that
there was " every reason to believe that the Khedive
could pay the coupon, which falls due in May, if
he chose to do so." M. Waddington expressed a
hope that the British Government would join the
French Government in pressing for payment.
Lord Vivian was accordingly instructed to act in
concert with Baron des Michels on this subject.
The British Government thus became in a
certain degree responsible for the oppression which
necessarily accompanied the collection of the taxes.
JNIoreover, the step taken at this moment involved
a departure both from the local Egyptian policy,
which the British Government had hitherto
pursued, and also from their general policy in such
matters. As regards local policy, the British
had never espoused the cause of the bondholders
so warmly as the French Government. On the
contrary, a just consideration for the interests of
the Egyptian people had always tempered any
support given to the foreign creditors. As regards
general policy, it had for years been the tradition
of the London Foreign Office that British subjects,
who invested their money in a foreign country, must
do so at their own risk. They could not rely on
any energetic support in the enforcement of their
claims. There was evidently some special reason
for so brusque a departure from the principles
heretofore adopted. The reason is not far to seek.
The Berlin Congress was then about to sit to
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regulate the situation arising from the recent
Russo- Turkish war. Egyptian interests had to
give way to broader diplomatic considerations. It
was necessary to conciliate the French. The
French initiative was, therefore, followed.
Steps were taken to collect the money
necessary to pay the coupon. Two of the most
iron-fisted Pashas who could be found were sent
into the provinces. They were accompanied by a
staff of money-lenders who were prepared to buy
in advance the crops of the cultivators. Thus, the
low Nile having diminished the quantity of the
crop, the peasantry of Egypt were deprived of
such benefits as some of them, at all events, might
have derived from the higJi prices consequent on
the scarcity. "In some cases," Sir Alexander
Baird wrote, "perfectly authenticated, corn was
sold to the merchants for 50 piastres an ardeb,
which was delivered in one month's time when it
was worth 120 piastres an ardeb."
The money was, however, obtained. The last
instalment was paid to the Commissioners of the
Debt a few hours before the coupon fell due. The
great diversity of currency, and the fact that many
of the coins were strung together to be used as
ornaments, bore testimony to the pressure which
had been used in the collection of the taxes.
The only result of paying this coupon was that
the crisis was delayed for a short time. The
sufferings of the peo])le of Egypt were increased,
whilst the position of the foreign creditors, so far
from being improved, was rendered rather worse
than it was before.
Amidst this clash of conflicting interests, the
main question which presented itself was, what
could be done to place the finances of Egypt on a
sound footin^j. It was clear that the arran<]i;ements
made in 1870 would have to be modified, but, to
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what extent were they to be modified ? By what
procedure were the modifications to be introduced ?
What guarantees could be obtained that any new
arrangement would acquire a greater degree of
stability than those which had gone before ?
The discussion of these questions necessitates
some observations on the relations between the
Egyptian Government and the Commissioners of
the Debt, upon which the main interest of
Egyptian affairs centred at this moment.
The position of the Commissioners was one of
great difficulty. They were the representatives of
the bondholders. An obligation, therefore, rested
on them to support the just claims of the bond-
holders by every legitimate means in their power.
Apart, however, from the fact that it was
impossible for any one of ordinary humanity and
common sense to ignore the pitiable condition in
which the people of Egypt were then placed, it
was clear that the interests of the bondholders and
of the Egyptian taxpayers, if properly understood,
were far from being divergent. On the contrary,
they were in a great measure identical. Both were
interested in being relieved from a system of
government which was ruinous to the interests of
one class and in the highest degree oppressive to
the other. Would it not be possible to use the
bondholding interest as a lever to improve the
Egyptian administration, and thus both relieve
the lot of the peasantry and, at the same time,
afford some substantial guarantee to the foreign
creditors that whatever fresh financial obligations
were taken would be respected ? That was the
important question of the moment.
In view of the relatively large political and
financial interests of France and Great Britain
in Egypt, it was natural that tlie French and
British representatives should take the lead in the
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proceedings of the Commission of the Debt. I
was fortunate in being associated with a French
colleafjue who took a broad view of the situation.
M. de Blignieres was a French official, and the
tendencies of most French officials are somewhat
more bureaucratic than those of their counterparts
in England ; but he was a French official of the
best type, loyal, straightforward, intelligent, and
endowed with a high degree of moral courage. On
all essential points, we worked in complete harmony.
We were both determined that the petty inter-
national rivalries, which had been the bane of
Egypt, and which were skilfully used by Ismail
Pasha to avert the possibility of common action
on the part of France and England, should not
be allowed to separate us. That we succeeded in
sinking any minor differences of opinion in the
pursuit of a common object, was sufficiently proved
by the fact that each of us was at times blamed for
sacrificing the interests of his own country to tliat
of the other. In later days, when the relations
between France and England became unfortunately
embittered, I often looked back with regret to the
time when I was able to co-operate heartily with a
French colleague, such as M. de Blignieres, for
whom I entertained a sincere respect and a warm
personal friendship.^
The position of INI. de Blignieres was in some
respects more difficult than my own. I had not
been ap])ointed by the British Government, and
was, therefore, free to act according to the dictates
of my own conscience and to the best of my own
1 M. de Blif^nieres died iu 1900. He was a brilliant aud also very
voluble conversationalist. In 1879, I accompanied him on a visit to
Lord Salisbury, who was then residing at Dieppe. In 1887, Lord
Salisbury wrote to me : "The other day the gentleman who described
himself at my house at Dieppe as a ' pemonnage viuet'—M. de Blignieres
—called on me. He had not aciiuired any fresh claim to that designa-
tion. But he was very agreeable, and more friendly than I had been
led to expect."
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judgment. The tendencies and traditions of the
British Government, moreover, ran counter to any
endeavour to enforce the claims of the foreign
creditors at whatsoever cost to the population of
Egypt. The personal influence of Lord Vivian was
exerted on the side of justice and moderation. The
British bondholders were also, as a body, perfectly
reasonable. They naturally objected to any arbitral }
infringement of their legal rights, but there could be
little doubt that if a statement of facts and figures
could be put before them, the accuracy of which
could be guaranteed by their own trustees, there
would not be any insuperable difficulty in obtaining
their acquiescence to an equitable settlement of
all pending questions. Moreover, the influence of
the bondholders in England was limited. A
strong body of public opinion existed which was
hostile to their presumed interests, and which, in
its anxiety to do justice to the people of Egypt,
was inclined sometimes even to err on the side of
doing less than justice to the foreign creditors.
Those who represented this aspect of British public
opinion criticised, more frequently than not in a
hostile spirit, the action of the European officials
who were at that time employed in prominent
positions in Egypt. A good deal of this criticism
was based on an erroneous appreciation of the
facts of the case, but I never regarded it as really
hostile. On the contrary, I esteemed it an ad-
vantage to be able to strengthen my position in
case of need by an appeal to a body of general
opinion which, even when misled on points of
detail, was pursuing praiseworthy and very legiti-
mate objects.
M. de Blignieres, on the other hand, was
nominated by the French Government, ai d the
French Government were greatly under the in-
fluence of the bondliclding interest. The French
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bondliolders were inclined to be far less reasonable
than the English, neither did there apparently
exist any body of public opinion in France, which
could act as a check on any extreme views advanced
by the foreign creditors of Egypt.
Both M. de Blignieres and myself saw from an
early date that the financial arrangements of 1876
would have to be modified, but we also held that
an arbitrary reduction in the rate of interest would
be unjust to the bondholders and of doubtful
benefit to the taxpayers. Before we could ap-
prove of any fresh financial combination, it was
evident that more liffht would have to be thrown
on the situation. Under these circumstances, the
idea of holding a General Inquiry into the financial
condition of the country, which was originated
about this time, took root, and obtained some
support amongst the more moderate of those who
were interested in the solvency of the Egyptian
Government. "But," Lord Vivian reported, "the
bondholders ask that any inquiry into the financial
position should be impartial and exhaustive, leav-
ing nothing behind it uninvestigated in the shape
of debt, nor any pretext for further resettlement.
On these conditions, they are prepared to make
such a fair sacrifice of interest as may be found
absolutely necessary."
It would have been wise on the part of the
Khedive if, at this moment, he had on his own
initiative invited a full inquiry into the financial
situation of Egypt. But he was not disposed to
do so. He hoped to obtain an arbitrary reduction
in the rate of interest on the debt without any
inquiry. Eventually, the Commissioners of the
Debt took the initiative. In a letter addressed to
the Minister of Finance on January 9, 1878, they
dwelt on the gravity of the situation and suggested
an inquiry. The Khedive replied at length, declin-
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ing to institute a general inquiry into the financial
situation, but stating that he was willing to appoint
a Commission whose sole duty it would be to
ascertain the true amount of the Egyptian revenue.
The Commissioners of the Debt were invited to
take part in this inquiry.
A partial inquiry of this sort would have been
worse than useless. The Commissioners of the
Debt, therefore, addressed a further letter to the
Egyptian Government, in which they again urged
the necessity of a full inquiry, and declined to
take part in any inquiry of a partial nature.
No attention was paid to this remonstrance,
and, on January 27, 1878, a Khedivial Decree was
issued instituting a Commission of Inquiry into
the revenue only. A further Decree was to be
issued nominating the Commissioners.
The issue of this Decree caused an explosion of
European public opinion in Egypt, A meeting
was held at Alexandria at which the more extreme
of those who advocated the claims of the foreign
creditors expressed themselves in terms condemna-
tory of any inquiry, as they considered that the
Egyptian Government could meet all its engage-
ments. A petition was sent to the representatives
of the Powers, but it was couched in language so
insulting to the Egyptian Government that Lord
Vivian refused to notice it.
The Khedive did not, however, immediately
abandon the idea of instituting a partial inquiry.
The main difficulty was to find any qualified
persons to conduct it. General (then Colonel)
Gordon was at that time returning from the
Soudan. The idea occurred to the Khedive that
his services might be utilised. His high character,
the weight that his name carried with the British
public, and his known sympathy with the sufferings
of the Egyptian people, all pointed him out as
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a useful instrument ; whilst his inexperience in
financial questions would, it was thought, lead him
to accept the accuracy of any facts and figures
which were laid before him by the Egyptian
Government. T^ord Vivian pointed out that
" Colonel Gordon, with all his eminent qualities
and abilities, had no experience in finance." The
Khedive, however, held to his idea. General
Gordon was invited to conduct a financial inquiry,
and was at first inclined to accept the invitation.
M. de Lesseps was also asked to serve on the
proposed Commission, and intimated his willingness
to do so. The negotiation with General Gordon,
however, soon broke down, and he left Egypt.
^
It is unnecessary to describe in detail the
tedious negotiations which then ensued. The
British Government consistently supported "a full
and complete inquiry " into the financial situation
as the only possible solution of existing difficulties.
The German, Austrian, and Italian Governments
also supported the proposal. So also did the
French Government, although as it became daily
more and more clear that the result of any
impartial inquiry must be that the rate ot interest
on the debt would be reduced, their support was
rather lukewarm.
After long and wearisome discussions over the
scope of the inquiry and the persons to whom it
should be entrusted, the Khedive eventually yielded.
On March 15, I was able to write to Lord Goschen :
" At last T really think that, after five months of
incessant labour, the inquiry is settled." On
^ These proceeding's have formed the subject of much misrepre-
sentation. Tlie account of tliein iriven in Sir William Butler's Charles
George Gordon (pp. 138-139) is incorrect llie sole reason why the
negotiation broke down was that it was evident to every one concerned,
including General Gordon himself, that lie was not fitted to conduct
any financial inquiry. He wrote at the ti ne that he felt sure that he
"was only to be a figurehead."
—
Colonel Gordon in Central Africa,
p. 310.
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April 4, 1878, a Khedivial Decree was issued
appointing a Commission with the most extended
powers of inquiry. M. Ferdinand de I^esseps lent
the weight of his name to the Commission. He
was appointed President, but did not take any
active part in the proceedings, and left Egypt on
May 9. Sir Rivers Wilson and Riaz Pasha were
named Vice-Presidents. The four Commissioners
of the Debt were appointed members. A capable
Frenchman, M. Liron d'AiroUes, was chosen to act
as Secretary.
Some opposition had been offered, especially by
the French, to the nomination of any Egyptian to
be a member of the Commission. It was feared,
with some reason, that no Egyptian would be
sufficiently independent to express views which
might be displeasing to the Khedive. These fears
proved groundless. At a time when any show of
independent opinion on the part of an Egyptian
was accompanied with a good deal of personal risk,
Riaz Pasha displayed a high degree of moral
courage. His presence on the Commission was of
material help to his colleagues, whose confidence
he fully deserved and obtained.
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THE NUBAR-WILSON MINISTRY
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Difficulty of the task assigned to the Commission of Inquiry—Cherif
Pasha declines to appear as a witness—Defects in the system of
administration—The floating debt
—
The Rouznanieh Loan—Loans
from the W'akf and Beit-el-Mal Administrations— Ultimate reforms
proposed by the Commissioners—Immediate reforms necessary
—
Enforcement of Ministerial responsibility—The Khedive's Civil
List— Cession to the State of the Khedivial properties— The
Khedive accepts the proposals of the Commissioners—Nubar Pasha
forms a Ministry—Sir Ki\ ers A\'^ilson and M. de Blignieres named
Ministers— Loan authorised on the security of the Khedivial
estates.
The Egyptian Verres^ was at last, therefore,
obliged to render an account of his stewardship to
a body of men who were determined to arrive at
the truth. The Commissioners, however, soon
found that, in the confusion which then existed,
the mere discovery of the accurate facts of the
situation was a task which presented no inconsider-
able difficulties, whilst the abuses which had
grown up in the Egyptian administrative system
were so general and so deep-rooted as to defy the
application of any remedy which would be effectual
^ There is certainly a somewhat close analogy between Verres and
Ismail Pasha ; e.g. " Hoc piaetore Siculi neque suas leges, neque nostra
senatuscousulta, neque com munia jura tenuerunt . . . Nulla res . . .
nisi ad nutum istius judicata est ; nulla res tarn patria cujusquam atqr.e
avita fuit quae non ab eo imperio istius abjudicaretur. Innumerabiles
pecuniae ex aratorum bonis novo nefarioque instituto coactae," etc. —
Cicero, In C. Verrcm, Actio I'rima, iv. et v.
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and at the same time speedy. We had to deal not
with a patient suffering from a single specific
malady, but with one whose constitution was
shattered and whose every organ was diseased.
"II s'agit, en effet," we said, "de creer tout
un systeme fiscal, et cela avec un personnel tr^s
restreint ; a present presque rien n'existe de ce
qui doit exister."
At the outset of the inquiry, a preliminary diffi-
culty of a somewhat serious nature occurred. Cherif
Pasha was at that time, next to the Khedive, the
leading man in Egypt. No one thought that he
was in any degree responsible for the confusion
which then existed, but, inasmuch as he was
Minister of Justice, it was to him that the Com-
missioners were obliged to turn for information as
to the working of the judicial system in so far as^
fiscal matters were concerned. Under the Decree
instituting the Commission, all Egyptian officials
were bound to furnish such information as might
be demanded of them. Cherif Pasha, on receiving
a summons to attend before the Commission,
offered to answer questions in writing, but his
proud nature resented — and not unnaturally
resented—the idea of appearing in person before
the Commissioners. On the other hand, had the
latter yielded, all chance of extracting the truth
from other witnesses would have been shipwrecked
at the outset of the inquiry. The Commissioners,
therefore, insisted on Cherif Pasha appearing in
person. Under these circumstances, Cherif Pasha
could only yield or resign. He chose the latter
course.
The first step taken by the Commissioners was
to provide for the payment of the arrears due to
the Government employes and pensioners. They
then set to work to examine into the system of
administration of the country, more especially
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into the fiscal system. It is unnecessary to give
the results of their inquiries at any length. It was
found that public rumour had not exaggerated the
nature of the prevailing abuses. Certain laws and
regulations existed on paper, but no one ever
thought of obeying them. The principal officials
concerned were, indeed, often ignorant of their
existence. New taxes were levied, old taxes were
increased, and changes introduced without any
formal authority. The vilkge Sheikh executed the
orders of the JNIoudir, the latter those of the In-
spector-General, who, again, acted under " superior
order." This "superior order," in fact, constituted
the law. The officials obeyed it, even though it
were only communicated verbally ; and no tax-
payer ever dreamt of challenging it or of protesting
against it. The Inspector-General of Upper Egypt,
on being asked to whom the taxpayer could address
himself if he had any complaint to make, answered,
with a naivete arising without doubt from long-
familiarity with a system which he considered both
just and natural, " Pour les impots, le fellah ne pent
se plaindre ; il salt qu'on agit par 'ordre superieur.'
C'est le Gouvernement lui-meme qui les reclame
;
a qui voulez-vous qu'il se plaigne?"^ The In-
spector-General unconsciously indicated the main
difficulty in the path of the Egyptian reformer.
On the one hand, the people had from time
immemorial been accustomed to yield implicit
obedience to tlie Government. On the other hand,
inasmuch as the Government were themselves the
chief cause of all the mischief in the country, the
* This answer is alive with the spirit of the ancient Oriental despot-
isms. 'VhiiA \^uck\e (Histon/ of Ciri/i.sadon, vol. i. p. 80) records that
the Institutes of Menu laid down that any native of India helonging to
the Sudra caste must always remain a slave for ever, altliough his master
granted him his freedom. " For," said the lawgiver, " of a state whic'u
is natural to him, by whom can he be divested.'*" Paterson (The
Nemesis of Nations
,
p. 60) also alludes to the same point.
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direction reform had necessarily to take was that of
putting some restraint on the exercise of arbitrary
power. How were abuses to be reformed without
shaking the props which had so far held Egyptian
sjciety together, and on which the whole edifice
rested ? That was a question which, at a later
period, gave cause for much anxiety.
Another characteristic answer was given by a
high Egyptian official who was examined before
the Commission. A professional tax was at that
time levied in Egypt. Nothing, in fact, can be
fairer than that, in an agricultural country such as
Egypt, the non -agricultural classes should bear
their share of taxation. It was, however, perhaps
going rather far to levy the tax on the humblest
of the artisan class. But the Government went
much farther. Agricultural labourers paid the tax
;
in fact, it had become a poll-tax, which was paid
by all the poorer classes, whether or not they exer-
cised anything w^hich could be called a profession.
The witness in question was asked whether he did
not think it rather hard that a man who exercised
no profession should be called upon to pay a pro-
fessional tax. He expressed great and, without
doubt, genuine astonishment. Was it, he said, the
fault of the Government that the man did not
exercise any profession ? He could engage in any
profession he chose. The Government did not
prevent him from doing so. But, of course, if he
chose not to engage in any profession, he must
none the less pay the tax ; otherwise an injustice
would be done to those who were engaged in pro-
fessions ! Of the many specious arguments which
have been from time to time advanced in Egypt
to make the worse appear the better cause, this is
certainly one of the most remarkable.
The Commissioners did not confine their re-
searches to the methods adopted for the collection
voi>. I E
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of the revenue. The corvee, they found, was a
*' fruitful source of extortion and injustice." It was
ascertained, notwithstanding positive official asser-
tions to the contrary, that the Khedive's private
estates were cultivated by means of forced labour.
The recruitment for the army was managed in an
irregular and very cruel manner.^ It often happened
that a recruit first paid a heavy sum to obtain exemp-
tion from military service, and was after all obliged
to serve without the money being refunded to him.
In the vital question of the distribution of water
for purposes of irrigation, the interests of the
poorer cultivators were sacrificed to those of the
rich proprietors. No courts of justice, worthy of
the name, existed.
Herr von Kremer and myself were delegated by
our colleagues to inquire into the outstanding claims
against the Egyptian Government. JNlany a weary
hour did we pass in the broiling heat of an Egyptian
summer afternoon in endeavouring to unravel the
tangled meshes of some of the most astounding
financial operations in which any Government in
the world has ever been engaged. The waste had
been fearful. The head of the Ordnance Depart-
ment, if he heard that some new description of
* One of the Inspectors of the Antiquities Department (Mr. Howard
Carter), in the course of some excavations made at Dendera in the
month of August 1904, came across tlie corpse of a man who had
been tortured and put to death by Daoud Pasha, a former notorious
Moudir of the Province^ for trying to evade conscription for the
army. Mr. Carter reported : " The corpse presented a ghastly
sight ; the liead was turned towards the left, the chin resting on the
shoulder, the features distorted in agony, and the tongue between the
teeth. The body was in a contorted position, with the legs bent and
widely open. The hands were held at the wrists in rough wooden
.stocks, made apparently out of two rowlocks from a native boat, fixed
together, extremely tight, by means of two large iron native nails,
wliich pierced the wrists, and were clamped below. Tied round the
arms, high up near the arm-pits, was a lialter, which had evidently
been used to drag the man along, either dead or alive, the back show-
ing distinct signs of laceration. It was even possible to detect that the
hands had l)een much swollen from the pressure of the stocks."
—
Egypt,
No. 1 of 190o, p. 104.
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cannon had been invented, would order, not one as an
experiment, but a couple of dozen, on the ground, as
was explained to us, that Egypt " could not remain
behind other nations in miUtary matters." Names
familiar throughout Europe during the Napoleonic
era turned up as recipients of the Khedivial largesse.
The accounts also showed that the eulogies poured
at one time on Ismail Pasha by a portion of the
European press were not altogether due to dis-
interested motives. Money was due to contractors
and tradesmen of all sorts. An Egyptian princess
had run up an account of £150,000 with a French
dressmaker. Large sums had been spent at Con-
stantinople, as to which it was stated " on n'a pas
pu rendre compte." One financial operation was of
so complicated a nature that it almost defied the
ingenuity of man to get to the bottom of it. It
appeared, however, that the Khedive had been
engaged with his late Finance Minister in an
operation on the Stock Exchange, the basis of
which was that he was to " bear " his own stock.
In some cases, extravagant sums had been paid
for work done or for goods furnished. Thus, the
harbour works at Alexandria cost over £2,500,000.
According to a trustworthy estimate, they should
have cost about £1,400,000. In this case, how-
ever, the work was one of real utility, and it was
well executed, although at a high price. In a
number of other cases, large sums were owing
without the Egyptian Government having any-
thing to show for their money. Interest at
exorbitant rates, bonuses on the renewal of bills,
differences between the real and nominal value of
securities, and other financial juggleries, consti-
tuted almost the whole of the claim.
There was one series of operations, termed
" operations d'extourne," which are worth describ-
ing in some detail. The operation was after this
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fashion. The Egyptian Government, being in
want of ready money, sold to some Levantine firm
a quantity of grain wliich they did not possess, and
vvhicli, for the most part, they were never Hkely
to possess. The purchase money was paid at
once ; the grain had to be dehvered to the pur-
chasers a few months later. When the time for
its delivery arrived, a certain amount was in some
cases delivered, as it was then the practice of the
Egyptian Government to collect a portion of the
taxes in kind. The remainder was bought back
by the Government at a price of 25 per cent
above that which had been paid by the original
purchasers. In other cases, the Government
never delivered any grain, neither was any money
repaid at the time. The Government, however,
still went through the form of repurchase, and the
original purchasers received Treasury bills, bear-
ing interest at the rate of 18 or 20 per cent, not
for the amount which they had in the first instance
advanced, but for the far larger sum for which the
Government eventually effected the nominal re-
purchase of the grain. It is impossible to say
what rate of interest the Egyptian Government
really paid in the end for money advanced under
this system. It must have been something
enormous.
Instances might, in fact, be multiplied to show
the ruinous nature of the financial operations to
which the Government were at that time reduced
in order to obtain money. In one case, which
may be cited by way of example, the Govern-
ment, in part payment of a debt due to a local
bank, handed over £230,000 worth of Unified
Stoak at a price of 31 1 ; in other words, in order
to pay £72,000, the Government saddled the
country permanently with a debt of £230,000,
bearhig interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum.
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We also found, in the course of our researches,
that in 1874 a forced loan, entitled the "Empruiit
Rouznameh," had been raised in the provinces.
Subscriptions had been invited for a loan of
£5,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 9 per
cent. About £1,800,000 was actually paid into tlie
Treasury. We obtained from some of the villages
a list of the subscribers to the loan ; each list was
accompanied by a declaration signed by tlie Notables
of the village stating that the subscriptions were
"perfectly voluntary." They were, of course, in
no sense voluntary. No bonds were ever delivered
to the subscribers and, up to the date of our in-
quiry, one instalment of interest only had been
paid to a few favoured individuals.
We further discovered that the Government
had laid their hands upon the money belonging to
the Wakfs, that is to say, the Department which
deals with Mohammedan religious endowments.
There was also at that time in Egypt an institu-
tion termed the Beit-el-Mal,^ which administered
the estates of orphans and minors. The duty of
the director of this establishment was to invest the
money of which he was trustee in the manner best
suited to the interests of the cestuis-que trust.
" En vertu d'ordre superieur," the Director-General
lent tlie money to the Government at 10 per
cent interest, but he was never repaid the capital,
neither did he receive any interest. The Director-
General, on being asked whether the Minister of
Finance gave him any security for the trust money
which he lent to the Government, replied that,
inasmuch as the Khedive had given an order, no
security was necessary. " La garantie, c'est Tordre
du Khedive." "Dans le cours de nos recherches,"
we said, " nous avons ete frappes de I'usage pres-
qu'universel qui semble regner chez les fonction-
» Ut. "The House of Property."
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naires du Gouvernement Egyptien, et qui consiste
dans I'affectation des fonds particuliers qui passent
par leurs mains aux besoins du service gouverne-
mental. Las faits que nous avons racontes a
propos de Tadrninistration du Wakf, du Beit-el-
Mal, de la Caisse des Orphelius, et des Ecoles
Nationales, peuvent servir d'exemple du syst^me.
Nous pourrions en citer d'autres."
Besides the sums due to bankers and contractors,
we found that there were numerous claims from
such humble individuals as camel-drivers, barbers,
donkey-boys, etc., all of which had to be included
in the floating debt.
It is a pity that these claims could not have
been submitted to a court of arbitration with full
powers to deal with them. The result would
probably have been that a few would have been
admitted in full ; others would have been re-
duced in various proportions, some very largely
;
whilst some would perhaps have been rejected
altogether. Unfortunately, the Commissioners had
no such powers. We could only decide what
claims were admissible from a strictly legal point
of view, leaving any doubtful cases to be decided
by the law-courts. When the list came to be
made out, it was found that the outstanding claims
amounted to £0,276,000. The deficit for 1878 was
estimated at £2,587,000,^ and that of 1879 at
£381,000. In all, therefore, a new floating debt,
amounting to £9,244,000, had accrued, wliich in
one form or another had to be added to the
funded debt of the country.
It was easy to frame a crushing indictment
rtgainst the system of government under which
Egypt had of late years been administered. It
was more difficult to indicate what measures could
1 Tliis was an under-estimate. The actual deficit amounted to
£3,440,000.
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be taken to ensure any speedy improvement in the
system. The Commissioners, however, pointed out
the general directions which reforms should take.
No tax should be levied save in virtue of a law which
should be officially published. The collection of taxes
should be really, as well as nominally, under the
JNIinister of Finance. The Accounts Department
should be reformed, and a system of annual budgets
adopted. A Reserve Fund should be instituted to
provide for any extraordinary expenses incurred
whenever the Nile was exceptionally high or low.
The taxes should no longer be taken in advance.
A judicial system should be organised which would
protect the people against an arbitrary abuse of
authority. A number of small and vexatious taxes
should be suppressed. A cadastral survey should
be made. Reforms should be introduced into the
methods of collecting the salt and tobacco duties.
Proper regulations should be made for the distribu-
tion of water and the execution of public works.
Forced labour should only be employed on public
works of acknowledged utility. The terms of
military service should be defined and limited, whilst
at the same time some equitable system should
be adopted for obtaining recruits for the army.
These proposed reforms were excellent in their
way. But they all required time to inaugurate
;
eapable administrators to give effect to them ; ex-
perience to show in what particular form portions
of the European system of government could, with
advantage, be transplanted to an Eastern country
and above all, a gradual change in the habits of
thought, both of the Egyptian officials and of the
people themselves, which would enable them in
some degree to assimilate a system of administra-
tion, based on principles which, since the days of
the Pharaohs, had been unfamiliar to the people
of Egypt.
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In the meamvlnle, the pressing questions were.
What could be done at once to enable the machine
of the State to work, however inefficiently ? What
was to be the first step towards the inauguration
of an improved system of government ? How
were the claims which had on all sides surged up
against the Egyptian Treasury to be met ?
There was but little difficulty in stating the
main defect of the existing system, or in indicating
in general terms the nature of the remedy which
ought to be applied. " On ne saurait meconnaitre,"
the Commissioners said, "que le Chef de I'Etat
dispose d'une autorite sans limites." Manifestly,
that was the main blot. The celebrated maxim
attributed to Louis XIV. has never been more
thoroughly carried out in practice than in Egypt
under the reign of Ismail Paslia. He, in his own
person, was the State. He disposed of the lives
and properties of all his subjects. He constituted
the sole and final court of appeal in all affairs,
great or small. He administered in person every
Department of the State. His will was law. His
subordinates obeyed his every word impHcitly.
Ancient tradition and personal interest alike for-
bade an Egyptian official to question the wisdom
of a decision emanating from a ruler, wlio could at
pleasure dispose of the life and make or mar the
fortune of any one of his subjects. All inde-
pendence of thought and action was crushed out.
Moreover, Ismail Pasha did more than rule. He
afforded in his own person a striking example of
what may result from concentrating in the hands of
the ruler of the State functions which may more
advantageously be left to private enterprise. He
was the largest landed proprietor in Egypt. He
was the only sugar manufacturer. He was a large
shipowner. In fact, he was omnipresent. The
task whicli lie bad undertaken would have taxed
CH. IV NUBAR-WILSON MINISTRY 57
administrative abilities of the highest order. Ismail
Pasha was a man of some natural ability, but he
possessed neither the knowledge, nor the experience,
nor the power of application necessary to govern
successfully on his own principles.^
The result was that a state of affairs was pro-
duced such as that described in the report of the
Commissioners. At the time they wrote, the
whole machine of government was in danger of
collapsing. It was useless to elaborate any minor
reforms on paper, until steps had been taken to
remedy the main defect of the system. It was
clearly necessary to place some check on the
arbitrary power of the Khedive. The principle
of ministerial responsibility had to be enforced.
Another fundamental reform was also necessary
before the foundations of an improved system of
administration could be laid. So long as the
revenues of the country remained at the disposal
of a despotic and spendthrift ruler, no trustworthy
forecast could be made of the liabilities of the
State, and no reliance could be felt that revenues,
which were intended by the Finance Minister to
defray certain expenses, might not suddenly escape
his grasp and be devoted to some wholly different
object. Neglect to distinguish between the public
revenues of the State and the private income of the
Sovereign is a rock on which the Governments of
^ Compare Taine, Ancien Regime, p. 101. Speakiug of the duties
imposed on the King, he says : " En efFet, par sa complication, son
irregularite, et sa grandeur, la machine echappe a ses prises. Uu
Frederic II., leve a quatre heures du matin, un Napoleon qui dicte
une partie de la nuit dans sou bain et travaille dix-huit heures par jour,
y suffiraient a peine. Un tel re'gime ne va point sans une attention
toujours tendue, saus une euergie infatigable, sans un discernement
iufaillible, sans une seve'rite' niilitaire, sans un genie superieur ; a ces
conditions seulement on pent clianger vingt-cinq millions d'hommes en
automates, et substituer sa volonte partout lucide, partout coherente,
partout presente, a leurs volontes que Ton abolit."
What Louis XVI. was expected to do on a large scale in Fraiice,
Ismail Pasha attempted to do on a small scale iu Egypt. He naturally
failed.
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other countries have foundered before the days of
Ismail Pasha. Such a system must, in fact, lead to
confusion in any country. Under a primitive and
semi-barbarous Government, however, it may con-
tinue for a long while without producing a collapse
of the whole machinery of the State. Unless
resort be had to credit, a certain limit is of
necessity imposed on the harm which can be
inflicted by the most capricious despot. He can-
not spend more money than he can obtain, and
if he is unable to obtain more than the annual
revenue which his country yields, with })erhaps
a certain limited amount taken in advance, the
harm which can be done is not irremediable.
Agriculture is the principal and, indeed, almost
the only resource of most Asiatic States. Neither
the devastation caused by war nor the evils result-
inoj from the most gross forms of mis<>overnment
can altogether ruin the agriculture of any country.^
The vis medicatrix naturae soon repairs the harm
which has been done, and leaves a fair field open
for the future labours of some more intelligent
ruler. But the maximum amount of harm is
probably done when an Oriental ruler is for the
first time brought in contact with the European
system of credit. He then finds that he can
obtain large sums of money with the utmost
apparent facility. His personal wishes can thus be
easily gratified. He is dazzled by the ingenious
and often fallacious schemes for developing his
country which European adventurers will not fail
to lay before him in the most attractive light. He
is too wanting in foresight to appreciate the nature
of the future difficulties which he is creating for
himself. The temptation to avail himself to the
^ See Mill's well-known remarks as to why agricultural countries
recover so quickly from the effects of war {Political Economy, vol. i.
p. 94).
CH. IV NUBAR-WILSON MINISTRY 59
full of the benefits, which a reckless use of credit
seems to offer to him, are too strong to be resisted.
He will rush into the gulf which lies open before
him, and inflict an injury on his country from which
not only his contemporaries but future generations
will suffer. This is what Ismail Pasha did. During
the early years of his rule, Egypt must have been
an earthly paradise for all who had money to lend
at usurious rates of interest, or third-rate goods of
which they wished to dispose at first-rate prices. I
was not acquainted with Egyptian affairs in those
halcyon days. I only arrived in Egypt at the
moment when the second and inevitable stage on
the road to ruin had been reached, and when it
was no longer a question of spending money, but
of repaying the money already borrowed and
spent. Manifestly, the first step to avert further
disaster was to prevent more wanton expenditure
being incurred, and to obviate fresh abuses accruing
from a system which had already inflicted such
terrible injury on both the present and future
generations of Egyptians. Egypt, it would appear,
was to be civilised on a European model. So far,
it had assimilated but too often those portions of
the European system which were least suitable to
an Oriental community, and least worthy of being
copied.^ It was now necessary that at least one
cardinal principle of sound European administration
should be enforced. The Khedive must accept a
Civil List.^ It should be fixed at a liberal rate,
* Mr. Stanley Lane-Poole says with truth, " The Eastern mind has
an unequalled aptitude for*assimilating the bad and rejecting the good
in any system it meets."
—
Studies in a Mosque, p. 106.
2 The acceptance of a Civil List by tlie Ruler of a misgoverned
Oriental State is the first preliminary condition which must precede
all other reforms. It would be difficult to insist too strongly on this
point. In this connection, I may mention that Sir Edward Malet
{Shifting Scenes, p. 95) states that, when he was in charge of the Hritish
Embassy at Constantinople in 1879, the Sultan liad some idea of
appointing an Englislnnan to be his Minister of Finance. Sir Edward
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such as would harmonise with the pomp and hixury
with which custom has surrounded Oriental rulers
;
but, when once fixed, it should be unalterable.
The residue of the State revenues must for the
future be applied by responsible ministers to objects
in which the State, as distinguished from the ruler,
possessed an evident interest.
As a necessary consequence of the adoption of
this system, the estates which had accumulated in
the hands of the Khedive had to be handed over
to the State. It was an abuse of words to call
them private property. They had been bought
with public money. It was impossible that any
one individual could administer them efficiently.
By ceding them, an asset would be obtained to
satisfy the outstanding claims of creditors, whilst
by the adoption of a system under which the
estates could be gradually sold or farmed, great
benefit would ultimately accrue to the country.
The Khedive and his family possessed 916,000
acres of land in Egypt. Of these, 485,000 acres
were already mortgaged to the Daira creditors.
The Khedive, anticipating the demand which was
to be made on him, took the initiative during the
course of the inquiry, and offered to cede to the
State 289,000 acres of the 431,000 which remained
to him. The estimated revenue of the lands
which he proposed to cede amounted to £167,000
Malet communicated with me. He states, quite accurately, that I
sent ''a conditional acceptance, which enabled him to go so far as to
submit my name to the ISultan." 1 may now add that the principal of
my conditions was that the Sultan should accept a Civil List. I did
not for one moment think that this condition would be accepted. My
anticipations were realised. 1 never heard anything more of tlie matter.
Scarcely less important than the acceptance of a Civil List is the
withdrawal of the Crown Domains from the personal administration
of a despotic ruler. No one with any knowledge of the government
of backward States could have imagined that the system adopted by
King Leopold in connection with the administration of the Congo,
would succeed. All the world now knows the results which that system
has produced.
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a year. That of the 142,000 acres which he pro-
posed to retain amounted to £224,000 a year.
The best lands would therefore, under this arrange-
ment, have remained in the hands of the Khedivial
family.
The Commissioners were not satisfied with this
proposal. They demanded the cession of the whole
of the property, rural as well as urban, belonging
to the Khedivial family, of which the estimated net
revenue was about £423,000 a year.
Such, therefore, were the conclusions to which
four months of laborious inquiry had led. The con-
fusion existing in the State accounts was so great,
and the system of taxation so irregular, that it
was as yet impossible to estimate accurately the
resources of Egypt. Neither, indeed, could any
general financial arrangement be proposed with
advantage until the preliminary questions of prin-
ciple, to which allusion is made above, were satis-
factorily settled. These were, first, the enforce-
ment of the principle of ministerial responsibility
;
and secondly, the acceptance by the Khedive of a
fixed Civil List in lieu of the revenues derived
from the properties which, it was demanded, should
be yielded to the State.
The Commissioners sent in their report early
in August. The Khedive was in doubt as to
the line of conduct he should adopt. He was
pressed by Nubar Pasha to accept the conclusions
of the Commission. After a sliort period of
hesitation, the Khedive yielded. In a speech
addressed to Sir Rivers Wilson on August 23,
he expressed himself in the following terms
:
** Quant aux conclusions auxquelles vous etes
arrive, je les accepte ; c est tout naturel que je
le fasse ; c'est moi qui ai desire ce travail pour le
bien de mon pays. II s'agit actuellement pour moi
d'appliquer ces conclusions. Je suis resolu de la
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faire s^rieusement, soyez-en convain^u. INIoti pays
n'est ])lus en Afrique ; nous faisons partie de
1 Europe actuellement. II est done naturel pour
nous dabandonner les errements anciens pour
adopter un systeme nouveau adapte a notre etat
social. Je crois que dans un avenir pen eloign^
vous verrez des changements considerables. lis
seront amenes plus facilement qu'on ne le croit.
Ce n'est au fond qu'une simple question de legalite,
de respect a la loi. II faut surtout ne pas se payer
de mots, et pour moi je suis decide a chercher la
rdalit^ des choses. Pour commencer et pour
montrer a quel point je suis decide, j'ai charge
Nubar Pacha de me former un Ministere. Cette
innovation pent paraitre de pen d'importance
;
mais de cette innovation, serieusement con^ue,
vous verrez sortir I'independance ministdrielle, et
ce n'est pas pen ; car cette innovation est le point
de depart d'un changement de systeme, et, d'apres
moi, la meilleure assurance que je puisse donner du
serieux de mes intentions relativement a I'applica-
tion de vos conclusions." ^
A few days later (August 28), the Khedive
addressed a letter to Nubar Pasha authorising him
to form a Ministry. In this letter, the principle of
Ministerial responsibility was reaffirmed. "Dor^-
navant," the Khedive said, "je veux gouverner
avec et par mon Conseil des JNIinistres. . . . Les
membres du Conseil des Ministres devront etre
tons solidaires les uns des autres ; ce point est
essentiel." The voice of the majority was to
decide upon any question brought before the
Council. The chief officials of the State were to
be named by the Khedive acting on the advice of
his Council of Ministers.
Nubar Pasha undertook the direction of the
* This speech had, of course, been prepared by Nubar Pasha for
the Khedive.
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Departments of Foreign Affairs and of Justice.
Riaz Pasha was named Minister of the Interior.
It was, at the same time, decided to introduce
an important change into the form in which Euro-
pean agency should be employed in the direction
of Egyptian affairs. Only very limited executive
functions had been vested in the two Controllers.
It was now decided to appoint European INIinisters.
Thus, the European element was brought into direct
contact with the population of the country, instead
of acting, as heretofore, through the agency of
Egyptian Ministers. Sir Rivers Wilson was named
Minister of Finance, and M. de Blignieres Minister
of Public Works.
On October 29, a Khedivial Decree was issued
ceding to the State most of the properties which
had heretofore belonged to the Khedivial family,
and authorising a loan of £8,500,000 to be raised on
the security of those properties. They were to be
administered by a Commission composed of an
Egyptian, an Englishman, and a Frenchman. Tiie
two latter were to be selected by the British and
French Governments respectively.
The negotiations which were undertaken with
Messrs. Rothschild with a view to tlie issue of tlie
new loan, delayed the arrival of Sir Rivers Wilson
and M. de Blignieres in Egypt. It was not till
towards the close of November 1878 that they
took up their duties.
CHAPTER V
THE FALL OF NUBAR PASHA
November 1878-February 1879
Difficult position of the new Ministry—Support of the British and
French Governments—The Khedive declines all responsibility—
Convocation of the Chamber of Notables—The principle of
Ministerial responsibility—Contest between the Khedive and
Nubar Pasha—The Khedive intrigues against the Ministry
—
Mutiny of the officers—It is quelled by the Khedive—Nubar
Pasha resigns—Immediate consequences—Remote consequences
State of discipline of the army—The Khedive's responsibility for
the mutiny.
The new Ministers had undertaken a heavy task.
They had to deal not only with difficulties arising
from a long course of niisgovernment, but also
with those due to the special circumstances of the
moment. These latter were of a serious nature.
The country was staggering under a load of debt
which would, under normal circumstances, have
taxed its resources to the utmost. Unfortvmately,
at this particular moment its resources fell below
the normal level. The usual Nile flood had failed,
and the failure produced the maximum amount
of evil consequences, for the system of irrigation
was conducted on unscientific principles; neither,
although a contingency of this sort was of period-
ical recurrence, had any preparations been made
to meet it. Moreover, the country had been
exhausted by the endeavours made to pay the
interest on the debt in the previous spring.
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Further heavy payments were about to fall due.
On October 15, 1878, the interest on the Preference
Stock, amounting to £443,000, and on November 1,
the interest of the Unified Debt, amounting to
nearly £2,000,000, had to be paid. To meet these
engagements there was, at the end of August, only
£442,000 in the hands of the Commissioners of
the Debt. The revenue of the first eight months
of the year fell short of the receipts during the
corresponding period of 1877 by £1,143,000.
The sinking fund of the Unified Debt was, with
the consent of the Commissioners of the Debt,
temporarily suspended. The relief afforded by
this measure was, however, but slight. A sum
of £1,260,000 had to be taken from the proceeds
of the loan recently negotiated with Messrs.
Rothschild in order to pay the interest on the
Unified Debt. No sooner had the November
coupon been paid, than attention w^as attracted
to the difficulties of meeting the engagements
falling due in the following spring. In fact, at
this time the Egyptian Government lived from
coupon to coupon. Large sums on account of
land revenue are generally collected in Egypt
during the months of November and December
;
yet by the end of the year, only £302,000 was in
hand to meet a payment of nearly £2,000,000 fall-
ing due on May 1, 1879. To meet the coupon
on the Preference Stock due on April 15, 1879,
and amounting to £443,000, only £117,000 was
received from the Railway Administration duiing
the last two and a half months of 1878, although
this period embraced the season which was usually
the most productive of revenue. AA^ell might
Lord Vivian write : " These gloomy returns speak
for themselves ; they show that the financial posi-
tion of the country is as bad as it can well be."
From one point of view, however, the new
VOL. I F
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Ministry began work under auspices which augured
well for its success. It was warmly supported
by both the British and French Governments.
Nevertheless, two points were, from the first,
clear. The first was that the new administra-
tion could not hope to work successfully unless
it were cordially supported by the Khedive. The
second was that the Khedive had reluctantly
assented to the new order of things, and was
inclined to afford a very lukewarm support to, his
JNIinisters. It was essential to do all that was
possible to ensure his hearty co-operation. The
following instructions were, therefore, addressed
by Lord Salisbury to Lord Vivian : " In the
opinion of Her Majesty's Government a very
grave responsibility will rest with His Highness
the Khedive for the success or failure of the new
regime, especially as regards the collection of taxes.
Rumours have already reached Her Majesty's
Government which, if well founded, might cause
them to apprehend that, under cover of the inter-
ference of foreign Governments, attempts will be
made in high quarters to throw off all responsi-
bility, a state of things that would soon be under-
stood throughout the country generally. . . .
"Her Majesty's Government have full confi-
dence in the resources of the country, and enter-
tain no doubts as to the result of the new system,
if it is only allowed to have a fair trial. But if it
be opposed by those in power, or should they even
show a disposition to throw discredit upon it, the
difficulties of Nubar Pasha and his advisers will be
enormously increased, and the responsibility for
their failure will involve its promoters in the
disastrous consequences that must result."
M. Godeaux, who had taken Baron des Michels'
place in Egypt, gave a similar warning to the
Khedive on behalf of the Frencii Government.
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When these messages were delivered to the
Khedive, he "showed evident signs of great
annoyance, and regretted that Her Majesty's
Government sliould have thought it necessary
to hold language to him which he thought was
undeserved and unjust." The responsibility which
it was sought to throw on him was, the Khedive
thought, neither just nor logical. What was his
position in Egypt ? He had deliberately accepted
the position of a constitutional ruler. A respons-
ible Ministry had been formed to advise him.
'* If he rightly understood the first principles of
constitutional government, it was that Ministers,
and not the chief of the State, were made respons-
ible." He must decline to meddle with the
functions of his Ministers. His advice or opinion
was at their disposal if they chose to ask him for
it, but he could not thrust it upon them unasked.
If the Ministers were not responsible for their own
acts, what was the meaning of a responsible
Ministry ? Responsibility, he thought, would only
attach to him if he attempted to interfere in the
government of the country. Otherwise, he must
disclaim it.
To all this sophistry Lord Vivian replied, with
obvious good sense, that "His Highness must
remember that, although he had surrendered his
personal power, and a constitutional regime was
established in Egypt, the new order of things was
in its infancy, and it was rather too early for the
strict application of the doctrines of constitutional
government as understood in Europe. His High-
ness had still all the prestige and influence of the
chief of an Eastern State, combined with greater
knowledge and experience of Egypt than those of
any other person. What Her JNIajesty's Govern-
ment desired was that, instead of showing indiffer-
ence, coldness, or even dislike to the new order of
68 MODERN EGYPT pt. i
things, he should place all his knowledge, influence,
and experience at the disposal of his Ministers, and
loyally and cordially co-operate with tliem within
the proper sphere of his prerogative, A moral
responsibility devolved on him for any hostile
action that might tend to thwart the new
Ministry."
The Khedive's words were ominous. They
gave the keynote of what was to follow. The
British and French Governments had wished for
constitutional government in Egypt. He had
complied with their wishes. He would now stand
aside whilst the game of constitutional government
was being played out. It would soon be found
that, without his powerful aid, the country could
not be governed at all. If, however, constitu-
tional government was to be tried, he would be
thoroughly constitutional. He would leave his
Ministers to their own devices, but he could not
consent to the imposition of any fresh taxes with-
out ascertaining the will of the people. In 18G6,
a Chamber of Notables had been created, mainly
with a view to throwing dust in the eyes of
Europe. The Khedive was fully alive to the fact
that, in the then existing condition of affairs in
Egypt, the mediaeval Italian })roverb
—
chi dice par-
lamento, dice guastamento—applied with full force.
He had, therefore, maintained the Chamber in
a condition of perfect subserviency to himself
At the time about which I am writing, it had
fallen into complete obscurity. It was now to
be convoked with a view to the consideration of
certain financial proposals, notably the increase in
the Ouchouri land-tax,^ "by which the richer class
of proprietors are assessed at rates below the
present value of their lands, which have been
* The Ouchouri landowners answered, to a great extent, to the Indian
jaghirdars. They held fiefs at low rents.
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much improved by cultivation." This was con-
stitutionalism with a vengeance, for the Ouchouri
landov/ners were strongly represented in the
Chamber, and they would not fail to throw on
the new Ministry the odium resulting from an
increase of taxation, which would fall on the class
to which they mainly belonged. Neither would
they be pleased by a measure then under discussion
and subsequently adopted, under which cultivators
residing on Ouchouri lands would no longer, as
heretofore, be exempted from their share of the
corvee.
As has been already explained, the principle
of ministerial responsibility had been accepted by
the Khedive. There were, however, two different
methods of giving effect to that principle.
One was to exclude the Khedive altogether
from the meetings of the Council of Ministers, to
treat him as a cipher, and to endeavour to govern
the country, not only without his co-operation,
but often in a manner which was diametrically
opposed to his personal wishes and opinions. This
system, which involved pushing the principle of
ministerial responsibility to its extreme logical
limit, was advocated by Nubar Pasha, who was
supported by Sir Rivers Wilson. Arguments not
wanting in weight could be advanced in its favour.
The presence of the Khedive at the Council of
Ministers was, it was maintained, incompatible
with free discussion, which often turned either
upon questions affecting His Highness personally,
o:- upon the errors and abuses of the past, for
which he was principally responsible. Even the
appearance of restoring to him any part of
the power of which he had been shorn would,
it was argued, have a bad effect in the country,
and induce the Egyptians to think that he was
still all-powerful.
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This position was perfectly logical ; neither, in
explaining the causes of Nubar Pasha's attitude,
is it necessary to assume that personal ambition
and love of power were the motives which
prompted him. Without doubt, in attempting
to put the Khedive altogether aside, Nubar Pasha
thought that he was rendering a real service to his
adopted country. Nubar Pasha, altliough some-
what of a doctrinaire, was an earnest reformer.
Moreover, his versatile intellect was capable of
grasping a principle. In this case, he had got hold
of a principle which was unquestionably sound.
His French education, which tended to engender
in his mind a somewhat uncompromising attitude
on matters of theory, coupled with a certain inapti-
tude to seize the springs of action which move
individuals as well as Governments, conspired to
convince him that the principle should be driven
home to its logical conclusion. Loyalty to a
colleague, personal friendship, respect for Nubar
Pasha's abilities, consideration for his superior
local knowledge, and a vivid realisation of the
harm done by Ismail Pasha's abuse of personal
power, all rendered it natural that Sir Rivers
Wilson should follow in the same track.
The alternative system, which was supported
by Lord Vivian, was less theoretically perfect,
but was in a greater degree based on the actual
circumstances then existing in Egypt. Lord
Vivian thought that Nubar Pasha had overrated
his own strength and underrated the power of
the Khedive. That power was still an important
factor in the government of a country which he
and his predecessors had ruled for so long and in
so absolute a fashion. The Khedive was the only
authority recognised and obeyed by all classes in
the land. There was no middle course between
deposing him or counting with his power. The
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only system which presented a chance of success
was not to put the Khedive on one side altogether,
but to invite his co-operation, whilst at the same
time the exercise of his authority would be
controlled.
My own views were expressed on February 17,
1879,—the day before the mutiny of the officers
to which allusion will presently be made,— in the
following terms : " The transition from a purely
personal government by the Khedive to a govern-
ment by an executive council, whose leading
members are aliens and Christians, has been too
rapid. For some time to come, it will be impossible
not to take into account the personal authority of
the Khedive as an element in the government
of the country ; he will always possess a large
influence, which, if it be not used for good, will
almost certainly be used for bad ; I therefore think
it desirable to consider the best method of giving
the Khedive some practical share in the govern-
ment of the country."
Whatever defects, however, may have existed
in the methods of giving effect to a policy of
reform, it was certain that the Ministry of Nubar
Pasha represented the cause of progress and civilisa-
tion. The ultimate consequences of its fall might,
and probably would be serious in so far as the
Khedive was personally concerned. But the Khedive,
true to the traditions of his previous life, took little
heed of ultimate consequences. In the meanwhile,
the immediate issue of the struggle between the
Khedive and Nubar Pasha could scarcely be
do.ibtful. Nubar Pasha was at a great dis-
advantage. On the one side, was a ruler who was
feared and obeyed, who disposed absolutely of
the lives and fortunes of his subjects, and who
could readily divert the rising tide of popular
discontent from his own person and turn it against
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his Ministers. On the other side, was a Minister
who was not only a Christian and associated with
other European Christians, but who also belonged
to a nationality against which the Mohammedan
population of the Ottoman Empire is greatly
prejudiced. " When an Armenian rules," says
the Turkish proverb, " tlie State decays." ^ Nubar
Pasha carried but little weight with the Egyptian
population, with whom, moreover, owing to his
ignorance of Arabic, he was unable to communi-
cate in their own language. He could only rely on
persuasion and on the support oftwo foreign Govern-
ments. This support, although heartily accorded,^
did him in some respects more harm than good.
Under these circumstances, his eventual fall from
power was almost a foregone conclusion.
The crisis did not, however, arise at once. For
a few months, the new machine of government
worked, although with great friction. The
Khedive frequently complained that the anomalous
position in whicli it was sought to place him was
daily becoming more and more intolerable, and
that, whilst he was not consulted about the
measures of his Ministers, at the same time
the British and French Governments held him
responsible for their result. On the other hand,
Nubar Pasha was "evidently discouraged and
dissatisfied." " Nous tournons," he said, " dans un
cercle vicieux. Nous ne marchons pas."
In the meanwhile, there was good reason for
believing that the Khedive was actively intriguing
against his Ministers. "There is," Lord Vivian
' Ermeni vizir, devlet dilsher. Some of the more superstitious
followers of Islam are said to derive a certain amount of consolatiou
from the fact that Armenians have occasion;illy occupied high posts in
the service of tiieir hereditary enemy, Russia.
2 It has been occasionally stated that if Lord Vivian had supported
Nubar Pasha more cordially, he might have l)een maintained in power.
Such is not my o])inion. Lord Vivian's instructions were clear, and be
acted loyally upon them.
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wrote on January 11, **a certain amount of
fermentation in the country as evidenced by the
arrival of large deputations of Sheikhs from the
provinces to protest against any pressure for the
payment of taxes at this moment, and I am
told that there is a probability of opposition in
the Chamber of Delegates to the proposition that
is to be submitted to them by the Government
for an increase of the Ouchouri tax, which falls
especially upon the richer class of proprietors.
If this fermentation were natural, it would not be
an unhealthy symptom, but I have good reason
to suspect that it has been secretly fomented
by agents, probably employed by the Khedive
;
and I hear from a reliable source that the leading
men of the Chamber of Notables have been
secretly convoked and told that the Khedive
would not be displeased to see them oppose the
measures of an administration which was imposed
upon him, and which was entirely in the hands
of Europeans.
"Thus, in addition to their serious financial diffi-
culties, and to the task of attempting to create
order out of chaos, the new Ministry have to
struggle, not only with open enemies, but with
internal treachery of the most dangerous description,
carried on in spite of serious warning."
Under circumstances such as these, it only
required the occurrence of some adventitious
incident to bring about a crisis. No long delay
intervened before such an incident occurred. It
was, however, unfortunate that it happened in
that branch of the State administration which,
perhaps less than any other, can be infected with
disease without producing after-effects of a serious
nature. Hitherto, Egypt had suffered mainly from
fiscal misgovernment. The only sound ])art of
the system was that public tranquillity had been
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preserved, and, whatever may be thought of the
methods by which it had been preserved, every one
but a devotee of the sacred right of revolution
would prefer order of some sort to complete
anarchy. The security, which had so far reigned,
was now to be disturbed. The financial embarrass-
ments of Egypt were great. To these was now
to be superadded the disquietude produced by a
mutinous army.
Great discontent had been produced amongst
the officers of the army owing to the non-payment
of their salaries. The new Ministry decided to
pay a portion of the arrears due. At the same
time, a large number of officers were placed on
half- pay. This measure would, under any cir-
cumstances, have been considered harsh, however
necessary it might have been in view of the
straitened condition of the Egyptian Treasury.
It was, however, especially harsh and impolitic
to dismiss so large a body of officers without,
in the first place, fully liquidating the arrears of pay
due to them. The result was that many officers and
their families were reduced to a state of complete
destitution.
When this measure was adopted, there were
about 500 officers in Cairo ; but at this moment,
Lord Vivian reported, " by an unparalleled act of
folly, the Minister of War summoned the remaining
2000 ofKcers up to Cairo from various parts of the
country to receive a portion of their arrears of pay
and to deposit their arms wi+h the authorities.
He thus grouped together a seething mass of 2500
discontented officers, the garrison of Cairo con-
sisting only of 2600 troops, a large proportion of
whom had undoubted sym[)athy with the grievances
of the mutineers."
On the morning of February 18, as Nubar
Pasha and Sir Kivers Wilson were driving to their
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offices, they were mobbed by a crowd of officers
armed with swords, and taken out of their carriages.
After being subjected to some rough treatment,
they were dragged to the JNIinistry of Finance,
which was close to the scene of the outrage, where
they were shut in by the mutineers, who cut the
telegraph wires. Means were, however, found to
communicate with Lord Vivian, who at once had
an interview with the Khedive. What followed
may best be related in Lord Vivian's words. " The
Khedive," he reported, " drove with me to the
Ministry of Finance, which we found besieged by a
large crowd, who, however, made way res])ectfully
for the Khedive's carriage, and cheered him. In a
room on the upper floor, surrounded by the rioters,
we found Nubar Pasha, Sir Rivers Wilson, and
Riaz Pasha, none of them really hurt, although the
two former had received very rough treatment
while they were being forced from the street into
the building. The Khedive, having assured him-
self of their safety, turned to the rioters and
ordered them to leave the building on his promise
that their just demands should be satisfied. 'If,'
he said, *you are my officers, you are bound by
your oath to obey me ; if you refuse, I will have
you swept away.' They obeyed him, although
reluctantly and with some murmuring, begging
him to leave them to settle their accounts in their
own way. There were also cries of ' Death to the
dogs of Christians.' His Highness got them down
the stairs and into and beyond the courtyard,
where they fell back on the larger body who were
besieging the gates. The Khedive commanded all
of them to disperse and go to their homes, and on
their refusal to do so, he ordered up tlie troops.
They fired in the air, but a few soldiers were
wounded by the mutineers' revolvers, and a few
of the rioters received bayonet wounds. The
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Khedive's chamberlain was wounded while at His
Highness's side by a sabre -cut from one of the
mutineers, and the Khedive himself ran consider-
able risk. The whole affair lasted about half-an-
hour, and the Khedive, after providing for the safe
escort of the Ministers, returned to the Palace.
Sir Rivers Wilson behaved well throughout the
affair, which he might have avoided had he net
gone to Nubar Pasha's assistance, when he saw him
surrounded by the mob."
On the following morning (February 19), a
meeting took place at Lord Vivian's house, at
which JNI. Godeaux, Sir Rivers Wilson, ]M. de
Blignieres, and myself were present. Lord Vivian
stated that the Khedive had on the previous day
made a declaration to the Consular body to the
effect that his position must be changed, and his
proper share of power restored to him, or he would
not be answerable for the maintenance of public
order. It was decided to ask the Khedive to state
in what respects he wished his position to be
modified.
We then drove to the Palace. Nubar Pasha,
Sir Rivers Wilson, M. de Blignieres, and myself
remained in a room on the ground floor, while
Lord Vivian and M. Godeaux had an interview
with the Khedive upstairs. In a short while, they
reappeared and communicated the Khedive's reply.
His Highness stated " unequivocally that he would
not be responsible for public tranquillity unless he
were given his proper share in the government of
the country, and was allowed either to preside at
the Council of Ministers himself, or to select a
President in whom he could have confidence. He
further required, as a sine qua non condition, that
Nubar Pasha, whom he accused of sapping and
undermining his authority, should immediately
retire from the Ministry." Nubar Pasha was asked
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whether, in the event of the Consuls -General
msisting on his remaining in office, he would
guarantee the public safety. He naturally declined
to give any such guarantee. " The only course,"
he said, " left open to him under the circumstances
was to tender his resignation, which he begged
Lord Vivian and M. Godeaux as a favour to place
in the Khedive's hands, with a request that he
should be allowed to live unmolested as a private
individual in Egypt." To this request, the Khedive
consented, " on the condition that Nubar Pasha did
not intrigue or meddle in politics."
Thus the struggle between the Khedive and
Nubar Pasha was brought to a close. The attempt
to govern Egypt whilst Ismail Pasha was Khedive,
without allowing him any participation in the
government of the country, had signally failed.
Tried in the manner which has been described
above, the failure of the experiment was certain.
Indeed, looking back on the events of that time
after an interval of many years, my principal
feeling is one of surprise that any one should for
a moment have thought that, under these condi-
tions, the experiment could possibly have succeeded.
Nubar Pasha's fall from power was inevitable.
The circumstances narrated in this chapter
produced important changes, some immediate
and others more remote.
The immediate consequence was that the posi-
tion of the European Ministers was shaken, and
that before long they were dismissed from office.
The remote consequences were of even greater
importance. The officers of the army had, in the
first instance, been unjustly treated. They were
not paid the money which was due to them. So
long as their complaints were put forward in a
manner to which no exception could be taken,
they remained unheeded. At last, they mutinied.
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They then obtained what they wanted.^ A public
apology was tendered to Sir Rivers Wilson by
Prince Hassan, the Kliedive's son and the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army, for the
insults and ill - treatment to which he had been
subjected. But, although the ringleaders of
the mutiny were arrested, and some inquiry
into their conduct was instituted, they were
speedily released. Indeed, under the circum-
stances which tilen existed, it would have been
difficult to have subjected them to any punish-
ment without incurring serious risks. It is
impossible to treat any armed body of men after
this fashion with impunity. The discipline of the
Egyptian army was profoundly shaken. The
most humble private soldier discovered, for the
first time, probably to his own exceeding astonish-
ment, that he and his comrades were masters of
the situation, if, with muskets in their hands, they
exerted themselves to coerce the civil elements of
society. History affords abundant proofs of the
ease with which this lesson is learnt. It was not to
be unlearnt until a stronger race of soldiers appeared
on Egyptian soil. The mutiny of 1879 was the
direct precursor of the Arabi revolt. It would be
going too far to say that from this moment a foreign
occupation of Egypt became inevitable, but it is
certainly a fact that the mutiny which led to the
* At the time of tlie mutiny, the Treasury chest was empty. It was
imperative to pay the officers, who then held the town of Cairo at
tlieir mercy, but cousideral)le difficulty was experienced in obtaining
the money. I remember being present at an interview between Sir
Rivers Wilson and the representative of a local bank, who offered to
advance money at an exorbitant rate of interest. Sir Rivers Wilson
showed a moral courage after the riot as conspicuous as the physical
courage he had displayed whilst the riot was taking place. He declined
to accept tlie offer wliich was made to him, and he also refused to revert
to tlie pernicious system of taking the taxes in advance, although the
adoption of this measure was pressed upon him. Eventually, Messrs.
Rothschild advanced £400,000^ which was repaid from the loan fund%
and the officers were paid.
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downfall of Nubar Pasha greatly increased the
difficulties of governing the country, and brought
the pros})ects of foreign intervention of a decisive
nature appreciably nearer.
There is one further point which calls for remark
before leaving the history of this period. An
opinion was at the time generally entertained that
Ismail Pasha was privy to the mutiny of the
officers, and, in fact, that the whole affair was an
intrigue got up by the Khedive himself It is a
dangerous thing for a despotic ruler, who depends
wholly on force for the maintenance of his power,
to encourage a mutiny in his own army, even
although he may himself sympathise with the
objects of the mutineers. The spirit of mutiny,
when once raised, may not improbably turn against
the individual who raised it. Nevertheless, unwise
though a policy of this sort would have been, there
is no inherent improbability in such a dangerous
agency as a mutinous soldiery being used by an
Eastern ruler, who, in spite of an acute and subtle
intellect, was singularly lacking in foresight, who
was smarting under the humiliation of a loss of
power, and who had unbounded confidence in his
ability to rule, by his own drastic methods, the
generally docile races who inhabit the valley of
the Nile. Any opinion, however, of the degree to
which Ismail Pasha was privy to the mutiny must
be little more than conjecture. It is impossible
to adduce positive ' proof that he knew anything
precise of the intended outrage on Nubar Pasha
and Sir Rivers Wilson. The alarm he displayed
at the spirit of disorder which had been evoked
was perhaps genuine. It is, indeed, more than
probable that, when the officers assembled near the
Ministry of Finance on the morning of February
18, they had not devised amongst themselves any
very definite plan of action. Nevertheless, it
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would in any case be incorrect to say that the
responsibility for the outrage does not rest on
Ismail Pasha. On the contrary, he was, without
doubt, morally responsible for it.^ It does not
require either a very vivid imagination or any
great acquaintance with Eastern politics to form
a fairly accurate idea of what must have taken
place. I can best describe my own conjecture on
the subject by an analogy drawn from a well-
known incident in English history.
When Henry II. wished to get rid of Thomas a
Becket he said, in the presence of his court, " Will
no one rid me of this turbulent priest ? " and forth-
with four knights were found who possibly went
beyond their master's wishes, and rid him of the
Archbishop in the rude but effectual manner of
the twelfth century. Ismail Pasha's language and
intentions were, without doubt, more in conformity
with the civilised age in which we live than those
of Henry II., but his procedure was based on the
same principles as those of the English king. He
spoke openly of the dislike which he entertained
towards Nubar Pasha and his Euro])ean Ministers.
He represented his position as intolerable. In an
Eastern country, this was enough to focus on the
Ministry the responsibility for all the evils which
then afflicted Egypt. The officers of the army
were discontented. They attributed the miserable
condition in which they were placed to the action
of Nubar Pasha and his colleagues, who were
aliens and Christians. They learnt that their ruler,
who was of their own race and faith, and to whom
they had been accustomed to yield implicit
obedience, was as hostile as they were to the new
^ It has been stated on good authority that a few days before the
mutiny, Shahin Pasha spoke to the Khedive about the grievances of
the officers, and that the latter replied: 'Tourquoi les officiers
restent-ils tranquilles?" If this be true, it is quite sufficient to
account for the outbreak.
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Ministry, and would be pleased if means could be
found to bring about its downfall. That was
enough. They naturally mutinied, and in doing so
they, without doubt, thought that they were not
only furthering their own interests, but also that
they were acting in a manner which would obtain
the commendation of their Sovereign.
This is a sufficient and highly probable explana-
tion of the causes which led to the mutiny. It is
scarcely worth while to seek for any other.
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The Khedive had obtained a considerable triumph.
He had got rid of a JNIinister who was distasteful
to him, although the latter had been supported by
two powerful foreign Governments. He had shown
all the world that, without his co-operation, Egypt
could not be governed. The theory of ministerial
res})onsibility might be sound, but the personal
power of a despotic ruler in an Oriental State was
a practical fact, which had to be taken into account
in the application of the best of theories.
If Ismail Pasha had been content with what he
had achieved, and had from this time forth worked
loyally with his European Ministers, he might
possibly have died Khedive of Egypt. But it was
one of the characteristics of this singular man that,
although he had a quick perce])tion in dealing with
points of minor importance, he erred at almost every
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important crisis of his career. He was unable to
frame a correct estimate of the main factors in a
general political situation. He was wanting in the
power described by the Duke of Wellington, as
"guessing at what is going on on the other side
of the hill." His political forecasts were singularly
faulty. He would frequently show great acuteness
in deciding on some matter of detail, but would
generally make a mistake on a broad question of
principle. Lord Palmerston once said that if a
little learning was a dangerous thing, no learning
at all was much more dangerous, and so, without
doubt, it generally is. But Ismail Pasha was a
living proof that there is a good deal of truth in
the words of the English poet. He would probably
have fared better if he had never made any attempt
either to understand European politics or to gauge
European public opinion. As it was, he had just
sufficient knowledge of these subjects to lead him
astray. He knew that Europeans laid much stress
on the will of the people. They had large talking
assemblies, termed Parliaments, to whose will Kings
and Emperors were obliged to conform. Such in-
stitutions were, of course, wholly unsuitable to
Egypt. Nevertheless, would it not be possible to
hoist these Franks with their own petard ? It was,
indeed, difficult to deal with the French. They
scarcely made a pretence of caring for anything but
the interests of the French creditors. It was true
that, but a short time previously, he had declared
that the country was bankrupt, but circumstances
altered cases. Egypt had vast resources. Huge
sums had before now been screwed out of the
unfortunate peasantry. Let him regain his personal
power, and ado])t his own rude methods for collect-
ing the revenue. A few extra blows of the
courbash would produce financial equilibrium.
Thus would he conjure French opposition.
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The case of the Enghsh was different. They
cared, or at all events they pretended to care for
the welfare of the fellaheen. They disliked to
hear of oppression even in the cause of the
bondholders. Lectures on this subject had been
frequently delivered to him by meddling Consuls-
General and by the misguided humanitarian press
of England. 13 ut the English were an essentially
gullible race. They had, at a recent period
of their history, got embroiled with the half of
Europe because they sympathised with oppressed
nationalities, and believed that parliamentary insti-
tutions, trial by jury, and the like, were certain
remedies for all the maladies with which States, in
whatsoever part of the world, were afflicted.^ They
were easily carried away by phrases such as the
popular will, constitutional government, and so on.
Moreover, the English were a stiff-necked people
who would not easily be led by officials. On the
contrary, they as often as not thought that, when
they had paid their officials high salaries for looking
after their interests in a foreign country, they had
done enough. They were under no obligation to
accept as correct what their representatives said.
Indeed, they were at that time rather inclined
to disbelieve their officials because they were
officials, and, therefore, presumably devoid of popular
sympathies.^ With a ])eople such as this, a great
deal mioht be done. Mi^ht not an acute ruler soo o
* " Lord Palmerston, in the most insolent manner, told the Greek
Minister that he might tell the King of Greece that he never should
have a moment's peace or quiet until he gave his subjects a constitu-
tion ; that he, Lord I'almerston, would tiike care that neither he nor
any other Sovereign who governed witliout a constitution should have
any peace ; tliat all people so governed had a right to ' insurger,' and
he took good care to let them know that such was his opinion " (Sir
Robert Peel's Mentoirs, vol. ii. p. 1 ?!'')• "'® passage is contained in a
letter written in IB-'JIJ by "a, lady unnamed in the VVhig camp."
2 It must be l)orne in mind that 1 am speaking of a period before
the birth of modern Imperialism, Since 1557'), the general tone ol
British public opinion has undergone many notable changes.
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adapt his language as to suit a foreign public, whilst
his acts would be in strict conformity witli his own
wishes and personal interests ? The British Govern-
ment must not be openly defied. That would be a
proceeding both clumsy and attended with some
risk. Belial was a wiser councillor than Moloch,
But surely if a scheme were devised which would
present matters to the British Government and
jniblic in a form to which they were accustomed, if
their most cherished institutions were apparently
copied in Egypt, if the Egyptian people were to
express their own views through their own repre-
sentatives, then the bait would take. An Egyptian
Parliament should, therefore, be assembled. The re-
presentatives of tlie Egyptian people should express
their devotion to the Khedive, and their satisfaction
with his system of government. They would reject
as insulting the imputation that the country was
bankrupt. They would demur to the changes in
the system of taxation proposed by the European
advisers of their Sovereign. Those changes were
unjust, and, moreover, it was an incidental point
of some importance that, under the European
proposals, the fresh taxation would fall on the re-
presentatives themselves rather than on the people
whom, by a bold flight of the imagination, they
were presumed to represent. But they would
devise another system which would be more
equitable. The representatives of the people, who
were rich, should preserve their former privileges,
but tliey would make large sacrifices in order to
enable Egypt to meet its financial engagements.
It was true that those sacrifices would fall, not on
themselves, but on their fellow-countrymen in more
humble classes of society. But the result would be
the same. The interest of the debt would be paid.
The members of the Egyptian Parliament must be
left to devise their own scheme. That was essential.
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Otherwise, constitutional government would be a
mere farce. Their patriotism would revolt at the
idea of any foreign interference. For the future,
it must cease. The European Ministers must be
dismissed.
When all this was done, it would not be necessary
to talk any more of Parliaments or of popular
representation. The necessity for their existence
would have passed away. An intelligent despot
ruling over a docile people would easily find some
means for preventing parliamentary institutions
from taking any solid root in the country. The
personal rule of the Khedive would be restored.
The people, who had before been scourged with
rods, would in future be scourged with scorpions.
The bondliolders would be paid, and no one would
be able to complain.
Thus Ismail Pasha pondered over things which
were never destined to be accomplished.
The idea was ingenious, but the circumstances
under which the experiment was tried were un-
favourable to success. Ismail Pasha was too well
known in Europe to play the part of an ultra-
constitutional monarch. The most ardent partisan
of parliamentary institutions, however ill-informed
about Eastern politics, whilst yielding a ready assent
to the principles involved, would not be able to
refrain from some scepticism as regards the inten-
tions of the principal character in the piece.
Moreover, there were at the time in Cairo a
number of European officials of inconveniently in-
dependent characters, who had some knowledge of
the country, and who would certainly make tlieir
voices heard. They, at least, would be thrown into
strong op])osition. They knew too much to be
taken in by this flimsy travesty of free institutions.
Indeed, had not the interests involved, both Euro-
pean and Egyptian, been so serious, they would
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almost certainly have regarded the w^hole proceed-
ing not merely as a comedy, but as a screaming
farce. Further, the whole project was tainted by
one irremediable defect. It was based on the
assumption that money would be forthcoming to
satisfy the claims of the foreign creditors. Now,
in supposing that, by whatsoever means, he could
meet all his financial engagements, Ismail Pasha
erred. He forgot to make sure of his foundations
before erecting his superstructure.
When Nubar Pasha was forced to resign. Lord
Vivian pointed out that "the incident would
become still more serious if it were to shake the
experiment of reformed government in Egypt,
which should certainly be maintained, only with
far more consideration than has been shown for the
feelings, rights, and prejudices of the natives."
Lord Vivian had indicated the main danger of
the moment. The reformed administration must
be supported. Lord Vivian was, therefore, in-
structed " to state to the Khedive that the French
and British Governments were determined to act
in concert in all that concerned Egypt, and that
they could not lend themselves to any modification
in principle of the political and financial arrange-
ments recently sanctioned by His Highness. It
was to be clearly understood that the resignation
of Nubar Pasha had, in the eyes of both Govern-
ments, only importance so far as the question of
persons was concerned, but that it could not imply
a change of system." Similar instructions were
sent by the French Government to their repre-
seniative in Cairo.
On the Khedive behig informed of the tenor
of these instructions, he replied " that he would
pledge himself to maintain intact the engagements
he had taken in August last, and which constituted
the charter of the new scheme of administrative
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reform.* With respect to his financial engage-
ments, he could assure the two Consuls-General
of his sincere desire to observe them, but he could
not prejudice tl e decisions of his Council of
Ministers on this point."
Nothing could be fairer or more constitutional.
The principles of the reformed administration were
to be maintained. As regards the financial engage-
ments, the Khedive could obviously give no promise.
All the world, in fact, knew by this time that the
arrangements made in November 1876 would have
to be modified. A month previously. Lord Vivian
liad reported that "frequent meetings were being
held between Sir Rivers Wilson, M. de Blignieres,
and Sir Evelyn Baring, with the object of arriving
at some joint conclusions as to the basis upon which
a general and equitable arrangement, amounting
to a composition of the present financial difiiculties
of the Egyptian Government, was possible."
Two important questions then had to be decided.
The first was, who was to be the new Prime
Minister. The second was the nature of the rela-
tions between the Khedive and his new INIinistry.
Sir Rivers Wilson pressed for the reinstatement
of Nubar Pasha. He was su])ported by the British
Government. " Her Majesty's Government," Lord
Salisbury said, " are of opinion that the position
of Sir Rivers Wilson will be extremely difficult,
if not impossible to maintain, unless Nubar Pasha
is readmitted to the Cabinet in some form or
other."
Lord Vivian, however, did not concur in this
opinion. " I desire," he wrote, " to place on record
my strong conviction that Nubar Pasha's idea of
maintaining two distinct and probably antagonistic
powers in the State (the Kliedive and the Council
of Ministers) will prove im})racticable as long as
' ri(/e ante, pp. (51 -(53.
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the present Khedive remains in power. . . . Any
proposal for the re-entry of Nubar Pasha into the
Cabniet, after what has happened, would be, I fear,
in every respect a serious mistake that might lead to
difficulties and complications, which Her Majesty's
Government would wish to avoid."
When the Khedive was addressed on the
subject, he said that "he could not do otherwise
than bow to the will of the English and French
Governments, which he had no power to resist,
if they persisted in their demand for the re-entry
of Nubar Pasha ; but he felt bound to warn them
beforehand of the consequences, so that they might
not blame him hereafter if the new order of things
should break down, or if disturbances should again
arise."
It was clear that, if Nubar Pasha were forced
upon the Khedive, another and perhaps more seri-
ous breakdown would ensue. The French Govern-
ment, therefore, suggested that it might not be
advisable to insist on his readmission. The British
Government assented, but they "accompanied the
concession with a warning to the Khedive that
they considered His Highness responsible for the
recent difficulties in Egypt, and that if similar
difficulties should occur again, the consequences
would be very serious to him."
Concurrently with the discussion of the question
of Nubar Pasha's readmission to the Cabinet,
the relations which were to subsist between the
Khedive and his JNIinisters were considered afresh.
The Khedive made certain proposals. The Euro-
pean Ministers made counter-proposals. Eventually,
the British and French Governments decided on
the following programme :
—
(1) The Khedive was
not in any case to be present at Cabinet Councils.
(2) Prince Tewfik, the heir - apparent to the
Khedivate, who had been proposed by the Khedi\e
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himself, was to be appointed President of the
Council. (3) The English and French members
of the Cabinet were to have a rioht of veto overo
any proposed measure.
On these proposals being laid before the Khedive,
he said that " he unreservedly subscribed to all the
conditions imposed by the Governments of England
and France, more especially as they had listened
to his objections against the re-entry of Nubar
Pasha into the Cabhiet, for which he expressed his
gratitude. He fully acknowledged the very serious
responsibility that now devolved upon him for the
success of the new order of things and for the pre-
vention of disorder, and he pledged his cordial and
loyal support to his JNlinisters if, as he hoped, they
would meet him in the same conciliatory spirit."
It appeared, therefore, that the difficulties in the
way of the formation of a new JNIinistry were at
an end. On March 10, Prince Tewfik was nomi-
nated President of the Council. When, however,
the question arose of filling up the remaining
places in the Cabinet, fresh dissensions broke
out between the Khedive and his European
Ministers. Under the JNIinistry of Nubar Pasha,
Riaz Pasha had been in charge of the Departinent
of the Interior. The Khedive now wished to
transfer Riaz Pasha to the JNIinistry of Foreign
Affairs and of Justice. The European JNlinisters
objected to this transfer, on the ground that
the Khedive's object was to regain his hold over
tlie provinces, which would be impossible so long
as a man of such independent character as
Riaz Pasha was JNIinister of the Interior. Lord
Vivian and JNI. Godeaux, on tlie other hand, con-
sidered that it would be inconsistent Avith the
personal responsibility thrown on the Kliedive
to dictate to him the choice of his Ministers
and the posts they should occupy. The British
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and French Governments, however, more especially
the former, supported the views of Sir Rivers
Wilson and M. de Blignieres. The Khedive was
pressed to maintain Riaz Pasha at the JNIinistry of
the Interior. He at first declined to do so, but
eventually gave a reluctant assent. On March
22, after the country had remained for a month
without a Ministry, Riaz Pasha was named Minister
of the Interior and of Justice. The remaining
places in the Cabinet were easily filled up,
At the same time, a letter was addressed by the
Khedive to Prince Tewfik, embodying the principles
which were to regulate the relations between the
Khedive and his Ministers. " J'espere," the Khedive
added, "que ces nouveaux arrangements assure-
ront la marche de la nou\elle organisation, dont la
reussite doit amener un grand bien pour I'Egypte.
Le Cabinet pent etre assure qu'en toutes circon-
stances il pent compter de ma part sur le concours
le plus complet et le plus loyal, comme je compte
moi-meme sur son devouement a I'oeuvre que nous
poursuivons en commun."
During these discussions, the British and French
Governments had been in a difficult position. The
general political interest of England was clear.
England did not want to possess Egypt, but it was
essential to British interests that the country should
not fall into the hands of any other European
Power. British policy in respect to Egypt had
for years past been based on this principle. In
1857, the Emperor Napoleon III. made overtures
to the British Government with a view to the
partition of the northern portions of Africa.
Morocco was to fall to France, Tunis to Sardinia,
and Egypt to England.^ On this proposal being
' The accuracy of this statement is confirmed by M. Eniile Ollivier,
who speaks with authority on the subject. See his L'Enipire Liberal,
vol. iii. p. 418.
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submitted to Lord Palmerston, he stated his views in
a letter to Lord Clarendon. " It is very possible,"
he said, "that many parts of the world would be
better governed by France, England, and Sardinia
than they are now. . . . We do not want to have
Egypt. What we wish about Egypt is that it should
continue to be attached to the Turkish Empire,
which is a security against its belonging to any
European Power. We want to trade with Egypt,
and to travel through Egypt, but we do not want
the burthen of governing Egypt. . . . Let us try
to improve all those countries by the general
influence of our commerce, but let us abstain
from a crusade of conquest which would call down
upon us the condemnation of all other civilised
nations." ^
The general aims of British policy in 1879 were
much the same as they had been when Lord
Palmerston wrote these lines twenty - two years
previously ; but, with a change of circumstances,
the method of giving effect to the policy had
necessarily to be modified. It was no longer
possible to stand aside and neglect the internal
affairs of Egypt. The only European Power which
was likely to obtain a footing in Egypt was France.
The attempt liad already been made once, and the
misgovernment of Egypt might well lead to its
being renewed, more especially as large French
financial interests, to which the French Govern-
ment were prepared to afford support, were con-
cerned. Even admitting, as was without doubt
' Ashley's Life of Lord Palmerston, vol. ii. p. 125. I cannot refrain
from adding the following characteristic passage: "On one occasion
to Lord Cowley, he (Lord Palmerston) used a very homely but apt
illustration. * VVe do not want Egypt,' he said, *or wish it for our-
selves, any more than any rational man with an estate in the north of
England and a residence in the south would liave wished to possess the
inns on the north road. All he could want would have been tliat the
inns should he well-kept, always accessible, and furnishing him, when
he came, with mutton-chups and jio.-t-liorses.'
"
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the case, that the French Government had at that
time no designs involving the annexation of Egypt,
the pressure of public opinion was so great that it
would liave been scarcely possible for France to
have adopted a policy of complete non-intervention.
If the British Government would not act with
them, the French Government would have been
obliged to act alone.
French policy in respect to Egypt was, in most
essential points, the counterpart of the policy of the
British Government, It was impossible to adopt
a policy of annexation, even had there been any
disposition in that direction, without incurring the
risk, amounting almost to a certainty, of a serious
quarrel with England. But France regarded the
exclusive action of England in Egypt with the
same jealousy as that with which England would
have regarded exclusively French action. Any
extension of Turkish influence ran counter to the
traditional policy of France. It was clearly in
the interests of botli Governments to prevent
the affairs of Egypt from becoming a cause of
serious dissension between them. Both had equal
interests in the maintenance of the peace of
Europe. It was obviously undesirable that the
misgovernment of an Oriental state should threaten
a disturbance of the peace. The best way to pre-
vent any risk of dissension was for both Govern-
ments to co-operate in Egypt with a view to
the establisliment in that country of a system
of administration, which, although possibly de-
fective, would be sufficient to check the worst
of the existing abuses, and thus, by obviating
the necessity for further interference, prevent
the Egyptian Question from becoming European
rather than local.
In the execution of this policy, occasional dis-
agreements occurred. The French Government
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dwelt strongly on the interests of the foreign
creditors. The British Government leant to the
cause of the Egyptian peasantry. But in spite of
some differences of opinion, the principle of common
action was maintained. Moreover, the harmony
which existed between London and Paris was re-
produced in Cairo. In spite of occasional jars, the
local representatives of the two Governments, as
also their countrymen who were employed in the
Egyptian service, worked fairly well together.
Every one recognised that the anarchical condi-
tion of affairs then existing in Egypt was due to
the misgovernment of one individual, the Khedive
Ismail Pasha. Of that, there could not be any
doubt. But, as has been already pointed out, there
were two methods of checking the continuance of
misgovernment. One was to place Ismail Pasha
under such stringent control as to reduce him
almost to a cipher. The other was to impose on
him a modified form of control, to recognise the
impossibility of governing the country without his
co-operation so long as he remained Khedive of
Egypt, and to endeavour to guide him in the path
of reform rather than to exercise extreme compul-
sion in forcing him along it.
It was a most unfortunate circumstance that at
this moment the principal Europeans concerned in
the administration of Egypt were not agreed as to
which of these two systems should be adopted.
The official world was divided into two opposing
camps, each honestly believing that its own system
was the best. Lord Vivian supported the system
which involved counting with Ismail Pasha's per-
sonal power. Sir Rivers Wilson supported the
rival system, which involved the reduction of the
Khedive to a political nullity.
Neither Lord Vivian nor Sir Rivers Wilson had
had any previous experience in dealing with Eastern
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affairs. Sir Rivers Wilson had passed his life in
the service of the English Treasury, where he had
acquired a sound financial training, which, added
to much natural quickness and ability, proved of
great service to him in dealing with the technical
portions of the Egyptian financial situation.^ In
some respects, however, this training was a dis-
advantage to him. The fiscal system in an Eastern
country differs widely from that which exists in
England ; neither does the technically sound but
somewhat narrow school of the English Treasury
afford an ideal training for an Englishman who
has to deal with Eastern affairs. It often en-
genders a somewhat inelastic frame of mind, and
a tendency to ignore political considerations which
no European financier in the East can afford to
neglect.
Lord Vivian, on the other hand, had had no
experience in dealing with financial affairs. This
was a disadvantage to him at a time when the
pecuniary embarrassments of the country, in which
he was the Britisli representative, had become the
chief subject for diplomatic action. On the other
hand, he had been dealing with foreign affairs all
his life. He had had a sound diplomatic training.
He possessed a calm judgment, great moral courage,
and a clear insight into the political forces at work
around him.
I was a spectator of these unfortunate dissensions,
and was thus in a position to hear both sides of
the question. My belief is that, in view of Ismail
Pasha's personal character, neither the adoption of
the system advocated by Lord Vivian, nor the
adoption of that of which Sir Rivers Wilson was
the leading representative, would have materially
* Sir Rivers Wilson was employed in Egypt for a couple of months
in 1876, and had thus learnt something of the local financial situation,
but the period was too short to enable him to acquire any real experi-
ence of Orientals or of Eastern forms of government.
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altered the course of Egyptian history. No con-
fidence could be placed in Ismail Pasha's promises
Whatever he might say, he was determined to re-
main the absolute ruler of Egypt. He might appear
to yield for the moment, but he trusted to his
resource and to his remarkable power of intrigue
to nullify any concessions which might be extorted
from him, and thus ultimately regain his previous
position. This, however, is mere conjecture. It
is possible that I may be doing an injustice to
Ismail Pasha, though I do not think that I am.
What is more certain is that the system advocated
by Lord Vivian gave him a fair chance if he wislied
to act up to the engagements which he had taken.
It presented some hope of success. Sir Rivers
Wilson's policy, on the other hand, was fore-
doomed to failure. It was based on an incorrect
appreciation of what was and what was not pos-
sible under the political circumstances then existing
in Egypt.
In the meantime, the British Government were
bewildered by the conflicting accounts \\ hich they
received from Egypt. One point, however, was
clear. The disagreements between Lord Vivian
and Sir Rivers Wilson were doing a great deal of
harm. Ismail Pasha would gladly play the con-
genial pai-t of a tertius gaudeiis. He would not
be slow to turn the position to his own advantage.
On March 15, therefore. Lord ^''ivian was sum-
moned to London. On INIarch 20, Sir Frank
Lascelles arrived to take over Lord Vivian's duties.
He was instructed "to give his cordial support
to Sir Rivers Wilson in his dealings with the
Khedive."
Prince Tewfik, at the time of his assuming the
presidency of the Egyptian Council in 1879, was
twenty-seven years of age. He was desirous to do
all in his power to help in the crisis which then
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existed in* Egyptian affairs. On March 24, he
had an interview with Sir Frank Lascelles. The
mutinous officers, he said, had been paid. " Tout
rentrera dans le calme." The Khedive was deter-
mined to act in harmony with his JNIinisters.
" There were, no doubt, great difficulties to be
overcome, but with the cordial co-operation of all
parties, they might be surmounted."
Nevertheless, the experiment which was made
at this time failed. The Khedive had, indeed, got
rid of Nubar Pasha, but the principle that he was
himself to be reduced to the condition of a political
nullity had not undergone any serious modifications.
The terms imposed upon him were so onerous and
humiliating that, even had he been animated with
better intentions than those with which, I fear, he
must be credited, it would have been difficult to
make the machine of government work smoothly.
It was especially a mistake to insist on giving
precision in detail to the relations which were to
subsist between the Khedive and his Ministers.
A man like Ismail Pasha was not to be bound by
these ropes of diplomatic sand. Either he meant
to act loyally with his European Ministers, or he
had no such intention. Either they could acquire
a personal influence over him, or they would be
unable to do so. In the one case, the machine
could have been worked without any very precise
definition of the relations which were to exist
between the Khedive and his Ministers. In the
other case, those definitions were insufficient to
prevent a collapse of the system. Under the exist-
ing circumstances, personal influence was of greater
importance than any powers based on the text of
a Khedivial letter or Decree.
Scarcely had the new Ministry been formed,
when an incident occurred which gave a correct
indication of what was to follow. The interest on
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the loan of 1864, which was secure'd on the
JNIoukabala tax, fell due on April 1, 1879. It
amounted to £240,000. On March 28, the amount
of money in the hands of the Commissioners of the
Debt fell short of this sum by £196,000. The
Commission of Inquiry was at that time preparing
a project for a settlement of the financial situation.
It was known that the Commissioners contemplated
the repeal of the law of the JNIoukabala. This pro-
posal was unpopular amongst the wealthier classes
in Egypt. The Ministers, acting in concert with
the Commissioners of Inquiry, considered that the
best plan would be to postpone the payment of the
coupon due on April 1 to Alay 1. A draft Decree
giving effect to this proposal was submitted to the
Kliedive by Sir Rivers Wilson. The Khedive at
first refused to simi it. It was, he said, nothing
less than a declaration of bankruptcy. He did
not consider that the country was bankrupt. He
believed that all the financial engagements of the
Egyptian Government could be met. He could
not sign such a Decree in the face of the political
and financial engagements imposed on him by the
British and French Governments. Ultimately,
some changes were made in the wording of the
preamble, and the Khedive was induced to sign.
Inasmuch as the Khedive had for a long time
past been insisting on his inability to meet all his
financial engagements, it was evident that some
stron<y motive must have existed to make him
reject a proposal, which was submitted to him
by his European advisers, to postpone payment of
the interest on a portion of the debt. The reason
for this change of policy was abundantly clear.
The Khedive, in spite of his recent promises, was
actively engaged in intrigues having for their
object the overthrow of the Ministry. He was
preparing a financial plan of his own in opposition
CH.VI THE COUP D'ETAT 99
to the scheme then being evolved by the Com-
mission of Inquiry. This plan he intended to
submit to the Powers.
On April 1, Sir Frank Lascelles reported to
Lord Salisbury as follows : " Considerable agitation
exists here at the present moment. ... It appears
that the Sheikh-el-Bekri ^ holds meetings with the
Notables and Ulemas, with the object of exciting
religious animosity against the European Ministers,
and that Riaz Pasha has been denounced in the
Mosques as a friend of the Christians. There is
danger that Riaz Pasha, who has been warned by
the Prefect of the Police that his life is in peril,
may be forced into resigning."
Three days later (April 4), Sir Frank Lascelles
wrote : " It appears that there is no doubt about
the meetings having been held, and that there is
constant communication between the Khedive and
the more influential persons who attended them.
Their object, however, is to obtain support to the
financial plan, which the Khedive is preparing in
opposition to that of Sir Rivers Wilson, and also
to get up petitions to His Highness to put into
force the Turkish Constitution, which was pro-
mulgated here in 1877, but which has hitherto
remained a dead letter. ... I have been told that
the arguments addressed to the wealthy portion of
the population in order to obtain signatures to the
petition were that, if Sir Rivers Wilson's plan were
to come into force, the taxes on the Ouchouri
lands would be largely increased, and that the
benefits conferred by the Moukabala law would be
lost, and that the Ulema have been led to believe
that it is the intention of the European Ministers
to hand over the country entirely to Europeans,
* The Sheikh-el-Bekri was the Nekib-el-Ashraf, or representative of
all the descendants of the Proijliet in Egypt. He was also the head of
the religious Corporations.
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and thus seriously jeopardise the Moslem faith, but
there can be little doubt that the chief incentive
to sign the petition was the knowledge that the
signatures would be agreeable to the Khedive.
*' Riaz Pasha has informed me that some of the
employes of the Ministry of the Interior had been
called upon for their signatures, and had not dared
to refuse."
On April 6, the European Ministers placed in
the hands of the Khedive a formal protest against
the line of conduct which he was pursuing, and
which, as they rightly pointed out, was in opposition
to his former pledges. The Khedive paid no
attention to this protest. His plans were now
matured. He was ready to strike a decisive blow
with a view to regaining his personal power.
On April 9, the Khedive convoked the members
of the diplomatic corps and delivered an address to
them in the presence of a number of Egyptian
Notables, who had been assembled for the occasion.
He said that the discontent in the country had
reached such a pitch that he felt bound to allay it
by adopting radical measures. A financial project,
which expressed the true wishes of the country, had
been submitted to him signed by all classes of the
population. In this project, copies of which would
be at once communicated to the representatives of
the Powers, "the nation protested against the
declaration of bankruptcy, which was contemplated
by Sir Rivers Wilson, and demanded the formation
of a purely Egyptian Ministry, which would be
responsible to the Chamber of I3eputies."
Prince Tewfik, "yielding to the will of the
nation," had tendered his resig!iation. He would
be replaced by Cherif Pasha. The Khedive would
continue to govern in accordance with the Rescript
of August 28, which sanctioned the principle of
ministerial responsibility. The Decree of November
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18, 1876, which had been negotiated by Messrs.
Goschen and Joubert, would be strictly observed.
Cherif Pasha then added a few words. *' The
nation " thought that the Ministers had behaved in
a manner which was hisulting to its representatives.
A declaration of bankruptcy would be dishonour-
able. The country was determined to make any
sacrifices to avoid it. The contemplated repeal of
the law of the Moukabala had given rise to great
dissatisfaction. " It would have been impossible
for the Khedive to have put himself in opposition
to the will of the nation, which had been so
positively expressed."
The Consuls -General listened to these remark-
able declarations "in complete silence." The
Austrian Consul- General, however, asked a some-
what pertinent question. Would the persons
who had signed tlie project be prepared to mort-
gage their own properties as a guarantee for the
execution of the financial plan ? To this the
Khedive replied that there would be no necessity
for the adoption of any such course. " It would
be impossible to give a stronger guarantee than
the determination of the whole country, from the
head of the State to the humblest individual, to
submit to any sacrifices rather than to the disgrace
of national bankruptcy."
Three documents were communicated to the
Consuls-General immediately after the meeting.
The first of these was an address from the
Chambei of Notables. It stated that the new
INlinisters had frequently violated the rights of
the Chamber. No explanation was, however,
given as to the precise nature of these alleged
violations. As regards the idea of a declaration
of bankruptcy, and the proposed repeal of the law
of the JNloukabala, the Notables expressed them-
selves in the following; terms : " Tons ces actes'&
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sont nuisibles h nos int^rets et contraires h nos
droits. Jamais nous n'en accepterons Texecution."
They begged the Khedive, therefore, to take the
situation into his consideration, "afin d'^viter les
serieuses difficultes qui pourraient naitre a Tavenir
si nos droits et ceux de la nation continuaient k
^tre ainsi meconnues ; de graves dangers pourraient
meme en rdsulter."
The second document submitted to the Consuls-
General was an address presented to the Khedive
by a number of delegates chosen from amongst
the Ulema, the highest officials of the State, both
civil and military, and other Notables. In this
address it was stated that the petitioners had
examined the financial scheme prepared by Sir
Rivers Wilson. They considered that the pro-
posals contained in that scheme were contrary to
the interests of the country ; they were of opinion
that the revenues of Egypt were sufficient to dis-
charge all the debts due by the State ; they had,
therefore, prepared a counter-project, which they
asked should be submitted to the Chamber of
Notables. They begged that the Khedive would
give to the Chamber "les attributions et les
pouvoirs dont jouissent les Chambres des Deputes
Europeennes en ce qui concerne les questions
interieures et financieres." The Council of Ministers
was to be independent of the Khedive, and was to
be responsible to the Chamber.
The third document was a plan for the settle-
ment of the financial situation.
These documents were sent by the Consuls-
General to their respective Governments by the
mail which was then about to leave for Europe.
The same mail should have carried a number of
copies of the report, which the Commissioners of
Inquiry had just completed. Tliese latter were,
however, stopped in the Post-office by order of the
'»!?;
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Khedive in the hope that " the plan submitted to
the Klicdive might be approved of before the
report of the Commissioners was generally known."
Letters were written by the Khedive to Sir
Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignieres stating that
" in obedience to the positive wishes of the nation
he had entrusted Cherif Pasha with the formation
of a new Cabinet, which was to be composed
entirely of Egyptians."
When the European Ministers were appointed
to the Egyptian Cabinet, the British and French
Governments stipulated "that the Commission of
Control over the Egyptian finances appointed
under the Decree of November 1876, should be
ipso facto revived in case either the English or
French member of the Egyptian Cabinet should
be dismissed without the consent of his Govern-
ment." In order to fulfil the engagement thus
taken by the Egyptian Government, Cherif Pasha
wrote to M. Bellaigues de Bughas, who had been
appointed Commissioner of the Debt in succession
to M. de Blignieres, and myself, requesting us to
assume the ofTices of Controllers-General of the
expenditure and of the recei})ts. We stated in
our reply that we must decline to associate our-
selves with a financial plan which in our eyes was
impracticable, or with a change of system which
was in contradiction to the engagements recently
taken by the Khedive towards the British and
I'rench Governments. Cherif Pasha thereupon
informed Sir Frank Lascelles that he considered
our refusal to take ofKce freed the Egyptian
Government from any responsibility as regards
the immediate re -establishment of the Control.
The French and British Governments were,
however, asked to name Controllers.
Sir Gerald Fitzgerald, Blum Pasha, the Secretary
of the Financial Department, and Sir Auckland
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Colvin, who was head of the Cadastral Survey, also
resigned their appointments.
A Decree was issued naming Ch^rif Pasha
President of the Council, and charo;in": him with
the formation of a INIinistry. A letter was at the
same time addressed to Cherif Pasha by the
Khedive, setting forth the principles which were
for the future to guide the Government of the
country. This letter began in the following
terms : " Comme Chef d'Etat et comme Egyptien,
je considere un devoir sacre, pour moi, de suivre
Topinion de mon pays et de donner une satisfaction
entiere a ses legitimes aspirations." The Khedive
then went on to say that the financial plan pre-
pared by the JNIinister of Finance, which declared
the country in a state of bankruptcy and which
violated vested interests, had "achev^ de soulever
contre le Cabinet le sentiment national." Public
opinion had found expression in the address which
had been presented to him. Yielding to the wishes
expressed in this address, he requested Cherif
Pasha to form a Cabinet composed "d'el^ments
v^ritablement Egyptiens." As regards the demand
for parliamentary institutions, the Khedive said
that a Chamber would be formed, *'dont les
modes d'election et les droits seront regies de
fa^on a repondre aux exigeances de la situation
interieure et aux aspirations nationales." The new
Cabinet was to prepare electoral laws upon the
model of those which existed in Europe, "tout en
tenant compte des moeurs et des besoins de la popu-
lation." The Khedive expressed his approval of the
financial ])lan which had been submitted to him
by the Notables. The Cabinet was to carry out
that ])lan in its integrity. The letter concluded in
the following terms : " Connaissant votre devoue-
ment au pays, je ne doute pas que Votre Excel-
lence, s'entourant d'hommes jouissant comme Elle
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de la confiance et de Testime publique, ne mene
h bonne fin Toeuvre civilisatrice a laquelle je veux
attacher mon nom."
Immediately afterwards, the other JNIinisters,
those who were to "enjoy the public confidence
and esteem," were nominated. They were all
men who were under the absolute control of the
Khedive, and who did not in the smallest degree
represent the national party, supposing there to
have been one. Shahin Pasha was named Minister
for War, and Omar Pasha Lutfi Inspector-General
with a seat in the Cabinet. Both had gained un-
enviable reputations by the unscrupulous methods
which in former capacities they had adopted for
collecting the revenue.
History records several instances of free institu-
tions which have foundered under the influence of
one commanding mind. The Emperors Augustus
and Napoleon were the great high -priests of a
policy having for its object a transfer of power
from the people to their ruler. All students of
history are familiar with the procedures which
they adopted. But, so far as my historical know-
ledge goes, the clumsy experiment made by Ismail
Pasha was of a somewhat novel character. This
was not a case in which existing free institutions
had, by a combination of force and diplomacy, to
be bent to suit the wishes of a despotic ruler. On
the contrary, the Khedive was already an absolute
ruler. Scared)^ a trace of independent thought or
action could be found in the whole body politic of
Egypt. Ismail Paslia endeavoured to call free
institutions temporarily into existence as an instru-
ment through whose agency he miglit regain his
personal power, which was threatened by foreign
interference. It was a curious sight to see Ismail
Pasha, who was the living embodiment of despotic
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government in its most extreme form, posing as
an ultra-constitutional ruler who could not con-
scientiously place himself in opposition to the
national will. It was a still more curious sight to
see the same man, who had but recently pro-
tested that he could not pay his debts, suddenly
turn round and reject with disdain the proposals,
made to him by those who represented his creditors,
that he should declare himself insolvent. But
perhaps the highest point of interest in this
strange comedy was reached when the unfortunate
peasantry of Egypt, who were groaning under
Ismail Pasha's rule and who only asked to be
relieved of taxation without inquiring into the
effect such a relief would exercise on other in-
terests, were represented as being willing to incur
any sacrifice rather than submit to the disgrace
of national bankruptcy. It may be asserted with
absolute confidence that the mass of the Egyptian
people understood nothing of what was going on
at the time. The Notables, however, understood
something. In the first place, they understood
that the Khedive, for reasons of his own into
which it was no business of theirs to inquire,
wished them to say that they ardently desired the
establishment of certain institutions of the nature
of which they only had a vague idea, but which
were said to have produced excellent effects in
other countries. Whether or not the same bene-
ficial results would ensue from their adoption in
Egypt might be doubtful, but in any case it was
clear that the Khedive must be obeyed. In the
second place, they understood in a general way
that all the difficulties of the moment were due
to the fact that large sums of money were owing
to Europeans. They had seen the worst side of
European interference. That it should be exer-
cised in the true interests of the Egyptian people
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was not credible. When, therefore, it was repre-
sented to them that the last phase of European
interference was that the privileges of the classes
to which they belonged were threatened, it needed
no great amount of persuasion to enlist their sym-
pathies on the side of opposition to the new order
of things. Religious antipathy would also drive
them in the same direction.
It is, indeed, probable that, from the purely
Egyptian point of view, Ismail Pasha's plan would
have been more attractixe if the proposal to es-
tablish an Egyptian Parliament had been dropped
out of the programme, and if he had taken his
stand on the general feeling of dislike to Euro-
peans, and on "religious fanaticism. Appeals to
either of these sentiments would have been more
comprehensible to his followers, and would have
met with a more hearty response, than arguments
based on the establishment of institutions which
were foreign to the national traditions. Save to
a very few, such arguments were probably incom-
prehensible.
But Ismail Pasha was debarred from using arms
of this description, save to a very limited extent.
In the first place, he was not a fanatic, and re-
ligious fanaticism was a matter of which he had
had some experience. He knew its danger, and
when it had appeared he had on several occasions
adopted summary methods for stamping it out.
He did not enjoy the reputation of being a devout
Mohammedan, and, had not material interests and
the fear of disobedience to a despotic ruler been
brought into play, he would have exercised but little
influence over those classes who honestly repre-
sented ]Mohammedan devotion. In the second place,
it was a necessity of his position that he should
not go far in appealing to sentiments of this
description. He understood enough of European
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opinion to appreciate the fact tliat any such ap-
peals would forfeit the sympathies and evoke the
fears of Europe. This might be dangerous. From
every point of view it would be safer, and in
all probability more productive of result, if the
revolution were carried out in the name of
civilisation and progress, and under the banner of
constitutionalism. His followers could not, indeed,
be prevented from acting in some degree according
to tlieir own imperfect lights. "Large numbers of
the fanatical population " were summoned to Cairo.
Sir Frank Lascelles thought they " might become
a source of real danger." Provided proceedings of
this sort were kept within proper bounds, the}'
might afford powerful aid to the cause. But it
would be impolitic if the Khedive were too openly
associated with the crude ideas and ill-judged pro-
ceedings of his ignorant followers. It would be
wiser to pose as an enlightened ruler, following the
popular will and, at the same time, standing as a
guardian angel between Moslem fanaticism and
modern civilisation.
Ismail Pasha was employing dangerous instru-
ments. First, he encouraged mutiny in his own
army. Then he played with the uncongenial idea
of introducing free institutions into the country.
This was perilous work for a despotic ruler. The
soldiers had learnt their power, and even amongst
the poor ignorant people, who, at their master's
behest, asked for things of which the large majority
were completely ignorant, there might be some
few who would take him at his word. The seed
then sown did, in fact, bring forth some fruit at a
later period of Egyptian history.
For the moment, however, the success of the
mancEUvre appeared complete. Europe must
surely see that the Egyptian people were singularly
unanimous, and that an enlightened ruler was
CH. VI THE COUP D'ETAT 109
about to confer on them the blessings of a
constitutional form of government, which they
ardently desired. The Khedive had defied two
powerful Governments ; he had got rid of his
European advisers ; and he had appointed in their
places a number of men who would implicitly obey
his orders, and who, albeit free institutions were to
be introduced, would have no scruples in acting on
the most approved ])rinciples of personal govern-
ment. European Governments might perhaps
lecture him, but international rivalry was so
intense that no common action of a serious nature
was to be feared. He had, indeed, drawn a heavy
draft on the credulity of Europe. Even those who
were not conversant with Eastern affairs might not
unnaturally think that when an Oriental Gracchus
complained of sedition his arguments were not
to be accepted without some reserve. Nevertheless,
the scheme would probably have been successful if
the financial plan, which the Khedive had pledged
himself to carry out, had been based on any solid
foundation. If he had been able to pay his debts,
no excuse would have existed for further interfer-
ence from abroad. Unfortunately for the Khedive,
his financial plan was impossible of execution.
The entire scheme crumbled to the ground and, in
falling, overwhelmed its author.
CHAPTER VII
THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
April 1879
Declaration of bankruptcy— Principles of the settlement—The
Khedive's Civil List—The Ouchouri land-tax—The Rouznameh
loan—Ihe law of the Moukabala—Reductions of taxation—Com-
position with the creditors—Comments on the report—The Com-
missioners resign—The Khedive's counter-proposals— Revival of the
practices of the old regime—The Commissioners of the Debt
institute legal proceedings against the Egyptian Government—My
departure from Egypt.
During all this period, the Commission of Inquiry-
had been sitting with a view to the preparation of
a plan for the settlement of the financial situation.
It is unnecessary to enter into all the complicateci
details of the questions which came under the
consideration of the Commissioners. But it will
be desirable to state the main conclusions at which
they arrived.
The Commissioners began their report^ by stating
that the Egyptian Government were bankrupt, and,
moreover, that the state of bankruptcy had really
commenced on April 6, 1876, on whicli day tiie
Khedive suspended payment of the Treasury bills
fallintr due. It was true that since that date not
only had the interest on the debt been ])aid, but a
sum of £2,645,000 had been devoted to sinking
* Tlie first draft of this report was prepared by myself. It, of course,
underwent a good many modifications lu'fore a final text wass approved.
The French was revised by M. do IMignicres.
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fund. As purchases of stock were made in the
market at prices varying from 31J to 43, nominal
capital to the extent of £4,858,000 had been ex-
tinguished. On the other hand, the actual deficits
of the two years, 1877 and 1878. amounted to no less
than £4,822,000. The floating debt had, therefore,
been increased by an amount of £2,177,000 in
excess of the money applied to sinking fund.
"Payer les coupons," the Commissioners said,
"dans ces conditions, c'est distribuer des dividendes
fictifs, et Ton sait a quels resultats arrivent les
societes qui perseverent dans cette voie. Leur
situation parait brillante jusqu'au jour ou la mine
est irremediable." In truth, the taxpayers and
the creditors had alike suffered from the delay
which had occurred in recognising the true fiicts of
the case. The only sound starting-point for the
establishment of a better order of things was to be
found in facing the facts boldly. " Le pays," M. de
Blignieres said, "est saigne a blanc." JNIeasures
such as those which had been heretofore adopted
to produce a fictitious appearance of solvency, must
be discarded. The annual expenditure must be
brouii'ht down to the limits of the annual revenue.
It was a great point gained that these preliminary
truths should be officially recognised by a trust-
worthy body of Europeans, amongst whom were
included the representatives of the bondholders.
Having ascertained beyond doubt that the Egyp-
tian Government could not meet all their financial
engagements, the Commissioners proceeded to lay
down the principles which should form the basis of
a composition with the creditors of the State. It
was impossible to do justice to all the interests
involved. "Le systeme de gouverner le pays,"
we said, "jusqu'a present en vigueur a rendu
impossible de rendre justice a tons les interets
engages. Le seul r^sultat auquel le nouveau
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regime pourra aspirer, c'est de partager I'injustice
aussi equitablement que possible."
The Commissioners then laid down three
principles.
The first of these was that no sacrifice shduld
be demanded from the creditors until every reason-
able sacrifice had been made by the debtors. '* On
n'a pas," the Commissioners said, "a insister sur
I'equit^ de ce principe." It was, in fact, perfectly
just and logical. But in its application, a sub-
sidiary question naturally arose. Who in this case
were the debtors ? Morally speaking, the real
debtor was the Khedive. He had for years past
disposed absolutely of the revenues of Egypt.
He had contracted the debts without reference to
the wishes or true interests of the people over
whom, by the accident of birth, he had been called
to rule. Unfortunately, he had dragged his people
along with him. No moral responsibility whatso-
ever attached to them, for they had never been
consulted as regards the measures which had been
taken by the Khedive. But, however hard the
conclusion might appear, it was inevitable that
they should suffer from the faults of their ruler.
Considerations of equity and sound financial policy,
however, alike dictated moderation in the applica-
tion of the principle enunciated above. The people
of Egypt would have to make certain sacrifices,
but, the Commissioners added, *' il serait assur^-
ment contraire aux interets gen^raux de leur imposer
des sacrifices au-dessus de leurs forces. On verra
meme dans la suite de ce rapport que nous pro-
posons de leur accorder immediatement des sou-
lagements sensibles."
The second principle laid down by the Com-
missioners was that, in deciding on the degrees of
sacrifice which should be imposed on tiie different
classes of creditors, it was desirable to conform as
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much as possible to the procedure indicated by the
Egyptian code as that which should be followed in
dealing with the estate of a private individual who
was bankrupt.
In the third place, it was necessary that any
general arrangement which might be adopted
should be made obligatory on all the persons who
were interested. The number of creditors was
so large, and their claims were of such various
natures, that it was hopeless to expect unanimity in
the acceptance of any voluntary arrangement. A
small minority might, therefore, prevent the adop-
tion of any general scheme. The only way to avoid
this inconvenience was to pass a law, which would
have to be accepted by all the Powers, and which
would thus become binding on the Mixed Tribunals
and on all the parties concerned.
Having laid down these principles, the Com-
missioners proceeded to deal with the personal
position of the Khedive.
His Highness had given up most of the estates
of the Khedivial family,^ upon the security of which
a loan had been raised. The proceeds of this loan
were about to be applied to the liquidation of the
floating debt. It was now necessary to fix the
amount of the Khedive's Civil List. "Assur^-
ment," the Commissioners said, "au moment de
demander de nouveaux sacrifices de la part de ses
creanciers. Son Altesse ne voudra pas que ses
dotations soient fixees k un chiffre trop devd"
The Civil List was, therefore, fixed at £E.300,000
a year.
The question of the sacrifices to be imposed
on the Egyptian taxpayers presented greater
difficulties. Three important points had to be
* The residue which remained over eventually acquired great value.
Quite recently, a plot of land in the town of Cairo belonging to eome of
the Khedivial prince*> sold for no less than £600,000.
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decided. The first was whether the tax on the
Ouchouri lands should be increased. The second
was whether the Rouznameh loan was to be in-
cluded amongst the debts of the State. The third
was how to deal with the law of the Moukabala.
The financial future of the country depended more
especially on whether any satisfactory solution could
be found to the third of these questions.
Without going into any lengthy description of
the system of land-tenure existing in Egypt, it
will be sufficient for the purposes of the present
arscument to state that the land was at that time
divided into two main categories, Ouchouri and
Kharadji.^ Ouchouri lands, as their name implies,
are supposed to pay a tithe to the State. They
were originally, for the most part, fiefs granted by
the ruler of the country to his followers. The
assessment on the Kharadji was much higher than
in the case of the Ouchouri lands, and moreover
it was, in theory at all events, variable at the
will of the Government. At the time the Com-
mission of Inquiry sat, 1,823,000 acres of land
were held under Ouchouri, and 3,487,000 acres
under Kharadji tenure. In 1877, the total amount
of land-tax paid on Kharadji lands amounted
to £E.3,143,000, as against £E.333,000 paid by
the Ouchouri landowners. In Lower Egypt, the
Kharadji lands were assessed at from P.T. 120
to 170 an acre. In exceptional cases, the tax
was as much as, and occasionally even in excess
of P.T. 200. The average rate paid on Kharadji
lands throughout Egypt was P.T. 116-2. Tlie
maximum rate payable on Ouchouri lands was
P.T. 83-5 an acre. In many cases, they paid a
mere quit-rent. The average rate throughout
1 "Ouchouri" is derived from the Arabic word "Ushr," meaning
the tenth part. " Kharaj " was the word orii;:iiially applied to the
tribute paid, for the most part, by tlio inliabitauts of uoQ-Moslem
countries to their Moslem coiitiuerors.
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Egypt was P.T. 30*30 an acre. The quality of
the Oiichouri lands varied greatly. They included
some of the best and also some of the worst land
in the country. The best qualities of land were
largely held by the Khedivial family. All the
Ouchouri lands were in the possession of persons
of wealth and importance.
Before the first report of the Commission of
Inquiry was sent in, tlie Khedive had ex{)ressed
his willingness to raise the tax on the Ouchouri
lands. The Commissioners had now to consider
in what manner effect should be given to this
proposal. They recommended that a cadastral
survey should be made with the least possible
delay, and that, on reassessing the land-tax, the
distinction between Ouchouri and Kharadji lands
should disappear. As, however, a cadastral survey
would take a long time, they proposed that the
Ouchouri land-tax should be at once increased by
£E. 150,000 a year, to be distributed ratably.
Turning to the question of the Rouznameh loan,
the Commissioners pointed out that the Govern-
ment had considered it as a tax, and that there
was manifestly never any intention of paying in-
terest, and still less of repaying the capital to the
subscribers. Of the truth of these statenients there
could be no manner of doubt. In 1877, the Chamber
of Notables agreed to a proposal that the payment
of interest on the loan should be suspended. At
the same time, " il fut ordonne qu'aussitot que
I'integralitd de la Moukabala aurait cte perdue, on
devrait proceder a la perception des £3,000,000,
solde des £5,000,000 originairement fixees connne
le montant total de Temprunt Rouznameh." Tliis
decision threw a strong light on the complete
subserviency of the Chamber of Notables, as also
on the manner in which the Egyptian Govern-
ment regarded their engagements both towards the
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Rouznameh bondholders and towards those who
had paid the Moukabala.
There could, of course, be no question of
collecting any further sums on account of the
Rouznameh loan. The only point to be decided
was what was to be done as regards the money
already collected. After full consideration, the
Commissioners embodied their recommendations
in the following words : " Nous croyons devoir
proposer, conform^ment aux intentions primitives
du Gouvernement Egyptien, de considerer comme
un impot la somme per9ue a valoir sur I'emprunt
Rouznameh et de la rayer du montant des dettes
de I'Etat."
This proposal of the Commissioners was based
on two grounds.
In tlie first place, it was thought that the non-
recognition by the State of the Rouznameh loan
was a fiiir sacrifice to demand of the debtors, more
especially as, in connection with other matters, the
Commissioners proposed measures which would
afford a sensible relief to the taxpayers of Egypt.
In the second place, if the loan had been
recognised as a State debt, great practical diffi-
culties would have arisen in giving effect to the
decision. It was clear that no one could be recog-
nised as a State creditor unless he could afford
proof of having lent money to the Government.
It would have been necessary to insist on this
point. Otherwise, fictitious claims would have
cropped up on all sides. In the majority of cases,
no proofs would have been forthcoming. No
bonds or scrip were ever delivered to the sub-
scribers to the loan. Even simple receipts for
the money paid into the Treasury had only been
given to a few favoured individuals. Under these
circumstances, it would have been practically
impossible to do justice to all the subscribers, more
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especially to those in the humblest classes of society
who were most deserving of sympathy.
Considering the financial situation which then
existed, the decision of the Commissioners on this
subject was perfectly justifiable.
The most difficult question of all, however, was
how to deal with the Moukabala. It is unneces-
sary to dwell any further on the ruinous nature
of this transaction in so far as the State was con-
cerned. The only procedure which, from a fiscal
point of view, could in any way have justified it,
would have been to have applied the whole of
the money paid in virtue of the law of the Mouka-
bala either to the extinction of debt, or to the
execution of public works which would have
yielded a direct revenue to the State. Un-
fortunately, nothing of this sort was done. The
financial arrangements of November 1876 did,
indeed, contemplate the application of a portion
of the Moukabala funds to the extinction of debt,
but before that period the money had been applied
to current expenditure, and even after November
1876 the greater portion of the Moukabala money
was devoted to the payment of interest on the debt.
It was certain that the Egyptian Government
never had any intention of respecting the engage-
ments which they had taken towards those who had
paid the Moukabala. It was discovered in the
course of the inquiries made by the Commissioners
that the draft of a law had been prepared, under
instructions received from the Egyptian Govern-
ment, in virtue of which an "impot sur la pro-
priety " was to be imposed on the expiration of the
law of the Moukabala. It was estimated that :his
new tax would yield £900,000 a year. The inten-
tions, as also the bad faith of the Government
were, therefore, sufficiently clear.
It was equally certain that the optional character
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of the Moukabala payments was delusive. "On
ne pent pas douter," the Commissioners said,
"que le caractere facultatif de cette taxe n'existait
pas en reahte. Les contribuables I'ont toujours
consid^ree comme aussi obligatoire que toutes les
autres taxes. Le fait qua peine la nouvelle
administration ^tablie, ils refusent de tous les cotes
de continuer le paiement de la Moukabala, en se
referant a son caractere facultatif, prouve I'exacti-
tude de cette assertion."
It was clear that, if the reformed administration
continued to collect the Moukabala, they would
have to do so in a very different spirit from that
which had heretofore animated the Egyptian
Government. The engagements taken towards the
landowners would have to be respected. When
once the Moukabala payments had ceased, the land-
tax would have to be reduced to one-half of its
original amount. No violation of the law or
evasion of its spirit could be permitted. But, the
Commissioners asked, "la nouvelle administration
peut-elle remplir les engagements pris par ses
predecesseurs ?"
There could be but one answer to this question.
"Nous n'avons pas," the Commissioners said, "la
moindre hesitation a affirmer que, quel que puisse
etre le desir du Gouvernement actuel de remplir
les engagement pris par ses predecesseurs, les
necessites imperieuses de la situation ne lui per-
mettront pas de le faire."
Obviously, the only honest course was to state
the truth boldly. The Commissioners held that
the new INIinistry should not render itself re-
sponsible for the continuance of a system which
was " radicalement vicieux et d'une ap])lication
impossible." They therefore reconnnended that
no further collections should be made on account
of the Muukabala.
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It remained to be determined what should be
done as regards those persons who had ah'eady
paid the Moukabala in whole or in part. It
appeared from the accounts furnished by the
Egyptian Government that about £16,000,000 had
already been paid on account of Moukabala, but
when the figures came to be examined, it was found
that the Government had not in reality received
nearly so large a sum as this.
In the first place, considerable sums had been
paid in "ragaas " ; that is to say, certificates acknow-
ledging a debt due by the Government to the tax-
payer. " On ne pent guere douter," the Commis-
sioners said, " que I'acceptation de ces ' ragaas ' par
le Tresor n'ait donne lieu a de nombreux abus ; car,
par suite de ce systeme quelques proprietaires
puissants ont pu arriver au degrevement dune
moitie de leur impot foncier sans rien payer en
especes." The procedure, in fact, was after this
fashion. Some favoured person obtained from the
Finance Ministry an acknowledgment of a fictitious
debt due to him by the Government. This docu-
ment was paid into the Treasury in discharge of the
sum due by the same person on account of Mouka-
bala. His land-tax was then reduced by one-half,
without his having expended a farthing. It was
impossible to state with precision the extent to
which this practice had been carried on, but there
could be no doubt that it had occasioned a heavy
loss to the Treasury.
Another point had to be considered. Many of
the payments made, even in money, on account of
the Moukabala were fictitious. They had only
been possible because sums due on account of other
taxes were allowed to remain unpaid. A single
example will suffice to show how the system worked
in practice. The amount of land-tax due by four
villages, chosen at hazard in the province of
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Galioubieh, was £1640. The amount due on
account of Moukabala in these vilhiges was £1472.
The total amount due was, therefore, £3112. In
the year 1878, £2251 was collected in these four
villages. Of this amount, £1472, that is to say the
total sum due, was credited to JNloukabala, leaving
only £779 available for ordinary land -lax. The
latter, therefore, remained unpaid to the extent of
£861.
When, however, all the deductions based on the
above facts were made, there still remained a large
sum due by the Government to those persons who
had really paid the Moukabala. The most equit-
able course to have pursued would have been to
have raised a loan and to have repaid this money ;
but in the then exhausted state of Egyptian credit,
the adoption of this course was impossible.
It may be convenient if, passing over the recom-
mendations made by the Commissioners of Inquiry,
the course eventually pursued as regards those
persons who had really paid the Moukabala is here
stated. It was found that, when all legitimate
deductions had been made, the sum really due was
£9,500,000. Under the law of Liquidation of July
17, 1880, an annual sum of £150,000 was allotted
for fifty years to those who had ])aid the Mouka-
bala. They are thus now receiving interest at the
rate of about 1^ per cent on the capital sums which
they paid.
In 1876, the Egyptian Government estimated
the annual receipts from the Moukabala at
£1,650,000. The amount paid in 1877 was
£1,337,000, and in 1878, £1,000,000. For the
future, the country was, of course, relieved of these
payments. On the other hand, the land-tax was
raised by £1,130,000.
The results of this change affected the Ouchouri
and Kharadji proprietors in different proportions.
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Out of 3,487,000 acres of Kharadji land, only
240,000 acres had paid the Moukabala in full. For
the most part, therefore, the Kharadji landowners
were slightly relieved of taxation.
The case of the Ouchouri landowners was
different. There were 1,323,000 acres of Ouchouri
land in Egypt. On about 480,000 acres, the
Moukabala had been paid in full, but most of the
payments had been made in "ragaas," and were,
therefore, fictitious. The changes in the law fell
most severely on this class. Not only did they
have to pay the amount of land-tax, as it stood
previous to the enactment of the law of the
Moukabala, but they also had to bear their share
of the increase of £150,000 which was placed on
the Ouchouri lands. Even, then, however, they
paid much less than the Kharadji landowners.
The Moukabala had been paid in part on
725,000 acres of Ouchouri land. On these lands,
tlie immediate increase of taxation, if any, was
slight.
Finally, no Moukabala payments had been made
on 118,000 acres of Ouchouri land. The owners
of these lands were not, of course, affected by the
repeal of the law of the Moukabala, but they had
to pay their share of the £150,000 increase on all
Ouchouri lands.
In order to compensate for the withdrawal of
the privileges accorded by the law of the Moukd-
bala, the Commissioners proposed several measures,
from the adoption of which great benefits, it was
rightly thought, would accrue to the population.
The arrears due for land-tax prior to January 1,
1876, and amounting to about £30,000, were to be
remitted. All agriculturists were to be relieved
from payment of the professional tax. It was
estimated that the adoption of this measure would
involve a relief of taxation amounting to £80,000
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a year. The poll-tax, yielding £205,000 a year,
was to be abolished ; so also were the octroi dues
in the villages, yielding £21,000 a year ; tlie " droits
de voirie" in the vilhiges, yielding £8000 a year;
the market dues in the villages, yielding £10,000
a year ; the weighing dues in the villages, yielding
£17,000 a year; the dues on stamping mats and
tissues, yielding £23,000 a year ; the dues on the
sale of cattle, yielding £1500 a year ; and some
other minor taxes. In all, a remission of taxation
to the extent of about £400,000 a year was
proposed.^
On the whole, although it is, in my opinion, to
be regretted that no higher rate of interest was
allowed to those to whom money was really
due on account of Moukabala, it may be said
that the proposals of the Commissioners were as
just to the people of Egypt as the very difficult
circumstances of the case admitted.
It is unnecessary to dwell at any length on
the proposals made by the Commissioners in
respect to the creditors of the Egyptian Govern-
ment. Those proposals underwent considerable
modifications before a final settlement was eventu-
ally made in July 1880. It will be sufficient
to say that the general principle on which the
Commissioners based their recommendations was
that the special security held by each class of
creditor was to be respected as far as possible.
No change was* proposed in the position of the
Preference bondholders. The Commissioners were
of opinion that for the moment it was impossible
to state definitely what should be the rate of
interest on the Unified Stock. They proposed,
therefore, that the rate should be temporarily
* The relief was in reality much greater, for it cannot be doubted
that far larger sums were collected than were paid into the Goverumeut
Treasury.
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reduced from 6 to 5 per cent. The rate of interest
on the Daira Sanieh and Daira Khassa loans was
also reduced to 5 per cent. As regards the
creditors who held no special securities, a sum of
about £6,301,000 was available to liquidate claims
amounting to about £8,210,000. After discharging
certain debts which had to be paid in full, tiie
Commissioners recommended that the balance left
over should be distributed ratably amongst the
creditors. It was estimated that sufficient money
would be available to pay the creditors 52 per cent
of their claims.
Finally, the Commissioners prepared a Budget
for the year 1879. The revenue was estimated at
£'.),067,000, and the expenditure at £8,803,000, thus
leaving a surplus of £204,000. A sum of £3, 130,000
was included in the estimates for administrative
expenditure.
Such, therefore, were the general conclusions at
which the Commissioners arrived. Fifteen months
were to elapse before their recommendations, in a
modified shape, took the form of law. Subse-
quently, important political events ensued. The
work of fiscal reform had to be recommenced under
different auspices from those which existed in 1879.
Many years were to pass before the crisis in
Egyptian financial affairs could be said to ha^e
terminated. Some errors were, without doubt,
made by the Commissioners. Nevertheless, the
work performed by the Commission of Inquiry
has stood the test of time as well as could be
expected, looking to the difficult circumstances of
the situation with which they had to deal. It
afforded a sound starting-point for further reforms.
For the first time, an earnest effort had been made
to grapple with the difficulties of the Egyptian
financial situation. Tlie inquiries of the Commis-
sioners threw a flood of lii»ht on the extent of
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Egy})tian liabilities, the resources available to
meet those liabilities, and the system under which
the Government had heretofore been conducted.
Ad consilium de republicd dandum, caput est, tiosse
rempublicam. This elementary truth had been too
much forgotten in dealing with Egyptian affairs.
Now that the true facts of the situation were more
accurately known, although mistakes might be
made in subsidiary matters, it was no longer pos-
sible to draw erroneous conclusions as to tlie main
questions at issue. The Egyptian Treasury was
insolvent. The system of government had been
as bad as possible. Both the people of Egypt and
the creditors of the Egyptian Government were
alike interested in the adoption of an improved
system. It was futile to attempt to impose fresh
burthens on the country. On the contrary, certain
taxes should be abolished.
Even if the Connnissioners had done nothing
more than bring home the main facts of the situa-
tion to all concerned, they would have deserved
well both of the Egyptian people and of all who
were interested in the prosperity of Egypt.
The report of the Commission of Inquiry was
signed on April 8. On the previous day, the
Khedive dismissed his European Ministers, and
charged Chdrif Pasha with the formation of a new
Ministry. The situation was thus completely
changed. All hopes of introducing a reformed
system of administration had for the time to be
abandoned ; and, without reforms, the scheme pro-
posed by the Commission of Inquiry was incapable
of execution. The Commissioners, therefore,
tendered their resignations to the Khedive. They
were, of course, accepted.
The counter project which ^ was prepared by the
Khedive in concert with the Chamber of Notables
> Vide ante, p. 102.
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was published on April 23. Little need be said
of this plan. It was open to the most serious
objections.
In the first place, it was impossible of execution.
The revenue for 1879 was estimated at £9,837,000.
This was nearly £800,000 in excess of the estimate
made by the Commissioners of Inquiry, which was
£9,067,000. Even this latter estimate erred on the
side of optimism, and it was certain that the collec-
tion of such a sum as that named in the scheme of
the Chamber of Notables was impossible without
resorting to the oppressive methods of the past,
and without again sacrificing the future to the
present.
In the second place, although both the Khedive
and his advisers had rejected the idea of national
bankruptcy as dishonourable, the settlement which
they proposed did, as a matter of fact, constitute
an act of bankruptcy. The interest on the Unified
Debt was to be reduced from 6 to 5 per cent,
although hopes were held out that payment of
interest at a higher rate would be resumed at some
later period. In fact, as the Commissioners of
Inquiry pointed out in a letter addressed to the
Khedive, the scheme "protestait contra toute
declaration de faillite, mais en consacrait la realite."
These objections would alone have been fatal
to the scheme. Moreover, there was one very
significant omission in the project. There could
be no hope for reforms in Egypt unless a fixed
sum were assigned for the private expenditure of
the Khedive and his family. The scheme of the
Chamber of Notables made no mention of any
Civil List. In fact, the basis of the plan was
that the Khedive should regain his personal power,
and that the upper classes should preserve their
privileges intact.
The effect of the change of policy inaugurated
126 MODERN EGYPT ft. i
by the Khedive made itself immediately felt.
On April 19, Sir Frank Lascelles reported that
" Shahin Paslia, the Minister of War, had gone
to Behera, probably for the purpose of collecting
money; his former position as Insjjector-General in
Lower Egypt having secured for him an unenviable
notoriety as one of the harshest and most successful
tax-gatherers in the country."
A few days later, the British Vice- Consul at
Zagazig wrote : " You ask how is the new regime
working ? Worse than before. Three-fourths of
the taxes and one-half of the Moukabala are now
exacted by means of the usual oppressions. The
fellah, having no crop of cotton or grain to realise,
is obliged to have recourse to usurers for money,
which he gets at some 4 to 5 per cent per month.
He has no alternative if he would avoid the
* courbash.' The * Zawats ' (aristocracy), mean-
while, only pay the ' Mai ' (land-tax proper) at
their pleasure, and, therefore, see everything
couleur de rose. . . . Omar Pasha Lutfi, Inspector-
General of Lower Egy})t, has been here of late,
and has given stringent orders for the collection of
money by all possible means."
In a word, all the abuses of the old regime
returned immediately the new Mmistry came into
power.
In the meanwhile, the Commissioners of the
Debt were considering what action they should
take. Under the changed circumstances of the
situation, there was but one course left for them to
pursue. They commenced a lawsuit against the
Government in the Mixed Tribunals.
For some while previous to these events, I had
been wishing to leave Egypt. I had, however,
become interested in the work. So long as there
appeared any hope of placing Egyptian financial
affairs on a sound footing, I hesitated whether to
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go or to remain. All hopes of this sort seemed,
however, to be dashed to the ground. Under the
circumstances, I did not care to remain any longer
in the country. I therefore resigned my appoint-
ment and left Egypt on May 24, 1879. From
that date until I returned as Controller-General
after the abdication of Ismail Pasha, I cannot
speak from personal experience of what occurred
in Egypt. Sir Auckland Colvin was appointed
to be Commissioner of the Debt in my place.
CHAPTER VIII
THE FALL OF ISMAIL PASHA
April-June 1879
Embarrassment of the European Powers—Turkey—England—France
—Italy—Russia—Germany and Austria—The French and British
Governments demand the leinstatement of the European Min-
isters—The Khedive declines to reinstate them
—
Question of re-
establishing the Control—The German Government protest against
the proceedings of the Khedive—The British and French Govern-
ments advise abdication—The Khedive appeals to the Sultan
—
The Sultan deposes the Khedive—Inauguration of Prince Tewfik
—Ismail Pasha leaves Egypt—Remarks on his reign.
The action taken by the Khedive in dismissing his
EuropeanMinisters embarrassed the various Powers
who were interested in the affairs of Egypt. More-
over, all the most important Governments in Europe
claimed a right to make their voices heard in any
general settlement of Egyptian questions. The
local difficulties of the situation were great. They
were rendered greater by the fact that no serious
step could be taken without producing a clash of
conflicting international interests.
The Sultan was concerned lest his suzerain
rights should be endangered. Turkish policy was,
as usual, vacillating and inconsistent. Should not
the Khedive be deposed ? Nay, did not an oppor-
tunity now present itself to realise the pernicious
dream which had haunted the minds of Turkish
statesmen since the days when Mehemet Ali won
by the power of the sword a quasi-independent
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position for himself and his dynasty ? His de-
scendant had shamefully abused his power. The
people of Egypt were groaning under his yoke.
Europe was dissatisfied with him. Could not all
this be rectified by cancelling the Firmans and by
the despatch of a Turkish Governor, with a few
sturdy Ottoman battalions at his back, to rule the
country ? Truly, whispered interested diplomacy
in the garb of a candid friend, but is not all
this European interference somewhat dangerous ?
Might not the principle of deposition by reason of
misgovernment be applied elsewhere ? Was it not
possible that public opinion, which was now so
powerful, might apply the Horatian maxim and
contend that many of those things, which in-
quisitive Commissioners of Inquiry had said of
Egypt, might, with a change of name, be applied
to other parts of the Ottoman dominions ? This
argument was not without its weight. From this
point of view, perhaps it would be better to con-
gratulate the Khedive on his defiant attitude, and
to encourage him in his opposition to the appoint-
ment of European JNIinisters. But then came rival
diplomatic mutterings. What would be the
position of the Sultan if the two Western Powers,
with a mere appearance of consultation with Con-
stantinople, deposed the Khedive on their own
initiative ? If that were to happen, the world
would see that Turkish suzerainty over Egypt was
nothing more than a mere diplomatic expression.
Would it not, therefore, be better to act at once so
as to prevent others from taking action ? Under
all these circumstances, perhaps the best plan of all
for a bewildered ruler, who was, perforce, obliged to
speak the language of civilisation, but whose prin-
ciples of civil government were very similar to those
of his warlike ancestors, when they planted their
horse-tails on the banks of the Bosphorus, was to
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foil back on the reflection that the times were out
of joint, to await events, and to take no decisive
action of any kind.
The difhculties of the British Government were
also great. Their pohtical interests in Egypt were
of a nature which precluded total inaction. Indeed,
there was manifestly a danger that a policy would
be forced upon them which it had always been one
of the objects of British statesmanship to avoid.
" The Enghshman," a man of literary genius had
said some thirty years previously, " straining far
over to hold his loved India, will plant a firm foot
on the banks of the Nile and sit in the seats of the
faithful."^ Unless care were taken, the prophecy
might be on the point of fulfilment, and the Anglo-
Saxon race, in addition to responsibilities which
were already world-wide, would have thrust upon
it the burthen of governing Egypt.
British diplomacy, which may at times have
been mistaken, but which was certainly honest, did
its best to throw off the Egyptian burden. But
circumstances were too strong to be arrested by
diplomatic action. Egypt was to fall to Kinglake's
Englishman. Moreover, it was to fall to him,
although some were opposed to his going there,
others were indifferent as to whether he went or
not, none much wished him to go, and, not only did
he not want to go there himself, but he struggled
strenuously and honestly not to be obliged to go.
The Moslem eventually accepted the accomplished
fact, and muttered " Kismet " ; but the European,
blinded by international jealousy, not unfrequently
attributed the whole affair to a dee})-laid })lot, and
found in British policy as regards Egypt another
convincing proof of the perfidy of Albion.
French diplomacy, on the other hand, was
mainly interested in preventing the Englishman
1 King-lake's EoUien, p. 286.
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from planting his foot firmly on the banks oi the
Nile, and was, moreover, hampered by the financial
necessities of "Great Paris Syndicates," and the
like. A Turkish occupation was undesirable, the
remedy being, in French opinion, worse than the
disease, whilst the French Government of the day
had the wisdom to see that a joint Anglo-French
occupation would probably become a fertile source
of disagreement between France and England.
Had not Prince Bismarck been credited with the
blunt epigrammatic saying that Egypt would be to
France and England even as Schleswig-Holstein
to Prussia and Austria ?
Italy hovered around, clamorous to satisfy the
restless ambition, which might perhaps have
better been employed in improving the lot of
the Tuscan or Neapolitan peasant, by obtaining
some share of government on the cosmopolitan soil
of Egypt.
Russia had no local interests to serve, and stood
aloof. Possibly, however, as events developed,
something might occur which could be turned to
the advantage of INIuscovite interests. It was to
be observed, moreover, that the shipwreck of a
Mohammedan Government afforded an additional
proof that Orientals could not manage their own
affairs. It behoved, therefore, any one who claimed
to be heir-apparent to any part of the Ottoman
dominions to be on the watch. In the meanwhile,
perhaps a little diplomatic capital might be made
out of the affair by posing as the protector of
Turkey against foreign encroachments. " Nous
avons," said a well - known Russian diplomatist,
"tellement ^corchd ces pauvres Turcs au nord,
c'est bien le moins que nous pourrons faire de les
protdger un peu au sud."
Germany, which connoted Austria, had so far
interfered but little in, Egyptian affairs. Never-
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theless, the co-operation of France and England
in the execution of a common policy was perliaps
regarded with no very friendly eye at Berlin.
There were, moreover, certain German creditors
of the Egyptian Government who had obtained
judgments in the INIixed Courts. Were they not
to be paid ? Prince Bismarck would shortly ask
that question, and when the master of many
legions asked a question, it was understood that
he expected some satisfactory reply.
The responsibility of taking the initiative de-
volved on the British and French Governments.
It was evidently desirable, if possible, to avoid
the extreme step of deposing Ismail Pasha,
Supposing he refused to abdicate, it might become
necessary to use force. In that case, both Govern-
ments might be obliged to adopt the policy which
each honestly wished to avoid. INIoreover, the
summary dismissal of the European Ministers,
though an unwise act, and one which constituted a
grave discourtesy to both the British and French
Governments, was not a violation of any positive
engagement taken by the Khedive. On every
ground, therefore, it was desirable to see what
could be done by remonstrance before resorting to
extreme measures. After the matter had been
discussed in London and Paris, the two Govern-
ments agreed on a common line of action. In a
despatch addressed to Sir Frank Lascelles on
April 25, Lord Salisbury expressed himself in the
following terms :
—
" The Khedive is well aware that the con-
siderations which compel Her Majesty's Govern-
ment to take an hiterest in the destinies of Egypt
have led them to pursue no other policy than that
of developing the resources and securing the good
government of the country. They have hitherto
considered the independence of the Khedive
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and the maintenance of his dynasty as important
conditions for the attainment of these ends ; and
the same sentiments have, they are Avell assured,
animated the Government of France. . . . We
would rather assume that the decision thus hastily
taken by His Highness, both with respect to the
future conduct of the reform and the attitude he
proposes to maintain towards the two Governments,
is not final. We prefer to look to his future action
for a favourable interpretation of the conduct he
has lately pursued. But if he continues to ignore
the obligations imposed upon him by his past
acts and assurances, and persists in declining the
assistance of European Ministers whom the two
Powers may place at his disposal, we must conclude
that the disregard of engagements which has
marked his recent action was the result of a settled
plan, and that he deliberately renounces all pre-
tension to their friendship. In such a case, it will
only remain for the two Cabinets to reserve to
themselves an entire liberty of appreciation and
action in defending their interests in Egypt, and
in seeking the arrangements best calculated to
secure the good government and prosperity of the
country."
When the Khedive dismissed his European
Ministers, he was well aware of the serious nature
of the step which he had taken. His first intention
was to adopt a defiant attitude. An oath was
administered to the superior officers of the army
pledging them "to bear true allegiance to the
Khedive, and to resist all the enemies of the
country, of himself, and of his family." The
strength of the army was at the same time increased.
A few days, however, sufficed to show that the
Khedive could not count on the loyalty of his own
troops. Writing on April 26, Sir Frank Lascelles,
after dwelling on the misery and discontent caused
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by the harsh measures of the new Ministry, added:
"The discontent caused by such a state of things
exists, I am informed, to a large extent in the
army, and has given rise to a feehng of hostility
against the Khedive, not only among the private
soldiers, who are recruited from among the suffer-
ing classes of the population, but also among
the officers, who, although they may be strongly
opposed to European interference, regard the
Khedive as being responsible for the disasters that
have fallen upon the country."
When the British and French Consuls-General
communicated to the Khedive the views expressed
in Lord Salisbury's despatch of April 25, he depre-
cated any idea that he should have been guilty
of intentional discourtesy towards the British and
French Governments, but he declined to reinstate
the European Ministers. It was, indeed, obvious
to every one in Egypt that their reinstatement was
undesirable, even if it had been possible.
Some discussion then took place as to the form
in which Europeans should be associated with the
government of Egypt. There could be but little
hope that the revival of the Control would lead to
any satisfactory results. With whatever nominal
authority the Controllers might have been invested,
they would have had no real power. They would
not have been supported by any external force, or
by the willing assistance of the Khedive, or by the
sympathy of the peo})le. They would have been
associated with Ministers belonging to the retro-
grade Turkish ])arty, with whose ideas they would
have been unable to sympathise. Under such cir-
cumstances, their control would have been illusory,
whilst, had they been nominated, the Governments
of England and France would, at least in ap})ear-
ance, have assumed some responsibility for the
financial catastrophe which was evidently impending.
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The idea of reviving the Control was, therefore,
wisely set aside.
In truth, every day it was becoming more
apparent that no satisfactory solution of Egyptian
difficulties was possible so long as Ismail Pasha
remained at the head of affairs. The action of the
German Government hastened the decision which
would probably in any case have been taken,
though perhaps somewhat later. The German
Consul-General in Cairo was instructed to declare
to the Khedive "that the Imperial Government
looks upon the Decree of April 22, by which the
Egyptian Government at their own will regulate
the matters relating to the debt, thereby abolishing
existing and recognised rights, as an open and
direct violation of the international enoaorements
contracted at the institution of the judicial reform ;
that it must declare the Decree to be devoid of
any legally binding effect in regard to the com-
petency of the JNIixed Courts of Justice and the
rights of the subjects of the Empire, and must hold
the Viceroy responsible for all the consequences
of his unlawful proceedings." The other Great
Powers of Europe joined in this protest, although
the form of communication to the Khedive under-
went some modifications.
The end was evidently approaching. On June 19,
Sir Frank Lascelles, acting under Lord Salisbury's
instructions, made the following communication to
the Khedive :
—
"The French and English Governments are
agreed to advise your Highness officially^ to
abdicate and to leave Egypt. Should Your
Highness follow this advice, our Governments
will act in concert in order that a suitable Civil
List should be assigned to you, and that the order
' A private communication to the same effect had been made some
days previously.
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of succession, in virtue of which Prince Tewfik will
succeed Your Highness, should not be disturbed.
We must not conceal from Your Highness that if
you refuse to abdicate, and if you compel the
Cabinets of London and Paris to address them-
selves directly to the Sultan, you will not be able
to count either upon obtaining the Civil List or
upon the maintenance of the succession in favour
of Prince Tewfik." It was necessary to give a
warning as to the possibility of the succession
passing away from Prince Tewfik. According to
Mohammedan law, Prince Abdul Halim was the
rightful heir, but the Firman of June 8, 1873, laid
down that the succession was to proceed by right
of primogeniture. The Khedive had obtained this
concession from the Sultan by the expenditure
of large sums of money. There was now some
danger that his efforts to keep the succession for
his children would have been made in vain. It
was known that the candidature of Prince Halim
found favour at Constantinople.
Simultaneously with the transmission of orders
to Sir Frank Lascelles that he should, in con-
junction with his French colleague, advise the
Khedive to abdicate, a despatch was written by
Lord Salisbury stating the reasons why the British
Government had been led to take this decision.
" It is not possible," Lord Salisbury said, " to
review the events which ended in the dismissal
of the European Ministers without the conviction
that the Khedive never sincerely accepted the
limitations of his power proposed by the Com-
mission, and was quite resolved to resume his
full prerogative as soon as the immediate pur-
poses of his a})p;uent concession should have been
answered.
"Tlie two Powers have given to His Higlmess
ample time to recall any luisty step, and to re-
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enter, if he had been willing to do so, upon the
path of reform marked out by the International
Commission. He has refused to avail himself of
any such opportunity, and has only employed the
interval of delay in renewing the extortion and
cruelty by which his Treasury had formerly been
filled. It therefore remains for the two Govern-
ments, in accordance with the warning addressed
to His Highness by them in their despatches of
the 25th of April, to consider the course which
is necessary for defending their interests in Egypt,
and securing the good government of the country.
" It is evident that the remedies for misgovern-
ment hitherto proposed have been tried and have
wholly failed. . . . Any further attempt on the
part of the Powers to assist the Khedive in avert-
ing the consequences of his own misgovernment
can have no other effect than to make them
responsible for it in the future. His power to
frustrate all projects of reform, and his resolve to
use it, have been sufficiently demonstrated by events.
*' If Egypt were a country in whose past history
the Powers had no share, and to whose future
destiny it was possible for them to be indifferent,
their wisest course would be to renounce at this
point all further concern with the relations between
the Egyptian Ruler and his subjects. But, to
England at least, this policy is impossible. The
geographical situation of Egypt, as well as the
responsibility which the English Government have
in past times incurred for the actual conditions
under which it exists as a State, make it impossible
to leave it to its fate. They are bound, both by
duty and interest, to do all that lies in their power
to arrest misgovernment, before it results in the
material ruin and almost hicurable disorder to
which it is evident by other Oriental examples
that such misgovernment will necessarily lead.
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"In tlie case of Egypt, the evil has not yet gone
so far but that it may be arrested by changes of
small scope and immediate operation. The sole
obstacle to reform appears to lie in the character
of its Ruler. His financial embarrassments lead
almost inevitably to oppression, and his bad faith
frustrates all friendly efforts to apply a remedy.
There seems to be no doubt that a change of policy
can only be obtained by a change of Ruler.
"It may be the duty of the Western Powers to
submit these considerations to the Sultan, to whose
Firman the Khedive owes his power. But before
taking a step so grave, and which, in its results,
may possibly be disastrous not only to the Khedive
but to his family, it is right, in the first instance, to
intimate to the Khedive the conclusion at which
the two Powers have arrived, and to give him the
opportunity of withdrawing, under favourable and
honourable conditions, from a position which his
character and his past career have unfitted him to
fill."
When the British and French Consuls-General
communicated to the Khedive the views enter-
tained by their Governments, he asked that time
should be given to him to consider the matter. On
June 21, he informed them that he had referred
the question to the Sultan. There was, in fact,
some hope of support from Constantinople. The
Khedive had sent a special agent to the Sultan.
Money had been spent in bribes. Moreover, the
jealousy of the Sultan had been excited by repre-
sentations that the two Western Powers intended
to disregard his sovereign rights. The Khedive,
therefore, felt confident of su]>port, and for a
moment it appeared probable that support would
be accorded to him. The European Powers were,
however, now all combined. Germany, Austria,
Russia, and finally Italy, advised the Khedive to
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abdicate. Italian adhesion was, however, some-
what tardily given. Italy had throughout shown
some disposition to support Ismail Pasha.
It required some strong remonstrances on the
part of the Ambassadors at Constantinople to
prevent encouragement being given to the Khedive
by the Sultan. If, however, the Khedive were to
be deposed, the Sultan preferred that the act of
deposition should emanate from himself, rather
than that it should result from any independent
action taken by the two ^Vestern Powers. On
the night of June 24, M. Tricou, the French
Consul -General, received information from Con-
stantinople to the effect that the Porte had de-
cided upon the deposition of the Khedive and
the appointment of Halim Pasha as his suc-
cessor. Although it was past midnight, Sir Frank
Lascelles, M. Tricou, and Baron de Saurma, the
German Consul- General, went at once to the
Khedive's palace. *' I have been informed," Sir
Frank Lascelles wrote, " that when it was known
in the harem that the Europeans demanded to see
the Khedive at that hour of the night, there was
a scene of indescribable confusion. The Princess
Mother, fearing the existence of a plot to assas-
sinate her son, implored His Highness not to
receive us, but on hearing that the Europeans con-
sisted of the representatives of Germany, France,
and England, and were accompanied by Clierif
Pasha, the Khedive himself pointed out that there
could be no danger for his life, and consented to
receive us. His Highness, who was evidently in a
state of great excitement, gave me the impression
of scarcely knowing what was passing. He, how-
ever, remained perfectly firm in his intention not
to abdicate."
On the morrow, June 25, there was a last
flicker of resistance. A Khedivial Decree was
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prepared under which the army was to be increased
to 150,000 men. Some wild proposals, having for
their object the inundation of the country round
Alexandria, were also discussed. But the Khedive
was conscious that the game was played out.
Many of his valuables had already been embarked
on board his yacht at Alexandria.
In the meanwhile, the diplomatic pressure
brought to bear at Constantinople had produced its
effect. The Powers of Europe were evidently
determined that Prince Tewfik, and not Prince
Halim, should be Khedive of Egypt. On June 26,
the Sultan sent a telegram to Cairo addressed " to
the ex-Khedive Ismail Pasha," in which the follow-
ing passage occurred :
—
*' II est prouve que votre maintien au poste de
Khedive ne pouvait avoir d'autre resultat que de
multiplier et d'aggraver les difficultes pr^sentes.
Par consequent, Sa JNIajest^ Imperiale le Sultan, a
la suite de la decision de son Conseil des INIinistres, a
decide de nommer au poste de Khedive Son Excel-
lence Mehemet Tewfik Pacha, et ITrad^ Imperial
concernant ce sujet vient d'etre promulgud Cette
haute decision est communiquee a Son Excellence
par une autre depeche, et je vous invite a vous
retirer des affaires gouvernementales, conforme-
ment a I'ordre de sa Majesty Imperiale le
Sultan."
At the same time, another telegram was sent
to Prince Tewfik nominating him Khedive of
Egypt.
It was clear that further resistance was useless.
The last hope of support had disappeared. The
Khedive sent for Prince Tewfik, and, in the pre-
sence of his JNlinisters, made over his power to him.
The scene is said to have been affecting. Both
father and son showed signs of emotion.
It was desirable that there should be no delay
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in the inauguration of the new Khedive. It took
place at once. At 6.30 p.m., on .June 26, 1879,
Sir Frank Lascelles telegraphed to Lord Salisbury :
—"A royal salute on Prince Tevvfik's accession was
fired this evening from the citadel, where His
Highness held an official reception, which was
attended by the whole diplomatic and consular
corps, the Ministers, and Government officials,
and a large number of people." A crowd had
collected in the streets of Cairo, but the whole
transaction had been so expeditiously concluded
that the mass of the population were unaware of
the deposition of Ismail Pasha until they heard the
guns of the citadel thundering in honour of his
successor.
One further scene remained to be enacted. It
was undesirable that the ex-Khedive should remain
in Egypt. There was some question of his going
to Constantinople, and also to Smyrna. He even-
tually decided to seek an asylum at Naples, where
the King of Italy had placed a residence at his
disposal.^ At 11.30 a.m. on June 30, Ismail
Pasha left Cairo for Alexandria. He gave it to
be understood that he did not wish any official
notice to be taken of his departure. None of
the foreign representatives were, therefore, present
at the railway station. A large crowd, how-
ever, assembled to witness his departure. The
ladies of the liarem, dressed in black, were
present in carriages outside the station and were
loud in their lamentations. Before enterinff his
carriage, Ismail Pasha addressed a few words to the
people who were present, telling them that on leav-
ing Egypt he confided his son, the Khedive, to
their care. The latter then took leave of his father
and of his brothers, who accompanied Ismail Pasha.
* At a later period^ Ismail Pasha went to Constantinople. He died
oa March 2, 1895.
142 MODERN EGYPT pt. i
An eye-witness stated that "the scene was so affect-
ing that there were few among the spectators who
were able to refrain from tears."
On arrival at Alexandria, Ismail Pasha embarked
on board his yacht, the Maliroussa. JNIr. Calvert,
the British V^ice-Consul at Alexandria, reported
that "the deck of the Mahroussa was crowded
with officials and European residents who had
come to take leave of Ismail Pasha. His High-
ness met everywhere, both on shore and on board,
with marked respect and consideration. Though
his features bore the traces of strong recent emo-
tion, he bore up manfully, and was quite cheerful,
addressing a pleasant word and thanks to every one
who took leave of him, and shaking hands."
If Ismail Pasha's rule had been bad, his fall was
at least dignified. His worst enemies must have
pitied a man in the hour of his distress who had
stood so high and who had fallen so low. " Who,"
says Bacon, " can see worse days than he that, yet
living, doth follow at the funeral of his own repu-
tation?" Any chance moralist who may have
watched the Mahroussa steaming out of Alexandria
harbour on that summer afternoon must perforce
have heaved a sigh over one of the most striking
instances that the world has ever known of golden
opportunities lost.
It may be that the events of Ismail Pasha's
reign in Egypt are too recent for an impartial
verdict to be passed upon them. Neither perhaps
do I possess all tlie qualifications necessary to
strict impartiality. At the same time, I am quite
unconscious of any bias in the matter. In the
course of this narrative, I have criticised Ismail
Pasha's conduct, but I never felt any personal
dislike to the man. My feelings throughout all
these struggles were inspired by pity rather than
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by anger. I always felt that if Ismail Pasha
had fallen into better hands in the early part of
his career, the recent history of Egypt might have
been changed. Probably few individuals ever
experienced more fully than Ismail what has aptly
been termed "the lonely friendlessness of selfish
power." ^ The conduct of those who flattered
him, and then preyed upon him, cannot be too
strongly condemned. But as regards himself,
however severe may be the censure inflicted on
him, it must be admitted that there are some
extenuating circumstances. He wished to intro-
duce European civilisation into Egypt at a rapid
rate, but he had little idea of how to set about
the work. He had neither the knowledge nor
the experience necessary to carry out the task.
It should be remarked that Ismail was utterly
uneducated. When JNIr. Nassau Senior was
returning to Europe in 1855, he found that an
English coachman, who had been in Ismail's
service, was his fellow - passenger. The man's
account of Ismail's private life is worth quoting.
There can be little doubt of its accuracy.
" Ismail," he said, " and his brother Mustapha,
when they were in Paris, used to buy whatever
they saw ; they were like children, nothing was
fine enough for them ; they bought carriages and
horses like those of Queen Victoria or the
Emperor, and let them spoil for want of shelter
and cleaning.
. . . The people he liked best to
talk to were his servants, the lads who brought
him his pipes and stood before him with their
arms crossed. He sometimes sat on his sofa
and smoked, and talked to them for hours, all
about women and such things. ... I have known
him sometimes try to read a French novel, but
he would be two hours getting through a page.
1 Dill's Roman Societyfrom Nero to Marcus Aurelius, p. 379.
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Once or twice, I saw him attempt to write. His
letters were half an inch high, like those of a
child's copybook. I don't think that he ever
finished a sentence." ^
JNIy personal relations with Ismail Pasha were
of a friendly nature, a fact which redounds to
his credit, for if there was one person in Egypt
against whom he had a right to bear a grudge,
it was myself. I took a prominent part in
the events which brought about his deposition,
and especially in the nomination of the Com-
mission of Inquiry, a blow from which he never
recovered. Ismail Pasha was not a man who bore
malice.
Whenever and by whomsoever the verdict on
his rule in Egypt is passed, it can scarcely be
anything but unfavourable. Few people have
enjoyed a more enviable position than that of
Ismail Pasha when he became Khedive of Egypt.
He was absolute ruler over a docile people,
inhabiting one of the most fertile spots in the
world. He had power, rank, and a degree of
wealth such as has been given to few individuals.
With reasonable prudence he could have satisfied
every legitimate ambition, and left a name which
posterity would have revered. All this he threw
away. He fell a victim to {//S/^i?, the insolent
abuse of power. A great Nemesis fell upon the
Egyptian Crcesus. He squandered his wealth,
and when, finally, he was deposed at the behests
of the Powers of Europe, there were not a dozen
of his own countrymen, albeit they disliked the
interference of the foreigner, who did not think
that he had merited his fate.
It is frequently the habit of deposed Sovereigns
to think that their former subjects long for their
return to power. I do not know if Ismail Pasha
* Conversations, etc., vol. ii. p. 228.
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ever cherished thoughts of tiiis description. If
so, he was wrong. From the date of his deposition,
he was politically defunct, and his former subjects
would now regard his rei<]^n as a bad dream were
it not that they still suffer, and that their children's
children must continue to suffer, from the effects
of his misrule.
The centenary of Mehemet Ali's birth has
recently been celebrated in Egypt. National fetes
are reasonable enough when they call to mind
the occurrence of some event for which the
gratitude of posterity is due. Thus, it is not
unnatural that the French, forgetful of the horrors
which accompanied the fall of the Bastille, should
recognise that event as symbolical of the dawn
of a new era, and should, therefore, have raised
the date on which it occurred to the dignity of
a national anniversary. It is also perfectly natural
that the Egyptians should commemorate the birth
of the remarkable man who gave their country
a separate administrative existence. Nevertheless,
another very suitable anniversary for the modern
Egyptians to celebrate would be the day on
which Ismail Pasha, under pressure from the
Powers of Europe, abdicated. That day marked
the advent of a new era. It should be borne in
grateful remembrance by the present and future
generations of Egyptians. Ismail Pasha's abdica-
tion sounded the death-knell of arbitrary personal
rule in Egypt. It may be hoped and believed
that that rule can never be revived ; but in spite
of the strongest guarantees which can be recorded
on paper, there would unquestionably be a con-
siderable risk of its revival in some form or
another if tlie British occupation of the country
were allowed to terminate prematurely. When
it is quite clear that this risk has ceased to exist,
the question of the cessation of the occupation
VOL. I L
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will assume a new aspect. In the minds of all
well-informed and calm observers it seems, how-
ever, probable that some long while must elapse
before they can feel assured that this political
transformation has really taken place.
PART II
THE AKABI revolt
August 1879-August 1883
The daughter of Egypt shall he confoiinded ; she shall be
delivered into the hands of the people of the north.
Jeeemiah xlvi. 24.
U7

CHAPTER IX
THE INAUGURATION OF TEWFIK
August-November 1879
State of the country—Cherif Pasha's Ministry—The Khedive assumes
the Presidency of the Council— Ministry of Riaz Pasha— Relations
between the Kliedive and his Ministers—The Sultan cancels the
Firman of 1873 — Objections of France and England— The
Mohammedan law of succession— The right to make Commercial
Conventions, and to contract loans
—
'Hie Army—The Khedive's
investiture—Appointment of Controllers—Relations between the
Government and the Controllers—Division of work between the
Controllers—The Commission of Liquidation.
With the deposition of Ismail Pasha, the main
obstacle which had heretofore stood in the way of
Egyptian reform was removed. His sinister in-
fluence was, however, felt for long after his abdica-
tion. He had, indeed, left a damnosa hereditas to
his successor. The Treasury was bankrupt. The
discipline of the army had been shaken. Every
class of Egyptian society was discontented ; the
poor by reason of the oppressive measures of
their ruler ; the rich because the privileges which
they enjoyed were threatened ; the Europeans
because the money owing to them was not
paid, and because, in the general confusion which
existed, trade was natin-ally depressed. The
Powers of Europe had, for a while, combined in
the presence of a common danger, but the ceaseless
jar of petty international rivalries was sure to make
itself felt whenever any question of local interest
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was discussed. The Arab hated and mistrusted
the Turk. The Turk hated and mistrusted the
European. European assistance was necessary, but
it was difficult to decide in what form it should be
iriven. Reforms dictated in the best interests of
the country would be misunderstood and misrejire-
sented. It was well-nigh impossible that they
should bear immediate fruit, whilst any temporary
unpopularity which might arise from their adoption
would of necessity devolve mainly on the alien and
Christian elements in the Government. Time
would have to elapse before the sorely-tried people
of Egypt would begin to see dimly, through a
thick mist of ignorance and misrepresentation, that
some material benefits might accrue to them from
foreign interference. At the head of affairs was a
young Prince animated with the best intentions,
but wanting in experience. His own predisposi-
tion, as well as the censures which his father's
oppressive system of government had evoked, alike
led him to favour a reign of law and order. But
the proper administration of justice was impossible
until law-courts had been established and qualified
judges appointed. The period of transition from
an arbitrary to a legal system of government was
to be not only painful but dangerous. The minds
of the people had been unsettled by frequent dis-
cussions about organic changes. " It is unwise,"
said one of England's greatest political thinkers,
" to make the extreme medicine of the constitution
its daily bread." ^ The habits of obedience, which
the Egyptians had inherited from their forefathers,
had been rudely shaken. All this ferment was not
to settle do^vn at once. A more serious collapse
of the State machinery than any which had yet
taken ])lace was to occur before the calm waters of
peaceful progress could be reached. A well-known
* Burke, Ileflections on the French Revolution,
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Conservative statesman in conversation with me
once gave utterance to an opinion which involves
the ne plus ultra of anti-conservative principles.
" The East," he said, " is languishing for want of
a Revolution." This statement is true ; for the
violent changes from one Amurath to another,
which Oriental history has frequently recorded, have
generally been the result, not of revolution, but of
palace intrigue. The Egyptians were now to try
whether their lot could be improved by a move-
ment, whose leading feature was that it combined
some vague national aspirations, which were in-
capable of realisation, with the time-honoured
tactics of a mutinous preetorian guard. In the
meanwhile, the machine of State worked laboriously,
but apparently with some fair prospect of success.
It was not till the Egyptian Sisyphus had got his
stone some little way up the hill that it escaped
from his grasp and rolled back again into the
slough of anarchy. Then all the work had to be
begun again, but under new conditions which
augured better for the final result.
Before the new State machine could be got to
work, the various parts of the machinery had to be
adjusted. A Ministry had to be formed. The
degree to which the Khedive was to take an active
part in the administration had to be settled. The
relations between the Sultan and the Khedive had
to be regulated. The form in which Europeans
should be associated with the government of the
country had to be decided. It was also essential
to adopt measures which should place the new
relations between the Egyptian Government and
their creditors on a legal footing.
The Khedive charged Cherif Pasha with the
formation of a Ministry. He at once submitted
to the Khedive a project for a constitution of
which His Highness disapproved. On August 18,
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therefore, he tendered his resignation, which was
accepted. The Khedive resolved to retain the
Presidency of the Council of INIinisters in his own
hands for the present. His Highness explained
to Sir Frank Lascelles the reasons why he had dis-
approved of Cherif Pasha's proposals. " He was
aware," Sir Frank Lascelles wrote, " that it would
be said that his action was an attempt to return to
the old system of personal government. He could
assure me that he had no wish to do so ; but that
at present liberal institutions were utterly un suited
to the country, and the constitution which had
been submitted to him was nothing more than a
decor de theatre. . . . He was himself responsible
for the government of the country, and had deter-
mined to take his share of the labour, and not to
shelter himself behind an unreal and illusory con-
stitution." Cherif Pasha, on the other hand, told
Sir Frank Lascelles that, though he was personally
glad to be relieved of his duties, " as an Egyptian,
he regretted the return to personal power. There
were many persons both in and outside the palace
who would be glad, for their own ends, to see the
absolute powder of the Khedive re-established, but
it was a real misfortune for the country if it should
again fall under the rule of an absolute Sovereign."
There can be little doubt that the Khedive acted
wisely in declining the proposals submitted to him
by Cherif Pasha. Any Egyptian constitution must
of necessity at that time have been a mere decor de
thedti'e} The only form of government suitable to
• The methods of government which found favour about this time
amouf^st many of those who favoured, or pretended to favour constitu-
tional government, may be judged from a statement made in 1903 by
Sheikh Moliammed AI)dou to Mr. Wilfrid Bhnit {Secret llufforij, etc., p.
493). Sultan Pasha, tlie Sheikh said, "had promised to bring petitions
from every Notable in Kgypt in favour ofthe Constitution. This was true,
for all the Omdehs were angry with Riaz for having put down their
habit of employing forced labour." In other words, Riaz I'asha, who
was supposed to be a somewhnt extreme representative of persona]
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Egypt was a despotism, but it would have to be a
benevolent despotism, which would be under some
effective control. The control was to be sought
more in the careful selection of the individuals to
whom power was confided than in any endeavour to
copy European institutions, which were uncongenial
to the manners and customs of the people and to the
condition of society which then existed in Egypt.
Nevertheless, the attitude assumed at this moment
by Cherif Pasha merits a word of sympathy. He
was a perfectly honest man. He was convinced
of the harm done by the absolute rule of the
eX'Khedive. He was slow to believe that, with
a change of despot, the character of the despotism
would undergo any material alteration. Although,
therefore, his views as to the best system of govern-
ing the country appear to have been unsuited to
the circumstances of the time, both his proposals
and his resignation did him credit personally.
The arrangement under which the Khedive was
to be his own Prime Minister was of doubtful
wisdom. Fortunately, it did not last long. Riaz
Pasha was summoned to Egypt, and on September
22 was charged with the formation of a Ministry.
The principles of Ismail Pasha's Rescript of August
28, 1878, were maintained. Riaz Pasha was named
President of the Council, but the Khedive reserved
to himself the right to preside at the meetings of
the Council whenever he thought it desirable to
do so.
The duration of the new Ministry was much
longer than that of its predecessors. One of the
reasons why it acquired a certain character of
stability was that the relations between the Khedive
and his Mhiisters were at last placed on a foothig
government, was endeavouring to abolish the iniquitous corvee system,
wliilst the constitutionalists hoped that, through the introduction of
free institutions, it would be found possible to ensure its continuance.
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which was adapted to the actual requirements of
the country. A compromise was effected between
the system of exckiding the Khedive altogether
from the exercise of any real power and that under
which his authority would be absolute. It was
essential to associate the Khedive with the govern-
ment of the country. This was secured by accord-
ing to him the right to preside at the Council
whenever he thought fit to do so. On the other
hand, it was undesirable that the Khedive should
be his own Prime Minister. Apart from the risk
of a return to the old regime, which the adoption
of this system would have involved, there was the
further objection that the ruler of the State would
have become personally responsible for every act of
the administration. The natural remedy for any
serious defect in the government of a State is a
change of Ministry. If the Khedive had become
his own Prime Minister, this safety-valve would
have been removed. A case might have arisen in
which a change of policy would have been well-
nigh impossible without a change of Khedive. Of
course, much depended upon the spirit in which
the compromise was to be worked. Had the
Khedive meant to evade the spirit of the Rescript
of August 1878 he might have done so. On the
contrary, however, he loyally accepted the principle
of ministerial responsibility. The system worked
well, and although many difficulties of a different
nature were in store for Egypt, the question of the
part which Tewfik Pasha was to take in the govern-
ment of the country was finally set at rest by the
arrangement made in September 1879.
The settlement of the relations between Turkey
and Egypt gave rise to considerable difficulties,
which were only arranged after a somewhat stormy
diplomatic negotiation. The Porte made a deter-
mmed effort to tighten its hold on Egypt.
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Simultaneously with the issue of the order
deposing Ismail Pasha, an Imperial Irade was
signed repealing the Firman of 1873. The issue
of a new Firman was necessary in consequence of
this action of the Sultan. The Porte showed great
disinclination to submit the terms of the Firman
before issue to the British and French Govern-
ments. The result was that peremptory orders
had to be sent to the Ambassadors at Constan-
tinople. The Sultan and his advisers were made
to understand that, in their endeavour to tighten
their hold on Egypt, they ran a risk that the
country would escape from their grasp altogether.
They therefore yielded. The principle that the
terms of the Firman must be discussed with the
French and British Governments was accepted.
A discussion then commenced as to the stipula-
tions which were to be incorporated into the new
Firman.
In 1873, Ismail Pasha, in return for large sums
of money lavished at Constantinople, had obtained
four concessions from the Sultan. In the first
place, the Mohammedan law of succession was set
aside. Primogeniture was for the future to be the
principle under which succession to the Khedivate
was to be regulated. In the second place, the
right to conclude Commercial Conventions with
other Powers was conceded to Egypt. In the
third place, full power was given to the Khedive
to contract foreign loans. In the fourth place, the
Khedive obtained the right to fix the strength of
the Egyptian army at any figure he might consider
necessary without reference to Constantinople.
The Sultan now wished to cancel these con-
cessions.
The views entertained by the British and French
Governments upon the points at issue were not
altogether identical. The traditional policy of
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France favoured, if not an independent Egypt, at
all events the relaxation of the bonds which united
the suzerain and his feudatory. The French
Government were, therefore, opposed to the re-
strictive measures which the Sultan wished to
ado})t. jNIore especially M. Fournier, who was
then French Ambassador at Constantinople, insisted
strongly upon opposition being offered to them.
Successive British Governments, on the other
hand, had for a long time past been averse to
any measures which tended towards the dis-
memberment of the Ottoman Empire. Except
in the matter of the succession, Lord Salisbury
did not consider the proposals made by the Sultan
as open to any great objections on their own
merits. Moreover, the spokesman of the British
Government at Constantinople was Sir Austen
Layard, a strong Turcophile.
On the question of the succession, however,
the two Governments were agreed. Under the
Mohammedan law of succession the eldest member
of the family is Heir-Apparent. This practice
has, during the whole course of Ottoman history,
been a fertile source of intrigue, and has often
led to much bloodshed. The maxim of Bajazet
I.
—
" Better the death of a Prince than the
loss of a province "— is still inscribed over one
of the inner gates of the old Imperial Palace at
Constantinople. The slaughter of collateral
branches of the family is, in fact, a means of
protection against conspiracy which the rulers of
Oriental States have not unfrequently adopted.^
* It cannot be doulited tliat the practice of murdering or keeping in
confinement the heir to the throne, more especially if he showed any signs
of ability, has been one of the many causes of Ottoman decay. For
instance, Sultan Ibrahim (l(!40-48) was the sole surviving brother of
Amurath IV., the remainder having ])eeii ]>ut to death at the time of
the latter's succession. On his deathbed, Amnrath ordered Ibrahim,
who had Ijeen kept for elglit years in inivon. to In- killed, Ijut the ordef
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The British and French Governments, therefore,
insisted that the principle of primogeniture should
be ratified in the new Firman. On this point, the
Porte yielded.
"With regard," Lord Salisbury wrote, "to the
limit to be assigned to the military and naval forces
which the Khedive may maintain, and his power to
negotiate Commercial Conventions, Her Majesty's
Government will not object." The French
Government, on the other hand, attached great
importance to the question of the right to make
Commercial Conventions, with the result that the
Porte yielded. The new Firman was on this point
substantially a reproduction of the Firman of 1873.
The Porte, however, gained its point as regards
the restrictions which it wished to place on the
strength of the Egyptian army. The new Firman
laid down that in time of peace the army was not
to exceed 18,000 men.
As regards the power of borrowing money,
Lord Salisbury wrote : " The power to contract
loans has been so grievously abused, and with such
disastrous results to the prosperity of Egypt, that
it might advantageously be withdrawn altogether,
for it is quite clear that the country can bear no
further attempts to bolster up its credit by such
means." The Frencli Government would have
been glad to preserve the Firman of 1873 intact,
but seeing that the British Government were
lukewarm on the subject, and that they had
already achieved a diplomatic victory on the two
was not executed. When Amurath died. Creasy says {Ottoman Turks,
p. 259), "Ibrahim came forth and mounted the Turkish throne, which
received in him a selfish voluptuary, in whom long' imprisonment and
protracted terror had debased whatever spirit nature mif^ht have origin-
ally bestowed, and who was as rapacious and bloodthirsty as he was
cowardly and mean."
The practice is of very ancient date. Jehu, on obtaining possession
of the throne, killed the seventy sous of Ahab. — 2 Kings x.
1-11.
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important questions of the succession and the right
to make Commercial Conventions, they agreed to
the withdrawal from the Khedive of the right to
contract loans.
It is difficult to prophesy, especially in politics.
No one could foresee that, a few years later, the
British Government would find the work of reform
in Egypt to some extent hindered by the re-
strictions which, in 1879, were considered un-
objectionable and even beneficial. That, however,
is what actually happened. French diplomacy had,
in fact, unconsciously worked to facilitate the
future task of the British Government, whilst the
latter, with equal unconsciousness, had used their
influence to place obstacles in their own path.
On August 14, the ceremony of reading the
Firman of Investiture took place in Cairo.
The next question which had to be decided was
the form in which Europeans should be associated
with the government of Egypt. Immediately
after the Khedive's accession, a letter was addressed
by Cherif Pasha to the representatives of England
and France in Egypt, expressing a hope that, if
Controllers were nominated under the Decree of
November 18, 1876, their functions would be
limited to investigation and verification, and that
they would not be invested with any administrative
or executive powers. In reply to this communica-
tion, the Consuls-General were authorised to state
that "the two Governments accepted in principle His
Highness's offer to re-establish the ofBce of Con-
trollers-General, and that the details respecting their
powers and functions would form the subject of a
further communication."
Three questions had then to be decided. In the
first place, who were to be the Controllers ? In
the second place, what were to be the relations
between them and the Egyptian Government ? In
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the third place, how was the work to be divided
between them ?
Perhaps the first of these questions was the
most important of the three. More depended on
the character and personal influence of the in-
dividuals who were chosen than on the special
functions which might be assigned to them by a
Khedivial Decree. The situation of the European
advisers of the Khedive would, necessarily, be one
of great difficulty. They would have to guide with
as little appearance of guiding as possible. They
could not hope to succeed unless two conditions
were fulfilled. The first was that they should
be to some extent in sympathy with the Egyptian
Government. The second was that they should be
in sympathy with each other. If the more dis-
tasteful aspects of European interference were
constantly being presented to the Egyptian
Ministers without any compensatory advantages
being derived from European assistance in the
defence of Egy})tian interests, another breakdown
was sure to ensue before long. Further, the
selection of a Gallophobe Englishman, or of an
Anglophobe Frenchman, would have ensured the
failure of the experiment which was about to be
made.
The choice of the French Government fell on
M. de Blignieres. Lord Salisbury offered the post
of English Controller to me. After some hesita-
tion,^ I accepted the offer.
As regards the relations which were to exist
between the Egyptian Government and the Con-
* My intention at this time had been to stand for East Norfolk at
the next General Election. The acceptance of Lord Salisbury's offer
made me abandon the idea of entering Parliament. I think that it
was in 1880 tliat, happening- to meet Mr. Gladstone at Sandringham,
I spoke to him on this subject. He told me that he thought I was
quite right not to enter Parliament as all the principal questions which
interested Liberals had been solved. Very shortly afterwards, tba
Home Rule project was launched on an astonished world.
160 MODERN EGYPT pt. u
trollers, there was no difficulty in meeting the
Khedive's wishes. INI. de Bhgnieres and myself,
who were consulted on the subject, were of opinion
that the system of direct govermnent by Europeans
was unsuitable to the circumstances which then
existed in Egypt, and that it would be preferable
to give us general powers of supervision and
inspection, trusting to the exercise of personal
influence to do the rest. The Decree, which was
eventually issued, laid down that the most ample
powers of investigation were to be conferred on
the Controllers, but that they were not to be in-
vested with any administrative functions. They
could only make suggestions. They were to have
seats in the Council of Ministers, with voix con-
sultatives ; that is to say, they might give their
opinions, but they had no right to vote.
It was further provided that the Controllers
could not be dismissed without the consent of
their respective Governments. When, three years
later, Egypt was occupied by British troops, a dis-
cussion took place as to whether the Liberal or the
Conservative Government was res})onsible for the
events which led up to the occupation. The point
is now one of purely historical interest, and at
no time was it of much interest save to party
politicians. It may, however, be observed that,
in the discussions which took place in 1882, the
politicians on the Liberal side of the House of
Commons maintained that the necessity for British
interference was mainly due to tlie fact tliat in 1879
the Control, which was formerly financial, became
political. Mr. Gladstone, speaking on July 27,
1 882, said : *' What is a political control ? I assert
that this was not a political control then {i.e. prior
to 1879) because the Government were not con-
cerned in it. The fact that the Egyptians chose
to establish foreign Controllers, an arrangement
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attended with great benefits to the people of Eng-
land ( ? Egypt), was not necessarily an arrangement
entailing foreign interference, because they retained
the right to dismiss the Controllers, but in the
year 1879, in depriving them of that right, you
brought foreimi intervention into the heart of the
country, and established, in the strictest sense of
the phrase, a 'political control.'" There is some
force in this argument. Nevertheless, as will
appear at a later portion of this narrative, the
main responsibility for the British occupation, in
so far as it was due to events which were in any
way capable of control, would appear to lie with
the Government of Mr. Gladstone rather than with
that of Lord Salisbury which preceded him.
A further question, which had to be decided,
was how the work was to be divided between the
two Controllers.
Under the Decree of November 18, 1876, the
Englishman was Controller-General of Receipts,
and the Frenchman Controller-General of Expen-
diture. Subsequently, when European Ministers
were appointed, the Englishman was placed in
charge of the Ministry of Finance, and the French-
man of the Ministry of Public Works. Under
both these arrangements, the preponderating influ-
ence was in the hands of the Englishman. The
French chafed at their position of inferiority, and
it appeared both unwise and unnecessary to insist
upon a position of marked superiority being given
to the Englishman. Either ^1. de Blignieres and
1 could, or could not work together. If we could
do so, any distinction between us was unnecessary,
and would only serve to wound the amour propre
of the French without producing any useful result.
If we could not do so, the collapse of the system
was inevitable, and could not be averted by any
definition of our respective functions. V^arious
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proposals were made with a view to precise defini-
tion, such as that one Controller should deal with
Upper and the other with Lower Egypt. But
in the end it was wisely decided to leave the
matter to the discretion of the Controllers them-
selves.
The last point which had to be settled was the
method under which legal effect should be given
to the relations about to be established between
the Egyptian Government and their creditors. In
other words, the bankruptcy of Egypt had to be
sanctioned by law. The two reports of the Com-
mission of Inquiry had prepared the way for a
settlement, but it was essential that it should be
made binding on all the parties concerned. On
April 2, 1880, after some long and tedious dis-
cussions, a Khedivial Decree was issued instituting
a Commission of Liquidation with full powers to
regulate the financial situation. The Great Powers
bound themselves by anticipation to accept the
conclusions at which the Commissioners might
arrive. Sir Rivers Wilson was named President
of the Commission. The four Commissioners of
the Debt were named members. An additional
French member (M. Liron d'AiroUes) was named
so as to give France the same degree of representa-
tion as England. Germany was represented by
M. de Trescow. The new Commission of Liquida-
tion was, in fact, the old Commission of Inquiry
" writ large "—that is to say, with extended powers
and with the addition of a German representa-
tive. The Controllers were not appointed members
of the Commission. The interests of the creditors
were strongly represented, and it was thought both
just and politic that the Controllers should stand
outside and represent the interests of the Egyptian
Government and people, rather than those of
the creditors. Without European assistance, the
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Egyptian Ministers would scarcely be able to
resist the pressure which the Commission was
almost certain to bring to bear on them in the
bondholding interest.
The various essential parts of the State machine
were thus adjusted. A new Khedive ruled. The
relations between the Khedive and his JNlinisters
were placed on a satisfactory footing. A Prime
Minister had been nominated who had taken an
active part in opposing the abuses prevalent during
the reign of Ismail Pasha. The relations between
the Sultan and the Khedive had been regulated in
such a way as to ensure the latter against any
excessive degree of Turkish interference. The
system which had been devised for associating
Europeans with the Government held out good
promise of success, inasmuch as it was in accordance
with the Khedive's own views. Lastly, an Inter-
national Commission had been created with full
powers to arrange matters between the Egyptian
Government and their creditors.
It now remained to be seen how the machine
would work. There were great difficulties still to
be overcome, but on the whole the prospect was
brighter than at any previous moment during recent
times.
CHAPTER X
THE DUAL CONTROL
November 1879-December 1880
Working of the Control—Relations between the two Controllers—And
between the Controllers and the Egyptian Government—Delay in
paying the Tribute—Interest on the Unified Debt paid at 4 per
cent—Financial scbeme proposed by the Controllers—The Budget
for 1880—Reforms in the fiscal system—Confidence inspired by the
Control— Reports on the state of the country—The Law of Liquida-
tion—The military danger.
On November 30, 1879, I wrote to Sir Edward
Malet, who had been appointed Consul -General
in Egypt : " On the whole, I think the start
has been favourable. If we can only sit tight
for six months, I believe we may pull the thing
through. But I devoutly hope that there will be
no change of INIinistry, or any unexpected event,
such as often happens in the East, to upset every-
thing and to oblige a new beginning to be made."
Time, and a stable political situation,—these were
the two principal conditions which were essential
to success. Only the first of these conditions was,
to a very limited extent, fulfilled.
The Ministry of Riaz Pasha lasted for nearly
two years, and an acute observer wlio was on the
spot subsequently wrote that "with all its faults
it was the best administration which Egypt has
enjoyed before or since." ^
* Khedives and Pashas, p. 134. Tliis was written in 1884, that is to
Bay, before the i*eforms introduced subsequent to the Rritish occupation
bad produced much result.
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The main reasons why the machine of Govern-
ment worked fairly well for a time were twofold.
In the first place, the best relations existed
between the two Controllers. In the second place,
a modus Vivendi was found between the Controllers
and the Egyptian Government.
It has been mentioned in the previous chapter
that before the Controllers-General were appointed,
some discussion took place as to how the work
should be divided between them. Eventually,
M. de Blignieres and I were left to settle the
matter between ourselves. The solution which we
adopted was a simple one. We never attempted
to solve the question at all. We were in constant
communication with each other, and we worked in
common. Any precise definition of our respective
functions would have been difficult, and was quite
unnecessary.
It was a more difficult matter to establish
friendly relations with the Egyptian Government.
Riaz Pasha was thoroughly honest and well-inten-
tioned, but he was incapable of dealing unaided with
the perplexing financial questions which at that time
presented themselves for solution. He saw the
necessity for European assistance, but, at the same
time, in whatever form it was given, it v\'as distaste-
ful to him. He was himself a reformer, and had
courageously protested against the abuses of Ismail
Pasha's time, but he was slow to accept the inevit-
able conclusion that no reforms were possible
without European guidance and assistance. Qui
veut lafin veut les moyeus, formed no part of Riaz
Pasha's politic3,l creed. It was clear that, under
these circumstances, the best hope of success lay in
the Controllers submitting themselves to a self-
denying ordinance. They would have to pull the
strings behind the scenes, but appear on the stage
as little as possible.
166 MODERN EGYPT pt. n
Another essential requisite to success was tliat
both the Egyptian Ministers and the Egyptian
people should see that the Controllers were of
some use to them. Duty and justice alike pointed
to the necessity of standing as a buffer between
the Egyptian Government and their creditors. The
Ministers had neither the strength to oppose the
pressure which, in European interests, was brought
to bear on them, nor the knowledge requisite to
resist it with effect. The policy adopted by M.
de Blignieres and myself was to associate ourselves,
as much as possible, with the Egyptian Govern-
ment, and to defend them against any excessive
demands and encroachments on their rights. By
adopting this line of conduct, we hoped soon to
inspire confidence, and gradually to disabuse the
minds both of the Ministers and of the Egyptian
people of the prejudices which were entertained
against ICuropeans. If once we could inspire con-
fidence, our advice, we thought, would generally
be followed, and our influence could be used to the
benefit both of the country and of the creditors.
Opportunities for giving effect to these prin-
ciples were not slow to present themselves. Heavy
instalments of the Tribute, as also the half-yearly
interest on the Unified Debt, had to be paid.
Money was not forthcoming to meet these en-
gagements. M. de Blignieres and I had not yet
arrived in Egypt. Our advice was requested by
telegraph. The Egyptian Government flinched
at the responsibility of committing an act of
insolvency. They asked us whether they ought
to borrow money in order to meet their engage-
ments. The reply could not be doubtful. If the
Tribute could not be paid, so much the worse for
the Tribute. The same was to be said as regards
the interest on the Unified Debt. The main
thing was, once and for all, to abandon the ruinous
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expedients of the past. The employes of the
Government must, m the first instance, be paid
;
then the Tribute, whenever there was money enough
to pay it. As for the Unified Debt, the taxes should
on no account be taken in advance. If, when the
interest fell due, the revenues pledged to the
service of the debt were insufficient to meet the
whole charge, a dividend should be distributed.
The letter which we wrote from Paris on this
subject was published. One result of our advice
was that the Tribute due to the Porte remained
unpaid for some little while. A further result
was that the full interest on the Unified Debt
was never paid. The amount due on November 1
was £1,989,000. The rate of interest fixed by the
Decree of November 18, 1876, viz. 6 per cent,
had not as yet been legally changed. When the
1st of November arrived, only £1,147,000 was in
the hands of the Commissioners of the Debt.
Interest at the rate of 4 per cent was distributed
to the bondholders.
Directly after we arrived in Egypt, another
step of importance was taken. Difficulties were
being encountered in arranging for a Commission
of Liquidation to make a final settlement of
Egyptian financial affairs. In the meanwhile, both
the country and the creditors were suffering. We
therefore recommended the Egyptian Government
to cut the diplomatic knot by preparing their own
scheme, which could be submitted to the Com-
mission of Liquidation, if one were appointed, and
which could be put into operation without the
sanction of any law, in the event of no agreement
being arrived at as regards a Commission. The
suggestion was accepted, and, in concert with the
Egyptian authorities, we proceeded to prepare a
scheme.
On January 1, 1880, we submitted our report
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to the Khedive. " Experience," we said, " has
shown tb.'it the main detect of all former attempts
to regulate the Egyptian financial situation has
been that they have been too optimistic." It was
essential to steer clear of that danger. The Com-
mission of Inquiry had recommended that the
interest on the Unified Debt should be fixed at
5 per cent. INI. de Blignieres and I thought that
rate too high. We recommended that only 4 per
cent interest should be guaranteed. The public
had become accustomed to the idea that the rate
of interest would have to be reduced to 4 per cent.
When our proposals were made known, so far from
producing a bad effect, Unified Stock rose from 51
to 56. A sum of £l,084,000 was due to the bond-
holders for back interest on coupons which had
only been partially paid. " We cannot," we said,
*' hold out the least hope that these sums will ever
be paid."
The next thinsf was to frame a Budo^et for
the year 1880. The Commission of Inquiry had
estimated the Egyptian revenue at £9,067,000.
We considered this estimate too high. We
reduced it to £8,562,000. A sum of £4,323,000
was required to pay the Tribute and to carry on
the administration of the country, thus leaving
£4,239,000 available for the creditors of the
Egyptian Government.
The reforms proposed by the Commission of
Inquiry were at the same time taken in hand.
On January 6, 1880, the law of the JMoukabala
was repealed. On the 18th, an additional tax of
£E. 150,000 a year was placed on the Ouchouri
lands. On January 17, the poll-tax was abolished.
It yielded a revenue of £205,000 a year. Persons
whose sole employment was agriculture were,
at the same time, relieved from the payment
of the professional tax. Octroi duties, highway.
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market, and weighing dues were suppressed in
the villages, while in the towns, octroi duties were
abolished on 105 articles, mostly agricultural pro-
duce. Twenty -four petty taxes of a vexatious
nature were abolished by a stroke of the pen.
An important reform was also made in the
method of levying the salt tax. Under a law
passed in 1873, every individual in Egypt was
supposed to consume a certain amount of salt a
year. The population of each village was roughly
calculated at the time the law was passed, and the
tax divided amongst the villagers. The salt tax
had, in fact, become a poll-tax, which was paid
equally by those who consumed a great deal of
salt, and by those who consumed little or none.
No account was taken of changes, which might
have occurred since 1873, in the population of
each village. The defects of this system were
obvious. It was abolished, and, in substitution for
it, salt was constituted a Government monopoly.
The system of paying the land-tax in kind,
which had hitherto existed in some parts of Upper
Egypt, had given rise to numerous abuses. It
was suppressed. For the future, only payment in
money was allowed.
The dates at which the instalments of land-tax
were to fall due were fixed in a manner which was
convenient to the cultivators. At the same time,
the names of the taxpayers belonging to each
village were inscribed in one register. An extract
from this register was given to each taxpayer,
showing the total of the sums which were due
from him under the several heads of account, and
the dates on which he would be called upon to
pay. Of all the reforms which were introduced,
this was perhaps the most important and the
most beneficial. It was not so much the amount
of the land-tax which had heretofore weighed
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heavily on the country, as the fact that the
dates of collection had been regulated without
any reference to the convenience of the taxpayers.
Further, inasmuch as none of the taxpayers knew
with any degree of certainty how much they had
to pay, a wide door was opened for extortion and
illegal taxation.
At the same time, an improved system was in-
troduced for the payment of the village accountants.
Hitherto they had received no fixed salaries, but
were allowed to retain a certain proportion of the
sums which they collected.
The main reason why these and other reforms
w^ere carried into execution was that the Con-
trollers and the Egyptian Ministers worked
cordially together. The Control had, in fact,
inspired confidence.
I remember one incident which contributed in
no small degree to the establishment of this con-
fidence. A British syndicate, on the list of which
some influential names figured, was formed with a
view to the purchase of the Egyptian Railways.
The representatives of the syndicate laid their
proposals before the Egyptian Government. The
Ministers were anxious as to the attitude which
the Controllers, and particularly the British Con-
troller, would take up on this subject. It scarcely
occurred to them that any foreigner would do
otherwise than push the presumed interests of his
own countrymen. Great, therefore, was their sur-
prise when, directly the question was mooted in
the Council, I said that I considered that it was
for the Ministers to decide whether they would
entertain any proposal to purchase the railways;
that if they wished to reject the offer which had
been made to them, I had no wish to press them to
accept it ; but that if, on the other liand, they chose
to accept the princi})le, I was ready to go into
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the details and see that they obtained reasonable
terms. They at once decided not to sell the
railways. I had anticipated this decision. From
that time forth, I never had any serious difficulty
in getting my advice accepted. Shortly after the
occurrence of this incident, I was asked to see
if terms could be arranged with INIessrs. Green-
field, the contractors for the construction of the
harbour works at Alexandria, to whom a large
sum of money was due. The subject was full of
difficulties. However, in forty-eight hours I had
made an arrangement which seemed reasonable.
The contract had to be signed by Riaz Pasha. It
was prepared by about three o'clock one afternoon.
Messrs. Greenfield's representatives wished to leave
Cairo by a train at five o'clock the same afternoon
in order to catch a steamer at Alexandria. I
thought this difficult, as Riaz Pasha had not yet
had the matter explained to him. But I said that
I would do my best. I took the contract to Riaz
Pasha and explained its provisions to him. He said
that if I was satisfied he was ready to accept my
conclusions, and accordingly signed the contract
without reading it.
On April 30, Sir Edward INIalet wrote to the
Foreign Office that the Controllers had never been
obliged to apply for diplomatic support.
In the course of the summer of 1880, Sir
Edward Malet asked the British Consular officers
in Egypt to report on the condition of the country.
All the Consuls told the same tale. A "general
feeling of satisfaction " prevailed. The taxes were
being regularly collected. The rate of interest
charged by the village money-lenders had fallen
by 50 per cent. The value of land had risen, in
some cases as much as 100 per cent. The use of
the courbash was greatly diminished.
Whilst these reforms were in progress, the
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difficulties connected with the appointment of a
Commission of Liquidation had been overcome.
After discussions which histed some three montlis,
the Commissioners agreed on a law which was
submitted to the Khedive and signed by him on
July 17, 1880. The Commissioners never sent in
any report explanatory of the provisions of the
law. In a letter addressed by Sir Rivers Wilson
to Lord Granville, w^ho succeeded Lord Salisbury
at the Foreign Office on April 28, 1880, it was
stated that there "was an apprehension lest the
divergencies of opinion which manifested them-
selves on certain points among the Commissioners
should render impossible a unanimous report, and
lead to reservations or even protests detracting
from the authority of the official decisions of the
Commission."
It is unnecessary to allude at any length to
these differences of opinion. It w^ill be sufficient
to say that some members of the Commission, who
were supported by the Controllers, were in favour
of a cautious estimate of revenue, and an estimate
of administrative expenditure which would have
left a mari^in to be applied to the benefit of the
country, whilst others took a more optimistic view
of the revenue and endeavoured, in the bondholding
interest, to keep the administrative expenditure
down to the lowest possible figure. Eventually,
a compromise was effected. The revenue was
taken at £E.8,362,000 for 1880 and 1881, and at
£E.8,41 2,000 for subsequent years. The adminis-
trative expenditure was fixed at £E.4,520,000.
Tiie rate of interest on the Unified Debt was
fixed at 4 per cent. The outstanding portions
of the short loans were absorbed into the Unified
Debt. A fresh issue of Preference Stock to the
extent of £E.5,600,000 was made in order to
assist in paying the Floating Debt. The Floating
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Debt ci editors were divided into three categories,
viz. privileged creditors, creditors holding special
securities, and ordinary creditors. The privileged
creditors were paid in full. Special arrangements
were made with the creditors holding special
securities. Their claims were reduced by about
7|- per cent. The ordinary creditors received 30
per cent in cash and 70 per cent in Preference
Stock. At the price then current, they lost 8^
per cent on the capital of their claims. On the
whole, it may be said that the arrangement was a
fair one. Its main defect was that too large a
proportion of revenue (66 per cent) was mortgaged
to the bondholders, whilst the balance left at the
disposal of the Government was insufficient.
Thus, matters were improving in Egypt.
Several beneficial reforms had been carried out.
Some of the worst features of the old oppressive
system of government had disappeared. The rela-
tions between the Government and their creditors
were established on a legal basis, and the charge
on account of debt, although still very heavy, had
been brought more into conformity than heretofore
with the resources of the country. There were,
however, some dark specks on the horizon. For
instance, a petition was circulated amongst the
officers of the army, couched in language which
was intended to incite the Moslem population
against the European Control. It concluded with
a threat that the petitioners might have recourse
to the sword to attain their ends.
In June 1880, I was appointed Financial Mem-
ber of the Governor- General's Council in India.
Sir Auckland Colvin succeeded me as Controller-
General in Egypt.
In December 1880, I visited Cairo on my way
to India. At tliat time, it was manifest that the
only serious danger which threatened Egypt arose
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from the ftict that the ciiscipHne of the army had
betii profoundly shaken by the events of 1878. 1
warned Riaz Pasha of this danger, and urged liini
to remedy any grievances of which the army could
justly complain, but at the same time to treat
severely any signs of insubordination. Riaz Pasha
said that my warning was unnecessary, for that not
the smallest danger was to be apprehended from
the army.
For the moment, therefore, it appeared that
Egy])t had at last fairly entered the path of
reform, and that all that was required was time
to complete the superstructure of which the
foundations had been so laboriously laid.
CHAPTER XI
THE MUTINY OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY
January-September 1881
Discontent amongst the officers—They petition Riaz Pasha—Mutiny of
February 1—Dismissal of the Minister of VV^ar—Imprudent con-
duct of the Khedive—Conduct of the French Consul-General
—
Increase of discontent in the army — Mutiny of September 9
Sir Auckland Colvin—Demands of the mutineers—Dismissal of
the Ministers— Reluctance of Cherif Pasha to accept office
Nomination of the Cherif Ministry—Cherif Pasha supports the
European Control—Arabi is the real ruler of Egypt—His conduct
due to fear—Situation created by the mutiny.
Sir John Bowring wrote in 1840: "The situa-
tion of the Osmanlis in Egypt is remarkable ; they
exercise an extraordinary influence, possess most
of the high offices of state, and, indeed, are the
depositories of power throughout the country.
. . .
They are few, but they tyrannise ; the Arabs are
many, but obey."
After Sir John Bowring wrote these lines, the
Egyptians, properly so called, gradually acquired a
greater share in the administration of the country,
but in 1881, as in 1840, the Turks were the " para-
mount rulers." In the army, however, the number
and influence of the Turks sensibly diminished as
time went on. During the reigns of Abbas, Said,
and Ismail, the Egyptian element amongst the
officers had increased to such an extent as to
jeopardise the little that remained of the still
dominant Turco-Circassian element.
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The large number of officers who were placed
on half- pay in 1878 were, for the most part,
Egyptians. The discontent due to this cause was
hicreased by the fact that, whilst great and in some
degree successful efforts were made to improve the
civil administration of the country, nothing was
done to improve the condition of the army. The
prevailing discontent eventually found expression
in a petition addressed by certahi officers of the
army to lliaz Pasha on January 15, 1881.
Ahmed Arabi, an Egyptian of fellah origin,
who was colonel of the 4th Regiment, soon took
the lead in the movement which was thus begun.
But the prime mover in the preparation of the
petition was Colonel Ali Bey Fehmi, who com-
manded the 1st Regiment. His regiment had
been the object of special attention on the part of
the Khedive. It guarded the palace. For some
time previously, however, there had been a marked
cessation of friendly relations between the Khedive
and Ali Bey Fehmi. In the East, to be in disgrace
is to be in danger. Ali Bey Fehmi determined
to strengthen his position by showing that the
Egyptian portion of the army could no longer
be treated with neglect, and that he himself could
not with impunity be dismissed or exiled.
The petition set forth that the INlinister of War,
Osman Pasha Rifki, had treated the Egyptian
officers of the army unjustly in the matter of
promotions. He had behaved " as if they were his
enemies, or as if God had sent him to venge His
wrath on the Egyptians." Officers had been dis-
missed from the service without any legal inquiry.
The petitioners, therefore, made two demands.
The first was that the Minister of War should be
removed, "as he was incompetent to hold such a
high position." The second was that an inquiry
should be held into the qualifications of those who
CH. XI MUTINY OF THE ARMY 177
had been promoted. "Nothing," it was said, "but
merit and knowledge should entitle an officer to
promotion, and in these respects we are far superior
to those who have been promoted."
This petition was presented by the two Colonels
in person to Riaz Pasha. Riaz Pasha was ignorant
of military affairs, and had never interfered with
the administration of the army, which he con-
sidered to be a prerogative of the Khedive. He
endeavoured unsuccessfully to induce the Colonels
to withdraw their petition, promising at the same
time that inquiry should be made into their griev-
ances. A fortnight was allowed to elapse, during
which time further unsuccessful efforts were made
in the same direction. In the meanwhile, the
Colonels had learnt that their petition was viewed
with disfavour by the Khedive and his Turkish
surroundings. Riaz Pasha received a hint from
the palace that the dilatory manner in which he
was treating the question was calculated to throw
some doubts on his loyalty. He determined,
therefore, to provoke an immediate decision. The
matter was discussed at a meeting of the Council of
Ministers held under the presidency of the Khedive
on January 30, from which Sir Auckland Colvin
and M. de Blignieres were most unwisely excluded.
All idea of compromise was rejected. It was
resolved to arrest the Colonels, and to try them by
Court-martial. Subsequently, an inquiry would be
made into their grievances. An order was drawn
up and countersigned by the Khedive, summoning
the Colonels to the Ministry of War on February 1.
One peculiarity of Egyptian official life is that
no secrets are ever kept. The Colonels were im-
mediately informed of tlie decision at which the
Council of Ministers had arrived. Everything
was, therefore, arranged for the action which
followed. It was settled that, in the event of the
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Colonels not returning in two hours, the officers
and men of their regiments should go to the
INIinistry of War and deliver them if they were
under arrest. At the same time, a message was
sent to Toura, about ten miles distant from Cairo,
with a view to securing concerted action on the
part of the regiment quartered there. This pro-
gramme was faithfully executed. The Colonels
were summoned to the JNlinistry of War on the
pretext that certain arrangements had to be made
for a procession which was to accompany one of
the princesses on the occasion of her marriage.
They obeyed the summons. On their arrival at
the Ministry of War, they were arrested and
placed on their trial. Whilst the trial was pro-
ceeding, the officers and men of their regiments
arrived, and broke into the room where the Court
was sitting. They treated the INIinister of War
roughly, destroyed the furniture, and delivered
the Colonels, who then marched with their troops
to the Khedive's palace, and demanded the dis-
missal of the Minister of War. The Ministers
and other high functionaries soon gathered round
the Khedive. Some counselled resistance, but the
practical difficulty presented itself that no force
was available with which to resist. The only sign
of fidelity given by any of the troops belonging to
the Cairo garrison was that the regiment quartered
at Abbassieh, two miles distant from the town,
refused to join the mutineers, but the most their
Turkish officers could do was to keep them where
they were. They would not have defended the
Khedive against the mutinous regiments. The
regiment stationed at Toura marched to Cairo,
according to previous arrangement, and insisted on
continuing its march, although messengers were
sent to dissuade the men from advancing after the
obnoxious Minister had been dismissed.
CH. XI MUTINY OF THE ARMY 179
Under these circumstances, resistance was im-
possible. After some hesitation, tiie Khedive sent
for the Colonels and informed them that Osman
Pasha Rifki was dismissed and Mahmoud Pasha
Baroudi^ named Minister of War in his place.
This announcement was received with cheers.
The troops dispersed and tranquillity was for
the time being restored. The mutinous Colonels
were allowed to remain in command of their
regiments. They waited on the Khedive, asked
his pardon for their past misconduct, and gave
assurances of unalterable fidelity and loyalty to
his person.
This was the second mutiny of the Egyptian
Army. It had followed the same course as the
first. It originated with legitimate grievances to
which no attention was paid. The next stage was
mutiny. The final result was complete submission
to the will of the mutineers. The whole affair
was mismanaged, and for this mismanagement tlie
Khedive appears to have been largely responsible.
Two courses were from the first open to the
Khedive. Either he should have endeavoured to
rally to his side a sufficient force to crush the
mutineers, or, if that was impossible, he should
have made terms with the officers before discontent
developed into mutiny. Unfortunately, he adopted
neither of these courses. The attempt to decoy
the Colonels away from their troops and to punish
them without any trustworthy force behind him to
ensure effect being given to the decisions of the
Court-martial, was probably the most unwise course
which could have been adopted. Sir Edward JMalet
expressed his opinion tliat the officers were treated
**in the way best calculated to destroy all con-
fidence in the Khedive and his Government,
' Baroudi was the family name. He was also frequently called
Mahmoud Pasha Sami.
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although it was in harmony with the traditions of
Oriental statesmanship."
The Egyptian officers and soldiers now learnt
for the second time that they had only to assert
themselves in order to obtain all they required.
With this encouragement, they would not be slow
to mutiny a third time, should the necessity for
doing so arise.
For the moment, however, a truce was estab-
lished between the Khedive and his mutinous
officers ; but suspicions and fears were rife on both
sides. The Khedive and his Ministers were afraid
to disband the disaffected regiments, or even to
remove them from Cairo. The officers, on the
other hand, although their victory had been com-
plete, were fearful of the consequences of their
own action. They mistrusted the Khedive and
thought that, should an opportunity occur, the
reluctant pardon which they had received would
be cancelled, and that they would be visited with
condign punishment. They felt even greater re-
sentment against Riaz Pasha than against the
Khedive, and began a series of intrigues with a
view to bringing about a change of Ministry.
These intrigues were encouraged by Baron de
Ring, the French Consul-General, who had fre-
quent interviews with the mutinous Colonels,
The action of Baron de Ring increased the diffi-
culties of the situation. If, in addition to financial
embarrassments, defective administration, and a
mutinous army, there was to be superadded hostile
intrigue on the part of the representative of the
French Government, the position of the Egyptian
Ministry would clearly become untenable. Riaz
Pasha wished to resign, but was dissuaded from
doing so. The Khedive eventually wrote to the
President of the French Republic to complain of
Baron de Ring's conduct. The result was that
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he was recalled. He left Egypt on February 28.
The Khedive then summoned the prmcipal officers
of the army to the palace, and expressed the
confidence he entertained in Riaz Pasha, of
whom he spoke in eulogistic terms. Ah-eady
the pay of the unemployed Egyptian officers
had been increased, and a public declaration had
been made by the Khedive to the effisct that for
the future every class of officer, wliether Turk,
Circassian, or Egyptian, would be treated on the
same footing. These measures somewhat improved
the position of the Ministry. When Sir Edward
Malet left in May on a short leave, he "had reason
to believe that confidence was being restored ; that
the officers had, in fact, nothing to fear from in-
trigue ; that they were gradually relaxing measures
for their own protection, and beginning to feel that
the Khedive and the Ministers no longer aimed at
their lives."
It is unnecessary to give the detailed history of
the next few months. The officers still entertained
a deep-rooted mistrust of the intentions of the
Khedive and his Ministers. "The traditions of
the days of Ismail Pasha," Sir Edward Malet
wrote, " stalked like spectres across tlieir paths."
They thought that their lives were in danger. In-
subordination increased daily. A Commission was
appointed to inquire into the grievances of the
army. Arabi Bey was one of its members. His
language to the INIinister of War was very dis-
respectful. In the month of July, an artilleryman
was run over by a cart and killed in the streets of
Alexandria. His comrades bore his dead body to
the palace, and forced an entrance in defiance of
the orders of their officers. They were tried and
the ringleaders condemned to punishment. About
the same time, nineteen officers brought charges
against their Colonel (Abdul-Al). These charges
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formed the subject of inquiry. They were found
to be groundless. The officers were in consequence
dismissed from the active hst of the army, but
were shortly afterwards restored to their former
positions by the Khedive. The Colonels were
greatly offended. They believed that the Khedive's
action had been taken with the intention of en-
couraging the insubordination of their junior
officers towards them. About the same time,
JNIahmoud Pasha Baroudi, the INIhiister of War,
who sympathised with the officers concerned in
the mutiny of February 1, was dismissed, and
the Khedive's brother-in-law, Daoud Pasha, was
appointed in his place. This measure also caused
great dissatisfaction.
W^ithin the Ministerial circle, a good deal of
dissension reigned. The relations between Riaz
Pasha and M. de Blignieres became strained. The
Khedive's confidence in Riaz Pasha was impaired.
It was whispered that His Highness favoured the
return to power of Cherif Pasha.
It was clear that another crisis was not far off,
but at the moment it was about to occur, the
Government were hopeful that their main difficulties
had been overcome. " At no period," Sir Edward
Malet wrote, "since February 1 had the confi-
dence of the Khedive and his Government been so
complete as immediately before the outbreak of
September 9. On the very eve, and on the
morning itself of that day, Riaz Pasha assured
those with whom he conversed that the Govern-
ment were masters of the situation, and that the
danger of a military movement had passed away.
But, in fact, all the terrors of the Colonels for
their personal safety had been again aroused. A
story had got abroad that the Khedive had obtained
a secret Fetwa, or decree from the Sheikh-ul-Islam,
condemning them to death for high treason. There
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was absolutely no foundation for this story, but it
is currently believed, and at this moment the
position of the Sheikh-ul-Islam is precarious in
consequence of it. Spies were continually hovering
about the residences of the Colonels, and on the
night of the 8th September a man presented him-
self at the house of Arabi Bey, was refused admit-
tance, and was afterwards followed and seen to
return to the Prefecture of Police. There was no
doubt in the mind of Arabi Bey that he was to be
murdered; he left his house and went to that of
the other Colonels, to whom a similar incident had
just occurred. It is my belief that then only were
measures taken for immediate action, that it was
concerted and planned that night, as it was executed
on the following day."
On September 9, the 3rd Regiment of Infantry,
which was stationed at Cairo, was ordered to
Alexandria. This order produced a mutiny. Arabi
Bey, with 2500 men and 18 guns, marched to the
square in front of the Abdin Palace. The Khedive
was at the Ismailia Palace, distant about a quarter
of a mile from Abdin. He did the wisest thing
possible under the circumstances. He sent for Sir
Auckland Colvin.
Sir Auckland Colvin was a member of the
Indian Civil Service. In the hour of trial he did
not belie the proud motto. Mens aequa in arduis,
inscribed under the picture of Warren Hastings
which hangs in the Calcutta Council Chamber. It
is one which might fitly apply to the whole of that
splendid body of Englishmen who compose the
Indian Civil Service. The spirit of the English-
man rose high in the presence of danger. It was
not the first time he had heard of mutiny. He
knew how his own countrymen had met dangers of
this sort. The example of Lawrence and Outram,
of Nicholson and Edwards, pointed the w^ay to the
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Indian Civilian. His duty was clear. He must
endeavour at the risk of his own life to impart
to the Khedive some portion of the spirit which
aiiimated his own imperial race. He spoke in no
uncertain terms. "The \"iceroy," he subsequently
wrote, " asked my opinion on what should be done.
I advised him to take the initiative. Two regi-
ments in Cairo were said by Riaz Pasha to be
faithful. I advised him to summon them to the
Abdin Square, with all the military police avail-
able, to put himself at their head, and, when Arabi
Bey arrived, personally to arrest him. He replied
that Arabi Bey had with him the artillery and
cavalry, and that they might fire. I said that they
would not dare to, and that if he had the courage
to take the initiative, and to expose himself person-
ally, he might succeed in overcoming the mutineers.
Otherwise, he was lost. Stone Pasha ^ warmly
supported me. . . . While his carriage was coming
Sir Charles Cookson ^ arrived, expressed to the
Viceroy his concurrence in my views, and returned
to the Agency to telegraph to his Government."
What followed may best be told in Sir Auckland
Colvin's words. " I accompanied the Viceroy," he
wrote, " in a separate carriage ; the Ministers also,
and some five or six native officers of rank, with
Stone Pasha. We went first to the Abdin barracks,
where the regiment of the guard turned out, and
with the warmest protestations swore loyalty.
Thence we drove to the Citadel, where the same
occurred ; but we learnt that this regiment, pre-
vious to our arrival, had been signalHug to the
regiment (Arabi Bey's) in the Abbassieh barrack.
The Viceroy then announced his intention of going
to the Abbassieh barrack. It was already 3.30 ; I
' An American officer in the Egyptian army.
' Sir Charles Cookson was acting as Consul-General during the
temporary absence of Sir Edward Malet.
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urged him to return to the Abdin Square taking
with him the Citadel Regiment, and when he
arrived at the square to put himself at the head
of that regiment, the regiment of the guard and
the mihtary pohce. He drove off, however, to
Abbassieh. It was a long drive, and when we got
there about 4 (the Ministers having left us at the
Citadel and returned direct) we found Arabi Bey
had marched with the regiment to Cairo. We
followed, and on entering the town the Viceroy
took a long detou7\ and arrived at the Abdin
Palace by a side door. I jumped out of my
carriage, and urged him on no account to remain
in the palace, but to come into the square. He
agreed at once, and we went together, followed at
a considerable distance by four or five of his native
officers. Stone Pasha, and one or two other Euro-
pean officers. The square was entirely occupied
by soldiers drawn up round it, and keeping all
spectators at a distance. The Viceroy advanced
firmly into the square towards a little group of
officers and men (some mounted) in the centre. I
said to him, 'When Arabi Bey presents himself, tell
him to give you his sword, and to give them the order
to disperse. Then go the round of the square and
address each regiment separately, and give them the
order to disperse.' Arabi Bey approached on horse-
back ; the Viceroy called out to him to dismount.
He did so, and came forward on foot, with several
otliers and a guard with fixed bayonets, and saluted.
I said to the Viceroy, 'Now is your moment.'
He replied, 'We are between four fires.' I said,
* Have courage.' He took counsel of a native
officer on his left, and repeated to me : ' What can
I do ? We are between four fires. We shall be
killed.' He then told Arabi Bey to sheathe his
sword. The order was obeyed ; and he then asked
Arabi Bey what all this meant ; Arabi Bey replied
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by enumerating three points, adding; tliat the army-
had come there on the part of the Egyptian people
to enforce them, and would not retire till they
were conceded. The Viceroy turned to me and
said, 'You hear what he says.' I replied that it
was not fitting for the Viceroy to discuss questions
of this kind with Colonels, and suggested to him
to retire into the Palace of Abdin, leaving me to
speak to the Colonels. He did so, and I remained
for about an hour till the arrival of Sir Charles
Cookson, explaining to them the gravity of the
situation for themselves, and urging them to retire
the troops while there was yet time."
The three points to which Sir Auckland Colvin
alluded as constituting the demands of Arabi were :
(1) that all the Ministers should be dismissed ; (2)
that a Parliament should be convoked ; and, (3),
that the strength of the army should be raised to
18,000 men.
Sir Charles Cookson then entered into negotia-
tions with the mutineers. The Khedive consented
to dismiss his Ministers on the understanding that
the other points demanded by the officers should be
left in suspense until reference could be made to
the Porte. Arabi agreed to these terms. The
question then arose of who should be President
of the Council. One or two names were put
forward by the Khedive, and rejected by Arabi
and his followers. The Khedive then intimated
that he would be prepared to nominate Cherif
Pasha. This announcement "was received with
loud and universal shouts of ' Long live the
Khedive ! ' . . . Arabi Bey then asked to be
allowed to see the Khedive and make his sub-
mission. This favour was granted to him and the
other Colonels, and then the troops were drawn off
in perfect quietness to their respective barracks."
Some difficulty was encountered in inducing
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Chdrif Pasha to accept office. He objected to
becomincjc Prime JNIinister as the nominee of a
mutinous army. Sir Charles Cookson, M. Sien-
kievvicz (the P'rench Consul -General), and Sir
Auckland Colvin endeavoured to overcome this
reluctance, which was in no degree feigned. They
so far succeeded that Cherif Pasha consented to
enter into negotiations with the leaders of the
military movement. At first, there appeared but
little prospect of an arrangement. Cherif Pasha
asked that, on condition of his undertaking the
government, and guaranteeing the personal safety
of the leaders of the movement, the mutinous
regiments should withdraw to the posts assigned
to them. The more violent amongst the officers
had, however, got the upper hand. They did not
fear Turkish intervention, the probability of which
now began to be discussed. Indeed, there was
some reason to suppose that the mutineers had
received encouragement from Constantinople.
Cherif Pasha's terms were rejected, and he de-
clared that he would not undertake to form a
Ministry.
Under these circumstances, the Khedive
intimated that he was " ready to yield everything
in order to save public security." Suddenly,
however, on September 13, things took a turn
for the better. The relief came from an un-
expected quarter. Arabi had summoned to Cairo
the members of the Chamber of Notables. When
they arrived, "they proved more capable of
appreciating the true situation than their military
allies. Informed of the negotiations going on with
Cherif Pasha, they in a body went to him, and
entreated him to agree to form a Ministry, offering
him their personal guarantee that, if he consented,
the army should engage to absolute submission to
his orders. The military leaders seem to have been
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more struck by this conduct than by all the
previous representations made to them." Seeing
that public opinion was not altogetlier witli
them, Arabi and his followers moditied their tone.
They tendeitd their "absolute submission to the
autliority of Cherif Paslia as the Khedive's
Mhiister." They only made two conditions. One
was that Mahmoud Pasha Sami should be reinstated
in office. The second was that the INIilitary Law
recommended by the Commission, which had been
recently sitting, should be put into immediate
execution. "To both of these demands," Sir
Charles Cookson wrote, " Cherif Pasha, most
reluctantly, was compelled to yield, but as to the
latter, he expressly reserved to himself the liberty
of omitting the most important article, which
proposed to raise the army to 18,000 men."
This incident was significant. It showed that
there were two parties in opposition to the Khedive.
These were, first, a mutinous army half-mad with
fear of punishment, and secondly, a party, the
offspring of Ismail Pasha's dalliance with con-
stitutionalism, who had some vague national
aspirations, and who, as representing the civil
elements of society, shunned the idea of absolute
military government. Under statesmanlike guid-
ance, this tendency to separation between the two
parties might perhaps have been turned to account.
The main thing was to prevent amalgamation. If
the national party were once made to believe that
the only hope of realising its aspirations lay in
seeking the aid of the soldiers, not only would the
authority of the Khedive disappear altogether,
but all hope of establishing a regime under which
the army would be subordinate to the civil
Government would have to be abandoned.
One of the many political apophthegms
attributed to Prince Bismarck is the following:
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'*La politique est I'art de s'aceommoder aux circon-
stances et de tirer parti de tout, meme de ce qui
deplait." It would have been wise for the Khedive
at this moment to have acted on the principle set
forth in this maxim. The military party and the
national j^arty were alike distasteful to him. The
interests both of his dynasty and of his country
pointed, however, to the necessity of conciliating
the latter in order to keep in check the former of
these two parties. Unfortunately, the Khedive
did not possess sufficient political insight to
grasp whatever opportunities the situation offered
to him.
The new Ministry was nominated on September
14. Cherif Pasha was assured of the support of
the British and French Governments. At his own
request, he was further assured that " in case the
army should show itself submissive and obedient,
the Governments of England and France would
interpose their good offices with the Sublime Porte
in order to avert from Egypt an occupation bv an
Ottoman army." The usual exchange of letters
took place between the Khedive and his Prime
Minister setting forth the principles which were to
guide the new Ministry. These letters contained
only one remark which is noteworthy. Cherif
Pasha was no friend to European interference in
Egypt. But he had learnt that it might be
productive of some good. His letter to the
Khedive, therefore, contained the following
passage: "The institution of the Control, at first
criticised from different points of view, has greatly
assisted towards the re -establishment of the
finances, at the same time that it has been a real
support for the Government of Your Highness.
In this twofold capacity, it is important to main-
tain it as instituted by the Decree of November
15, 1879." To this, the Khedive rephed as
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follows : ** A perfect understanding between the
Control and my Government is necessary ; it must
be maintained and strengthened." •
The new jMinistry, therefore, began work with
such props from without as were possible under the
circumstances. But for all tliat, it was clear that
the real masters of the situation were the leaders
of the mutinous army. Arabi had already treated
on equal terms with the representatives of the
Powers. He had issued a Circular on Sep-
tember 9 signed " Colonel Ahmed Arabi, repre-
senting the Egyptian army," in which he assured
the Consuls-General that he and those actiu"; in
concert with him " would continue to protect the
interests of all the subjects of friendly Powers."
There could be no mistakins: this lano-uao'e. It
was that of a ruler who disposed of power to assert
his will, and who intended to use his power with
that object.
Yet, whilst Arabi was heading a mutiny against
his Sovereign, and employing language which could
only lawfully proceed from the Khedive or from
one of his Ministers, there can be little doubt that
his conduct was mainly guided by fear of the
Khedive's resentment and vengeance. Sir Charles
Cookson thought that the officers had " exclusively
regarded their own safety and interest throughout
the ao-itation." Sir Edward INIalet entertained a
similar opinion. Every word and deed of the
mutineers showed, indeed, that fear was the pre-
dominating infiuence at work amongst them. In
the Circular which Arabi addressed to the repre-
sentatives of the Powers, he said : *' Since the
Khedive's returti to Cairo, intrigues have been on
the hicrease, while we have been threatened both
o])enly and secretly ; and they have culminated in
an attempt to create disunion among the military,
in order to facilitate the object in view, namely,
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to destroy and avenge themselves upon us. In this
state of things, we consider it our duty to protect
our lives and interests." Sir Edward Malet was
informed by "a Musulman gentleman, who had
had long and frequent conversations " with Arabi,
that the latter thought that action had become
absolutely necessary in self-defence. At a later
period, Arabi said that he believed that a party of
Circassians agreed together to kill him, as well
as every native Egyptian holding a high appoint-
ment, on October 1, 1881. "We heard," he said,
"that three iron boxes had been prepared into
which to put us, so that we might be dropped
into the Nile."^ ]Men in this frame of mind
would probably not, at an early stage of the
proceedings, have been uncontrollable. But, in
order to control them, one condition was essential.
They might have been treated with severity,
or, if that was impossible or undesirable, with
leniency, but in either case it was essential that
they should be treated in a manner which would
leave no doubt in their minds as to the good faith of
their rulers. Moreover, the practices which until
a recent period had existed in Egypt, notably the
fate of Ismail Pasha's Finance Minister,^ the natu-
rally suspicious character of Orientals, and their
belief, which is often 'well founded, that some
intrigue lies at the bottom of every action of the
Government, should have rendered it clear to the
Khedive that the slightest whisper imputing bad
faith would be fatal to his reputation for loyalty.
The utmost caution was, in fact, necessary. A
bold, straightforward conduct, and a stern repres-
sion of all palace intrigues, might perhaps have
quieted the fears of the officers. Riaz Pasha,
although he may not have grasped the whole
* " Instructions to my Counsel," Nineteenth Century, December 1882.
2 Vide ante, p. 26.
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situation, liad sufficiently statesmanlike instincts
to appreciate the true nature of the danger. He
warned the Kliedive frequently not to do or say
anything which could give rise to the least sus-
picion as to his intentions. It is improbable tliat
the Khedive had any deliberate plan for wreaking
vengeance on the mutineers. It is certain that his
humane nature would have revolted at any idea of
assassination, such as was attributed to him. At
the same time, if he had considered himself suffi-
ciently powerful to act, he would not improbably
have made his dis])leasure felt in one form or
another, in spite of the pardon which had been
reluctantly wrung from him. Like Macbeth, he
would not play false, but yet would wrongly win.
It would be in harmony with the inconsistency
even of an honest Oriental to pardon fully, and at
the same time to make a mental reserve, which
would enable him at some future time to act as
though the pardon had only been partial. He
allowed his surroundings, which almost always
exercise a baneful influence in an Oriental court,
to intrigue and to talk in a manner which was
calculated to excite the fears and suspicions of the
mutineers. Arabi, in his Circular to the Consuls-
General, made special allusion to the intrigues of
Yousuf Pasha Kemal, the Khedive's agent, and
Ibrahim Aga, the Khedive's Tutunji (Pipe-bearer),
who, he said, " had been sowing discord." National
proclivities and foreign intrigue may, therefore,
have had something to do with the mutiny of
September 9, but there can be little doubt that
the main cause was truly stated by Arabi. It was
fear.
This was the third mutiny of the Egyptian
army. On each occasion, the mutineers gained
confidence in tlieir strength. On each occasion, the
submission of the Government was more complete
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than previously. The first mutiny was quelled
by the sacrifice of an unpopular Minister (Nubar
Pasha), whom the ruling Khedive did not wish to
maintain in office. On the second occasion, the
War Minister (Osman Pasha Rifki) was offered up
to appease the mutineers. On the third occasion,
the mutineers dictated their own terms attlie point
of the bayonet ; they did not rest satisfied without
a complete change of Ministry. " Things bad
begun make strong themselves by ill." No rem-
nant of military discipline was now left. The
Khedive was shorn of all real authority. Tiie
smallest incident would suffice to show that tlie
Ministers only held office on sufferance from
the mutineers. No long time was to elapse before
such an incident occurred.
VOL. I
CHAPTER XII
THE CHERIF MINISTRY
September-December 1881
The Porte wishes to interfere—Objections of France and England-
Despatch of Turkish Commissioners to Cairo— Effect of their
mission— British and French ships sent to Alexandria— Arabi
leaves Cairo with his regiment—Remarks on Turkish interference
—Divergent views of Finance and England—Despondency of the
Khedive—Che'rif Pasha's policy—Sir Auckland Colvin's views
—
Arabi's policy— Insubordination in the army— Violence of the
local press—Attitude of the civil population—Summary of the
situation at the end of 1881.
One of the first results of the events related in
the last chapter was to stimulate the ambition
of the Sultan, who saw, in the confusion with whicli
Egypt was threatened, another opportunity for
reasserting Turkish supremacy over the country.
There was, indeed, a good deal to cause anxiety
to a ruler whose o^vn tenure of power was so far
precarious in that it was, and still is mainly based
on the jealousies of the different heirs to his
succession. Arabi had sent a petition to Con-
stantinople stating that Egypt was falling into the
hands of foreigners and being Christianised, and
tliat, unless the Sultan intervened, the country
would soon share the fate of Tunis. From the
Sultan's point of view, it was not desirable to
discourage Arabi too much, and accordingly some
slight encouragement was given to him. But,
whilst running with the hare, it was also necessary
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to hunt with the hounds. Heterodox political
views were in the air. There was some vague talk
of an Egyptian constitution. Now, the Sultan
objected strongly to the introduction of constitu-
tional government into any part of the Ottoman
dominions. Then, again, tliere had been whispers
of a secret movement which was on foot with a
view to the establishment of an Arab kingdom in
Egypt and Syria. If this were done, what would
become of the homogeneity of the Ottoman
Empire, and, indeed, of the House of Osman itself?
From the days when Sobieski repulsed the Turks
from the walls of Vienna, the Ottoman Empire
had been steadily declining. One province after
another had been torn from its flank. For the
moment, the onward march of European civilisation
took no very militant form ; but it was probable
that the combat, which had been going on for a
couple of centuries or more, would sooner or later
be renewed, and, if it were renewed, it might well
be that, although the Christian Powers might
quarrel over the heritage, the fate of the rightful
heir would be sealed. The House of Osman might
have to abandon its European possessions. In
that case, the only refuge left would be to establish
the Khalifate somewhere on the other side of the
Bosphorus, notably at Baghdad, which, according
to ancient tradition, was to be the Dar-el-Selam
(the House of Peace) of the dynasty of Osman.
The establishment of an Arab kingdom, more
especially if it was to be encumbered with new-
fangled ideas of constitutions and the like, would
materially interfere with the execution of a policy
of this sort. Any such proposal was, therefore, to
be resisted as strongly as possible.
The first idea of the Sultan was to occupy the
country with Turkish troops. Early in September
1881, preparations were made to transport an
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Ottoman force to Egypt. The French Govern-
ment, liowever, true to their traditional policy,
entertained strong objections to any Turkish inter-
ference in Egypt. The British Government were
also of opinion that " it would not be desirable that
any active measures of repression should be taken
by the Sultan until, at all events, the necessity for
them had been clearly demonstrated, and the
method to be adopted had been discussed and agreed
upon. But they saw no objection to the Sultan,
if His Majesty should be so disposed, sending, with
the consent of England and France, a Turkish
General to Egypt to support the Khedive's
authority, and aid His Highness with his advice."
The French Government, however, thought
that " even the despatch of a Turkish General to
Egypt might lead to further steps, resulting,
perhaps, in a permanent occupation of the country
by Turkish troops." The British Government
yielded to the French representations on this
subject, and on September 18, Lord Dufferin, who
was at the time Ambassador at Constantinople,
was instructed, in the event of the Sultan pro-
posing to send a Turkish General to Cairo, "to
endeavour to dissuade His Majesty from adopting
this course." The French Ambassador at Con-
stantinople had already received instructions "to
protest against any sort of intervention on the
part of Turkey in Egyptian affairs."
If, however, Turkish troops could not be sent
to Egypt ; if the deposition of Tewfik Pasha in
favour of Halim Pasha, which was also con-
templated, was ini})ossible by reason of British
opposition ; if, moreover, the idea of despatching a
Turkish General to Egypt had to be abandoned,
at all events a sort of shadowy supremacy would
be asserted if a Turkish official were sent in some
kind of capacity to Egypt, even although neither
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the envoy nor the Sultan had any very clear idea of
what functions he would perform on arrival. The
Sultan, therefore, informed the French Ambassador
"that he considered, in view of Turkey's enormous
interests both in Egypt and the Hedjaz, that he
had a perfect right to despatch an emissary with
his compliments and advice to the Khedive, and
this he intended to do, though the person would
not have the character of a Commissioner." Ali
Fuad Bey and Ali Nizami Pasha were, therefore,
sent to Egypt, and arrived at Alexandria on
October 6.
The effect of the despatch of these envoys
was instantaneous on all the parties concerned.
Every one recognised that the Sultan had S(ime sort
of technical right to interfere. Some recognised
that, in an extreme case, his interference would be
the least of many evils. Others were anxious to play
with Turkish suzerain rights in order to subserve
their own interests. But there was one point on
which Lord Granville,^ M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire,
Cherif Pasha, Arabi, the Egyptian military party, the
Egyptian national party, the bondholding interest,
and the public opinion of Europe, appeared to be
agreed. It was that Turkish interference in Egypt
would do a great deal of harm, and was to be
avoided if possible.
The British and French Governments informed
the Sultan that they had "learnt with surprise and
regret " of the decision to send envoys. Sir Edward
Malet and M. Sienkiewicz were instructed "to
receive the Turkish envoys with all the honours
due to their rank, but to firmly oppose any inter-
ference on their part in the internal administration
of Egypt." Moreover, both the British and French
Governments suddenly found out that, "with a
^ Lord Granville assumed charge of the Foreiffn Office on April
28, 1880.
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view to diminishing the danger of a panic amongst
tlie foreign popuhition in Cairo and Alexandria,
which tlie absence of a phice of refuge might
occasion amongst them in the event of disturb-
ances," it would be desirable to send a couple of
ships to Alexandria, a measure which gave con-
siderable umbrage at Constantinople. It was
calculated, the Sultan thought, " to cause agitation
and disturbance among the whole Arab population,
and it was not improbable that it might lead to a
general revolution."
To the Khedive, the intelligence that two Turkish
envoys were to come to Cairo was " altogether un-
expected," and he asked Sir Edward Malet and
]M. Sienkiewicz whether they "could throw any light
upon it"; to which question, Sir Edward Malet
reported, *' we replied in the negative." As regards
Cherif Pasha, he was of opinion that, as two
Turkish envoys were to come, the main thing was
to get rid of them as soon as possible. Accordingly,
at the request of the Egyptian Government, the
British and French Ambassadors at Constantinople
were instructed to " urge upon the Porte that they
should shorten as much as possible the stay of the
Turkish envoys in Egypt."
A considerable effect was also produced on
Arabi. He was willing enough to strengthen his
own cause against Circassians and Europeans by
an appeal to the Sultan, but he never intended that
the appeal should be taken seriously. There was,
indeed, something strangely inconsistent, not to
say comical, m asking the Sultan to countenance
a movement which was avowedly directed against
Turkish supremacy in Egypt. Arabi, therefore,
made no further difficulties about moving his
mutinous regiment from Cairo to Suez. " He had
always said," Sir Edward Malet reported, " that he
was ready to go, but no date liad been fixed for
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his departure, and he himself had spoken about
leaving perhaps in three weeks, but I have little
doubt that there would have been considerable
difficulty in inducing him to fix a day had it not
been for the unexpected announcement of the
advent of the envoys."
Under all these circumstances, it was clear that
the Turkish mission could not be productive of
much practical result. As a matter of fact, all that
the Turkish envoys did was to inspect the troops
at Cairo. After the inspection, Ali Nizami l^asha
harangued the officers. He reminded them that the
Khedive was the representative of the Sultan, and
that therefore disobedience to the Khedive wan
disobedience to the Sultan. After that, nothing-
more was done. The pressure exerted from all
sides on the Turkish envoys with a view to
getting them out of the country was too great
to be resisted. The question, however, arose
as to which were to leave first, the British and
French ships, or the Turkish envoys. Musurus
Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in London,
told Lord Granville "that it would be im-
possible for the Sultan to withdraw his mission
until after the departure of the ships." Lord
Granville, on the other hand, said that the ships
had already left Malta for Alexandria, but would
not arrive till October 19, "by Mhich time it
was to be presumed that the Turkish Commis-
sioners would be taking their departure." Lord
Dufferin was instructed to tell the Sultan that the
ships would leave on the same day that the Turkish
Commissioners embarked. M. Barthelemy St.
Hilaire also told Lord Lyons that when once the
Turkish envoys had gone, both ships might (juit
Alexandria without delay, and simultaneously.
Both Governments were of opinion that, after the
departure of the envoys, there was no longer any
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necessity to provide a place of refuge for Europeans
in the event of disturbance. The result of all this
diplomatic skirmishing was that H.M.S. Invincible
arrived at Alexandria on October 19. Twenty-
four hours before her arrival, the Turkish envoys
had left Cairo for Alexandria with a view to
embarkation at that port, and twenty-four hours
after her arrival both the British and French ships
left Alexandria harbour.
This episode has been narrated at some length,
because an important principle was involved in
the discussion connected with the mission of the
Turkish envoys. Who, as a last resort, was to be
responsible for the maintenance of order in Egypt ?
It is a most unfortunate thing that at no stage
of the Egyptian Question has it been possible to
make any suggestion against which valid objec-
tions might not be urged. Turkish intervention
in Egypt was open to obvious objections; but
could any alternative and less objectionable policy
be suggested ? The British Government thought
not; they, therefore, from the first leant towards
the idea that, as a last resort, the Sultan should be
used as the Deus ex machina^ who should restore
order. They were, however, so hampered by their
partnership with the French as to be unable to
give effect to their own views.
Both the British and French Governments
were honestly desirous of acting together. M.
Barthelemy St. Hilaire said that "his policy with
reference to Egypt was well known, and never
varied ; it was summed up in the absolute necessity,
as in the past, so in the future, of perfect frank-
ness between the two Governments, and joint action
on every occasion." There cannot be the least
doubt that these words honestly represented the
views of the French Government at this time,
and that the desire to co-operate was as honestly
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reciprocated by the British Government. Un-
fortunately, the views of the British and French
Governments were divergent on one impoitant
point of j)rinciple. The French Government
regarded Turkish intervention in Egypt as the
worst possible solution of the Egyptian Question.
M. Bartlielemy St. Hilaire told the British Charge
d'Affaires that he would prefer an Anglo-French
to a Turkish occupation of Egypt. Moreover, the
French Government feared tliat, if Turkish inter-
vention were allowed, the pretensions of the
Sultan would be raised and his prestige increased
amongst the Mohammedan population of Northern
Africa. Thus, a spirit of fanaticism might be
aroused in Tunis.
The objections of the British Government to
Turkish intervention, on the other hand, were far
less strong than those of the French. This was
evidenced by their willingness to allow the Sultan
to send a Turkish General to Egypt, although,
at the instance of the French Government, they
ultimately withdrew their su})port to this measure.
If any armed occupation became necessary, the
British Government preferred that it should be
Turkish rather than Anglo - French. But they
allowed French diplomacy to take the lead, and the
main end of French diplomacy was to prevent any
Turkish interference in Egypt.
When the Egyptian Question was subsequently
(July 24, 1882) discussed in Parliament, Lord
Salisbury said : " There were two modes of going
to work with the Government of Egypt. You
might have used moral force as you have made use
of material force. ^ Your only mode of acting by
moral force is by means of the hearty co-operation
of the Sultan of Turkey. But you took the best
* This was in allusion to the bombardment of Alexandria^ which,
when Lord Salisbury spoke, had recently taken place.
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means of alienating that hearty co-operation. If
you had gone to him from the first, taken him into
your counsels, and made him the instrument of
what you desired, and indicated from the first that
you wished to take no steps without his concurrence
and co-operation, there might iiave been objections
to such a plan ; but, at least, you would have had
him heartily with you." Lord Salisbury then indi-
cated various steps which had been taken, and
which, in his opinion, must "in themselves have
resulted in setting any Sultan of Turkey in
opposition."
There was much force in Lord Salisbury's criti-
cism. In October 1881, the necessity for armed
foreign intervention of any kind had not yet arisen.
Lord Granville was, witlu)ut doubt, acting wisely in
deprecating measures of repression on the part of the
Sultan until their necessity had been clearly demon-
strated. On the other hand, it was apparent that
Egypt was threatened with a degree of confusion
against which moral force, persuasion, or even
threats would be employed in A^ain. It was, there-
fore, necessary at the outset to have a clear idea as
to the method by which physical force was to be
employed in case of need. There were but two
alternative courses possible. One was an Anglo-
French occupation, for at that time no one thought
of an occupation by France or by England alone.
The other was a Turkish occupation. The French
preferred an Anglo - French occupation as the
lesser evil of the two. Their views were ])erfectly
logical and consistent, and, for a time at all events,
the French Government acted upon them. Whether
the policy they advocated was the best in the true
interests of France or England is a matter of
opinion.
The British Government, on the other hand,
contemplated the possibility of a 'J'urkish occupa-
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tion, and preferred this solution to any other. In
a despatch addressed to Sir Edward JNJalet on
November 4, 1881, Lord Granville laid down the
general lines of British policy in connection with
Egyptian affairs. He deprecated the idea that
either the French or the British Government
entertained any " self - aggrandising designs " as
regards Egypt. " The Khedive and his Ministers,"
he added, " may feel secure that Her Majesty's
Government contemplate no such deviation from
the policy which they have traced for themselves."
He set forth the British view of the Turkish con-
nection with Egypt. It was that the status quo
should be maintained. The tie with Turkey should
not be severed. At the same time, Lord Granville
pointed out that the British Government " desired
to maintain Egypt in the enjoyment of the measure
of administrative independence which has been
secured to her by the Sultan's Firmans. The
Government of England would run counter to the
most cherished traditions of national history were
it to entertain a desire to diminish that liberty or
tamper with the institutions to which it has given
birth." Lord Granville then went on to say that
"the only circumstance which would force Her
Majesty's Government to depart from the course
of conduct which he had mentioned would be the
occurrence in Egypt of a state of anarchy." These
were wise words. They indicated that Turkish
intervention was undesirable, but that, if material
force had to be employed, a Turkish was to be
preferred to an Anglo-French occupation.
Unfortunately, while the British Government
contemplated using the Turk, with all his obvious
defects, as the instrument by which order was as a
last resort to be maintained in Egypt, they allowed
themselves to be led away by the objections
which could be urged against Turkish intervention
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considered exclusively on its own merits. They fol-
lowed the French Government in a line of conduct
which irritated and discouraged the Sultan. As
the Sultan's military forces might eventually have
to be used for the preservation of order, it would
have been wise to have encouraged the exercise of
his authority by viewing with a friendly eye the
despatch of a Turkish mission to Egypt, in spite of
the objections urged from Cairo in deprecation of
the mission. But this was not done. The Sultan
was discouraged and opposed in the exercise of his
authority. The British Government thus entered
a groove hostile to Turkish intervention, with the
result that British intervention became eventually
a necessity.
It is, of course, true that this subject presents
another aspect. So far as the welfare of the
Egyptian people and of all Europeans interested in
the affairs of Egypt is concerned, European inter-
vention, whether British, French, or Anglo-French,
was to be preferred to Turkish intervention. But,
on the assumption that it was desirable to avoid
the occupation of Egypt by British or French
troops, it would appear that Turkish intervention,
in spite of its acknowledged drawbacks, should,
from the first, have been less totally discouraged.
It is curious, in reading over the correspond-
ence after a lapse of many years, to observe how
heartily the French Government worked to bring
about the solution which eventually occurred, and
which was probably more distasteful to them than
any other, namely, a British occupation of Egyp:.
The British Government, on the other hand, acted
throughout on the principle of J'^ideo meliora, pro-
boque, deteriora sequor. They saw the objections
to any European occupation. They preferred a
Turkish occupation. Yet, although they appear
to have shown greater political foresight than the
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French, they failed to act in a manner which
would have enabled effect to be given to their own
principles. The more unreasonable amongst the
French eventually said that England, with her
habitual perfidy, was merely playing a part with a
view ultimately to bring about a British occupation.
They were quite wrong. The British Govern-
ment acted, as they always act, with perfect honesty,
but, at the same time, with so little consistency in
the pursuit of political aims, that it can be no
matter for surprise that their motives should have
been subsequently misrepresented. Their vacilla-
tion was, without doubt, due to a desire to ensure
French co-operation, and also probably in part to
an excessive deference to English public opinion.
The idea of handing over Egypt, even temporarily,
to the rule of the Sultan would unquestionably
have met with much hostile criticism in England,
probably from the same classes who were eventu-
ally most strongly opposed to a British occupation.
But it can scarcely be held that this argument
constituted a sufficient plea for discarding the
policy. No one would have been able to pro-
pose any alternative policy which would have
been preferable. The duty of a Government
is to take the lead, especially as regards foreign
affairs, and to stand criticism even, when matters
of the first importance are concerned, at the risk
of bringing about its own downfall.
Shortly after the mutiny of September 9, Sir
Edward Malet reported that the "general tone
of the Khedive with regard to the future was
despondent. His Highness said that he could no
longer believe in any professions of fidelity made
by the officers of the army." These observations
gave the keynote to the Khedive's conduct during
the next few months. He resented the humilia-
tion to which he had been subjected by the
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mutinous conduct of his officers. It rankled in
his mind, and led him to nurture schemes for
revenge. He constantly expressed his opinion that
there could be no tranquillity in the country until
the army was mastered. It can be no matter for
surprise that the Khedive entertained views of this
description, but it would have been wiser and more
statesmanlike if he had sunk all personal feelings
of resentment against the army. As it was, the
breach between the Khedive on the one hand, and
the army and the national party on the other hand,
continued to widen every day.
Cherif Pasha took a broader view of the situa-
tion. He appreciated the desirability of separating
the national party from the army. He told Sir
Edward Malet on September 21 "that it was his
intention later on to convoke the Chamber of
Notables, which he hoped would by degrees
become the legitimate exponent of the internal
wants of the country, and by this means deprive
the army of the character which it had arrogated
to itself in the late movement. . . . The Notables
would be a representative body on which the
Khedive and his Government would be able to
lean for popular support against military dictation."
On October 8, a Decree was issued convoking the
Chamber of Notables for December 23. The
functions and composition of the Chamber were
regulated by Ismail Pasha's law of 1866. Arabi
pressed for the adoption of a law giving greater
power to the Chamber, but eventually yielded.
Sir Edward JNIalet reported on October 2 that
Arabi once more "professed confidence in Cht^rif
Pasha, and stated his intention of leaving the
matter entirely in his hands."
The situation at this time was well described in
a Memorandum written by Sir Auckland Colvin
on September 19. "As to the position," he said,
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*' my view of it is that it is essentially an armistice.
The arrangement we have been able to come to
gives us a little breathing-time, during which we
can take count of the forces that are at work
around us, and endeavour to guide or repress them.
There should be no illusions on this point. That
we are entering on a fresh period of order and
regularity, there seem to be no grounds for believ-
ing. The army is elated by what it has achieved,
and its leaders are penetrated with the conviction
that their mission is to give Egypt liberty. The
Notables, who are now in large numbers in Cairo,
though they have taken into their own hands the
right to ask for an extension of civil liberties, and
deny the officers any right of petition or of inter-
ference in the matter, are at one with them in the
desire to obtain some solid concessions. All is
being done in an orderly and everj exemplary
manner : but the chance of any final settlement
depends :
—
"(1) On the army dispersing to the several
quarters assigned to it.
" (2) On the moderation shown by the Notables
in their demands.
*' (3) On the tact and firmness of the Ministers
in dealing with the army and the Notables.
. . .
*' I do not think it is at all my duty to oppose
myself to the popular movement, but to try rather
to guide and to give it definite shape. So long as
the financial position of the country, or the influ-
ence of the Control, is not likely to be affected
by concessions made to the Notables, I believe I
should be very foolish to express any hostility to
their wishes. It is in this sense that I propose to
act, and to advise Cherif Pasha when the matter
is ripe for discussion. It is, to sum up, by advis-
ing promptness in carrying out the necessary
measures with the army, and, in the second place,
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by reasonable discussion of any petitions presented
by the Notables, that we can alone hope to assist in
converting the armistice into a peace."
Sir Auckland Colvin rightly judged the
situation. Cherif Pasha was the nominal Prime
JNIinister but Arabi, as Sir Edward Malet said, was
the "arbiter of the destinies of the country." A
local newspaper, Kl Hedjaz, which was the organ
of the Arabist party, spoke of " the illustrious and
magnanimous Emir, His Excellency Ahmed Bey
Arabi." When Arabi received orders to leave Cairo
with his regiment, he did not take his departure
as a simple Colonel in command of a battalion.
He made a sort of royal progress through the
streets of Cairo, which were crowded with
spectators on the occasion. He was received with
enthusiasm, and, on arrival at the railway station,
he harangued the troops. " Une ere nouvelle," he
said, " vient de s'ouvrir pour I'Egypte, et grace aux
hommes places a la tete des aftaires, en qui nous
devons avoir toute confiance, I'heure du developpe-
ment et de la prosperite vient de sonner pour nous.
Kendons hommage aux qualites et merites qui
distinguent les membres du nouveau Cabinet ; et
en })articulier a Mahmoud Pacha Sami, notre
JNIinistre de la Guerre . . . Je voudrais que vous
puissiez comprendre tons, quelle giorieuse mission
est reservee a une armee bien unie, bien com-
mandee, bien disciplinee, et ne marchant que vers
un but unique, le bien de la patrie. Vous avez
une force entre les mains, et tons reunis vous en
representez une invincible."^ A little later, a fete
was given iit Zagazig in honour of Arabi. About
1000 pe()})le were ])resent, "all patriots" having
been invited to attend. Arabi was received with
' This speech was, of course, delivered in Arabic. Hie French
translation, quoted above, was subsequently published in the local
newspapers.
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enthusiasm. He made a speech in which he insisted
on the necessity of reforms, inveighed against the
employment of Europeans in Egypt, and said that
he had three regiments in Cairo on whom he
could rely to carry out his behests.
Whilst, however, in public Arabi incited hatred
to Europeans, in private he used a different
language. On November 1, Arabi, Ali Bey Fehmi,
and Toulba Bey Ismet had an intervicAv with Sir
Auckland Colvin. Arabi "described the Govern-
ment of the Mamelukes and that of the present
dynasty as being equally oppressive to the Arab
population. His point was to show that up to the
present the Egyptians have had no security for life or
property. They were imprisoned, exiled, strangled,
thrown into the Nile, starved, and robbed accord-
ing to the will of their masters. A liberated slave
was a freer man than a freeborn Arab. The most
ignorant Turk was preferred and honoured before
the best of the Egyptians. He illustrated his
statement by the case of the Mufettish.^ He then
went on at great lengtli to explain that men came
of one common stock and had equal rights of
personal liberty and security. The development
of this theme took some considerable time, and
was curious in its naive treatment, but it evidently
was the general outcome of the speaker's laboured
thoughts, and was the expression, not of rhetorical
periods, but of conviction. Passing on to the
bearing of his reasoning on facts, he said that on
the 1st February the Circassian rule (by which he
meant the arbitrary Turkish regime) had fallen in
Egypt ; on the 9th September, the necessity of
substituting for it the era of law and justice had
been recognised and established. It was for law
and justice that he and the army contended. He
disclaimed in the plainest words the desire to get
' Ismail Pasha's Fiuauce Minister, who was assassinated in 187G.
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rid of Europeans, whether as employes or residents
;
he spoke of them as the necessary instructors of
the people. He himself and the two officers
(pointing to them) had never been to school.
Intercourse with Europeans had been their school.
He and all felt the need of it ; they had no wish to
question the need of Europeans in the adminis-
tration ; on the contrary, if more were required let
them come. . . . The impression left on my mind
was that Arabi, who spoke with great moderation,
calmness, and conciliation, is sincere and resolute,
but is not a practical man. The exposition, not
the execution of ideas, is his strength. The other
two Colonels are clearly more practical men, and
act, I should say, as a sedative on Arabi, when his
views excite and stimulate him too dangerously."
Whilst the leading officers of the army were
thus assuming the role of demagogues, the dis-
cipline of the men became daily more and more
shaken. Early in November, a couple of soldiers,
who had been arrested by the police for brawling,
were forcibly released by their comrades from the
guard-house to which they had been conveyed. A
little later, the Government decided to change the
Colonel of the artillery quartered in Cairo, but the
soldiers of the regiment opposed the change, and
declared that they would not obey any new Colonel
who might be appointed. Their opposition was
overcome, but not without considerable con-
cessions having been made to them. About the
same time, the band of a regiment quartered at
Cairo refused to obey an order to play at the
theatre. The troops at Suez also showed signs
of insubordination, due to a soldier having been
murdered by an Italian. These symptoms were
sufficient to indicate that there was no public
force in Egypt on whom reliance could be placed
to maintain order.
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In the meanwhile, the minds of the civil popula-
tion were excited by the vernacular press, whicli
attacked Europeans and their systems of govern-
ment with virulence and appealed to JNloham-
medan fanaticism. " We are the prey," wrote one
of these newspapers, "of two lions, England and
France, who are watching for the favourable
moment to realise their designs, hidden under a
deceptive policy. . . . One day we hope to see our
administrations cleared of all Europeans, and on
that day we can say tliat England and France
have rendered us a great service, for which we shall
really thank them." " Some people," another news-
paper wrote, *' pretend tliat fanaticism is ruinous to
progress, yet our best days were tliose in which we
conquered the Universe by devotion to our faith.
To-day we have neglected it, and we and our
country are in the hands of strangers, but our mis-
fortunes are a just punishment for our sins.
O ye Ulema of El-Azhar! wliose sacred duty
it should be to combat this religious decadence,
what will be your answer at the Day of Judg-
ment to Flim who can read the secrets of your
hearts ?
"
Writings of this sort naturally led to retorts
from the local European press. A French paper,
U f^'gijpte, described Osman, the third of the
Khalifs, as " le fanatique heritier d'un faux pro-
phete." The editor's life was threatened, and he
left the country. His newspaper was suppressed,
as also was El Hedjaz, a newspaper which had
specially distinguished itself by the violence of its
language in support of Pan-Islamic views. "The
suppression of this newspaper," Sir Edward JNlalet
wrote, "especially while Arabi Bey was still at
Cairo, was regarded as a sign of returning authority
to the Government ; and consequently had the
effect of, to some degree, restoring confidence."
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In spite of all this inflammatory literature, the
mass of the people remained for some time in-
different to all that was passing. Eventually,
however, the insubordination, whicli had shown
itself in the army, began to spread to the civil
population. This it was sure to do, for the reason
given by Sir Auckland Colvin in a JNIemorandum
dated September 24. " What," he said, " gives a
show of justification to the recent conduct of the
army and gives them support among great numbers
of the respectable Egyptians, is that there is a
great deal of truth in their complaints. They are
sure of sympathy when they ask for justice, and
protest against acts of arbitrary violence. The
only way in which the Government can deprive
them of the influence which they acquire by their
appeal is by taking the game out of their hands."
When the year 1881 closed, therefore, the con-
dition of affairs was as follows. The Khedive was
brooding over the humiliation inflicted on him by
his mutinous army, and was desirous of an oppor-
tunity to reassert his authority. Cherif Pasha
was inspired by some statesmanlike principles, and
was endeavouring to regain the legitimate authority
of the Government, but he was wanting in the
energy and strength of character necessary to
control the turbulent elements which had been
let loose. He was ably seconded by Sir Edward
Malet and by Sir Auckland Colvin. Arabi was
the real ruler of the country. He had the army
at his back. Early in January 1882, he was
appointed Under - Secretary of State for War, as
" it was thought better that he should belong to
the Government than be outside it." The popula-
tion of Egypt was discontented, but the junction
between the national party and the mutinous army
was not complete. The civil element still looked
askance at the soldiers. The native press was
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appealing to Mohammedan fanaticism, and inciting
hatred against Europeans.
Under circumstances such as these, the utmost
care was necessary. In the general ferment which
then existed, a false step would be fatal. The
British and French Governments were about to
take a step which was to be well-nigh destructive
of all hope of guiding the movement, and was to
render foreign interference of some sort, whether
Turkish or European, an almost unavoidable
necessity.
CHAPTER XIII
THE JOINT NOTE
January 1882
Proposal to establish an Anglo-French Military Control—Change of
Ministry in France—M. Gambetta proposes joint action—Lord
Granville agrees—Sir Edward Malet consulted—Sir Auckland
Colvin's recommendations—M. Gambetta prepares a draft note
—Lord Granville agrees—Instructions sent to Cairo—Proposed
increase in the army—Reorganisation of the Chamber of Notables
—Eifect produced by the Note—Remarks on the Note.
Immediately after the mutiny of September 9,
M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire proposed to Lord
Granville that a joint Military Control should be
established in Egypt. A British and a French
General were to be sent to Cairo. These officers,
the French Minister thought, "would be able to
introduce order and discipline into the Egyptian
army." The British Government asked " what
consequences would ensue supposing these Generals
were set at nought by the Egyptian army." To
this question, " INI. Barthelemy St. Hilaire answered
that in such a case it might be necessary to make
it unmistakably manifest that the Generals had the
support of England and France. He spoke in very
general terms of a naval demonstration, of the
despatch of English and French ships of war to
Alexandria, but he did not make any definite pro-
posal or suggestion on the subject." The proposal
was referred to Cairo, where it was scouted by
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Cherif Pasha and by Sir Auckland Colvin. The
fact that it should have been made showed how
little the French Government realised the true
nature of the local situation. At a moment when
every endeavour was being made to incite the
population against European interference of any
kind, it was absurd to suppose that two European
Generals could, by mere force of character, have
obtained any control over the mutinous army.
The only result of sending them would have been
to cause another and probably more serious mutiny.
This proposal was, therefore, allowed to drop.
No further proposal for joint action on the part
of England and France was put forward until the
middle of December, by which time a change
of Ministry had taken place in France. M.
Gambetta assumed the direction of affairs. His
masterful spirit soon imparted a fresh impulse to
Egyptian policy, in which he took a lively personal
interest.
On December 15, M. Gambetta told Lord
Lyons that "he considered it to be extremely
important to strengthen the authority of Tewfik
Pasha. On the one hand, every endeavour should
be made to inspire Tewfik himself with confidence
in the support of France and England, and to
infuse into him firmness and energy. On the
other hand, the enemies of the present system,
the adherents of Ismail Pasha and Halim Pasha,
and the Egyptians generally should be made to
understand that France and England, by whose
influence Tewfik has been placed on the throne,
would not acquiesce in his being deposed from
it. . . , Any interposition on the part of the
Porte, M. Gambetta declared emphatically to be,
in his opinion, wholly inadmissible. . . . He
thought the time was come when the two Govern-
ments should consider the matter in common m
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order to be prepared for united and immediate
action in case of need."
To this communication, Lord Granville replied
on December 19 : *' Her JNIajesty's Government
quite agree in thinking that the time has come
when the two Governments should consider what
course had better be adopted by both Governments.
Her Majesty's Government also think that it is
desirable that some evidence should be given of
their cordial understanding ; but that it requires
careful consideration what steps should be taken in
case of disorder again reappearing."
To any one who can read between the lines,
this correspondence is instructive. It gives a
correct indication of what was to follow. Both
Governments were in a frame of mind which is
dangerous in politics. They both thought that,
in ordinary conversational language, "something
must be done." The action of the French
Government was directed by a fiery and energetic
Minister who could not brook inaction. M. Gam-
betta thoroughly understood what he wanted. He
wished to bring Egypt under Anglo-French control
without an armed occupation, if that were possible ;
but if it were impossible, then he would accept the
occupation as the best solution of the question.
On the other side of the Channel, affairs were
directed by a Minister with a far calmer judgment
than M. Gambetta, but who was wanting in
initiative. It is a dangerous thing in politics for
a responsible INlinister to accept vaguely the prin-
ci])le that "something must be done," when he has
not a clear idea of what should be done. The
acceptation of the principle will not improbably
lead liim into doing things which he will sub-
sequently wish had been left undone. At a later
period, Lord Granville was to see that, though
there " were objections to every possible course,"
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at the same time, the main question was, "which
of them offered the least inconvenience." But he
discovered this too late. For the moment, he
allowed his headstrong French associate to drag
him in a direction opposed to that which, as a
choice of evils, he most approved, namely, a
Turkish occupation. He was eventually to drift
into a solution to which he was much opposed,
namely, a British occupation, and it was only by
the accident of a change of INIinistry in France
that he was prevented from drifting into what
was probably the worst solution possible, namely,
an Anglo-French occupation.
On December 24, M. Gambetta developed some-
what more fully the nature of the steps which he
thought might advantageously be taken by the
British and French Governments. The Chamber
of Notables was about to assemble at Cairo. Their
meeting would, M. Gambetta thought, "produce
a considerable change in the political situation of
Egypt." He proposed, therefore, that " the two
Governments should instruct their representatives
at Cairo to convey collectively to Tewfik Pasha
assurances of the sympathy and support of France
and England, and to encourage His Highness to
maintain and assert his proper authority. . . . This
seemed to him a simple and practical measure, to
be adopted without delay, and the two Govern-
ments might make it a starting-point for consider-
ing in concert what further steps they should be
ready to take in case of need."
Lord Granville communicated M. Gambetta's
proposal to Sir Edward Malet, and, on December 26,
asked him whether he saw any objection to it. On
the following day. Sir Edward Malet replied : " I
see no objection to M. Gambetta's ])roposal. The
support that the Khedive is most likely to require
is towards the maintenance of the independence of
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the Chamber against the jealousies and suspicions
of the Porte." Thereupon, Lord Granville in-
structed Lord Lyons to inform JNI. Gambetta that
the British Government agreed to his proposal.
AA'hen this message was communicated to M.
Gambetta, he said that he would prepare a draft
of an instruction to the British and French repre-
sentatives at Cairo for submission to the British
Government.
On December 30, Sir Edward Malet tele-
graphed to Lord Granville stating that it would
be desirable to await the arrival of a despatch then
on its way from Cairo before deciding on the terms
of the communication which was to be addressed
to the Egyptian Government. "It would be
unadvisable," Sir Edward Malet added, "that the
Khedive should be encouraged to hope that we
would support him in maintaining an attitude of
reserve towards the Chamber. It has been con-
voked with the full approval of Cherif Pasha, who
looks to it for success and support. To discoun-
tenance it would be to play into the hands of the
Porte, increase the influence of the military, and
diminish that which we are now obtaining as
befriending moderate reform. The reply of the
Chamber to the Khedive's speech is stated to be
extremely moderate and satisfactory."
The despatch to which Sir Edward INIalet
alluded in this telegram was dated December 26.
It enclosed a remarkable INIemorandum prepared
by Sir Auckland Colvin, who wrote as follows :
—
"The events of the last three months, and the
movement still going on in Egypt, must necessarily
make itself felt in the relations of Egypt with the
two Powers. It will be well to describe briefly
what the present movement seems to be, and in
what direction it threatens to encroach on the
ground held by England and France.
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"In its origin, the movement is, I tliink,
miquestioiiably an Egyptian movement against
Turkish arbitrary rule. The rebound I'rom
Ismail Pasha's tyranny, the growing emancipa-
tion of the Egyptian mind owing to its close
contact with Europeans, and the opportunity
given by the anomalous position in which Egypt
finds herself in relation severally to Turkey and
the two Powers, have immediately led to the
events we are now witnessing. Cherif Pasha,
having been placed at the head of the movement,
partly from conviction but more by weakness, is
allowing himself to be carried forward on it, and
will, I think, be eventually swept away by it. He
is quite incompetent to control, and little able to
guide it.
" The movement, though in its origin anti-Turk,
is in itself an Egyptian national movement. For
the moment, it is careful in its attitude towards
Europeans because it has need of them in its duel
with its immediate opponents, but it cannot look
on them with favour, or be animated, aufond^ by
any other desire than that of eventually getting
rid of them."
" So much for the nature of the movement; next,
as to the direction in which it threatens to encroach
upon the ground now occupied by England and
France,
*' There will be, I think, a twofold danger : first,
a disposition to ignore or modify the engagements
by which Egypt is bound ; secondly, to get rid of
foreign interference in branches of the administra-
tion in regard to which there exists no direct
engagement.
" With regard to the first point, ... if the right
of voting the Budget, in otlier words, control over
the finances, is given to the Chamber, the ])osition
of the Anglo-French Control will be profoundly
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modified. At present, it is effective because the
Council gcverns the country, and in the Council
the Control has a seat and an effective voice, whilst
it is in constant and intimate relations with the
different individuals composing the Cabinet. But
it can have no relations, except of the most indirect
character, with the Chamber, nor any confidence in
the decisions of that irresponsible and ill-histructed
body. How, if the Chamber is to vote the Budget,
can the Control exercise any useful check on the
finances ? The Chamber, doubtless, in voting the
Budget, can only do so within the conditions
allowed by the Law of Liquidation ; but those
conditions are sufiiciently elastic to allow of the
finances being misapplied in a degree which would
endanger financial equilibrium.
" We have caused this to be pointed out to Cherif
Pasha, who is said to be prepared to modify his
projects in accordance with our views. But
whether the Chamber will accept his modification
is another matter."
As regards the second point, that is to say, the
desire to get rid of foreign interference in those
branches ojf the administration in respect to which
the Egyptian Government were under no distinct
international engagement, Sir Auckland Colvin
said that "successful attacks on one or more of
those administrations would sap the moral influence
of the Control, as well as destroy, proportionately
as such attacks are successful, the material hold
acquired by the Powers in the country."
Under these circumstances. Sir Auckland Colvin
thouglit that for the guidance of himself and tlie
other high British and French officials in Egypt,
the " wishes of the two Cabinets should be
expressed as to the attitude that they were to
assume."
He then proceeded to lay the following recom-
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mendations before the British Government. "The
liberal movement," he said, " now going on should,
I think, in no wise be discouraged. It lias many
enemies, no less among Europeans than amongst
Turks. But I believe it is essentially the growth
of tlie popular spirit, and is directed to the good of
the country, and that it would be most impolitic
to thwart it. But precisely because I wish it to
succeed, it seems to me essential that it should
learn from the first within what limits it must
confine itself. Otherwise, expectations may be
formed and hopes raised, the failure of which
may lead to its entire discomfiture. In all that
is doing or to be done, neither the Government
nor the Chamber should be allowed to forget that
the Powers have assumed a direct financial control
over the country and intend to maintain it. The
Powers should not, in my opinion, accept any
proposed measures which jeopardise this control,
which is essential at present to the well-being of
the country, and is, therefore, the main safeguard
against the recurrence of an * Egyptian Question.'
All that is guaranteed by the Law of Liquidation
and preceding Decrees should also be authoritatively
placed beyond the pale of discussion. All that is
designed to transfer the centre of financial authority
from the Control to the Chamber should be especi-
ally discountenanced and, if need be, negatived,
as neutralising and nullifying the agency through
which the Powers assure themselves of the efficient
conduct of financial affairs, for which they have made
themselves responsible in Egypt.
'* At the same time, I should give Cherif Pasha,
oi whoever may represent the Government, to
understand that he is expected to discourage and
oppose popular attacks on European administra-
tions, and that the Powers will by no means look
with indifference on the success of any such
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attacks. Each of these administrations is in
itself, though doubtless with many iin})eifections,
a centre of reform. They are the spokes of the
wheel representing the Control. . . . The line, it
will be thus seen, that I advocate, is the open
and firm recognition by the Powers, through their
diplomatic agents, at this critical juncture when
Egypt is remoulding her internal reorganisation,
of the material interest they possess and intend
to maintain in the administration, leaving full
liberty to the Egyptians to frame what measures
they please for their internal government, so far
as they are not inconsistent with the status
acquired by the Powers. In fact, the Egyptian
administration is a partnership of three. Unless
the Powers are prepared to modify their share,
they must secure and strengthen it, now that
the Egyptians are in a state of movement and
change. They cannot look on with indifference,
and allow matters to be discussed and settled
here without some intimation of their views. If
a clear understanding is not imposed from the first,
much misunderstanding will arise, embittering
more, as I think, the relations between us and the
Egyptians than would the authoritative declara-
tion, now when the Chamber is about to meet, of
the intentions of the Powers."
Sir Auckland Colvin's INIemorandum has been
quoted at length because it is important to ascer-
tain what information as regards the situation in
Egypt was before the Britisli Government when
it was decided to agree to M. Gambetta's proposal.
The JNIemorandum was received at the Foreimi
Office on January 2. On the same day, the draft
note prepared by M. Gambetta, which was to be
sent to the British and French Consuls-General
at Cairo, readied London. It was couched in
the following terms :
—
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"You have already been instructed on several
occasions to inform the Khedive and his Govern-
ment of the determination of England and France
to afford them support against the difficulties of
various kinds which might interfere with the
course of public affairs in Egypt. The two
Powers are entirely agreed on this subject, and
recent circumstances, especially the meeting of the
Chamber of Notables convoked by the Khedive,
have given them the opportunity for a further
exchange of views. I have accordingly to instruct
you to declare to the Khedive that the English
and French Governments consider the maintenance
of His Highness on the tlirone, on the terms laid
down by the Sultan's Firmans, and officially
recognised by the two Governments, as alone able
to guarantee, for the present and future, the good
order and development of general prosperity in
Egypt, in which France and Great Britain are
equally interested. The two Governments being
closely associated in the resolve to guard by their
united efforts against all cause of complication,
internal or external, which might menace the order
of things established in Egypt, do not doubt
that tlie assurance publicly given of their formal
intentions in this respect will tend to avert the
dangers to which the Government of the Khedive
might be exposed, and which would certainly find
England and France united to oppose them. They
are convinced that His Highness will draw from
this assurance the confidence and strength which
he requires to direct the destinies of Egypt and
his people."
On January 6, the Britisli Government agreed
to M. Gambetta's draft, with the reservation
"that they must not be considered as committing
themselves thereby to any particular mode of
action, if action should be found necessary." On
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January 7, M. Gambetta wrote to Lord Lyons
:
"We observe with pleasure that the only reservation
of the Government of the Queen is as to the mode
of action to be employed by the two countries
when action is considered necessary ; and this is
a reservation in which we participate."
It was, therefore, four days after the arrival in
London of Sir Auckland Colvin's Memorandum,
which is quoted above, that the British Govern-
ment intimated their acceptance of M. Gambetta's
proposals. On January 6, the instructions were
telegraphed to Sir Edward Malet. Identic in-
structions were at the same time sent by the
French Government to M. Sienkiewicz.
When these instructions reached Cairo, the local
situation was as follows. The Chamber of Notables
had been opened by the Khedive on December 26.
Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber, and
Suleiman Pasha Abaza, one of the leading
members, replied to the Khedive's opening address
in terms expressive of their loyalty and devotion
to the public interests. On January 2, Sir Edward
Malet reported : " At an interview which I had
with the Khedive on the 31st ultimo I found His
Highness, for the first time since my return in
September, cheerful in mood and taking a hopeful
view of the situation. He spoke with much
satisfaction of the apparently moderate tendencies
of the Delegates, and he expressed his belief
that the country would now progress. The
change was very noticeable, because His High-
ness had, up to the time of the opening of the
Chamber, been full of misgiving, and I feared
that this feeling was prompted not only by a
mistrust of what the Delegates might do, but
also by a dislike of the Chamber as an institution."
Two difficulties, however, lay aliead. In the
first place, the military party wished tlie army
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to be increased to 18,000 men, the maximum
figure allowed by the Firman of 1879. The
Controllers were prepared to grant a certain
increase, but they declined, on financial grounds,
to give all that the military party desired, and in
this matter they were supported by the British
Government. Cherif Pasha was at first inclined
to go farther than the Controllers approved in
the direction of increasing the army. At last,
however, " he sided entirely with the Control,
and was equally resolved not to give way." On
the eve of the meeting of the Chamber, it was
decided to fix the Military Budget for 1882
at £E.522,000, an increase of £E. 154,000 over
the Budget for the previous year. The Minister
of War, however, was not satisfied. He wished
for a further increase of about £E. 126,000, which
would have enabled the army to be brought up
to 18,000 men.
The other difficulty was of a different character.
The Chamber was convoked under Ismail Pasha's
law of 1866. It was known that, when the
Chamber met, it would demand larger powers
than those conferred by this law. In anticij)ation
of such demands, the Egyptian Ministry had
prepared new regulations, which were submitted
to the Chamber on January 2. In sending these
proposals to Lord Granville, Sir Edward JNIalet
remarked : " Your Lordship will observe that
guarantees are given in these regulations for the
observance of the duties of Egypt towards foreign
Powers. With the exception of these restrictions,
the constitution of the Chamber is extremely
liberal, and there is little doubt that, as time
goes on, further changes in a liberal direction
will be made." It remained to be seen whether
the Chamber \vould be satisfied with the proposals
of the Government.
VOL. I Q
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The situation was evidently critical. Still, there
was hope that, with very careful guidance, the
difficulties of the moment might be overcome,
and a complete upset of the State machinery
obviated.
One main point should surely have been borne
in mind before the Joint Note was delivered.
It was that a National Party existed in Egypt.
On this subject, the British Government appear
to have been under a delusion from the first. They
thought that the movement was wholly military,
and, therefore, undeserving of sympathy. At a
later period (July 22, 1882), when British military
intervention had become necessary, ]Mr. Gladstone,
speaking in the House of Commons, said : "There
have been periods in this history at which it has
been charitably believed, even in this country,
that the military party was the popular party,
and was struggling for the liberties of Egypt.
There is not the smallest rag or shred of evi-
dence to support that contention. . . . Military
violence and the regimen established by mili-
tary violence are absolutely incompatible with the
growth and the existence of freedom. . . . The
reign of Cromwell was a great reign, but it did
nothinoj for Eng-lish freedom. . . . The reitjn of
Napoleon was a splendid reign, but, founded on
military power, it did nothing for freedom in
France."
However true these general principles may be,
nothing can be more certain than that at that
time there existed in Egypt a national party
who were working more or less in co-operation
with the military party. Cherif Pasha, who was,
as Sir Auckland Colvin said, an Egyptian gi^and
seigneur^ and who was one of the dominant
race, recognised its existence, and wisely recom-
mended a policy which would encourage the
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development of the national, at the expense of
the military elements in the movement. Sir
Edward JNIalet also ^ had distinctly warned the
Government of the unwisdom of taking any step
which would be construed as one of hostility to
the national movement. One of the most able
Europeans in Egypt at that time was Sir
Auckland Colvin. He was a trained Anglo-
Indian official, and was certainly not carried away
by any Utopian ideas as to the possibility or
desirability of rapidly developing free institutions
amongst a backward Oriental people. His official
position obliged him to look after the interests
of the Egyptian Treasury, but his political insight
was too keen to allow of his being deceived as
to the true nature of the movement which was in
course of progress. He had warned the British
Government that "the liberal movement then
going on should in no wise be discouraged.
Though in its origin anti-Turk, it was in itself
an Egyptian national movement."
Such, therefore, was the situation in Egypt
when the British and French Governments com-
municated the Joint Note to their diplomatic
representatives in Cairo.
The instructions were received at Cairo on the
night of January 6. At 5.30 p.m. on the 8th Sir
Edward Malet telegraphed to Lord Granville
:
"My French colleague and I communicated the
dual note to the Khedive to-day." " His High-
ness," he added, "requested us to express to our
respective Governments his sincere gratitude for
the solicitude which it showed for his own welfare
and that of his people."
In an article written by Mr. John Morley in
the Fortnightly Review (July 1882), the effect of
the Note is described in the following words : " At
' Vide aiifc, |>, -Ul.
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Cairo, the Note fell like a bombshell. Nobody had
expected such a declaration, and nobody there was
aware of any reason why it should have been
launched. What was felt was that so serious a
step on such delicate ground could not have been
taken without deliberate calculation nor without
some grave intention. The Note was, therefore,
taken to mean that the Sultan was to be thrust
still farther in the background ; that the Khedive
was to become more plainly the puppet of England
and France ; and that Egypt would, sooner or
later, in some shape or other, be made to share the
disastrous fate of Tunis. The general effect was,
therefore, mischievous in the highest degree. The
Khedive was encouraged in his opposition to the
sentiments of the Chamber. The military, national,
or popular party was alarmed. The Sultan was
irritated. The other European Powers were made
uneasy. Every element of disturbance was roused
into activity."
Cherif Pasha called on Sir Edward Malet and
M. Sienkiewicz on .Tanuary 10, and said that the
"message was regarded, first, as encouraging the
Khedive to place himself in antagonism to reform ;
secondly, that the wording which connected, as it
were, the events of September with tlie opening of
the Chamber, showed a spirit unfavourable to the
latter ; thirdly, that it indicated a desire to loosen
the tie to the Porte ; fourthly, that it contained a
menace of intervention, which nothing in the state
of the country at ])resent justified."
Sir Edward Malet's personal testimony was no
less conclusive. On January 9, he telegraphed to
Lord Granville: "The communication has, at all
events temporarily, alienated from us all confidence.
Everything was progressing ca])itally, and England
was looked on as the sincere wellwisher and pro-
tector of the country. Now, it is considered that
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England has definitely thrown in her lot with
France, and that France, from motives in connec-
tion with her Tunisian campaign, is determined
ultimately to intervene here.' "It is too soon,"
Sir Edward jNIalet wrote on January 10, "to judge
at present of the ultimate result of what has taken
place ; but for the moment it has had the effect to
cause a more complete union of the national party,
the military, and the Chamber, to unite these three
in a common bond of opposition to England and
France, and to make them feel more forcibly than
they did before that the tie which unites Egypt to
the Ottoman Empire is a guarantee to which they
must strongly adhere to save themselves from
aggression. The military, who had fallen into the
background on the convocation of the Chamber,
are again in everybody's mouth, and Arabi Bey is
said to be foremost in protesting against what he is
represented to consider as unjust interference."
The greatest General, it has been said, is he
who makes the fewest mistakes. The same may
be said of politicians and diplomatists. A remark
made to me in this connection many years ago by
Sir F'rancis Baring, the first Lord Northbrook, has
sunk into my memory. I was staying at his
country-house in 1864, having just returned from
America, where I had been present as a spectator
with the Northern army. I discussed the prospects
of the war which was then going on, and expressed
my opinions with all the confidence of youth.
After listening for a while. Sir Francis said to
me : " Now that you are a young man, you should
write down not what has hajjpened but what you
think is going to happen. You will be surprised
to find how wrong you are." Nearly half a cen-
tury of official life, during which time I have
been behind the scenes wliilst events of some
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interest and importance were passing, has con-
vinced me of the justice of the remark made by
my shrewd old relative. I have myself made too
many erroneous political forecasts to be inclined
to criticise severely the mistakes of others. It
must, however, be admitted tluit, in agreeing to
the Joint Note, Lord Granville made a serious
mistake. It is clear that the British and French
Governments were aiming at different objects.
The French Government, whilst admitting the
partnership with England as an unavoidable, though
perhaps unpleasant, necessity, wished to tighten the
hold of France over Egypt. The British Govern-
ment, on the other hand, wished above all things
to avoid the necessity of serious interference in
Egypt. When, on January 6, Lord Granville
made a reservation in agreeing to the Joint Note
to the effect that he was not committed " to any
particular mode of action," and when, on January 7,
M. Gambetta replied "c'est une reserve qui nous
est commune," they were in reality far from being
agreed. Each interpreted his reservation in a differ-
ent manner. Lord Granville meant that, as a last
resource, he would fall back on Turkish armed
intervention. JNI. Gambetta, on the other hand,
was "emphatically of opinion that any interven-
tion of the Porte was wholly inadmissible." On
January 14, the llepithlique Franx/aise, which was
the recognised organ of JM. Gambetta, declared
that " it would be a grave error to imagine that the
two Powers were not firmly resolved to follow up
their })latonic demonstration in a suitable manner if
order should be disturbed, or if the authority of the
Khedive should again be placed in jeopardy." In
other words, M. Gambetta contemplated an Anglo-
French occupation.
Another consideration should have made Lord
Granville pause. Before he agreed to the Joint
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Note, he was in possession of Sir Auckland Colvin's
Memorandum of December 26. Sir Edward JNIalet
drew his special attention to this memorandum,
and urged that it should be considered before any
decision was taken. It is an extremely able paper.
It gave a very clear description of the local situa-
tion. Sir Auckland Colvin pointed out that it
would be most "impolitic to thwart" the move-
ment then going on in Egypt, the national char-
acter of which he fully recognised. His principal
business, however, was to look after the finances
of Egypt. He was aware that without European
assistance it was hopeless to expect that the finances
could be brought into good order. He deprecated
anything which would jeopardise the financial
control exerted by France and England. He
advocated "the open and firm recognition by the
Powers ... of the material interest they possess
and intend to maintain in the administration." In
point of fact, the Egyptian administration was " a
partnership of three," and he advocated the prin-
ciple that no change could be made in the terms of
association without the consent of all the partners.
All this was perfectly true. Moreover, it was
natural that, holding the position which he held.
Sir Auckland Colvin should have advocated views of
this nature. They were views to which the French
Government would readily have assented, for French
p6licy in Egypt had, for a long time past, been
guided to a great extent by the interests of indi-
vidual Frenchmen in the solvency of the Egyptian
Treasury. But the case of the British Govern-
ment was somewhat different. They had, indeed,
agreed to the appointment of Controllers. They
had been parties to the Law of Liquidation. But
it was going a distinct step farther to giv^e a solemn
pledge that they would interfere seriously if any
complication arose, whether "internal or external,
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which miixht menace the order of things established
in Egypt." If this pledge meant anything, it meant
that the British Government would give materia!
support to the Controllers ; and, indeed, when the
matter came to be discussed at a later period in
Parliament, the case of the Government rested
upon the alleged obligation to sup})ort the Control.
An obligation, indeed, existed, but it did not extend
nearly so far as the French Government, with the
liritish Government following in their train, implied.
The British Government might perfectly well have
accepted as correct Sir Auckland Colvin's descrip-
tion of the facts of the situation, without adopting
to the full his recommendations. They were in a
position to take a more unbiassed view than Sir
Auckland Colvin of the extent to which it was
wise to go in the direction of interference in Egypt
on purely financial grounds. There was no reason
why, at this moment, the Controllers should not
have been informed that they could rely on nothing
but moral support, and that they must do the best
they could, in the difficult circumstances in which
they were ])laced, by persuasion and force of char-
acter. At the same time, the Egyptian Government
and the Arabists might have been told that the
British and French Governments had no wish to
check any reasonable development of the national
movement. The Kliedive might have been en-
couraged to come to terms with his people rather
than to resist their wislies. Attention might have
been drawn to the views of the Controllers, on the
ground that their financial knowledge and experi-
ence would be of great use to tlie Egyptian people,
and that, in tlie event of their advice being system-
atically neglected, financial disorder would almost
inevitably ensue. At the same time, it might have
been hinted that no armed intervention was to be
feared in respect to a mere financial question,
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however much the two Governments might regret
to see financial disorder prevail. Armed interven-
tion would be reserved for the time when life and
property were no longer secure. It cannot, indeed,
be stated with any degree of confidence that, if
hmguage of this sort had been held, the occupa-
tion of Egypt by foreign troops would have been
avoided. The financial interests concerned were
so great, and the risk that financial disorder would
eventually have led to anarchy was so considerable,
that it may well be that armed intervention of
some sort would ultimately have become an un-
avoidable necessity. This, however, is mere con-
jecture. What is more certain is that, by following
M. Gambetta's lead, the British Government
pledged themselves to a greater degree of inter-
ference in Egyptian internal affairs, and especially
financial affairs, than the actual circumstances of
the case appear to have necessitated.
There can be little doubt that Lord Granville
associated himself with M. Gambetta's Note because
he failed to appreciate the effect which the Note
would produce. In the debate which subsequently
took place in the House of Lords, Lord Granville
alluded to his despatch of November 4, 1881, which
set forth the policy of the British Government.^
That despatch, he said, " had the singular good
fortune of being generally approved both at home
and abroad." This statement was quite correct.
When the despatch in question was communicated
to Cherif Pasha by Sir Edward Malet, he " expressed
great satisfaction at it, and stated that he should
have it translated for hisertion in the local press,
as it ought to have an excellent effect." Lord
Granville then went on to say : " .^Vt the end of
December, M. Gambetta proposed that we should
join with France in a Dual Note on the same lines
* Vide ante, p. 203.
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as my despatch of November, but possibly accentu-
ated as to its terms by the fact of its being drafted
by a more eloquent pen." There was, however, a
wide difference between both the tone and the sub-
stance of Lord Granville's despatch of November 4,
and the Joint Note of January 8. The former was
friendly and sympathetic. The latter was menacing.
The former indicated that nothing but "the occur-
rence in Egypt of a state of anarchy" would be
likely to lead to foreign intervention of a serious
description in Egypt. The latter stated in some-
what harsh terms that the British and French
Governments were determined to maintain "the
order of things established in Egypt," an expression
which might be held to cover a very wide field.
Moreover, it was to be inferred from the despatch
of November 4 that, if any foreign intervention
were found necessary, the military forces of the
Sultan would be employed. The British and
French Governments deprecated the idea that
they entertained "any self-aggrandising designs."
On the other hand, the studied silence of the
Joint Note in respect to the contingency of
Turkish intervention naturally led to the suppo-
sition that, in an extreme case, Anglo-French
and not Turkish intervention was contemplated.
Neither, in so far as M. Gambetta was concerned,
was the inference incorrect.
When carburetted hydrogen and air in certain
proportions exist in a mine, no great harm is done
so long as they are left alone. But if a miner
enters with a lighted candle, an explosion at once
takes place. This is what the French and British
Governments did in Egypt when they issued the
Joint Note. Previous to the issue of the Note, the
National Party and the Military Party existed side
by side. Cherif Pasha, aided by Sir Edward Malet
and Sir Auckland Colvin,was laboriously and wisely
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endeavouring to keep the two parties separate.
There was some hope that their united efforts
would be successful, and that the National Party,
which constituted the more healthy of the two
elements, would eventually predominate over the
Military Party, which constituted an element of
obvious danger. At this moment, the British and
French Governments appeared, without any suffi-
cient reason, on the scene. They applied a lighted
candle to the inflammable material. In an instant,
the two elements combined with an explosion. The
French Government possibly wished for an explo-
sion. They were, at all events, callous as to whether
an explosion occurred or not. But Lord Granville's
action can only be explained on the assumption,
either that, in his desire to act with the French
Government, he momentarily forgot the safety-
lamp of diplomatic prudence and reserve, or else
that he did not sufficiently appreciate the fact that
the mine was full of fire-damp.^
From the moment the Johit Note was issued,
foreign intervention became an almost unavoidable
necessity.
' It has been occasionally stated,—apparently on the authority of
Mr. Wilfrid Blunt {Secret History, etc., pp. 159 and 182),—that, in
following the French lead during these neg-otiations, the British
Government were influenced by their desire to conclude a Commercial
Treaty with France. I believe this statement to be wholly devoid of
foundation. Sir Charles Dilke, who was at the time Under-Secretary
of State at the Foreign Office, and whose evidence on this point seems
to me conclusive, wrote, on June 27, 1907, to the Manchester Guardian :
** At no time was the Egyptian policy of either Cabinet allowed to have
a bearing upon the commercial relations of the Powers."
Whilst the proofs of this work were passing through the press, a
second edition of Mr. Blunt's book was published. In the Appendix,
a correspondence is given between Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. Wilfrid
Blunt, which is confirmatory of the opinion that there was no connec-
tion whatever between the policy set forth in the Joint Note and the
commercial relations between France and England.
CHAPTER XIV
THE EFFECTS OF THE JOINT NOTE
January-February 1882
The British Government wish to explain the Joint Note—The French
Government oiiject—The Chamber of Notables claims the right to
vote the Budget— Proposals of the British Government—Objections
of the French Government—The Consuls-General instructed to
oppose the Chamber—The Chamber demands a change of Ministry
—Appointment < ' a National Ministry—The French Government
press for an Anglo-French occupation—The British Government
favour a Turkish occupation— Resignation of M. Gambetta
—
Remarks on his policy.
When Lord Granville agreed to the Joint Note
he possibly thought that the best method to obviate
the necessity of armed intervention in Egypt,
whether Turkish or Anglo-French, was to threaten
to intervene. The Note itself, indeed, almost
expressed this view in plain words. It appeared,
however, that tlie Note had produced an effect
opposite to that which was intended. It had
increased the chances that armed intervention
would be necessary. Lord Granville recognised
that he had made a mistake. He accordingly
applied himself to the task of rectifying his error,
liis French partner, on the other hand, was far
from being convinced that any mistake had been
made. On the contrary, he adhered strongly to
the ])olicy indicated in the .loint Note.
On January 10, Cherif Pasha expressed a hope
that the two Powers would make some further
236
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communication which would tend to remove the
bad impression caused by the Joint Note. On the
same day, Lord Granville instructed Lord Lyons
to consult the French Government on the desira-
bility of sending " an explanatory telegram to Sir
Edward INIalet to the effect that the character of
the dual communication had been misunderstood."
On January 11, Lord Lyons reported the result
of his consultation with M. Gambetta. M. Gam-
betta " was, of course, ready to study attentively
any proposal of Her Majesty's Government, but he
was himself decidedly of opinion that it might be
extremely unadvisable to send any explanation at
all of the dual communication."
Cherif Pasha further suggested that the Khedive
might reply to the Note in a sense which would
perhaps mitigate its bad effects. Sir Edward
Malet (January 11) "did not see any particular
objection " to this proposal, but his French colleague
would not hear of it. He thought that the Egyptian
Government " had only to listen to the advice of
the two Powers and be silent."
In the meanwhile, the immediate effect of the
Joint Note was to bring to a head the quarrel
between the Ministry, backed up by the Controllers,
and the Chamber of Notables. The Egyptian
Budget was at that time divided into two parts.
The first part dealt with the revenues which were
assigned to the payment of the interest on the
Debt. The second part dealt with tlie remainder
of the revenues, which was left at the disposal
of the Government. The Chamber of Notables
claimed the right of voting the second part of the
Budget. The Controllers and Cherif Pasha ob-
jected to this })roposal, on the ground that, if the
right claimed by the Chamber were accordetl to
them, the Council of Ministers and, therefore, the
Controllers, would lose their hold over the finances
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of tlie country. " There was a chance," Sir Edward
Malet telegraphed on January 10, "of arriving at
an understanding, but this is apparently now passed.
The Chamber may exercise its right with modera-
tion and good sense, but it is a sanguine presumption.
On tlie other hand, it is impossible now to suppress
the Chamber except by intervention, which 1
earnestly deprecate. In fact, intervention could
only be justified on the violation of the Law of
Liquidation, not on the apprehension of its viola-
tion, and it is right to say that as yet 1 have heard
of no nitention on the part of any one to infringe it."
When this message reached Lord Granville, he
made an effort to release himself from French
guidance. As an English Liberal, he could not do
otherwise than sympathise to some extent with the
development of free institutions in Egypt. He
appears also to have seen that he was being hurried
rapidly along the road which led to increased inter-
vention in the internal affjiirs of Egypt. Moreover,
the somewhat overbearing conduct of the French
was distasteful to the more fair-minded English
statesman, whose character and training alike led
him to favour compromise and to reject extreme
measures. Lord Granville, therefore, telegraphed
to Sir Edward Malet : " Her Majesty's Government
do not wish to commit themselves to a total or per-
manent exclusion of the Chamber of Notables from
handling the Budget. Caution, however, will be
required in dealing with it, regard being had to
the pecuniary interests on behalf of which Her
JNIajesty's Government have been acting." The
French Goverimient, however, speedily placed a
check on any idea of making concessions to the
Chamber. Lord Lyons reported that M. Gam-
betta " expressed a very strong objection to any
interference at all by the Egyptian Chamber with
the Bud<xet. He said that it behoved France and
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England to be very firm, lest any appearance of
vacillation on their part should encourage the pre-
tensions of the Notables to lay their hands on the
Budget ; and he argued that their touching the
Budget must inevitably lead to the overthrow of
the arrangement made by the Liquidation Com-
mission, to the subversion of the French and
English Control, and to the ruin of the Egyptian
finances. Finally, M. Gambetta expressed his con-
viction that any explanation of the joint com-
munication of the two Governments would serve
to swell the arrogance of the opponents of France
and England, and encourage them in their designs
upon the Budget."
Lord Granville yielded to French pressure.
"The proposal of the Notables," he 'vvrote to Lord
Lyons, " at all events in its present shape, cannot be ,
agreed to, although there may be points worthy
of consideration hereafter. Sir Edward JMalet has,
therefore, been instructed to join his French
colleague in supporting Cherif Pasha in his op-
position to the demand of the Chamber in this
respect." \\'hen this message was communicated
to M. Gambetta, it became at once apparent that
he had no intention of leaving the door open to
future concessions. He seized at once on that
portion of Lord Granville's message which was
ftivourable to his own views, and rejected the rest.
" A very strong instruction " had, he said, been
already sent to the French representative at Cairo,
" directing him to concert with Sir Edward ^lalet,
and to insist upon Cherif Pasha absolutelv reject-
ing the demands of the Notables, on the ground
that they were incom})atible with the state of things
established in Egypt by international engagements
with France and England." A compromise had
been suggested at Cairo to the effect that the
rejection of the demands should be accompanied
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by an assurance that they would be favourably
considered at some later period. M. Gambetta,
however, told Lord Lyons that he had " especially
mstructed INI. Sienkiewicz not to listen for a
moment to anything of the kind."
In spite of the support given by the two Powers
to Cherif Pasha and the Controllers, it became
clearer every day that the Chamber of Notables
would not yield. On January 20, Sir Edward
Malet telegra})hed : '* The Chamber will almost
certainly vote the counter-project of Law, which
places the administrative and financial power in its
hands, and amounts to Government by Conven-
tion. . . . Armed intervention Avill become a
necessity if we adhere to the refusal to allow the
Budget to be voted by the Chamber."
Two days later {January 22), Sir Edward JMalet
asked Lord Granville whether " he might consider
proposals which had been made to him unofficially
by the President of the Chamber, with a view to
coming to an arrangement which would accord to
delegates from the Chamber the right to co-operate
with tlie Ministers in the vote and examination of
the Budget." Sir Auckland Colvin thought "that
the negotiation might possibly result in a reason
able arrangement," but his French colleague, M. de
Blignieres, "was strongly opposed to receding in
any way from an absolute refusal to allow the
Chamber to participate in framing the Budget."
No answer appears to have been sent to this
proposal, but a plan was elaborated in London
under which some control over the public revenues
would have been given to the Chamber of Not-
ables. In sending this scheme to Lord Lyons, on
January 25, Lord Granville said : " It seems clear
that the claim of the Notables, in the form in
which it is presented, is unacceptable, if not im-
practicable. . . . At the same time, it would be
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consistent with the desire which Her INIajesty's
Government and that of France entertain to
encourage the judicious development of the in-
stitutions of Egypt, and for this purpose, as well
as for the practical advantage that would be derived
from it, it would seem advisable and probably
would not be difficult to find matters confined to
the expetiditure side of the Budget in which the
local knowledge of the Notables could be profitably
employed."
When M. Gambetta received this communica-
tion, he replied (January 29) that the lYench
Government agreed in principle to Lord Gran-
vilfe's proposals. Agreement in principle to the
proposals made by a foreign Government is
not unfrequently a diplomatic euphemism for
total rejection. Such it was in the present case.
M. Gambetta made so many objections in detail
to Lord Granville's proposals as to render the
concessions to the popular party in Egypt of little
value. More especially, he was of opinion that the
Budget of the Police and of the Administration of
the Wakfs (religious endowments) should not be
under the control of the Chamber of Notables.
Lord Granville's reply, which is dated February 2,
brings out clearly the different spirits which ani-
mated the French and the British Governments.
" Her Majesty's Government," Lord Granville
wrote, "are unable, without further information,
to offer an opinion upon the classification of the
Egyptian Police, nor does it appear to them tliat
the Governments of England and France are called
upon to interfere in the question of JNIusulman
religious foundations, in which they do not see
that their interests are afllected, and which would
appear at first sight to be a matter with which
the Chamber of Notables would be peculiarly com-
petent to deal. . , . Her Majesty's Government
VOL. I R
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apprehend that neither of these are questions upon
which it rests with the Governments of England
and Franee to give or withhold privileges, but if
the Egyptian authorities are disposed to concede
them, they do not think that it is for them to
object."
It is clear from this correspondence that
M. Gambetta wished to interfere in every detail
of the Egyptian administration, even although no
semblance of international right could be invoked
to justify such interference. Lord Granville, on
the other hand, wished to keep within the strict
limits of international right, and to deal in a fair
spirit of compromise with the national movement
in Egypt.
Whilst these negotiations were going on in
London and Paris, Sir Edward INIalet and
M. Sienkiewicz made a written communication
to Ch^rif Paslia setting forth the attitude which
the British and French Governments intended to
adopt towards the Chamber of Notables. They
explained "that the Chamber could not vote the
Budi>:et without infrino'iu'jj tlie Decrees establishinoj
the Control, and that an innovation of the nature
proposed by the Chamber could not be introduced
without the assent of the English and French
Governments." In order, however, not to close
the door to a possible understanding, the two
Consuls- General added that "if the Government
of the Khedive deemed fit to open negotiations
on the subject, they were prepared to transmit
its proposals to their respective Governments, but
they considered that such a negotiation should be
on the understanding that the Government and
the Chamber were agreed with regard to the rest
of the proposed Organic Law," When Cherif
Pasha received this connnunication, he wrote
(February 1) to tlie Chamber explaining the situa-
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tion, and requesting them "to formulate a basis
of negotiation with the Powers."
This conununication brouglit matters to a head.
On February 2, a deputation from the Cliamber
waited on the Khedive and requested him to
change his Ministers. " His Highness asked on
what law of the Chamber they founded their
right to make the request. This they could not
answer, but insisted on a change. They also pre-
sented a copy of the draft Organic Law of the
Chamber, and requested His Highness to sign,
saying that the right to \ote the Budget was not
one for discussion with foreign Powers. His
Highness dismissed them, saying that he would
consider their request."
It was clear that a change of Ministry was
inevitable. The Kliedive was obliged to yield
because, as he told Sir Edward Malet, " he had
no force to resist." Later on the same day, the
Khedive received the deputation again and asked
them to "name the persons whom they desired as
Ministers. This they at first declined to do on
the ground that the selection was the prerogative
of His Highness." On the following day, how-
ever, a further deputation from the Chamber
waited on the Khedive, and stated that they
wanted Mahmoud Pasha Sami, who was then
Minister of War, to be appointed President of
the Council. He was accordingly appointed on
February 5. Arabi Bey was, at the same time,
named Minister of War. The other members of
tlie Cabinet, except Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, wlio
assumed the direction of Foreign Affairs, were
members of the National or Military parties, terms
which had now become wholly synonymous.
The effect produced by tlie change of Ministry
on the views of the Khedivial party in Egypt Avas
marked. Until then, Chdrif Pasha had entertained
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hopes of guiding the movement, and had stood out
against any idea of armed Turkish intervention.
He now informed Sir Edward Malet that "the
only issue froin the situation was the immediate
despatch to Egypt of a Commissioner from tlie
Porte, to be followed as soon as possible by a
Turkish force. . . . He thought that by acting
with tact, and accepting any Ministry the Chamber
asked for, the moment could be tided over without
public disturbance; but he was of opinion that, as
the army had again exercised dictatorship, there
was no hope for the future unless it were rendered
powerless by force." The Khedive shared Cherif
Pasha's views.
As events developed, it became more and more
clear that M. Gambetta wished to force on an
Anglo-French occupation of Egypt. On January
25, Lord Granville wrote to Lord Lyons in the
following terms :
—
"The French Ambassador told me yesterday
eveninfj that M. Gambetta had written to* him
expressing his opinion that it was desirable, in
view of the probable crisis in Egypt, that the
English and French Governments should come to
an understanding as to the course which they
should pursue. M. Gambetta, it appeared, had
not in his letter given his opinion as to what steps
should be taken, but he was desirous to know the
views of Her Majesty's Government. Any Turkish
intervention was, in ]\L Gambetta's opinion, the
worst possible solution. M. Gambetta's attention
had been called to a plan, which had appeared in
the press, of calling in the co-operation of Europe.
M. Gambetta remarked tliat the position of
England in Egypt, in consequence of her Indian
Dossessions, was unique. That of France, owing
to her being a great African Power, and to other
circumstances, was of tlie greatest importance.
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Besides this normal position of the two Powers,
arrangements had been entered into by Egypt,
which had been acquiesced in by the European
Powers generally. It would, in JNI. Gambetta's
opinion, be most disadvantageous to Egypt and to
the two Powers that these arrangements should
be in any way weakened."
When I^ord Granville received this communica-
tion, it was impossible to ignore any longer the
radical difference of opinion which existed between
the British and French Governments. In a despatcli
to Lord Lyons, dated January 30, he laid down
the policy of tlie British Government : " Her
Majesty's Government," he said, "desire to main-
tain the rights of the sovereign and vassal as now
established between the Sultan and the Khedive,
to secure the fulfilment of international engage-
ments, and to protect the development of institu-
tions within this limit. They believe that the
French Government share these views. The
question remains—If in Egypt a state of disorder
should occur which would be incompatible with
this policy, what measures should be taken to
meet the difficulty ? . . . It is to be regretted,
but it appears to Her Majesty's Government
apparent, that if such a contingency unfortunatelv
occurred, there are objections to every possible
course. The question remains— which of them
offers the least inconvenience ? . . . Her Majesty's
Government have a strong objection to the occupa-
tion by themselves of Egypt. It would create
opposition in Egypt and in Turkey ; it would
excite the suspicion and jealousy of other European
Powers, who would. Her Majesty's Government
have reason to believe, make counter-demonstra-
tions on their own part, which might possibly lead
to very serious complications, and it would throw
upon them the responsibility of governing a
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country inhabited by Orientals under very adverse
circumstances.
"They beUeve that such an occupation would
be as distasteful to the French nation as the sole
occupation of Egypt by the French would be to
this country.
"They have carefully considered the question
of a joint occupation by England and France, and
they have come to the conclusion that, although
some of the objections above stated might be
lessened, others would be very seriously aggravated
by such a course.
" With regard to Turkish occupation. Her
Majesty's Government agree that it would be a
great evil, but thev are not convinced that it would
entail political dangers so great as those attending
the other alternatives which have been mentioned
above. . . . The most important point is that the
union of the two countries should be both real and
apparent.
"M. Gambetta entertains objections to any
further admission of the other European Powers
to interference in Egyptian aflairs. Her JNIajesty's
Government agree that England and France have
an exceptional position in that country owing to
actual circumstances and to international agree-
ments, and they also believe that inconvenience
might arise from many Powers being called u})on
to join in any administrative functions ; but they
would submit for the consideration of the French
Government whether it would not be desirable
to enter into some communication with the other
Powers as to the most desirable mode of dealing
with a state of things which ap})ears likely to
interfere with the Firmans of the Sultan and the
international engagements of Egypt."
Tiie day after this despatch was written (January
31), M. Ciambetta resigned office. He was sue-
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ceeded by ^I. de Freycinet, under whose auspices
a complete change took place in the Egyptian
policy of the French Government.
During; the short time M. Gambetta was in
office, he exercised a decisive and permanent in-
fluence on the future course of Egyptian history.
Lord Granville, M. de Freycinet, and others might
do their best to put back the hands of the clock,
but it was impossible that they should ever
restore the status quo ante Gambetta. When he
assumed office, the Egyptians entertained con-
fidence in the intentions of England and France,
especially in those of England. The amalgamation
of the military and national parties in Egypt was
not complete. The Egyptian movement was not
altogether beyond control. When he left office,
England and France were alike mistrusted by the
Egyptians. The ascendency of the military over
the national party was complete. Any hope of
controlling the Egyptian movement, save by the
exercise of material force, had well-nigh disappeared.
Possibly, the movement was incapable of being
controlled, but an ex post facto conjecture of this
sort hardly appears a sufficient answer to the plea
that, before reverting to extreme measures, every
possible endeavour should have been made to
control it.
In the opinion of many competent autiiorities,
M. Gambetta adopted a mistaken policy. But
there are always at least two sides to every ques-
tion. It will be as well, therefore, to examine
the case from JNI. Gambettas point of view. It
was stated by his friend and political su]:>porter,
M. Joseph Keinach, in an article, published in
the Nineteenth Century of December 1882.
One portion of M. Reinach's argument may be
very briefly treated. He complained that there was
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a want of "sincerity and cordiality" in the dealings
of the British Foreign Office with France. Also
he thought that public opinion in England "ex-
perienced the influence of certain Tories, who
believed that it would be best to slacken pro-
ceedings as much as possible, in the hope of find-
ing some opportunity for entering the Nile valley
without France." As to this argument, all I have
to say is that I believe I have seen every official
document,whether published or unpublished, which
is in the possession of the British Foreign Office,
bearing upon the questions now under discussion.
I have also had ample opportunities of ascertaining,
by personal and verbal communications, the views
of the principal actors on the scene. These events
are now matters of past history. Many of the
principal persons concerned are dead. Had there
been any design of outwitting France, such as
M. Reinach insinuated, I certainly should not be de-
terred by any false spirit of patriotism from stating
the true facts of the case. I am, however, able to
state with the utmost confidence that the insinua-
tions of M. Reinach • are without a shadow of
foundation. The policy of the British Government
at the time may or may not have been mistaken,
but it was certainly sincere. When Lord Gran-
ville deprecated a British or Anglo-French armed
intervention in Egypt, there can be no doubt that
he meant what he said, and, moreover, that he had
behind him the preponderating weight of British
public opinion.
Leaving aside this collateral issue, I proceed to
state M. Reinach's main argument. He thought
that "grave mistakes" were committed by the
British Government. The British Foreign Office
failed to understand how dangerous the situation
in Egypt had become when the Chamber of
Notables met. Neither Mr. Gladstone nor Lord
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Granville saw that "the Chamber of Notables vs^as
a sham assembly, Ariibi an ambitious intriguer,
encouraged and suborned by the fanatic Council
of Constantinople, and the national party a ludi-
crous invention of some badly informed or too well
paid journalist." M. Gambetta, on the other hand,
"siuiply made use of his eyes and ears." He saw
all these things plainly enough. "The hesitation
of the English Government," M. Reinach con-
tinued, "to suppress the first acts of the insurrec-
tion plotted by the military camarilla at Cairo was
much more than a lack of cordiality towards us
(the French) and our alliance ; it was, as far as
Egyptian matters are concerned, pernicious and
deplorable to the highest degree. It encouraged
the spirit of rebellion among Arabi's partisans. It
helped to kindle and rouse a fire, which a bucket
of water shed at the proper time would have
extinguished, into a conflagration where lives and
treasures have been uselessly destroyed."
In other words, to put the matter plainly.
M. Gambetta was convinced, as early as December
1881, that armed intervention of some sort in
Egypt would, sooner or later, becon e necessary.
Therefore, he did not hesitate to take steps which
he knew might and probably would precipitate the
final and, as he thought, inevitable conclusion.
It is impossible to prove that JNI. Gambetta was
wrong. It is equally impossible to prove that he
was right. There can be no doubt that the Artibi
movement was in some respects a boiiajide national
movement. There can be equally little doubt that,
if Arabi and his followers had been left at the head
of affairs without any control, a state of the utmost
confusion would have been produced in Egypt, and
that eventually armed foreign intervention of some
sort might have become necessary. In December
1881, however, the only practical question was,
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would it be possible to control and guide the
movement ? It is not certain that it would have
been impossible to do so. A few able Europeans,
like Sir Auckland Colvin, by the exercise of tact
and judgment, by encouraging the civil elements
of Egyptian society, and by the exhibition of some
sympathy with reasonable native aspirations, might'
possibly in time have acquired a sufficient degree
of moral control over the movement to have
obviated the necessity for armed intervention. In
any case, on the assumption that armed interven-
tion was a solution to be avoided, save as a last
resource, the experiment was worth trying. It is
impossible, however, to read the correspondence on
this subject without seeing that M. Gambetta did
not regard armed intervention, provided it was
Anglo-French and not Turkish intervention, in
this light. On the contrary, he wished to brhig
about a state of things which would render it
necessary. Obviously, therefore, from his point of
view, the experiment was not worth trying. But
his conclusion cannot command assent unless his
premises be accepted, and there are strong grounds
for holding that his premises were wrong. Tlie
essential point, at all events from the British point
of view, was to avoid any armed intervention.
Mr. John Morley summed up the case in the
following words, which appear to be correct. " It
is impossible," he said, "to conceive a situation
that more imperatively called for caution, circum-
spection, and deference to the knowledge of
observers on the scene, or one that was actually
handled with greater rashness and hurry. INI.
Gambetta had made u]) his mind that the military
movement was leading to the abyss, and that it
must be peremptorily arrested. It may be that he
was right in supposing that the army, which had
first found its power in the time of Ismail, would
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go from bad to worse. But everything turned upon
the possibihty of pulling up the army, without
arousinff other elements more dangerous still. M.
Gainbetta's impatient policy was worked out in his
own head without reference to the conditions on the
scene, and the result was what might have been
expected." ^
It may be conceded to M. Reinach that at this
time " grave mistakes " were committed by the
British Government in respect to Egypt. An
Englishman who holds, as Lord Granville held, that
a British or Anglo-French occupation of Egypt was
above all things to be avoided, may with perfect con-
sistency indicate those mistakes. But a Frenchman,
more especially a partisan of M. Gambetta, has no
right to criticise them. His mouth should be closed,
for "the hesitations, indecisions, perplexities, half-
measures, and delays which characterised English
tactics," and of which M. Reinaeli complained, were
due to the strong desire of the British Government
to co-operate witli the French. Lord Granville
honestly wished to avoid any armed intervention in
Egypt, and as honestly wished, if any intervention
eventually became necessary, that the arms em-
ployed should be those of the legitimate Suzerain of
Egypt, and not those of France or England. Had
he been left from the first to act according to the
dictates of his own judgment, it is possible that no
foreign occupation would have been necessary, and
it is more than probable that no British occupation
would have taken place. But he allowed himself
to be hifluenced by his French colleague, whose
strong will and rash policy dragged him to such an
extent along a road which he had no wish to
follow, that eventually retreat became impossible.
Englishmen may criticise Lord Granville for yield-
ing too much to France. French criticism can only
1 Fortnightly Review, July 1882.
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be based either on the assumption that JNI. Gam-
betta's action was best calculated to prevent a foreign
occupation, or on the allegation that an Anglo-
French occupation of Egypt was in itself to be
desired as a preventive against evils which might
arise, rather than as a cure for evils which liad
already arisen. The verdict of subsequent events
has disproved the assumption. The allegation is a
matter of opinion. M. Gambetta and M. lleinach
held one opinion on this point. Lord Granville
held another, and, as I venture to think, a wiser
opinion.
During the parliamentary discussions which
took place in England, a great deal of ingenious
special pleading was devoted to showing that the
occupation of Egypt was due, not to any action
taken in 1881 and 1882, but to the appointment
of European Controllers in 1879.^ The facts con-
nected with this subject may be explained by a
metaphor. Suppose a man to be suffering from a
severe but not necessarily fatal disease. He calls
in a doctor who prescribes some mild remedies, and
warns him that, unless he be careful, the disease
will increase in virulence. He fails to profit by
the advice which he has received, and in conse-
quence gets worse. He then calls in another
doctor, who abandons the mild treatment of his
predecessor, and ajjplies some more drastic remedy.
The remedy, far from producing any good effect,
aggravates the disease, and the patient dies. Under
these circumstances, the friends of the patient, pro-
vided they be impartially minded, will not inquire
carefully into the suitability or otherwise of the
remedies applied by the first doctor. They will
hold with reason that the patient's death was
hastened, if indeed it was not caused, by the heroic
but mistaken treatment of the second medical
» Vide ante, p. 160.
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adviser. In the case of Egypt, Lord Salisbury
stood in the place of the first doctor. Lord
Granville, acting under the advice of his impetuous
French colleague, stood in the place of the second.
Similarly, in France the mistakes made by
M. Gambetta were forgotten, and the British occu-
pation of Egypt was subsequently attributed by
M. Joseph Reinach and other Gambettists to the
fact that "the demeanour of the Freycinet ]\!inis':ry
was unworthy of France and of the Republic."
Whether this accusation is true or the reverse is
a matter for Frenchmen to decide. To an English-
man it would appear that the fact of JVI. de
Freycinet's having been opposed to an Anglo-
French occupation of Egypt does not relieve
M. Gambetta from the responsibility of having
largely contributed to create a situation from which
it was well-nigh impossible to escape except by
means of armed intervention of one sort or another.
The atmosphere of party politics, whether in
France or England, is not congenial to the
formation of an impartial judgment. A Minister,
who is in the thick of a tough parliamentary
struggle, must use whatever arguments he can to
defend his cause without inquiring too closely
whether they are good, bad, or indifferent. How-
ever good they may be, they will probably not
convince his political opponents, and they can
scarcely be so bad as not to carry some sort of
conviction to the minds of those who are pre-
disposed to support him. Politicians who are not
bound by any strong party ties can weigh the
arguments in a somewhat more judicial spirit.
The conclusions stated in this chapter will, it
is hoped, commend themselves to those who
stand outside the immediate sphere of political
partisanship.
CHAPTER XV
THE ARXbI ministry
February-May 1882
Proposal to revise the Org;tnic Law— Mr. ^^'^ilfrid Blunt— M. de
Blignieres resigns—Concessions made to the army— Disorganisa-
tion in the provinces — The Porte protests against the Joint
Note—The Powers are invited to an exchange of views—M. de
Freycinet wishes to depose the Khedive—Lord Granville proposes
to send Financial Commissioners to Egypt—Alleged conspiracy to
murder Arabi—The Ministers resign, but resume office—M. de
Freycinet assents to Turkish intervention— Arabi requested to
leave Egypt—He refuses to do so—The Ministers again resign—
The Khedive reinstates Arab!—And asks for a Turkish Com-
missioner.
The official transactions of the next four months
are recorded in several ponderous volumes, but
the main facts admit of being very briefly stated.
The Chamber of Notables, whose powers were
at once increased by the new Ministry, was, Sir
Auckland Colvin wrote on February 13, "wholly
under the influence of a mutinous and successful
army." Some well-meaning proposals were put
forward by tlie British Government with a view
to revising the Organic Law in a sense which
would be liberal but, at the same time, would not
give excessive powers to the Chamber. A few
months earlier, a suii:i>:estion of this sort miijlit
perliaps have led to some useful resiflt. But the
propitious moment had been allowed to pass,
and it was now too late to stem the Egyptian
Revolution, for such it really was, by redrafting
254
ctt XV THE ARABI ministry 255
an article in a Khedivial Decree. "It would be
childish," M. de Freycinet thought (April 20), "to
be discussing the pattern of a carpet when the
house in which it was laid down was in flames." Sir
Auckland Colvin's opinion was no less decisive and
his metaphor no less apt. "The house," he said,
"is tumbling about our ears, and the moment is
not propitious for debating whether we would like
another storey added to it. Until civil authority is
reassured and the military despotism destroyed,
discussion of the Organic Law seems premature
and useless."
The civil elements of the national party still
made some slight show of independence, but the
tendencies which were at work to ensure the pre-
dominance of the mutinous army were too strong
to be resisted. Not only did Arabi receive en-
couragement from the Sultan, but the advice of
English sympathisers with the nationalist cause
tended to consolidate the union between the
military and civil elements of the movement.
Of these sympathisers, the most prominent was
Mr. Wilfrid Blunt. Mr. Blunt had hved a good
deal with Mohammedans, and took a warm interest
in all that related to themselves and their relio-ion.
He appears to have believed in the possibility of
a regeneration of Islam on Islamic principles. It
chanced that he was in Egypt during the winter
of 1881-82. He threw himself, with all the en-
thusiasm of a poetic nature, into the Arabist cause,
and became the guide, philosopher, and friend of
Arabi and his coadjutors. Mr. Blunt saw that
he had to do with a movement which was in
some degree unquestionably national. He failed
to appreciate sufficiently the fact that the pre-
dominance of the military party would be fatal
to the national character of the movement.
At one period of the proceedings, his services
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were utilised as an intermediary between Sir
Edward JNIalet and the nationalists. The selec-
tion was unfortunate, for it is abundantly clear
from the account which Mr. Blunt has given
of his own proceedings^ that, with tiie exception
of some knowledge of the Arabic language, he
possessed none of the qualifications necessary to
ensure success in the execution of so difficult and
delicate a mission. He advised the nationalists to
hold to the army or they would be "annexed to
Europe."^ The advice was, without doubt, well-
meant, but it was certainly inopportune and mis-
chievous. Whatever danger of "annexation to
Europe " existed lay rather in the direction of the
consolidation of the national and -military parties
than in that of their separation. A trained
politician would have seen this. INIr. Blunt had
had no political training of any value. He was
an enthusiast who dreamt dreams of an Arab
Utopia. He, therefore, failed to see what Cherif
Pasha and others on the spot saw. He worked
earnestly and to the best of his abilities to prevent
a foreign occupation of Egypt. But the impartial
historian must perforce record his name amongst
those who, by ill-advised action at a critical moment,
unwittingly contributed to bring about the solution
which they most of all deplored.
Terrorised by a mutinous army on the one side,
urged, on the other side, by their English advisers,
whose weight with the British public they greatly
' Blunt's Secret Hisfoiy of the British Occupiition of Egypt.
^ A letter from Dr. Schweinfurth, tlie well-known botanist, was
published in the Times of June 21, 18<52. He related an interview
he had had with some members of the Chamber. lie commended their
moderation and good sense, and then went on to say : " From England
they expect more for their cause than from France. They imagine
that in England you are all of the same complexion as Mr. Blunt,
or at least, as Sir William (Jregory. At Ghirgeh, they showed me
with much satisfaction Mr. lilunt's telegram addressed to all the
members of the Egyptian Chamber: *Si vous allez vous de'sunir de
I'arme'e, I'Europe vous amiexera.' " See also Secret Jliatory, etc., p. 271.
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overrated,^ to seek salvation in submitting to
military dictation, it can be no matter for sur-
prise that the ignorant and inexperienced men
who feebly represented genuine constitutionalism
sank into insignificance and ranged themselves on
the side of the mutineers.
The power of the Controllers disappeared. Sir
Edward JNlalet wrote to Lord Granville (February
20) that he thought it had "become a question
whether the Control should be maintained, now
that it existed only in name." M. de Blignieres
resigned his appointment.
Mahmoud Pasha Sami, the new President of
the Egyptian Council, shared the usual fate of
revolutionary leaders. He was violently attacked
because he failed to carry out his engagement that
all Europeans should be turned out of Egyptian
employment. Arabi, Sir Auckland Colvin wrote
(February 27), warned him that "he was like a
man trying to balance himself on a plank." Every
effort was made to keep the army in a good humour.
Fresh battalions were raised. The pay of the
officers and men was increased without reference
to the sufficiency of the revenue to meet the fresh
expenditure thus incurred. Hundreds of officers
were promoted. The Khedive pointed out that
"the law required the previous examination of
officers under the rank of full Colonel," but Arabi
was ready with an explanation. The officers, he
said, "were of such well-known capacity that
examination was unnecessary. Moreover"—and
this was perhaps more to the point—" they refused
to be examined, and were supported in their refusal
by the rest of the army." The Khedive was obliged
to yield. Clearly, as Sir Ciiarles Cookson wrote,
"all the pretended aspirations for legality and
constitutional liberty had ended in substituting
^ See Appendix to this chapter.
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tlie indisputable will of the army for all lawful
authority."
In the provinces, complete disorganisation pre-
vailed. The INIoudirs had lost all authority. At
JNIansourah and elsewliere, JNIr. Ilowsell, the English
administrator of the State Domains, found that
" all power was paralysed." In the neighbourhood
of Zagazig, the British Vice - Consul reported,
** armed bands continue to attack and pillage
villages." An active trade was carried on in fire-
arms. At Damietta, the black soldiers of Abdul-
Al's regiment robbed and ill-treated the inhabitants
with impunity. An unwise attempt was made by
the Government to deprive the- Bedouins of the
privileges which they had enjoyed since the days of
Mehemet Ali, but the heads of the various tribes
met on April 8, and declared that they would allow
no interference in their affairs. Tlie banks would
no longer lend large sums of money ; petty usurers
asked as much as 6 per cent monthly interest on
small loans. Land was everywhere losing in value.
Sir Edward INIalet quoted one example of land,
bought a few months ])reviously for £G(), being
sold at £28 an acre. An officer of the army told
the peasants at Zagazig that the acres belong-
ing to their landlords " were theirs by right." In
a word, all the usual symptoms of revolution were
prevalent in Egypt. The moderate men became
alarmed. " The disorganised and uneasy state of
the provinces," Sir Charles Cookson wrote, "has
caused many of the Notables and others who have
a stake in the country to draw back from the
hastily formed alliance with the military party,
and seek for other means of escaping from its
domination."
It is now time to return to the history of diplo-
matic action. The Porte protested against the
Joint Note. The answer of the four Powers
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(Russia, Austria, Germany, and Italy) was to the
effect that they "desired the maintenance of the
status quo in Egypt on the basis of the European
arrangements and of the Sultan's Firmans, and
tliat they were of opinion that this status quo could
not be modified except by an understanding between
the Great Powers and the Suzerain Power." This
reply did not answer the expectations of the Sultan.
He was irritated by the use of the word "Suzerain"
instead of " Sovereign."^ Moreover, his design of
acquiring a more absolute control over Egyptian
affairs was in no way advanced by the opinion
expressed by the Powers that any change in the
Egyptian status quo was a matter of general Euro-
pean interest.
The protest of the Porte, however, stimulated
the British and French Governments to place
themselves in communication with the other
Powers. The British Government took the initi-
ative. The French Government were invited to
join Her Majesty's Government in addressing the
Powers. M. de Freycinet agreed " with the reser-
vation that it be well understood that the French
Government reserve their adhesion to any miHtary
intervention in Egypt, and that they will examine
that question when the necessity for any interven-
tion shall have arisen." Accordingly, on February
11, a Circular was addressed by the British and
French Governments to the Cabinets of Berlin,
Vienna, Rome, and St. Petersburg, asking them
whether they would be prepared to enter into an
exchange of views on the affairs of Egypt. " The
^ The Sultan is Suzerain of Bulgaria. Article 1 of the Berlin Treaty
says : " Bulgaria is constituted an autonomous and tributary Princi-
pality under the Suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan." In
so far as Egypt is concerned^ the word "Sovereign" is technically
more correct. The Firman of 1841 granted to Mehemet All uses the
expression " Ma connaissance Souveraine." llie Sukan cannot depose
the Prince of Bulgaria. Technically speaking, he can depose the
Khedive, and, in fact, in 1879 he .ieposed Ismail Pasha.
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Governments of England and France," it was said,
*' do not consider that a case for discussing tlie
expediency of an intervention has at present
arisen. . . . But, should the case arise, they would
wijih that any such eventual intervention should
represent the united action and authority of Europe.
In that event, it would also, in their opinion, be
riglit that the Sultan should be a party to any
proceeding or discussion that might ensue."
The proposal to treat Egyptian affairs as an
international, rather than as an exclusively Anglo-
French question, was well received. All the Powers
expressed their willingness to enter into an exchange
of views. No progress had, however, so far been
made as to the nature of the views which were to
be exchanged. Until the British and French
Governments could agree as to the proposals they
were to submit to the other Powers, it was hopeless
to expect any general agreement.
Both Governments were, however, daily becom-
ing more convinced that some action was necessary.
" The Egyptian question," M. de Freycinet said to
Lord Lyons (April 8), "was like a bill of exchange.
The exact day at which the bill would be presented
for payment was not known, but it was quite
certain that the presentation would not be long
delayed, and it would be only prudent to provide
means of meeting the liability before the constable
was upon us." The remedy he proposed was to
depose the Khedive, and to substitute Hahm Pasha
in his place. The authority of the Sultan would,
without doubt, have to be brought into play, but
M. de Freycinet thought that '*the great object
was to ward off a military intervention of what-
ever kind it might be, and he would rather the
Sultan should depose twenty Khedives than send
one soldier to Egypt." T^ord Granville rejected
this proposal. He did not see that it would dc
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any good, and, moreover, he pointed out *' that
after the declarations of support so recently given
to the Khedive, in the name of the British and
French Governments, it would be an act question-
able in point of good faith if we were now not
only to abandon him, but to combine for his
removal without any new or more apparent cause
than can at present be shown to exist."
The Khedive also found a warm defender in
Sir Edward Malet, who expressed himself in
the following terms : " When I hear him (the
Khedive) abused for lack of energy and capacity,
I doubt whether there be many men who would
have been able to extricate themselves from the
difficulties in which he has been involved." In
the place of so drastic a remedy as the deposition
of the Khedive, Lord Granville put forward a
characteristic proposal of his own. The idea of
sending special Commissioners to report on the
situation in Egypt appears, during a considerable
period, to have presented some strong attractions
to the British Government. Lord Granville now
fell back on a proposal of this sort. He suggested
to the French Govtiiunent that "the British and
French Representatives at Cairo might each for
the moment be advantageously supported by having
at their side an adviser possessed of the necessary
technical experience, who had been in the habit of
considering economical reforms, and to whom they
might have recourse for an independent and im-
partial opinion upon any points which seemed to
them doubtful or complicated." Lord Granville
wished this proposal to be considered by the French
Government, but he " had no wish to press the
suggestion if M. de P'reycinet saw decided objec-
tions to it." M. de Freycinet saw some obvious
objections to the proposal ; amongst others, it
would, he thought, " be difficult to prevent the
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Controllers from supposing that it was with a view
to controlling them that the agents were to be
furnished with special Financial Advisers. They
would, in fact, suppose that they would sink from
the position of ' Controleurs ' into that of ' Con-
troles.'" This proposal was, therefore, allowed to
drop. A more strange idea than that of sending
two gentlemen, " who had been in the habit of
considering economical reforms," in order to control
a mutinous army certainly never entered into the
head of a responsible statesman.^
Whilst these barren diplomatic negotiations
were going on in Europe, another incident occurred
in Cairo of a nature to precipitate the crisis, which
had now become inevitable. A large number of
Egyptian officers had, as has been already men-
tioned, been promoted. This caused great dis-
content amongst the Turkish and Circassian officers
who had been passed over. Arabi and his
colleagues feared their resentment. A story was,
therefore, got up that the leaders of the military
and nationalist party were to be murdered. On
April 12, nineteen officers and soldiers were arrested
on a charge of conspiracy to murder Arabi. By
April 22, as many as forty-eight persons had been
arrested. Amongst these, was Osman Pasha Rifki,
the late Minister of War. They were tried by a
Court-martial, whose proceedings were secret.
They were undefended by counsel. Forty officers,
including Osman Pasha Rifki, were condemned to
exile for life to the farthest limits of the Soudan.
Arabi's account of this affair is given in a docu-
ment entitled " Instructions to my Counsel," which
was subsequently published. "A Mameluke slave
^ This proposal, tlioiig'h in a somewhat different form, appears to
liave emanated from Mr. Wilfrid Blunt. On March 20, 1882, he
wrote to Lord Granville sufr^estin'j' that ''sometliing in the nature of
a commission of inquiry" should he sent to Egypt.
—
Secret Uintory,
etc., p. 232.
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of the Khedive's," he said, " and a Circassian, made
a plot to administer arsenic to Abdul-Al Pasha at
the Koubbeh school. The Circassian succeeded
in putting some of the poison into the Pasha's
milk, which he took nightly, but fortunately the
servant found it out in time to save his life. . . .
This plan having failed, another was set on foot
to get rid of me. A party of Circassians agreed
together to kill me as well as every native Egyptian
holding high appointments." There does not,
however, appear to have been a shadow of trust-
worthy evidence to show that the charge of con-
spiracy was true. The verdict of the Court-martial
is a wild rambling document, bearing the character
of a political manifesto rather than that of a judicial
decision. Like most ignorant men, Arabi was very
suspicious. The conspiracy to murder him merely
existed in his own imagination.
The Khedive was now placed in a position of
^reat difficulty. The sentence of the Court-
anartial was manifestly unjust, but it was question-
able whether he would be able to resist the pressure
brought to bear on him by his Ministers, who were,
of course, in favour of its being confirmed. Tlie
Porte interfered. Osman Pasha Rifki bore the
title of Ferik, or General, which was conferred by
the Sultan and could only be taken away by His
Imperial Majesty. The Sultan, therefore, desired
that the matter should be referred to him. The
Khedive answered that he would comply with this
request. By doing so, he threw himself into the
arms of the Porte, and assumed an attitude of
direct hostility to his Ministers, but he explained
to Sir Edward Malet (May 6) that he thought
it better that Egypt should lose some of its
privileges at the hands of the Porte, and that
proper authority should be re-established, ratiier
than that the existing misgovernment should
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continue. The INIinisters were much incensed.
The President of the Council told Sir Edward
JMalet " that if the Porte should send an order to
cancel the sentence of the Court-martial on the
Circassian prisoners, the order would not be obeyed,
and that if the Porte sent Commissioners, they
would not be allowed to land, but would be re-
pulsed by force, if necessary."
The defiant attitude adopted by the Egyptian
Ministers towards the Porte was, without doubt,
in a measure due to the belief that, in resisting
Turkish interference, they could count on French
support. As a matter of fact, directly it was
suggested that, by reason of Osman Pasha Rifki's
rank, Turkish interference was necessary, M. de
Freycinet stated that " he was strongly of opinion
that the Khedive should himself grant the pardon
immediately by virtue of his own prerogative
without waiting for action on the part of the
Porte." Lord Granville agreed. Identic instruc-
tions to advise the Khedive in this sense were,
therefore, sent to the British and French repre-
sentatives at Cairo. The Khedive acted on this
advice. On May 9, he signed a Decree commuting
the sentence of the Court-martial on the forty
officers into exile from Egypt, but not to the
Soudan. The commutation of this sentence
widened the breach between the Khedive and
his JNIinisters. On May 18, Sir Edward Malet
reported that "relations had been broken off
between the Khedive and his Ministers," and that
"the situation had become most serious." The
representatives of the great Powers, with uncon-
scious humour, requested the President of the
Council "to describe the situation." The latter
replied that, as the Khedive and his Ministers
could not agree, the Chamber had been convoked
without the authority of the Khedive having been
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requested. "The complaint against His Highness
was that he had acted in a way to diminish the
autonomy of Egypt, and on many occasions
without consulting his Ministers." There appears
to be little doubt that the intention of the military
party at this time was to depose the Khedive, to
exile the family of Mehemet Ali, and to appoint
Mahmoud Pasha Sami Governor-General by the
national will.
By this time, the civil elements in the national
movement had again become alive to the folly of their
conduct in allying themselves with the mutineers.
Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber, told
Sir Edward Malet that "in overthrowing Cherif
Pasha the Chamber had acted under pressure from
Arabi, and that the very deputies who had then
insisted on the course taken, finding that they
had been deceived, were now anxious to overthrow
the Ministry." On May 13, Sir Edward Malet
wrote: "The President of the Chamber and the
deputies ostensibly take the part of the Khedive,
but they have requested His Highness to pardon
and to be reconciled with his Ministers. The
Khedive has refused. His Highness remains firm,
and will not be reconciled to a Ministry which
has defied him openly, threatened himself and
his family, and, by the convocation of the
Chamber without his sanction, has violated the
law. At Cairo, there is considerable uneasiness,
and many persons are leaving."
The President of the Council then tendered his
resignation to the Khedive. The British and
French Consuls-General proposed that Mustapha
Pasha Fehmi should be appointed President.
"We agree," Sir Edward Malet said, "to the
nomination of any one, except Arabi Pasha."
The leaders of the military party had stated that,
if the Ministry were changed, they would not be
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responsible for the maintenance of order. The
British and French Governments, however, would
not accept this denial of responsibility. Their
representatives in Cairo were authorised "to send
for Arabi and inform him that if there is a disturb-
ance of order, he will find Europe and Turkey,
as well as England and France, against him, and
will be held responsible."
When Mustapha Pasha Fehmi was offered the
Presidency of the Council, he declined to accept
the ])ost. The Ministers also said that "they
would only resign if the Chamber of Notables
desired it." The President of the Chamber
"declared that it would be impossible to change
the Ministry so long as the military power
continued to be vested in Arabi Pasha." Under
these circumstances, the British and French
Consuls - General informed the Khedive that
"personal questions must be set aside." As His
Highness was unable to form a new Ministry, he
was "requested to enter into relations with the
present one."
It was by this time evident that some decisive
intervention in Egypt was inevitable, but the
question of whether that intervention should be
Turkish or Anglo-French still remained undecided.
On May 21, however, INI. de Freycinet took a great
step in advance. He recognised the possibility
of Turkish armed intervention. The following
proposals were submitted to the British Govern-
ment :
—
1. An Anglo-French squadron was to be sent
to Alexandria.
2. The British and French Governments were
to "request the Porte to abstain for the present
from all intervention or interference in Egy))t."
3. The Cabinets of Germany, Austria, Russia,
and Italy were to be informed of the despatch of
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an Anglo-French squadron to Alexandria, and they
were to be asked to send to their representatives at
Constantinople similar instructions to those sent to
the British and French Ambassadors.
4. The French Government agreed to abandon
the idea of deposing the Khedive, "a plan which,
if adopted in time, might, in their opinion, have
prevented serious complications."
5. As regards the important question of Turkish
intervention, M. de Freycinet expressed himself in
the following terms : " The French Government
continue to be opposed to Turkish intervention,
but they would not regard as intervention a case
in which Turkish forces were summoned to Egypt
by England and France, and operated there under
English and French control, for an object, and on
conditions which France and England should have
themselves defined. If, after the arrival of their
ships at Alexandria, the French and English
Governments should consider it advisable that
troops should be landed, they should have recourse
neither to English nor to French troops, but should
call for Turkish troops, on the conditions above
specified."
6. The Consuls -General were to be instructed
'*to recognise as legal no other authority than
that of Tewfik Pasha, and not to enter into
relations with any other de facto Government,
except for the purpose of securing the safety of
their countrymen."
Lord Granville at once acceded to these pro-
posals. He thought, however, that in requesting
the Sultan to abstain for the present from all
interference in Egypt, it would be "desirable to
intimate in guarded language that it was not
improbable that further propositions might be
made hereafter to the Porte." Moreover, Lord
Granville suggested "in view of the very large
268 MODERN EGYPT n. ii
force which it is ]>roposed should be despatched
to Alexandria by England and France, that it
might be as well, if not inconsistent with the
other objects which M. de Freycinet has in view,
that the other Powers, including Turkey, should
be invited to have their flags represented." In
other words, the British Government wished for
Turkish executive action under international
sanction. Both the Turkish action and the
international sanction were, on the other hand,
distasteful to the French. M. de Freycinet,
however, agreed to Lord Granville's first proposal
so far as to instruct the French Ambassador at
Constantinople that he might "hint to the Sultan,
in very moderate terms, that it was not improbable
that further proposals might be made to the Porte
hereafter." As regards the international sanction,
M. de Freycinet would make no concession. " I
am not of opinion," he said, "that we should at
present invite the other Powers to send ships by
the side of ours. It is not, in my judgment, for
our own interest that we should in this way take
an initiative which would deprive the Anglo-
French action of the directive character, which
Europe herself assigns to it, and appears desirous to
leave to it in Egypt." When M. de Freycinet's
reply was communicated to Lord Granville, he
**told the French Ambassador that Mr. Gladstone
agreed with him in regretting that the other
Powers had not been invited to co-operate. Her
Majesty's Government tho'ight this a mistake, but
as the French Government had gone so far to
meet the views of Her Majesty's Government,
they have concurred in the course taken."
The weak part of this scheme was that the
intention to invite Turkish co-operation was not
})ublicly announced. Sir Edward Malet at once
saw the danger. On May 14, he telegraphed to
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Lord Granville : " Knowing the feeling here (i.e.
at Cairo) I fear that if the Sultan's implied co-
operation is not secured and made known, and if
he does not give his countenance at the beginning
to the action of the Powers, there is a risk that
the Chamber and the army may again coalesce
and offer resistance, which would otherwise, I
think, be impossible." The Khedive was no less
anxious to obtain the moral support of the Sultan.
On May 20, he asked Sir Edward Malet "to beg
the English Government to induce the Porte to
send him a telegram approving of his entering
into negotiations with us for the restoration of his
authority, and the maintenance of the status quo.
He wished for it as a lever to act on the deputies,
and dissipate the idea, which was then taking root
with them and the military, that the Sultan opposed
the action of the Powers." A frank explanation of
the intentions of the Powers might perhaps, even at
this late hour, have ensured the cordial co-opera-
tion of the Sultan. As it was, lie was irritated
by the action taken by the British and French
Governments, more especially by the despatch
of an Anglo-Frjnch squadron to Alexandria.
The Turkish Ambassadors at Paris and London
were instructed to protest. The despatch of the
squadron also gave offence to the other Powers,
who thought that they should have been previously
consulted on the subject, and, therefore, declined
to join in the Anglo-French recommendation to
the Sultan that he should abstain from all inter-
ference in Egypt.
The dislike of the French Government to Turkish
intervention was, however, such as to render it
injpossible to obtain the full advantage which
might otherwise possibly have been derived from
the co-operation of the Sultan. On May 19, M. de
Freycinet told Lord Lyons that "there were very
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strong objections to speaking openly at that moment
either at Constantinople or elsewhere of the agree-
ment to call in Turkish troops, in case military in-
tervention in Egypt should be unavoidable." On
JNIay 22, therefore, Lord Granville telegraphed to
Sir Edward JMalet : " The French Government are
nervous lest the conditional consent they have
given to Turkish intervention may be publicly
announced at Cairo or Constantinople, and produce
an explosion of public feeling at Paris." Under
these circumstances, all that could be done was to
send a somewhat vague explanatory telegram to
the British and French representatives at Berlin,
Rome, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Constantinople.
" It was never proposed," Lord Granville said, " to
land troops or to resort to a military occupation of
the country. Her Majesty's Government intend,
when once calm has been restored, and the future
secured, to leave Egypt to herself, and to recall
their squadron. If, contrary to their expectations,
a pacific solution cannot be obtained, they will
concert with the Powers and with Turkey on the
measures, which shall have appeared to them and
to the French Government to be the best." At
the same time (JNIay 23), Lord Dujfferin told the
Minister for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople that
if " instead of helping to terminate the crisis in the
desired manner, the I*orte complicates the situation
by falsifying facts and rumiing counter to our
advice, we shall double the number of our ships
at Alexandria, and their stay will be indefiinitely
prolonged." Lord Dufferin " had already hinted
to Said Pasha confidentially that if the Ottoman
Government acted in a loyal and reasonable
manner, the first-fruits of their moderation might be
the countermanding of the additional ships of war
which were under orders to join the squadron."
In the meanwhile (May 19), the British and
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French Consuls -General had been instructed "to
advise the Khedive to take advantage of a
favourable moment, such, for instance, as the
arrival of the fleets, to dismiss the present JNIinistry
and to form a new Cabinet under Cherif Pasha, or
any other person inspiring the same confidence."
Sir Edward Malet replied (May 20) that he and
M. Sienkiewicz had considered these instructions.
" Until the supremacy of the military party is
broken," he added, "the Khedive is powerless to
form a new Ministry. No one will accept the task
until this is effected," He, therefore, proposed to
enter into negotiations with Arabi and his three
principal coadjutors with a view to inducing them
to leave the country. Sultan Pasha, the President
of the Chamber of Deputies, consented to act as
intermediary. He questioned the Consuls-General
as to " whether there was any infringement of the
Porte's sovereign rights in the action of England
and France." Sir Edward Malet replied that "the
intention of the two Governments was to respect
those rights and in no way to infringe them." The
negotiation failed. Arabi positively refused " either
to retire from his position or from the country."
An Egyptian Colonel said, in the presence of a
member of the French Consular service, that " the
officers would hew Arabi in pieces if he deserted
them." A Cabinet Council was held at which it was
decided that the Government should re})ly "to any
official demands made upon them that they did not
admit the right of the English and French Govern-
ments to interfere, and that they recognised no
ultimate authority but that of the Sultan." At
the same time, the President of the Chamber
informed the French Consul - General that " he
could no longer rely upon the deputies, on account
of the feeling against the intervention of the two
Powers which was gaining ground." It was, in
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fact, clear that tlie fears vvliich Sir Edward JNIalet
had expressed on JMay 14 had been realised. The
rehic Lance of the French Government to appeal to
the authority of the Sultan had cast suspicion on
tlie intentions of tlie AVestern Powers, and had
again united the civil and military elements of the
Egyptian movement. JNIore than this, the jealousy
shown by the French of Turkish intervention had
resulted in strengthening the unnatural alUance
between Arabi and the Sultan. Essad Effendi, a
confidential agent of the Sultan, arrived at Cairo.
It was certain that the defiant attitude adopted by
the Egyptian Ministers was in a great measure due
to the messages brought by this individual from
Constantinople.
Meanwhile, in anticipation of the failure of the
negotiations with Arabi, Sir Edward Malet and
^I. Sienkiewicz had, on Mny 21, suggested to their
respective Governments that they should be
authorised to make an official demand that Arabi
and his principal coadjutors should leave the
country. When, however, they saw the decided
attitude taken up by the leaders of the military
party, they hesitated to adopt so strong a measure
on their own authority. On May 23, Sir Edward
Malet telegraphed to Lord Granville in the
following terms : " M. Sienkiewicz and I hesitate
to make an official demand to the INIinisters, which
we know beforehand will be met with refusal, until
we are in a position to declare what would be the
consequences of such a refusal, and I accordingly
venture to beg Your Lordship to favour me with
further instructions. The present situation has
been brought about by the JNIinisters and the
people persisting in a belief that the two Powers
will not despatch troops, and tliat the opposition of
France renders a Turkish intervention impossible.
In the meanwhile, military preparations are being
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carried on, and a fanatical feeling against foreigners
is sedulously fostered. I am still of opinion that if
the Sultan declares himself at once, and if it be
known that troops are ready to be despatched, we
may succeed without the necessity for landing
them." On receipt of this message, Lord Granville
telegraphed (May 24) to Lord Lyons in the follow-
ing terms : " Tell M. de Freycinet that the news
from Cairo is disquieting. Time is all important.
Propose to him that the two Governments should
telegraph a Circular to the Powers, requesting them
to join in asking the Sultan to have troops ready to
send to Egypt under strict conditions."
No immediate answer was sent to Sir Edward
Malet's telegram, but the two Governments
authorised their Consuls-General to take whatever
steps they considered possible to ensure the de-
parture from Egypt of Arabi and his principal
partisans, and the nomination of Cherif Pasha to
be President of the Council.
When this telegram reached Cairo, a document
was being circulated amongst the officers and
soldiers of the army in which it was stated that the
British and French Governments insisted on the
following points : All the Ministers were to be
exiled ; all the officers on the Army List were
to leave Egypt ; the entire army was to be dis-
banded ; Egypt was to be occupied by foreign
troops ; the Chamber was to be dissolved. " The
French representative and I," Sir Edward JNIalet
telegraphed on May 2.5, " persuaded that the situa-
tion would become still further complicated, and
even dangerous to the lives of foreigners, if these
conditions were believed to be true ones, determined
upon the official step from whicli we had hitherto
shrunk." They handed an official Note to the
President of the Council, in which the following
demands were set forth :
—
vol.. I
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"1. The temporary retirement from Egypt of
Arabi Pasha, witli tlie mamtenance of his rank and
pay. 2. The retirement into the interior of Egypt
of Ali Pasha Fehmi and Abdul-Al Pasha, who will
also retain their rank and pay. 3. The resignation
of the present INIinistry."
The Note added that "the intervention of the
two Powers, being divested of all character of
vengeance and reprisal, they will use their good
offices to obtain from the Khedive a general
amnesty, and will watch over its strict observance."
In consequence of the delivery of this Note, the
Ministers resigned on INIay 26. At the same time,
they addressed a letter to the Khedive stating that
as His Highness had accepted the conditions
proposed by the two Powers, he had acquiesced in
foreio-n intervention in contradiction to the terms
of the Firmans. The Khedive replied that he
accepted the resignation of the Ministry because
it was the will of the nation, and that, as regards
the rest, it ^\as a matter between him and the
Sultan, whose rights he would always respect.
For a moment, there appeared some hope that
the crisis was over. Sir Edward Malet reported
(May 27) that the Ministers " perceived that, were
they to reject the conditions which the Khedive
had accepted, they would be in overt, instead of
covert rebellion, a position from which they shrank.
The retirement of the Ministry was, therefore, due
to the decisive and firm attitude assumed by His
Highness." The French Government were elated.
They now answered the proposal made by Lord
Granville on May 24, to the effect that the Powers
should be addressed with a view to Turkish troops
being held in readiness to proceed to Egypt. M.
Tissot, the French representative in London, wrote
to Lord Granville in the following terms : *' M. de
Freycinet telegraphs to me that the Council of
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Ministers, to whom he has submitted your proposal,
have been unanimous in thinking that notliing in
the present situation of affairs would justify an
appeal to Turkish troops. A Note was delivered
by our Consuls-General on the 25th instant ; the
Ministry has just tendered its resignation, the
elements of resistance are manifestly in process
of disorganisation ; there is, tlierefore, every motive
for awaiting the course of events. It appears
impossible to M. de Freycinet that you should not
be struck with the justice of these considerations,
and that, taking into account the recent events
which have taken place at Cairo, you should not,
yourself, my dear Lord, recognise the uselessness
of the step which you at first proposed to him."
This elation was short-lived. On INIay 27, Sir
Edward JNIalet telegraphed that Cherif Pasha had
been asked to form a JNlinistry, but had refused to
do so, "on the ground that no Government was
possible so long as the military chiefs remained
in the country." The Khedive, Sir Edward Malet
added, "will now endeavour to form another
Ministry, altiiough he has faint hope of being able
to get an efficient one, if he can form one at all."
Sir Edward Malet urged that the Sultan should be
called upon to exercise his authority, and especially
that he should despatch an officer to Egypt with
as little delay as possible. The Khedive also
thought that " a Turkish Commissioner could
make himself heard and restore tranquillity."
Toulba Pasha, one of Arabi's principal associates,
had an interview with the Khedive, at which
" he stated that the army absolutely rejected the
Joint Note and awaited the decision of the Porte,
which was the only authority they recognised."
There was, in fact, little doubt that the JNlinisters
were acting in collusion with the Porte.
On May 28, the Grand Vizier telegraphed to
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the Khedive statmg that a Turkish Commissioner
would be sent if an official request to that effect
were made. The Khedive asked the British and
French Consuls-General what he was to do. His
position was, indeed, one of the utmost difficulty.
The officers of the regiments and of the Police
force stationed at Alexandria had telegraphed to
him on the previous day (INIay 27) that "they
would not accept the resignation of Arabi Paslia,
and tliat they allowed twelve hours to His
Highness to consider, after which delay they would
no longer be responsible for public tranquillity."
Moreover, Sultan Pasha and other deputies told
the Khedive in the presence of the British and
French Consuls -General, that "unless he agreed
to reinstate Arabi as Minister of War, his life
was not safe." Nevertheless, Sir Edward Malet
reported, " His Highness refused." As regards the
request for a Turkish Commissioner, Sir Edward
Malet telegraphed: "I stated that, if His
Highness's life were in danger, I could not give any
advdce against the step he proposed, if it appeared
to be the only chance of safety. JNI. Sienkiewicz
limited himself to saying *that he would request
instructions from the French Government,' and we
left without giving any further answer, although
the Khedive urged the necessity of immediately
making some reply to the Grand Vizier." Well
might Sir Edward INIalet say: "The position of
the Khedive is a most painful one. Threatened
with death, prevented by us from going to
Alexandria while there was yet time,^ and not
allowed to appeal to the only quarter from which
effectual assistance can come, he must feel bitterly
the ap})arent result at present of following our
* The Khedive had, a short while previously, wished to go to
Alexandria, l)ut he was urged by the British aud Freuch Goverumentfl
to remain at Cairo.
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advice and relying upon our support." The
necessity for action was, indeed, so a])parent that
Lord Granville, without waiting to consult the
French Government, telegraphed both to I^ord
DufFerin at Constantinople and to the Ambassadors
at the other courts of Europe that " Her INIajesty's
Government considered it most desirable that no
time should be lost by the Sultan, who should send
an order to support the Khedive, to reject the
accusation of the fallen Ministry with regard to
His Highness, and to order the three military
chiefs, and perhaps also the ex-President of the
Council, to come and explain their conduct at
Constantinople." M. de Freycinet, when he was
informed of what had been done, sent similar
instructions to the French representatives abroad,
but he evidently did so with reluctance.
In the meanwhile, Cairo and Egypt generally
remained in the hands of the military party. On
May 29, Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour (after-
wards liOrd Alcester), who commanded the British
fleet, which had by this time arrived at Alex-
andria, telegraphed : " Alexandria is apparently con-
trolled this morning by the military ])arty." It
was clear that, in the absence of any effective help
from without, the Khedive would be obliged to
yield to the wishes of the mutinous army. On
May 28, Sir Edward Malet telegraphed to Lord
Granville in the following terms : " This afternoon,
the Chiefs of religion, including the Patriarch, and
the Chief Rabbi, all the deputies, Ulema and others,
waited on the Khedive, and asked him to reinstate
Arabi as Minister of War. He refused ; but they
besought him, saying that, though he might be
ready to sacrifice his own life, he ought not to
sacrifice theirs, and that Arabi had threatened them
all with death if they did not obtain his consent.
The Colonel of the Khedive's Guard stated that
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the guard of the Palace had been doubled, that
orders had been given to them to prevent his
leaving the Palace for his usual drive, and to fire
if he attempted to force his way. Under these
circumstances, the Khedive yielded, not to save
himself, but to preserve the town from bloodshed."
At the same time, the Khedive made a formal
demand to the Sultan that a Commissioner should
be sent to Egypt.
The situation at the end of May was, therefore,
as follows : An attempt had been made to free the
Khedive from the dictatorship of the military party.
In spite of the support accorded by the British and
French Governments, the attempt had completely
failed. Arabi and his associates had again
triumphed. British diplomacy, although somewhat
more free in action than previous to the accession
to power of M. de Freycinet, was still hampered
by its association with France. No frank appeal
could be made to the Sultan that he should exercise
his authority, although both Lord Granville and Sir
Edward Malet saw that in such an appeal lay the
only chance of avoiding military intervention of
some sort. M. de Freycinet was almost as much
opposed as his predecessor to Turkish intervention.
The result of all this vacillation was that the policy
of England and France was suspected on all sides,
— by the Sultan, who was greatly irritated ; by the
other Powers ; and by the Egyptians. The Khedive,
in the meanwhile, had so far found that Anglo-
French support was a weak reed on which to lean
in time of necessity.
The end, however, was not far off. It was
daily becoming more clear that Arabi could be
suppressed by nothing but force. If no one else
would use the requisite force, the task would
necessarily devolve on England.
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APPENDIX
Note on the relations between Mr. Gladstone and
Mr. Wilfrid Blunt.
The overestimate of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's influence was in
no small degree due to the fact that he was known to be in
communication with Mr. Gladstone. As Mr. Blunt in his
Secret History has narrated at length his dealings with
Mr. Gladstone, who, he says (p. 369), was, in his opinion,
" capable of any treachery and any crime," I think that, in
justice to the memory of that distinguished statesman, I
should furnish whatever evidence is in my possession as to
the manner in which he regarded the question of his rela-
tions with Mr. Blunt. At a later period of Egyptian
history (October 23, 1883), Lord Granville wrote to me
privately, forwarding a letter addressed by Mr. Blunt to
Sir Edward Hamilton, Mr. Gladstone's Private Secretary,
with the following remarks
:
Gladstone sent me this letter, condemning Blunt, but suggest-
ing that I miglit send it on to you.
I declined, and expressed a hope that Hamilton would not
answer him at all ; that there was no knowing what use he
might make of the fact of his being in correspondence with any
one in Downing Street.
But as Gladstone returns to the charge, I forward it to you
privately.
He writes
:
" There are certain parts of Blunt's letter which, indifferently
as I think of him, I certainly should have wished Baring to see.
My rule has always been to look in the declarations of even the
extremest opponents for anything which either may have some
small percentage of truth in it, or ought not to be let pass
without contradiction (private in this case). I know not how
it is that he writes to Hamilton, but you see it is personal and
tuluyant, not official."
Gladstone's principle is plausible, but I fancy it often gets
h m into unnecessary difficulties.
\ ou have seen Blunt, and heard all he had to say.
1 replied on November 5, in the following terms
:
I would just as soon that Mr. Blunt was not in corre-
spondence with any one connected with the Government; if
it were known, it might be misinterpreted.
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The principle of not neglecting criticisms which come from
an opponent is a very sound one, and I always endeavour to
follow it. But, in this case, we may have the advantage of
knowing what Blunt has to say without corresponding with him.
He will not hide his light under a bushel. You may feel sure
tliat before long it will burn brightly in the pages of some
magazine.
I also, for Mr. Gladstone's information, replied at some
length to Mr. Blunfs criticisms, but neither his letter, nor
my reply, are of sufficient importance or interest to warrant
their reproduction.
CHAPTER XVI
THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA
May-July 1882
State of the country—Vacillation of the Porte—A Conference pro-
posed—Dervish Pasha and Essad Effendi sent to Egypt—The
Alexandria massacres—Failure of Dervish Pasha's Mission—Panic
in Egypt—The Conference meets—Tlie Ragheb Ministry—The
British Admiral demands that the construction of batteries at
Alexandria shall cease—The French decline to co-operate—The
bombardment of Alexandria—The town abandoned and burnt.
Arabi's reinstatement was *' looked upon by the
natives as a sign that the Christians were going to
be expelled from Egypt, that they were to recover
the land bought by Europeans or mortgaged to
them, and that the National Debt would be can-
celled." Great numbers of Christians left the
interior. The British residents at Alexandria called
upon their Government to provide means for the
protection of their lives. " Every day's delay," Sir
Charles Cookson telegraphed on May 30, *' increases
the dangerous temper of the soldiery, and their
growing defiance of discipline." The officers of
the army were "obtaining by threats signatures
to a petition praying for the deposition of the
Khedive." The President of the Chamber re-
quested the deputies to go to their homes " in order
to save them from being compelled to sign the
petition." Official business, except at the Ministry
of War, was at a standstill. Tiie whole country was
in a state of panic. Sir Edward Malet warned the
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British Government (May 31) that "a collision
might at any moment occur between the INIoslems
and the Christians."
It was abundantly clear by this time that the
question of protecting European financial interests
in Egypt had fallen completely into the back-
ground. It was also clear that the national move-
ment was entirely under the control of the military
party. Foreign intervention of some sort had
become necessary.
For years past, the Ottoman Government had
been longing to regain their hold over Egypt. The
chanceries of Europe were filled with notes and
protests embodying the querulous complaints made
by the Porte against the intervention of the
European Powers in Egyptian affiiirs, and against
the insufficient recognition accorded to the sovereign
rights of the Sultan. The Turkish opportunity
had at last come. The force of circumstances had
fought in favour of Turkish pretensions. The
Khedive and the two Western Powers had en-
deavoured to settle the affairs of Egypt indepen-
dently of the Sultan. They had signally failed in
the attempt. All the Powers of Europe, with the
exception of France, were in favour of employing
the authority of the Sultan as the executive arm
by which order should be restored in Egypt. Even
French opposition was much modified. The Re-
publique Fra7ifaise, indeed, which was inspired by
M. Gambetta, strongly opposed any idea of Turkish
intervention. " II faut niaintenir," it said on May
31, " Tiudependance de I'Egypte, en interdire I'ap-
proche aux Commissaires aussi bien qu'aux troupes
du Sultan." But M. Gambetta was no longer in
office. "Je ne m'expliquerai point a la tribune,"
M. de Freycinet said in the French Chamber on
June 1, "sur les divers moyens auxquels on pour-
rait etre conduit, mais il y a un moyen que j'exclus;
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ce moyen c'est une intervention militaire Fran^'aise
en Egypte." This declaration, which produced an
explosion of indignation from M. Gambetta, was
almost tantamount to publicly admitting the
possibility of Turkish intervention.
It is one of the peculiarities of the vacillating
and tortuous policy invariably pursued by the Porte
that Turkish statesmen are rarely able to seize the
favourable moment for action in support of their
most cherished views. The Khedive had asked for
the despatch of a Turkish Commissioner to Egypt.
The British and French Governments viewed the
proposal more or less favourably. It might reason-
ably have been supposed that the Sultan would
seize with avidity the opportunity for asserting his
sovereign rights which was thus afforded him. He
did nothing of the kind. He was inclined to show
his resentment at the way in which he had been
enjoined not to intervene at the commencement of
the Egyptian troubles, by refusing to act at the
instance of England and France when they were
favourably disposed towards his intervention. A
suggestion was ostentatiously promulgated that
the withdrawal of the allied fleet from Alexandria
must be a preliminary condition to the despatch of
a Turkish Commissioner. The Sultan had yet to
learn that his assistance, though desirable, was not
indispensable.
In the meanwhile, M. de Freycinet, under the
p]:essure of circumstances, had in some degree over-
come his objections to international action. On
May 30, he telegraphed to M. Tissot that " there
could no longer be any reasonable hope of a pacific
solution through the moral influence of the French
and English squadrons, and the good offices of the
two agents at Cairo." He therefore proposed to
Lord Granville that a Conference should be sum-
moned. Lord Granville at once intimated his
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concurrence in this proposal, which was well received
by the other Powers. Prince Bismarck thought
the idea of a Conference "a very good expedient
for covering the change of policy on the part of
the French Government in regard to the admissi-
bility of Turkish intervention." The Sultan was
pressed to join the Conference. " I expressed my
hope," Lord Granville wrote on June 2, " that
Musurus Pasha would represent to his Government
the expediency of acting in cordial co-operation
with England. I remarked that if the Sultan were
to make difficulties and raise obstacles, it would be
difficult to find arguments to meet the pressure
that would be put upon us to take immediate and
independent action in consideration of the pressing
nature of the circumstances and engagements under
which we lay."
The idea ofassembling a Conference was distaste-
ful to the Sultan, and the proposal was sufficient
to overcome his hesitation about the despatch
of a Turkish Commissioner to Egypt. Dervish
Pasha left Constantinople for Alexandria on June 4.
The Porte " confidently hoped that the mission of
Dervish Pasha would suffice to restore the normal
situation in Egypt to the general satisfaction,"
and Musurus Pasha was instructed to express to
Lord Granville a hope that the project of the Con-
ference would be abandoned. He was told in reply
that if it were found that there were good hopes
of a settlement being speedily attained by the un-
assisted efforts of Dervish Pasha, there would be
no objection to the Conference adjourning for a
short time in order that the result of his mission
might be watched.
Any beneficial results, which might possibly
have accrued from the despatch of the Turkish
mission to Egypt, were frustrated by the conditions
under which it was sent. It would have been
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contrary to the traditions and to the existing practice
of Turkish diplomacy to have selected one capable
Commissioner, in whom confidence might be re-
posed, and to have traced clear and straightforward
instructions for his guidance. Whilst Dervish
Pasha was to act on lines friendly to the Khedive
and hostile to Arabi, his colleague, Essad EfFendi,
was to be guided by diametrically opposite prin-
ciples. He was to hold out the hand of fellowship
to the mutineers. Moreover, in order to guard
against the possibilityof common action on the part
of the two Commissioners, each of them was to
communicate independently with the Sultan. The
end to be obtained by each of the Commissioners
was, indeed, identical, though the method of attain-
ing it was more explicitly set forth in Dervish Pasha's
instructions than in those of Essad EfFendi. The
latter was merely told that the principal object he
should bear in mind was to " faire echouer les entre-
prises et intrigues pernicieuses des etrangers."
Dervish Pasha, on the other hand, was told that
*' in order to create a rivalry amongst the Consuls,
he was to attach himself to the Consuls of Ger-
many, Austria, and Italy, by pretending to invite
them to decisive deliberations, and to promise to
take their advice."
Save in respect to this point of principle, the
instructions given to each of the two Commissioners
differed widely.^ Dervish Pasha was ordered, if
necessary, to arrest Arabi and his principal fol-
lowers and to send them to Constantinople^ to
abolish the Chamber of Notables, to curtail the
powers of the Khedive, to extend those of the
Sultan, and, lastly, to call for troops if necessary.
' The instructions to each Commissioner were, of course, secret.
But there can be no doubt of the accuracy of the facts here stated in
connection with them. See also the testimony of Mr. AVilfrid Blunt,
who was probably well-informed on the point under discussion.
—
Secret
History, etc., p. 305.
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Essad Eifendi, on the other hand, was instructed
to^ thank the " Notables et hommes de marque de
I'Egypte pour le devouement dont ils ont fait
preuve," and to assure every one that the Sultan
had no intention of curtaihng the powers granted
to the Khedive by the Firmans. " Quant a I'envoi
d'une force arm^e," it was added, " ce n'est qu'une
invention pernicieuse et malveillante." It was, in
fact, certain that the Sultan was reluctant to bring
his troops into collision with the population of
Egypt. He preferred to pose as their defender
against European aggression. Under these circum-
stances, it is not surprising that the bewildered
Essad Effendi should, shortly after his arrival at
Cairo, have reported that the policy of Dervish
Pasha was in entire contradiction to the instruc-
tions he had himself received. He asked, but
asked in vain, for some clear indication of what he
was to do.
Dervish Pasha, however, lost no time in acting
on his instructions. He resolved to assert his
authority. On June 10, he received a deputation
from the Ulema of Cairo. " One of them," Sir
Edward Malet reported, "well known as a follower
of Artibi, proceeded to deliver a speech, extolling
the course pursued by the army in having pre-
served the country from falling into the hands of
infidels. Upon this, the Commissioner rose from
his seat, and, in forcible language, reminded those
present that he had come to issue orders and not
to listen to preaching. The ofiending Alim was
thereupon seized and forced to retire by an
attendant of colossal stature who appears always
at hand."
It was, to say the least, a curious coincidence
that at the moment when it appeared possible
that the rulership of Egypt would slip from the
hands of the military clique, wliich then exercised
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supreme power, an incident should have occurred
which showed that without the aid of Arabi and
his colleagues public tranquillity could not be pre-
served. For some while past, the population of
Alexandria had shown unusual signs of efferves-
cence. Europeans had been hustled and spat upon
in the streets. A Sheikh liad been crying aloud in
the public thoroughfares, "O INIoslems, come and
help me to kill the Christians!" On June 9, a
Greek was warned by an Egyptian to " take care,
as the Arabs were going to kill the Christians either
that day or the day following." On the 10th, some
low-class Moslems went about the streets calling out
that "the last day for the Christians was drawing
nigh."^ On June 11, the storm burst. It is
needless to give the details of the riot which took
place on that day. It will be sufficient to say
that disturbances broke out simultaneously in three
places. Some fifty Europeans were slaughtered
in cold blood under circumstances of the utmost
brutality. INIany others, amongst whom was Sir
Charles Cook son, the British Consul, were severely
wounded and narrowly escaped with their lives.
"Whenever a European appeared in sight, the
mob cried out * O Moslems I Kill him I Kill the
Christian I
'
"
Both the Khedive and Arabi have at times
been accused of having instigated the Alexandria
massacres.^ So calm and impartial an observer
* Royle's Egyptian Campaigns o/"1882 to 1885^ vol. i. p. 88.
2 Mr. Wilfrid Blunt (Secret Hintory, pp. 497-534) gives at great
length the evidence on which he relies to incriminate the Khedive.
After a careful examination of all the facts, I have come to the con-
clusion that this evidence is altogether valueless. It is unnecessary
that I should give my reasons at length.
Lord Randolph Churchill made himself the principal mouthpiece in
Parliament of the cliarges against the Khedive. Papers on the subject
were laid before I' rliament (see Egypt, No. 4, 1884). They were
forwarded to Sir Edward Malet on August 6, 1883, by Lord Granville
with the following remarks : " A full examination of the papers and
arguments adduced by Lord Randolph Churchill leads to the couclusiou
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as Sir Edward INIalet, however, held that both
accusations were devoid of foundation, and that
the massacres were the natural outcome of the
political effervescence of the time. There can
be little doubt that this view of the question is
correct. A considerable moral responsibility, how-
ever, rested on Arabi and his colleagues for tne
blood which was shed. For a long time past, they
had done their best to arouse the race hatred and
fanaticism of the cowardly mob at Alexandria.^
The natural result ensued.
The effect of the riot was instantaneous. Sir
Edward JNIalet reported to I^ord Granville, on
June 13, that Dervish Pasha's mission had alto-
gether failed in its object. The Sultan's Com-
missioner was obliged to bow to the authority of
Arabi. He informed the representatives of the
Powers that " under the urgent circumstances of
the case, he would assume joint responsibility with
Arabi Pasha for the execution of the orders of the
Khedive." Dervish Pasha distributed decorations
alike to the Arabists and to the Khedivial party,
but his influence was gone. None of the officers
of the army went to see him. It was only by " a
remnant of politeness" that Arabi answered the
letters which Dervish Pasha addressed to him.
It was r.bout this moment that the Sultan
informed Lord Dufferin that "Arabi Pasha had
made a complete submission, and tliat the status
quo was about to be established." Musurus Pasha
also told Lord Granville that the Sultan had
conferred on Arabi the Grand Cordon of the
that no primafacie evidence (either legal or moral) exists in support of
the charges which liave been preferred against His Highness Tewfik
Pasha."
As regards Arabi, Sir Charles Wilson, who watched his trial,
expressed tlie opinion that '' there was no evidence to connect Arabi
with the mass;icre at Alexandria on June 11."
' Al)unilant evidence in supjjort of tliis statement was adduced at
Arabi's trial.
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Medjidieh, and that Arabi " had expressed his
gratitude and had reiterated his assurances of
fideUty and devotion to the Sultan." His JNIajesty
thought that there was " no longer occasion for
anxiety." The alarm which had prevailed had
been due to insubordination on the part of the
military, but these acts of submission and the
restoration of tranquillity " removed all difficulties
and rendered any measures of rigour useless."
The extent of Arabi's submission may be gathered
from the fact that, on July 5, Arabi " intimated
to Dervish Pasha that he had better quit Egypt,"
and tliat when, on July 8, he was summoned,
through Essad EfFendi, to proceed to Constan-
tinople "he refused to comply with the invitation
of His Majesty." Then, at last. Lord DufFerin
extorted from the unwilling Minister for Foreign
Afiairs at the Porte the admission that " Arabi
had taken the bit in his teeth and that it was
evident something must be done."
Manifestly something had to be done, for the
whole framework of society in Egypt was on the
point of collapsing. By June 17, 14,000 Christians
had left the country, and some 6000 more were
anxiously awaiting the arrival of ships to take
them away. On June 26, ten Greeks and three
Jews were murdered by a fanatical mob at Ben ha.
Anibi, following perhaps unconsciously the ex-
ample of the French Jacobins, proposed to the
Council that the property of all Egyptians leaving
the country should be confiscated.^ On June 29,
Mr. Cartwright, Sir Edward JNIalet's locum teiiens,^
^ It is possible that Arabi designedly copied the proceedings of the
Jacobins. 1 have been informed on good autliority that at this period
he devoted a good deal of attention to the literature of the French
Revolution.
2 Ill-health obliged Sir Edward Malet to leave Egypt at this time.
He subse(iuently came to the conclusion that the sudden illness by
wbicli he was prostrated was the result of a plot to poison him.—See
his letter in the Times of October 12, 1907.
vox.. 1 u
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reported to Lord Granville : '* The exodus of
Europeans and the preparations for flight continue
with vigour. ... It is impossible to conceive the
collapse and ruin which have so suddenly overtaken
the country. . . . The natives, even the religious
Sheikhs, are now raising their voices against the
military party, and a large number of respectable
Arabs are leaving the country. The departure of
Turkish families is taking large proportions."
The effect of the massacre at Alexandria was
to quicken the slow pace of European diplomacy.
M. de Freycinet thought it "more than ever
imperative that the Conference should be con-
stituted without the least delay." On June 13,
the British and French Governments instructed
their representatives at the various courts of
Europe to propose that " the Sultan, as Sovereign,
shall, in case of necessity, be jointly invited by the
Powers united in Conference to be prepared to
lend to the Khedive a sufficient force to enable
His Highness to maintain his authority ; the Sultan
to be requested to give a positive assurance that
these troops should only be used for the mainten-
ance of the status quo, and that there should be
no interference with the liberties of Egypt secured
by the previous Firmans of the Sultan, or with
existing European agreements ; the troops not to
remain in Egypt for a longer period than a month,
except at the request of the Khedive, and with the
consent of the Great Powers, or of the Western
Powers as representing Europe ; the reasonable
expenses of the expedition to be borne by the
Egyptian Government." This was quickly followed
by a proposal that the Conference should meet
immediately " with or without Turkey." The
Sultan declined to join the Conference. He
thought it unnecessary, as "Dervish Pasha was
succeeding in his efforts to fulfil his mission in
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Egypt." The result was that, after some diplomatic
skirmishing, the Conference met at Constantinople
on June 23 without the Porte being represented.
It is unnecessary to dwell at length on the
tedious proceedings of the Conference. It was
clear, as Lord Salisbury said in the House of
Lords on July 24, that the " European concert
was rather a phantasm." On the one side, was the
British Government, represented at the Conference
by one of the most able diplomatists of the day.
Lord Granville and Lord DufFerin thoroughly
understood what they wanted. They wished for
order to be maintained in Egypt, and they were
alive to the fact that, without the employment of
material force, order could not be maintained.
European public opinion had been irritated by the
" tortuous and occult devices " of the Sultan. If
the Sultan refused to send troops, it would be
necessary to "resort to an armed occupation of
Egypt other than through the instrumentality of
Turkey." On the other side, were the various
Powers of Europe, watchful of their own interests,
but unwilling to incur any responsibility. On
June 30, Lord Dufferin reported that so far the
Conference had "done absolutely nothing," and
that, unless something could speedily be settled,
"the prolongation of its existence would seem
useless." By July 2, the Conference had only got
so far as to consider "the object to be attained by
the armed Turkish intervention in Egypt," and
the united Ambassadors had come to the sage but
somewhat impotent conclusion that, if the Porte
refused an invitation to send troops, "the Con-
ference reserved the right to express an opinion as
to what should be done at the opportune moment."
In the meanwhile, the bewildered ruler, whose
battalions it was proposed to use in order to keep
the peace, held aloof from the Council Chamber,
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being at times willing and at times unwilling to
act. He wished to know what Lord Granville
meant when he referred to "the safe improve -
ment of the internal administration of Egypt."
He was anxious to have some explanations on this
point, for his suspicions had been excited by the
fact that the Conference had been invited to con-
sider how "the prudent development of Egyptian
institutions " might best be effected. " What,"
Lord Dufferin reported, " has excited His Majesty's
mistrust, is evidently the allusion to Parliamentary
Government, which he imagines to be shadowed
forth in the word ' institutions.' "
Eventually, on July 6, the Conference got so
far as to invite the Sultan to send troops under
certain conditions, which were specified in general
terms, and which, in the event of the invitation
being accepted, were to be embodied in a subse-
quent agreement between the six Powers and
Turkey.
Whilst these discussions were taking place,
matters had been going from bad to worse in
Egypt. On June 26, Mr. Cartwright wrote
:
"The exclusive hifluence of Arabi Pasha is best
shown by the unbroken ascendancy, the intolerable
pretensions, and the threatening attitude of the
army." A mock inquiry was instituted into the
massacres of June 11, but the English member of
the Commission soon withdrew from the proceed-
ings, and the Minister of War told the Khedive's
private secretary that " he would not allow any
Arab to be executed, unless for every Arab, a
European was hung." No one dared to give evi-
dence which might be distasteful to the military
party.
The Austrian and German representatives in
Egypt urged the formation of a INIinistry approved
by the military party. l*rince Bismarck thought
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that Arabi had become a power "avec lequel il
fallait compter."
The German and Austrian proposals were not
viewed with disfavour in Paris. M. de Freycinet
spoke about "the possibihty of patching up the
Egyptian question by making terms with Arabi,"
but was at once met with the decisive statement
that, in the opinion of the British Government, no
'* satisfactory or durable arrangement was possible
without the overthrow of Arabi Pasha and the
military party in Egypt."
Under the pressure exerted by the Austrian
and German Consuls -General, the Khedive, on
June 7, nominated Ragheb Pasha, an effete old
man, to be President of the Council, with Arabi as
his JNlinister of War. The result was what might
have been expected. On June 28, Mr. Cartwright
reported to Lord Granville : ** Ragheb Pasha meets
with great difficulties in his endeavour to control
the military element in his Ministry. I hear that
His Excellency is greatly disheartened at his
want of success, and finds the officers too much
occupied with warlike designs and preparations to
pay any serious attention to reassuring measures,
or to the need of serious steps with a view to the
establishment of order and a more normal state of
affairs."
For some while past, both British public opinion
and the British Government had shown a dis-
position to break through the diplomatic cobwebs
which were hindering all effective action and allow-
ing Arabi to defy Europe. The opportunity for
doing so now presented itself. So early as June 3,
the Admiralty was informed that batteries were
being raised at Alexandria with the intention of
using them against the British fleet. The Sultan
gave orders that the construction of these batteries
should cease, and for the time being his order
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was obeyed. A month later, the works were
recommenced. The garrison of Alexandria was
reinforced. Arabi urged upon his colleagues the
desirability of a Icvce en masse. On July 5, Mr.
Cartwright reported : " At a Council of INIinisters
held yesterday, Arabi Pasha made a very violent
speech against the S ultan. He has, moreover, ordered
the officers of the Egyptian army to discontinue
all communication with Dervish Pasha, who is to
be told that his mission in Egypt is terminated."
On July 3, Lord Alcester was instructed to
prevent the continuance of work on the fortifica-
tions. If not immediately disconthiued, he was to
" destrov the earthworks and silence the batteries if
they opened fire." The French Government were
informed of the issue of these instructions and
invited to co-operate. The other Powers of
Europe were also informed. On July 5, JNI. de
Freycinet told Lord Lyons that ** the French
Government could not instruct Admiral Ccnrad to
associate himself with the English Admiral in
stopping by force the erection of batteries or the
placing of guns at Alexandria. The French
Government considered that this would be an act
of offensive hostility against Egypt, in which they
could not take part without violating the con-
stitution, which prohibits their making war without
the consent of the Chamber." On July 6, INI. de
Freycinet, in answer to a question addressed to
him by INI. Lockroy in the Chamber of Deputies,
" repeated emphatically the assurance that the
arms of France would not be used without the
express consent of the Chamber." On July 6,
Lord Alcester sent a note to the commandant of
the garrison demanding that the work of fortifi-
cation and the erection of earthworks should be
discontinued. He was informed in reply that no
guns had recently been added to the forts, or
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military preparations made. The truth of this
statement was confirmed by Dervish Pasha. On
the 9th, however, work on the fortifications recom-
menced. Guns were mounted on Fort Silsileh.
At daybreak on July 10, Lord Alcester gave notice
to the Consuls resident at Alexandria that he would
*' commence action twenty-four hours after, unless
the forts on the isthmus and those commanding
the entrance to the harbour were surrendered."
The different Cabinets of Europe were informed
of this step.
The views of the Austrian Government on a
matter of this sort are of special importance, on
account of the interest possessed by Austria in
any step which menaces the integrity of the Otto-
man Empire. When Sir Henry Elliot, the British
Ambassador at Vienna, informed Count Kalnoky
of the measures about to be taken by the British
Admiral, " His Excellency replied without hesita-
tion that he thought Her Majesty's Govern-
ment perfectly right in the step that was being
taken, and nothing could be more complete and
cordial than the manner in which he declared the
action to be perfectly legitimate, as it was
impossible for us to permit the threatening pre-
parations to be carried on without interference."
The bewilderment of the Sultan was at this
moment extreme. Baron de Ring, who had been
formerly French Consul -General in Egypt and
whose Arabist sympathies were well known, was
at Constantinople, and had given the Sultan to
understand that France would be glad to see some
compromise effected with Arabics party. Under
these circumstances, the Sultan was inclined to join
the Conference. Indeed, on July 10, he informed
the German Charge d'AfFaires at Constantinople
that "a Turkish Commissioner would join the Con-
ference the next day but one." It was, however,
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clear that the work of restoring order in Egypt
was about to be taken out of the hands of
the Conference. When, on July 10, the Sultan
was informed of the intended bombardment of
Alexandria, he told Lord Dufferin that he " would
send a categorical answer to his communication by
five o'clock to-morrow (July 11)." In the mean-
while, he asked that the bombardment should be
delayed, and he appointed a new Prime Minister,
who at once called on Lord Dufferin and said
that "to-morrow (the 12th) he would be able to
propose a satisfactory solution of the Egyptian
question." Lord Dufferin forwarded the Sultan's
request to London and to Alexandria, but he "held
out no hope that the line of action determined
upon would be modified." He also pointed out
"the folly, when such great interests were at stake,
of postponing diplomatic action till it became
materially impossible to interfere with the course
of events."
The Sultan was, as usual, too late. The
patience both of the British Government and of
the British public was exhausted. For the last
year and a half, every one had been agreed that
something should be done, but no one could agree
as to what should be done. At last, something
effectual was done. "At 7 a.m., on the 11th," Lord
Alcester stated in his report on the bombardment,
"I signalled from the Invincible to the Alexandra
to fire a shell into the recently armed earthworks
termed the Hospital Battery, and followed this by
a general signal to the fleet 'Attack the enemy's
batteries,' when immediate action ensued between
all the ships in the positions assigned to them, and
the whole of the forts commanding the entrance to
the harbour of Alexandria." By 5.30 p.m., the
batteries were silenced. On the afternoon of the
following day, the Egyptian garrison retreated,
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having first set fire to the town, which was pillaged
by the mob. Several Europeans were murdered.
On the evening of the 13th, 150 marines, with a
Gatlino- ouii, were landed from the fleet, but re-
embarked after remaining on shore for about half
an hour. On the morning of the 14th, a further
force was landed. In the course of the next day
or two, reinforcements having arrived, effective
possession was taken of the town and something-
like order restored. On July 18, Europeans and
Egyptians began to return to Alexandria.
It has been frequently stated by critics hostile
to England that Alexandria was set on fire by the
shells from the British fleet. For this statement
there is not a shadow of foundation.^ There is no
* Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's testimony on Egyptian affairs generally ia
of very little value, but it may perhaps be quoted on this special
point. His first impressions are recorded in the following words
(Secret History, etc., p. 872): "^'July 14th. Went to see Gregory.
He is frightened at Alexandria's being burnt, and will have it that
Arabi did not order it. I say he ordered it, and was right to do so.
This is the policy of the Russians at Moscow, and squai-es with all
I know of their intentions." Somewhat later, Mr. Blunt wrote
(pp. 390-91) : " With regard to the burning of Alexandria, I have never
been able to make up my mind exactly what part, if any, the Egyptian
army took in it. Arabi has always persistently denied having or(lered
it, and an act of such great energy stands so completely at variance
with the rest of his ail-too supine conduct of the war that I think it
may be fairly dismissed as improbable.
. . .
Ninet, who was present
at the whole affair, attributes the conflagration primarily to Seymour's
shells, and this is probably a correct account. ... I do not consider
the question of any great importance as affecting the moral aspect of
the case, it being clearly a military measure. . . . Historically, how-
ever, it is of importance, and I therefore say that on a balance of
evidence I am of opinion that the retreating army had its share in it,
not in consequence of any order, but as an act of disorder."
Mr. Broadley, who defended Ar/ibi at his trial, evidently had strong
suspicions that the burning of Alexandria was his handiwork. On
November 27, 1882, he wrote to Mr. Blunt: "Nothing presents
difficulties but the burning of Alexandria. As regards this, 1 believe
the proof will fail as to Arabi's orders, but many ugly facts remain, viz. :
(1) No efforts to stop conflagration and loot. (2) Continued intimacy
with Suliman Sami afterwards. (8) No punishment of offenders.
(4) Large purchases of petroleum. (5) Systematic manner of incendi-
arism by soldiers. This is the rub. Could Arabi have not stopped the
whole thing .^ Besides, some of his speeches have a very burning
appearance."
—
Secret History, etc., p. 468.
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doubt that the conflagration was the deliberate
work of incendiaries.
At the time, the British Government were
severely blamed for not taking prompt measures
immediately after the bombardment to stop the
conflagration and to restore order in the to^\^l.
So early as July 7, the Khedive pointed out that
the bombardment should be immediately followed
by the landing of a military force. The War
Office and the Admiralty were desirous to land
troops, but their advice was overruled by the
Cabinet on political grounds. Mr. Gladstone stated
in the House of Commons that the landing of a
force was objectionable, because it would have in-
volved *'the assumption of authority upon the
Egyptian question," and would have been *' grossly
disloyal in the face of Europe and the Conference."
It is difficult to conceive the frame of mind of any
one who considers that firing several thousand shot
and shell into Egyptian forts did not involve an
'* assumption of authority," whereas landing some
men to prevent a populous city from being burnt
to the ground did involve such an assumption.
These technicalities, which are only worthy of a
special pleader, were the bane of the British
Government in dealing with the Egyptian ques-
tion during Mr. Gladstone's JNIinistry. No foreign
Power would have had any reasonable ground for
complaint if, immediately after the bombardment,
a force sufficient to preserve order had been landed
at Alexandria.
The question remains whether, apart from the
details in the execution, the bombardment was
justifiable. There can be no doubt tliat it was
perfectly justifiable, not merely on the narrow
ground taken up by the British INIinistry, namely,
that it was necessary as a means of self-defence,
but because it was clear that, in tlie absence of
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effectual Turkish or international action, the duty
of crushing Arabi devolved on England.^
* The bombardment of Alexandria led to the retirement from Mr.
Gladstone's Cabinet of Mr. Brig^lit, " the colleague who in fundamentals
stood closest to him of them all" (Morley's Life of Gladstone, iii. p. 83).
The arguments by which Mr. Gladstone defended the action taken at
Alexandria are given in a letter addressed at the time to Mr. Bright
(p. 84). Save to those who hold that, under no circumstances is the
use of force justifiable, they would appear to be conclusive.
CHAPTER XVII
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co-operate—Negotiations with Italy—Italy declines to co-operate
—Negotiations with Turkey—Tel-el-Kebir—General remarks.
After the bombardment of the forts, Arabi retired
to Kafr-Dawar, a few miles distant from Alex-
andria, whence he issued a Proclamation stating
that "irreconcilable war existed between the
Egyptians and the English, and all those who
proved traitors to their country would not only be
subjected to the severest punishment in accordance
with martial law, but would be for ever accursed
in the future world." On July 22, the Khedive
formally dismissed Arabi from the post of Minister
of War, but it was not till August 27, that a new
Ministry under the presidency of Cherif Pasha,
with Riaz Pasha as INIinister of the Interior, was
formed at Alexandria. In the meanwhile, the
condition of the provinces was one of complete
anarchy. The towns of Tanta, Damanhour, and
INIehalla were plundered, and the European in-
habitants massacred.
The history of the next two months may be
summarised in a single sentence. England stepped
in, and with one rapid and well -delivered blow
crushed the rebellion. But it will be interesting
300
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to the student of diplomatic history to know in
somewhat greater detail how it was that the British
Government were left to act alone in the matter.
After the bombardment of Alexandria, British
public opinion was thoroughly roused. On July
22, Mr. Gladstone stated the policy of the British
Government in the House of Commons. " We
feel," he said, " that we should not fully discharge
our duty if we did not endeavour to convert the
present interior state of Egypt from anarchy and
conflict to peace and order. We shall look during
the time that remains to us to the co-operation of
the Powers of civilised Europe, if it be in any case
open to us." But, INIr. Gladstone added, amidst
the cheers of the House, " if every chance of
obtaining co-operation is exhausted, the work will
be undertaken by the single power of England."
Parliament granted, by a majority of 275 to 19,
the money (£2,300,000) for which the Government
asked. 15,000 men were ordered to Malta and
Cyprus. A force of 5000 men was ordered to be
sent to Egypt from India. Sir Garnet (afterwards
Lord) Wolseley was placed in chief command.
He was to go to Egypt " in support of the authority
of His Highness the Khedive, as established by the
Firmans of the Sultan and existing international
engagements, to suppress a military revolt in that
country."
Simultaneously with the military preparations,
diplomatic negotiations were actively carried on.
The French Government were " firmly resolved to
separate the question of protecting the Suez Canal
from that of intervention properly so - called."
They would "abstain from any operation in the
interior of Egypt except for the purpose of re-
pelling direct acts of aggression. If, therefore,
the English troops thought fit to undertake
such operations, they must not count on French
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co-operation." Amongst other reasons for adopting
this course, it was stated that the Ministers of War
and Marine considered that the season was most
unfavourable, and that at least half the troops
would perish from sickness, if operations were
undertaken before November. At the same time,
the French Chargd d'Affaires in London told
Lord Granville "that it was certain that M. de
Freycinet wished it to be understood that the
French Government had no objection to our {i.e.
the British) advance if we decided to make it."
M. de Freycinet, however, was not unwilling to
take action in common with England for the
defence of the Canal. On July 19, the French
Chamber granted to the Government, by a majority
of 421 to 61, the navy credits for which they
asked, amounting to about £313,000. In the
course of the debates on this vote, it became clear
that much difference of opinion existed in the
Chamber. M. Gambetta denounced in the stronejest
terms the despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt,
and spoke eloquently in support of the Anglo-
French alliance. " Au prix des plus grands sacri-
fices," he said, "ne rompez jamais Talliance
Anglaise. Et precisement — je livre toute ma
pensee, car je n'ai rien a cacher
—
precisement ce
qui me soUicite a I'alliance Anglaise, a la co-opera-
tion Anglaise, dans le bassin de la Mediterranee,
et en Egypte, et ce que je redoute le plus, entendez-
le bien, outre cette rupture ndfaste, c'est que vous
ne livriez a I'Angleterre et pour toujours, des
territoires, des fleuves, et des passages ou votre
droit de vivre et de trafiquer est dgal au sien."'
1 To a limited extent, M. Gambetta was a true prophet, although
time alone can show how far he was rij^ht in usiiij^^ the words pour
toujours: lu the meanwhile, it may he remarked that the " right to
live and to trade" in Egypt has been as fully, indeed, j)erhaps some-
what more fully assured to the French since the British oecujjation than
was the case before the occurrence of that event. According to a
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M. Clemenceau, on the other hand, was animated
with a very different spirit. He congratuhited
the Government on not having taken part in
the bombardment of the forts at Alexandria, he
approved of the Conference, and he deprecated any
active French interference in Egypt. Speaking
with a manifest suspicion of the poUcy and inten-
tions of Germany, he said that it appeared to him
that endeavours were being made to get the French
forces scattered over Africa, and that, as Austria
had been pushed into Bosnia and Herzegovina, so
France had been pushed into Tunis, and was now
being pushed into Egypt.
Active preparations were now made in the
French dockyards. The French Admiral at Port
Said was instructed to concert measures with Rear-
Admiral Hoskins for the protection of the Suez
Canal. But both the French Government and the
French Chamber were haunted by the idea that
France would be isolated in Europe. M. de
Freycinet wished to have a distinct mandate from
the Conference deputing England and France to
watch over the Canal. The British and French
Ambassadors at Constantinople were, therefore,
instructed to propose to their colleagues that the
Conference should designate the Powers who,
failing any effective action on the part of Turkey,
should be charged in case of need to take whatever
measures were necessary for the protection of the
Canal. It soon became apparent that it would be
impossible to obtain a mandate from the Powers.
Prince Bismarck " was afraid of giving the question
greater proportions by such a step, and of convert-
ing it into a war between the Christian Powers of
Europe and the Mohammedan countries." Count
statement published in the Journal Offidel in 1903, French capitiil to
the extent of over 67 millions sterliuir was at that time invested io
Effypt. I do not doubt that this amount has now been exceeded.
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Minister, however, assured Lord Granville that,
in the event of the British Government taking
action on their own initiative, they would receive
the moral support of Germany, although Prince
Bismarck \vas not prepared to go to the length
of a formal mandate. The Austrian Government
shared the views set forth by Germany.
In the meanwhile, the feeling in France against
any intervention in Egypt grew apace. The parti-
sans of non-intervention and those of intervention
united against the Suez Canal Credit Bill. The
opposition was increased by a communication made
by the German Ambassador in Paris to M. de
Freycinet, which favoured Turkish intervention as
the best means for safeguarding the Canal. This
communication was regarded as one of many steps
said to have been recently taken by Prince
Bismarck with a view to keeping M. de Freycinet
in office. Resentment at the interference in their
internal affiiirs implied, as the French conceived,
in the undisguised su])port Prince Bismarck was
sup})osed to give to INI. de Freycinet, had been
ranklino; for some while in French minds. The
suspicions entertained of Germany found expres-
sion in a report made by the Committee of the
Chamber. Some members of the Committee
thought " que Tinteret de la France ^tait de ne
pas intervenir en Egypte et de ne point immo-
biliser dans une expedition lointaine une partie de
nos forces militaires. Sans meconnaitre que la
politique de non-intervention avait ses perils, ils
ont expose que la politique d'intervention leur
paraissait plus dangereuse encore dans la situation
actuelle de I'Europe." M. Clemenceau, in the
final debate on the Bill, expressed himself as
follows : " JNIessieurs, la conclusion de ce qui se
passe en ce moment est celle-ci : L'Europe est
couverte de soldats, tout le monde attend, toutes
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les Puissances se reservent leur liberte pour
I'avenir ; reservez la liberte d'actioii de la France."
A division took place on July 29, with the result
that the Government were defeated by a large
majorily, the numbers being 416 to 75. This vote
brought about the ftiU of the Freycinet Ministry,
and finally settled the question of French inter-
vention in Egypt. A new Government was
formed under the presidency of M. Duclerc, who,
on August 8, informed the Chamber that "le
Gouvernement s'inspirera de la pensee qui est
dictee par ce vote et y conformera sa politique."
For the time being, the attitude of the French
Government and people was dignified and friendly
to England. There was, indeed, no reason for the
display of any unfriendly feeling. Whether it was
or was not wise that France should intervene
actively in the affairs of Egypt, might be an open
question. But one point was clear. The British
Government had done all in their power to ensure
French co-operation; their want of success in
obtaining it was due to the action of the French
Government and of the French people, speaking
through their constitutional representatives. When,
a little later, British military preparations were in a
more advanced stage, M. Grevy, the President of
the French Republic, told the British Chargd
d'Affaires at Paris "that it was not only out of
goodwill to England that he hoped for the prompt
success of our arms, it was also in the interest of
France. Pan-Islamism was a factor of great weight
in the future ; and he considered it of the highest
importance that there should be no doubt, even for
a moment, that Musulman or Arab troops could
not resist Europeans in the field. The action of
the Chamber had prevented the French Govern-
ment from giving practical proof of their desire for
our success, but he could assure me (in spite of
VOL. I X
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what some few might say to the contrary) that
France wished well to England in this matter, and
would sincerely rejoice at the success of her arms."
The Temps, which was supposed to be the organ
of the French Government, pointed out that, even
if England established herself in Egypt, as France
had done in Tunis, " la France y gagnerait autant
qu'elle." The main point was to keep out the
Turk. "Nous avons," the same newspaper said,
" des interets de diverses sortes en Egypte : la
liberte du Canal, le paiement de nos creanciers, la
securite de ceux de nos nationaux qui habitent le
pays—autant d'interets que ne menace aucunement
I'Angleterre, mais nous avons, sur le Nil, un interet
infiniment superieur a ceux-la ; c'est que le Turc
ne change pas sa domination nominale contre un
pouvoir reel, c'est que la puissance Ottomane, au
lieu d'y remporter un avantage, y re^oive un
echec."
Immediately after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir,
the French Minister for Foreign Affairs congratu-
lated the British Government on the victory, and
"expressed his sincere hope for the prompt and
complete success of the British forces in Egypt."
"There was," M. Duclerc said a day or two later
(September 15), "no doubt in France a certain
general spirit of Chauvinism (which personally he
did not share) which must have an outburst when
fighting is going on anywhere without France
being in it, and which was inclined to flare up at
any moment. He trusted, however, that Her
JNIajesty's Government knew the right value to
attach to the outpourings of some portion of the
Paris press. The sober good sense of France felt
that the success of England against Arabi was also
a solid gain to the rulers of Algeria."
In spite, however, of all this apparent cordiality,
it was evident that there were rocks ahead The
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force of circumstances had unfortunately severed
the entente cordiale between Enghxnd and France.
Internal dissension and mistrust of Germany had
paralysed French action at a critical moment.
But, whatever may have been the causes, the fact
that the French had lost their former footing of
equality in Egypt was not calculated to make them
easier to deal with when the final arrangements
to be adopted in the valley of the Nile came to
be discussed. Signs of the coming estrangement
were, indeed, already visible to observers behind
the scenes.
Foiled in their endeavours to obtain the co-
operation of the French, the British Government
turned to Italy. Italian jealousy had been set
ablaze at the prospect of British, and still more
of Anglo-French, intervention in Egypt. The
policy of England was attacked with virulence
by the Itahan press. The Anglo-French Control
had, it was said, brought about the ruin of
Egypt. A sedative was evidently required.
On July 24, Sir Augustus Paget, the British
Ambassador at Rome, was authorised " to join
with his French colleague in the application to be
made to the Italian Government to co-operate
with England and France in the steps to be taken
for the protection of the Suez Canal ; and he
was at the same time to express the great
satisfaction of Her INIajesty's Government should
Italy agree to be associated with Enghuid in
this important work." This was immediately
(July 25) followed by a further instruction to Sir
Augustus Paget to invite the co-operation of Italy
without waiting for action on the part of tlie
French Ambassador. On July 26, the British
Government went still farther. They no longer
limited their invitation to co-operation in order to
secure the safety of the Canal. Lord Granville
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informed the Italian Ambassador in London that
" Her JNIajesty's Government would also welcome
the co-operation of Italy in a movement in the
interior, which they were of opinion could no
longer be delayed, and for which they were making
active preparations." Lord DufFerin was also
instructed to state to the Conference that "while
reserving to themselves the liberty of action which
the pressure of events might render expedient and
necessary. Her JNIajesty's Government would be
glad to receive the co-operation of any Powers
who were ready to afford it."
At this moment, the Sultan, after much vacilla-
tion, had signified his readiness to send Turkish
troops to Egypt. On July 29, General Menabrea
informed Lord Granville that " under these circum-
stances, the Italian Government would be open to
a charge of contradiction if they were to negotiate
with a view to the intervention of any other
Power, and that it only remained for them, there-
fore, to express their thanks to the British Cabinet
for having entertained the idea that the friendship
of Italy for England might take the form of an
active co-operation." Although, therefore, these
negotiations produced no practical result, they had
the effect of calminij Italian irritation. Hence-
forward, Italian policy in Egypt was conducted on
lines which were consistently friendly to England.
In view of the restless ambition displayed at
times by the Italian Government and their desire,
which has frequently been manifested, to extend
their influence in the Mediterranean, the refusal of
Italy to co-operate with the British Government
in Egypt appears at first sight strange. It is not
pro) able that M. Mancini, who was then in power,
could have attached much importance to Turkish
promises, or that he could have believed to any
great extent in the efficacy of Turkish assistance.
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The real reasons for Italian inaction must be
sought elsewhere than in a desire to spare the
susceptibilities of the Porte. Something may,
without doubt, be attributed to a reluctance on
the part of Italy to separate herself from the
European concert. Something was also due to
the fact that, from a naval and military point of
view, the Italian Government was not ready to
take prompt action. But the main reason was
to be sought in the mistrust of France, which then
existed in Italy, and in fear of ultimate collision
with the French, which engendered a reluctance
to co-operate with them. Whatever may have
been the reasons, the decision of the Italian Govern-
ment was unquestionably a wise one. It relieved
Italy from a heavy responsibility. It removed
the risk of complications whether with France
or England. It left the care of Italian interests
in Egypt in the hands of a Power traditionally
and necessarily friendly to Italy, and it enabled
the Italian Government to devote themselves to
the study of internal questions.
Turning from Paris and Rome to Constanti-
nople, it will not be wholly unprofitable to trace
in some detail the tortuous windings of Turkish
diplomacy.
Immediately after the bombardment of Alex-
andria, the Sultan again brought forward his
favourite solution of the Egyptian question.
Tewfik Pasha should be deposed, and Halim
Pasha should be installed in his place. The latter
would be "an excellent ruler," His nomination
would "prevent the effusion of blood and satisfy
everybody." This proposal was summarily rejected
by the British Government, and the Sultan was
told that "he was only wasting time by putting
forward such suggestions."
Pressure was brought to bear on the Porte to
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join tlie Conference, with tlie result that on July
20, Said Pasha and Assim Pasha were named to
be the Turkish representativ^es.
After much hesitation, the Sultan consented to
send troops to Egypt under conditions which were
generally of a nature to keep Turkish intervention
under the control of the Powers of Euroj)e. On
July 26, Said Pasha informed the Conference that
troops were on the point of starting. At the
same time, he " expressed a hope that the military
intervention of the foreign Powers in Egypt would
no longer be necessary." In reply, Lord Granville
stated that " Her JNIajesty's Government would
accept the arrival and co-operation of Turkish
forces in Egypt, provided the character in which
they came was satisfactorily defined and cleared
from all ambiguity by previous declarations of
the Sultan."
It was evident that the conditions under which
Turkish co-operation was promised were far from
being free from ambiguity. Moreover, the Sultan
would not issue any Proclamation against Arabi.
The Grand Vizier told Lord Dufferin that he
" did not think it would be advisable to issue a
Proclamation until after the troops were landed."
Lord Dufferin replied that "if the Sultan desired
to co-operate with Her INIajesty's Government it
was necessary he should first clearly define the
attitude he intended to assume towards Arabi and
the rebellious faction."
Whilst the Sultan, acting apparently under the
erroneous impression that his assistance was in-
dispensable, was thus endeavouring to intervene
without the restraints imposed upon him by the
Powers, the reluctance to call in Turkish aid in
any shape was increasing, notably in Egypt. On
July 31, the Khedive told Sir Auckland Colvin
that he " was very apprehensive of Turkish
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intrigue, and trusted that the Turks would be
closely controlled."
Preparations were now made for the despatch of
5000 Turkish troops to Egypt, and on August 2,
Said Pasha undertook to submit to the Confer-
ence a draft Proclamation, denouncing Arabi as
a rebel. Besides the Proclamation, which was
necessary as a guarantee of the Sultan's intentions,
it was essential that, before Turkish troops landed
in Egypt, a JNIilitary Convention should be framed
indicating the manner in which they were to be
employed. On August 5, therefore. Lord DufFerin
informed Said and Assim Pashas, " that unless the
Sultan would issue a Proclamation of a satisfactory
character, and unless the Turkish Government
would consent to enter into a Military Convention
with Her Majesty's Government, the Ottoman
troops would not be allowed to land." At the
same time, the British Admiral was instructed, in
the event of any vessel with Turkish troops appear-
ing at an Egyptian port, to inform the officer in
command, "with the utmost courtesy, that the
despatch of Turkish troops must be premature and
due to some misunderstanding, and that his orders
were to request the officer commanding to proceed
to Crete or elsewhere, and to apply to the Turkish
Government for further instructions, as he was
precluded from inviting them to land in Egypt."
The Admiral was, at the same time, instructed " to
prevent their landing if they declined to comply
with his advice." The result of adopting this
firm attitude was that, at a meeting of the
Conference held on August 7, the Ottoman
Delegates made the following declaration : " The
Sublime Porte accepts the invitation for military
intervention in Egypt made to it by the Identic
Note of July 15, as well as the clauses and
conditions contained therein." At the same time,
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a promise was made to Lord Dufferin that a
Proclamation declaring Arabi to be a rebel should
be at once drawn up and communicated to
him. On August 9, the Proclamation was sent
to Lord Duft'erin. On the 10th, the text of
the Proclamation was accepted by the British
Government with some slight modifications.
In the never-ceasing jar of Palace intrigue, which
always goes on at Constantinople, the party which
was in favour of an understanding with England
appeared for the moment to have got the upper
hand. The question of the Proclamation having
been apparently settled, negotiations were set on
foot with a view to the arrangement of a Military
Convention between England and Turkey. A
draft Convention was communicated by Musurus
Pasha to Lord Granville on August 10. It pro-
vided that the British troops should not pass
beyond the zone which they then occupied in
Alexandria and its neighbourhood, that they should
not remain more than three months, that all
persons arrested should be handed over to the
Khedive's authorities, and that all further details
should be settled between the Ottoman Commis-
sioners and the British Commander-in-Chief on
the spot. It was obvious that these terms were
unacceptable. The Sultan now made an effort to
get the Military Convention before the Conference,
instead of treating separately with the British
Government. This attempt, however, failed. It
had, indeed, now become clear to everybody,
except the Sultan, that it was useless to prolong
the sittings of the Conference. At a meeting
held on August 14 "the Representatives of the
Powers unanimously expressed their opinion that
the moment had come to suspend the labours of
the Conference." The Sultan, however, who but
a short time previously had resisted the meeting of
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the Conference, and who had only been persuaded
with difficulty to allow an Ottoman representative
to attend its meetings, now gave a further instance
of the perversity which appears always to attend
Turkish diplomacy. He was anxious that the
Conference should continue to sit, thinking, with-
out doubt, that there would be a greater chance of
dissension amongst the l^owers if the Conference
were sitting, than would be the case if it suspended
its labours. The Ottoinan delegates were, there-
fore, instructed to say that "they did not share the
opinions of the Representatives of the Powers."
They reserved the right of fixing a date for the
next meeting of the Conference. The date was,
however, not fixed. The Conference was never
formally closed. It died a natural death.
Foiled in his attempt to bring the Military
Convention before the Conference, the Sultan fell
back on negotiations with the British Government.
On August 18, Lord Dufferin spent five hours in
discussing the matter with Said and Assim Pashas,
with the result that the Turkish delegates agreed
to a Convention subject to the approval of the
Sultan. On the following day, the Sultan rejected
the draft Convention, and made counter proposals
which Lord Dufferin declined to discuss. At the
same time, the Ottoman Government refused per-
mission for the embarkation at Smyrna of some
mules purchased for the use of the British troops
in Egypt. The action was characterised by Lord
Granville as " most unfriendly." In view of all
these circumstances. Lord Dufferin wrote to Said
Pasha and begged him "to consider as void and
non avenues whatever friendly assurances and ex-
pressions of confidence in relation to the Egyptian
question he might have addressed to him outside
the Conference."
After tlie lapse of a few days, the negotiations
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were renewed. IMunir Bey, an officer of the
Sultan's household, was sent to I^ord Duffiirin to
assure him "that it was from no unfriendly feeling
towards England that the ])rohibition against the
export of mules had been insisted upon, and that,
in order to show his friendly feelings. His JNIajesty
had ordered it to be removed." Lord DufFerin
" took the opportunity of again repeating to Munir
Bey some very earnest words of warning as to the
gravity of the situation."
On the same day (August 23), Lord Dufferin,
at the request of Said Pasha, paid him a visit
and discussed the question of the Convention
again with him and Assim Pasha. The result
of this discussion was that the Turkish delegates
agreed to all the clauses of the Military Conven-
tion proposed by the British Government, except
that the latter wished the Turkish troops to
disembark at Aboukir, Rosetta, and Damietta,
whilst the Sultan attached great importance to
the disembarkation taking place at Alexandria.
Lord Dufferin then alluded to the Proclamation
against Arabi, which, although the text had been
arranged between the two Governments, had not
yet been issued. What followed had best be
related in Lord Dufferin's words. *' Said Pasha,"
Lord Dufferin telegraphed, "then began with
much hesitation, and evidently against his will, to
suggest to me, in a roundabout manner, that the
Proclamation agreed upon should not be issued
at all in the first instance, but that another
Proclamation of a different character, containing
a final appeal to Arabi's sense of loyalty, should
precede it. This im]nident repudiation of his
former engagements made me so angry that I
got up and left the room, simply saying that it
was impossible to negotiate either a Convention
or anything else under such circumstances. On
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this, the two Pashas followed me downstairs and
into the street, accompanied by their secretaries
and dependants, calling to me that they withdrew
every word of what they had said, that I must
consider it altogether as non avenu, and that
they would never again allude to the proposal.
On concluding' our interview in a more amicable
mood, I told them that I could not sign any
Convention until the Proclamation had been
officially communicated to me in French and
Arabic, and that not a single Turkish soldier
would be allowed to land until it had been pro-
claimed in Egypt. The two Pashas seemed
heartily ashamed of themselves, and admitted
that they had been compelled to make the
proposal very much against their will." On this
interview being reported to London, Lord
Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin that
"Her INIajesty's Government were unable to
make any further changes in the provisions
of the proposed Military Convention." Lord
Dufferin was, at the same time, instructed to
intimate to the Porte that, " under the present
pressure of circumstances, it would not be well
for the dignity of either England or Turkey that
the negotiations should be indefinitely prolonged."
On August 24, Said and Assim Pashas paid a
further visit to Lord Dufferin, and endeavoured
to obtain some modifications in the draft Con-
vention. On the 25th, an incident occurred which
showed how little in earnest the Sultan was in
the friendly assurances given to the British
Government. Lord Dufferin telegraphed to Lord
Granville : " I regret to have to inform your
Lordship that although the Prime Minister and
the Foreign Minister had actually written a letter
ordering the release of the shepherds and muleteers
engaged by the contractors to proceed to Egypt
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ill charge of the live stock which had been shipped
at Odessa and Smyrna for the use of our army,
a subsequent order from the Palace annulled their
decision. A further order from the Palace has
threatened with imprisonment the artificers who
have undertaken to supply the contractors with
the six hundred pack-saddles we require."
The time during which Turkish co-operation
would have been useful, was now rapidly passing
away. On August 25, Sir Edward JNIalet tele-
graphed to Lord Granville : " The action of the
Sultan has been such as to prevent the possibility
of the rebels believing that the Sultan is really
anxious to assist us ; and thus the moral support,
which an alliance with Turkey might have given
us, cannot any longer be attained. Both Ch^rif
Pasha and Riaz Pasha have expressed confidentially
their extreme anxiety to obviate the difficulties
which the arrival of Turkish troops would entail,
and they are especially apprehensive of the com-
plications which may ensue hereafter from their
presence in the country."
On August 27, tlie Turkish delegates again
waited on Lord Dufferin and informed him that
they would unconditionally acce])t the Convention
in the terms to which the British Government
had agreed. Directly the Convention was signed,
the Proclamation denouncing Arabi as a rebel
would be published in Egypt and communicated
officially to the British Ambassador. It was
known that the Austrian Government was anxious
that England and Turkey should come to terms.
It was more in deference to the views of that
Government than for any other reason, that, on
August 28, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord
Dufferin authorising him to agree to the Conven-
tion on the following conditions : That the
animals, supplies, and persons for the British
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expedition should be immediately released, and
that a promise should be given by the Porte to
assist in forwarding the same to Egypt ; that an
assurance should be given that no furtlier impedi-
ments would be offered hereafter ; that the
Proclamation declaring Arabi a rebel should be
issued immediately ; and that British officers, who
should be sent either to Crete (where the Turkish
force was then collected) or to Constantinople,
as the Porte might prefer, should concert with
Turkish officers as to the military operations to
be undertaken. The matter appeared now at last
to be settled. On August 31, Lord Granville
telegraphed to this effect to Sir Edward Malet.
On the same day, Said Pasha made an earnest
appeal to Lord Dufferin that the British Govern-
ment should " allow the disembarkation of Turkish
troops to take place at Alexandria, on condition
that the troops should merely file through the
town, and march at once to Aboukir." The
Sultan, Lord Dufferin said, was "on his knees."
" I would venture," Lord Dufferin added, '* most
earnestly to urge Her Majesty's Government to
acquiesce in His Majesty's prayers." In spite of
the little faith Lord Dufferin had in Turkish
sincerity, he thought that a real chance of
establishing good relations with the Porte had
now presented itself. " The Sultan promised to
do everything Her Majesty's Govermnent desired
in regard to the Proclamation, and to ensure an
altered tone in the press." On September 1, Lord
Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin that his
recent message "altered the situation," but that
the British Government could not agree to dis-
embarkation at Alexandria. They " would prefer
that the landing should take place in the Suez
Canal." On September 2, I^ord Dufferin was
able to telegraph the final text of the Convention
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to Lord Granville, and to state that it was ready
for signature. On September 3, Lord Dufferin
saw the Sultan. "His Majesty confirmed, in
a perfectly explicit manner, all the propositions
made by Said Pasha." The Proclamation, the
Sultan said, was being translated into Arabic
and would be communicated to Lord Dufferin
immediately. On September 4, Lord Dufferin
was authorised to sign the JNLilitary Convention
as soon as the Proclamation against Arabi was
published.
Strong representations were again made by the
Khedive and Cherif Pasha against the landing of
Turkish troops in Egypt. Nevertheless, Lord
Granville decided to adhere to his arrangement
with the Sultan. This was all the more loyal on
the part of the British Government, inasmuch as
evidence was forthcoming to show that even at
this late hour the Sultan contemplated treating
with Arabi behind the backs both of the British
Government and the Khedive.
By September 6, the Proclamation was ready
and was published in the newspapers before being
communicated to Lord Dufferin. It was found
that the text did not tally with the draft to
which the British Government had agreed. Lord
Dufferin thereupon telegraphed to Lord Granville :
*' I at once stated to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs that, in presence of such an inconceivable
act of bad faith as the publication without warning
of a different document from that which had been
formally agreed upon between the two Govern-
ments, I must decline signing the Convention
;
that I should report what had happened to my
Government ; and that I should not be surprised
if it declined to continue negotiations. Said
Pasha fully admitted that he had been guilty of
an act of what he called 'heedlessness,' but he
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said that the fault had been cominitted through
an excess of zeal, as the denunciation of Anibi
in the new Proclamation was still stronger than
in the old. He undertook . . . that an official
correction of what had been published in the
Vakit should be inserted in that paper. He
begged me to do my best to mitigate the indigna-
tion, which I led him to understand this intolerable
mode of procedure would arouse in the mind
of the British Government." On September 10,
Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin
accepting some of the changes made in the Pro-
clamation, but objecting to others. Sir Edward
Malet was, at the same time, informed that, in
consequence of the difficulties which had been
raised about the Proclamation, the signature of
the Military Convention had been deferred. On
the same day (September 10), the Turkish Pleni-
potentiaries met Lord Dufferin, bringing with
them copies of a draft Convention and of a
new Proclamation. Even at this late hour,
however, further difficulties were raised. Said
Pasha explained to Lord Dufferin " with much
earnestness " that it was most desirable that the
words " se rendront a Port Said," which had been
struck out of the Convention, should be maintained.
After much discussion, it was settled that the words
should only be interpreted in the following sense,
viz. that the Turkish ships should "direct their
course to Port Said, in order to enter the Canal."
Lord Granville was asked by telegraph to agree
to this modification.
At the moment when the Porte was pressing
for the signature of the Convention, another act
was committed which showed how little confidence
could be placed in the assurances of the Sultan.
A number of porters, who had been engaged at
Lord Wolseley's request for service with the
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army in Eoypt, were imprisoned by order of the
Porte. They were only released after I^ord
Dufferin had made a strong representation on
the subject. Indeed, Lord Dufferin was at one
time authorised to break off all diplomatic relations
with the Porte.
On the afternoon of September 13, Lord
Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin that he
might sign the })roposed Military Convention. On
the morning of the same day, however, the battle
of Tel-el- Kebir was fought. The French Govern-
ment, who had always looked upon the presence
of the Turks in Egypt with great disfiivour, were
the first to suggest that a Military Convention
with the Porte was now no longer necessary.
The Khedive also told Sir Edward Malet that
"if anything could enhance the value of the
victory, it was that it removed all pretext for
the signature of a Convention with Turkey. He
said that he looked back with dismay at the
danger which Egypt would have incurred, if the
Sultan, through the presence of his troops, had
obtained a footing in the couiitry." Under these
circumstances, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord
Dufferin that he "presumed that the emergency
having passed, His INIajesty the Sultan would
not now consider it necessary to send troops to
Egypt."
Before this message could arrive, the Sultan sent
for Lord Dufferin and kept him eleven hours at
the Palace discussing a variety of further changes,
which he wished to have made both in the Con-
vention and the Proclamation. Finally, matters
were brought to a close on September 18 by the
despatch of the following telegram from Lord
Granville to Lord Dufferin: "Her Majesty's
Government greatly appreciate the fact that a sub-
stantial accord exists between the Government of
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the Sultan and that of Her Majesty on the
Egyptian Question, and especially as to tlie rebellion
of Arabi Pasha and the position of His Highness
the Khedive. The occasion of the proposed Mili-
tary Convention between this country and Turkey
having now passed away, Her Majesty's Govern-
ment rejoice that it is no longer necessary to dis-
cuss the difficulties which have been raised by His
Majesty. Your Excellency is, therefore, authorised
to convey to the Sultan, in the most courteous
terms, the permission given you to drop the negotia-
tions on this question."
In summing up the history of these events.
Lord DufFerin said : "I can only reiterate that,
from first to last, I have used every means at my
disposal to induce the Turkish Government to
move quickly, and to settle the matter out of
hand. . . . Their conduct was so obviously contrary
to their interests, that Europe had begun to mis-
judge the situation. While ruining my reputation
as an honest man, they were enhancing it as a
diplomatist, for it had begun to be believed that
the delay in signing the Convention could not
possibly result from their own incomprehensible
shortsightedness, but must have been artificially
created by the Machiavellian astuteness of the
English Ambassador."
Lord Granville also summed up the Egyptian
negotiations in a despatch to Lord Dufferin, dated
October 5, 1882, which concluded with the follow-
ing words : " This summary of events will show
that the isolated action which has been forced upon
Her Majesty's Government was not of their seek-
ing. From the first moment when it became
apparent that order could not be re-established in
Egypt without the exercise of external force, they
maintained that that force should be supplied by
the Sultan as Sovereign of Egypt. They proposed
VOL. I Y
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this solution to the Conference, and Your Excel-
lency lost no opportunity of urging it upon His
Majesty and his advisers. Our efforts to induce
them to intervene in Egypt, under conditions which
would satisfy Europe, proved unavailing, and when
it became necessary to make immediate provision
for the safety of the Suez Canal, we prepared to
undertake this duty jointly with France, with the
co-operation of any other Powers who might be
prepared to join us. We addressed a special invita-
tion to Italy to take part in the arrangements.
The progress of the rebellion having destroyed the
authority of the Khedive, and reduced Egypt to a
state of anarchy, we invited France and Italy to
act with us in suppressing it ; and when those
Powers declined to do so, we still urged the Porte
to send troops, insisting only on such conditions as
were indispensable to secure unity of action. But,
before the Turkish Government carried out its
agreement to sign the Military Convention, the
success of our arms had put an end to the insur-
rection."
The details of these negotiations have been
stated at some length because they afford an
admirable instance of the diplomatic procedure
ordinarily adopted by the Ottoman Government.
The Turks, as a nation, possess many fine, though
perhaps somewhat barbaric qualities. But a species
of paralysis appears to affect most Turks in high
positions. The duplicity and shortsightedness of
the Ottoman Government come out strongly in
every incident of these negotiations.
It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of
the military operations by wliicli the insurrection
in Egypt was crushed. They have been described
in a book published by the British War Office,
and in other works. It will be sufficient to say
that Lord Wolseley arrived at Alexandria on
CH. XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR 323
August 13. Previous to this, some desultory
operations had taken place in the neighbourhood
of Alexandria. Lord Wolseley decided to move on
Cairo by way of Ismailia.^ The Canal was seized
in spite of the querulous cries of M. de Lesseps.
On September 13, the Egyptian army was totally
routed at Tel-el-Kebir.^ A small force of cavahy
was at once pushed on to Cairo, which was captured
without a blow being struck. Kinglake's prophecy
had been fulfilled. "The Englishman"—in the
person of Major Watson, R.E., with two squadrons
of the 4th Dragoon Guards and a detachment of
Mounted Infantry, who occupied the Citadel on
the evening of September 14—"planted a firm
foot on the banks of the Nile, and sat in the seats
of the faithful." Arabi and his associates, who
throughout the whole affair do not appear to have
displayed a single quality worthy of respect or
admiration, surrendered.^
It is always a somew^hat unprofitable proceeding
to speculate on what might have been in politics,
but I cannot close this portion of the narrative
without hazarding a conjecture as to whether any
foreign occupation of Egypt could have been
avoided. Mistakes were, without doubt, com-
mitted. The true nature of the Arabi revolt was
' Arabi was warned by Mr. Wilfrid Blunt that he would probably be
attacked from the side of Ismailia. " I believe," Mr. Bluut writes
{Secret History, p. 228), " that it was in consequence of this hint that the
lines of Tel-el-Kebir were be^un to be traced by Arabi."
'^ At this time, I was in India. On Aujjust 22, Lord Wolseley wrote
to me from Ismailia: "I hope to hit Arabi very hard about tlie 10th
or 12th of September at latest." Lord W^olseley was only twenty-four
hours out in his prediction.
3 Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, in spite of his sympathy with Arabi, says, in
.speaking of the fact that he did not attempt to handle the Ko-yp+ian
troops in the field : " His abstention on this head has been attributed
by liis detractors to physical cowardice, and it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that there was some truth in this."
—
Secret History, etc.,
p. 385.
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misunderstood.^ It was more than a mere military
mutiny. It partook in some degree of the nature
of a bona fide national movement. It was not
solely, or, indeed, mainly directed against Euro-
peans and European interference in Egyptian
affairs, although anti-European prejudice exercised
a considerable influence on the minds of the leaders
of the movement. It was, in a great degree, a
movement of the Egyptians against Turkish rule.
Although previous to the issue of the Joint Note
some hope might have been entertained of guiding
the movement, and although I am distinctly of
opinion that an effort to guide it should have been
made, it must be admitted that the chances of failure
predominated over those of success. Leaving out
of account questions of detail, and speaking with
some knowledge of the various classes of Egyptian
society, I ask myself, where were the elements for
the formation of any stable government to have
been found when, in pursuance of the policy of
" Egypt for the Egyptians," there had been elimi-
nated, as would probably have been the case, first,
the Europeans, with all their intelligence, wealth,
and governing power ; secondly, the Khedive in
whose place some illiterate Egyptian, of the type
of Arabi or ISIahmoud Sami, would have been
appointed ; thirdly, the Syrians and Armenians,
with all their industry and capacity for sedentary
employment ; fourthly, the nativ^e aristocracy,
largely composed of Turks, who were at that time
the ])rincipal large landowners in the country, and
amongst whom, in spite of many defects, the
habits and traditions of a governing class still
* Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, who accompanied Lord Dufferiu
to rVypt and who had exceptionally ffood opportunities for forming an
opinion on this subject, says : " 'I'liere can be no longer any reasonable
doubt that the English Government totally misconceived the real
nature of the Egyptian revolutionary movement."
—
Eyypt and thi
Eijiiptian Question, p. 3Go.
CM. XVII TEL-EL-KEBIR 325
lingered ; when, in fact, the nationalists and muti-
neers had got rid of all the classes, who then
governed, and who for several centuries had governed
the country ? The residue would have consisted,
first, of the mass of the fellaheen population, who
were sunk in the deepest ignorance, who cared little
by whom they were governed provided they were
not overtaxed, and whose main idea throughout the
Arabi movement was to tear up the bonds of the
Greek or Syrian usurer ; secondly, of a certain
number of small proprietors, village Sheikhs,
Omdehs, etc., who constituted the squirearchy of
the country, and who, in point of knowledge and
governing capacity, were but little removed from
the fellaheen ; thirdly, of the Copts, whose religion
would certainly, sooner or later, have prevented
them from acting in complete harmony with the
Arabists, and who, even if tolerated by the
Mohammedan population, could neither have ob-
tained any influence over the Mohammedans, nor,
even if that influence had been obtained, could
have used it to the general advantage of the
country ; fourthly, of the hierarchy, consisting prin-
cipally of the Ulema of the El-Azhar Mosque.
The latter, though numerically the smallest, was by
far the most important and influential of the four
classes to which allusion is made above. The spirit
which animated them would, in the first instance
at all events, have been infused into the masses
below. They would have been the Jacobins of the
movement, which, whether nationalist or military,
would certainly have been reactionary in so far
as it would have tended to destroy whatever germs
of civilisation had been implanted into Egypt.
Like their prototypes in France, they would, had
no strong hand intervened, have maintained their
supremacy until, possibly after an acute and disas-
trous period of tidnsition, their incapacity for
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government had been clearly demonstrated. The
corruption, misgovernment, and oppression, which
would have prevailed, if the influence of this class
had become predominant, would probably have
been greater than any to which Egypt had been
exposed at previous periods. An attempt would
have been made to regulate, not only the govern-
ment, but also the social life of the country upon
those principles of the Mohammedan faith which
are most antiquated, obsolete, and opposed to the
commonplace ideas of modern civilisation.
Egypt may now almost be said to form part of
Europe. It is on the high road to the far East.
It can never cease to be an object of interest to all
the Powers of Europe, and especially to England.
A numerous and intelligent body of Europeans and
of non-Egyptian Orientals have made Egypt their
home. European capital to a large extent has
been sunk in the country. The rights and privileges
of Europeans are jealously guarded, and, moreover,
give rise to complicated questions, which it requires
no small amount of ingenuity and technical know-
ledge to solve. Exotic institutions have sprung
up and have taken root in the country. The
Capitulations impair those rights of internal
sovereignty which are enjoyed by the rulers or
legislatures of most States. The population is
heterogeneous and cosmopolitan to a degree almost
unknown elsewhere. Although the prevailing faith
is that of Islam, in no country in the world is a
greater variety of religious creeds to be found
amongst important sections of the community.
In addition to these peculiarities, which are of a
normal character, it has to be borne in mind that
in 1882 the army was in a state of mutiny; the
Treasury was bankrupt ; every branch of the
administration had been dislocated ; the ancient
and arbitrary method, under which the country
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had for centuries been governed, had received a
severe blow, whilst, at the same time, no more
orderly and law-abiding form of government had
been inaugurated to take its place.
Is it probable that a Government composed of
the rude elements described above, and led by
men of such poor ability as Arabi and his co-
adjutors, would have been able to control a com-
plicated machine of this nature ? Were the
Sheikhs of the El-Azhar Mosque likely to
succeed where Tewfik Pasha and his Ministers,
who were men of comparative education and
enlightenment, acting under the guidance and
inspiration of a first-class European Power, only
met with a modified success after years of patient
labour ? There can be but one answer to these
questions. Sentimental politicians may consider
that the quasi-national character of Arabi's move-
ment gives it a claim to their sympathies, but
others who are not carried away by sentiment
may reasonably maintain that the fact of its having
been a quasi-national movement w^as one of the
reasons which foredoomed it to failure ; for, in
order to justify its national character, it had to
run counter, not only to the European, but also
to the foreign Eastern elements of Egyptian govern-
ment and society. Neither is it in the nature of
things that any similar movement should, under
the present conditions of Egyptian society, meet
with any better success. The full and immediate
execution of a policy of " Egypt for the Egyptians,"
as it was conceived by the Arabists in 1882, was,
and still is impossible.
History, indeed, records some very radical
changes in the forms of government to which a
State has been subjected w ithout its interests being
absolutely and permanently shipwrecked. But it
may be doubted whether any instance can be
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quoted of a sudden tmnsfer of power in any
civilised or semi-civilised community to a class so
ignorant as the pure Egyptians, such as they were
in the year 1882. These latter have, for centuries
past, been a subject race. Persians, Greeks,
Romans, Arabs from Arabia and Baghdad, Cir-
cassians, and finally, Ottoman Turks, have suc-
cessively ruled over Egypt, but we have to go
back to the doubtful and obscure precedents of
Pharaonic times to find an epoch when, possibly,
Egypt was ruled by Egyptians. Neither, for the
present, do they appear to possess the qualities
which would render it desirable, either in their
own interests, or in those of the civilised world
in general, to raise them at a bound to the category
of autonomous rulers with full rights of internal
sovereignty.
If, however, a foreign occupation was inevitable,
or nearly inevitable, it remains to be considered
whether a British occupation was preferable to
any other. From the purely Egyptian point of
view, the answer to this question cannot be
doubtful. The intervention of any European
Power was preferable to that of Turkey. The
intervention of one European Power was pre-
ferable to international intervention. The special
aptitude shown by Englishmen in the government
of Oriental races pointed to England as the most
effective and beneficent instrument for the gradual
introduction of European civilisation into Egypt.
An Anglo-French or an Anglo-Italian occupation,
from both of which we narrowly and also acci-
dentally escaped, would have been detrimental to
Egyptian interests and would ultimately have
caused friction, if not serious dissension, between
England on the one side and France or Italy on
the other.
The only thing to be said in favour of Turkish
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nlerveiition is that it would have reheved England
from the responsibiUty of intervening. It has been
shown in tlie course of this narrative that, hi the
early stages of the proceedings, the policy of the
two Western Powers, which was guided by the
anti-Turkish sentiments prevalent in France, was
not of a nature to invite or encourage Turkish
co-operation. At a later period, the shortsighted-
ness of the Sultan was such as to cause the Porte
to commit political suicide in so far as decisive
Turkish action was concerned. Perhaps it was
well that it did so, for it is highly probable that
armed Turkish intervention in Egypt, accompanied,
as it might well have been, by misgovernment,
paltry intrigue, corruption, and administrative and
financial confusion, would only have been the
prelude to further, and possibly more serious inter-
national complications.
By a process of exhausting all other expedients,
we arrive at the conclusion that armed British
intervention was, under the special circumstances of
the case, the only possible solution of the diffi-
culties which existed in 1882. Probably also it
was the best solution. The arguments against
British intervention, indeed, were sufficiently
obvious. It was easy to foresee that, with a
British garrison in Egypt, it would be difficult that
the relations of England either with France or
Turkey should be cordial. With France especially,
there would be a danger that our relations might
become seriously strained. Moreover, we lost the
advantages of our insular position. The occupation
of Egypt necessarily dragged England to a certain
extent within the arena of Continental politics.
In the event of war, the presence of a British
garrison in Egypt would possibly be a source of
weakness rather than of strength. Our position in
Egypt placed us in a disadvantageous diplomatic
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position, for any Power, witli whom we had a
difference of opinion about some non- Egyptian
question, was at one time able to retaliate by
opposing our Egyptian policy. The complicated
rights and privileges possessed by the various
Powers of Europe in Egypt facilitated action of
this nature.
There can be no doubt of the force of these
arguments. The answer to them is that it was
impossible for Great Britain to allow the troops
of any other European Power to occupy Egypt.
When it became apparent that some foreign occu-
pation was necessary, that the Sultan would not
act save under conditions which were impossible
of acceptance, and that neither French nor Italian
co-operation could be secured, the British Govern-
ment acted with promptitude and vigour. A great
nation cannot throw off the responsibilities which
its past history and its position in the world have
imposed upon it. English history affords other
examples of the Government and people of England
drifting by accident into doing what was not only
right but was also most in accordance with British
mterests. Ael 8e o-KOTrelv fiev Kol irpdrreLv ael ra hiKaia,
av/xTrapaTijpelv 8' oVti)? a/xa zeal (TUficpepovTa earai ravra}
Such was the advice Demosthenes gave to his
fellow-countrymen. In spite of some mistakes of
detail, it was on this sound principle that, broadly
speaking, the British Government acted in dealing
with E^j-yptian affairs in 1882.
* Oration For the Megalopolitan$.
CHAPTER XVIll
THE DUFFERIN MISSION
September 1882-August 1883
British policy—Trial of Arabi—Resig'nation of Riaz Pasha—Exile of
political prisouers—Courts-martial—The Alexandria Indemnities
—The abolition of the Dual Control—Rupture of the Anglo-
French understanding—Lord Dutferin's Report—My arrival in
Egypt
Kinglake's prophecy was that the Enghshman
would phmt his foot firmly in the valley of the
Nile. It had so far been fulfilled that the English-
man had planted his foot, but he had not planted it
firmly. Hardly, indeed, had his foot been planted
when, fearful of what he had done, he struggled
to withdraw it. A few hours after the battle of
Tel-el-Kebir had been fought. Sir Edward INIalet
was instructed to send to London "as soon as
possible, suggestions as to army, finance, and
administration for the future." Lord Dufferin
was, at the same time, informed that " Her
Majesty's Government contemplated shortly com-
mencing the withdrawal of the British troops from
Egypt."
The British Government were, at a subsequent
period, blamed for not having at once proclaimed
a Protectorate. A petition signed by 2(i00 Euro-
peans residing at Alexandria was presented to
Lord Dufferin in favour of a permanent British
occupation of Egypt. The Egyptians generally
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also viewed British intervention with unmixed
satisfaction.
It cannot be doubted that if the position of
the British Government had been more strongly
asserted directly after the occupation, many of the
obstacles which have stood in the path of the
reformer would have been swept away. On the
other hand, the adoption of a policy of this sort
would have constituted a breach of faith with
Europe. It is extremely doubtful whether it would
have met with adequate support in England. It
may be said, therefore, that the execution of this
policy was, for all practical purposes, both un-
desirable and impossible.
Moreover, it is to be observed that the mere
proclamation of a Protectorate would not in any
degree have impaired the rights and privileges of
Europeans resident in Egypt,^ and it was these
which so much hampered the progress of reform in
the early days of the occupation. In order to
ensure this result, annexation, either permanent or
temporary, would have been necessary.
At the same time, it must be admitted that the
situation in Egypt was misunderstood both by the
British Government and by British public opinion of
^ The French Government established a Protectorate over Tunis in
1884, but subsequent ne^otintions with the Powers were necessary
before the re'^ime of the Capitulations could be modified. The diffi-
culties whicli the existence of the Capitulations threw in the way of
the French administration of Tunis have been described by a very
competent authority, who wrote under the pseudonym of P. H.X., in
the following terms:—"Les difficulte's que devait faire cesser I'organi-
sation de la reforme financiere et de notre controle sont relativement
peu de chose aupres des complications inextricables et des abus que la
multiplicite comme la toute-puissance des juridictions Europeennes en
Tunisie avaient fait naitre. Sous pre'texte de proteger les Europe'ens
contre I'arbitraire et le desordre du Gouvernement Beylical, les Capitu-
lations leur assuraient des privileges qui s'etaient etendus demesure-
ment a mesure que I'autorite locale s'atfaiblissait ; ce qui n'etait a
I'origine qu'uiie exception etait devenue plus fort que la regie, en sorta
que I'administration indigene, eut-elle ete animee des meilleures inten-
tions du monde, s'etait trouvee peu a peu completement paralyse'e"
{La Politique Franfuiae en Tunisie, p. 360).
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the time. Moreover, party politics cast their baneful
spell over the Ell^lish proceedings, and obscured
the real issues at stake. Two alternative policies
were open to the British GovernmenL These were,
first, the policy of speedy evacuation ; and, secondly,
the policy of reform. It was not sufficiently
understood that the adoption of one of these
policies was wholly destructive of the other. The
withdrawal of the British troops connoted severity
in the treatment of the rebels, the establishment of
some rough prsetorian guard composed of foreigners,
who would have quelled all disturbance with a high
hand, the re-establishment of an arbitrary rule, and
the abandonment of all attempts to introduce the
various reforms which follow in the train of
European civilisation. On the other hand, the
adoption of a policy of reform connoted an
indefinite prolongation of the British occupation,
and an increase of European interference, without
which no progress was possible.
It was natural and praiseworthy that public
opinion in England should have been opposed to
handing the Egyptians over to the uncontrolled
rule of the Turkish Pashas, but it was character-
istic of the want of consistency, which so often
distinguishes English politics, that the same people
who cried out most loudly for control over the
Pashas, were also those who most strenuously
opposed the adoption of the only method by which
Pashas could be effectively controlled. They
wished to withdraw the British troops, and, at the
same time, to secure all those advantages which
could only be obtained by their continued presence
in the country. Party politicians had not failed
to dwell constantly and in condemnatory terms
on the number of Europeans employed in Egypt.
It was a good ad captandum cry, for at the time
the British public did not appreciate the extent
334 MODERN EGYPT ft. n
to which European agency was necessary if a
policy of reform was to be adopted. The
attempt to attain two objects, which were irrecon-
cihible one with the other, naturally rendered the
policy of the British Government vacillating and
uncertain.
This vacillation showed itself immediately after
the occupation in the treatment accorded to Arabi
and the other leaders of the rebellion. There could
be no doubt that, as a subject of the Khedive,
Arabi had been guilty of treason and rebellion,
and that, as an officer of the army, he had been
guilty of mutiny. Had he been tried by Court-
martial and shot directly after he was taken prisoner,
no injustice would have been done. On the other
hand, he was regarded by some few Englishmen as
a hero, and, from a purely political point of view, it
was more than questionable whether it was wise to
elevate him to the rank of a martyr. INIoreover, it
is not easy, as a matter of public morality, to state
precisely at what point the sacred right of revolu-
tion begins or ends, or to say at what stage a
disturber of the peace passes from a common
rioter, who is an enemy to society, to the rank of
a leader in a political movement set on foot for
the attainment of ends wliich command at least a
certain degree of sympathy. The commonplace
standard of success is not a bad test by which to
decide this question. It is difficult to justify
unsuccessful rebellion, or to maintain that those
who have been instrumental in brinffing it about
should not suffer the extreme consequences of
their own conduct. Even from this point of view,
however, it was not easy to decide on Arabi's fate.
Had he been left alone, there cannot be a doubt
that he would have been successful. His want of
success was due to British interference. The
British Goverinnent had, tliercfore, a perfect right
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to decide on his fate. Their decision could not be
doubtful. British public opinion condemned the
execution of prisoners for political offences, and
the British Government would naturally follow
public opinion on a point of this sort. " Her
Majesty's Government," Lord Granville wrote,
" were disposed to recommend to the Khedive
to adopt the more humane practice of modern
times, and to exercise his prerogative of mercy,"
if it were found that Arabi could not be charged
with any other crimes than those of treason and
rebellion.^ It was, from the first, doubtful whether
any *' crime which, according to the practice of
civilised nations, called for the extreme penalty
of the law" could be brought home to Arabi, and
it was certainly not worth while to prolong the
proceedings, and thus keep the country in a
ferment, whilst a lengthy inquiry into this point
was going on. The best plan would have been
for the British Government to have decided at
once that Arabi and his principal associates should
be exiled.
Unfortunately, this was not done. The fiction
was maintained that the fate of the prisoners
depended, not on the strong Government which
had suppressed the revolt, but on the weak
Government which had proved itself powerless
to suppress it. Arabi and his fellow -prisoners
were made over to the Khedive. There miaht
have been some slight justification for the adoption
of this course if the cession had been real, and if,
in view of the early withdrawal of the British
troops which was then contemplated, the British
^ The following statement, for which, of course, there is not the
smallest foundation, is one amongst very numerous illustrations which
might be given of the little value to be attached to Mr. AVilfrid Blunt's
testimony on Egyptian affairs. He writes {Secret History, p. 44;^) tbat
"Gladstone had made up his mind that Arabi should be executed no
less than had the Foreign Office."
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Government had stood aside whilst, under the
protection of British bayonets, the Turkish party
wreaked its vengeance on the Arabists, and struck
te. ror hito the hearts of future revolutionists.
But this was obviously both undesirable and im-
possible. The cession was, therefore, made unreal.
The Khedive was to have the appearance of
dealinir with Ariibi, but he was not to move a
step without the consent of the British Govern-
ment. JNIore than this, when the Egyptian
Government established a court to try Arabi,
it was thought, and, without doubt, rightly
thought, that the trial would be a mockery.
Hence arose an unseemly wrangle, in which the
Egyptian Government endeavoured to create a
condition of things which would increase the
cliances of Arabi being condemned to death,
whilst the British Government insisted on a fair
trial conducted in public, and with European
counsel to defend the prisoners. The Egyptian
Government were, of course, obliged to yield.
After long discussions, the conditions under which
the trial was to be conducted were settled. On
November 7, Lord Dufferin, who had been deputed
on a special mission to Egypt, arrived in Cairo.
He saw at a glance that it was essential to bring
tlie Arabi proceedings to a close. A preliminary
in(juiry had rendered it clear that no charge,
except that of rebellion, could be established
against Arabi. Lord DufFerin, therefore, arranged
that Arabi should plead guilty to the charge of
rebellion, that he should be sentenced to death,
and that, inunediately after the sentence was
pronounced, it should be connnuted into perpetual
exile. This arrangement was carried out. Several
places were suggested to which Arabi might be
sent. It was finally settled that he should go to
Ceylon. A special ship was chartered, and he
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and his six principal associates left Suez on
December 26.^
In the meanwhile, Riaz Pasha resigned his
position in the Ministry, ostensibly on the ground
of ill- health. It was, however, well known that
the real reason for his resignation was that he could
not reconcile himself to the idea of Arabi having
escaped capital punishment. Neither would it be
fair to ascribe this attitude to vindictive feelings.
Without doubt, Riaz Pasha thought that the
execution of Arabi was not merely an act of
justice but a State necessity.
In a report addressed to Lord Granville on
December 12, Lord Dufferin described the effect
produced in Egypt by the commutation of the
capital sentence on Arabi and his principal followers.
The Europeans and the Pashas condemned the
leniency with which they had been treated. On
the other hand, the mass of the people approved of
the commutation of the sentences.
In addition to the leaders of the rebellion, about
150 persons were condemned, some to exile from
Egypt, and some to residence in the provinces
under police supervision for various terms. On
January 1, 1883, a Decree was issued granting an
amnesty to all other prisoners charged with political
offences.
"The debris of the late rebellion having thus
been cleared away," Lord Dufferin expressed a
hope that "the stage was cleared for reconstruc-
tion." Unfortunately, however, some months were
yet to elapse before the whole of these debris were
fully cleared away. The prisons were crowded with
persons who were charged with murder, pillage,
and arson. At Tanta, from seventy to eighty
Christians, mostly Greeks and Syrians, had been
massacred, on July 13, by a mob of Moslem
' lu 1901, Arabi was allowed to return to Egypt.
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fanatics under circumstances of great brutality.
On the same day, eight Italians had been killed at
Mehallet-Kebir, and, on July 14, fourteen Christians
and one Jew had been killed at Damanhour and
its neighbourhood. In all these places, the houses
and shops of the Christians had been pillaged. It
was impossible to allow crimes of this nature to
remain unpunished. Commissions were, therefore,
appointed to make preliminary inquiries and to send
accused persons, against whom a prima facie case
had been established, for trial before a Court-martial.
There was little risk of injustice being committed.
" The persons dealt with by the Commissioners,"
Lord Dufferin pertinently remarked, "and by the
Court-martial were Musulman Egyptians accused
of murdering and pillaging Christians, principally
European Christians. My experience of the East
has long since convinced me that an Oriental court
of justice may be safely trusted not to strain either
law or evidence when the cause lies between a
Musulman culprit and his Christian victim. During
all the time I was in Egypt, Major MacDonald ^
was principally preoccupied in noting the tendency
of the Court to unduly favour the prisoners ; and
Your Lordship may rest assured that whatever
miscarriages of justice may have occurred have
been occasioned by the escape of the guilty, and
not by the condemnation of any innocent persons."
These were wise words, but the advice of the im-
partial and experienced diplomatist was unheeded
by party politicians in England, who saw in the
Egyptian trials an opportunity for attacking the
Government of the day. The fate of Suleiman
Sami, a miscreant who was largely responsible for
the burning of Alexandria and who was deservedly
1 Major (subsequently Sir Claude) MacDonald was Lord Dufferiu's
Military Attache'. He was charged with the duty of watching the
proceedings of the Court-martial.
CH. XVIII THE DUFFERIN MISSION 339
hanged, attracted a special degree of fictitious
sympathy, and was characterised by Lord Randolph
Churchill in the House of Commons as " the
grossest and vilest judicial murder that has ever
stained the ainials of Oriental justice." Both
the British Government and the authorities in
Egypt, however, stood firm in the face of these
attacks. In a few cases, capital punishment was
inflicted. Others were condemned to various terms
of penal servitude and imprisonment. A large
number of accused persons were released after a
preliminary inquiry. Eventually, on October 9,
1883, a Decree was issued abolishing the Special
Commissions and the Court-martial.
The punishment of the principal offenders was
not the only burning question which the rebellion
left in its wake. A large amount of valuable
property had been destroyed at Alexandria. After
some lengthy negotiations, a Decree appointing an
International Commission to assess the claims was
issued on January 13, 1883. The delay hi the
settlement of this question caused great irritation
and discontent.
The final rupture of the Anglo-French entente,
which followed immediately after the occupa-
tion, increased the difficulties of the situation.
On September 20, M. Duclerc told the British
Charge d'Affaires in Paris, "that he thought
it would be in the interest of England to give at
an early date some notion of what her future
intentions were with regard to Egypt." It was
impossible at that moment to state, save in the
most general terms, what were the intentions
of England as regards Egypt, and it soon became
apparent that the only ])()int to which for the
moment the French Govenunent attached any real
imp(irtance, was the contiiuiance of the Anglo-
French Control, as it existed previous to the
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occupation. The Egyptian Government, m the
other hand, wished tlie institution to be abolished
on the ground that its dual nature and semi-
political character had caused great inconvenience.
Public opinion in England pronounced strongly
in favour of its abolition. In spite of considerable
pressure exerted by France, the British Govern-
ment wisely stood firm and declined to accede to
the French wishes on this point. The presidency
of the Commission of the Debt was offered to
France, but was declined on the ground that it was
not " consistent with the dignity of France to
accept as an equivalent for the abolition of the
Control, a position which was simply that of
cashier." Eventually, after some sharp diplomatic
skirmishing, the negotiations were dropped, and
the French Government "resumed its liberty of
action in Egypt." From that moment, until the
signature of the Anglo-French Agreement in 1904,
French action in Egypt was more or less per-
sistently hostile to England.
On January 3, 1883, Lord Granville addressed
a circular to the Powers in which he expressed
himself in the following terms : "Although for the
present a British force remains in Egypt for the
preservation of public tranquillity, Her JNIajesty's
Government are desirous of witlidrawino; it as soon
as the state of the country and the organisation of
proper means for the maintenance of the Kliedive's
authority will admit of it. In the meanwhile, the
position in which Her Majesty's Government are
placed towards His Highness imposes upon them
the duty of giving advice with the object of
securing that the order of thhigs to be established
shall be of a satisfactory character, and ))ossess the
elements of stability and progress." Lord Dufferin
was sent to Egypt to report u})on the measures
which were necessary in order that "the adniinis-
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tration of affairs should be reconstructed on a
basis which would afford satisfactory guarantees
for the maintenance of peace, order, and prosperity
in Egypt, for the stability of the Khedive's
authority, for the judicious development of self-
government, and for the fulfilment of obligations
towards the Powers."
It is unnecessary to dwell on Lord Duflferin's
detailed proposals. A few remarks on the main
framework of his plan will suffice.
It was not the first time that an endeavour had
been made on the banks of the Nile to make
bricks without straw. The task, which Lord
Dufferin was called upon to perform, was, in fact,
impossible of execution. He was asked to devise
a plan for the complete rehabilitation of the
country, and, at the same time, one which would
not be inconsistent with the policy of speedily
withdrawing the British garrison. It can be no
matter for surprise that, in spite of the qualities of
statesmanship, political foresight, and literary skill,
all of which Lord Dufferin possessed in an eminent
degree, he should have failed to accomplish the
impossible. It is, moreover, difficult to read Lord
Dufferin's report without entertaining a suspicion
that he was aware that the policy of the British
Government was incapable of execution. There
was only one practicable method by which the
Egyptian administration could be reformed. That
was to place the government more or less under
British guidance. Lord Dufferin's statesmanlike
eye saw this clearly enough. His remarks on this
point form, indeed, the most valuable portion of
his report. "I cannot," he said, "conceive any-
thing which would be more fatal to the prosperity
and good administration of the country than the
hasty and inconsiderate extrusion of any large
proportion of the Europeans in the service of the
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Government, in deference to the somewhat un-
reasonable clamour which has been raised against
them. For some time to come, European assist-
ance in the various Departments of Egyptian
administration will be absolutely necessary. . . .
It is frightful to contemplate the misery and
misfortune which would be entailed on the popula-
tion, were the Financial, the Public Works, and
analogous Departments to be left unorganised
by a few high-minded European officials. The
Egyptian Government would quickly become a
prey to dishonest speculators, ruinous contracts,
and delusive engineering operations, from which
they are now^ protected by the intelligent and
capable men who are at hand to advise them in
reference to these subjects. This is especially
true in regard to financial matters. The main-
tenance of Egypt's financial equilibrium is the
guarantee of her independence."
Without doubt. Lord Dufferin was right. But
in what manner was the ascendency of European
influence to be secured ? It could only be secured
by the prolongation of the British occupation.
Lord Dufferin's instructions, however, forbade him
to state in clear and positive terms the inevitable
inference to be drawn from his own proposals.
In the meanwhile, in deference, to a great
extent, to British public opinion, a certain develop-
ment of free institutions was proposed. But
Lord Dufferin appears to have liad little con-
fidence that he would succeed in "creating a
vitalised and self-existent organism, instinct with
evolutionary force." "A paper constitution," he
said, "is proverbially an unsatisfactory device.
Few institutions have succeeded that have not
been the outcome of slow growth, and gradual
development; but in the East, even the germs of
constitutional freedom are non-existent. Despotism
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not only destroys the seeds of liberty, but renders
the soil, on which it has trampled, incapable of
growing the plant. A long- enslaved nation in-
stinctively craves for the strong hand of a master,
rather than for a lax constitutional regime. A
mild ruler is more likely to provoke contempt and
insubordination than to inspire gratitude."
It was, without doubt, desirable to make some
beginning in the way of founding liberal institu-
tions, but no one with any knowledge of tlie East
could for one moment suppose that the Legis-
lative Council and Assembly, founded under Lord
DufFerin's auspices, could at once become either
important factors in the government of the
country, or efficient instruments to help in adminis-
trative and fiscal reform.
Where Order deigns to come.
Her sister. Liberty, cannot be far.*
What Egypt most of all required was order
and good government. Perhaps, longo intervallo,
liberty would follow afterwards. No one but a
dreamy theorist could imagine that the natural
order of things could be reversed, and that liberty
could first be accorded to the poor ignorant re-
presentatives of the Egy]itian people, and that the
latter would then be able to evolve order out of
chaos. In the early days of the struggles which
eventually led to Italian unity, Manzoni said that
"his country must be morally healed before she
could be politically regenerated.*' ^ The remark
applied in a far greater degree to Egypt in 1882
than it did to Italy in 1827. Lord DufFerin was
certainly under no delusion as to the realities of
the situation. In the concluding portion of his
report, he said that one of the main points to
* Akenside, Pleasures of the Imagination.
• Bolton King, History of Italian Unity, vol. i. p. 112.
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consider was "how far we can depend upon the
continued, steady, and frictionless operation of the
machinery we shall have set up. A great part
of what we are about to inaugurate will be of
necessity tentative and experimental. . . . Before
a guarantee of Egypt's independence can be said
to exist, the administrative system of which it
is the leading characteristic must have time to
consolidate, in order to resist disintegrating in-
fluences from within and without, and to acquire
the use and knowledge of its own capacities. . , .
With such an accunmlation of difficulties, native
statesmanship, even though supplemented by the
new-born institutions, will hardly be able to
co))e, unless assisted for a time by our sympathy
and guidance. Under these circumstances, I
would venture to submit that we can hardly con-
sider the work of reorganisation complete, or the
responsibilities imposed upon us by circumstances
adequately discharged, until we have seen Egypt
shake herself free from the initial embarrassments
which I have enumerated above." In other words,
Lord Dufferin, without absolutely stating that the
British occupation must be indefinitely prolonged,
clearly indicated the maintenance of the para-
mount influence of the British Government for an
indefinite period as an essential condition to the
execution of the policy of reform.
Lord Dufferin threw out another important
hint. " If," he said, " I had been commissioned to
place affairs in Egypt on the footing of an Indian
subject State, the outlook would have been different.
The masterful hand of a Kesident would have
quickly bent everything to his will." After de-
tailing the advantao;es to be derived from this
system of government, Lord Dufferin added
:
"The Egyptians would have justly considered
these advantages as dearly purchased at the
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expense of their domestic independence. INIoreover,
Her Majesty's Government and the public opinion
of England have pronounced against any such
alternative." Public opinion in England, however,
had not pronounced strongly against this alter-
native. On the contrary, many people were of
opinion that the course indicated by Lord Dufferin
was the best to adopt. It is, moreover, possible,
in spite of the forced condemnation which he
pronounced, that Lord Dufferin was of a some-
what similar opinion. It was, indeed, clear that
for some long while to come, the representative
of the British Government in Egypt would of
necessity be more than an ordinary diplomatic
agent. "The title-deeds of all political authority,"
it has been truly said, "are elastic."^ Their elas-
ticity was about to be put to the test in Egypt.
The question of who should be the man then
arose. I was at that time in India. Sir Edward
Malet was promoted to be Minister at Brussels.
The British Government did me the honour of
inviting me to become his successor. I accepted
the invitation and arrived in Cairo on September
11, 1883.
* Oliver's Alexander Hamilton, p. 169.

PART III
THE SOUDAN
1882-1907
The difficulties of the case have passed entirely beyond the
limits oj" stich political and military difficulties as I have knmvn
m the course of an experience of half a century.
Mr. Gladstone, Speech iyi tJie House of Commons
on Soudan affairs, Febricary 23, 1885.
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CHAPTER XIX
THE HICKS EXPEDITION
January-November 1883
Extent of Egyptian territory—Misgovernment in the Soudan—Slave^
hunting— Said Pasha's views— Colonel Stewart's Report— The
Mahdi—Military and financial situation—Interference from Cairo
—Attitude of the British Government— Destruction of General
Hicks's army.
The affairs of the Soudan exercised a very im-
portant influence on the course of events in Egypt,
more especially during the years which immediately
followed the British occupation of the country.
They will, therefore, be treated separately.
At the time when this narrative commences, the
nominal authority of the Khedive extended over
an area stretching from Wadi Haifa on the nortli
to the Equator on the south, a distance of about
1300 miles, and from JNlassowah on the east to the
western limit of the Darfour province on the west,
a distance of about 1300 miles—that is to say, he
ruled, or attempted to rule, over a territory twice
as big as France and Germany together.
The worst forms of misgovernment existed over
this vast tract of country. Sir Samuel Baker, on
the occasion of his second visit to the Soudan in
1870, wrote : " I observed with dismay a frightful
change in the features of the country between
Berber and the capital since my former visit. The
rich soil on the banks of the river, which had a few
years since been highly cultivated, was abandoned.
349
350 MODERN EGYPT ft. m
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There was not a dog to howl for a lost master.
Industry had vanished ; oppression had driven tlie
inhabitants from the soil."^ The taxes, which
were excessive in amount, were collected by Basil i-
Bozouks. These agents were described by Colonel
Stewart, who was sent to the Soudan in the winter
of 1882-83 to report on the state of the country, as
"swaggering bullies, robbing, plundering, and ill-
treating the people with impunity." In addition,
moreover, to the evils attendant on a thoroughly
bad and oppressive system of government, tlie
Soudan suffered from a scourge peculiar to itself.
It was the happy hunting-ground of the Arab
slave-dealer. "The entire country," Sir Samuel
Baker wrote, "was leased out to piratical slave-
hunters, under the name of traders, by the
Khartoum Government."
Even assuming that Ismail Pasha was sincere
in his desire to suppress slavery and to govern
the Soudan well, nothing is more certain than
that he was powerless to do so. Qui t?^op
embi'asse^ mat etreint. In extending his dominions
to the centre of Africa, the Khedive had under-
taken a task which was far beyond the military
and financial resources, as well as the adminis-
trative capacity of the Egyptian Government.
His predecessor, Said Pasha, saw this, although
during his time the area, over which the Khedive
of Egypt was supposed to exercise authority,
was far smaller than in 1883. In 1850, Said
Pasha visited Khartoum. "After due considera-
tion he had almost decided to abandon the country,
and was only restrained from doing so by the
Sheikhs and Notables pointing out the inevitable
anarchy that would result from such a measure."
Twenty- seven years later. Colonel Stewart saw
that the only hope of improvement lay in abandon-
^ Ismailia, p. 11.
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ing some of the outlying provinces of the Soudan,
and thus bringing the ambitious task, which the
Egyptian Government had set itself to perform,
within comparatively manageable limits. " It is
generally acknowledged," he wrote, " that the
Soudan is, and has for many years been, a source
of loss to the Egyptian Government. . . . Putting,
however, the financial view of the question aside, I
am firmly convinced that the Egyptians are quite
unfit in every way to undertake such a trust as the
government of so vast a country with a view to its
welfare, and that both for their own sake and that
of the people they try to rule, it would be advisable
to abandon large portions of it. The fact of their
incompetence to rule is so generally acknowledged
that it is unnecessary to discuss the question."
There is a tradition in the Mohammedan world
that, at some future time, a Mahdi ^ will appear on
earth, upon whose coming the world will be con-
verted to the Mohammedan religion. A variety
of unauthorised rumours are current amono-st theo
lower orders of Mohammedans as to the appearance
and qualities of the true Mahdi, such as, for instance,
that he will have very long hands ; but these are
discarded by the more learned classes. A work
written at Mecca in 1883 by a Sherif of that place,
and entitled 21ie Conquests of Islam, contains
what may be considered as an authorised version of
the conditions which the true Mahdi must fulfil.
" The greatest of the signs," it is said, " shall be
that he shall be of the line of Fatma {i.e. a Sherif,
or descendant of the Prophet) ; that he shall be
proclaimed Mahdi against his will, not seeking
such proclamation for himself, and not causing
strife amongst tiie Faithful to obtain it, nor even
yielding to it till threatened with death by them.
' The literal meaning of the word " Mahdi " is one who is " con-
ducted in the right path."
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He shall be proclaimed in the Mosque of Mecca,
not elsewhere ; he shall not appear save when there
is strife after the death of a Khalifa ; he shall
neither come nor be proclaimed until such time as
there is no Khalifa over the Moslems. His advent
shall coincide with that of Anti-Christ, after whom
Jesus will descend and join himself to the Mahdi.
These are the great signs of his coming. The
others are imaginary or disput?d, and whosoever
shall, of his own will, declare himself to be Mahdi
and try to assert himself by force, is a pretender,
such as have already appeared many times."
In August 1881, a man named Mohammed
Ahmed proclaimed himself to be the Mahdi in
the Soudan.^ He was born in 1843 in the
province of Dongola. As a young man he was
apprenticed to his uncle, a boatbuilder in Sennar,
but the tendency which, from liis earliest child-
hood, he had shown towards religious studies, led
him to abandon trade, and to enter a religious
school at Khartoum. His mission, as ex])lained
in his various Proclamations, was to gain over
the Soudan to his cause, then to march on Egypt,
overthrow the heretical Turks, and convert the
whole world. All who opposed his mission were to
be destroyed, whether Christians, Mohammedans,
or Pagans.
Mohammed Ahmed was at once branded by
* Many persons had appeared in Earypt prior to 1881 claiming to be
the Mahdi. See, for instance, Colonel Burj^oyne's History, etc., 1798 to
1801, f. 13. In Ismail I'asha's time, a .Mahdi appeared in I^pper Kg-ypt.
He and his followers were put to death (see l>ady Duff Gordon's
Lettersfrom Egypt, p. 342). In the l\oran, no allusion is made to the
cominj^ of tlie Alahdi. 'ilie belief in a future Ma'r.ti is l)ased on a
Haditli, tliat is to say, one of tlie traditiunary sayiiijjs of tlie I'lopliet,
which were recorded hy Al)u Hekr and others. It is confined to the
Sunnis. According? to the Sliiaiis, the Mahdi lias already apj)eared
in the person of Mohammed Al)u el Kasim, the twelftli Imam, wlio is
believed to he concealed in some secret place until the day of his
manifestation before the end of the world.—Hughes s Dictionary of
Islam, p. 305.
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orthodox INIohainmedans in Egypt and elsewhere
as a False INIahdi (Mutemahdi). Neither, in spite
of the credulity and ignorance of the population
of the Soudan, is it probable that he would have
met with any success even in that province, had
not the prevailing discontent predisposed the
inhabitants against the Egy])tian Government.
It was, however, Colonel Stewart wrote, *' a
melancholy fact that the Government was almost
universally hated and abhorred." The people,
therefore, flocked to the standard of the Mahdi,
whose prestige was increased by some successes
gained over the Egyptian troops in the early
days of the insurrectionary movement. It soon
became apparent that the Egyptian Government
had to deal, not with any petty disturbance which
must sooner or later succumb to superior force,
but with a formidable rebellion, the suppression
of which would tax to the utmost their military
and financial resources. What, therefore, was the
nature of those resources ?
The army was in a deplorable condition. " The
troops in garrison here (at Khartoum)," Colonel
Stewart wrote on January 5, 1883, "are working
at elementary drill and tactics, and are making
some progress. It is, however, very uphill work
;
the officers are so ignorant and so incapable of
grasping the meaning of the simplest movement.
Quite one -third of the troops are also ignorant
of the use of the rifle, and they would be more
formidable as adversaries were they simply armed
with sticks. Many have also superstitious ideas
of the power of the Mahdi." A little later
(February 27), Colonel Stewart wrote : " It is
impossible for me to criticise too severely the
conduct of the Egyptian troops, both officers and
men, towards the natives. Their general conduct
and overbearing manner is almost sufficient to cause
VOL. I 2 A
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a rebellion. When to this conduct cowardice is
added, it is impossible for me to avoid expressing
my contempt and disgust.' Moreover, the soldiers
were imbued with Arabist sympathies ; their
loyalty to the Khedive was doubtful. "The
question," Colonel Stewart wrote on February
16, "is whether they will remain faithful, or
whether their cowardice may not induce them to
desert, knowing, as they will, that the JNIahdi
will not harm them. . . . At one or two of the
late skirmishes, they were heard exclaiming, ' Oh,
Effendina Arabi ! If you only knew the position
Tewfik has placed us in ! '
"
The financial position was as bad as the military.
The Soudan revenue for 1882 was estimated at
£E.507,000, and the expenditure at £E. 610,000,
thus leaving a deficit of £E. 103,000. There is
little use in endeavouring to ascertain what the
real revenue of the Soudan was at this time.
No trustworthy accounts were kept. It is
certain, however, that it had for years been the
practice to overestimate the revenue, and it was
obvious in the then condition of affairs that little
or no revenue of any kind was to be expected.
*' There can be no doubt," Colonel Stewart wrote,
" that the deficits of many provinces are very far
in excess of those stated. Probably, no revenue
whatever has been collected in the province of
Kordofan. INIuch the same can also be said
of Dara and Fashoda. Sennar, with perhaps
Darfour, must also be in pretty much the same
plight."
Several British officers, chief amongst whom
was General Hicks, were appointed to the staff of
the Soudan army in the spring of 1883. Shortly
after his arrival at Khartoum in ^larch 1883,
General Hicks made an appeal to Cairo for help.
Those who have followed the account which
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has already been given of the financial situation in
Egypt at that time, will be able to judge of the
degree of pecuniary assistance which it was possible
for the exhausted Treasury at Cairo to afford to
General Hicks. Nevertheless, an effort was made
to provide funds for the Soudan. General Hicks
was told that up to the end of the year 1883 the
Egyptian Government would provide him with
£E. 147,000. The pecuniary aid thus afforded,
though sufficient to cause embarrassment to the
Egyptian Treasury, was wholly inadequate to
meet General Hicks's wants. It only amounted
to enough to provide for the pay of the men to
the end of the current year. " Tlie native Bashi-
Bozouks," (icneral Hicks pointed out, " are still
months in arrears of pay. The men on the Blue
Nile are in some cases two years in arrear."
The position, therefore, in the spring of 1883
was as follows :—The Treasury was exhausted
;
the army was unpaid, undisciplined, untrained,
partially disloyal, and, therefore, worthless as a
fighting machine.
Under such conditions, the Egyptian Govern-
ment had to face a formidable rebellion, which
drew its strength from two potent forces, namely
:
first, the religious fervour of a credulous, fanatical,
but courageous population ; secondly, the well-
merited hatred engendered by a long course of
misgovernment. The difficulty of the task was
enhanced by the fact that the scene of the rebellion
was remote from the headquarters of the Govern-
ment, and that the physical difficulties of communi-
cation with the base of operations were very great.
It was a task which would have taxed the resources
of a civilised Government whose affairs were con-
ducted by men of the utmost energy and intelli-
gence. It was altogether beyond the strength of
the inexperienced Cairene administrators, who had
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themselves only just emerged from an internal
revolution which, but for foreign aid, would have
been successful.
The Horatian maxim Versate diu, quid fen e
recusent, quid vahant humeri, holds good of politics
as well as of poetry. The first thing which the
Egyptian Government ought to have done was to
have considered whether their strength was pro-
portionate to the task which they had undertaken.
The main question to be decided was whether the
Egyptian Government should, for the time being
at all events, abandon the more remote parts of the
Soudan and stand on the defensive at Khartoum, or
whether an expedition should be sent into Kordofan,
which had become the chief centre of rebellion, in
the hope of dealing a crushing blow to the rising
power of the Mahdi. The importance of the
decision in this matter was realised by the British
authorities on the spot, more especially by Colonel
Stewart, who could speak with high authority
on Soudan affairs. On December 27, 1882, that
is to say, whilst El Obeid, the capital of the Kor-
dofan province, was still besieged and Abdul-Kader
Pasha, who was Governor-General of the Soudan,
was preparing an ex])edition for its relief. Colonel
Stewart wrote : '* I would beg to point out how
very important it is that the present expedition
should prove a success. A failure would probably
entail the total loss, if not of the Soudan, of at any
rate many provinces. This truth can hardly be
brought home with too much force to the Egyptian
Government." At that time. Colonel Stewart
thought that "Abdul-Kader had every right to
expect a success." A little later (January 9), when
Colonel Stewart had seen more of the Egyptian
troops and had become strongly convinced of their
hiefficiency, he s])()ke less hoj)cfully. Alluding to
various small engagements in wliich the Egyptian
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troops had behaved badly, he wrote : '* It is very
evident that the matter will become exceedingly
serious should the troops continue to exhibit such
pusillanimity. It will be quite hopeless to expect
to cope successfully with the rebellion, and it will
only remain with the Egyptian Government to
make the best terms they can with the Mahdi."
On January 16, he recurred to the same subject.
"This move of Abdul-Kader," he wrote to Sir
Edward Malet, " is a critical one, for, should he
meet with any reverse, it will probably be a decisive
one, as far as Egyptian authority in this country is
concerned."
On February 16, when the fall of El Obeid was
imminent, Colonel Stewart wrote : " The question
now arises, ' What should be done in this crisis ?
'
I think the first thing the Government will have to
decide on will be whether the Kordofan expedition
should leave or not. My own opinion, from what
I am told and know of the Egyptian soldiers, is
that to send it would be to run a very great risk,
and if the expedition were defeated, the probability
is that the Soudan would be lost. Should it be
decided to give up the expedition, I wo ild then
suggest that orders should be at once sent to
Slatin Bey, the Governor of Darfour, to destroy
all his stores and retreat as best he can on the
Bahr-el-Ghazal Province. There is, of course, a
chance that Khartoum may be beleaguered, but I
can hardly fancy that even 10,000 Egyptian soldiers,
if they remain faithful, and are commanded by some
energetic officers, will allow themselves to be shut
up." Two days later (February 18), the news of
the fall of El Obeid reached Khartoum. On
February 20, Colonel Stewart wrote : " I am
strongly of opinion that to advance now on Kor-
dofan would be exceedingly injudicious, and that
the alternative policy of remaining on the defensive.
358 IMODERN EGYPT pt. in
vigorously putting down any attempted rising on
this bank of the Nile, and waiting to see what
will happen, is the true one. To advance now with
our miserable troops against an enemy flushed with
recent success, well supplied with arms, and worked
up to a pitch of fanaticism, would be but to risk a
disaster with no corresponding advantage now that
Obeid has fallen. A serious disaster or, indeed, a
check, would also very probably involve the loss of
the whole of the Soudan." Speaking of the '* utter
worthlessness of the Egyptian infantry," Colonel
Stewart added : " It is almost impossible for me
to convey an idea of the contempt with which all
classes of people here regard them. The negro
troops will not associate with them, nor will,
curiously enough, the Egyptian officers in com-
mand of those troops." ^
It was unfortunate that Colonel Stewart's advice
was not followed. Both Lord DufFerin and Sir
Edward Malet shared his views. On April 2,
1888, Lord Dufferin had an interview with Ibrahim
Bey, the head of the Soudan Department at Cairo,
in which he said that " if the Egyptian Government
were wise, it would confine its present efforts to
the re-establishment of its authority in Sermar, and
would not seek to extend its dominion beyond that
province and the bordering river banks." In his
general report on Egypt, Lord Dufferin, whilst
deprecating the abandonment of the whole of the
Soudan, no necessity having as yet arisen for so
heroic a remedy, added : " I apprehend, however,
1 In a letter dated September 1, 1883, Mr. Power, the British Con-
sular A^ent at Khartoum, wrote : " In three days, we march on a
canipaij^n tli;it even the most sanfruine look forward to with the f;reatest
jrloom. We have liere i)000 intaiitry that titty fjood men would rout
in ten minutes, and 1000 cavalry (Hasiii-liozouks) tliat have never leaiiit
even to ride, and these, with a few Nordent'elt fiuns, are to heat tiie
60,000 men whom the Mahdi has ^rot tof^ether. . . . Tiiat Kj^-yptian
officers and men are not worth the ammunition they throw away, is
well known."—Power's Lettersfrom Khartoum, p. 20.
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that it would be wise on the part of Egypt to
abandon Darfour and perhaps part of Kordofan,
and to be content with maintaining her jurisdiction
in the provinces of Khartoum and Sennar." On
June 5, when General Hicks was urging the
Egyptian Government, through Sir Edward Malet,
to give him more men and more money, the latter
telegraphed to Lord Granville : " Your Lordship
is aware that it is already impossible for the
Egyptian Government to supply the funds de-
manded for the Soudan, and the proposed
operations will run a considerable risk of failure
unless they are conducted on a large scale, and
unless the army is well supplied in every respect.
Under these circumstances, a question arises as to
whether General Hicks should be instructed to
confine himself to maintaining the present supre-
macy of the Khedive in the region between the
Blue and White Niles." Sir Edward Malet added
that he "had furnished Cherif Pasha with a copy
of General Hicks's telegram, as requested, but
without comment or expression of opinion upon
its contents."
What, however, was the opinion of General
Hicks, the officer who was to command the expedi-
tion about to be sent against the INIahdi ? General
Hicks's position was one of great difficulty. The
Government at Cairo had not learnt the elementary
lesson that, in dealing with a state of affiiirs such
as that which then existed in the Soudan, the first
essential and preliminary condition to success was
to entrust the supreme command to one individual
and to support him cordially. Ala-el -Din Pasha
was sent to Khartoum to supersede Abdul-Kader
Pasha, of whom Colonel Stewart thought highly
;
but when he arrived (February 1883) he did
not, in the first instance, declare his mission.
"Although," Colonel Stewart wrote, "nominally
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he has no official position, his presence is sufficient
to neutralise the influence of Abdul-Kader, with
the result that practically no one is in command."
It is easy to believe that the position of the
Governor-General at Khartoum was tlius rendered
extremely difficult. Suleiman Pasha Niazi, who is
described by Colonel Stewart as "a miserable-look-
ing old man of seventy-four or seventy-five," was
sent up in nominal command of the troops, with
the understanding "that he was to defer in all
things to his subordinate (General Hicks), who was
held responsible for the direction of all prepara-
tions and operations." In addition to the confusion
caused by these arrangements, much harm resulted
from the inveterate habit, which was at that time
common to many high Egyptian authorities, of
giving orders direct to subordinate officials over
the lieads of their superiors. After mentioning
a flagrant instance of this sort, Colonel Stewart
added (January 26) : " I need hardly point out
how deplorable is this independent action of the
Khedive's. Should it continue, we shall not alone
have all the authorities here quarrelling with each
other, but it will be also quite impossible to carry
out any concerted plan. The Khedive must entrust
some one here with supreme authority (Dictator)
and then leave him alone. To telegraph what he
should do or not do, or to correspond with his
subordinates over his head, is only to make his
position quite untenable, and to insure a disastrous
termination to the campaign." Colonel StcAvart's
letters written at this time, are full of complaints
of the "backstairs influence" exerted at Cairo, and
of the " unbusinesslike interference of the Cairo
Government in Soudan affairs." "Until matters,"
he wrote on February 27, "are conducted in a
businesslike, straightforward, and honest w^ay, it is
hopeless to expect any amelioration in the Soudan."
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The difficulties of a British officer suddenly
thrust into the middle of these paltry intrigues can
easily be imagined. General Hicks soon found his
position intolerable. Suleiman Pasha in no way
considered his own office as a sinecure. On the
contrary, he paid no attention to the opinions
expressed by General Hicks. At last, after making
a series of complaints to which little attention was
paid. General Hicks telegraphed, on July 16, to
Sir Edward Malet : " My orders and arrangements
here are quite disregarded ; promises are made that
they shall be carried out, but nothing whatever is
done. Suleiman Pasha disregards them altogether.
It is useless to keep me here under these condi-
tions, and it is a position which I cannot hold. I
beg you will have me recalled." This telegram
brought matters to a crisis. General Hicks was
appointed Commander-in-Chief in the Soudan with
the rank of General of Division. Suleiman Pasha
was recalled from Khartoum, but any good effect,
which might otherwise have been produced by this
measure, was marred owing to his being at once
named Governor of the Eastern Soudan. His
new appointment. General Hicks telegraphed, was
" looked upon as promotion."
In view of the intrigues which surrounded
General Hicks, of the wretched material of which
his army was composed, and of the fact that the
Egyptian Government could not comply with his
requests for men and money, it is scarcely conceiv-
able that he should have been confident of success.
But he seems to have underrated the difficulties of
the task which lay before him. He was perhaps
unduly elated at some, trifiing successes gained
during the early stages of the rebellion over the
forces of the Mahdi. He thought (June 23)
that as he advanced, the tribes, though "afraid
of commencing hostilities against the Mahdi,
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would join him as camp-followers.*' It does
not appear that at any time General Hicks
was definitely asked by the Egyptian Govern-
ment to state his views as to the wisdom of
undertaking the expedition, though it might have
been supposed that ordinary prudence would have
dictated the necessity of obtaining, in official form,
a very distinct expression of his opinion on this
momentous question. But on June 18, that is to
say about three months before he started into
the Kordofan desert, he telegraphed to General
Valentine Baker, who was at the time at the head
of the Egyptian Police : " In my telegram of the
3rd of June to Malet, I pointed out what I thought
was necessary to ensure success in Kordofan and
guard against all possible eventualities.^ At the
same time I am prepared to undertake the campaign
with the force available ; the risks are, as I have
said, in case of a mishap, but I think this is not
at all probable. Khartoum ought to be safe from
outside under any circumstances."
Looking to the terms of this telegram, it is
not difficult to judge of General Hicks's frame of
mind. In view of the fact that the expeditionary
force, as it eventually started, was below the
strength which he recommended, and that the
material of which the army was composed was of
the worst possible description, it can scarcely be
conceived that he felt sanguine of success. It
* The telegram to which allusion is here made runs as follows :
*'Tlie force we have is not nearly sufficient to undertake the Kordofan
campaign. ... It should be 10^000 men. What number of men will
it be possible for the (iovernment to send me in augmentation .'' When
we consider that a defeat miglit mean not only the loss of Darfour and
Kordofan, but also of Sennar, and possibly Kliartoum, I think no risk
should be run." It was this telegram which elicited the opinion
expressed by Sir Edward Malet {ade ante, p. 359) that General Hicka
should confine his operations to the country lying between the Blue
and ^Vhite Niles. But the telegram was sent on to Chcrif Pasha " with-
out comment or expression of opinion." The natural result ensued.
General Hicks's weighty opinions were never properly considered.
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may be surmised that his qualified expression of
willingness to undertake the campaign was in-
spired, not so much by any heartfelt confidence of
success based on a full consideration of the whole
of the facts, as by the reluctance naturally felt
by a gallant soldier to appear to shrink from a
dangerous undertaking.
The truth is that the decision in this matter
should not have been left to General Hicks. It
was from no fault of their own that the Govern-
ment which then existed at Cairo were power-
less to provide the resources, whether in men or
money, which were necessary in order to suppress
the rebellion. The helplessness of the Khedive's
Government was the result of the misgovernment
of the Khedive's predecessor. But it behoved the
Egyptian Ministers to look the facts with which
they had to deal fairly in the face, and to bring the
objects, which they sought to attain, into harmony
with the means which they possessed for attaining
them. They did nothing of the sort. They drifted
on, until at last they brought on their heads a
catastrophe, which involved the collapse of Egyp-
tian authority over the whole of the Soudan.
There was only one method by which the
realities of the situation might have been brought
home to the minds of the Khedive and his
Ministers. The British Government should have
insisted on the adoption of a rational and practicable
policy. Unfortunately, they abstained from all
interference. They appear, indeed, to have seen
that the wisest plan for the Egyptian Government
would have been to stand on the defensive at
Khartoum. But they did nothing to enforce this
view.
The British Government had, in fact, been led
much against their will into the occupation of
Egypt. They were now fearful that they might
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unconsciously drift into military intervention in
the Soudan. Lord Granville was determined to
guard against this danger. He refused to have
anything to say to Soudan matters. The fact that
General Hicks's telegrams were sent to the various
Egyptian authorities through Sir Edward Malet
roused him to a sense of danger. He thought that
the British representative, by allowing himself to
become the medium of communication between
Cairo and Khartoum, might involve his Govern-
ment in some degree of responsibility. On May 7,
Lord Granville, therefore, telegraphed to Mr.
Cartwright, who temporarily occupied Sir Edward
Malet's place: "Her Majesty's Government are
in no w^ay responsible for the operations in the
Soudan, which have been undertaken under the
authority of the Egyptian Government, or for the
appointment or actions of General Hicks." This
disclaimer of responsibility was repeated in a letter
addressed by Sir Edward Malet to Cherif Pasha
on May 22, when forwarding another telegram
addressed by General Hicks to Lord Dufferin.
"In this particular instance," Sir Edward said, "I
desire to guard against any supposition on the part
of Your Excellency that my sending a copy of
the telegram to Your Excellency indicates any
expression of opinion with regard to the recom-
mendations contained in it."
A little later, Lord Granville was again alarmed
at the continuance of communication between Sir
Edward Malet and General Hicks. On August 8,
he wrote to Sir Edward Malet: "It appears that
General Hicks continues to communicate with you
respecting the financial difficulties which he meets
with in the Soudan, under the impression that
you will exert your influence with the Egyptian
Government to induce them to give favourable
consideration to his wishes. I need not remind
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you that Her JNIajesty's Government assume no
responsibility whatever in regard to the conduct
of affairs in the Soudan, and it is desirable that
General Hicks should understand that, although
they are glad to receive information as to the
progress of the campaign, it is their policy to
abstain as much as possible from interference with
the action of the Egyptian Government in that
quarter." Sir Edward Malet informed Lord
Granville that his action had been in strict con-
formity with the instructions he had received on
this subject. He took steps, also, to render the
position clear to General Hicks. On August 18,
he telegraphed to General Hicks : " I congratulate
you on your appointment as Commander-in-Chief
and General of Division. The act is spontaneous
on the part of the Egyptian Government, for
although I am ready to transmit to them tele-
grams that come from you, I am debarred by
my instructions from giving advice with regard
to action on them, the policy of Her Majesty's
Government being to abstain as much as possible
from interference with the action of the Egyptian
Government in the Soudan."
The objections to British military intervention
were obvious, neither was the danger against which
Lord Granville sought to guard imaginary. It
might well have happened that, almost before the
Government were aware of it, they might have
found themselves in a situation which would have
obliged them to assert their authority by force of
arms in the Soudan. The history of the rise of
Uiitish power in the East served as a warning that
one forward step in the direction of territorial
extension often leads to another, until at last a
goal is reached far more distant than any which
was originally contemplated. IVIoreover, when
once a question, such as the state of the Soudan,
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becomes a matter for public discussion in England,
there are not wanting many who, partly from the
love of adventure natural to most Englishmen,
partly from a keen sense of the benefits which
would be conferred locally by British interference,
and partly from a great, perhaps an exaggerated
idea of England's mission as a civilising agent in
the world, are prone to push on the Government
to action without sufficient consideration of the
ultimate consequences of their proposals. Under
these circumstances, it behoved a wise statesman to
move cautiously. Nevertheless, looking back over
the course of events as we now know them, it
must be admitted that the line of action which Lord
Granville adopted was very unfortunate. It is to
be regretted that he did not by timely interference
save the Egyptian Government from the conse-
quences of their own want of foresight. Had he,
acting on the views expressed by the various
British authorities in Egypt, stepped in and for-
bidden the desi)atch of the Hicks expedition to
Kordofan, not only would thousands of lives and
the large sums of money, which were subsequently
squandered, have been saved, but he would have
deserved the gratitude of the Egyptian people, and
would have saved his own country from that inter-
ference which he so much dreaded, and which was
eventually precipitated by the negative policy
adopted in the early stage of the ])roceedings.
Lord Granville appears to have thought that he
effectually threw off all responsibility by declaring
that he was not responsible. There could not have
been a greater error. The responsibility of the
British Government for the general conduct of
aflairs in Egypt did not depend on a few phrases
thrown into a des])atch and subsequently published
in a parliamentary paper. It was based on the
facts that the British Government were in military
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occupation of the country, that the weakness and
inefficiency of the native rulers were notorious, and
tluit the civiHsed world fixed on England a respon-
sibility which it was impossible to shake off so
long as the occupation lasted. "Those," Lord
Salisbury said in the House of Lords (February 12,
1884), " who have the absolute power of preventing
lamentable events, and knowing what is taking
place, refuse to exercise that power, are responsible
for what happens." Lord Granville failed to see
this. Instead of recognising the facts of the
situation, he took shelter behind an illusory
abnegation of responsibility, which was a mere
phantasm of the diplomatic and parliamentary
mind. The result was that the facts asserted
themselves in defiance of diplomacy and parlia-
mentary convenience.
It may, however, be urged in defence of the
policy adopted by Lord Granville that he does
not appear to have received sufficient warning of
the possible, and, indeed, probable consequences
of inaction. What was most of all required was
that an alarm-bell should be rung to rouse the
British Government from its lethargy, and show
that the consequences of inaction might be more
serious than those of action.^ But no sufficient
warning appears to have been given. The result
was that the Egyptian Governm,ent blundered on
headlong to their own destruction, and that the
British Government, like the frail beauty of
Byron's poem, whilst vowing that they would ne'er
consent to a policy of intervention in the Soudan,
consented but a short time afterwards to a degree
• " I am not of the opiiiiou of those gentlemen who are against
disturbing the public repose ; I like a clamour when there is an
aliuse. The fire-bell at midnight disturbs your sleep, but it keeps you
from being burned in your bed. The liue-and-cry ahirnis the country,
but it preserves all the property of the province."—Burke's Speech on
the Prosecutionfor Libels.
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of intervention far greater than would have been
necessary had the true facts of the situation been
hi the first instance recognised.
On Septen.ber 8, 1883, that is to say, three days
before my arrival in Egypt, General Hicks started
on the expedition, which was to terminate in so
disastrous a manner. At Cairo, news from the
Soudan was anxiously awaited, but no one con-
templated the possibility of the disaster which
shortly ensued. I remember speaking to Cherif
Pasha as to the desirability of giving up the
outlying provinces of the Soudan. He was not
disinclined to give up Darfour ; on the other hand,
he held strongly to Kordofan. But, he added,
with the light-heartedness characteristic of a Galli-
cised Egyptian, " Nous en causerons plus tard
;
d'abord nous allons donner une bonne raclee a ce
monsieur " {i.e. the INlahdi).^
Cherif Pasha was soon undeceived. On No-
vember 22, news reached Cairo that on the 5th
General Hicks's army had been totally destroyed.
'* Hardly anythmg was known of the country
into which the army was venturing, beyond the
fact that it was the driest in the Soudan." The
last communication received from General Hicks
spoke of the want of water and of the intense
heat. The final catastrophe is described by Colonel
Colville in the following words : " On advancing to
Kasghil, the army was led astray by the guides,
who were Mahdi's men, and who, when they were
sure that it was thoroughly lost in the bush,
deserted it. After wandering three days and
1 On January 4, 1884, Sir Charles W. Wilson wrote: "When
Hicks Pasha left Cairo, it was not intended that he should do more
than clear Senuar of rebel bauds, a work he accomplished with ease,
and protect Khartoum. It is useless to inquire what madness made
the Egyptian Government order Hicks Pasha to attempt the reconquest
of K()i(iof;in ; it was a hazardous operation, and with the troops
employed, of whom Colonel Stewart has given a faithful picture,
disaster was an almost foregone conclusion."
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nights without water, they came upon a force
of the enemy near Kasghil. But many hundreds
had already died from thirst, and the remainder
were too feeble to olier any determined resistance,
and were soon despatched by the enemy. A
brilliant charge was made by Hicks Pasha and
his staff, who all died fighting like men." ^
It was not until twenty-two years later that
the site of the Hicks disaster was visited by any
European. Sir Reginald Wingate went over the
ground in the course of a tour through Kordofan
during the winter of 1905-6. He recorded his
impressions in the following words :
—
I visited the battlefield where the late General Hicks
Pasha and his force were almost entirely annihilated by the
Dervish hordes in 1883, despite the fact that within a mile
of the spot where the thirst-stricken troops were overwhelmed
was a large pool of water, of which they were apparently
in complete ignorance. The locality is in the depths of a
huge forest some thirty miles south of El Obeid, and I have
no hesitation in hazarding the opinion that, had the efforts
to relieve El Obeid been conducted by a far more numerous
and efficient force, the result would have been the same. It
is abundantly evident that the Government of that period
neither realised the situation nor appreciated the enormous
difficulties attendant on the movement of a large force
through such country ; the dispatch of the expedition,
under the circumstances, can only be characterised as an
act of extreme folly.
Thus, the whole edifice of territorial aggrandise-
ment in Africa, which Ismail Pasha and ids pre-
decessors, in an evil moment for their country, had
planned, toppled to the ground. It was built on
no sure foundation. The power gained by semi-
civilised skill over the wild tribes of the Soudan
had been grossly misused. Slave-hunting Pashas,
and corrupt and extortionate tax-collectors, had
* History of the Soudan Campaign
, p. 16.
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rendered the name of Egypt hateful to tlie people.
A despotism, which is neither strong nor beneficent,
must perforce fall directly it is exposed to serious
attack. The bubble Government established by
Ismail Pasha and his predecessors in the Soudan
collapsed directly it was pricked by the religious
im])ostor who was now to rule the country, neither
amongst the population whose fate was at stake in
the combat was a voice raised or a sword drawn
to avert its downfall.
CHAPTER XX
THE ABANDONMENT OF THE SOUDAN
November 1883-January 1884
My position—I press the British Goveiument to depart from a passive
attitude— Lord Granville's reply— The Egyptian Government
decide to hold Khartoum— Colonel Coetlogon recommends a
retreat on Berber—Opinions of the military authorities at Cairo
—The Egyptian Government wish to invoke the aid of the
Sultan— The British Government recommend withdrawal from
tlie Soudan—The Egyptian Ministers resign—Nubar Pasha takes
office—Observations on the policy of withdrawal from the Soudan.
I HAVE SO far been dealing with a period of
Egyptian history during which I either played
a subordinate part, or was in no way connected
with Egypt. I have occasionally criticised tlie
acts of those who were responsible for the conduct
of Egyptian affairs at this time. I now reach
another period. It would be false modesty not
to recognise that from this time forward I was
myself one of the principal actors on the Egyptian
stage, not, of course, to the extent of being re-
sponsible for the general policy of the Britisli
Government, but rather to the extent of being
mainly responsible for the management of local
affairs in Egypt. This latter responsibility 1
accept, only begging that it should be borne in
mind that my action had of necessity to conform
itself to the lines of general policy adopted in
London.
Durhig the period when I represented the
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British Government in Egypt, Egyptian affiiirs
frequently formed the subject of pubUc discussion.
jNIy own conduct was at times sharply criticised.
Any 3ne engaged in English public life must
expect at times to receive some hard knocks. I
believe I know, perhaps better than any one else,
the mistakes which I committed, and I shaU use
my best endeavours to deal with them at least as
unsparingly as I have dealt with what appear to
me to be the mistakes of others. Se judice^ nemo
nocens absolvitur.
The first step of any importance taken in
connection with Soudan affairs after my arrival
in Egypt was on November 19, 1883, on which
day I sent the following telegram to Lord
Granville: "The position of affairs in the Soudan
is becoming very serious. . . . Nothing definite
has been heard of Hicks since September 27.
He only had provisions for two months. The
Egyptian Government are very anxious, and evi-
dently anticipate bad news. Giegler Pasha, who
was with Gordon in the Soudan, and whom I
saw to-day, says that if Hicks is beaten, Khartoum
will probably fall. In fact, the Egyptian Govern-
ment have no money, and excepting Wood's and
Baker's forces,^ they have sent almost their last
available man to the Soudan. If Hicks's army is
destroyed, I have little doubt that, unless they get
assistance from outside, they will lose the whole of
the Soudan. Neither, if once they begin to fall
back, is it easy to say where along the valley of
the Nile they could arrest the rebel movement.
From some observations which Cherif Pasha let
dro]) to me this morning, I think it not at all
im])r<)l)able that before long he will ask for the
assistance of English or Indian troops. He said
• Sir Evelyn Wood commanded the Egyptian ai*my then in course
of tonnation. General Valentine Baker commanded the Gendarmerie.
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to me, *I suppose Her Majesty's Government
would not like to see Turks intervene in the
Soudan?' Shall I be right in telling him, if the
occasion arises, that under no circumstances must
he look for the assistance of British or Indian
troops in the Soudan ? As regards Turkish
assistance, I should be glad to receive instructions
as to the attitude I am to adopt. It is a question
which course the Egyptian Government would
dislike most—to call in the Turks, or to abandon
the Soudan. My own opinion is that, if Hicks be
beaten, the wisest course for the Egyptian Govern-
ment to adopt is to accept defeat and fall back
on whatever point on the Nile they can hold with
confidence, although the adoption of this course
would certainly give a great impulse to the Slave
Trade. But it will not be easy to persuade them
of this. Turkish intervention would, I think, be
most undesirable. ... I may now, at any moment,
be forced to discuss these Soudan affairs with
Cherif Pasha, and it is, therefore, desirable that I
should receive some indications of Your Lordship's
views. It will be very difficult, under the circum-
stances, to maintain a purely passive attitude, and
to give no advice whatsoever."
To this telegram Lord Granville replied, on
November 20, in the following words : " We
cannot lend English or Indian troops. ... It
would not be for the advantage of Egypt to invite
Turkish troops into the Soudan. If consulted,
recommend the abandonment of the Soudan within
certain limits."
The principal object which I had in view in
sending my telegram of November 19 was to
draw the British Government out of the passive
attitude which they had hitherto adopted. A
short residence in the country had been sufficient
to convince me that it was neither possible nor
374 JMODERN EGYPT pt. iii
desirable to leave the Egyptian Government to
manage Soudan affairs without any advice or
assistance.^ My object had been attained. It
is true that I was instructed only to give
advice " if consulted," but as I was sure to be
consulted, the reserve placed on my action did
not practically hamper me. I had obtained a
definite expression of opinion as to the Soudan
])olicy which commended itself to the British
Government in the event of a disaster happening
to General Hicks's army. They would not afford
military aid to reconquer the Soudan ; they were
also averse to the employment of Turkish troops.
Under these circumstances, the only possible
course to pursue would be to abandon the Soudan
within certain limits. This is the policy which,
as has been already mentioned, commended itself
to Lord Dufferin, Sir Edward ]\'alet, and Colonel
Stewart ; but the telegram which I sent on
November 19, was, so far as I am aware, the first
occasion upon which the British Government were
strongly pressed to express a decided opinion on the
subject. I consider myself, therefore, largely respon-
sible for initiating the policy of withdrawal from
the Soudan. On 5lr. Gladstone's Government rests
the responsibility of approving that policy.
So early as November 18, a report reached
Cairo that General Hicks's army was surrounded
and in want of provisions. But it was not till
* On November 22, I wrote privately to Lord Granville : " I fully
understand the policy of the Government, which is not to be drawn
into affairs in the Soudan. I see no reason why this policy should not
be carried out. On the other hand, it is quite impossible to separate
the Egyptian question from the Soudan question altogether." In
anotlier letter, dated December 23, I said : " The separation of tlie
Soudan question from the question of Egypt proper was always well-
nigh impossible on financial grounds. Now, it has become quite
impossible. 1 think tlie policy of complete abandonment is, on the
whole, the be*t of wliich the circumstances admit ; but I am not sure if
the extreme difficulty of carrying it out, or the consequences to which
it must almost inevitably lead, are fully appreciated at home."
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the 22nd that intelligence was received of the
destruction of the army.
I did not at once press any advice on the
Egyptian Government. In the first place, contra-
dictory reports continued to be received regarding
the fate of General Hicks's army, and, indeed, some
weeks elapsed before all doubts as to the occur-
rence of the disaster were removed. In the
second place, it was necessary to consult the
military authorities, who naturally required time
to study the facts of the case before expressing any
opinion as to the course to be adopted. In the
third place, I wished to give the Egyptian Govern-
ment time in order to see whether they would be
able to devise any practicable policy of their own.
The first decision at which the Egyptian
Government arrived was "to try and hold Khar-
toum, and to reopen the route between Suakin
and Berber." In reporting this decision to Lord
Granville, on November 23, I said that "accord-
ing to several telegrams received from Khartoum,
there appeared to be a general opinion on the spot
that it would be impossible to hold the town, and
that it would be necessary to fall back on Berber."
On November 26, Colonel Coetlogon, an officer
of General Hicks's army who had remained at
Khartoum, telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Wood in
the following terms: "I think it right to let you
know the situation. Khartoum and Sennar cannot
be held. In two months' time, there will be no
food. All supplies are cut off. To save what
remains of the army in the Soudan, a retreat on
Berber should be made at once, and, by a combined
movement from Berber and Suakin, that route
should be opened. Reinforcements arriving could
not reach Khartoum except by land, and for that a
very large force is necessary. . . . The troops that
are left are the refuse of the army, mostly old and
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blind. Again I say, the only way of saving what
remains is to attempt a general retreat on Berber,
This is the real state of affairs here, and 1 beg of
you to impress it on His Highness the Kliedive."
By December 3, I had obtained the views of
the principal British military authorities in Cairo,
and I was able to report to Lord Granville on the
situation. *' The most important question for
the moment," I said, "is to know whether the
Egyptian Government will be able to maintain
themselves at Khartoum. I have had the advan-
tage of fully discussing this question with General
Stephenson, Sir Evelyn Wood, and General Baker.^
All these high military authorities are of one
opinion. They consider that, if the INIahdi
advances, it will be impossible for the Egyptian
Government to hold Khartoum, I mean, of course,
with any forces of which they now dispose, or are
likely to dispose. I leave out of account the con-
tingency of despatching forces to Khartoum
belonging either to Her JNlajesty the Queen or
His Imperial JNlajesty the Sultan. Your Lordship
has informed me that Her Majesty's Government
are not prepared to send English or Indian troops
to the Soudan. I will not now attempt to discuss
* Sir Frederick Stephenson then commanded the British army of
occupation. General Baker left for Suakin durine^ the course of these
discussions. He did not see my despatch before he left Cairo. I,
therefore, wrote to him with a view to ascertaininj? whetlier I had
riijhtly interpreted the opinions whicli he liad expressed to me verbally.
He replied on January 7, 1884, in tlie following terms: " 1. I did not
believe tliat, witliout the aid of e.xterior power, Egypt could reconquer
or hold tlie Soudan. 2. 1 believed tliat tlie loss of tlie Soudan would
be a disastrous blow to Egypt, and that the e.xpenditure necessary for
the defence of Egypt proper would be ruinous to her financially in the
future, and far in excess of the sum which tlie Soudan liad cost in the
past. 3. I tliouglit it necessary that both England and Egypt should
immediately adopt a definite policy, and that the latter should prepare
to witlidraw from tlie Soudan, unless England could afl'ord such aid ag
would enable her to recover it and hold it." This, of course, really
meant that General Baker wished the British Government to undertake
the recouquest of the Soudan,
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the possible contingency of troops belonging to
His Imperial Majesty the Sultan being sent to the
Soudan. The adoption of this last-named measure
involves serious political considerations, which I
must leave to the appreciation of Her Majesty's
Government.
"The reasons which have led General Stephen-
son, Sir Evelyn Wood, and General Baker to tlie
conclusions that, if the Mahdi advances, it will be
impossible for the Egyptian Government to hold
Khartoum are that the garrison is demoralised,
that they have little or no confidence in the fight-
ing qualities of the soldiers, tliat the Egyptian
Government have no adequate reinforcements to
send, and that the difficulty of provisioning the
place, whether from the north or the south, is very
great, as are also the difficulties of maintaining a
line of communications. It is also very doubtful
whether General Baker will be able by force to
open up the Suakin-Berber route.^ . . . General
Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood are of opinion
that if the Egyptian Government be left to rely
exclusively on their own resources, and the Mahdi
advances, Khartoum must fall. They think that
an endeavour should be made to open out tiie
Berber-Suakin route, not because the mere estab-
lishment of communication between those two
points will enable the Egyptian Government, with
the forces at their disposal, to hold Khartoum, but
because the success of General Baker's undertaking;
will afford the best hope of retreat to the garrisons
of Khartoum and the immediate neighbourhood.
*' If Khartoum is abandoned, they think that
the whole valley of the Nile down to Wadi Haifa
or thereabouts will probably be lost to the
Egyptian Government.
^ General Baker's expedition to Suakin will be described in a
subsequent chapter.
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"I have dwelt especially on the opinions of
General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood,
because, as they have seen this despatch, I am
confident that I am riglitly interpreting their
views. I may, however, add that I have gathered,
in communication with Baker Pasha, that his
views on the military situation do not differ
materially from those of General Stephenson and
Sir Evelyn Wood.
"My own views on the points which I have
so far discussed are, relatively speaking, of little
value. But I should wish to say that, in view of
the facts with which we have to deal, it appears
to me scarcely possible to arrive at any other
conclusions than those of General Stephenson and
Sir Evelyn W^ood. Their views are also shared
by Mr. Clifford Lloyd,^ who has been present at
many of our discussions.
" I need hardly say that these views are, not
unnaturally, very unpalatable to the Egyptian
Government. I hardly think that Ch^rif Pasha
believes that he will be able to hold Khartoum
if the Mahdi advances, but neither he nor his
colleagues can make up their minds to aban-
doning it."
Whilst this despatch was on its way to London,
daily discussions took place in Cairo about the policy
which was to be pursued. It became clearer every
day that, if the Egyptian Government were left
to themselves, they would never decide upon any
definite and practicable policy. On December 10,
I sent the followiug private telegram to Lord Gran-
ville : *' I have not telegraphed for fresh instructions
as I thought it useless to do so until events had de-
veloped somewhat, and I had something definite to
recommend. But it is quite clear to me that more
* Mr. Clifford Lloyd had been sent to Egypt to reorganise the
Department of the Interior.
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definite instructions must shortly be sent as to the
attitude of Her Majesty's Government and as to
the advice to be given to the Egyptian Govern-
ment. At present, they are drifting on without
any very definite or practical plan of action, and
will continue to do so unless they are told what
course to pursue." This was followed, on
December 12, by an official telegram in which I
informed Lord Granville that Cherif Pasha had
called upon me and informed me that " the Khedive
had held a Council of Ministers and that they had
resolved to place themselves absolutely in the hands
of Her Majesty's Government." The Egyptian
Government thought that the best solution of the
question was to invite the aid of the Sultan. They
wished the British Govenmient to arrange the con-
ditions under which Turkish aid would be afforded,
the principal of these conditions being that the
Sultan's troops should leave the country when
their presence was no longer required. Clierif
Pasha pointed out that as the rebellion in the
Soudan was a religious movement, it would prob-
ably gather strength if British or Indian troops
were employed.
On December 13, I^ord Granville replied in the
following terms : " Her Majesty's Government
have no intention of employing British or Indian
troops in the Soudan. Her Majesty's Government
have no objection to offer to the employment of
Turkish troops, provided they are paid by the
Turkish Government, and that such employment
be restricted exclusively to the Soudan, with their
base at Suakin. Excepting for securing the safe
retreat of the garrisons still holding positions in
the Soudan, Her Majesty's Government cannot
agree to increasing the burden on the Egyptian
revenues by expenditure for operations which, even
if successful, and this is not probable, would be
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of doubtful advantage to Egypt. Her INIajesty's
Goveriiiiieiit recommend the Ministers of the
Khedive to come to an early decision to abandon
all territory south of xissouan, or, at least, of Wadi
Haifa. They will be prepared to assist in main-
taining order in Egypt proper, and in defending it,
as well as the ports of the Red Sea."
On December 16, I informed Lord Granville
that I had communicated to Cherif Pasha the
leading features of the policy of the British Govern-
ment in respect to Soudan affairs. Cherif Pasha
told me that he saw considerable objections to the
abandonment of the territory south of Wadi Haifa.
He promised that he would communicate to me
a written Memorandum on the subject. On
December 22, Cherif Pasha gave me this Memo-
randum. The Egyptian Government, it was said,
" cannot agree to the abandonment of territories
which they consider absolutely necessary for tlie
security, and even for the existence, of Egypt
itself." Cherif Pasha reiterated his proposal that
Turkish troops should be sent under conditions to
be negotiated in concert with the British Govern-
ment.
The impression left on my mind during the
course of these discussions was that the Egyptian
Government were only half in earnest in tlieir desire
to invoke Turkish aid. My belief at the time was
that they wished to use the suggestion about the
employment of Turkish troops as an instrument
by which to force the hand of the British Govern-
ment, and oblige the latter to employ British
troops. Moreover, the condition laid down by
the British Government to the effect that the
Ottoman Treasury should bear the cost of the
expedition, was practically prohibitive. In tele-
graphing the substance of Cherif Pasha's note to
Lord Granville, I, therefore, added the following
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remarks : " If negotiations are commenced with
tlie Porte on the basis of tlie latter paying, they
are, I conceive, ahiiost certain to fail. I believe
that the policy recommended by Her Majesty's
Government is, on the whole, the best of which
the very difficult circumstances admit. . . . No
amount of argument or persuasion will make the
present Ministry adopt the policy of abandonment.
The only way in which it can be carried out is for
me to inform the Khedive that Her Majesty's
Government insist on its adoption, and that if the
present Ministers will not carry it out, he must
name others who will do so. Further, I am not
sure that any Egyptian Ministers can be found who
will be willing to carry out the policy, and capable
of doing so. If, therefore, it is forced on the
Egyptian Government, Her Majesty's Government
must be prepared to face the possible contingency
of appointing English Ministers temporarily."
Some delay ensued before any answer was sent
to this telegram. In the interval, Cherif Pasha
presented me, on January 2, 1884, with a further
Note. In this Note, it was stated that the Egyptian
Government proposed to apply to the Porte for
10,000 men. In the event of their request being
refused, they wished to restore the Eastern Soudan
and the ports of the Red Sea to the Sultan, and to
endeavour with their own resources to hold the
valley of the Nile up to Khartoum. In forwarding
this proposal to Lord Granville, I said : " I can
only say that I entirely disbelieve that any Egyptian
force, which can be got together, will be capable
of defending the whole length of the valley of
the Nile from Khartoum downwards."
On January 4, I received Lord Granville's
reply. It was to the effect that the British
Government had no objection to the Sultan being
asked to send troops to Suakin provided that there
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was no increase of Egyptian expenditure, and pro-
vided also that the decision to be taken by the
Egyptian Government as regards its ovm move-
ments was not retarded. Her Majesty's Govern-
ment concurred in the proposal tliat, in the event
of the Sultan declining to send troops, the ad-
ministration of the shores of the Red Sea and of
the Eastern Soudan should be given back to the
Porte. As regards the suggestion that, with the
frontiers thus reduced, the Egyptian Government
should endeavour to hold the Nile up to Khartoum,
Her Majesty's Government, it was said, "do not
believe it to be possible for Egypt to defend
Khartoum, and whilst recommending the concen-
tration of the Egyptian troops, they desire that
those forces should be withdrawn from Khartoum
itself, as well as from the interior of the Soudan,
and you will so inform Cherif Pasha."
Simultaneously with this telegram, a further
confidential message was sent to me for use should
occasion require. It was to the following effect
:
** It is essential that in important questions affect-
ing the administration and safety of Egypt, the
advice of Her JNIajesty's Government should be
followed, as long as the priwisional occupation
continues. Ministers and Governors must carry
out this advice or forfeit their offices. The appoint-
ment of English INIiuisters would be most objec-
tionable, but it will no doubt be possible to find
Egyptians who will execute the Khedive's orders
under English advice. The Cabinet will give you
full support."
On communicatino; the views of the British
Government to Cherif Pasha, I found, as I had
anticipated, a strong determination to reject the
policy of withdrawal from Khartoum. I was,
therefore, obliged to make use of the instructions
contained in Lord Granville's confidential tele-
CH. XX THE SOUDAN 383
gram.^ The result was that, on January 7, Cherif
Pasha tendered his resignation to the Khedive.
My position at this moment was one of consider-
able difficulty. The policy of withdrawal from the
Soudan was very unpopular in Egypt. Riaz Pasha
was asked to form a Ministry, but declined to accept
the task. A rumour reached me that I should be
told that no JNlinistry could be formed to carry out
the policy of withdrawal from the Soudan ; thus,
it was hoped, the hand of the British Govern-
ment would be forced, and Cherif Pasha would of
necessity have returned to office to carry out his
own policy. I had warned the British Govern-
ment that they might have to face the possibility
of nominating English Ministers. This, however,
they were unwilling to do. JNIy instructions were
to get an Egyptian Ministry appointed. If, how-
ever, no Egyptian Ministry could be formed to
carry out the policy recommended by the British
Government, I intended to take the government
temporarily into my own hands, and then telegraph
to London for instructions. The Egyptians had,
I know, some inkling of what was likely to
happen, as, without making any official or private
communication to the Ministers, I purposely
allowed my intention to be known. The Khedive
became alarmed at the prospect of my pro-
gramme being carried into execution. He, there-
fore, decided to yield. On the night of January 7,
he sent for me and informed me that he had
accepted the resignation of his Ministers, and
had sent for Nubar Pasha. He added that he
*' accepted cordially the policy of abandoning tlie
whole of the Soudan, which, on mature reflection,
he believed to be the best in the interests of the
^ Although I was unable to agree with Cherif Pasha about Soudan
affairs, my personal relations with him during all this period were
excellent. On the day following his resignation, he dined at my
house, to the great astonishment of all the gossips of Cairo.
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country." On January 8, I was able to telegraph
to Lord Granville that Nubar Pasha had consented
to form a Ministry, and that "he entirely con-
curred in the wisdom of abandoning the Soudan,
retaining possession of Suakin."
Thus the general policy, which was to be
pursued, was definitely settled. It was, indeed,
high time to come to some decision. Mr. Power
telegraphed from Khartoum on December 30
:
"The state of affairs here is very desperate." On
January 7, Colonel Coetlogon telegraphed to the
Khedive : " I would strongly urge on Your High-
ness the great necessity for an immediate order for
retreat being given. Were we twice as strong as
we are, we could not hold Khartoum against the
whole country, which, without a doubt, are one
and all a":ainst us."
"O"
Few measures have formed the subject of more
severe criticism than the policy adopted by Mr.
Gladstone's Government in 1883-84 in connection
with the Soudan. On February 12, 1884, a vote
of censure on the Government was moved by
Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords and by Sir
Stafford Northcote in the House of Commons.
It was couched in the following terms : " That
this House ... is of opinion that the recent
lamentable events in the Soudan are due in a great
measure to the vacillating and inconsistent policy
pursued by Her Majesty's Government." Care
was evidently taken not to base the attack on the
Government upon any specific objections to the
policy of withdrawal from the Soudan. Lord
SaUsbury, indeed, said ; " We may think it was a
right policy to maintain the Soudan, or we may
think it was a riglit policy to abandon it; but we
must, whatever opinion we hold, condemn the
policy of the Government." Looking back on
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what occurred, and making allowance for the fact
that the necessities of party warfare often involve
an expression of condemnation or of approval in
somewhat exaggerated terms, it must be admitted
that the censure, which the leading Conservative
statesmen wished to pass on the Government,
though severe, was not altogether undeserved.
Unquestionably, the state of affairs, which then
existed in the Soudan, was in some measure due
to the policy of the British Government. But if
we inquire in what measure it was due to that
pohcy, the answer is clear. The British Govern-
ment could have used their paramount influence in
Egypt to stop the departure of General Hicks's
expedition, and they did not do so. Had they done
so, it is not only possible but also probable that the
advance of the Mahdi would have been arrested at
Khartoum. Putting aside points of detail, that is
the sum total of the charge which can be brought
against Mr. Gladstone's Government. I do not
know of any answer to this charge save that which is
contained in the commonplace, but extremely true
remark that it is easy to be wise after the event.
^
Turning to the criticisms made, not so much by
responsible party leaders as by the general public,
it is to be observed that the view which was at the
time freely expressed, and which has to some extent
floated down the tide of history, was that the British
Government were responsible for the relapse of the
Soudan into barbarism, and that not only might
that country have been preserved to Egypt, but that
it would have been so preserved had the Egyptian
Government been allowed to follow their own de-
vices. General Gordon did a good deal to propagate
1 Mr. Morley {Life of Gladstone, vol. iii. p. 72) very appropriately
prefaces his chapter on Ei^-ypt by the following characteristic i-emark
made by the Duke of >Vellington ; " 1 find many very ready to say
what I ought to have done wlien a battle is over ; but I wish some of
these persons would come and tell me what to do before the battle."
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this idea. His Journal abounds with statements
fixing the responsibility for the abandonment of the
Soudan on the British Government. I maintain
that this view is entirely erroneous. Save in respect
to one sin of omission, that is to say, that no veto
was imposed on the Hicks expedition, the British
Government were in no way responsible for the loss
of the Soudan. They were responsible for obliging
the Egyptian Government to look the facts fairly in
the face. Now the main fact was this,—that after
the defeat of General Hicks's army, the Soudan
was lost to Egypt beyond any hope of recovery,
unless some external aid could be obtained to effect
its reconquest. That external aid could only come
from two countries, England or Turkey. The
British Government decided that the troops of
Great Britain should not be used to reconquer
the Soudan. This decision was ratified by British
public opinion, neither am I aware that any one,
who could speak with real authority on the subject,
was at the time found to challenge its wisdom. It
must be borne in mind that, if British troops had
been sent to the Soudan in 1883, they would have
been obliged to stay there in considerable lumibers.
The Egyptian Government could not, with their
own resources, have held the country even after
the forces of the iNIahdi had been defeated. The
conditions of the problem which awaited solution
were, therefore, essentially different from those
which obtained some thirteen years later when
the reconquest of the Soudan was taken in hand.
Turning to the other alternative, it may be said
that, although the proposal to utilise the Sultan's
services gave occasion to some diplomatic trifling,
no one seriously wished Turkish troops to be
em])loyed. Every one felt that the remedy would
be worse than the disease. 'I'he Egyptian Govern-
ment, as in the days of Anibi, were afraid that if
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Turkish troops once came into the country, they
would not leave it again. The British Government
gave a half-hearted assent to the employment of a
Turkish force, but coupled their assent with con-
ditions which were impossible of execution. Even
supposing that the Sultan would have been able to
reconquer the country, which is a bold assumption,
it was notorious that the misgovernment of Turkish
Pashas had caused the rebellion, and it might be
safely predicted that, whatever temporary success
might be gained, no permanent settlement could be
hoped for if Turkish authority were re-established.
It must also be remembered that to take so
important a step as that of immediately sending
troops to the Soudan would have been quite
inconsistent with the character of the Sultan. It
is highly improbable that he would have consented
to render any prompt and effective assistance. For
all these reasons, it cannot be doubted that the
decision not to call in Turkish aid was wise.^
^ About four years later, the question of handing over Suakiu to
the Turks was again raised. I did not like the proposal, but the
difficulties of the whole Egyptian situation were at that time so great,
that I was rather disposed to support it, as a choice of evils. Lord
Salisbury, however—very wisely, I think—rejected the idea, and, as
subsequent events proved, it was fortunnte that he did so. His
opinion was conveyed to me in the following very characteristic letter,
dated December 22, 1888 : " At first, your proposal to hand over
Suakin to the Turk seemed to me very alluring. It would be such
a blessing to be rid of it, both for Egypt and for us ; and in the light
of that hope, the conditions which it would be necessary to obtain from
the Turks did not seem insuperable obstacles, but only difficulties to
be overcome. But as time went on—and especially after we had been
able to watch the impression caused by Grenfell's easy success—we
felt the task was not so easy. It is as material that we should look
at the matter from an English, as that you should look at it from an
Egyptian point of view. Unluckily, the English point of view is not
only in practice the most important, but it is also the most difficult
to understand. The misfortune—the root- difficulty—we have iu
dealing with questions like those which beset Egypt is that public
opinion in its largest sense takes no note of them. Unless some
startling question appealing to their humanity arises, the constituencies
are quite indifferent. The result is that the Members of the House
of Commons are each like a ship without an anchor. They drift as
any chance current may drive them. Yet the combined resultant oi
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If, therefore, neither British nor Turkish troops
were to be employed, withdrawal from the Soudan
was imposed on the Egyptian Government as an
unavoidable although unpleasant necessity. This,
in fact, was the conclusion to which all the
responsible authorities on the spot arrived at
different stages of the proceedings. I have already
given the opinions expressed by Lord Dufferin,
their many drifting wills is omnipotent and without appeal. If they
vote wrong on an Irish question, a hint from their electoral supporters
will bring them right. If they vote wrong on an Egyptian question,
there is no such appeal. The result is that we are at the mercy of
any fortuitous concurrence of fanaticisms or fads that chance may
direct against us. This preamble is necessary to enable you to
understand the importance 1 attach to the next remark : if we
withdrew our own and tlie Egyptian troops from Suakin in favour
of Turkey, we should be assailed by three separate feelings—the
Turcophobists, still very strong ; the military or jingo feeling, which
simply desires to annex, and objects to evacuating in all cases ; and
the curious collection of fanatics who believe that by some magic wave
of the diplomatic wand the Soudan can be turned into a second India.
The superficial philanthropy of the day runs in this channel, and by
its side, as is often the case, a current of decided roguery. There are
promoters, and financiers, and contractors of various kinds, who know
perfectly well that there is as much chance of colonising the Sahara
as the Soudan, but who see a prospect of sweeping a shoal of guile-
less shareholders into their net, and are longing to take advantage
of the prevailing delusion. All these people would grumble fiercely
if we gave Suakin to the Turks ; but if we could have done with it,
the riddance would be well worth a few grumbles. But the Turks
would commit every po-^sible blunder. Tliey would oppress the
Arabs, destroy all possibility of any trade, except the Slave Trade, to
which they would give every facility ; and, having caused the hostility
of the natives to the utmost by taxation and misgovernment, would
allow the garrison of Suakin to fall into so weak a state in regard to
command, numbers, and equipment, that some fine day a lieutenant
of the Khalifa would rush the fortresses. If such a thing happened,
the combined forces to which I have referred would have their
opportunity. They would dominate the House of Commons. The
political air would be rent with tales of the inefficiency and the
brutality of the Turks, and with praises of the virtues of the
Soudanese, only requiring Home Rule under the aegis of Great IJritain
to develop them into an equatorial Arcadia. The whole evil would je
attributed to the evacuation, which must be immediately reversed. 1
need not go any farther. There would be endless complications with
foreign Powers, and a great deal of waste of blood and money with no
result. It might go much I'arther still, for there is a good deal of
loose powder about on the shores of the Red Sea. On these grounds
alone, we have come to the conclusion that a Turkish occupation
presents more dangers than advantages."
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Sir Edward Malet, and Colonel Stewart prior to the
occurrence of the Hicks disaster, and those of Sir
Frederick Stephenson, Sir Evelyn Wood, General
Baker, and myself expressed subsequent to that
event. Sir Auckland Colvin, who knew Egypt
well, wrote to me from India, in December 1883,
advocating the policy of abandoning the Soudan.
Mr. Power, also, put the matter in homely and
forcible language. Writing to his mother on
February 9, 1884, he said : " Holdhig Khartoum is
bosh. . . . This is, indeed, a * land of desolation,' as
Baker called it. We must give it up." I would
now speak of the opinions of General Gordon.
Colonel Stewart was, I think, a better authority
on Soudan affairs, as they then existed, than
General Gordon ; but the public attached great
weight to General Gordon's opinions. What,
therefore, were those opinions ?
General Gordon so frequently expressed at short
intervals opinions which were opposed to each other,
that it is not easy to answer this question with
confidence. In a pamphlet issued by the Pall Mall
Gazette in 1885 and entitled Too Late, it was stated
that General Gordon's " personal views as to the
impolicy of abandoning Khartoum were notorious " ;
and in the Pall Mall Gazette of January 11, 1884,
an account is given of an interview between
General Gordon and a representative of that news-
paper. General Gordon is alleged to have con-
demned the policy of evacuation. "You must
either," he said, "surrender absolutely to the
Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all hazards." I do
not call in question the fact that General Gordon
used language of this sort, but it was certainly
op])osed both to what he wrote about the same
time officially, and to what he said when he was
on the point of starting for Khartoum.
On January 22, 1884, whilst on his way to Egypt,
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General Gordon wrote a INIemorandum which he
sent to Lord Granville, and in which the following
passage occurs : " The Soudan is a useless posses-
sion, ever was so, and ever will be so. ... 1 think
Her Majesty's Government are fully justified in
recommending the evacuation, inasmuch as the
sacrifices necessary towards securing a good govern-
ment would be far too onerous to admit of such
an attempt being made." Colonel Stewart, after
reading General Gordon's INIemorandum, wrote as
follows : " I have carefully read over General
Gordon's observations and cordially agree wit
what he states. ... I quite agree with Genera
Gordon that the Soudan is an expensive and use-
less possession. No one who has visited it can
escape the reflection : ' What a useless possession
and what a huge encumbrance on Egypt.'
"
Further evidence can be produced, which is even
more conclusive as regards General Gordon's views.
When he arrived in Cairo in January 1884, I had
to prepare certain instructions for him. One
passage of those instructions ran as follows : "You
will bear in mind that the main end to be pursued
is the evacuation of the Soudan. This policy was
adopted after very full discussion by the Egyptian
Government on the advice of Her Majesty's
Government. I understand, also, that you entirely
concur in the desirability of adopting this policy."
When I went through the draft instructions with
General Gordon, I well remember stopping at this
passage and asking him whether I was right in
saying that he agreed in the policy adopted by
the Egyptian Government on the advice of the
British Government. Without the smallest hesi-
tation. General Gordon expressed in the strongest
terms his entire concurrence in that policy. In-
deed, he insisted that a phrase should be added
stating that in his opinion the policy, which had
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been adopted, "should on no account be changed."
This was accordingly done.
It seems to me that this evidence is conclusive.
I think that I have every right to assume that
when General Gordon, at a momentous period of
his life, gave his opinion deliberately in official
form, and with a due sense of the responsibility
he was taking, what he then said must be regarded
as his true opinion, and that it cannot be gainsaid
by any obiter dicta let fall in conversation at other
times.
Mere appeal to authority is, however, a weak
argument. Reason, it has been truly said, and
not authority, should determine the judgment. I
maintain that, judged by the standard of reason,
the arguments in favour of the policy adopted at
the time are irrefragable. I am, of course, merely
speaking of the general policy, not of the details
of its execution, in respect to which, as I shall
subsequently show, many errors were committed.
The only practical question was, not whether it
was or was not desirable to hold Khartoum, but
whether it was possible to hold Khartoum. To
this question there could only be one answer.
The Egyptian Government, with the resources of
which they disposed, were unable to hold Khar-
toum. No one, therefore, has a right to criticise
the policy which was actually adopted, unless he is
prepared to advocate that the reconquest of the
Soudan should have been effected by British,
British -Indian, or Turkish troops. For my own
part, I may say that, although during the period
1 represented the British Government in Egypt
I may have made many mistakes, there is one
episode to which I look back without the least
sense of personal regret. Time and reflection
have only served to convince me more strongly
than ever that I acted rightly in advocating
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withdrawal from the Soudan in 1883-84. It was
the adoption of that policy which allowed the
Egyptian and British Governments, after a painful
period of transition, to devote themselves to the
work of reorganisation and reform in Egypt proper,
a work which could not have been undertaken
at tliat time with any prospect of success so long
as the Soudan hung like a dead -weight round
the necks of Egyptian reformers. Whatever
else may be said against the Egyptian policy of
Mr. Gladstone's Government, my conviction is that
they deserve the eternal gratitude of the Egyptian
people for coming down with a heavy hand on all
the vacillations of the Cairene administrators, and
obliging the Egyptian Government to look the
facts of the case fairly in the face.^
There is, however, another criticism which was
directed against the conduct of the British Govern-
ment at this time and to which some allusion
should be made. It was stated that, even suppos-
^ In a private letter to me, dated December 28, 1883, Lord Granville
stated the case in characteristic lang'uage. " It tal<es away," he said,
"somewhat of the position of a man to sell his racers and hunters, but
if he cannot afford to keep them, tlie sooner they ^o to Tattersall's the
better." 1 have a large number of private letters from Lord Granville.
Some of them are very interestinsf. His light touches on serious
questions were inimitable, and his good humour and kindness of heart
come out in every line lie wrote. It was possible to disagree with him,
but it was impossible to be angry with him. It was also impossible to
get him to give a definite answer to a difficult question when he wished
not to commit himself. His power of eluding the main point at issue
was quite extraordinary. Often did I think that lie was on the horns
of a dilemma, and that he was in a position from which no escape was
possible without the expression of a definite opinion. I was generally
mistaken. With a smile and a quick little epigrammatic plirase. Lord
Granville would elude one's grasp and be off without giving any opinion
at all. I remember on one occasion pressing him to say what he wished
me to do aiiout one of the numerous offshoots of tlie general tangle,
wliich formed tlie Egyptian Question. The matter was one of consider-
able importance. All I could extract from him was the Delphic saying
that my " presence in London would be a good excuse for a dawdle."
I remember once comparing notes with Lord Goscben on this
subject. He told me that on one occasion, when he was at Con-
stantinople, after many unsuccessful endeavours to obtain definite
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ing that withdrawal from the Soudan was necessary,
the policy of the Government should not have been
publicly announced. This view was advocated by
Lord Salisbury. Speaking in the House of Lords
on February 27, 1885, he said : " As soon as they
(the British Government) made up their minds
that the Soudan was to be evacuated, their first
course was to retire the garrisons as rapidly as
they could, and when this was done they might
announce their policy as loudly as they please.
But it was an unfortunate announcement when
the men were in deadly danger,— a policy of
crass folly, which almost amounts to a crime."
This criticism, though strongly expressed, sounds
reasonable in substance ; and, in fact, if the policy
advocated by Lord Salisbury had been possible,
it would unquestionably have been the best to
pursue. Can any one, however, suppose that,
when the British press and the British Parliament
were actively engaged in discussing Egyptian
answers to certain important questions which he had addressed to Lord
Granville, he wrote a very lengthy and very strong- private letter,
intimating that unless clear answers were sent, he would resign. 'I'he
only reply he received from Lord Granville was as follows: "My
dear Goschen—Thank you a thousand times for expressing your views
so frankly to your old colleagues." The dawdling policy, or, to put the
case in another way, the policy of not having a policy at all, is often
very good diplomacy, particularly when it is carried out by a man of
Lord Granville's singular tact, quickness, and diplomatic experience.
This line of action, which involves delaying any important decision
until the last moment and not looking far ahead, is rather in con-
formity with English customs and habits of thought. It was generally
practised by many of the Englisli statesmen and diplomatists of Lord
Granville's generation. Unfortunately, Lord Granville, during tiie
latter portion of his career, fell on times when, under the auspices
of Prince Bismarck, a directness, I might almost say a brutality, had
been introduced into European diplomacy, which did not exist before.
Lord Granville always seemed to me to make the mistake of con-
founding the cases in which the dawdling launez-faire policy was wise,
with those in which it was necessary to take time by the forelock and
have a clearly defined policy at an early date. This, in a F\)reign
Minister, is a great fault. He becomes to too great a degree the sport
of circumstances, and inspires foreign Governments with a belief that
the policy of hia country is vacillating and uncertain.
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affairs, when keen party opponents were constantly
pressing the Government for a dechu-ation of their
intentions, when Cairo was full of newspaper
correspondents, when the policy of withdrawal
could only be enforced by the heroic remedy
of a change of Ministry in Egypt, when it is
remembered that such a thing as official secrecy
is almost unknown in Egypt, and when it is
further remembered that numerous agents, some
of whom, especially General Gordon himself,^ were
not remarkable for reticence of speech, necessarily
had to be taken into the confidence of the Govern-
ment,—can any one suppose for one moment that,
under all these circumstances, the adoption of a
policy of withdrawal could have been kept secret ?
Secrecy was, in fact, impossible, and it mattered
little whether any public announcement was or
was not made, at all events in Europe or in Egypt
proper.
This, therefore, is all I have to say about the
policy of withdrawal from the Soudan. In spite
of the vehemence with which every one connected
with the adoption of this policy was at one time
assailed, I believe it to have been the only wise policy
possible under the circumstances. Further, in spite
of some obvious drawbacks, and of many mistakes
in the execution, I believe the adoption of this
policy to have been beneficial to Egypt itself and
to the accomplishment of the general aims of Eng-
land in that country. If I am asked whether the
policy of withdrawal from the Soudan \vas desir-
able or the reverse, and, if undesirable, why it was
adopted, I have no hesitation in answering these
questions. As a mere academic question, I think
that the policy of withdrawing from Khartoum was
* It will presently be explained (pp. 467-471) that General Gordon
was himself responsible for spreading- in the Soudan the news that the
Egyptian Government intended to withdraw from tlie country.
OH. XX THE SOUDAN 395
undesirable, but I decline to consider that, in view
of the circumstances which then existed, the
question of the desirability or undesirability of
withdrawal was at the time one of any practical
importance. A long course of misgovernment had
culminated in a rebellion in the Soudan, which the
Egyptian Government were powerless to repress.
They, therefore, had to submit to the time-
honoured law expressed in the words Vae victis.
The abandonment of the Soudan, however
undesirable, was imposed upon the Egyptian
Government as an unpleasant but imperious
necessity for the simple reason that, after the
destruction of General Hicks's army, they were
unable to keep it. This, as it appears to me, is
the residuum of truth which may be extracted
from all the very lengthy and somewhat stormy
discussions which have taken place on this subject.
CHAPTER XXI
THE REBELLION IN THE EASTERN SOUDAN
August 1883-March 1884
Prevailing discontent—Annihilation of a force sent to Sinkat—And of
one sent to Tokar—Defeat of the Egyptians at Tamanieb—It is
decided to send the Gendarmerie and some black troops under
Zobeir Pasha to Suakin— Instructions to General Baker— He
arrives at Suakin— His instructions are modified—Zobeir Pasha
retained at Cairo—General Baker advances to Tokar—His defeat
—
Fall of Sinkat—It is decided to send a British force to Tokar
Fall of Tokar—General Graiiam advances—Action at El Teb—The
British troops return to Suakin—Battle of Tamai—Results of the
operations.
The events already narrated could not fail to
have a great effect in the Eastern Soudan.
There also a long course of misgovernment had
produced its natural result. The people were ripe
for rebellion against the Egyptian Government.
When, therefore, towards the middle of 1883, the
Mahdi issued a Proclamation to the inhabitants of
the Eastern Soudan, inviting them "to advance
against the Turks and drive them out of the
country," they were well disposed to respond to his
appeal. A former slave-dealer at Suakin, named
Osman Digna, was appointed to be the Mahdi's
Emir. He was a man of considerable ability, and
was destined in the near future to play a leading
part in the affairs of the Eastern Soudan.
At this time, an Egyptian garrison was posted
at Sinkat, a spot situated about fifty miles from
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Suakin. The road from Suakin to Sinkat passes
through some rocky defiles, which present great
facilities for defence against any force advancing
from the coast. The geographical position of
Sinkat renders it devoid of military importance.
A wise foresight would have dictated its abandon-
ment and the retreat of the garrison to Suakin
at an early stage of the rebellion. Unfortunately,
this was not done ; the result was disastrous. The
garrison of Sinkat was commanded by Tewfik Bey,
an officer of courage and ability, who is described
by Mrs. Sartorius as "the one grand and noble
man who stands forth so prominently amongst the
horde of Egyptian officials." ^
The first overt act of rebellion took place on
August 5. On that day, Osman Digna appeared
with 1500 men before Sinkat and demanded, in the
name of the Mahdi, that both Sinkat and Suakin
should be delivered up to him. These demands
being refused, Osman Digna attacked the outskirts
of Sinkat. He was repulsed with considerable
loss. Two of his nephews were killed, and he was
himself wounded.
On September 9, Tewfik Bey again defeated the
rebels at Handoub, a spot on the road leading from
Suakin to Berber.
These successes were, however, but the prelude to
a series of disasters which were about to befall the
Egyptian arms. Towards the middle of October,
a force of about 160 men sent by Suleiman Pasha,
the Governor of Suakin, to the relief of Sinkat,
was attacked and totally defeated by the Dervishes.
The women and children, who accompanied the
soldiers, alone escaped to become the slaves of
their captors.
• The Soudan, p. 61. Mrs. Sartorius was the wife of Colonel
Sartorius, who was General Baker's principal staff officer. She
accompanied her husband to Suakin.
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The result of this engagement was to increase
the prestige of the JNIahdi and of Osman Digna,
and to encourage amongst their followers the belief
that they were fighting in a cause w^hich would
render them invincible. Another event soon fol-
lowed tending in the same direction.
On November 3, an Egyptian force of about 550
men was despatched from Suakin to Trinkitat, a
seaport lying about forty -five miles to the south.
The object of this expedition was to relieve Tokar,
situated some twenty miles from the coast, which
place was at that time invested by the JNIahdist
forces. Captain JMoncrieff", R.N., the British Consul
at Jeddah, accompanied the expedition. The force
left Trinkitat on the morning of November 4.
After marching for about an hour and a half, they
were attacked by the Dervishes. " The Egyptian
troops formed square, the front and right of the
square commenced firing, but by some means the
left of the square was broken into by eight or ten
Arabs, which immediately created a panic amongst
the troops and caused a general stampede." In
this action, Captain Moncrieff and 160 Egyptian
officers and men were killed. The attacking force
only amounted to about 200 men.
A worse disaster was to follow. Suleiman
Pasha and JNIahmoud Tahir Pasha, who com-
manded the troops at Suakin, were fearful of the
effect which would be produced at Cairo when
the news arrived of the recent defeat near Tokar.
They were aware that an expedition was to be
sent from Cairo to Suakin under the command of
General Baker. They determined, therefore, "to
try another throw of the dice with a fine regiment of
600 Soudanese, under JNIajor Kassiin, that had been
hurriedly sent from INIassowah." This regiment
was attacked and cut to pieces. Of the whole
force, only 2 officers and 33 men returned to Suakin.
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These successive victories established the power
of Osman Di<i:na in the Eastern Soudan. On
November 19, 1883, I telegraphed to Lord
Granville : *' It is clear that Egyptian authority
in the Eastern Soudan does not extend beyond
the coast, and is even threatened there."
After the defeat of General Hicks's army, the
military authorities at Cairo were of opinion that
an endeavour should be made to open out the
Berber- Suakin route with a view to facilitating
the retreat of the garrison of Khartoum. The
question then arose as to what troops should be
employed to attain this object.
The British Government objected to the em-
ployment of the Egyptian army, then being
organised by Sir Evelyn Wood. There were
valid grounds for their objection. The army
was intended for service in Egypt proper. Its
organisation was at that time defective. None
of the men had served for more than one year.
Sir Evelyn Wood and the officers serving under
him had not as yet had time to fashion into shape
the raw material at their disposal. The employ-
ment of the Egyptian army might not improbably
have led to a further disaster. The British War
Office authorities felt this so strongly that, at a
subsequent period when British troops were em-
ployed, they declined to allow any portion of the
Egyptian army to take part in the expedition.
Under these circumstances, the only force avail-
able was the Egyptian Gendarmerie commanded
by General Baker. A few British officers were
attached to this force, but with, I think, one
exception (Colonel Sartorius), they were not on
the active list of the British army, and it was
held, perhaps somewhat illogically, that the
Egyptian Government possessed a greater degree
of liberty of action in respect to the employment
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of this force than was the case in respect to the
army. The Gendarmerie were fairly well equipped,
but, with the exception of some "200 Turks, who
were good soldiers, the force was composed of bad
fighting material.
It was with the utmost hesitation that I con-
sented to the despatch of General Baker's force to
Suakin. I was under no delusion as to the quality
of the troops which he would command. JNlore-
over, I feared that Baker Pasha would be led into
the committal of some rash act. He was a
gallant officer, and it was certain that his military
instincts would revolt at inaction, more especially
when Sinkat and Tokar were being beleaguered in
the immediate vicinity of Suakin. There were
also special reasons which made me doubtful as to
the wisdom of sending General Baker. He had
been obliged to leave the British army under
circumstances on which it is unnecessary to dwell.
He was ardently attached to his profession, and it
was well known that the main object of his life
was to regain his position in the British army,
which he hoped to do by distinguished service in
the field. Before he left Cairo, I impressed upon
him strongly that the necessity of avoiding any
disaster must come before all other considerations,
and that if he did not feel suflficient confidence in
his troops to advance, he must remain and defend
Suakin, however painful the consequences might
be as regards the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar.
General Baker expressed to me his entire con-
currence in these views, and promised that he
would act up to them. I was not, however,
content with mere verbal instructions. On the
advice of Sir Evelyn Wood and myself, a letter,
which contained the following passage, was written
to General Baker by the Khedive on December 17:
"The mission entrusted to you, having as its object
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the pacification of the regions designated in my
above-mentioned order, and the maintenance, as
far as possible, of communication between Berber
and Siiakin, I wish you to act with the greatest
prudence on account of the insufficiency of the
forces placed under your command.
"I think it would be hazardous to commence
any military operations before receiving the rein-
forcements which shall be sent to you with Zobeir
Pasha. ... If, in the event of the situation im-
proving, you should consider an action necessary, I
rely on your prudence and ability not to engage
the enemy except under the most favourable
conditions. . . . ]\Iy confidence in your prudence
enables me to count upon your conforming to
these instructions."
On December 27, General Baker arrived at
Suakin. Almost simultaneously with his arrival,
the change of Ministry narrated in the last
chapter took place at Cairo. The result of this
change was the issue, on January 11, 1884, of
the following further instructions to General Baker
by Sir Evelyn Wood, acting on behalf of the
Khedive :
—
1. All that portion of your instructions which gives you
discretion to open the Suakin -Berber route westward of
Sinkat by force, if necessary, is cancelled.
2. If it is absolutely necessary to use force in order to
extricate the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar you can do so,
provided you consider your forces sufficient and you may
reasonably count on success.
The enforced submission of the men who have been
holding out at these two places would be very painful to
His Highness the Khedive; but even such a sacrifice is
better, in his opinion, than that you and your troops should
attempt a task which you cannot fairly reckon to be within
your power.
3. You are directed to continue to use every effort
possible to open the route up to Berber by diplomatic
means.
VOL. I 2d
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About this time, another change of importance
was made. On December 9, 1 wrote to Lord
Granville : " The Egyptian Government propose
to send Zobeir Pasha to Suakin. Your Lordship,
without doubt, is aware of Zobeir Pasha's ante-
cedents. He lias been intimately connected with
the Slave Trade. Under ordinary circumstances,
his employment by the Egyptian Government
would have been open to considerable objection,
and I should have thought it my duty to remon-
strate against it. Under present circumstances,
however, I have not thought it either necessary or
desirable to interfere with the discretion of the
Egyptian Government in this matter. Whatever
may be Zobeir Pasha's faults, he is said to be a
man of great energy and resolution. The Egyptian
Government consider that his services may be
very useful in commanding the friendly Bedouins
who are to be sent to Suakin, and in conducting
negotiations with the tribes on the Berber-Suakin
route and elsewhere. I may mention that Baker
Pasha is anxious to avail himself of Zobeir Pasha's
services. Your Lordship will, without doubt, bear
in mind that, up to the present time, the whole
responsibility for the conduct of affairs in the
Soudan has been left to the Egyptian Govern-
ment. It appears to me that, under present
circumstances, it would not have been just, while
leaving all the responsibility to the Egyptian
Government, to have objected to that Govern-
ment using their own discretion on such a point
as the employment of Zobeir Pasha. I make these
remarks as the employment of Zobeir Pasha may
not improbably attract attention in England."
Every Englishman is justly proud of the part
which his country has borne in the suppression of
Slavery and the Slave Trade ; few will be disposed
to challenge the distinguished part played by the
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Anti-Slavery Society in this humane work. The
Society, however, is not without its defects. Con-
centration of thought and action on one subject,
together with a certain want of imagination which
occasionally characterises the conduct of English-
men in dealing with foreign affairs and wliich is
perhaps in some degree due to tlieir insular habits
of thought, produce their natural effect. The
members of the Anti-Slavery Society appear some-
times to be unable to look at any question save
from a purely anti-slavery point of view, and, even
from that point of view, they are often liable to
error through failure to judge accurately of the
relative importance of events. It is certain that
the action of the Society in connection witli Soudan
affairs in 1883-84, though well hitentioned, was
mischievous. The main question, whether from
the general or the anti-slavery point of view, was
how to quiet the Soudan. The establishment of
the Mahdi's domination in that country coukl not
fail to give an impulse to the Slave Trade. Every
measure which tended to counteract the JNlahdi's
authority should, therefore, have been welcomed
by the Anti- Slavery Society, even although it
might have been open to some objections in
detail. The Society failed to see this. They
were so taken up with the objections to the detail,
that they forgot tlie main principle. In deference
to the opinions which the Society was known to
entertain, it was decided not to send Zobeir Pasha to
Suakin. The consequences of this decision are thus
described by Mrs. Sartorius : " As a matter of fact
Zobeir never came down. . . . This was another
grand blunder that rendered the Suakin expedition
ahnost hopeless from the first. 'J'he black troo])s
required to be led in their own fashion ; they had
no idea of diill or discipline. There was no time
to lick them into shape. With Zobeir I^asha
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at their head, they would have been formidable
antagonists to tiie Soudanese, and have fought in
precisely the same fashion. AVithout him, they
were wasted."
On January 31, telegraphic communication with
Suakin was established. General Baker reported
that he was at Trinkitat, and hoped to move on
the following day to Tokar. Some little delay,
however, occurred. On February 2, General Baker
telegraphed that he would advance on the morning
of the 3rd with 3200 men. " There is," he added,
"every chance of success." I awaited the result
with anxiety. On the 6th, General Baker tele-
graphed : " I marched yesterday morning with
3500 men towards Tokar ; we met the enemy,
after two miles' march, in small numbci s, and drove
them back about two miles nearer the wells of Teb.
On the square being only threatened by a small
force of the enemy, certainly less than 1000 strong,
the Egyptian troops threw down their arms and
ran, carrying away the black troops with them,
and allowing themselves to be killed without the
slightest resistance. INIore than 2000 were killed.
They fled to Trinkitat. Unfortunately, the
Europeans who stood suffered terribly. . . . The
troops are utterly untrustworthy except for the
defence of earthworks."
I remember the bitter disappointment with
which I received this telegram. JNIy worst fears
had been realised. General Baker had evidently
been led into undertaking a task which was beyond
the powers of the inefficient force at his dis})osal.
I remember also that my first impression was that,
after the strong manner in which I had spoken to
him and after the assurances he had given to me at
Cairo, General Baker would re})roach himself fur
having advanced on Tokar. It was with this feel-
ing uppermost in my mind that I at once tele-
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graphed to the Consul at Suakin : "Tell General
Baker that I feel sure that he did all that could be
done, that he has my entire confidence, and that I
shall continue to do all I can to help and support
him."
When this matter was subsequently (February
12) discussed in England, Lord Derby, speaking
on behalf of the British Government, said : " We
may have known—we did knoAv—that the com-
position of General Baker's force was not very
good, but I venture to affirm that nobody supposed
that a body of men calling itself a regular army
would run away, almost without a shot fired, from
half its own number, or less than half, of savages
under no discipline whatever. It is a thing, I
should imagine, new in war. It is a misfortune,
but it is a misfortune for which we, sitting in
London, can hardly hold ourselves responsible."
I agree in this view. I do not think that
the British Ministers were responsible for the
despatch of General Baker's force to Suakin
except in so far that, by not offering any other
form of assistance, they practically obliged the
Egyptian Government either to utilise the Gen-
darmerie or to remain altogether inactive. INIani-
festly, they could form no independent opinion
of the military value of General Baker's force.
The main responsibility, therefore, rests on the
authorities at Cairo, and notably on myself.
Mr. Gladstone stated in the House of Commons:
"Baker Pasha was under no military necessity to
undertake this expedition. He was not enlisted
for that purpose, and was under no honourable
or military obligation to undertake it unless he
thought it hopeful. ... I say he went with a be-
lief that the means at his command were adequate
means for the purpose which he had in view. . . .
Baker Pasha stated that he was very confident that
406 MODEUN EGYPT pt. in
the means at his disposal, though not sufficient to
reheve all the garrisons, were sufficient for Tokar,
which would liave been most important. On the
2nd of February, three days before the calamity
which overtook him. Baker Pasha telegraphs that
he will advance to the relief of Tokar to-morrow
with every chance of success." All this is per-
fectly true. I have heard it stated that General
Baker was induced to advance by one of his staff
officers against his own judgment. How far this
statement is correct, I cannot say. There can,
however, be no doubt that he made an error in
advancing. He saw the hopelessness of endeavour-
ing to relieve Sinkat,^ but he was too confident of
success in the direction of Tokar.
Whilst, however, the accuracy of INIr. Gladstone's
statement may be admitted, he did not, as it
appears to me, state the whole case ; neither,
indeed, was he in possession of sufficient informa-
tion to have enabled him to do so. Mrs. Sartorius
had the best possible opportunities of learning the
opinions current amongst the officers at Suakin.
This is what she says : " I still say that the
military and other authorities at Cairo should not
have allowed General Baker to advance ; they
ought not to have left it to him, for they could not
but know that he had no choice." Regarded by
the light of subsequent events, there is much force
in this criticism. Either General Baker should not
have been sent to Suakin, or, if sent, he should
have received no discretionary power to advance
;
in fact, it would have been better that he should
have received positive orders not to advance. I
was principally responsible for this mistake, that is
* "A most painful decision has lately been arrived at, namely, that
we ourselves cannot relieve Sinkat, for it would be madness to trust
our troops in a broken an<l mountainous country like that through
which the Sinkat road runs. We intend to do what we can in the
Tokar direction."
—
The Soudan, p. 210.
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to say, I could liave prevented General Baker from
going to Suakin, and, although 1 knew the risk I
was running and although 1 thought seriously of
imposmg a veto on the expedition, I eventually
decided not to do so. I remember the nature of
the arguments which led me to take this decision.
I was not influenced by the consideration that
General Baker's force would be able to open up
the Berber-Suakin route. I never believed that
he would be able to do so, and, as has been
already stated, this portion of his instructions
underwent considerable modifications immediately
after the change of INIinistry took place in Cairo.
The way I reasoned the matter was this : here are two
garrisons, one at Sinkat and one at Tokar, shut up
within a short distance of the coast ; moreover, the
administration at Suakin is so bad, and the troops
there are so demoralised, that the Egyptian
position at Suakin itself may at any moment be
endangered ; the British Government will not
afford any military aid, neither will they allow the
Egyptian Government to use their own army ; I
daresay they are right in these decisions, but the
position thus created for the Egyptian Govern-
ment and its British advisers is, to say the least, a
painful one ; are we not only to refuse assistance,
but are we also to impose a veto on the Egyptian
Government employing the only remaining force at
their disposal, with the certainty that in doing so
Suakin itself will be endangered and that any hope
of relieving the beleaguered garrisons of Sinkat and
Tckar will have to be abandoned ? I answered
this question at the time in the negative. Sub-
sequent events showed that I should have answered
it in the affirmative. I should have stated the
case to the British Government, and have informed
them that the Egyptian Government had no
trustworthy force at their disposal with which to
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act, and that they must decide whether or not to
defend Suakin, and to send a British force to
relieve the two garrisons. It was, however,
difficult at the time to take up this line. I felt
sure that the British Government would do nothing
to help the beleaguered garrisons, although they
would have afforded naval protection to Suakin.
Indeed, so early as November 23, Admiral Hewett
was ordered to maintain Egyptian authority at
the Red Sea ports. Moreover, however acute
the pressure and however painful the consequences
of inaction might be, I sympathised with the
reluctance of the British Government to be drawn
into military operations in the Soudan. Once
begun, it was difficult to say where they would end.
Then, again, in view of the instructions, written
and verbal, which General Baker had received
before leaving Cairo, and in view of the whole
tenor of his conversation, I beheved that I might
rely on him not to advance unless success was
well-nigh absolutely certain, and, indeed, I thought
it probable that, when he arrived at Suakin and
had studied the situation, he would tell me that
the risk of advancing either to Sinkat or Tokar
with the troops under his command was too great
to be undertaken. In reasoning thus, I was
mistaken. General Baker's military instincts, the
natural reluctance of a gallant officer to leave the
beleaguered garrisons to their fate without making
an effi)rt to help them, the pressure which was
probably brought to bear on him by the younger
and less responsible British officers at Suakin to
advance, and the special personal inducement
which existed in his case to distinguish himself by
lieading a daring and successful military exploit,
all acted in a sense contrary to the conclusions
formed when discussing the matter calmly in my
room at Cairo.
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For these reasons, I think I was wrong in
allowing General Baker's expedition to go to
Suakin.
Sinkat had for long been in great straits. With
the defeat of General Baker's force, the last hope
of relief disappeared. On February 12, news
reached Suakin that Tewfik Bey, despairing of all
succour and finding his provisions exhausted, had
made the desperate resolution to evacuate Sinkat
and fight his way to Suakin. He made a brave
fight for life and killed large numbers of the enemy,
but eventually his whole force, with the exception
of about thirty women and six men, was annihi-
lated. Thus, another was added to the list of
disasters in the Soudan.
The defeat of General Bak-er's force caused a
panic at Suakin. Manifestly, the first thing to do
was to provide for the safety of the town. Admiral
Hewett landed a small force. He was placed in
civil and military command. I was, at the same
time, authorised to inform the Egyptian Govern-
ment that " in the event of an attack on Suakin on
the part of the rebels, the town would be defended
by a British force."
In the meanwhile, British public opinion was
greatly excited about Soudan affairs. Party
politicians were sure not to allow so good an
opportunity for attacking the Government to
escape. Chauvinists and humanitarians alike
swelled the ranks of the opposition. A meeting
was called at the Mansion House to condemn the
policy of the Government. No inconsiderable
section of British public opinion was dis})osed to
push the Government on to a policy of reconquer-
ing the Soudan without much regard either to the
difficulties of the task, or to the ulterior conse-
quences which would have ensued had such a
course been adopted. Mr. Forster, who was a
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leading member of the Anti- Slavery Society and
the chief of the party of bellicose philanthropy,
attacked the Government. V^'^hen, eventually, it
was decided to send an expedition to Suakin,
Mr. Forster said (February 14) : " I rejoice that the
Government have taken their present policy. By
that, they are more likely to strike a blow against
slavery than anything we have yet done." There
was no mistaking this language. The Government
were invited to undertake a military campaign
against slavery.
Thus, there was a risk that the Government,
which had been too fearful of assuming responsibility
during the early stages of the Soudan troubles,
would now, under the pressure of excited and
ill-informed public opinion in England, be forced
into the assumption of more serious responsibilities
than they were aware of, or than it was desirable
that they should assume. On February 12, I
repeated to Lord Granville the following telegram
which I had received from General Gordon, who
was then on his way to Khartoum : " I sincerely
hope that you will be reassured as to the situation,
in spite of all that has happened." I added, '* I
entirely agree on all points witli General Gordon,
and trust that, in S})ite of the panic which appears to
prevail in London, Her IMajesty's Govermnent will
not change any of the main points of their policy."
I followed this up by a further telegram on the same
day in which I said : "I am altogether opposed to
sending troops to Suakin exce])t to hold the town."
I held this opinion because I did not believe that
British troops would arrive in time to save Tokar.
The pressure on the Government was, however,
too strong to be resisted. It was decided to send a
force to the relief of Tokar.
By February 28, about 4000 British soldiers,
under the command of Major-General Sir Gerald
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Graham, were collected at Trinkitat. A week
before that date, however, a report arrived to
the effect that the garrison of Tokar was about
to capitulate.
The British Government were singularly un-
fortunate. From this time forth, the stock argu-
ment of their opponents was that their action was
mvariably "too late." This was the title given
to a pamphlet published a year later on the Gordon
mission ; amongst party politicians, Lord Randolph
Churchill, more especially, used his remarkable
oratorical powers to place before the public the
aspect of Soudan aflairs represented by these
words. The facts of the case had, however, to be
faced. It was clear that the expedition would
not be able to accomplish the only object with
which it had been sent. What, therefore, was to
be done ? On February 24, Sir W. Hewett
telegraphed to the Admiralty that the news of
the fall of Tokar had been confirmed ; but, he
added, with all the conviction and impetuosity of
a fighting sailor who was longing for action, "we
must move on there with our men. Rebels are
sure to stand ; they are in considerable numbers
mustering. Our forces landed. Decisive victory
will re-establish order amongst the tribes round
here." I remember Sir Frederick Stephenson,
coming into my room on the morning of February
23 and saying to me, " Well ! Tokar has fallen,
but of course we must go on." He subsequently
telegraphed to Lord Hartington, who was at that
time Secretary of State for War : " News just
received that rebels are in force on Baker Pasha's
late battlefield, eager to fight and confident of
victory. I strongly recommend that Graham
should be ordered to advance towards Tokar,
should this prove true."
It was clear that the soldiers and sailors were
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like greyhounds straining at the leash. They were
almost within sight of their enemy, and at the
last moment it appeared that they might not
be allowed to attack. They were naturally dis-
appointed, and I trust that the same spirit will
always animate the British army and navy. My
view, however, at the time was that the soldiers
and sailors should not be allowed to decide the
question. As Tokar had already fallen, I could
not see what was tlie object of expending a
number of valuable lives under the pretence of
relieving the garrison. I, therefore, telegraphed
to Lord Granville on the evening of February
23 in the following terms, " If the troops are
not to advance on Tokar, the War Office should
send out orders without a moment's delay. The
soldiers are, of course, longing for a fight,
and will advance if there is the smallest excuse
for doing so. I can scarcely entertain a doubt
that Tokar has fallen. In that case, I think
a useless effusion of blood should be stopped
;
that enough troops should be left to garrison
Suakin ; and that the remainder should come back
here. I would on no account send a British force
to Kassala." At the same time, I repeated to
Lord Granville a telegram which I had received
from General Gordon, in answer to a messaoe
despatched by me telling him of the report that
Tokar had fallen. "I think," he said, "if Tokar
lias fallen. Her Majesty's Government had better
be quiet, as I see no advantage to be now gained
by any action on tlieir part. I^et events work
themselves out. Tiie fall of Tokar will not affect in
the least the state of affairs here {i.e. at Khartoum)."
It vv'as, without doubt, difficult for the Govern-
ment to act on the advice of General Gordon and my-
self To have landed a force at Trinkitat, and then
to have brought it away without achieving anything
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whatever, would have rendered the Government
ridiculous, and would have exposed them to further
attacks in Parliament. Tiie lives of the officers
and men who subsequently fell at the battle of
El Teb, were, in reality, sacrificed to public
clamour and the necessities of the Parliamentary
situation. On February 15, Lord Granville wrote
privately to me telling me that the papers on the
subject were about to be presented to Parliament.
"I have," he said, "cut out your opinion un-
favourable to the expedition. You might as well
try to stop a mule with a snaffle bridle as check
the feeling here on tlie subject. Our great object
must now be to get them {i.e. the troops) back
as soon as possible." When, eventually, the
Soudanese were beaten, the Government, which
had been violently attacked from one quarter for
inaction, were attacked from another quarter for
their activity. On March 14, Lord Granville wrote
to me : " We are very nearly stalemated in the
Soudan by the bloody victories."
Sir Gerald Graham was consulted. On February
24, the following telegram was sent to him from
the War Office : " Assuming Tokar to have fallen,
what course would you recommend, remembering
that no distant expedition will be sanctioned ?
Could the force march to Teb, protect fugitives,
bury the English dead, and return by land to
Suakin ? If a movement on Suakin is threatened,
you may take the offensive from Trinkitat oi
Suakin, as you think best. Report fully on the
position." There could be no mistaking the spirit
of this message. It meant that the Government
wanted Sir Gerald Graham to suffo-est action of
some sort, so that the policy of sending the ex-
pedition to Suakin might in some degree be
justified. This, of course, tallied with the views
of the soldiers. After receiving Sir Gerald
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Graliam's report, Lord Hartington sent him the
foUowmg mstriictions : " You should, if practicable,
before attacking, summon the chiefs to disband
their forces and attend Gordon at Khartoum for
the settlement of the Soudan. Say that we are
not at war with the Arabs, but must disperse force
threatening Suakin." This telegram was first
communicated to me by Sir Frederick Stephenson.
I felt convinced that the proposed summons to
the tribal leaders to go to Khartoum would not
be productive of any result. I, therefore, tele-
graphed privately to Lord Granville (February 27)
:
" Stephenson has shown me the AYar Secretary's
telegram to Graham. I do not think that you
can stop Graham advancing now. It is too late."
On the morning of February 29, Sir Gerald
Graham advanced with his entire available force.
He found the Dervishes entrenched at El Teb
;
they were attacked and driven from their position
with heavy loss. The British loss amounted to
189 of all ranks, killed and wounded.
On IMarch 3, Sir Gerald Graham advanced to
Tokar, which was reached without any further
fitxhtino;. On the 4th, the whole force returned
to Trinkitat, and on the 5th embarked for
Suakin. Admiral Hewett telegraphed to the
Admiralty : " Tokar expedition most successful."
The success or failure of the expedition must
be a matter of opinion. Its original object
was to relieve the garrison of Tokar. This ob-
ject had not been accomplished. It had been
shown, not for the first time in history, that a
small body of well-disciplined British troops could
defeat a horde of courageous savages. But no
other important object had been attained. Osman
Digna had received a severe blow, but his power in
the Soudan was by no means broken. Osman
Digna's own view on the subject may be gathered
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from a letter written by him at the time and found
some years afterwards at Tokar. " The English,"
he said, " did not stay long. God struck fear into
their hearts, and they went back the next morning,
staying only one night at the Mamurieh, and then
they started back in their steamers."
The question now arose of whether any further
operations should be undertaken by Sir Gerald
Graham's force. On March 2, Admiral Hewett
telegraphed to the Admiralty recommending that
the troops should be assembled at Suakin, and that
Osman Digna, who was still in the neighbourhood,
should be attacked. "That," he said, "will quiet
the whole of this country." On JNIarch 7, Lord
Granville telegraphed to me: "Her Majesty's
Government have approved the recommendation
of Admiral Hewett and General Graham to land a
force at Suakin to give effect to their Proclamation
calling upon the rebel chiefs to come in and de-
nouncing Osman Digna as an impostor. They will
march on Osman's camp to disperse force if the
Proclamation is ineffectual."
The Proclamation produced no effect, and, on
March 13, General Graham's force advanced on
Tamai, a few miles from Suakin, which was
occupied by a Mahdist force estimated at 12,000
men. On the following morning, an engagement
ensued. After an obstinate fight, 2000 Dervishes
were killed ; the remainder fled to the hills. In
this action, the British loss was 13 officers and 208
men, killed and wounded.
On the following day (March 15), Osman Digna's
camp was burned, and the British force returned to
Suakin. On the 17th, Sir Gerald Graham tele-
graphed to the War Office : " The present position
of affairs is that two heavy blows have been dealt
at the rebels and followers of the Mahdi, who are
profoundly discouraged. They say, however, that
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the English troops can do no more, and must
re-embark and leave the country to them."
It will be as well to break off the narrative of
events in the Eastern Soudan at this point. The
subsequent operations depended upon the course of
events in the valley of the Nile, to which it is now
time to revert. It will be sufficient for the present
to say that the whole of the episode narrated in
this chapter is not one to which any En<jjlishman
can look back with either pride or pleasure. INIany
valuable lives were lost. A great slaughter of
fanatical savages took place. But no political or
military result was obtained at all commensurate
with the amount of life and treasure which was
expended.
CHAPTER XXII
THE GORDON MISSION
December 1883-January 1884
The situation in Earypt—Sir Frederick Stephenson—General Earle
—
Sir Edgar Vincent—Sir Evelyn Wood—Foreign Office support
First and second proposals to send General Gordon—They are
rejected—Third proposal to send General Gordon—It is accepted
—No British officer should have been sent to Khartoum—General
Gordon should not in any case liave been chosen—The responsi-
bility of the British press—And of the British Government
General Gordon's optimism—My regret at having assented to the
Gordon Mission.
During the course of an official career which
extended over a period of nearly fifty years, I at
times had some hard work. But I never had such
hard work, neither was I ever in a position of such
difficulty, or in one involving such a continuous
strain on the mind, the nerves, and, I may add, the
temper, as during the first three months of the year
1884. I was rarely able to leave my house. I
had a very small staff to help me. I was generally
hard at work from daybreak till late at night.
Witliout doubt, mistakes were made during this
period, but looking back to the difficulties of the
situation and remembering the confusion which
then reigned in Egyptian affairs, I caimot help
reflecting that it was quite as much by luck as by
good management that the mistakes were not more
numerous and more serious. I had, fortunately,
one qualification for dealing with the situation, and
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that was a strong constitution. Without that, I
should certainly have broken down altogether.
Without entering into any detail, I will describe
the broad features of the Egyptian situation, as it
then existed.
The Egyptian question alone, by which I mean
the work of reorganisation in Egypt proper, pre-
sented difficulties of no common order. On to
this was now grafted the Soudan question, which
by itself was one of the utmost importance, and
which for the time being exercised a paramount,
though indirect influence on the solution of all
other Egyptian questions. The Gov^ernment
Treasury was well-nigh bimkrupt. It seemed at
the time as though a whole or partial re})udiation
of the Egyptian debt was imminent, and, if this
had happened, very troublesome international com-
plications would have ensued. The Europeans
were discontented because trade was depressed,
and because the indemnities due to them for their
losses during and after the Alexandria bombard-
ment had not yet been paid. The Pashas were
in a morose and sullen condition because their
privileges were threatened. The people were dis-
contented because they had not as yet reaped the
benefits which they had expected from the British
occupation. The old arbitrary system of govern-
ment by the courbash had been abolished, but
nothing had as yet been instituted to take its
place. The Anibist , rebellion had profoundly
shaken the authority of the ruling classes. The
reorganisation of the army and of the police had
only just been commenced. A large force of
Gendarmerie had been withdrawn for service at
Suakin, whence such of them as did not leave
their bones to whiten on the sands of Trinkitat
were to return discomfited and demoralised. The
Anglo-Egyptian officials were for the most part
CH. XXII THE GORDON MISSION 419
new to their work. With some rare exceptions,
the Egyptian officials were not only nseless but
often obstructive. A severe epidemic of cholera
had but recently sw^ept over the country, leaving
behind it a variety of troublesome quarantine
questions, the settlement of which involved con-
siderable diplomatic difficulties. Every man's
hand was against the British Government. French
hostility was never more active. The other Powers
of Europe, with the exception of Italy, were
animated with no very friendly sentiments tow^ards
England. Prince Bismarck disliked the Liberal
Government in England ; moreover, he was at
this time making an effort, which ended in failure,
to conciliate France, a policy which naturally led
Germany to adopt a hostile attitude towards
England in Egypt. The Sultan again came for-
ward with his favourite idea of deposing Tewfik
Paslia and substituting Halim in his place, an idea
which was, as on former occasions, at once nipped
in the bud by the British Government. Nubar
Pasha was unpopular in the country. The attitude
which he assumed on matters connected with in-
ternal reform, increased the difficulties of the situa-
tion. His main object at this time was to get
rid of Mr. Clifford Lloyd, who was endeavouring
to reorganise the Department of the Interior.
An international question of considerable import-
ance had also to be dealt with during this period.
The powers of the Mixed Courts had expired,
and the conditions under which they were to be
renewed had to be discussed. This subject afforded
a wide field for petty international intrigue. In
England, the Government were exposed to con-
stant attacks from party politicians. The incidents
of this party warfare necessitated frequent re-
ference to Cairo for information, the collection of
which often caused great trouble and waste of
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valuable time,^ which I grudged all the more be-
cause I was aware that, when the information had
been collected, it wotdd be of little real utility
and that, in fact, it was only demanded with a
view to affording a handle to Parliamentary attack
or defence. The Government themselves did not
know their own mind. Every British official in
Egypt turned to me for advice and guidance about
the affairs of his Department, and in each Depart-
ment numerous troublesome questions of detail
were constantly cropping up for settlement. I
was myself new to the work and had not had
sufficient time to take stock of the situation,
which was greatly changed since T left the country
in 1880, or to fully understand the characters of the
principal people with whom I had to deal. Look-
ing at the situation as a whole, it seemed as if
Isaiah's prophecy had been fulfilled. " The Lord
hath mingled a perverse spirit in the midst thereof,
and they have caused Egypt to err in every work
thereof, as a drunken man staggereth in his vomit."
There were, however, some redeeming features in
the situation.
In the fu'st place, the presence of a British army
in the country afforded a solid guarantee that, in
spite of administrative disorder and foreign intrigue,
nothing could occur of a nature calculated to en-
danger seriously the stability of the Khedive's
rule. The behaviour and discipline of the British
troops were alike excellent. Moreover, they were
commanded by an officer (Sir Frederick Stephen-
son) who combined in a high degree all the qualities
necessary to fill with advantage to his country a
post of such exceptional difficulty as the conmiand
^ On this subject, and, indeed, on all others, 1 received the utmost
personal consideration from Lord Granville. On February 8, 1884,
he wrote to me: "I keep over tlie references to you as much as
possible, and I hope you fully understand that questions do not
mean complaints."
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of an army of occupation in a foreign country.
The French residents in Egypt resented the
presence of a British army in their midst. They
were in a state of nervous irritabihty, which
rendered them prompt to take offence at the
smallest real or imaginary provocation. At any
moment, some paltry squabble might have occurred
between the officers and soldiers of the army of
occupation on the one hand, and the population on
the other hand, which, if any Frenchman had been
concerned, might have caused much trouble. The
General Officer in command of the troops was thus
called upon to exercise great tact, firmness, patience
and judgment. These qualities Sir Frederick
Stephenson possessed in a high degree ; it was
largely due to him that such difficulties as arose
never assumed proportions which it was beyond
the resources of local diplomacy to settle satis-
factorily. Sir Frederick Stephenson won for him-
self the admiration even of those who were most
hostile to the British occupation.
General Earle occupied at Alexandria much
the same position as that held by Sir Frederick
Stephenson at Cairo. A first-rate soldier, a clear-
headed and vigorous man of business, endowed
with exceptional tact, good manners, and judgment,
he was respected and liked by the whole population
of Alexandria. A statue, now standing in the
principal square of the town, was erected by public
subscription to his memory, and bears witness to
the honour in which he was universally held. The
Dervish bullet, which subsequently cut short this
promising career, deprived the Queen and the
country of a servant of the higliest merit.
Another bright spot on the otherwise dark
horizon was that, in s])ite of occasional jars, reli-
ance could always be placed on the loyalty and
devotion of the British officials in the service of
422 MODERN EGYPT ft. m
the Egyptian Government. Of the services ot
those officials, I shall have to speak more fully at a
later period. For the present, I need only allude to
the work performed by Sir Edgar A^incent and by
Sir Evelyn ^Vood. The former was using all the
resources of a mind endowed with singular fertility
of resource to strui^o-le with a financial situation
which appeared well-nigh desperate. Sir Evelyn
Wood was reconstructing the Egy]:)tian army out
of materials which appeared at the time to be very
unpromising. Moreover, his advice on the military
aspects of the Soudan question, on which the policy
of the Government mainly depended, was of great
value. He loyally sup])orted me in enforcing a
course of action, which, although obviously dictated
by reason, was at the time extremely unpo})ular
with almost all classes whether in England or in
There was yet a third consideration from which
I derived a certain amount of consolation during
this stormy and difficult period. It has often been
my fate to disagree with the Government which I
was serving, but I have seen somethino; of the
relations between foreign Governments and their
representatives abroad. So far as is possible foi
any one \\ho has never sat in the House of Com-
mons, I think I can appreciate the difficulties of
Parliamentary life,— dilHculties which, owing to a
variety of circumstances, have increased in magni-
tude during the last few years. Looking to the
whole of the facts, my experience leads me to the
conclusion that British Ministers, whether Liberal
or Conservative, are good masters to serve.
Of course, the exigencies of Parliamentary war-
fare are sometimes too much even for the most
loyal of Ministers. They are occasionally obliged
to trim their sails to a Parliamentary breeze
;
during the Soudan discussions, indeed, the breeze
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rose almost to the force of a hurricane ; and, when
this happens, the character and reputation of their
representative abroad may suffer. But even then,
it will probably only suffer for a time if he has
a fairly good case to show. Not only British
Ministers, but British public opinion are fair and
just in the long run, although both the fairness
and the justice are at times obscured in the midst
of a sharp party conflict. I often disagreed with
Lord Granville during his tenure of office ; but I
always felt that, if I got into any real difficulty, he
would support me to the best of his ability.
On December 1, 1883, I received the following
telegram from Lord Granville : " If General Charles
Gordon were willing to go to Egypt, could he be of
any use to you or to the Egyptian Government, and,
if so, in what capacity ? " ^ I did not at that time
know General Gordon well, but I had seen a little of
him, and I had, of course, heard much of him. INIy
first impression was decidedly adverse to his employ-
ment in the Soudan. Moreover, when I spoke to
Cherif Pasha on the subject, I found that he enter-
tained strong objections to the proposal. I was
unwilling to put forward my own objections, which
were in some degree based on General Gordon's
personal unfitness to undertake the work in hand.
In replying to Lord Granville, therefore, I only
dwelt on the objections entertained by the Egyptian
Government, which were reasonable, and, I thought,
calculated to produce an impression in London,
without bringing in the awkward question of per-
sonal fitness. It was with these feelings uppermost
in my mind that, on December 2, I telegraphed to
* Sir Henry Gordon {Events, etc., p. 322) says that if General Gordon
had gone to Khartoum six weeks earlier the result of his mission "would
most likely have been a complete success.' This conclusion is, of
course, a Tnere conjecture and is incapable of proof. I see no reason to
believe that the despatch of General Gordon to Khartoum early in
December would have materially altered the course of events.
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Lord Granville : " The Egyptian Government are
very much averse to employing General Gordon,
mainly on the ground that, the moveuient in the
Soudan being religious, the appointment of a
Christian in high command would probably alienate
the tribes who remain faithful. I think it wise not
to press them on the subject." ^
The idea of sending General Gordon to the
Soudan was then allowed to drop for a while, but
his employment continued to be warmly advocated
by the press in England, more especially by the
Pall Mdll Gazette, a newspaper which took a lead-
ing part in the discussion of Egyptian affairs at
that time.
On December 22, I sent to Lord Granville a
telegram advising that the British Government
should insist on the withdrawal of the Egyptian
troops from the Soudan." I indicated that Cherif
Pasha would probably resign, and I added : "Also,
it will be necessary to send an officer of high
authority to Khartoum with full powers to with-
draw the garrisons and to make the best
ments he can for the future of the country."
On January 7, the Ministry of Cherif Pasha
resi<>'ned, and a new JNIinistrv was formed under
the presidency of Nubar Pasha. On January 10,
Lord Granville telegraphed to me : "Could General
Charles Gordon or Sir Charles AVilson be of assist-
ance under altered circumstances in Egypt ? " I
had had further time to think over this proposal
since sending my telegram of December 22. The
more I thought of it, the less was I inclined to
send General Gordon, or, indeed, any Englishman
to Khartoum. I discussed the matter with Nubar
* Tliere was reason in the objection taken by the Ejryptian Govern-
ment. On March 4, 18B4, General Gordon telej^raphed from Kiiar-
toum : " My weakness is that of being foreign and Chi'istian, and
peaceful."
* Vide ante, p. 881.
CH.XXII THE GOllDON MISSION 425
Pasha, and we both came to the conclusion that the
best plan would be to send Abdul-Kader Pasha. He
had been a former Governor-General of the Soudan.
He had been highly sj)oken of by Colonel Stewart.
He had the reputation of being a courageous and
ca])able soldier. It was under these circumstances
that, on January 11, I telegraphed to Lord Gran-
ville : " I have consulted with Nubar Pasha, and I
do not think that the services of General Gordon
or Sir Charles Wilson can be utilised at present."
I had thus twice rejected the proposal to send
General Gordon to Khartoum. Would that I had
done so a third time !
On January 14, Lord Granville telegraphed to
me : " Can you give further information as to
prospects of retreat for army and residents at
Khartoum, and measures taken ? " On the follow-
ing day (January 15), Lord Granville telegraphed
to me privately : " I hear indirectly that Gordon
is ready to go straight to Suakin without passing
through Cairo on the following rather vague terms.
His mission to be to report to Her JNIajesty's
Government on the military situation of the
Soudan, and to return without any further engage-
ment towards him. He would be under you for
instructions and will send letters through you
under flying seal. You and Nubar Pasha to give
him all assistance and facilities as to telegraph-
ing, etc. Egyptian Government to send Ibraliim
Bey Fauzi to meet him at Suez, with a writer to
attend on him. He might be of use in informhig
you and us of the situation. It would be popular
at home, but there may be countervailing objec-
tions. Tell me your real opinion with or without
Nubar Pasha." ^
* Mr. Morley {Life of Gladstone, vol. iii. p. 140) says that, on January
14, Lord Granville wrote to Mr. Gladstone as follows : " It Gordon says
he believes he could, by his personal inliuence, excite the tribes to
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On January 16, I sent two telegrams to Lord
Granville, one ofTicial, and the other private. The
official telegram was as follows : " I hope soon to
be able to telegraph fully, as the subject of the
withdrawal from Khartoum is now being discussed.
There can be no doubt, however, that very great
difficulties will be encountered. It was intended
to despatch Abdul- Kader, the new Minister of
War, to Khartoum ; he at first accepted, but now
declines to go. The Egyptian Government would
feel greatly obliged if Her INIajesty's Government
would select a well-qualified British officer to go
to Khartoum instead of the War Minister. He
would be given full powers, both civil and military,
to conduct the retreat." At the same time, I
sent the following private telegram : "My official
telegram of to-day, and your private telegram of
yesterday. Gordon would be the best man if he
will pledge himself to carry out the policy of with-
drawing from the Soudan as quickly as is possible
consistently with saving life. He must also fully
understand that he must take his instructions from
the British representative in Egypt and report to
him.^ He was at Brussels early this month and
is now believed to be in England. If so, please see
him. I would rather have him than any one else,
provided there is a perfectly clear understanding
with him as to what his position is to be and what
line of policy he is to carry out. Otherwise, not.
Failing him, consider Stewart. Whoever goes
escort the Khartoum garrisou and inhabitants to Suakin, a little pressure
on Baring might he advisable." Mr. Gladstone replied by telegraph
that he agreed. Hence, the telegram from Lord Granville to me given
above.
1 have been told on good authority that Mr. Gladstone was, in the
first instance, much opposed to the despatcli of General Gordon to Khar-
toum, and tliat he only yielded witli great reluctance to the pressure
wliiili was brought to bear on him by some of his colleagues.
^ Tlie reason why 1 said this was that I knew something of General
Gordon's erratic character, and I tliought that the only chanos of
keeping him to his task was to appeal to his sense of discipline.
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should be distinctly warned that he will undertake
a service of great difficulty and danger."
On January 18, Lord Granville informed me
by telegraph that General Gordon and Colonel
Stewart would leave London that evening for
Egypt. On the same day, Lord Granville wrote
privately to me : " 1 was glad to get your approval
of Gordon. He may possibly be of great use, and
the appointment will be popular with many classes
in this country. He praises you very highly and
expressed a wish to be placed entirely under you."
General Gordon's own account of how he came
to go to the Soudan is as follows: " At noon he,
Wolseley, came to me and took me to the Ministers.
He went in and talked to the Ministers, and came
back and said : ' Her INIajesty's Government want
you to undertake this. Government are deter-
mined to evacuate the Soudan, for they will not
guarantee future government. Will you go and
do it ? ' I said : *Yes.' He said : 'Go in.' I went
in and saw them. They said : 'Did Wolseley tell
you your orders ?' I said : ' Yes.' I said : ' You
will not guarantee future government of the
Soudan, and you wish me to go up and evacuate
now.' They said : ' Yes,' and it was over, and I
left at 8 P.M. for Calais." ^
General Gordon's appointment, the Pall 3Iall
Gazette said, with perfect truth, " w as applauded
enthusiastically by the press all over the country
without distinction of party." I was reproached
for having too " tardily discovered that Gordon was
the best man," and the Government were sharply
criticised for not having utilised his services at an
earlier date.
Mr. Gladstone's Government made two jrreat
dealing with Soudan affj
* Letters to the Rev. J. Barnes, 1885.
mistakes in fairs in their
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early stages. Of these one was a sin of omission,
and the otiier a sin of commission. The sin of
omission was that the Government did nothing to
stop the departure of the Hicks expedition. The
sin of commission was the despatch of General
Gordon to Khartoum. Looking back at what
occurred after a space of many years, two points are
to my mind clear. The first is tliat no Englishman
should have been sent to Khartoum. The second
is that, if any one had to be sent, General Gordon
was not the right man to send.
The reasons why no Englishman should have
been sent are now sufficiently obvious. If he were
beleaguered at Khartoum, which was possible and
even probable, the British Government might be
obliged to send an expedition to relieve him. The
main object of British policy was to avoid behig
drawn into military operations in the Soudan.
The employment of a British official at Khartoum
involved a serious risk that it would be no longer
possible to adhere to this ])olicy, and the risk was
materially increased when the individual chosen to
go to the Soudan was one who had attracted to
himself a greater degree of popular sympathy than
almost any Englishman of modern times. General
Gordon, Lord Cairns said (February 14) amidst
the cheers of the House of Lords, " is one of our
national treasures," and, although possibly party
politicians used the popular sympathy with General
Gordon as a card in the political game. Lord Cairns's
expression faithfully represented the general tone of
British public opinion at that time.
The Government scarcely realised the gravity
of the decision at which they had arrived. I
believe I am correct in stating that the question
was not discussed at a Cabinet Council. Some
years afterwards. Sir Charles Dilke, who was then
a member of the Government, gave me the follow-
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ing extract from his Journal: "January 18, 1884.
—Meeting at War Office. Ld. G., Hartington,
Northbrook, and self. Decided to send Colonel
(Jordon to Suakin to report on the Soudan."^
I think I may say that I saw the danger more
clearly than the Ministers in England, and it was
on that account that I wished to send an Egyptian
official to Khartoum, but I did not realise it so
fully as I should have done.
If, however, it was a mistake to send any
Englishman to Khartoum, it was a still greater
mistake to choose General Gordon as the man to
send.
It happens to most men engaged in public life
that their conduct gives rise to some differences of
opinion. General Gordon's actions were rarely
subjected to this healthy form of criticism. A
wave of Gordon cidtus passed over England in
1884. His personal character, which was in many
respects noble, the circumstances connected with
his mission to the Soudan, the perilous position
in which he was placed at Khartoum, his heroic
defence of the town, and his tragic death, all
appealed powerfully to the imagination of a people,
who are often supposed to be pre-eminently cold
* On January 18, Lord Northbrook wrote privately to me as follows :
" I ^ot a summons to-day to the W. O. to meet C'hiiiese Gordon with
Granville, Hartington, and Dilke. The upsliotof the meeting was that
he leaves by to-niglit's mail for Suakin to report on the best way of
withdrawing the garrisons, settling the country, and to perform such
other duties as may be entrusted to him by the Kliedive's Government
through you. He will be under you, and wishes it. He has no doubt
of being able to get on with you. He was very ]io])eful as to the state
of affairs, does not believe in the great powers of the Mahdi, does not
think the tribes will go much beyond their own confines, and does not
see why the garrisons should not get off. He did not soem at all
anxious to retain the Soudan, and agreed lieartily to accept tlie policy
of withdrawal."
The following entry occurs in Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff's Notes
from a Diary 1896-1901, vol. ii. p. 75 : *' Nortiibrook said that, if he
had previously read Gordon's book, nothing would have induced him
to couseut to his going anj'where. It was the book of a maduiau !"
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and practical, but who in reality are perhaps more
led by their emotions than any other nation in
Europe.^ During this stage of national excite-
ment, any one who had attempted to judge General
Gordon's conduct by the canons of criticism which
are ordinarily applied to human action, would have
failed to obtain a hearing. His melancholy death
also silenced the voice of criticism. Five years
after its occurrence, a critic, who was disposed to
be hostile to General Gordon (Colonel Chaill^
Long), wrote to Mr. Gladstone, with a view to
eliciting an expression of his opinion on General
Gordon's conduct. INIr. Gladstone, with the mag-
nanimity of a true statesman and the delicate
feelings of a gentleman, declined to enter into any
discussion on the subject.^
The public enthusiasm which General Gordon's
name evoked led to some disastrous consequences,
yet I cannot bring myself to condemn it. It was,
in fact, eminently creditable to the British public.
There was nothii)<>: mean or self-seekino' about it.
It was a genuine and generous tribute to moral
worth, and it showed that, even in this material
age, moral worth has a hold on the public opinion
of at least one great civilised country. It may be
that the Gordon of real life did not always act quite
up to the standard of the idealised hero who was
present to the public mind, but, after all, this is
merely to say that he was human and fallible.
More than this, whatever may have been General
Gordon's defects, the main lines of his character
were really worthy of admiration. I do not speak
so much of his high courage and fertility in mili-
^ It was, I think, Lord Beacoiisfield who said that the Eiij,''lish were
the most emotional i)eople in Europe, and Lortl IJeaconsfield was a keen
observer of human nature. Lord Salisbury once wrote to me: " It
is easier to combat with the rinderpest or the cholera than with a
popular sentiment."
2 BelJ'ord'n Ahiijazlne, SepLeniber 1890, p. 549.
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tary resource, though in these respects he was
remarkable, but of his moral qualities. His reli-
gious convictions, though eccentric, were sincere.
No one could doubt the remarkable purity of his
private life, or his lofty disinterestedness as regards
objects, such as money and rank, which usually
excite the ambition of mankind. His aims in life
were unquestionably high and noble.
Besides his moral qualities, there was another
point in General Gordon's character, which was
eminently calculated to attract tlie sympathy of
the British public. He was thoroughly uncon-
ventional. He chafed under disci})line, and was
never tired of pouring forth the vials of his wrath
on the official classes.^ Mistrust of Government
officials is engrained in tlie Eno-lish character, and
I may add that I hope the dislike of being
over - governed will ever continue to exist in
England.
It is dangerous when either an individual or a
nation allow their imagination to predominate ovei"
their reason, and this is what the British nation
did under the spell of General Gordon's name.
But it is perhaps better that the national imagina-
tion should even run riot at times in a o-ood cause
rather than that a dull level of practical utility
should invariably be maintained, and that the
imaginative qualities should be discarded alto-
gether. Enthusiasts are troublesome to politicians
and diplomatists, but the world would be dull
without them. The enthusiastic and emotional
classes found, or thought they had found their
* General Gordon, who had a keen sense of humour, was fully aware
of his own unfitness for official employment. " I own," he wrote in his
Journal (p. 59), "to luivino; l)een very insubordinate to Her Majesty's
Ciovernment and its officials, but it is my nature, and I cannot help it.
I tear I have not even tried to play battledore and shuttlecock with
them. I know if 1 was chief I would never employ m;/,\e/J', for I am
incorris^ible. To meu like Dilke, who weigh every word, I must be
perfect poison."
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ideal type in General Gordon, and accordingly
they bestowed on him extreme, sometimes ex-
travagant eulogy.^
General Gordon was no friend to the particular
official class to which I belonged. " I must say,"
he wrote, " I hate our diplomatists. I think, with
few exceptions, they are arrant humbugs ; and I
expect they know it." Acting on this general
principle, General Gordon in his Journal which,
when it was first published, was probably read
by almost every educated man in England, held
up Mr. (subsequently. Sir Edwin) Egerton,^ myself
and others to odium and ridicule. To all this,
acting on Mr. Gladstone's principle, I shall not
attempt to reply, more especially as I feel sure
that, had he lived, no one would have regretted
what he wrote more than General Gordon himself
But I must, for the elucidation of this narrative,
1 Unquestionably, officialism and enthusiasm—notably undisciplined
enthusiasm—we se murient pas, as the French would say. At the same
time, strang-e as it may appear to some sections of the public, it is
quite possible to have a genuine sympathy for suffering humanity
without constantly mouthing- the catchpenny phrases which form to
so large an extent the stock-in-trade of the professional "friends of
humanity." These latter are usually not over-cliaritable to those who
cannot accept, and at once carry into execution, the whole of their
idealist programmes. There appears to be much truth in Mr. John
Morley's remark {Robespierre, p. 59), that " the most ostentatious faith
in humanity in general seems always to beget the sharpest mistrust of
all human beings in particular." 1 should term most of the leading
British officials in Egypt humanitarians under any reasonable inter-
pretation of that term, but the responsible nature of their position
naturally obliges them to look at the questions with which they
have to deal from many, and not merely from one point of view.
2 Mr. Egerton acted as my locum tenens when I was temporarily
absent from Cairo in 1884.
I saw (Jeneral Gordon's Journal in manuscript before it was printed.
I know that I am correct in saying that the Government would have pre-
ferred that the Journal should liave been published without any omissions.
At the instance, lutwever, of (Jeneral Gordon's friends and family, a
good deal of violent and very foolish abuse of I>ord Granville—and, if I
remember rightly, of others—was omitted. It is, in my opinion, to be
regretted that this was done. The publication of the Journal, as it was
originally written, would have enabled the public to judge more accu-
rately of the value of General Gordon's criticisms, than was possible
when only an expurgated edition was issued.
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state why I think it was a mistake to send General
Gordon to Khartoum.
" It is impossible," I wrote privately to Lord
Granville on January 28, 1884, "not to be charmed
by the simplicity and honesty of Gordon's character."
" My only fear," I added, " is that he is terribly
flighty and changes his opinions very rapidly. I
am glad that Stewart, who impressed me favour-
ably, is going with him, but I do not think Gordon
much likes it himself. He said to me : ' They sent
him (Stewart) with me to be my wet-nurse.'"^
Impulsive flightiness was, in fact, the main defect
of General Gordon's character, and it was one
which, in my opinion, rendered him unfit to carry
out a work which pre-eminently required a cool
and steady head. I used to receive some twenty
or thirty telegrams from General Gordon in the
course of the day when he was at Khartoum, those
in the evening often giving opinions which it was
impossible to reconcile with others despatched
the same morning. Scarcely, indeed, had General
Gordon started on his mission, when Lord Gran-
ville, who does not appear at first to have under-
stood General Gordon's character, began to be
alarmed at his impulsiveness. On February 8,
Lord Granville wrote to me : " I own your letters
about Gordon rather alarm. His changes about
Zobeir are difficult to understand.^ Northbrook
consoles me by saying that he says all the foolish
things that pass through his head, but that his
judgment is excellent." I am not prepared to go
^ Whilst on his way to Khartoum, Colonel Stewart wrote me a letter,
from which it was clear that, at one time, the relations between him
and General Gordon were much strained. He asked me to tear it up
directly I had read it, without showing it to any one. This I accordingly
did. Subsequently, they appear to have been fully reconciled, but it was
only natural that there should have been occasional jars between two
men of such very different characters and habits of thought
^ This is an allusion to circumstances which took place at Cairo, and
which will be presently narrated.
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so far as to say that General Gordon's judgment
was excellent. Nevertlieless, there was some truth
in Lord Xorthbrook's remark. I often found that,
amidst a mass of irrelevant verbiage and amidst
many contradictory ophiions, a vein of sound
common sense and political instinct ran through
General Gordon's proposals. So much was I
impressed with this, and so fearful was I that the
sound portions of his proposals would be rejected
in London on account of the eccentric language
in which they were often couched, that, on
February 12, I telegraphed to Lord Granville:
" In considering Gordon's suggestions, please re-
member that his general views are excellent, but
that undue importance must not be attached to
his words. We must look to the spirit rather
than the letter of what he says."
In spite of General Gordon's high qualities,
however, I do not think that a man of his peculiar
character was a proper person to send on such an
extremely difficult mission as that of arranging
for the evacuation of the Soudan. The task was,
indeed, so difficult that it is probable that no one
could have carried it out successfully, but I believe
that a better chance of success would have pre-
sented itself if Colonel Stewart had been sent
without General Gordon. It is singular how
entirely General Gordon's reputation has over-
shadowed that of Colonel Stewart. I have rarely
come across anybody wlio impressed me more
favourably than this cool, sagacious, and courageous
soldier. His premature death was a great loss
both to England and to Egypt.
One further point remains to be considered.
Who was responsible for sending General Gordon ?
In a sense, the main responsibility rests with the
press of England, and, notably, with the Pall Mall
Gazette. The people of England, as represented
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by the press, insisted on sending General Gordon to
the Soudan, and accordingly to the Soudan he was
sent. "Anonymous authorship," one of the wisest
political thinkers of modern times has stated,
'* places the public under the direction of guides
who have no sense of personal responsibility." ^ The
arguments in favour of newspaper influence are too
commonplace to require mention. But newspaper
government has certain disadvantages, and these
disadvantages were never more clearly shown than
in the incident now under discussion.
The attitude of the British press, however,
though it may be pleaded in palliation of the
mistake which was made, does not, of course,
exonerate the Government from responsibility.
The truth is, that Mr. Gladstone's Government
did not fully realise the importance of the step they
were taking. Whilst entirely agreeing in the policy
of evacuating the Soudan, I had pressed upon the
Government the extreme difficulty of carrying the
policy into execution. I had told Lord Granville
that any one who went to the Soudan would
" undertake a service of great difficulty and danger."
But these warnings fell unheeded, neither can it be
any matter for surprise that they should have done
so, for the one person who the Government were told
on all sides was the highest authority on Soudan
affairs, namely. General Gordon himself, did not
share my apprehensions in any degree ; neither
was any danger-signal hoisted by Colonel Stewart.
There can be no doubt that when General Gordon
was in London, his views were far too optimistic.
He did not rightly appreciate either the state of
affairs which then existed in the Soudan, or the diffi-
culties of the task which he had undertaken. Being
deceived himself, it was natural that lie should,
^ Sir G. Coniewall Lewis, On the Injluence of Authority in Matters oj
Opinion, p. 355.
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quite unintentionally, have deceived the Govern-
ment, and should have encouraged them in the
optimism to which all Governments are somewhat
prone.^ On January 28, after having seen General
Gordon, I wrote to Lord Granville : " Gordon
speaks very hopefully of being able to do the whole
thing in tiiree or four months." So late as Feb-
ruary 20, that is to say, two days after his arrival
at Khartoum, General Gordon wrote to Colonel
Coetlogon : " I have proposed to you to go back to
Cairo because, in my belief, there is not the least
chance of any danger being now incurred in
Khartoum, which I consider as safe as Cairo. . . .
You may rest assured that you leave a place which
is as safe as Kensington Park."
To sum up,—the main defence of the Govern-
ment, for what it is worth, is contained in the
saying of the French revolutionary leader when he
was reproached for obeying, the dictates of the
Jacobin mob : *' Je suis leur chef; il faut que je les
suive." The Government did not attempt to guide
public opinion. They followed it. Nevertheless,
the opinions which General Gordon entertained,
may be pleaded as some justification for the line of
policy adopted by the Government. If the British
Ministers erred on the side of optimism, it is
certain that their optimistic views were shared by
General Gordon, and, indeed, were largely based on
what he said both before leaving London and whilst
on his way to Khartoum.
So far as my personal responsibility is concerned,
I can plead no such justification, or, at all events,
I can only plead it to a less degree. I was never
* On September 28, 1884, General Gordon wrote in his Journal
(p. 110): "The Government may say that tiiey liad reasonable hopea
that I would succeed ; 1 will neither say 1 gave them such assurance
or that 1 did not give it. I think 1 was neutral in giving or in not
giving such an assurance." When General Gordon wrote this, he
must have forgotten many of his previous utterances.
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under any delusion as to the difficulties of the task
which General Gordon had undertaken, or as to the
personal danger which he and Colonel Stewart
would run. More than this, I mistrusted General
Gordon's judgment, and I was in reality adverse to
his employment. I am not now making use of ea^
post facto arguments. I have such a vivid recol-
lection of my own frame of mind at that time, that
I can state very positively why it was that, after
having twice refused to utilise General Gordon's
services, I yielded on being pressed a third time
by Lord Granville. I believed that at that time
I stood alone in hesitating to employ General
Gordon. Public opinion in England was calling
loudly for his employment. Lord Granville's
telegrams, though couched in language from which
it might be inferred that the Government would
defer to my opinion, showed, nevertheless, clearly
enough a strong wish on the part of the Govern-
ment that General Gordon should be employed.
Nubar Pasha concurred in this view. I did not,
however, attach much importance to his opinion
on the special point at issue. Sir Evelyn AA^ood's
opinion carried more weight with me. He was
favourable to the employment of General Gordon.
So also was Colonel Watson, who was at that
time on the staff of the Egyptian army, and who
spoke with the authority of one who knew General
Gordon well, having served under him in the
Soudan.
With this array of opinion against me, I mis-
trusted my own judgment. I did not yield because
I hesitated to stand up against the storm of public
opinion. I gave a reluctant assent, in reality
against my own judgment and inclination, because
I thought that, as everybody differed from me, I
must be wrong. I also thought that I might be
unconsciously prejudiced against General Gordon
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from the fact that his habits of thought and
modes of action in dealing with pubhc affairs
differed widely from mine.
In yielding, I made a mistake which I shall
never cease to regret. It may well be that, had I
not yielded, the result would have been the same.
The public feeling in favour of sending General
Gordon was so strong as to be almost irresistible.
But this consideration does not constitute any
consolation to me. By yielding, I rendered myself
in some degree responsible for all the valuable
lives which were lost, and the treasure which was
subsequently expended in the Soudan.
The whole incident left a strong impression on
my mind. Unquestionably, much harm has been
done at times by Governments failing to yield, or
yielding too late, to a clear and unmistakable ex-
pression of public opinion. Nothing, in fact, can
be more foolish or hurtful than that officials should
unreasonably oppose a stiff barrier of bureaucratic
obstruction to the views of the outside public. If
they do so, they are liable to be swept away. But
occasions do occur, which in these democratic days
are becoming more rather than less frequent, when
the best service a Government official can render
to his country is to place himself in opposition to
the public view. Indeed, if he feels certain that he
is right, it is his bounden duty to do so, especially
in respect to questions as to which public opinion
in England is ill-informed. Such an occasion ])re-
sented itself when there was a question of sending
General Gordon to the Soudan. It was worth while
to incur a good deal of unpopularity and misie])re-
sentation in order to save the Government and the
nation from making so great a mistake. " A man,"
it has been truly said, " who never disagrees with
his countrymen, and who shrinks from unpopularity
as the worst of all evils, can never have a share in
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moulding the traditions of a virile race, though for
a time he may make its fashions." ^ I repeat,
therefore, that I shall never cease to regret that
I did not stand to my guns and maintain, to the
best of my ability, my original objections to the
Gordon mission. Had I known General Gordon
better, I should certainly never have agreed to his
employment.
* Oliver's Alexander Hamilton, p. 436.
CHAPTER XXIII
GORDON AT CAIRO
January 24-26, 1884
General Gordon wishes to go to Suakin—He goes to Cairo—(!!on-
sequences which resulted from the change of route—General
Gordon's views as to the Soudan—His London instructions
—
Instructions issued at Cairo—General Gordon appointed Governor-
General of the Soudan—And furnished with certain Proclamations
—Reasons why General Gordon's instructions were changed
The Darfour Sultan—General Gordon proposes tliat Zobeir Pasha
should accompany him—Interview between General Gordon and
Zobeir Pasha—It is decided not to employ Zobeir Pasha—General
Gordon leaves Cairo.
When, on January 18, Lord Granville informed
me that General Gordon and Colonel Stewart were
about to proceed to Egypt, be added tbat General
Gordon was anxious not to go to Cairo, and tbat
he would go through the Suez Canal straight to
Suakin. I was requested to meet him at Ismailia.
The reason why General Gordon did not wish to
visit Cairo was obvious. He had publicly criticised
the conduct of the Khedive in no measured terms,
and did not wish to meet him.
The road from Suakin to Berber was at this
time blocked. The tribes were in a state of open
rebellion, and had gained a series of successes over
the Egyptian troops. It was certain that General
Gordon would never be able to reach Khartoum
by the Suakin route. I, therefore, telegraphed
to Eord Granville, on January 19, urging the
desirability of General Gordon's coming to Cairo.
Lord Granville supported my view. The result
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was that General Gordon came to Cairo. He
arrived on the evening of January 24.
If I had not interfered as regards General
Gordon's route, a point which seemed at the
time to be one of detail, the course of history
in the Soudan would have been changed and
many valuable lives, including probably that of
General Gordon himself, would have been saved.
General Gordon would possibly never have got
to Khartoum, and it would not, therefore, have
been necessary to send any British expedition to
the Soudan. It is probable, indeed almost certain,
that in a few weeks he would have returned
to England without having effected anything of
importance towards the accomplishment of his
mission. I remember that it crossed my mind
that I had better not interfere, but leave General
Gordon to work out his plans in his own way.
It was, however, clear that, in going to Suakin,
General Gordon would foredoom his mission to
failure, and that he would never have made any
such proposal had he been well acquainted with
the state of affairs then existing in the Eastern
Soudan. I had, therefore, excellent reasons for
interfering, but, looking back upon events as they
subsequently occurred, I regret that I did so.
On the morning of January 25, General Gordon
accompanied me to the Ismailia Palace to see the
Khedive. Colonel Stewart wrote in his journal :
''Gordon apologised to Tewfik for his former
brusque behaviour, and the interview went off
very well
The question of General Gordon's instructions
then had to be discussed. I shall have to deal
with this matter at some length, as it has formed
the subject of much misapprehension.^
^ For iustance. Sir William Butler {Charles George Gordon, p. 200)
says: ''Few persons are aware that the English Government knew
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On January 23, whilst on his way to Egypt,
General Gordon wrote a Memorandum settinir
forth the line of policy which he proposed to
pursue in the Soudan. It contained the following
passage
:
"My idea is that the restoration of the country
should be made to the different petty Sultans, who
existed at the time of Mehemet All's conquests,
and whose families still exist ; that the Mahdi
should be left altogether out of the calculations as
regards the handing over of the country, and that
it should be optional with the Sultans to accept
his supremacy or not. As these Sultans would
probably not be likely to gain by accepting the
Mahdi as their sovereign, it is probable that they
will hold to their independent positions. . . . The
most difficult question is how, and to whom, to
hand over the arsenals of Khartoum, Dongola, and
Kassala, which towns have, so to say, no old-
standing families, Khartoum and Kassala having
sprung up since Mehemet All's conquest. Prob-
ably it would be advisable to postpone any decision
as to these towns till such time as the inhabitants
have made known their opinion."
Colonel Stewart in recording his "cordial
agreement " with General Gordon's views, added :
" Handing back the territories to the families of
the dispossessed Sultans is an act of justice both
towards them and their people. The latter, at any
rate, will no longer be at the mercy of foreign mer-
cenaries, and if they are tyrannised over, it will be
more or less their own fault. Handing back the
districts to the old families is also a politic act, as
raising up a rival power to that of the INIahdi. As
it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to
nothing of the appointment of their officer as Governor-General of the
Soudan^ or of the clianj^e of his destination from iSuakin to tlie Nile
route, until some days after hoth had been ejected by our Minister in
Cairo." Both of these statement are devoid of foundation.
CH. xxm GORDON AT CAIRO 443
foresee all the eventualities that may arise during
the evacuation, it seems to me as the more judicious
course to rely on the discretion of General Gordon
and his knowledge of the country."
The policy of setting up the local Sultans to
govern the country appeared at the time wise and
politic; but, looking at events with an after-know-
ledge of what subsequently happened, it is evident
that General Gordon both underrated the power of
the JNIahdi, and overrated the influence of the local
Sultans. The most powerful and warlike tribes
in the Soudan were partisans of the Mahdi. The
families of the local Sultans, who had governed the
Soudan in former times, had lost all hold on the
public opinion of the country.
JNIoreover, General Gordon himself indicated one
great difficulty in the way of giving effect to this
policy. It was that, in respect to Khartoum,
Dongola, and Kassala, there were " no old-standing
families." Now, whoever holds Khartoum, domi-
nates a large part of the Soudan ; unless, therefore,
the policy in question could be carried into execu-
tion as regards Khartoum, it was almost sure to
fall to the ground altogether.
When General Gordon arrived in Egypt, I
received a copy of the instructions, dated January
18, which were given to him in London by Lord
Granville. The principal portion of these instruc-
tions was as follows :
—
*' Her Majesty's Government are desirous that
you should proceed at once to Egypt to report to
them on the military situation in the Soudan, and
on the measures which it may be advisable to take
for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still
holding positions in that country, and for the
safety of the European population in Khartoum.
" Vou are also desired to consider and report
upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of
444 MODERN EGYPT pt. m
the interior of the Soudan, and upon the manner
in which the safety and the good administration
by the Egyptian Government of the parts on the
sea-coast can best be secured. . . .
" You will consider yourself authorised and
instructed to perform such other duties as the
Egyptian Government may desire to intrust to
you and as may be communicated to you by Sir
E. Baring."
On the morning of January 25, a meeting took
place to consider whether, acting on the authority
I had received from Lord Granville, I should issue
further instructions to General Gordon. At this
meeting were present Nubar Pasha, General Gordon,
Colonel Stewart, Sir Evelyn AVood, and myself
After a long discussion, the meeting was adjourned
till the following afternoon. It was arranged
that, in the interval, I was to embody in a letter
addressed to General Gordon the conclusions at
which we had arrived.
On the occasion of the second meeting, I went
through the draft instructions which I had pre-
pared, and discussed them with General Gordon
and the others who were present. A few
changes were made. The following extracts will
be sufficient to show the leading features of these
instructions :
—
"It is believed that the number of the Euro-
peans at Khartoum is very small, but it has been
estimated by the local authorities that some
10,000 to 15,000 people will wish to move north-
wards from Khartoum only when the Egyptian
garrison is withdrawn. These people are native
Christians, Egyptian employees, their wives and
children, etc. The Government of His Highness
the Kliedive are earnestly solicitous tiiat no effort
should be spared to ensure the retreat both of these
people and of the Egyptian garrison without loss
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of life. As regards the most opportune time and
the best method for effecting tlie retreat, whether
of the garrisons or of tlie civil populations, it is
neither necessary nor desirable that you should
receive detailed instructions. . . .
" You will bear in mind that the main end to be
pursued is the evacuation of the Soudan. This
policy was adopted, after very full discussion, by
the Egyptian Government, on the advice of Her
Majesty's Government. It meets with the full
approval of His Highness the Khedive, and of the
present Egyptian Ministry. I understand, also,
that you entirely concur in the desirability of
adopting this policy, and that you think it should
on no account be chanoed.^ You consider that it
may take a few months to carry it out with safety.
You are further of opinion that ' the restoration of
the country should be made to the different petty
Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet Ali's
conquest, and whose families still exist ; and that
an endeavour should be made to form a confedera-
tion of those Sultans.' In this view, the Egyptian
Government entirely concur. It will, of course, be
fully understood that the Egyptian troops are not
to be kept in the Soudan merely with a view to
consolidating the power of the new rulers of the
country. But the Egyptian Government have the
fullest confidence in your judgment, your know-
ledge of the country, and your comprehension of
the general line of policy to be pursued. You are,
therefore, given full discretionary power to retain
the troops for such reasonable period as you may
think necessary, in order that the abandonment
of the country may be accomplished with the least
possible risk to life and property.
" A credit of £100,000 has been opened for you
* The last part of this sentence was added at Gordon's own request
(vide ante, p. 390).
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at the Finance Department, and further funds will
be supplied to you on your requisition when this
sum is exhausted."
Simultaneously with the issue of these instruc-
tions, a letter was addressed by the Khedive to
General Gordon appointing him Governor-General
of the Soudan. General Gordon was, at the same
time, furnished with two Proclamations from the
Khedive addressed to the inhabitants of the Soudan.
In one of these, the appointment of General Gordon
to be Governor-General was notified, and the people
were invited to obey his orders. In the other
Proclamation, more distinct allusion was made to
the intention of the Government to evacuate the
Soudan. "We have decided," it was said, "to
restore to the families of the kings of the Soudan
their former independence."
" General Gordon," I wrote to Lord Granville
on February 1, "has authority and discretion to
issue one or other of these Proclamations whenever
he may think it desirable to do so. He fully
understands that he is going to Khartoum for the
purpose of carrying out the policy of evacuation,
and has expressed to me his fullest concurrence in
the wisdom of this policy. Your Lordship will
have seen, by my instructions to him, that no
doubt is left on this point, and these instructions
were drafted at the request and with the entire
approval of General Gordon himself It was,
however, thought desirable, after full discussion
here, that the widest discretionary powers should
be given to General Gordon as regards the manner
of carrying out the policy, and as to the best time
and mode of announcing it at Khartoum."
It has been frequently stated, first, that the
instructions which General Gordon received at Cairo
differed so widely from those which were given
to him in London as to alter entirely the character
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of his mission ; and, secondly, that the change in
his instructions was effected by myself without
any reference to London. These statements were
freely made by the press. They were echoed by
Mr. Egmont Hake, Sir William Butler, and others
who have written on the Gordon Mission. The
British Government, also, wrote to me a despatch
in which, though they approved of the instruc-
tions given to General Gordon, tliey confirmed the
erroneous popular impression that the London
instructions had been materially altered by me,
acting on my own authority, without reference to
the Foreign Office. " Her Majesty's Government,"
it was said, "bearing in mind the exigencies of the
occasion, concurred in these instructions, which
virtually altered General Gordon's mission from
one of advice to that of executing, or at least
directing, the evacuation not only of Khartoum,
but of the whole Soudan, and they were will-
ing that General Gordon should receive the very
extended powers conferred upon him by the
Khedive to enable him to effect this very difficult
task,"
The statement that the instructions, which
General Gordon received in Cairo, altered the
character of his mission is substantially correct.
The statement that I altered General Gordon's
instructions without authority from the British
Government is wholly devoid of foundation.
I never cared to go into this subject at the
time, because my hands were full of other work,
and, moreover, by the time the discussions to
which I allude took place, the question merely had
an historic interest. But I may now state what
occurred.
In the first place, I have to observe that the
importance of this question has been exaggerated.
In reality, it mattered little what instructions
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General Gordon received, because he was not the
sort of man to be bound by any instructions.^
In the second place, the instructions, which
General Gordon received in London,were manifestly
written without a due appreciation of the neces-
sities of the situation. The Egyptian Government
had asked for "a well -qualified British officer to
go to Kliartoum with full powers, both civil and
military, to conduct the retreat." It would have
been a mere mockery if, instead of an executive
officer, they had been given some one whose sole
duty it would have been to write a report. There
had already been a sufficient number of reports
about the Soudan. The moment had arrived
when it was necessary to cease writing and to
act. It would have been particularly ridiculous
to send General Gordon, of all men in the world,
as a "mere reporter upon a difficult situation."^
General Gordon was essentially a man of action.
No one, who knew anything of his character,
could have supposed for one moment that he
would confine himself to mere reporting.
The idea, however, appears to have originated
with General Gordon himself On January 15,
Loid Granville telegraphed to me that General
Gordon was prepared to go to the Soudan on certain
"rather vague terms," the principal of which was that
he was to "report to Her Majesty's Government on
the military situation of the Soudan." JNIoreover,
on February 14, Sir Charles Dilke stated in tlie
House of Commons : " General Gordon drafted
his own instructions. . . . Believing him to be
the highest authority, that he knew more of the
conditions, and that he was better able to form a
* On January 21, 1884, I wrote to Lord Granville : " It is as well
that Gordon sliould be under my orders, but a man who habitually
consults the Prophet Isaiah when he is in a difficulty is not apt tc
obey the orders of any one."
'^ Too Late, p. 4.
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judgment on the subject than anybody else, we
asked him to draft his own instructions." In spite
of this fact, however, nothing can be more certain
than that General Gordon never considered his
mission to be that of a simple reporter. Indeed,
on the day (January 18) on which General Gordon
received his London instructions. Lord Granville
telegraphed to me : "Gordon suggests that it may
be announced in Egypt that he is on his way to
Khartoum to arrange for the future settlement of
the Soudan for the best advantage of the people."
Nothing was said of reporting. If General Gordon
was to arrange for *'the future settlement of the
Soudan," I fail to see how he could do so without
exercising; some executive authoritv.
In the third place, it is to be observed that
the proposal that General Gordon should be made
Governor-General of the Soudan did not emanate
from any one in Cairo. It was made by General
Gordon himself, whilst he was on the journey from
London to Egypt, and was communicated to me by
Lord Granville who, on January 22, telegraphed to
me certain " suggestions made by Gordon as to the
steps which should be taken with regard to the
present state of affairs in the Soudan." ^ The first
of these suggestions was that the Khedive should
issue a Proclamation to the people of the Soudan,
in the following terms : " To the people of the
Soudan ! The immense distances which have
separated me from you have given rise to disorders
which have resulted in revolt against my authority.
This revolt has cost much blood and treasure, far
beyond any adequate compensation, and has thrown
» See Egypt, No. 2 of 188i, p. 4. A short despatch from Lord
Granville to nie is published in this Parliamentary paper. From tliis
despatch it appears that certain suggestions of General (Gordon's
were telegraphed to me, and tliat 1 was authorised to cai ry them out.
But the suggestions themselves were not published. If tliey had been
publislied, no misapprehension on the point now under discussion would
have been possible.
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burdens on Lower Egypt which are mtolerable.
I have, tlierefore, determined to restore to the
various Sultans of the Soudan their independence,
and for this purpose I have commissioned General
Gordon, hite Governor-General of the Soudan, to
proceed there as my representative, and to arrange
with you for the evacuation of the country and
the withdrawal of my troops. Her Majesty's
Government, being most desirous of your welfare,
have also appointed General Gordon as their Com-
missioner for the same purpose. General Gordon
is hereby appointed Governor-General for the time
necessary to accomplish the evacnatio7i." ^
The second su<><>:estion was that a Proclama-
tion should be issued in General Gordon's name,
announcing that he had "accepted the post of
Governor-General ofthe Soudan.''^ "I recommend,"
General Gordon said in his telegram to Lord
Granville, which was repeated to me, "that these
Decrees and Proclamations should be published as
soon as possible in the Soudan." In forwarding
General Gordon's recommendations to me, Lord
Granville added : *' Her JNIajesty's Government have
not sufficient local knowledge to enable them to
form an opinion as to the practicability of these
suggestions, and I therefore authorise you, as time
is valuable, either immediately to make the arrange-
ments suggested, or to await General Gordon's
arrival, and consult with him as to the action to
be taken." As, when I received this telegram.
General Gordon had already left Brindisi, I did
not think it desirable to act upon the authority
given to me to cause these Proclamations to be
issued at once. I decided to await General
Gordon's arrival. Wlien he arrived, I moved the
Khedive to name him Governor-General of the
Soudan. This was in accordance with General
* The italics are not iu the oriii-iual.
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Gordon's own suggestion, upon wliich I had been
authorised by Lord Granville to act. Further,
as I have already mentioned,^ certain Proclama-
tions were prepared and given to General Gordon
with discretionary power to use them should he
think fit to do so. These Proclamations did not
differ materially from those wliich had been com-
municated to me in Lord Granville's telegram of
January 22.
Under these circumstances, it was with some
surprise that, on February 4, I received a telegram
from Lord Granville asking me whether " General
Gordon had accepted any appointment from the
Khedive." And it was with still greater surprise
that I found myself accused, not only by the
public, but also to a certain extent by the Govern-
ment, of having altered the character of General
Gordon's mission without any authority to do so.
The documents quoted above are sufficient to show
that this accusation was altofjether groundless.
Indeed, so little importance did I attach to the
changes in the instructions, which had been made
at Cairo, that on January 28, I wrote privately to
Lord Granville: " You will see that I gave Gordon,
at his own request, additional instructions, of
which I hope you will approve. They really
amount to nothing more than what he had
already received, but they give him a little
latitude as to the time at which the troops shall
be withdrawn." Looking to the fact that, on the
face of the thing, it was absurd to send General
Gordon as a mere reporter, to the further fact tliat
General Gordon, who had just arrived from London,
never said one word to me to induce the belief
that such was the intention of the Government,
and also to the fact that Lord Granville had him-
self authorised me to secure General Gordon's
* Vide untey p. 446.
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nomination as Governor-General of the Soudan,
it never occurred to me that I was departing
from the wishes and instructions of the British
Government by one hair's-breadth. The explana-
tion of all this confusion is, however, very simple.
I believe that the original intention of the British
Government was that General Gordon should
limit himself to reporting, and that Lord Granville
did not see that, in authorising General Gordon to
accept the appointment of Governor-General of the
Soudan, he changed the spirit of the instructions
which he had issued on January 18. He was,
therefore, surprised to find out what he had done.
Leaving aside, however, the personal and, there-
fore, unimportant question of who is responsible for
naming General Gordon Governor-General of the
Soudan, I wish to say that, in my opinion, the
decision was a wise one. General Gordon was about
to depart on a very difficult and dangerous mission.
He had resided for some while in the Soudan,
and was supposed to be well acquainted with the
affairs of that country. The only chance of
success lay in following his advice, and adopthig
such measures as he thought most likely to conduce
to the accomplishment of his task. He wished to
be named Governor-General, and he was obviously
right. Otherwise, he would have exercised no
authority.
To resume the narrative. It has been already
mentioned that one of the mahi difficulties, which
stood in the way of re-establishing the rule of the
local Sultans in the Soudan, was that in some of
the most important portions of the country tliere
were no old-standing families. This difficulty did
not, however, exist in respect to Darfour. Only
ten years had elapsed since that province had
been annexed by Egypt. Before that period, the
country had been governed by a line of Sultans
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which had existed for more than four hundred years.
When the annexation took place, the surviving
members of the reigning family were deported
to Cairo. The Egyptian Government doled out
allowances to them. In respect toDarfour, therefore,
there seemed to be some prospect of carrying into
execution the policy advocated by General Gordon.
There were several members of the Darfour
family at Cairo. It was no easy matter to decide
which to choose. The position of a Roi en exil is
not under any circumstances calculated to ennoble
the character. When the ex-monarch happens to
be an ignorant barbarian leading a slothful life in
a semi -civilised Oriental capital, such as Cairo, and
dependent on the charity of the Government for his
subsistence, no element is wanting to hasten the
process of moral decadence. The uses of adversity
had not been turned to account by the Darfour
family. The materials from which a choice had
to be made were, therefore, unpromising. How-
ever, a choice was made. The individual chosen
was Emir Abdul-Shakour, son of the late Sultan
Abdul -Rahman. He is described in Colonel
Stewart's Journal as a "common-looking, unintelli-
gent, and badly-dressed native." He was given
"£E.2000, a well-embroidered coat, and the biggest
decoration that could be found." He at first wished
to remain in Cairo for several days in order to make
preparations for his departure, but General Gordon
was in a hurry to be off, and the Darfour Sultan
was with some difficulty induced to start with
him. Colonel Stewart, speaking of General
Gordon's departure from Cairo on the night of
January 26, wrote in his Journal : " Some delay
was caused at starting by the numerous retinue
of the Darfour Sultan. Extra carriages had to be
put on for the accommodation of his twenty-three
wives and a quantity of baggage. At the last
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moment, his gala uniform was almost forgotten,
and there was some commotion until it was found."
Altogether, it did not look much as if an " un-
intelligent native " with twenty-three wives and a
quantity of baggage, who was, as it subsequently
appeared, inordinately proud of his decoration and
of his "gala uniform," would be very helpful in
inaugurating the new policy.
One further incident of importance occurred
whilst General Gordon was in Cairo.
In the course of this narrative allusion has
already been made to Zobeir Pasha.^ It is need-
less to dwell at length on the history of his pre-
vious relations with General Gordon. It will be
sufficient to say that Zobeir Pasha's social position, '^
the wealth which he had amassed in slave-hunting,
his courage, ability, and force of character, had at
one time won for him a position of commanding
influence in the Soudan. In June 1878, Zobeir
Pasha's son, Suleiman, raised a revolt in the Bahr-
el-Ghazal province, and killed 200 of the Egyptian
regular troops. General Gordon's lieutenant, Gessi,
was sent against him, and, in the beginning of 1879,
the rebellion was crushed. Suleiman was taken
prisoner and shot. A letter from Zobeir Pasha was
found in Suleiman's possession, in which the father
incited the son to revolt. Zobeir Pasha's property
was confiscated. In 1884, he was residing at
Cairo. He was detained there, but was allowed
his personal liberty and received an allowance from
the Egyptian Government. Under these circum-
stances, it was natural that there should be enmity
between General Gordon and Zobeir Pasha.
On January 22, whilst General Gordon was on
his way to Egypt, I received the following telegram
* Vide ante, pp. 402-404.
^ Zobeir Pasha is a descendant of the Abbaside dynasty of
Khalifs.
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from Lord Granville : " Gordon considers it most
important that Zobeir should be well watched by a
European to prevent his sending emissaries or letters
to the Soudan. He has suggested that Zobeir
should be sent to Cyprus, but there is no legal
power to detain him if sent." On receiving this
telegram, I took steps to have Zobeir Pasha watched.
On January 25, whilst paying a visit to Cherif
Pasha, General Gordon accidentally met Zobeir
Pasha. A short conversation ensued between the
two, with the result that General Gordon ex-
pressed a wish that he and Zobeir Pasha should
meet in my presence with a view to the latter
stating his complaints.
On the morning of the 26th, I received a written
Memorandum from General Gordon, in which,
after sketching the history of the events which led
to Zobeir Pasha's expulsion from the Soudan, he
went on to express himself as follows :
—
" Zobeir, without doubt, was the greatest slave-
hunter who ever existed. Zobeir is the most able
man in the Soudan, he is a capital general, and has
been wounded several times. Zobeir has a capacity
of government far beyond any other man in the
Soudan. All the followers of the INIahdi would, I
believe, leave the Mahdi on Zobeir's approach, for
the Mahdi's chiefs are ex-chiefs of Zobeir. Person-
ally, I have a great admiration for Zobeir, for he
is a man, and is infinitely superior to those })oor
fellows who have been Governors of the Soudan.
But I question in my mind, 'Will Zobeir ever
forgive me the death of his son ? ' and that question
has regulated my action respecting him, for I have
been told he bears me the greatest malice, and one
cannot wonder at it, if one is a father. I would
even now risk taking Zobeir, and would wilHngly
bear the responsibility of doing so, convinced as I
am that Zobeir's approach ends the JNIahdi, which
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is a question which has its pulse in Syria, the
Hedjaz, and Palestine,
" It cannot be the wish of Her Majesty's
Government, or of the Egyptian Government, to
have an intestine war in the Soudan on its evacua-
tion, yet such is sure to ensue, and the only way
which would prevent it is the restoration of Zobeir,
who would be accepted on all sides, and who would
end the Mahdi in a couple of months. My duty
is to obey the orders of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment, i.e. to evacuate the Soudan as soon as
possible vis-a-vis the safety of the Egyptian em-
ployes. To do this, I want no Zobeir. But if
the addenda is made that I leave a satisfactory
settlement of affairs, then Zobeir becomes a si^ie
qua non. Therefore, the question resolves itself
into this, does Her Majesty's Government, or
Egyptian Government, desire a settled state of
affairs in the Soudan after the evacuation ? Do
those Governments want to be free of this trouble-
some fanatic ? If they do, then Zobeir should be
sent ; if the two Governments are indifferent, then
do not send him, and I have confidence we will
get out the Egyptian employes in three or four
montlis, and will leave a cockpit behind us. It is
not my duty to dictate what should be done. I
will only say
—
" 1. 1 was justified in my action against Zobeir.
"2. That if Zobeir bears no malice personally
against me, I would take him at once, as a humanly
certain settler of the Mahdi and of those in revolt.
** I have written this Memorandum, and Zobeir's
story may be lieard. 1 only ask that after he has
been interrogated, I may be questioned on such
subjects as his statements are at variance with
mine. I would wish the inquiry to be official, and
in such a way tliat whatever may be the decision
come to, it may be come to in my absence.
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•* With respect to the Skive Trade,^ I think
nothing of it, for there will be Slave Trade always
as long as Turkey and Egypt buy the slaves, and
it may be Zobeir will or might see his interests to
stop it in some manner.
" I will, therefore, sum up my o])inion, viz. that
I would willhigly take the responsibility of taking
Zobeir up with me, if after an interview with Sir
E. Baring and Nubar Pasha, they felt the mystic
feeling I could trust him, and which mystic feeling
I felt I had for him to-night when I met him at
Ch^rif Pasha's house. Zobeir could have nothing
to gain in hurting me, and I would have no idea
of fear. In this affair my desire, I own, would be
to take Zobeir. I cannot exactly say why I feel
towards him thus, and I feel sure that his going-
would settle the Soudan affair to the benefit of
Her Majesty's and Egyptian Governments, and I
would bear the responsibility of recommending it."
The interview between General Gordon and
Zobeir Pasha took place on the afternoon of
January 26 in the presence of Nubar Pasha, Sir
Evelyn Wood, Colonel Stewart, Colonel Watson,
Giegler Pasha, and myself.^ A shorthand writer
and an interpreter were present. The scene was
dramatic and interesting. Both General Gordon
and Zobeir Pasha were labouring under great
excitement and spoke with vehemence. Zobeir
Pasha did not deny that his son had rebelled against
the Egyptian Government, but he denied his own
complicity in the rebellion. General Gordon's case
rested mainly upon the letter addressed by Zobeir
' General Gordon's instructions given to him in London, contained
the following passage : " You should pay especial consideration to the
question of the steps that may usefully be taken to counteract the
stimulus which it is feared may possibly be given to the Slave Trade
by the present insurrectionary movement, and by the withdrawal of
the Egyptian authority from the Interior."
2 A full account of this interview is given in Egypt, No. 12 of 1884,
pp. 38-41.
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Pasha to his son, which was found by Gessi. This
letter could not be produced at the time, but
I saw a copy of it subsequently. If genuine,
it afforded sufficient proof of Zobeir Pasha's com-
plicity in his son's rebellion.
After this interview was over and Zobeir Pasha
had retired, General Gordon's Memorandum, in
which he had proposed that Zobeir Pasha should
accompany him to Khartoum, was discussed. All
present, more especially Colonel Stewart, were
opposed to sending him. I had always been rather
in favour of employing Zobeir Pasha in the Soudan.
Moreover, I saw tliat the main difficulty in the way
of carrying out General Gordon's policy was the
absence of any strong local men to whom to entrust
the future government of the Soudan, and especially
of Khartoum. I believed that, by giving Zobeir
Pasha money and an influential position, it might
be possible to secure his friendshij) towards General
Gordon ; and there could be no doubt that, if this
friendship could be secured, he would prove a
valuable instrument in the execution of General
Gordon's policy. The arguments on the other
side were, however, strong.
In the first place, the employment of Zobeir
Pasha would be sure to raise an outcry in England.
I should not have minded this, if 1 could have felt
certain that his employment was desirable. But
was it desirable ? I was not at that moment
prepared to take the responsibility of answering
this question in the affirmative. The weight of
authoritative opinion was decidedly against sending
him to the Soudan. My wish was to follow
General Gordon's lead, but he himself hesitated as
to what course to pursue. It was impossible to say
how far this impulsive man was animated, not so
much by a consideration of the political necessities
of the case, as by a chivalrous feeling that possibly
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in former times he might have done some injustice
to Zobeir Pasha, and that he wished to atone for
such injustice by giving his old adversary an oppor-
tunity of retrieving his position. The argument,
however, which convinced me that, for the time
being at all events, it was undesirable to employ
Zobeir Pasha, was that forty-eight hours before I
received General Gordon's Memorandum proposing
that Zobeir Pasha should accompany him to the
Soudan, I had received, through Lord Granville, a
proposal, also emanating from General Gordon, that
Zobeir Pasha should be deported to Cyprus.^ A
few minutes' conversation with Zobeir Pasha, and
a "mystic feeUng " which that conversation had
engendered, had led General Gordon to jump from
one extreme to the other. Instead of being con-
sidered as an enemy, Zobeir Pasha was to be treated
as a trusted ally, on whose conduct the success of
the mission was to depend. 1 have no confidence
in opinions based on mystic feelings. Colonel
Stewart subsequently (M.irch 11) wrote to me from
Khartoum: "I never saw or met any one whose
mind and imagination are so constantly active as
Gordon's. For him to giasp an idea is to act on it
at once." Short as my personal acquaintance had
been with General Gordon, it was clear to me that
his various obiter dicta were not to be regarded
as expressions of his matured opinions. It might
eventually be desirable to employ Zobeir Pasha,
but it was necessary to give General Gordon more
time to think over the matter before taking action.
Under these circumstances, I had no hesitation
in deciding against the immediate employment of
Zobeir Pasha. " At General Gordon's suggestion,"
I wrote to Lord Granville, " I informed Zobeir Pasha
that he would be allowed to remain in Cairo, and
that the future treatment he would receive at the
* Vide ante, p. 455.
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hands of the Egyptian Government depended in
a great measure upon whether General Gordon
returned alive and well from the Soudan, and upon
whether, whilst residing at Cairo, Zobeir Pasha used
his influence to facilitate the execution of the policy
upon which the Government had determined."
Thus the matter was settled for the moment.
On the night of January 26, General Gordon and
Colonel Stewart left Cairo on the ill-fated expedi-
tion from which they were destined never to return.
General Gordon was in excellent spirits and hopeful
of success. My own heart was heavy within me.
I knew the diflficulties of the task which had to be
accomplished. I had seen General Gordon. Nothing
could have been more friendly than his behaviour.
The main lines of his policy appeared wise and prac-
tical. Nevertheless, I was not relieved of the doubts
which I originally entertained as to the wisdom
of employing him. Manifestly, in spite of many
fine and attractive qualities, he was even more
eccentric than I had originally supposed. How-
ever, the die was cast. A comet of no common
magnitude had been launched on the political
firmament of the Soudan. It was difficult to
predict its course. It now only remained for me
to do my best to help General Gordon, and to trust
to the shrewd common sense of his companion,
Colonel Stewart, to act in some degree as a correc-
tive to the impulsiveness of his wayward chief.^
* I may mention that during- the short period whilst General Gordon
and Colonel Stewart were at Cairo I was most unfortunately afflicted with
a severe sore throat, which well-nigh deprived me of any powers of
speech. The health of individuals in responsible positions, more especi-
ally at critical moments, has a more serious bearing on public affairs
than is often supposed. During the Egyptian Conference, which sat in
London in the summer of 188.5, the course of events was, I am in-
clined to think, a good deal influenced by the fact that Lord Granville
had a rather unusually severe attack of gout. Further, I may mention
that whilst the question of Zobeir Pasha's despatch to the Soudan waa
under discussion, Mr. Gladstone was ill in bed. (See further remarks
on this subject, p. 631.)
CHAPTER XXIV
Gordon's journey to khartoum
January 26-February 18, 1884
Contradictory nature of General Gordon's proposals—The Darfour
Sultan—General Gordon proposes to visit the Mahdi—Or to retire
to the Equator—He issues a Proclamation announcing the inde-
pendence of the Soudan— The Slavery Proclamation— General
Gordon arrives at Khartoum—He is sanguine of success—Colonel
Stewart's warning.
On February 1, Colonel Stewart wrote to me
from Korosko : " I shall be very glad when we are
actually at Khartoum and face to face with the
situation. Gordon is so full of energy and action
that he cannot get along without doing something,
and at present he revenges himself for his enforced
inactivity by writing letters, despatches, etc., and
sending telegrams."
Now, in fact, began a period during which I
received a large number of very bewildering and
contradictory messages from General Gordon. They
began immediately after he left Cairo. Sir Henry
Gordon subsequently wrote : *' It was no part of
General Gordon's character to form a definite
opinion from imperfectly known facts, and to
adhere obstinately to that opinion, notwithstanding
the evidence of altered circumstances and new
elements." Much may be forgiven to fraternal afiec-
tion. The truth, however, is that General Gordon's
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main defect was that he was constantly forming
strong opinions on imperfectly known facts.
Extreme consistency in political matters is certainly
not a cardinal virtue. It lias, indeed, been char-
acterised by Emerson as "the hobgoblin of little
minds." But the peculiarity of General Gordon was
that, in great things as in small, his revulsions of
opinion were so ra})id and so complete that it was
almost impossible to follow him. On INIarch 11,
Colonel Stewart wrote to me from Khartoum: "I
most sincerely congratulate you on the interruption
in the telegraphic communication.^ The shower of
telegrams which we have been sending you of late
must have acted somewhat like a cold douche.
Yesterday, I told Gordon that his numerous com-
munications might tend to confuse you, but he replied
that he was merely giving you different aspects of
the same question." General Gordon's communica-
tions did, indeed, tend to confuse me. In addition
to the other difficulties of the situation, this further
difficulty was now superadded, that I had, if I may
be allowed to coin such an expression, to learn
Gordonese. I had to distinguish between such pro-
posals of General Gordon as represented his matured
opinions, and others which were mere bubbles
thrown up by his imaginative brain, probably
forgotten as soon as made, and, therefore, un-
worthy of serious attention. I do not say that I
al,ways succeeded in eliminating the dross in order
to arrive at the valuable residuum. I can only
say that the task was one of great difficulty, and
that I did my best to accomplish it.
1 Before telep^raphic communication between Khartoum and Cairo
was permanently interrupted, several temporary breaks took place
owin^ to the line being in a very bad condition. Lord Granville
expressed much the same idea as Colonel Stewart, On March 21, he
wrote to me: "I am not sure that the stoppage of communication
with Gordon for a time is the greatest of niihlortunes either for himself
or us."
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The policy of setting up the local Sultans did
not begin well. The Darfour Prince, who accom-
panied General Gordon, was a wretched creature.
On January 29, General Gordon telegraphed to me :
"The Emir Abdul-Shakour has taken to drinking."
On the 30th, Colonel Stewart wrote in his diary
:
"The Darfour Sultan decided to get out here
(Assouan) and not to come with us any farther."
Two days previously (28th), Gordon wrote to me
" Please listen to no telegrams from the Sultan of
Darfour's family. I have explained to him that,
having placed him at Dongola, whence clear roads
exist to Darfour, we wash our hands of him, for it
is his work to raise the tribes in his favour. We
have nought to do with him and will not support
him, for we cannot do so." The Darfour Prince
was manifestly deficient in the qualities necessary
to carry out a policy such as that projected by
General Gordon. He got as far as Dongola,
where he remained for some months, and then
returned to Cairo.
Whilst General Gordon was on his way from
Brindisi to Port Said, he gave tlie following mes-
sage for Mr. Clifford Lloyd to an English officer,
who was a fellow -passenger on the same ship
"Tell Lloyd, no panics. It is possible that I
may go to the Mahdi and not be heard of for
two months, for he might keep me as a hostage
for Zobeir. You can tell Lloyd this when you
get to Cairo, so that he can publish it at the
right time, if necessary." Owing to Mr. Clifford
Lloyd being confined to his house through illness,
I did not hear of this message until General Gordon
was half-way to Khartoum. Looking to General
Gordon's very singular character, I thought it not
impossible that he would carry out the idea of going
to the Mahdi. Had he done so, he would certainly
have been detained a prisoner for life, unless a
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British force had been sent to release liiin. I,
therefore, telegraphed to him : " I hope you will
give me a positive assurance that you will on no
account put yourself voluntarily in the power of
the JNIahdi. Tlie question is not a personal one.
There would, in my opinion, be the strongest
political objections to your risking a visit to the
iNIahdi." In reply, General Gordon telegraphed tc
me that he had no intention of visiting the Malidi.
I do not believe that he ever seriously contemplated
this step. It was merely an idea which flashed
through his brain for a moment. But, had he
gone, the consequences both to himself and, pos-
sibly, to his country, would have been so serious
that it was as well to obtain from him an assur-
ance that he would not give effect to this hare-
brained project.
I turn to another incident which occurred about
this time. On February 1, General Gordon wrote
to me from Korosko enclosing a letter for the King
of the Belgians. In this letter, he spoke of going up
the AVhite Nile, taking possession of the Bahr-el-
Ghazal and Equatorial Provinces, and then handing
them over to the King of the Belgians. I received
this letter on February 9. This project did not
appear to me to be feasible. INIoreover, I was always
afraid of General Gordon acting on the impulse
of the moment without sufficient reflection. I,
therefore, telegraphed to Lord Granville : " I do
not think tliat General Gordon should be allowed,
at all events for the present, to go anywhere south
of Khartoum." At the same time, I sent the
following private telegram to Lord Granville
:
"Do I understand riglitly that I have full powers
to give Gordon positive orders not to ])roceed
beyond a certain point, if I think it necessary to
do so? I believe he would obey oiders, but I
doubt his caring much about suggestions. If he
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comes to any harm, it will be the worst thing that
has happened yet. I am more anxious lest his total
disregard for his own safety should lead to further
serious difficulties than almost anything else." On
February 10, Lord Granville, in reply to my
inquiry, sent me the following private telegram :
" You have full powers. Instruct Gordon not to
proceed at present south of Khartoum." This was
followed, on February 11, by an official telegram,
which was to the following effect : " Her Majesty's
Government are of opinion that General Gordon
should not, at present, go beyond Khartoum." I
communicated the views of the British Govern-
ment on this point to General Gordon on
February 12, and in reply received a telegram,
stating that he would not go south of Khartoum
without my permission.
It may be as well, for the sake of clearness, that
I should anticipate this narrative so far as to state,
in the present place, what subsequently occurred
in connection with this particular })oint. On
March 9, General Gordon sent me several tele-
grams. In one of them he proposed to resign his
commission in the British army, to " take all
steamers and stores up to the Equatorial and Bahr-
el-Ghazal provinces, and consider those provinces as
under the King of the Belgians." Later on, I shall
have to deal with the reply which Lord Granville
gave to the various proposals then under discussion.
I need here only state that, in communicating to
General Gordon the views of the British Govern-
ment, I instructed him to hold on at Khartoum
until I could communicate with Her Majesty's
Government, and I told him that he should on no
account proceed to the Bahr-el-Ghazal and Equa-
torial provinces. In his Journal, General Gordon
complained bitterly of not having been allowed to
proceed up the White Nile. Writing on October 5,
VOL. I 2 H
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1884, he said: "Her INIajesty's Government
ought to have taken the bold step of speaking
out and saying, SHIFT FOR YOURSELF
in 3Iarch,'^ when I could have done so, and not
now when I am in honour bound to the people
after six months' bothering warfare. Not only
did Baring not say ' Shift for yourself,' but he
put a veto upon my going to the Equator, vide
his telegrams in Stewart's Journal."
As regards General Gordon's complaint on this
subject, I have tlie following observations to make.
In the first place, I doubt whether General
Gordon would in any case have attempted to go up
the White Nile. If he had done so, he would have
been obliged to abandon the garrisons of Khartoum
and other places, and this, as Colonel Stewart wrote
to me so early as INIarch 4, he was " the last man
in the world to do."
In the second place, if General Gordon had made
the attempt, I believe he would have failed. Both
he and his followers would almost certainly have
been taken prisoners by the Mahdi.
In the third place, in spite of the entry in General
Gordon's Journal, to which I have alluded above,
it is clear that, as a matter of fact, the instructions
received from me on this particular point did not
hamper his action. I received an undated telegram
from him, on April 16, 1884, which was to the
following effect : " I consider myself free to act
accordincr to circumstances. I shall hold on here
as long as I can, and if I can suppress the rebellion,
I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire to the
Equator." Colonel Stewart, at the same time,
telegraphed that he did not think it would be
possible to get to Berber. " I am inclined," he
* In this and other quotations from General Gordon's Journal, the
capitals and italics, save in a few cases to which attention is specially
drawn, are in the original.
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added, "to think my retreat will perhaps be safer
by the Equator. 1 siiall, therefore, follow tlie
fortunes of General Gordon." Mr. Power, the
British Consuhir Agent at Khartoum, telegraphed
to the same effect. These messages constitute a
sufficient proof that, in spite of my telegram of
P^ebruary 12, General Gordon did not think himself
precluded from retiring up the White Nile, should
he have thought fit to do so.
It will be borne in mind that General Gordon
took with him two Proclamations, one of which
stated that the Egyptian Government had decided
to withdraw their troops from the Soudan, whilst
in the other it was stated that General Gordon
was appointed Governor-General of the Soudan.^
On February 1, Colonel Stewart wrote to me
from Korosko : *' It seems to me that at present
the most suitable plan is not to publish abroad
throughout the Soudan that we mean to leave.
Before doing so, we ought at any rate to place
the kinglets in their several districts. Whether
it will be possible to induce Gordon to remain
silent in the matter is, however, more than
doubtful."
On February 11, General Gordon and Colonel
Stewart arrived at Berber. The following entry
occurs in Colonel Stewart's Journal, dated February
12 : "I was called up at 5 a.m. by General Gordon,
who, having pondered deeply all night, had come to
the decision of opening the Pandora box, and openly
proclaiming the divorce of the Soudan from Egypt,
and the forming of local militias, and the appoint-
ment of Soudan officials in every important post.
At 8 A.M., Hussein Pasha Khalifa, and JNlohammed
Tahir, the judge of the civil court, a man w^e
have every reason to believe is a bosom-friend of
the Mahdi, made their a})pearance. With their
* Vide ante, p. 44G.
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assistance, and after showing them the secret
Firmans, which the General thought necessary
to show them to allay their alarm at the over-
turning of the Khedive's authority, a Proclamation
was drawn up. This Proclamation appointed a
Committee, or provisional Government consisting
of six of the most influential Notables of the
Mudirieh, and proclaimed that the JNIudirieh was
from henceforth independent of Cairo, but subject
to General Gordon as Governor -General and
Commissioner of the British Government. The
Proclamation was affixed to the gate, and caused
a good deal of excitement ; so far as I am able
to judge, the people appeared to approve of it."
On February 13, the following further entry
occurs in Colonel Stewart's Journal : " At 2 p.m.,
Hussein Pasha Khalifa and the leadino; men of the
province assembled in secret conclave, and General
Gordon, after a speech, showed them the secret
Firman. This document caused the most profound
astonishment, but in so far as one could judge from
what they said, nothing could exceed their delight.
We have tried to fathom what those present really
thought, and we are told that it was a mistake
to have shown it. We are told that the probable
effect will be to lead those who read the Firman to
conclude that all the concessions made by General
Gordon, viz. :—half-tax {sic), were made merely
with a view to getting the troops out of the
country without danger, and to leave the people
to stew in their own juice. On consideration, it
may perhaps have been a mistake to show this
Firman, but General Gordon says that, as the
object of his mission is to get out of the country
and to leave tliein independent, that he could not
have put a sharper spur into them to organise
their government tlian by this action. It is
certain that they fondly believe that by some
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means or other they would be rid of the
Cairo Government, and remain inde])endent under
General Gordon, who would give them greater
local liberties and not interfere with their darling
slave-trade. As regards my own opinion on the
matter, I fully admit that the question of showing
or not showing the Firman is a difficult one to
answer. Perhaps 1 should have preferred follow-
ing Nubar Paslia's advice and delaying any action
in the matter till a later period, wlien I could have
better judged what would have been the result, or
at any rate, till the political situation had become
clearer."
In a letter to me of the same date, February 13,
Colonel Stewart wrote : '* You will see by my
Journal that Gordon has taken his leap in the dark
and shown his secret Firman. How it will act, and
what will be the result, goodness only knows. At
any rate, the deed is done and we must now abide
by the result and hope for the best."
General Gordon says in his Journal (p. 28.5) that
the Khedive's Firman— by which he meant the
Proclamation which was g-iven to him in Cairo—was
not " promulgated " in the Soudan, and the same
statement is repeated by the editor of the Journal
(Mr. Egmont Hake) in a note on p. 309. It is
clear, however, from the facts narrated above, that,
after the events which took place at Berber, the
existence of the Firman must have been known
throughout the Soudan.
There can be little doubt that General Gordon
committed an error of judgment in showing the
Firman at Berber. News of the intended abandon-
ment of the Soudan had, indeed, reached Khartoum
prior to that date. But it was only half believed.
It was not till after the events which took place
at Berber on February 12 and 13, that the inten-
tions of the Egyptian Government became widely
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known. Sir Reginald Wingate^ alludes to the
" fatal Proclamation wliich gave the Soudan
away," and he has informed me verbally that his
researches have led him to the conclusion that
General Gordon's difficulties were greatly increased
by the action taken at Berber.
If General Gordon had not stated the fact himself,
and if we did not know something of his peculiar
character, it would be almost incredible that he
should have shown such an important document
as the Khedive's Firman to the Sheikhs at Berber
without having fully mastered its contents. Such,
however, is the case. He appears subsequently to
have seen that he made a mistake in showinjj the
Firman, for, on November 9, 1884, the following
entry occurs in his Journal (p. 309) : " If the
Mahdi got this {i.e. the Firman), he would have
crowed, though he may know of it,^ for I sliowed
^ Mahdiism, etc., p. 121. Father Ohi-walder also says: ''Gordon
himself committed a mistake by which he gave a death-blow to himself
and his mission. On his way to Khartoum, he stopped at Berber and
interviewed the Mudir Hussein Pasha Khalifa ; he imprudently told
him that he had come up to remove the Egyptian garrisons, as Egypt
had abandoned the Soudan. At Metemmeh also ... he committed a
similar imprudence, by giving the same information to Haj AH Wad
Saad, the Emir of Metemmeh."
—
Ten Years' Captivity in the Muhdi's
Camp, p. 123.
2 On October 22, i.e. eighteen days before General Gordon made this
entry in his Journal, he had received a letter from the Mahdi (Appendix
to Journal, p. 522), in which the latter gave a list of the documents which
had fallen into his possession at the time of Colonel Stewart's death.
Inter alia, the Mahdi wrote: "Also we have seen your telegram dated
August 28, 1884^, stating that, as for the Firman emanating from the
Khedive to all the Nobles and Notables and people of the Soudan,
announcing the withdrawal of the troops of the Government from it,
and their evacuation of tiie country, and leaving it to the Soudanese to
appoint rulers of the country from among the natives,
—
you had not been
aide to communicate it, or to show it to any one on account of what
had taken place." The receipt of this letter is recorded in General
(lordon's Journal (p. 220) in the followinar cliaracteristic words written
on October 22, 1884 : ''Tlie Mahdi's letter is to relate how he captured
the post, etc. , Abbas (the steamer in which Stewart went down the
Nile), etc. .My answer was tliat I did not care who had surrendered
and who had l)een captured. As for these letters, I cannot make head
or tail of them, so I leave them to the Arabic sciiolars of tlie Univer-
sities." General Gordon knew very little Arabic, neither does he appeal
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it, not knuwhig well its contents,^ to Hussein Pasha
Khalifa {vide Stewart's Journal, which went down
and in which I criticised my having done so)."
I now turn to another episode. In 1877, a
Convention was signed between the British and
Egyptian Governments having for its object the
abolition of slavery and of the Slave Trade in Egypt.
The Convention was not to come into operation
in the Soudan till the year 1888. It would, under
any circumstances, have been very difficult to apply
the Convention to the Soudan. General Gordon
knew this. So early as October 11, 1883, Lord
Granville wrote privately to me : " About slavery,
I was very keen at first, and the first cold water
I got was, of all people in the world, from Colonel
Gordon, who seemed to me sensible on the matter."
In other words, in spite of his anti-slavery sympa-
thies, and although he had himself been a witness
of the horrors of the Slave Trade, General Gordon
recognised the facts of the situation more fully than
his friends, who, in so far as the incident about to
be narrated is concerned, became his critics.
On February 12, Colonel Stewart, who was
then at Berber, made the following entry in his
Journal : " A deputation of the Notables came to
inquire whether the Treaty, which had been printed
and published by General Gordon, in November
1877, by which all slaves would be freed in 1889,
was in his present programme. General Gordon,
knowing the utter futility of saying ' Yes,' replied
' No,' and published a Proclamation to this effect.
It is probable that this Proclamation interested and
pleased the people more than anything else."
A few days later, the Proclamation was publisheci
to have taken pains to ^et Arabic documents properly translated to him.
This, added to his habitual carelessness in the transaction of business,
led him into the committal of many mistakes which might have been
avoided.
1 The italics are not in the oiijjiual.
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in Kliartoum. It was to the following effect: " My
sincerest desire is to adopt a course of action which
shall lead to public tranquillity, and knowing your
regret at the severe measures taken by the Govern-
ment for the suppression of the slave traffic, and
the seizure and punishment of all concerned,
according to the Convention and Decrees, I confer
upon you these rights, that henceforth none shall
interfere with your property ; whoever has slaves,
shall have full right to their services and full control
over them. This Proclamation is a proof of my
clemency towards you."
This Proclamation naturally caused some ex-
citement in England. That a man who had
heretofore been considered a champion of the
anti- slavery cause, should, immediately on his
arrival at Khartoum, sanction slavery and thus
run counter to the traditions of his previous
career, seemed, indeed, astonishing. The special
supporters of the anti - slavery movement were
up in arms. Party managers, moreover, were not
likely to let slip such a good opportunity for
attacking the Government. On February 18,
Sir Stafford Northcote, speaking in the House of
Commons, asked, amidst the '* loud cheers " of his
supporters, whether " General Gordon's powers
extended to the issue of such a Proclamation ?
"
The Government were, in fact, in an em-
barrassing position. It was obvious from the first
that, if the Soudan were abandoned, a stimulus
would be given to slavery and the Slave Trade.
Nothing General Gordon could have said or done
could have acted as an antidote. He rightly
judged that he had to look to the main object of
his mission, which was to evacuate the Soudan.
He sought, therefore, to make some capital out of
permitting the continuance of an abuse which he
was powerless to arrest. Without doubt, under
OH. XXIV JOURNEY TO KHARTOUM 473
ordinary circumstances, it would have been better,
if he could not remedy the evil, at all events not
to have given the sanction of his name to its con-
tinuance. But the circumstances in which General
Gordon was placed were far from being ordinary.
The difficulties of carrying out his task were such
that he could not afford to miss a point in the game.
He was free from the peculiar feature which,
according to many foreign critics, is such a promi-
nent defect in the English character, and which,
if it be not cant, is nearly allied to cant. I mean
that particular phase of thought which, although it
cannot deny that certain unpleasant facts exist,
hesitates to draw the logical conclusion from their
existence, and hesitates still more to make any
open acknowledgment of their existence. General
Gordon probably reasoned thus : " As I cannot stop
slavery, there can be no harm in my saying so,
and in acting accordingly." A section of British
public opinion, on the other hand, reasoned some-
what as follows : " We know that you cannot stop
slavery, but you had better hide the unpleasant
fact from the eyes of the world."
General Gordon's action in this matter appeared
to me to be justifiable. I, therefore, determined to
support him to the best of my ability. On February
21, General Gordon telegraphed to me as follows
:
" Several telegrams have been sent from the press
asking about what I said respecting slaves. The
question asked me was this : Did I insist on the
liberation of slaves in 1889, as per Treaty of 1877 ?
I answered that the Treaty would not be enforced
in 1889 by me, which, considering the determina-
tion of Her JNIajesty's Government respecting the
Soudan, was a self-evident fact. The question is
one of slave-holding, not of slave-hunting, and, in
my opinion, that Treaty of 1877 will never be
carried out in Cairo as to slave-holding."
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I sent the following reply : " About your
Slavery Proclamation, 1 am sure I quite under-
stand your reasons. I have telegraphed home to
say that I think you are quite right. You
are doing admirably, and may rely on my full
support in everything."
At the same time (February 21), I sent the
following telegram to Lord Granville : *' It is only
natural that the Proclamation issued by General
Gordon at Khartoum should have caused a good
deal of surprise in England. But in reality his
declaration with regard to the buying and selling
of slaves is of very little practical importance, and
it is easy enough to understand his reasons for
making it.
" It was obvious from the first that a revival of
slavery in the Soudan would result from the policy
of abandonment. Nothing tliat General Gordon
can do at Khartoum will prevent this revival
;
knowing that he is powerless to stop slavery
in the future, General Gordon evidently intends
using it as a concession to the people which will
strengthen his position in other matters. I con-
sider that he has succeeded admirably so far, and
I sincerely trust that he will be allowed full liberty
of action to complete the execution of his general
plans. I have informed him that my personal
opinion is entirely in his favour, and that I will
give him all tiie support in my power.
" As to the best means of preventing slavery,
the subject will have to be considered carefully and
discussed afresh, in view of the altered circum-
stances of the situation."
After this, the subject was allowed to drop.
The Pall iMall Gazette wrote : " The Government
stood by their agent with commendable courage,
and, as is usual when responsible authorities
well-informed as to facts resist the clamour of
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ill-informed public opinion, the cry promptly
subsided."
On February 18, General Gordon readied
Khartoum. His arrival was announced to me by
Mr. Power, in the following telegram : " Gordon
arrived here this morning, and met with a wonder-
ful demonstration of welcome on the part of the
population. The state of affairs here, since it
was heard that Gordon was coming, gives every
promise of the speedy pacification of this portion
of the Soudan. His speech to the people was
received with the greatest enthusiasm."
On the following day (February 19) Mr. Power
sent me another telegram. " Gordon," he said,
" met with a great reception yesterday. Has ordered
all white troops to leave for Cairo. Soudani
soldiers kept in Khartoum. Has formed Council
of twelve Notables, Arabs, to sit with him. Burned
all old records of debts against people, and instru-
ments of torture in Government House. Colonel
Stewart at prison striking irons off all prisoners of
war, debtors, and men who have long ago served
their sentences. Gordon sends Ibrahim Pasha
down with detachment of white troops. Every-
thing is now safe here for troops and Europeans.
He is giving the people more than they expected
from the Mahdi."
General Gordon was at tliis time hopeful as
regards the future. Without doubt, he was over-
sanguine, but at the time a reasonable prospect
seemed to exist that he would be able to carry
out his mission successfully. He had begun well.
On February 12, he telegraphed to me: "Do not
fear for the Khartoum garrison. It can come by
Berber, if necessary, but neither the men who
attacked Baker, nor those who attacked Hicks, will
ever leave tribal limits. What had to be feared
was the rising of other peoples, which I trust I
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have prevented by libenil concessions." Again, on
February 14, he telegraphed to me : " I believe
you need not give yourself any further anxiety
about this part of the Soudan. The people, great
and small, are heartily glad to be free of a union
which only caused them sorrow."
To a certain extent, General Gordon was right
in his view of the situation. The tribes round
Khartoum were wavering. If they openly joined
the Malidi, the difficulties of the situation would be
greatly increased. The only chance of ensuring
their friendship was by making liberal concessions.
General Gordon had made such concessions. He
had issued a Proclamation sanctioning slavery,
which, although it caused consternation in London,
was hailed with delight at Khartoum. He had
remitted taxes. He had destroyed the bonds of
the usurers—always a most popular proceeding in
an Oriental country. He had released prisoners
who were unjustly confined. His mere presence
at Khartoum was interpreted as a guarantee that
the future government of the Soudan would be
less oppressive than that of the past. Lord
Gianville's buoyant spirits at once rose. On
February 15, he wrote privately to me : '* It was an
anxious moment while Gordon was in the desert.
\Mien he gets at the head of 6000 men, it becomes
more of a normal situation. It looks as if he
would succeed." ^
1 On another occasion (December 28, 1883), speaking' of Eg-yptian
affairs jj^eiierally, Lord (Jninville wrote to nie : " 1 was delighted to
see that you do not feel the alarm, which is felt here, and apparently
in Egypt. I am perpetually reproaching myself with heing too
optimistic. The difficulties are great, especially the enormous one of
finance, but they ouglit not to be insurmountable." I do not think
tliat I was ever very optimistic about Egyptian affairs. Indeed, as
regards finance, 1 at one time erred somewhat on the side of undue
pessimism. What 1 felt during this period was that, amidst all the
excitement that then prevailed, and which resulted in some very
wild and ill-considered suggestions being occasionally made, it w.aa
necessary for me to keep my head, to ascertain so far as was
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The shrewd Scotchman, who accompanied
General Gordon, was not, however, carried away
by the jubilation of the moment. On February 17,
Colonel Stewart wrote to me : *' The problem of
evacuating the Soudan is continually in our minds.
I must confess the more one looks at it, the more
difficult it becomes. However, perhaps, when
actually tackled, it will resolve itself somehow or
other."
I have already stated that it was, in my opinion,
a mistake ever to have sent General Gordon to
the Soudan. Once sent, however, the best chance
of success lay in adopting the course advocated by
the Pall Mall Gazette. General Gordon should
have had *' carte blanche to do the best that could
be done," so long as he conformed to the broad lines
of the policy which he was sent to carry out. I
saw this from the first, and regulated my conduct
accordingly. My difficulty lay in discovering,
amidst the numerous contradictory opinions that
emanated from General Gordon, what it was he
really wished should be done. Unfortunately, a
section of the British public did not realise suffi-
ciently the importance of giving General Gordon
a free hand. In spite of his popularity, directly he
made proposals which ran counter to the current
of preconceived public opinion, a chorus of dis-
approbation was raised, in which some of General
Gordon's warmest friends and supporters joined.
possible the real facts of tlie case, to consider carefully the merits of
any proposal before acting upon it, and especially to avoid the use
of sensational or exaggerated language. On April 13, 1884, (ienoral
Gordon sent me a telegram wliicli I did not receive till six years later
(March 20, 18i)0), and in which he exhorted me to depart "from that
delicious diplomatic calm wliich is Paradise." He fre(|uently used
language of a somewhat similar description in his Journal. The
"diplomatic calm " existed in a somewhat less degree than General
Gordon supposed. Its appearance was mainly due to the fact that, in
my opinion, the greater the difficulties, the more does it behove any
one in a responsible position to maintain a clear judgment, and not
be carried away by sentiment or rash advice.
478 IMODERN EGYPT pt. m
The Government accepted the principle thcat they
must follow General Gordon's advice. Mr. Glad-
stone, speaking in the House of Commons, on
February 12, said that it was the duty of the
Government " to beware of interfering with
General Gordon's plans generally." They adhered
to this principle, at all events in respect to the
Slavery Proclamation, with the result that the
agitation against it speedily died a natural death.
The Soudan question was, indeed, as Colonel
Stewart said, to be solved *' somehow or other," but
its solution was to bring to the British Government
the political discredit which always attaches itself
to failure. It was to cause a great waste of public
treasure and to involve the sacrifice of many valu-
able lives, including those of the two brave men on
whose actions the attention, not only of England
and Egypt, but it may also be said of all Europe
was then fixed.
CHAPTER XXV
ZOBEIR PASHA
February 18-March l6, 1884
The turning-point of General Gordon's Mission—General Gordon's
Memorandum of February 8—Change in General Gordon's views
—He asks for Zobeir Pasha— I advise that Zobeir Pasha should be
General Gordon's successor—llie Government reject this proposal
—General Gordon proposes to " smash up" the Mahdi—Conflicting
policies advocated by General Gordon— His Proclamation stating
that British troops were coming to Khartoum—General Gordon's
neglect of his instructions— I again urge the employment of Zobeir
Pasha—Difficulty of understanding General Gordon's telegrams
—
Colonel Stewart recommends that Zobeir Pasha should l)e sent—
I
support this view—General Gordon recommends that the Berber-
Suakin route should be opened—ITie Government object to the
employment of Zobeir Pasha—I again urge the employment of
Zobeir Pasha—General Gordon's communications to tlie Times'
correspondent—The tribes round Khartoum waver—The Govern-
ment reject the Zobeir proposal— I instruct General Gordon
to hold on to Khartoum—I again urge on the Government the
necessity of employing Zobeir Pasha—The proposal is rejected
I remonstrate— Final rejection of the Zobeir proposal—Were the
Government right in their decision ?
Everything of political importance connected
with General Gordon's Mission took place within a
few weeks of his arrival at Khartoum. The essential
facts connected with the history of those eventful
weeks can be summed up in a few words. General
Gordon proposed that Zobeir Pasha should govern
the Soudan as a feudatory of the Egyptian Govern-
ment. Colonel Stewart and myself at first liesitated
as to the desirability of sending Zobeir Pasha to
the Soudan, but after a brief interval we came
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round to General Gordon's opinion. The British
Government would not agree to tlie employment
of Zobeir Pasha. Subsequently, the tribes round
Khartoum rose. General Gordon and Colonel
Stewart were besieged. It was clear that General
Gordon's political mission had failed, and from
that moment there only remained an im])ortant
military question to decide, viz., whether a British
military force should or should not be sent to the
relief of Khartoum.
The broad facts of the case are already well
known. They were set forth in the Parliamentary
papers, which were published at the time. I am
not, however, aware that any attempt has as yet
been made to give so clear a p?Tcfs of the whole
of the correspondence as to enable a thorough
appreciation to be formed of the parts played
respectively by those who were the principal
actors in this political drama— I might almost say
political tragedy. I propose, at the risk of being
tedious, to make such Si precis.
On February 8, General Gordon, who was then
at Abu Hamed, addressed to me an important
Memorandum. He wrote : " In spite of all that
has occurred, I feel satisfied that the prestige of
the Cairo Government, except in so far as the
conduct of their troops in the field is concerned, is
not seriously shaken, and lliat the people still
continue to look up to the Cairo Government as
the direct representatives of the Sultan as Khalif,
and would look with horror on a complete separa-
tion." He proposed that the Egyptian Government
" should continue to maintain their position as
a Suzerain Power, nominate the Governor-General
and Moudirs"—v;ho were to be Soudanese—"and
act as a supreme Court of A])peal. Their control-
ling influence should, however, be a strictly moral
one, and limited to giving advice." " I would, there-
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fore," he added, ''earnestly beg that evacuation,
but not abandonment, be the programme to be
followed, and that the Firman, with which I am
provided, be changed into one recognising moral
control and suzerainty."
Accompanying this Memorandum, were some
remarks by Colonel Stewart upon General Gordon's
proposals, to which he gave a qualified support.
He said that he " did not quite agree with General
Gordon that the prestige of Cairo had not been
greatly diminished." General Gordon's Memor-
andum and Colonel Stewart's observations did not
reach me till February 23.
In the meanwhile, I had received a private letter
from Colonel Stewart, dated Korosko, February 1,
in which the following passage occurred : " Gordon
is apparently still hankering after Zobeir, says he
feels a sympathy for him, etc. It is impossible to
say that he may not of a sudden request him to be
sent up. Should such be the case, I trust you will
not let him leave Cairo unless under very cogent
reasons. I am convinced his coming up would be
a dangerous experiment. It is also quite possible
that he may not have the influence attributed to
him, now that it is said his Bazingers (slave
soldiers) have ceased to exist." On the other
hand, General Gordon wrote to me from Abu
Hamed on February 8 : " W^ith respect to Zobeir,
he is the only man who is fit for Governor-General
of the Soudan if we wish it to be quiet, and as for
his touching me, he would have no object to do so.
I wish you would see more of this remarkable
man. ... I wish Lady Baring would see him."
There can be no doubt that, as General Gordon
approached Khartoum and as he became better
informed of the situation in the Soudan, not only
did the optimism of the views, which he had
previously held, fade away, but also his sympathy
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for the people of the country led him to forget the
main object for the accomplishment of which he
had been sent to the Soudan. But a few months
were to elapse before the same man who had
insisted that, in his mstructions, it should be
stated that the policy of evacuating the Soudan
" should on no account be changed," was to write
in his Journal : " I hate her Majesty's Government
for their leaving the Soudan after having caused
all its troubles."
The first indication I got of the rapid change
which was to take place in General Gordon's views
was contained in a letter from Colonel Stewart,
dated Berber, February 13, in which he wrote
:
" Gordon is so full of sympathy for these people
that he is inclined to use every effort to mitigate
the efi'ect of our withdrawal, but I am convinced
no effort of his will prevent the reign of anarchy.
Personally, although I regret the unavoidable, still
I am persuaded that the evacuation policy is the
right one, and that it will probably be in the end
the best for all parties."
Immediately upon his arrival at Khartoum, on
February 18, General Gordon sent me the following
telegram : "In a previous INIemorandum,^ I alluded
to the arrival of an epoch when whites, fellaheen
troops, civilian employes, women and children of
deceased soldiers—in short, the Egyptian element
in the Soudan—will be removed ; when we shall
be face to face with the Soudan administration,
and when I must witlidraw from the Soudan. I
have stated that to withdraw without being able
to })lace a successor in my seat would be the signal
for general anarchy throughout the country, which,
though all Egyptian element was withdrawn, would
be a misfortune, and inhuman.
* This is the Memorandum of February 8, which did uot reach me
till the 23rd. Vide ante, pp. 480-481.
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" Also, I have stated that, even if I placed a
man in my seat unsupported by any Government,
the same anarchy would ensue.
" Her Majesty's Government could, I think,
without responsibility in money or men, give the
commission to my successor on certain terms which
1 will detail hereafter. If this solution is examined,
we shall find that a somewhat analogous case exists
in Afghanistan, where Her Majesty's Government
give moral support to the Ameer, and go even
beyond that in giving the Ameer a subsidy, which
would not be needed in the present case.
" I distinctly state that if Her Majesty's Govern-
ment gave a Commission to my successor, I recom-
mend neither a subsidy nor men being given. I
would select and give a commission to some man,
and promise him the moral support of Her Majesty's
Government and nothing more.
" It may be argued that Her Majesty's Govern-
ment would thus be giving nominal and moral
support to a man who will rule over a Slave State,
but so is Afghanistan, as also Socotra.
** This nomination of my successor must, I think,
be direct from Her Majesty's Government.
"As for the man. Her Majesty's Government
should select one above all others, namely, Zobeir.
He alone has the ability to rule the Soudan, and
would be universally accepted by the Soudan. He
should be made K.C.M.G., and given presents."
After stating the terms under which Zobeir Pasha
should be nominated. General Gordon continued :
" Zobeir's exile at Cairo for ten years, amidst all the
late events and his mixing with Europeans, must
have had a great effect on his character. Zobeir's
nomination, under the moral countenance of Her
Majesty's Government, would bring all the mer-
chants, European and others, back to the Soudan
in a short time. I have asked Stewart to gfive his
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opinions independently of mine, in order to pre-
vent a one-sided view. He is a first-rate man."
At the same time, Colonel Stewart sent me the
following telegram : " With reference to Gordon's
telegram of to-day, I think that the policy he
urges would greatly facilitate our retirement from
the country. As to Avhether Zobeir Pasha is the
man who should be nominated, I think we have
hardly yet a sufficient knowledge of the country to
be able to form an opinion. It is, however, prob-
able that whoever is nominated will be accepted
for a time."
I thought that General Gordon, when at Cairo,
had made his proposal to utilise Zobeir Pasha's
services without sufficient deliberation. When,
however, I found that, after an interval of three
weeks and after having had an opportunity of
judging of the situation at Khartoum, General
Gordon still thought that Zobeir Pasha's services
might be utilised, it appeared to me safe to assume
that he was expressing something in the nature
of a matured opinion, and that he was not, as so
frequently happened, dashing off an ill-considered
proposal on the spur of the moment. I, therefore,
resolved to support him in so far as the ultimate
utilisation of Zobeir Pasha's services was concerned.
On the other hand, there was manifestly a risk in
allowing Zobeir Pasha and General Gordon to be
at Khartoum together. Moreover, General Gordon's
cautious companion. Colonel Stewart, entertained
considerable doubts as to the advisability of em-
ploying Zobeir Pasha. I had great confidence in
Colonel Stewart's judgment. I wished to give him
the time, for whicli he asked, to form an opinion.
On February 19, therefore, I re])eated to Lord
Granville General Gordon's and Colonel Stewart's
telegrams of the I8th, with the following remarks
of my own :
—
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" As regards the choice of his (General Gordon's)
successor, there is, as Colonel Stewart says in his
telegram, no necessity to decide at once, but I
believe Zobeir Pasha to be the only possible man.
He undoubtedly possesses energy and ability, and
has great local influence.
"As regards the Slave Trade, I discussed the
matter with General Gordon when he was in Cairo,
and he fully agreed with me in thinking that Zobeir
Pasha's presence or absence would not affect the
question in one way or the other. I am also con-
vinced, from many things that have come to my
notice, that General Gordon is quite right in
thinking that Zobeir Pasha's residence in Egypt
has considerably modified his character. He now
understands what European power is, and it is
much better to have to deal with a man of this
sort than with a man like the Mahdi.
" I should be altogether opposed to having
General Gordon and Zobeir Pasha at Khartoum
together. As soon as General Gordon has arranged
for the withdrawal of the garrison and the rest of
the Egyptian element, he could leave Khartoum,
and Zobeir Pasha might shortly afterwards start
from Cairo. One of my chief reasons for allowing
the interview betw een the two men to take place
was that I wished to satisfy myself to some extent of
the sentiments entertained by Zobeir Pasha towards
General Gordon. I would not on any account run
the risk of ])utting General Gordon in his power.
" If Zobeir Pasha is nominated, it will be very
necessary to lay down in writing and in the plainest
language what degree of support he may expect
from Her Majesty's Government. I cannot recom-
mend that he should be promised the moral support
of Her Majesty's Government. In the first place,
he would scarcely understand the sense of the
phrase, and, moreover, I do not think he would
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attach mucli importance to any support which was
not material. It is for Her JNlajesty's Government
to judge what the effect of his appointment would
be upon public opinion in England, but except for
that, I can see no reason why Zobeir Pasha should
not be proclaimed Ruler of the Soudan with the
approbation of Her IMajesty's Government. It
should be distinctly explained to him in writing
that he must rely solely upon his own resources to
maintain his position. He might receive a moder-
ate sum of money from the Egyptian Government
to begin with. His communications with that
Government might be conducted through Her
Majesty's Representative in Cairo, as General
Gordon suggests.
" With regard to the detailed conditions men-
tioned by General Gordon, 1 think they might
form the subject of further consideration and dis-
cussion, both with General Gordon and with others
in authority here. I am inclined to doubt whether
such conditions would be of any use ; they would
probably not long be observed.
" In conclusion, I may add that I have no idea
whether Zobeir Pasha would accept the position
which it is proposed to offer him."
On February 22, Lord Granville replied : " Her
Majesty's Government are of opinion that the
gravest objections exist to the appointment by
their authority of a successor to General Gordon.
The necessity does not, indeed, appear to have yet
arisen of ffoino; bevond the sujjcrestions contained
in General Gordon's Memorandum of the 23rd
ultimo,^ by making a special provision for the
government of the country.
" In any case, the public opinion of this country
would not tolerate the appointment of Zobeir
Pasha."
• Vide ante, p. 442.
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Simultaneously with the receipt of this tele*
gram, I received General Gordon's Memorandum
written at Abu Hamed on February 8. This
Memorandum, though in some respects at variance
with the proposals contained in his telegram of
the 18th, enabled me more fully to understand
the general line of policy which he wished to
advocate. I repeated to General Gordon Lord
Granville's telegram of the 22nd, and at the same
time I added the following remarks of my own :
"The views expressed in your telegram of the
18th do not appear to me to harmonise with those
contained in your letter of the 8th instant, which I
received this morning, but that is of no conse-
quence. The real difficulty is to find a man, or
several men, who will take over the government of
the country to the south of Wadi Haifa, especially
the government of Khartoum itself. In view of
the objections entertained in England against
Zobeir, can you suggest any other names ?
"
I resolved to postpone any further connnunica-
tion to Lord Granville until I had received General
Gordon's reply to my question. It came on Feb-
ruary 26, and was as follows : " Telegram of the 23rd
February received respecting Zobeir. That settles
question for me. 1 cannot suggest any other.
Mahdi's agents active in all directions. No chance
of Mahdi's advance personally from Obeid. You
must remember that when evacuation is carried
out, Mahdi will come down here, and, by agents,
will not let Egypt be quiet. Of course, my duty
is evacuation, and tlie best I can for establishing a
quiet government. The first I hope to accomplish.
The second is a more difficult task, and concerns
Egypt more than me. If Egypt is to be quiet,
Mahdi must be smashed up. Mahdi is most
unpopular, and with care and time could be
smashed. Remember that once Khartoum belong-s
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to Mahdi, the task will be far more difficult ; yet
you will, for safety of Egypt, execute it. If you
decide on smashing JNIaluli, then send up another
£100,000, and send up 200 Indian troops to Wadi
Haifa, and send officer up to Dongola under pretence
to look out quarters for troops. Leave Suakin and
JNIassowah alone. I re})eat that evacuation is pos-
sible, but you will feel effisct in Egypt, and will be
forced to enter into a far more serious affiiir in
order to guard Egypt. At present, it would be
comparatively easy to destroy Mahdi."
I have now arrived at the moment which was
the turning-point of General Gordon's mission. It
will be well to pause in order that I may give a
summary of the situation as it then stood.
On February 26, the date on which I received
the above telegram from General Gordon, thirty-
nine days had elapsed since he had left London,
thirty-one days since he had left Cairo, and eight
days since he had arrived at Khartoum. During
that period, leaving aside points of detail, as to
which his contradictions had been numerous,
General Gordon had marked out for himself no
less than five different lines of policy, some of
which were wholly conflicting one with another,
whilst others, without being absolutely irrecon-
cilable, differed in respect to some of their most
important features.
On January 18, he started from London with
instructions which had been dictated by himself.
His wish then was that he should be merely sent
to " report upon the best means of effecting the
evacuation of the interior of the Soudan." He
expressed his entire concurrence in the policy of
evacuation. This was the first and original stage
of General Gordon's opinions.
Before he arrived in Egypt on January 24, he
had changed his views as to the nature of the
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functions he should fulfil. He no longer wished
to be a mere reporter. He wished to be named
Governor-General of the Soudan with full execu-
tive powers. He supplemented his original ideas
by suggesting that the country should be handed
over to "the different petty Sultans who existed
at the time of Mehemet All's conquest.' This was
the second stage of General Gordon's opinions.
Fifteen days later (February 8), he wrote from
Abu Hamed a Memorandum in which he advo-
cated "evacuation but not abandonment." The
Government of Egypt were "to maintain their posi-
tion as a Suzerain Power, nominate the Governor-
General and Moudirs, and act as a supreme Court
of Appeal." This was the third stage of General
Gordon's opinions.
Ten days later (February 18), General Gordon
reverted to the principles of his JNIemorandum of
the 8th, but with a notable difference. It was no
longer the Egyptian, but the British Government
which were to control the Soudan administration.
The British Government were also to appoint a
Governor -General who was to be furnished with
a British commission, and who was to receive a
British decoration. Zobeir Pasha was the man
whom General Gordon wished the British Govern-
ment to select. 'This was the fourth staffe of
General Gordon s opinions.
Eight days later (February 26), when General
Gordon had learnt that the British Government
were not prepared to approve of Zobeir Paslia being
sent to the Soudan, he proposed that the JNlahdi
should be " smashed up," and that, to assist in this
object, 200 British Indian troops should be sent
to Wadi Haifa. This was the fifth staae of
General Gordon s opinions.
In thirty-nine days, therefore. General Gordon
had drifted by successive stages from a proposal
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that he should report on the affairs of the Soudan,
to advocating the policy of "smashing up" the
Mahdi. It would, he said, be '* comparatively easy
to destroy the JNIahdi."
It is inconceivable that General Gordon should
have thought that the JNIahdi could be destroyed
with any force which the Egyptian Government
could place at his disposal. British or British-Indian
troops would have to be employed. He must have
known this. Accordingly, three days later he took
another step in advance. He proposed (February 29)
that British-Indian troops should be used to open
up the Suakin-Berber road. This, he said, "will
cause an immediate collapse of the revolt." About
the same time (February 27), he issued a Proclama-
tion in which he stated that he had advised the
people to desist from rebellion, but, he added,
"finding that my advice had no effect on some
people, I have been compelled to use severe
measures, so much so that British troops are now
on their way to reach Khartoum."
Mr. Egmont Hake says,^ "the statement that
British troops were on their way to Khartoum is,
of course, inexplicable. It was probably due to
the fact that Gordon had heard that British troops
were advancing along the Suakin-Berber route."
This explanation is wholly insufficient. At this
time, telegraphic communication between Khartoum
and Cairo was open. Nothing could have been
easier than for General Gordon to have asked me
whether such rumours, supposing there to have
been any, were true, and I should, of course, at
once have replied in the negative. It is clear that
General Gordon made the statement about British
troops being on their way to Khartoum knowing it
to be unfounded. He wished to exercise a moral
effect upon the population. I will not attempt to
* The Story of Chbicm (lordon, pp. 82 and 163.
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discuss wlietlier, under the circumstances in which
General Gordon was placed, his statement was
justifiable from a moral point of view.' Many a
military commander before General Gordon has
found it necessary to employ ruses of various
descriptions. From the point of view of ex-
pediency, it would appear that General Gordon
made a mistake. It was certain that, in a short
time, the people would find out that no British
troops were on their way to Khartoum. Thus,
General Gordon would be discredited. Indeed,
when eventually Lord Wolseley's expedition ad-
vanced, the news of the approach of a British
force failed to obtain credence.
It can be no matter for surprise that the British
Government should have been bewildered by the
rapid changes in General Gordon's opinions. And
this bewilderment was mixed with some alarm, for
their impulsive agent appeared to be hurrying them
along a path which would almost certainly lead to
British armed intervention in the Soudan. Now,
the Government lield that one of the main objects
of their policy should be to avoid any such inter-
vention. Mr. Gladstone, speaking in the House
of Commons on February 23, 1885, said: "When
General Gordon left this country and when he
arrived in Egypt, he declared it to be—and I have
not the smallest doubt it was—a fixed })ortion of
his policy, that no British force should be employed
in aid of his mission." This statement is unques-
tionably correct.
The following letter from Lord Northbrook, dated
February 29, contains such a clear description of the
difficulties of the moment, that I give it in full :
—
What a queer fellow Gordon is and how rapidly he
changes his opinions
!
I. Zobeir is to be sent to Cyprus before Gordon ari'ives
in Egypt.
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II. Zobeir is to rule at Khartoum.
I. The Mahdi is a good kind man, whom Gordon is to
visit quietly and settle affairs with.
II. The Mahdi is to be Emir of Kordofan.
III. The Mahdi is to be smashed up.
I. The Suakin-Berber route is to be opened up, and the
Hadendowa tribe is to be set upon by the other tribes.^
II. Suakin is to be left alone.^
Why should Zobeir be trusted ? His antecedents are all
against it. Why should he oppose the Mahdi .'* He is
supposed to have had a main hand in the insurrection.
Why should he protect Egypt ? He knows her weakness,
and is just as likely to be her worst enemy.^ Why should
he like us ? Gordon and you must have very good reasons,
but I hope you will let us know them. There is no disposi-
tion here to negative Zobeir, simply because his nomination
woukl undoubtedly be extremely distasteful to every one who
has paid any attention to the history of the Soudan, or cares
about checking the Slave Trade. But, looked at with refer-
ence to the real interests of Egypt, the arguments and
probabilities against seem to me greatly to preponderate.
The Mahdi must be " smashed up.'"* This seems to be
Gordon's view now. But he gives no reasons, and it is
utterly contrary to our policy hitherto. Indeed, his telegram
does not differ very much from Cherif Pasha's programme of
keeping Khartoum, upon which you turned him out.
Things may be in such a condition that a change may be
necessary, but I cannot say I feel that confidence in Gordon's
opinions, which are often most hastily expressed and con-
stantly changed, to induce me to think without further
reasons being given, that we were all wrong in January last.
* This proposal was contained in an undated Memorandum sent to
me by General Gordon which I received on February 4, 1884. See
Egypt, No. 12 of 1884, p. 61.
^ When General (iordou was in Cairo, he wished the whole of the
garrison of Suakin to be witlidrawn, except 1.50 men. I think that this
question must have formed the subject of further discussion between
General Gordon and Colonel Stewart after their arrival at Khartoum,
for on March 4, Colonel Stewart wrote to nie : "I trust the Govern-
ment will not be so ill-advised as to send away the troops from Suakin ;
it would be in every way a very had move, and very prejudicial to us."
^ Lord Northbrook might have quoted General Gordon's own testi-
mony in support of tliis view. When, early in December 1883, I
favoured the idea that Zobeir Pasha should be sent to Suakin, General
Gordon wrote : " Zobeir will mana2:e to get taken prisoner and wili
head the revolt."
—
JJirtit.s, etc., p. 314.
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If the religious movement is really so serious that the
Mahdi must be " smashed up " for the safety of Egypt,
how is it to be done ? For my part, I can only see one way,
and that is to set Musulman against Musulman, and to try
and induce the Turk to take the business up. Turk against
Arab it will be, and a serious business too.
Pray do not suppose that, because we hesitate to take
very grave decisions involving a considerable change of policy
without time to consider and without further motives upon
which to form our judgment, that we have the least want of
confidence in you. As to Gordon, I have great confidence
in his wisdom in action—little in his steadiness in Council.
We certainly have the mostdifhcult job to tackle between
us that any men ever had, and I am sure it requires great
steadiness all round.
Before General Gordon had been long at Khar-
toum, his combative spirit completely got the better
of him. As a soldier, he could not brook the idea of
retirino^ before the Mahdi. Moreover, as a civilised
European, he winced at the idea that a country,
in which some germs of civilisation had been sown,
should relapse into barbarism. On April 11, 1884,
he telegraphed tome : ^ " Having visited the schools,
workshops, etc., it is deplorable to think of their
destruction by a feeble lot of stinking Dervishes."
He wished, therefore, to " smash up " the Mahdi,
and perhaps it was natural that he should have
done so. But in taking up this attitude, which
necessarily involved armed British interference in
the country, he departed from the spirit of his
instructions. He was sent to evacuate the Soudan.
A subsidiary portion of his instructions— I look to
the spirit of those instructions rather than to the
strict letter—was that, if possible, he was to leave
behind him a fairly good government, which would
not constitute a standing menace to Egypt. It
is difficult to understand how General Gordon
could have made his proposal to wage war against
* I did uot receive this message till March 26, 1890.
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the Mahdi with British troops tally with these
instructions.
It was not until February 23, when I received
General Gordon's JNIeniorandum of February 8
written at Abu Hamed, that I fully understood his
telegram of the 18th from Khartoum, in which he
proposed to utilise Zobeir Pasha's services. I tlien
set myself to work to consider what it was that
General Gordon really wanted. I swept aside all
the minor contradictions in his proposals. I did
not consider that the suggestion about " smashing
up " the Mahdi was worthy of serious discussion.
It was obviously impracticable without employing
British troops, a policy the adoption of which the
British Government would certainly have rejected.
It appeared to me, however, that at the bottom
of all General Gordon's contradictions there was
an underlying vein of common sense. He wished,
in the terms of his Memorandum of February 8,
to advocate a policy of " evacuation but not
abandonment." The policy of setting up the
local Sultans, which he had put forward at
Cairo, was manifestly impossible of execution, not
because it was faulty in principle, but because
there were no local Sultans to set up. He wished,
therefore, to carry out the same principle, but
in a manner differing from that which had been
originally proposed. One man, Zobeir Pasha,
was to be set up, who was to govern the most
important portions of the Soudan. He was to
be a feudatory of the Egyptian Government.
This was a serious departure from the policy of
reporting, which had been adopted in London.
It was not, however, a serious departure from, but
rather a modification of the policy embodied in
the instructions given to General Gordon at
Cairo. Some two years later. Lord Nortlibrook
wrote to me : *' INIy own opinion of the reason of
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the failure is that, instead of doing as we wished,
viz., withdrawing the garrison of Khartoum,
Gordon, on his arrival, hankered after the ignis
fatiius of arranging for a settled government of a
country, which could not be settled excepting by a
lengthened and possibly a permanent occupation in
force." It may be that this view is right. But at
the time it seemed to me that it would be a wise
policy to establish a " buffer state " in the Soudan,
which would hold much the same relation to Egypt
as Afghanistan holds to British India. The policy
was, I thought, at any rate worthy of a trial, and,
so far as I could judge from General Gordon's
utterances, he was of opinion that the difficulties
in the way of its accomplishment, though great,
were not altogether insurmountable.
It was with this view uppermost in my mind
that, on February 28, I repeated to Lord Granville
General Gordon's telegram of the 26th ^ and added
the following remarks :
—
" I will now submit to your Lordship my views
upon the main points at issue, after having care-
fully considered the different proposals made by
General Gordon. There are obviously many con-
tradictions in those proposals ; too much import-
ance should not be attached to the details. But I
venture to again recommend to the earnest atten-
tion of Her Majesty's Government the serious
question of principle which General Gordon has
raised.
" Two alternative courses may be adopted. One
is to evacuate the Soudan entirely, and to make
no attempt to establish any settled government
tiiere before leaving ; the other is to make every
effort of which the present circumstances admit to
set up some settled form of government to replace
the former Egyptian Administration.
* Vide ante, p. 487.
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'* General Gordon is evidently in favour of the
latter of these courses. I entirely agree with him.
The attempt, it is true, may not be successful, but
I am strongly of opinion that it should be made.
From every point of view, whether political,
military, or financial, it will be a most serious
matter if complete anarchy is allowed to reign
south of Wadi Haifa. And this anarchy will
inevitably ensue on General Gordon's departure,
unless some measures are adopted beforehand to
prevent it.
" With regard to the wish of Her Majesty's
Government not to go beyond General Gordon's
plan, as stated in his Memorandum of the 23rd
ultimo, I would remark that he appears to have
intended merely to give a preliminary sketch of
the general line of policy to be pursued. Moreover,
in that Memorandum he makes a specific allusion
to the difficulty of providing rulers for Khartoum,
Dongola, and other places where there are no old
families to recall to power.
" It is clear that Her Majesty's Government
cannot afford moral or material support to General
Gordon's successor as Ruler of the Soudan, but
the question of whether or not he should be
nominally appointed by the authority of Her
Majesty's Government appears to me to be one
of very slight practical importance.
" Whatever may be said to the contrary. Her
Majesty's Government must in reality be respon-
sible for any arrangements which are now devised
for the Soudan, and I do not think it is possible to
shake off that responsibility.
" If, however, Her Majesty's Government are
unwilling to assume any responsibility in the
matter, then I think they should give full liberty
of action to General Gordon and the Khedive's
Government to do what seems best to them.
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"I have no doubt as to the most advisable
course of action. Zobeir Pasha should be per-
mitted to succeed General Gordon. He should
receive a certain sum of money to begin with, and
an annual subsidy of about £50,000 for the first
five years, to depend upon his good behaviour.
This amount would enable him to maintain a
moderate-sized army, and the whole arrangement
would be an economical one for the Egyptian
Government.
" The main difficulty lies in the selection of the
man. It is useless to send any one who has
no local influence. There are certain obvious
objections to Zobeir Pasha, but I think too great
weight is attached to them, and I believe that
General Gordon is quite right when he says that
Zobeir Pasha is the only possible man. I can
suggest none other, and Nubar Pasha is strongly in
favour of him.
" It is for Her Majesty's Government to judge
of the importance to be attached to public opinion
in England, but I venture to think that any
attempt to settle Egyptian questions by the light
of English popular feeling is sure to be productive
of harm, and in this, as in other cases, it would be
preferable to follow the advice of the responsible
authorities on the spot."
On March 1, Lord Granville replied : " I have
received your telegram of the 28th ultimo, inform-
ing me of General Gordon's views with regard to
the proposals which he made for placing Zobeir
Pasha in power at Khartoum.
" Her Majesty's Government desire further
information as to the urgency of any immediate
appointment of a successor to General Gordon,
who they trust will remain for some time longer at
Khartoum.
" If it be found necessary to make an arrange-
voi« I 2 K
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ment of this subject eventually, Her INIajesty's
Government will carefully weigh your opinions as
to the proper person for the post.
*' They are, at the same time, of opinion that
if such an appointment is made, it might be
advantageous that it should receive the confirma-
tion of the Sultan." I repeated this telegram to
General Gordon.
Lord Granville wrote me a private letter, on
February 29, which shows the views entertained
by the Government at the time this telegram was
despatched. "Pray do not," he said, "doubt our
full confidence in you, but as circumstances
naturally sometimes oblige you to change the view
you had taken when things were in a different
state, we often desire to have your opinion before
a final decision. We had a Cabinet, and although
there would have been much reluctance if we had
been obliged to answer at once categorically about
Zobeir, yet we should, probably, have yielded to
your, Gordon's and Nubar's opinion. If you
persist in it, I am certain it will be carefully
considered. The Cabinet were startled at what
appeared to be a change of front as to withdrawal
from the Soudan. I apprehend that your answer
would be that you do not propose an Egyptian
Government administering the Soudan with
Egyptian troops scattered about the desert, that
it is only proposed that an individual should be
appointed with a large salary to govern the country
as best he could, and in a friendly manner towards
Egypt. But even this offers many considerations.
As to the person, I do not doubt that Zobeir is
the only man strong enough to cope with the
iNIahdi. But can you guarantee that tlie official
income will be a sufficient bribe to prevent his
embarking in his former lucrative pursuits, or even
of his not going over to the Mahdi ?
"
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It was obvious that I could give no guarantee
of the sort required by Lord Granville. As has
been already mentioned, the attitude of tlie British
Government in respect to Egyptian affairs was
often of an exclusively negative and hypercritical
character. The objections to the adoption of any
particular course were clearly seen. Those objections
Avere allowed to prevail. But as no alternative
policy was adopted, the Government became tlie
sport of circumstances. On April 18, 1884, Lord
Granville wrote to me: "The misfortune during
the last two years has been that we hardly ever
have had anything but bad alternatives to choose
from. The objectors to whatever was decided
were pretty sure to have the best of it."
In the interval between the receipt of General
Gordon's telegram of February 26 ^ and that of Lord
Granville's reply on March 1,- General Gordon sent
me a large number of telegrams. It was difficult
to understand from them what it was he really
wanted. Moreover, the language hi which they
were couched led me to the conclusion that he was
making a number of proposals on matters of general
policy without sufficient reflection. On March 2,
therefore, I telegraphed to him : " I am most
anxious to help and support you in every way, but
I find it very difficult to understand exactly what
it is you want. I think your best plan will be to
reconsider the whole question carefully, and then
state to me in one telegram what it is you recom-
mend, in order that 1 can, if necessary, obtain the
instructions of Her IMajesty's Government." I
added some further observations drawing attention
to the main points which required consideration.
At the same time (March 2), I sent the follow-
ing telegram to Colonel Stewart: "Private. As
regards my long telegram to Gordon, pray make
1 Vide ante, p. 487. ^ ^ide ante, p. 497.
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him understand that my sole object is to help him
to the best of my ability, but it adds immensely to
my difficulties to receive constant and somewhat
contradictory telegrams, apparently written on the
spur of the moment, in respect to matters of
policy. What I should like him to do is to
consider the whole question carefully and deliber-
ately, and then to let me know what he thinks and
what he recommends. At present, with the best
possible intentions, I can really do little to help
him, for I cannot clearly miderstand what it is he
wants." *
Prior to the despatch of this telegram to Colonel
Stewart, I had, on February 29, sent the following
private telegram to Lord Granville : " I have
received a fresh batch of telegrams from Gordon.
His statements and proposals are hopelessly
bewildering and contradictory. I do not mean
to say that I have lost confidence in Gordon.
Such is not the case. But in dealing with his
proposals it is often difficult to know what he
means, and still more difficult to judge what is
really worthy of attention, and what is more or less
nonsense. It is really of no use my forwarding all
he sends home for instructions, for the difficulty
for you will be even greater than for me. I think,
on the whole, you had better give me full authority
' On receiving this telegram. Colonel Stewart wrote to me (March 4):
"1 fully sympathise with you about the many and rather divergent
teleg-rams you get. Gordon telegraphs directly an idea strikes him.
There is no use in trying to stop it. Were I you, 1 should always wait
for a few days before acting unless the subject matter is so evident that
there can be no doubt about it."
Matters were so urgent tliat I was unable to follow Colonel Stewart's
advice to the extent of " waiting for a few days before acting." But I
rarely acted on any telegram of General Gordon's directly I received it.
I generally found a batch of them waiting for me when I began my
work in the nioiniiig. My practice was to put them on one side and
wait till the afternoon, by wliich time more had generally arrived. I
used then to compare the different telegrams, to try to extract from
them what it was that General Gordon really wanted, and then to
decide what could be done towards carrying out his wishes.
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to do the best I can. I fully understand the policy
of Her Majesty's Government, and you can rely
on my doing nothing contrary to it, but, of course,
I can only do this if I feel sure I possess the
entire confidence of Her JNIajesty's Government. 1
should, in any case, like an answer about Zobeir as a
question of principle is involved." To this telegram
Lord Granville replied on March 2 : " I am not
surprised at your private message. We have full
confidence in you and give the full discretion you
ask. When you have time, we like to know your
reasons."
I received several telegrams from General
Gordon in reply to my message of IMarch 2. I
need not give them in full. They were to the
effect that he maintained the policy of eventually
evacuating the Soudan, including Khartoum ; that,
in consequence of the evacuation, anarchy would
ensue, about which. General Gordon said, " I
would not trouble myself"; and that the imme-
diate withdrawal of all the Egyptian employes
was impossible. General Gordon dwelt strongly
on the necessity of sending Zobeir Pasha to
Khartoum at once. "The combination," he said,
"at Khartoum of Zobeir and myself is an absolute
necessity for success, and I beg you and Lord
Granville to believe my certain conviction that
there is not the slightest fear of our quarrelling,
for Zobeir would know that the subsidy depended
on my safety. To do any good we must be
together, and that without delay.
. . . Pray
abandon fear of Zobeir's hurting me. His interests
are bound up with mine. Believe me I am right,
and do not delay. . . . Things are not serious,
although they may become so if delay occurs in
sending Zobeir. Mv weakness is that of bein<r
foreign and Christian and jjeaeeful ; and it is only
by sending Zobeir that that prejudice can be
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removed. I wish you would question Stewart on
any subject you like without hesitation and you
can learn his views distinct from mine. This
would please me."
General Gordon also urged that it was necessary
to open up the road from Berber to Suakin. He
desired that 200 British troops should be sent to
Wadi Haifa. " It is not," he said, " the number,
but the prestige which I need ; I am sure the
revolt will collapse if I can say that I have British
troops at my back."
At the same time, I received the following tele-
gram from Colonel Stewart, dated JNIarch 4 : " The
principal desire of General Gordon is to have Zobeir
here as soon as possible. His reasons are : Zobeir
is the only man with sufficient prestige to hold
the country together, at any rate for a time, after
the evacuation. Being a Pasha among the Shaggieh
irregulars, he will be able to get at sources of in-
formation and action now closed to us. He will
be opposed to the Mahdi. I agree with Gordon.
It seems evident to me that it is impossible for us
to leave this country without leaving some sort of
established government which will last at any rate
for a time, and Zobeir is the only man who can
ensure that. Also, that we must withdraw the
Sennar and other besieged garrisons, and here also
Zobeir can greatly assist us. The principal objec-
tions to Zobeir are his evil reputation as a slave
dealer and his enmity to General Gordon. As
regards the first, it will have to be defended on the
plea that no other course is open except British
annexation or anarchy. As regards the second, if
precautionary measures are taken, such as making
the subsidy payable through General Gordon, I
think Zobeir will see that his interests are in
working with General Gordon.
*' Of the secondary measures proposed by General
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Gordon to assist the evacuation, they are : When
the Berber- Suakin road is clear, to send a small
force of Indian or British cavalry to Berber, and
to send a small force of British cavalry to Wadi
Haifa. These measures, showing that we had
forces at our disposal, would greatly assist nego-
tiations with rebels, and hasten evacuation. I
assure you none are more anxious to leave this
country than Gordon and myself, and none more
heartily approve the Government policy of evacua-
tion. Unless, however, Zobeir is sent here, I see
little probability of this policy being carried out.
Every day we remain, finds us more firm in the
country, and causes us to incur responsibilities
towards the people, which it is impossible for us
to overlook."^
* Colonel Stewart's private letters give some further indication of his
views at this time. On March 1, he wrote to me : ''As for the future
of this country, the clioice of a ruler, it would seem to me, lies between
Zobeir and the Mahdi. Politically and socially, I should much prefer
the former. To have a religious ruler here would be a great dis-
advantage to us in Egypt, not to speak of the probable consequences in
other parts of the Arab world. If once we establish Zobeir here, and
gave him something to start upon, we might let matters slide, and act
on the Darwinian principle of the ' survival of the fittest.' ... It
seems to me that the only people here who will suffer by the with-
drawal of the Government are the rich Arab merchants and the
Greeks. I cannot say that I have any sympathy with either class, and
I should greatly grudge that any Englisli money should be spent in
supporting them. Let them make tlieir own terms and get out of the
mess as best they can. The villagers and nomad tribes have an
organisation of their own, which is independent of any Government.
They will probably fight and squabble amongst themselves, but that is
their affair. Of the towns, such as Kliartoum, Kassala, Berber, and
Dongola, they are all only collections of mud-huts, which, if burnt one
day, can be rebuilt the next. Of the lot, Khartoum is the best.
. . .
The country is only intended by nature for nomad tribes and a few
scattered Arabs along the banks of the Nile. It annoys me greatly to
see the blood and treasure wasted on it. . . . As regards Zobeir, I
think you have no option in the matter. Unless he is sent up, I see no
means of terminating the state of affairs here. . . . There is no one
here we can appoint who would stand for a day ; hence, 1 see no option
but Zobeir witii a small subsidy. I think by means of the subsidy j'ou
would ensure his fidelity. Of course, there is always a certain risk in
the matter, but we can only do wliat is best. Every possible sclieme
has its advantages and its disadvantages. How far Gordon and Zobeir
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Up to this time, I had pressed the British
Government to allow Zobeir Pasha to succeed
General Gordon at Khartoum, but I had opposed
the idea of sending him there immediately. My
reasons for making this reserve were twofold.
In the first place, I feared that Zobeir Pasha's
old grudge against General Gordon would en-
danger the latter's life. In the second place, I
entertained greater confidence in the judgment
of Colonel Stewart than in that of his chief. Up
to IVIarch 4, Colonel Stewart hesitated as to the
desirability of employing Zobeir Pasha. The
telegrams which I have given above, led me, how-
ever, to reconsider the recommendations wliich I
had so far made. It was clear that the situation
at Khartoum was becoming very critical. The
tribes between Berber and Khartoum were waver-
ing. They were being driven by the force of
circumstances into the arms of the Mahdi. It was
evident that, if anything was to be done in the
way of establishing an anti-lMahdist Government
at Khartoum, no time was to be lost. General
Gordon was pressing strongly for the immediate
despatch of Zobeir Pasha, and argued—as I thought
with great force—that, so far as his personal safety
was concerned, Zobeir Pasha's interest would be
in the direction of doino; him no harm. Colonel
Stewart also had come round to General Gordon's
opinion. He now advocated, without reserve of
any kind, the immediate employment of Zobeir
Pasha. Judging, not only from the contents of
his telegram, but also from what I knew of the
cliaracter of the mati, it seemed to me certain that
Colonel Stewart had not changed his opinion merely
in order to be agreeable to his chief, but that the
will be able to work together, time alone can say. I apprebend, how-
ever, Zobeir, like the rest of the world, knows what ia to his own
advantasre."
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change was due to a careful consideration of the
facts of the situation at Khartoum. I determined,
therefore, to modify my own recommendations
to the British Government, and to support the
proposal that Zobeir Pasha should be sent to
Khartoum at once.
On March 4, I repeated to Lord Granville
General Gordon's telegrams of the 2nd and 3rd and
Colonel Stewart's telegram of the 4th. I added :
" The general substance of General Gordon's tele-
gram is that he presses strongly for Zobeir Pasha
to be sent to Khartoum without delay. I have
carefully reconsidered the whole question, and I
am still of opinion that Zobeir Pasha should be
allowed to succeed General Gordon. I do not
think that anything would be gained by post-
poning a decision on this point ; on the contrary,
I should say that delay would be injurious.
" As regards the question of when Zobeir should
be sent—in the face of the strong opinion expressed
by General Gordon, I am not inclined to maintain
my objection to his going at once to Khartoum.
But, before giving a final opinion on this point, I
should prefer to have another interview with Zobeir
himself. It would be useless for me to do this
until Her Majesty's Government has decided
whether, apart from the question of the time of
his departure, Zobeir is to be allowed to return to
the Soudan at all. I await, therefore, an answer
on this latter point before taking any further
action."
At the same time (March 4), I sent the follow-
ing private telegram to Lord Granville : " My
official telegram of to-day gives the gist of some
twenty telegrams from Gordon. I feel confident
that I am stating his real opinion, and not a mere
passing impression. Do not commit yourself to
sending Zobeir at once until I have seen the man
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again. What I want to know is whether your
objections to sending- him at all are insuperable."
AV^hen I sent these telegrams, my intention was
to see Zobeir Pasha, and, after hearino; his laniiuaoe
and observing his demeanour, to form a final
judgment as to whether it would be desirable to
send him to Khartoum at once. I should have
told him that, if the withdrawal from the Soudan
was conducted successfully, and especially if
General Gordon and Colonel Stewart returned
safely to Cairo, he would be named Governor
-
General of the Soudan, and that he would receive
a subsidy of £100,000 a year from the Egyptian
Government, so long as his behaviour was satis-
factory ; on the other hand, that if any harm befell
General Gordon or Colonel Stewart, and in general,
if at any subsequent period he adopted a hostile
attitude towards Egypt, he would incur the dis-
pleasure of both the British and Egyptian Govern-
ments, and that should he fall into the hands of
either, his life would possibly be forfeited. It
was, however, useless for me to enter into any
negotiations of this sort until I had received from
the British Government a free hand to act in the
matter according to the best of my judgment.
It will be observed that both General Gordon
and Colonel Stewart in their telegrams of JNIarch
3 and 4 urged the desirability of opening up the
Berber-Suakin road. Colonel Stewart also suggested
that a force of British or Indian cavalry should be
sent from Suakin to Berber. At that time. General
Graham was at Suakin, and was about to advance
against Osman Digna. There was some prospect
that, when the latter had been defeated, Hussein
Pasha Khalifa, who was then at Berber, might be
able to open up the road to Suakin without further
British military assistance. Moreover, so long as
any prospect existed of sending Zobeir Pasha to
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Khartoum, and thus settlmg the Soudan question
by diplomacy, I was not prepared to incur the
responsibility of recommending that a British force
should be despatched into the interior of the
Soudan. On ^larch 4, therefore, I telegraphed to
Lord Granville : " I cannot agree with the proposal
mentioned in Colonel Stewart's telegram that a
force of British or Indian cavalry should be sent
through from Suakin to Berber."
On March 5, Lord Granville telegraphed to me
as follows : *' I have received your telegram of the
4th instant on the subject of the proposal that
Zobeir Pasha should succeed General Gordon at
Khartoum, and I iiave to inform you that Her
Majesty's Government see no reason at present to
change their impressions about Zobeir, which were
formed on various grounds, amongst others on the
Memoranda, dated the 23rd January, written by
General Gordon and Colonel Stewart on board the
Tanjore} Unless these impressions could be
removed. Her INlajesty's Government could not
take upon themselves the responsibility of sending
Zobeir to Khartoum.
" Her Majesty's Government would be glad
to learn how you reconcile your proposal to
acquiesce in such an appointment with the preven-
tion or discouragement of slave-hunting and Slave
Trade, with the policy of complete evacuation, and
with the security of Egypt.
" They would also wish to be informed as to the
progress which has been made in extricating the
garrisons, and the length of time likely to elapse
before the whole or the greater part may be with-
drawn.
" As Her Majesty's Government require details
as to each garrison, your report should be a full
one, and may be sent by mail.
* Vide ante, p. 442.
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*' In your telegram now under reply, no allusion
is made to the proposal that the local Chiefs should
be consulted as to the future government of the
country, and Her INIajesty's Government desire to
know whether that idea has been abandoned."
I remember the feeling akin to despair with
which I received this telegram. It was clear that
the Government did not realise the true nature
of the situation at Khartoum. I was asked to re-
concile the proposal that Zobeir Pasha should
be employed, (1) with the prevention or discour-
agement of slave-hunting and the Slave Trade;
(2) with the policy of complete evacuation ; and
(3) with the security of Egypt. The answers
were obvious.
If the Soudan were abandoned, slave-hunting
and the Slave Trade could not be prevented.
This was clear from the first. The fact was an
unpleasant one, but no object was to be gained
by a failure to recognise its existence.
Again, it could scarcely be argued that to set up
Zobeir Pasha as a subsidised and semi-independent
ruler of the Soudan was inconsistent with the
policy of evacuation. The policy, which both
General Gordon and myself were at this moment
advocating, was one of " evacuation but not
abandonment,"—that is to say, not complete
abandonment to anarchy.
As regards the security of Egypt, the choice
lay between Zobeir Pasha and the Mahdi, and the
opinion of the best -informed authorities on the
spot was that the former was less dangerous than
the latter.
Again, I was asked to furnish information "as
to the ])r(\gress which had been made in extricat-
ing the garrisons, and the length of time likely to
ela{)se before the whole or the greater part might
be withdrawn."
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The Government must surely have known
that no progress had been made in extricating
the garrisons, and that if the remote garrisons in
Sennar and the Equatorial provinces Avere to be
withdrawn, it was impossible to state what length
of time would elapse before the operation could
be completed. One of the objects in recommend-
ing the employment of Zobeir Pasha was to
facilitate the extrication of the garrisons by pre-
venting the wavering tribes from joining the Mahdi.
But perhaps the most deplorable part of Lord
Granville's telegram was that in which the British
Government, at a time when every moment was
precious, asked for a full report to be sent by
mail as to the details of each garrison. These
details had been already furnished to the Govern-
ment three months previously in a despatch which
fills five pages of a blue book.^
My position at this time was one of great
difficulty. It was clear that the situation at
Khartoum was very critical. Every telegram
received from General Gordon and Colonel
Stewart insisted more strongly than its precursor
on the necessity of sending Zobeir Pasha at
once to Khartoum. On the other hand, the
British Government were evidently very averse
to the employment of Zobeir Pasha. INIoreover,
General Gordon's frequent changes of opinion, and
the number and tone of his telegrams, had not
unnaturally engendered the belief that he had
not sufficiently considered the nature of his
proposals. In spite of the messages which had
been sent to London, the Government evidently
thought that General Gordon and Colonel Stewart
were not in any immediate danger, and that time was
available to consider leisurely tlie future course of
action in the Soudan. After weiohing; the matter
» See Egypt, No. 1 of 1884, p. 126.
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carefully, I came to the conclusion that the best
course to adopt would be to make a further en-
deavour in the direction of utilising Zobeir Pasha's
services. I was all the more disposed to adopt
this course because just at this moment (March 7)
I received Lord Granville's private letter of
February 29/ from which I gathered that the
Government were open to conviction on the Zobeir
question.
It seemed to me that the best way to induce the
Government to yield was to get General Gordon
to send a carefully reasoned reply to the objections
raised in Lord Granville's telegram of March 5.
I resolved, therefore, to repeat that telegram to
General Gordon. I added the following observa-
tions : " In view of the opinions entertained by Her
Majesty's Government, it becomes your duty and
mine to reconsider very carefully the two following
points :
—
" First, is it possible to choose any other man
except Zobeir ? Secondly, if it is not possible to
do so, are the arguments in favour of Zobeir's
appointment sufficient to outweigh the obvious
disadvantages ?
" As regards the first point, would it be possible
to place Hussein Pasha Khalifa at Khartoum with
a certain portion of territory northwards, and to
divide the rest of the country amongst the heads
of tribes ? I do not recommend this course. I
merely ask for your opinion on it.
" Further, will you reconsider the question of
collecting the Chiefs at Khartoum, and coming
to an a<>:reement with them as to the future of the
country ?
" As regards the second question, the following
points require consideration.
"First, how is the proposal to nominate and
* Vide ante, p. 498.
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subsidise Zobeir to be reconciled with the policy of
evacuation ?
*' Secondly, how is it to be reconciled with the
prevention or discouragement of slave-hunting or
the Slave Trade ?
"Thirdly, how is it to be reconciled with the
security of Egypt ? In dealing with this latter
question, it is desirable to consider how far Zobeir
can be trusted to remain friendly to Egypt. Might
he not make common cause with the Mahdi, should
he become powerful, and prove a source of danger,
on his own account, rather than of assistance to
Egypt ? Many people think that he has instigated
the revolt of the Mahdi. Have you any reasons
to believe that he has done so ?
" Having answered these questions, please reply
fully to Lord Granville's question as to the
prospects of extricating the garrisons, including
Darfour."
My object in sending this telegram was to ask
General Gordon a series of leading questions, which
he might answer in a form calculated to produce
an effect in London. I felt, however, that some
further explanation was due to him, for he might
reasonably cavil at questions being addressed to
him which, so far as was possible, he had already
answered several times. Simultaneously, therefore,
with the despatch of my official telegram, I sent
him the following private message : "Please under-
stand, as regards my long telegram of to-day, that
I could answer many of the questions myself, but
I want to get your opinions and then see whether
they agree with mine. You can regard the Zobeir
question as still under consideration, but the Home
Government does not like the proposal, and recpiires
solid reasons to be given before they can accept it.
Send me a careful and well-argued answer on the
different points I raise."
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On INIarch 8, I received General Gordon's reply.
It was as follows : *'The sending of Zobeir means the
extrication of the Cairo employes from Khartoum,
and the garrisons from Sennar and Kassala. I can
see no possible way to do so except through him
who, being a native of the country, can rally the
well -affected around him, as they know he will
make his home here. I do not think that the
giving a subsidy to Zobeir for some two years
would be in contradiction to the policy of entire
evacuation. It would be nothing more than giving
him a lump sum in two instalments under the con-
ditions I have already written. As for slave-hold-
ing, even had we held the Soudan, we could never
have interfered with it. I have already said that
the Treaty of 1877 was an impossible one ; there-
fore, on that head, Zobeir's appointment would
make no difference whatever. As for slave-hunt-
ing, the evacuation of the Bahr-el-Ghazal and
Equatorial provinces would entirely prevent it.
Should Zobeir attempt, after his two years' subsidy
was paid him, to take those districts, we could put
pressure on him at Suakin, which will remain in our
hands. I feel sure that Zobeir will be so occupied
with the Soudan proper, and with consolidating his
position, that he will not have time to devote to
those provinces. As for the security of Egypt,
Zobeir's stay in Cairo has taught him our power,
and he would never dream of doing anything
against Egypt. He would rather seek its closest
alliance, for he is a great trader. As to progress
made in extrication of garrisons, all I have done is
to send down from Khartoum all the sick men,
women, and children of those killed in Kordofan.
Sennar, I heard to-day, is quite safe and quiet.
Kassala will hold out without difficulty after
Graham's victory, but the road there is blocked,
as also is the road to Sennar. It is quite impos-
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sible to get the roads open to Kassala and Sennar,
or to send down the white troops, unless Zobeir
comes up. He will change the whole state of
affairs. As for the Equatorial and Bahr-el-Ghazal
provinces, they are all right, but I cannot evacuate
them till the Nile rises, in two months. Dongola
and Berber are quiet ; but I fear for the road
between Berber and Khartoum, where the friends
of the JNIahdi are very active. A body of rebels on
the Blue Nile are blockading a force of 1000 men,
which have, however, plenty of food; till the Nile
rises, I cannot relieve them. Darfour, so far as I
can understand, is all right, and the restored Sultan
should now be working up the tribes to acknow-
ledge him. It is impossible to find any other man
but Zobeir for governing Khartoum. No one has
his power. Hussein Pasha Khalifa has only power
at Dongola and Berber. If you do not send Zobeir,
you have no chance of getting the garrisons away
;
this is a heavy argument in favour of sending him.
There is no possibility of dividing the country
between Zobeir and other Chiefs ; none of the
latter could stand for a day against the Mahdi's
agents, and Hussein Pasha Khalifa would also fall.
The Chiefs will not collect here, for the loyal are
defending their lands against the disloyal. There
is not the least chance of Zobeir making common
cause with the Mahdi. Zobeir here would be far
more powerful than the Mahdi, and he would
make short work of the Mahdi. The JNIahdi's
power is that of a Pope, Zobeir's will be that of
a Sultan. They could never combine. Zobeir is
fifty times the Mahdi's match. He is also of
good family, well known and fitted to be Sultan
;
the Mahdi, in all these respects, is the exact
opposite, besides being a fanatic. I daresay Zobeir,
who hates the tribes, did stir up the fires of revolt,
in hopes that he would be sent to quell it. It is
VOT,. 1 2 L
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the irony of fate that he will get his wish if he is
sent up."
At the same time, I received some further tele-
grams from General Gordon, which showed that
the danger of communication between Berber and
Khartoum being cut off was daily becoming more
imminent, although, General Gordon added, "for
Khartoum itself, there is not any fear."
On March 9, I repeated to Lord Granville
General Gordon's long telegram of the 8th, adding
the following remarks :
—
" I think that the policy of sending Zobeir to
Khartoum and giving him a subsidy is in harmony
with the policy of evacuation. It is in principle
the same policy as that adopted by the Govern-
ment of India towards Afghanistan and the tribes
on the north-west frontier. I have always con-
templated making some arrangements for the future
government of the Soudan, as will be seen from
my despatch of December 22, 1883, in which 1
said that it would be 'necessary to send an English
officer of high authority to Khartoum with full
powers to withdraw all garrisons in the Soudan,
and make the best arrangements possible for the
future government of the country.'
" As regards slavery, it may certainly receive a
stimulus from the abandonment of the Soudan by
Egypt, but the despatch of Zobeir Pasha to Khar-
toum will not affect the question in one way or the
other. No middle course is possible so far as the
Soudan is concerned. We must either virtually
annex the country, which is out of the question, or
else we must accept the inevitable consequences of
the policy of abandonment.
" Your Lordship will see what General Gordon
says about the question of the security of Egypt.
I believe that Zobeir may be made a bulwark
agahist the approach of the INIahdi. Of course.
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there is a risk that he will constitute a danger to
Egypt, but this risk is, I think, a small one, and it
is in any case preferable to incur it rather than
to face the certain disadvantages of withdrawing
without making any provision for the future
government of the country, which would thus be
sure to fall under the power of the Mahdi.
'* I venture to urge upon Her Majesty's Govern-
ment the necessity of settling this question without
delay. General Gordon's telegrams have latterly
caused me some uneasiness. He evidently thinks
that there is a considerable dano:er of his bein<>"
hemmed in and blockaded by the rebels at Khar-
toum, and he appears to contemplate the despatch
of British troops to extricate him. Moreover, so far
as I can judge. General Gordon exercises little or
no influence outside Khartoum, and, altliough he
was at first hailed as a deliverer, his influence is
sure to decline as time goes on.""
An incident now occurred which practically
destroyed all hopes of utilising Zobeir Pasha's
services. Up to this moment, nothing definite
was known to the public about the proposal to
send Zobeir Pasha to Khartoum. Mr. Power was
employed by the Times as its special correspondent
at Khartoum. On March 8 or 9, INIr. Moberly
Bell, who was Times correspondent in Egypt, com-
municated to me a telegram from Mr. Power for
transmission to the Times, from which it appeared
that General Gordon had given to him all the
information which was contained in his telegrams
to me. I subsequently received a letter from
Colonel Stewart, dated March 8, which informed
me of what had taken phice in connection with
this subject. "The telegram," Colonel Stewart
wrote, " shown you by Bell this morning has, no
doubt, surprised you. Gordon also sent you a tele-
gram giving in his resignation if his views were not
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carried out. Yesterday evening, he got very
irritated with me because I did not at once accede
to his request to send you a telegram about Zobeir
and the ])ropriety of sending him up with a British
force to Berber. I said tliat you had ah'eady told
us the chief difficulty was not at Cairo, but at
London, etc.
" I did not refuse to write the telegram, I
merely asked for a little time to think. G. got
very impatient and finally left the table. Seeing
that he was annoyed, I got up and wrote the
telegram as he desired. On returning, I found
him with the Times correspondent. Tlie result
was the telegram you have been shown. We had
a discussion on the subject, but it was of no avail.
He then telegraphed his resignation to you, but
this I fortunately succeeded in getting put into
cipher. The affair is very annoying, but I think
the Ministry at home ought to let him have his
wish and give him Zobeir."
General Gordon wrote in his Journal : " Baring
pitched into me for indiscretion in asking openly for
Zobeir, which I did on purpose, in order to save Her
Majesty's Government the odium of such a step."^
As regards the indiscretion, there can be no doubt
whatever. It was not only that the publication of
General Gordon's views raised a storm of opposition
in England to Zobeir Pasha's a])pointment, but
also that the difficulties of neffotiatino- with Zobeir
Pasha were greatly increased. Instead of my being
able to send for him and point out to him that
he had hitherto been under a cloud, but that now
he had an o})portunity of retrieving his reputation,
he was placed in a position in which it would have
appeared possible to him to dictate his own terms.
* Journal, September 19, 1884, vol. i. p. 67. I remember sending
a telegram urging on Genenil Gordon the dcsinibility of reticence in
his communications to the press, but I cannot lay my hands on it.
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Indeed, he received advice to act in this manner
from the numerous persons in Cairo who were
eager to seek any and every opportunity for showing
hostility to England.
As regards the effect in England, Mr. Sturge,
the Chairman of the Anti-Slavery Society, wrote,
on March 18, to Lord Granville that he had been
instructed by a full Committee of tlie Society to
state that they were '* unanimous in the feeling that
countenance in any shape of such an individual
{i.e. Zobeir Pasha) by the i3ritish Government would
be a degradation for England and a scandal to
Europe. . . . As yet, however, the Committee are
unable to believe that Her Majesty's Government
will thus stultify that anti-slavery policy which has
so long been the high distinction of England, or that
they will thus discharge a trust which they have
undertaken on behalf of the British people and of
Europe." The action of the Anti-Slavery Society
was injudicious. It can scarcely be doubted that
their opposition, together with the fact that there
was every indication of the matter being taken up
as a party question in England, greatly contributed
to the rejection of the views put forward by General
Gordon, Colonel Stewart, and myself.
Before dealing with the reply which Lord
Granville sent to my telegram of March 9, I must
describe the further correspondence which took
place between General Gordon and myself on
March 9, 10, and 11.
On the 9th, General Gordon telegraphed to me :
**I shall await your decision {i.e. the decision about
Zobeir Pasha) ; if wire is cut, I shall consider your
silence is consent to my propositions, and shall hold
on to Khartoum and await Zobeir and British
diversion at Berber." I had still some hope of being
permitted to utilise Zobeir Pasha, but, in view of the
fact that telegraphic communication with Khartoum
518 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii
might at any moment be interrupted, I did not
think it was either just or desirable to leave General
Gordon under tlie impression that the British
Government had any intention of sending an
expedition to Berber, wlien I knew that they had
no such intention. I, therefore, replied at once
:
" So far as I know, there is no intention on the
part of the Government to send an English force
to Berber."
On JNIarch 10 and 11, I received a large number
of telegrams from General Gordon. I need not give
them in full. They were to the general effect that
the Sheikh-el-Obeid was undecided whether to join
the Mahdi or not,^ that there was considerable risk
of communication between Berber and Khartoum
being interrupted, but that Khartoum itself was
not in any danger, and that the utility of Zobeir
Pasha had been greatly diminished by the delay in
settling the question of his employment, '* which
had forced the loyal to join tlie enemy." *' If,''
General Gordon telegraphed, "you mean to make
the proposed diversion to Berber (of British troops),
and to accept my proposal as to Zobeir, to install
him in the Soudan and evacuate, then it is worth
w hile to hold on to Khartoum.
" If, on the other hand, you determine on
neither of these steps, then I can see no use in
holding on to Khartoum, for it is impossible for
me to lielp the other garrisons, and I shall only be
sacrificing the whole of the troops and employes
here.
*' In this latter case, your instructions to me
had better be that I should evacuate Khartoum,
and, with all the employes and troops, remove the
seat of government to Berber. You would under-
' The Sheikh-el-()beid occupied a position of importance, as his
tribal influence extended over the popul.ition lyin";' between Kliartoum
and Berber. Colonel Steuart, in a letter to me, described him as "a
very lioly man, but a decided trimmer."
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stand that such a step would mean the sacrificmg
of all outlymg places except Berber and Dongola.
'* You must give a prompt reply to this, as even
the retreat to Berber may not be in my power in
a few days ; and even if carried out at once, the
retreat will be of extreme difficulty.
" I should have to leave large stores and nine
steamers, which cannot go down. Eventually,
some question would arise at Berber and Dongola,
and I may utterly fail in getting the Cairo em-
ployes to Berber.
" If I attempt it, I could be responsible only for
the attempt to do so."
In another telegram, General Gordon said : " If
the immediate evacuation of Khartoum is deter-
mined upon, irrespective of outlying towns, I would
propose to send down all the Cairo employes
and white troops with Colonel Stewart to Berber,
where he would await your orders. I would also
ask Her Majesty's Government to accept the resig-
nation of my commission, and I would take all
steamers and stores up to the Equatorial and Bahr-
el-Ghazal Provinces, and consider those provinces
as under the King of the Belgians.
*' You would be able to retire all Cairo employes
and white troops with Stewart from Berber to
Dongola, and tlience to Wadi Haifa.
" If you, therefore, determine on the immediate
evacuation of Khartoum, this is my idea. If you
object, tell me.
*' It is the only solution that I can see if the
immediate evacuation of Khartoum, irrespective
of the outlying towns, is determined upon." ^
Lord Granville's reply to my telegram of
March 9 was despatched to me on the 11th. It
* Some of the telegrams, which Gordon sent me at this moment, did
not reach me till many days later, owing to the frecjuent interruptions
of telegraphic communication.
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was to the following effect : " Her Majesty's
Government have carefully considered your tele-
grams of the 9th instant with regard to the future
government of Khartoum and the Soudan, but
they do not consider that the arguments against
the employment of Zobeir Pasha have been satis-
factorily answered. They are prepared to agree to
any other Mohammedan assistance, as well as to
the supply of any reasonable sum of money which
General Gordon may consider necessary in order
to carry out successfully the objects of his mission.
" Her Majesty's Government are not prepared
to send troops to Berber. They understand from
your telegrams that General Gordon and yourself
are of opinion that the withdrawal of the garrisons
will take a considerable time, and that the chief
difficulty arises from the uncertainty felt by the
inhabitants of the Soudan with regard to the future
government of the country. While attaching
great importance to an early evacuation. Her
Majesty's Government have no desire to force
General Gordon's hand prematurely, and they pro-
pose, therefore, to extend his appointment for any
reasonable period wliich may be necessary to enable
him to carry out the objects of the mission with
which he has been intrusted. You will communi-
cate with General Gordon in the sense of this
despatch."
Immediately afterwards (March 12), I received
the following telegram from Lord Granville: "Her
Majesty's Government desire to learn whether
General Gordon's proposal as to his eventual
successor refers to the whole of the Soudan, and,
if not, to what districts of it. They would also
be glad to receive information as to whether his
proposed jurisdiction would embrace points from
which Slave Trade or slave - hunting could be
carried on."
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I repeated Lord Granville's teleiirams to General
Gordon, instructing liini at the same time to hold
on to Khartoum until I could communicate further
with the British Government. I also told him "on
no account to proceed to the Bahr-el-Ghazal and
Equatorial provinces."
I do not think that General Gordon ever received
this message. Nevertheless, I regret that I sent it.
I have already discussed this matter partially in
dealing with the question of the prohibition placed
on his action in respect to retiring southwards.^ I
may now add that, in view of the danger of tele-
graphic communication being interrupted, it would
have been better for me, instead of telling General
Gordon to hold on to Khartoum, to have taken
upon myself the responsibility of directing him to
retire at once to Berber, if he thought fit to do so.
Also, it would have been better for me to have
accepted the conclusion that the British Govern-
ment were determined not to employ Zobeir Pasha.
If it could have been announced, before the tribes
between Berber and Khartoum rose, that Zobeir
Pasha was to be installed as Governor-General of the
Soudan with a force of black troops at his disposal
to maintain order, it is possible that the Sheikh-el-
Obeid and his followers would never have joined
the Mahdi. But the favourable moment for in-
fluencing them in this direction had been allowed to
pass by. At the time, however, I thought from
the tone of Lord Granville's telegrams of the 11th
and 12th of March that the employment of Zobeir
Pasha was still an open question. I, therefore,
repeated to him a summary of General Gordon's
most recent telegrams. I also replied at length to
the questions addressed to me, and at the same
time 1 sent to him the following private telegram
:
"If you eventually decide to send Zobeir, please
» Vide ante, pp. 465-467.
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keep it, if possible, secret, till I have dealt with
him here. I am told that he will not fjo unless
Gordon comes away, as, if Gordon came to any
harm, he thinks he would be accused of causino; it.
The publicity, which Gordon gave to this matter,
is most unfortunate. Newspaper correspondents
are interviewing Zobeir, and some people here are
urging him to make his own terms, as we cannot
get on without him. All this will make him
difficult to deal with."
Lord Granville replied immediately (March 13)
:
"I have received your telegram of the 13th
instant on the subject of General Gordon's sugges-
tions with regard to the appointment of Zobeir
Pasha as Governor of Khartoum and the despatch
of British troops to Berber. Her Majesty's
Government are unable to accept these proposals.
If General Gordon is of o})inion that the prospect
of his early departure diminishes the chance of his
accomplishing his task, and that by staying at
Khartoum himself for any length of time wiiich he
may judge necessary he would be able to establish
a settled government at that place, he is at liberty
to remain there. In the event of his being unable
to carry out this suggestion, he should evacuate
Khartoum and save that garrison by conducting it
himself to Berber without delay.
" Her Majesty's Government trust that General
Gordon will not resign his commission. He should
act according to his judgment as to the best course
to pursue with regard to the steam -vessels and
stores." ^
^ On March 14, Lord Granville wrote to me privately : " We have
had two Cabinets (at which Gladstone was not present) ; there wag
a difference of opinion as to the abstract advantaj^es or disadvantasfeg
of Zobeir, but the unanimous opinion of tlie conunoners in the Cabinet
was that no Liberal or (Joiisorvative (ioveriimeut could appoint
Zobeir. And the difficulty of sending troojis to Berber is very great,
and may entail unlimited difficulties upon us."
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On March 14, I replied to T^ord Granville's
telegram of the 13th: "The instructions contained
in your Lordship's telegram of the 13th are likely
to lead to such very serious consequences that,
even if the line were not still interrupted, I should
hesitate to repeat them to General Gordon until
I have again asked your Lordship whether
the question has been fully considered in all
its bearings. When it is said that General
Gordon may stay at Khartoum for any length of
time which he may judge necessary to establish a
settled government, is it meant that he may stay
an indefinite time, and that he will be succeeded
by some other Governor - General working, as
before, under orders from Cairo ? This is a possible
policy, but it is, of course, a reversal of abandon-
ment. It must lead either to the Egyptian
Government endeavouring to govern the Soudan
unaided (and this they cannot do, and should not
be allowed to attempt), or it will lead to the
appointment of a succession of English Governors-
General, and probably of other English officials.
This must ultimately involve the English Govern-
ment becoming virtually responsible for the govern-
ment of the Soudan. I trust Her Majesty's
Government will not for a moment think of
adopting such a policy. If, on the other hand, it
is merely intended to prolong General Gordon's
period of office for a few months, then I can assure
your Lordship that delay will not facilitate his
task. On the contrary, the difficulty of establish-
ing a settled government will, I believe, increase
rather than diminish with time. The alternatiA'e,
which General Gordon will probably adopt, of
evacuating Khartoum at once and retiring on
Berber, is open to very great objections, and will
be most difficult to execute. It involves the
certainty of sacrificing the garrisons of Sennar,
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Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Gondokoro. The garrisons of
Kassala and the neighbourhood may perhaps be
brought down to JNIassowah, but it is at present
impossible to speak with certainty on this point.
I do not think that the retreat could be carried
out without great personal risk to Gordon and
Stewart. The ultimate effect will be that Khar-
toum must fall to the IMahdi, whose powers will
be thus immensely increased, and the policy of
creating a bulwark between Egypt and the Mahdi,
which I cannot but think is the only wise course
to follow, will have to be finally abandoned. I
would beg your Lordship not to attach undue
importance to some of the minor contradictions in
General Gordon's telegrams. His main contentions
ap])ear to me to be perfectly clear and reasonable.
They are, first, that the two questions of with-
drawing the garrisons and of arranging for the
future government of the country cannot be
separated. Secondly, that it is most undesirable,
even if it be possible, for him to withdraw without
leaving some permanent man to take his place.
I regret that no one but Zobeir can be found
to succeed Gordon, and although I believe the
opinions held in England as to the effect of
Zobeir's appointment are based on an incorrect
appreciation of the facts, I am nevertheless fully
aware of the great difficulties which would have to
be encountered in England, if the appointment is
made. But the real question is, not whether the
appointment of Zobeir is objectionable, but whether
any other practical and less objectionable alter-
native can be suo-jijested. I can su<:^<>est none. I
trust your Lordship will not think that, after the
repeated telegrams I have received, I am unduly
pressing for the Zobeir solution. I should not
again urge it, if I could see any other less objection-
able way out of the present very difficult position.
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On the other hand, I should not be doing my
duty if I did not lay before Her Majesty's Govern-
ment the grave dangers which will result from,
and the objections which may be urged against
the alternative set forth in your Lordship's tele-
gram under reply."
Simultaneously with the despatch of this tele-
gram, news arrived from Berber which left no
further doubt that the Sheikh-el-Obeid had de-
clared in favour of the Mahdi, and that the tribes
between Berber and Shendy were in revolt.
On March 16, Lord Granville telegraphed to
me : " I have received your telegram of the 14th
instant, in which you discuss the question of the
future government of the Soudan ; and after full
consideration of the weighty arguments put forward
therein. Her Majesty's Government adhere to the
instructions contained in my telegram of the 13th.
While the objections of Her Majesty's Government
to Zobeir are unaltered, the prospect of good
results attending his appointment seem to be
diminished. The instructions to General Gordon
to remain in the Soudan only apply to the period
of time which is necessary for relieving the garrisons
throughout the country, and for affording a prospect
of a settled government. If General Gordon
agrees with you that the difficulty of establishing
a settled government will increase rather than
diminish with time, there can be no advantage
in his remaining, and he should, as soon as is
practicable, take steps for the evacuation of
Khartoum in accordance with the instructions
contained in my telegram of the 13th instant.
On evacuating Khartoum, he should exercise his
discretion as to what is to be done with the
steamers and stores there."
Tt was evidently useless to continue the
correspondence. The British Goverinnent were
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determined not to send Zobeir Pasha, and, moreover,
now that there was no longer any doubt that the
tribes between Berber and Khartoum had joined
the Mahdi, the favourable moment for sending him
was passed. On March 17, therefore, T sent a long
telegram to General Gordon, informing him of the
result of the correspondence which had taken place
between Lord Granville and myself. I added
:
" I think you must now regard the idea of sending
Zobeir as finally abandoned, and that you must act
as well as you can up to the instructions contained
in Lord Granville's telegrams." I do not think that
General Gordon ever received this telegram.
On JNIarch 17, I wrote a despatch to Lord Gri.i-
ville in which I stated that I did not propose to
continue the correspondence about the employment
of Zobeir Pasha. I added : '* I regret the decision at
which Her Majesty's Government has arrived, and
I look forward with considerable apprehension to the
results of the policy which it has now been decided
to adopt. But your Lordship may rely on my
using my best endeavours to carry out the instruc-
tions which I have received."
On March 28, Lord Granville wrote to me a
despatch stating at length the reasons which had
induced the Government to reject the proposal that
Zobeir Pasha should be employed. The despatch
alluded to the condemnatory terms which, on various
occasions, General Gordon had employed in speaking
of Zobeir Pasha. It was pointed out, with perfect
accuracy, that both Colonel Stewart and myself
had, in the course of the correspondence, greatly
modified our original opinions. After giving a
summary of the corres})ondence which had taken
place. Lord Granville went on to say :
" If reliance could safely have been placed upon
Zobeir to serve loyally with General Gordon, to
act in a friendly manner to\vards Egypt, and to
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abstain from encouraging the Slave Trade, the
course proposed was undoubtedly the best which
could have been taken under the circumstances ;
but upon this most vital point General Gordon's
assurances failed to convince Her Majesty's Govern-
ment. They felt the strongest desire to comply
with his wishes, but they were bound, at the same
time, to exercise their own deliberate judgment
upon a proposal the adoption of which might
produce such serious consequences. Tliey could
not satisfy themselves of the probability that the
establishment of Zobeir's authority would be a
security to Egypt ; on the contrary, his ante-
cedents, and character and disposition, led them
to the conclusion that it would probably constitute
a serious danger to Egypt. There seemed to Her
Majesty's Government to be considerable risk that
Zobeir might join with the Mahdi, or if he fought
and destroyed him, that he would then turn against
Egypt. The existence of an outbreak of Musul-
man fanaticism was undoubted ; but the INIahdi
had not shown any personal qualifications which
threatened to convert it into a military power and
organisation. To have let loose in the Soudan a
Musulman of undoubted ability and ambition,
possessed of great military skill, and with a
grievance against the Egyptian Government,
appeared to Her Majesty's Government to be
so perilous a course that they were unable to
accept the responsibility of adopting it. They
were unable to share General Gordon's confidence
that Zobeir's blood feud with him involved no
serious danger, and they felt that the opinion
originally expressed by General Gordon, by tlie
Council at Cairo, and by yourself, was more likely
to be correct than the subsequent one. The
chivalrous character of General Gordon appeared
to be likely to lead him into the generous error
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of trusting too much to the loyalty of a man whose
interests and feelings were hostile to him.
"Besides these considerations affecting the in-
terests of Egypt and the safety of General Gordon,
Her Majesty's Government had further to consider
how far it was probable that his authority might
be exercised to renew the slave-hunting raids for
which he was notorious. The temptation to em-
bark in such lucrative transactions would be great
to himself, and there would be the additional risk
that having to rely on the support of his former
friends and dependents, the slave-hunters, he would
be obliged to purchase their support by connivance
at their nefarious practices. Her JM'jesty's Govern-
ment understand the reasons which compelled
General Gordon to announce that the property in
slaves in the Soudan would be recognised ; but this
is a very different thing from using the authority
of Great Britain to establish a notorious slave-
hunter as ruler over that country. General Gordon,
indeed, proposed that the Bahr-el-Ghazal and
Equatorial provinces should be excluded from
Zobeir's rule, but England would have possessed
no power to secure his adherence to such a stipula-
tion.
" These were the considerations which led Her
Majesty's Government to address to you the in-
structions of the 13tli instant."
On April 14, 1 rephed as follows to this despatch :
" I trust your Lordship will permit me to say that,
in my opinion, the despatch under reply contains a
very fair statement of a question which I think was
beset with more difficulties than any which, in the
course of my experience, I have had to consider.
If the arguments used in that despatch stood
alone, they would, I think, be unanswerable ; but
the diflficulty which I experienced in treating this
question was to suggest some alternative which
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would be preferable to that which I recommended.
If eventually any better solution is found, I shall
be tlie first to admit that I was in error in pro-
posing to send Zobeir Pasha to the Soudan."
Were the British Government right in their deci-
sion not to employ Zobeir Pasha ? It is, of course,
impossible to give more than a conjectural answer
to this question. Reviewing the matter now, after
a lapse of many years, I am still of opinion that
Zobeir Pasha should have been employed.^ I
believe that if, when General Gordon sent his
first telegram on the subject from Khartoum on
February 18, the Government had stated that
they had no insuperable objections to the employ-
ment of Zobeir Pasha, the course of events in the
Soudan might possibly have been changed. AVhen
once General Gordon was supported by Colonel
Stewart, I should have yielded to his pressure
that Zobeir Pasha should have been despatched
to Khartoum at once, to which I was at first
reluctant to consent. He could have left Cairo
before the end of February, or at all events very
early in March. It is not improbable that the
announcement of his departure would have pre-
vented the tribes round Khartoum, who \.ere
then wavering, from joining the Mahdi. But the
favourable moment was very fleeting. Regarded
by the light of after events, it is evident that the
discussion of this subject was prolonged for a
fortnight longer than was necessary. Even if the
Government had yielded when the correspondence
1 There can be no question as to the extent of the influence which
Zobeir Pasha then exercised in the Soudan, more especially over the
tribes between Berber and Khartoum. 'When I visited the Soudan
thirteen years later, I found that even tlie jioorest classes, however
ignorant of other matters, were well acquainted with Zobeir Pasha'a
name, and asked eagerly for news of his welfare. In the spring of
1000, he was allowed to return to the Soudan.
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closed in the middle of INTarch, no good would have
been done. The propitious moment had been
allowed to pass by.
Whilst, however, my personal opinion is that the
British Government made a mistake in not giving
General Gordon and myself a free hand in this
matter, the error was one which I do not think
that any impartial critic, even supposing he adopts
our views, will be disposed to condemn severely.
The objections which Lord Granville urged against
the employment of Zobeir Pasha were, in truth, very
forcible. Lord Northbrook, for whose calm judg-
ment and independence of character I entertained
the highest respect, wrote to me two years later
:
" I believe that to have sent Zobeir would have
been a gambler's cast, and that the probabilities
were in favour of his action against Gordon, and
of his raising a power in the Soudan, which would
have been a greater danger to Egypt than there
is now. I can say most positively that my own
conclusion, with every disposition to agree with
you, was very deliberately formed against Zobeir,
and I am still of the same opinion." Without
doubt, the risks involved in employing Zobeir Pasha
were considerable. My own opinion was, and still
is, that the advantages which might have accrued
from employing him were of a nature to counter-
balance those risks. Moreover, my main objec-
tion to the policy of the Government was that, as
so often occurred in Egyptian affairs, the British
Government confined themselves to criticism on
what was })roposed without being able to suggest
any alternative and less objectionable plan. I re-
peat, however, that all this is conjectural. No one
can positively decide whether tlie British Govern-
ment on the one hand, or General Gordon, Colonel
Stewart, and myself on the other hand, showed the
greater amount of foresight. All that can be said
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is that disastrous circumstances ensued after the
refusal to employ Zobeir Paslia, but any one who
asserts that those circumstances were due to the
non-employment of Zobeir Pasha falls into the
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.
One further point remains to be examined.
Were the British Government really averse to the
employment of Zobeir Pasha, or did they merely
act under the pressure of British public opinion ?
I will endeavour to answer this question.
On INIarch 21, that is to say, after the final
decision of the Government had been given, Lord
Granville wrote to me privately : " There was
much difference of opinion as to the abstract merits
of sending Zobeir, but there was really none as to
the vote of the House of Commons. Three of the
members of the Commons in the Cabinet who were
in favour of Zobeir,^ were of opinion that, not only
would the House of Commons pass a censure, but
that they would do it so immediately as to stop
the possibility of his going. I should not have
minded the vote, if I had been sure the policy was
right, but I see nothing in its favour, excepting the
great authority of you, Gordon, and Nubar, and
1 Mr. Morley {Life of Gladstone, vol. iii. p. 169) writes: "The
matter was considered at two meetings of the Cabinet, but the Prime
Minister was prevented by his physician from attending. A difference
of opinion showed itself upon tlie despatch of Zobeir ; viewed as an
abstract question, three of the Commons members inclined to favour
it, but on the practical question, the Commons members were unanimous
that no Government from either side of tlie House could venture to
sanction Zobeir. Mr. Gladstone had become a strong convert to the
plan of sending Zobeir. . . . One of the Ministers went to see him in
his bed, and they conversed for two hours. The Minister, on his
return, reported with some ironic amusement that Mr. Gladstone
considered it very likely that they could not bring Parliament to
swallow Zobeir, but believed that he himself could. Wliellier his
confidence in this was right or wrong, he was unable to turn his
Cabinet. The Queen telegraphed her agreement witli tlie Prime
Minister. But this made no difierence. 'On Saturday 15,' Mr.
Gladstone notes, ' it seemed as if by my casting vote Zobeir was to be
sent to Gordon. But on Sunday and receded from their
ground, and I gave way.'"
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two of you have supplied very strong arguments
the other way."
This, without doubt, represented the real state
of the case. Some members of the Government
would have had the courage to face the storm of
opposition if they had been convinced that it was
wise to employ Zobeir Pasha. But they entertained
an honest conviction that it was unwise to employ
him. Others were inclined to accept the proposal
of General Gordon and myself, but they would
naturally hesitate to insist on the adoption of this
view in a doubtful case against the adverse opinions
of their colleagues. The opposition, which was
certain to be encountered in Parliament and in
the press, contributed to turn the scale. Whether
that opposition was in reality so serious as it was
represented to be is a point on which, having had
no personal experience of parliamentary proceed-
ings, I cannot express any valuable opinion. But
I cannot help thinking that there is a good deal
of truth in the following remarks of the Pall
Mall Gazette : " The opposition, getting wind of
Gordon's application for Zobeir, and displaying
their usual anxiety to damage the Government,
coute que coute, began to raise a hue and cry
against Zobeir. Yet, it was pre-eminently a case
in which a strong Government could and ought
to have supported their agent. Public opinion, no
doubt uninformed, and unaware of the arguments
which were used by General Gordon and Sir
Evelyn Baring, was outraged by the very sugges-
tion of Zobeir's appointment. But, if the ])ublic
liad been phiced in possession of the facts laid
before the Government, the appointnicnt of Zobeir
woukl have been aj)proved, nor would it have
excited more serious opposition than the Slave-
holding Proclamation."
To an outsider, indeed, the case did not seem hope-
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less from a parliamentary point of view. I do not say
that the arguments in favour of employing Zobeir
Pasha were by any means conclusive, but tliey were
certainly strong. However high party spirit may
run, there must surely always be a certain number
of moderate men on both sides of the House of
Commons, who would pause before, in a very serious
matter of this sort with which they were imperfectly
acquainted, they would deliberately reject the
opinion of the best qualified authorities on the
spot. From the point of view of an appeal to
authority, the case was a strong one. General
Gordon's name carried immense weight with the
public. Both Colonel Stewart and myself were
less known, and our opinions would have certainly
carried far less weight with the general public than
those of General Gordon. Nevertheless, we might
possibly have exercised some influence over the
views of those who may have felt, but were re-
luctant to express a certain want of confidence in
General Gordon owing to the eccentricities to
which allusion has been made in these pages.
General Gordon's character and habits of thought
differed widely from both Colonel Stewart's and
mine, but, as it appears to me, the fact that these
differences existed served rather to strengthen
the case in so far as it depended on an appeal to
authority.
Mr, Gladstone, speaking in the House of
Commons on February 23, 1885, said : " It is
well known, that if, when the recommendation to
send Zobeir was made, we had complied with it,
an address from this House to the Crown would,
before forty-eight hours were over, have paralysed
our action ; and, although it is perfectly true tluit
the decision arrived at was the judgment of the
Cabinet, it was also no less the judgment of
Parliament and of the people." Without doubt.
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there is much truth in this argument. But there
was this notable difference between the Govern-
ment on the one side, and ParUament and the people
on the other side. The former were well informed
of the facts and arguments ; the latter were, in
a great degree, ignorant of them. I believe
that the final catastrophe at Khartoum might
possibly have been averted if Zobeir Pasha had
been employed. If I am right in this conjecture,
the main responsibility must naturally devolve on
Mr. Gladstone's Government. But it must in
fairness be added that the responsibility must be
shared by the British Parliament and by the people
generally, notably by the Anti- Slavery Society.
The Ministers who objected to the employment
of Zobeir Pasha were perhaps in some degree want-
ing in imagination and elasticity of mind. They
could not transport themselves in spirit from
Westminster to Khartoum and Cairo. They do
not appear to have shown the versatility necessary
to deal with the rapidly shifting scenes in the
drama which was being; unfolded in the Soudan.
The arguments which they applied against General
Gordon and myself appear to me to be rather those
of debaters trained in the art of dialectics than
of statesmen whose reason and imagination enable
them to grasp in an instant the true situation of
affairs in a distant country widely differing from
their own. Nevertheless, even supposing my
appreciation of the facts to be correct, it must
be adinitte 1 that in a matter of such difficulty
an error of judgment is, to say the least, pardon-
able.
CHAPTER XXVI
THE PROPOSED DASH TO BERBER
March 16-April 21, 1884
Sir Gerald Graham proposes to move on Sinkat— Lord Granville
approves— The proposed movement on Wadi Haifa—Proposal to
send a British expedition to Berber—It is rejected—The order to
move on Sinkat is cancelled—Remarks on this decision—Proposal
to despatch a force to VV^adi Haifa—General Gordon recommends
the employment of a Turkish force—The Government reject the
pi'oposal—Necessity of preparing for a Relief Expedition.
The decision not to employ Zobeir Pasha, coupled
with the rising of the tribes between Khartoum
and Berber, completely altered the aspect of affairs
in the Soudan.
From that moment it became certain that, with-
out external military aid, the Soudan must fall under
the domination of the Mahdi. No such aid was
available, yet without it any attempt to establish
an anti-Mahdist Government at Khartoum was
merely, to use Lord Northbrook's phrase, to follow
a will-o'-the wisp.
This, however, did not constitute the only
change in the situation. Communication with
Khartoum was cut off. It became clear that the
question of employing British troops might before
long present itself for solution under different
aspects from those which had heretofore existed.
General Gordon and Colonel Stewart were sur-
rounded by hostile tribes. It miglit become neces-
sary to consider whether an expedition should be
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sent, not to re-establish order in the Soudan, or to
reheve the beleaguered Egyptian garrisons, but to
bring away the officers who had been sent by the
British Government to Kliartoum.
It was obviously desirable that the necessity for
sending any expedition to Khartoum should be
avoided. The best chance of avoiding it lay in
opening up the road from Suakin to Berber at once,
and thus facilitating General Gordon's retreat before
the JNlahdists could gather in force to oppose it. It
was futile to rely any longer on diplomacy, on
political concessions, or on individual influence to
execute the aims of British policy in the Soudan.
Diplomatists and politicians had had their say.
Whether their efforts had been skilfully or unskil-
fully directed, was now immaterial. The political
concessions made by General Gordon immediately
after his arrival at Khartoum merely produced a
temporary effect. His influence, although consider-
able on those with whom he was brought into per-
sonal contact, was manifestly confined to the walls
of Khartoum. It had proved powerless to prevent
the neighbouring tribes from throwing in their lot
with the JNIahdi. It was becoming daily more and
more clear that it was only by the use of force that
anything effective could be done to help General
Gordon.
The course of events in the Eastern Soudan up
to the middle of JNIarch 1884 has been already
described.^ Osman Digna's forces had been de-
feated by Sir Gerald Graham, first at El Teb on
February 29, and again at Tamai on JNIarch 13.
There was at one time some hope that, as a result
of the latter victory, the road from Suakin to Berber
would be opened without further military operations
of a serious nature. It soon became ap})arent, how-
ever, that the effect of the victories at El Teb and
* y^ide Chapter XXI.
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Tamai had not been so great as was anticipated.
The Mahdists were, indeed, discouraged, but they
thought that the British troops could do no more,
and that they would leave the country.
It would be necessary, therefore, to follow up
the victories, at all events to the extent of making
a demonstration towards Berber. On March 15,
Sir Gerald Graham telegraphed to Lord Harting-
ton that both Admiral Hewett and himself were of
opinion that " an advance to Sinkat would now
have a great effect, and ratify the late victories."
A copy of this telegram was sent to me from
Suakin. I decided to support Sir Gerald Graham's
recommendation. On March 16, I telegraphed to
Lord Granville : " With reference to Graham's
message to the War Secretary recommending an
advance on Sinkat, so far as I can judge of the
situation from here, I should say it would be a wise
measure. It will facilitate Chermside's negotiations
with the tribes.^ Chermside agrees in this view.
It has now become of the utmost importance not
only to open the Berber-Suakin route, but to come
to terms with the tribes between Berber and Khar-
toum. If we fail in the latter point, the question
will very likely arise of sending an expeditionary
force to Khartoum to bring away Gordon. I do
not think that he is in any immediate danger. He
has provisions for six months."
On the following day (March 16), Lord Gran-
ville replied : " Graham's movement on Sinkat has
been approved, but we cannot authorise the
advance of any troops in the direction of Berber
until we are informed of the military conditions,
and are satisfied that it is necessary for Gordon's
safety, and confined to that purpose. Our present
^ Major (subsequently Sir Herbert) Cbermside, R.E., was attached
to Si:- Gerald Graham's staff with the object of assisting in negotiations
with the tribes.
538 MODERN EGYPT pt. iii
information is that it would not be safe to send
a small body of cavalry as proposed, and that it
would be impossible to send a large force."
No further communication on this subject of any
importance passed until March 21, on which day
Lord Granville telegraphed to me that the British
Government " would deprecate the despatch of an
expedition against Osman Digna, with whom they
would be disposed to recommend, if possible, treat-
ing on the basis of his submission, and rendering
himself answerable for the safety of the Berber
road and the protection of traders and other
travellers." The details of the instructions to be
given to Sir Gerald Graham were left to my dis-
cretion. I, therefore, telegraphed to the latter
(March 21) the substance of the instructions
received from Lord Granville, and added : " A
wide discretion must be left to you, acting on the
best local advice obtainable, as to the best method
of dealing with the tribes. . . . You must judge
whether it is necessary to send an expedition
against Osman Digna, or whether it is possible to
treat with him on the basis of submission and
becoming answerable for the peace of the Berber
road and the protection of traders and others."
1 reported to Lord Granville the nature of the
instructions which I had sent to Sir Gerald
Graham, and added : " It appears to me undesir-
able to debar General Graham from attacking
Osman Digna, if he thinks it necessary to do so in
order to open up the road to Berber."
On March 22, Sir Gerald Graham replied to my
telegram in the sense which I had anticipated.
" It would be useless," he said, " to enter into com-
munication with Osman Digna." I repeated tliis
telegram to Lord Granville, and added that I was
of opinion that Sir Gerald Graham " should be
allowed to attack Osman Digna as he proposed."
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On March 23, Lord Granville replied : " Her
Majesty's Government are averse to further mili-
tary operations being undertaken without any
definite object ; but if General Graham considers
that the security of the Berber road will be thereby
ensured, he is authorised to advance to Tamanib as
proposed." I repeated this to Sir Gerald Graham,
and in reply received the following message from
Admiral Hewett : " In Graham's opinion and mine
the security of the Berber road cannot be attained
so long as Osman Digna remains in arms. The
first object of the advance on 'J'amanib is, therefore,
to disperse him. No further fighting is anticipated."
It will be seen from this correspondence that,
whilst my opinion was veering round to the neces-
sity of employing force to help General Gordon, the
British Government, on the other hand, were daily
becoming more reluctant to sanction the use of
force. The truth was that, whereas the Govern-
ment had but a few weeks before been sharply
criticised for their delay in proceeding to the relief
of Tokar, they were now being attacked for having
caused the useless slaughter of a number of
Dervishes. They were unwilling to yield to the
pressure in the direction of vigorous action, which
was now being applied from Cairo and Suakin.
At the same time, they wished to do something
to help General Gordon. On March 22, therefore.
Lord Granville telegraphed to ask my opinion on the
following points : first, whether it would be desir-
able to " despatch a portion of the Egyptian army
to garrison Wadi Haifa in order to lend moral
support to General Gordon at Khartoum
"
;
secondly, whether some British officers " with some
knowledge of Arabic and experience in dealing
with natives" might not advantageously be sent
to Berber, " there to await instructions from
General Gordon."
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I consulted Sir Frederick Stephenson, Sir
Evelyn \^^ood, and Colonel Watson on these
proposals. Our joint opinion was that the des-
patch of a handful of fellaheen troops to Wadi
Haifa was a half measure which would be of
little use. I, therefore, telegraphed to Lord
Granville in this sense. There was more to be
said in favour of sending some officers to Berber,
but it was questionable whether they would be
able to get there. JNIajor Kitcliener and Major
Rundle were, however, directed to proceed to
Berber. By the time they got to Assouan, it
became clear that it would be imprudent to allow
them to proceed any farther. Their original
orders were, therefore, cancelled, and it was
fortunate that this was done, for, had they pro-
ceeded to i^>erber, they would certainly liave been
made prisoners.
The more I thought over the whole matter, the
more did it seem to me, first, that it was essential
not only to open up the Suakin-Berber road, but
also to clear the road from Berber to Khartoum
;
and secondly, that this could not be accomplished
without the despatch of a British force to Berber.
I discussed with Sir Frederick Stephenson and
Sir Evelyn Wood the question of whether it
would be possible to send a British force from
Suakin to Berber. They were both of opinion
that the operation was possible, although it was
attended with risk, and although the health of the
troops would suffer from the climate. On March
24, therefore, I telegraphed to Lord Granville
:
" It appears to me tliat, under present circum-
stances. General Gordon will not be able to carry
out your Lordship's instructions, although those
instructions involve the abandonment of the
Sennar garrison on the ]5hie Nile, and the
garrisons of Bahr-el-Ghazal and Gondokoro on
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the White Nile. The question now is how to
get General Gordon and Colonel Stewart away
from Khartoum. In considering this question, it
should be remembered that they will not will-
ingly come back without bringing with them the
garrison of Khartoum and the Government officials.
I believe that the success gained by General
Graham in the neighbourhood of Suakin will
result in the opening of the road to Berber, but
I should not think that any action he can take
at or near Suakin would exert much influence
over the tribes between Berber and Khartoum.
Unless any unforeseen circumstance should occur
to change the situation, only two solutions appear
to be possible. The first is to trust General
Gordon's beino^ able to maintain himself at
Khartoum till the autumn, when, by reason of
the greater quantity of water, it would be less
difficult to conduct operations on the Suakin-
Berber road than it is at present. This he might
perhaps be able to do, but it of course involves
running a great risk. The only other plan is to
send a portion of General Graham's army to
Berber with instructions to open up communica-
tion with Khartoum. There would be very
great difficulty in getting to Berber, but if the
road were once open, it might be done by sending
small detachments at a time. General Gordon is
evidently expecting help from Suakin, and he has
ordered messengers to be sent along the road from
Berber to ascertain whether any English force is
advancing. Under present circumstances, I think
that an effort should be made to help General
Gordon from Suakin, if it is at all a possible
military operation. General Steplienson and Sir
Evelyn Wood, whilst admitting the very great
risk to the health of the troops, besides the extra-
ordinary military risks, are of opinion that the
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undertaking is possible. They think that General
Graham should be further consulted. We all
consider that, however difficult the operations
from Suakin may be, they are more practicable
than any operations from Korosko and along the
Nile. If anything is to be done, no time should be
lost, as each week increases the difficulty as regards
climate."
On March 25, Lord Granville replied : " Having
regard to the dangers of the climate of the Soudan
at this time of the year, as well as the extraordinary
risk from a military point of view, Her Majesty's
Government do not tliink it justifiable to send a
British expedition to Berber, and they wish you to
communicate this decision to General Gordon, in
order that he may adopt measures in accordance
therewith. Her Majesty's Government desire to
leave full discretion to General Gordon to remain
at Khartoum, if he thinks it necessary, or to retire
by the southern or any other route which might
be found available."
On the following day (March 26), I received a
further telegram from I^ord Granville, directing
me to send the following instructions to Sir Gerald
Grahan : " The Government have no intention of
sending British troops to Berber. The operations
in which you are now engaged must be limited to
the pacification of the district around Suakin, and
restoring communication with Berber, if possible by
other means and influence of friendly tribes. Re-
ports of the effect of heat on the troops strengthen
the desire of Government that your operations
should be brought to a speedy conclusion, and
preparations made for the immediate embarkation
of the bulk of your force. Report when you can
dispense with the services of regiments from India."
I confess that when I received these two tele-
grams I found it difficult to preserve the " diplo-
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matic calm," which formed the subject of General
Gordon's sarcasms.^ It was not so much that I
minded the decision that no expedition should be
sent to Berber, in so far as that decision was based
upon military grounds. The militaiy question was
undoubtedly difficult of solution. There was
a difference of opinion amongst the military
authorities as to the practicabiHty of opening the
road to Berber. It could, therefore, be no matter
for surprise that the Government should lean
preferentially to the side of those who deprecated
immediate action. The tone of the telegrams,
however, grated upon me. The question which I
had propounded to Lord Granville was how to
get General Gordon and Colonel Stewart away
from Khartoum. The march of events had been
rapid, and it was obvious that at this moment
the relief of General Gordon and Colonel Stewart
was the most important point at issue. On
March 25, I telegraphed to Lord GranviUe
that Hussein Pasha Khalifa, who commanded at
Berber, had reported that Khartoum was sur-
rounded, and that the rebels were receiving
reinforcements. The only answer I got was that
the British Government left full discretion to
General Gordon either to remain where he was or
to retire by any route which might be found avail-
able. The Government, therefore, begged the
question. They did not appear to realise the
situation. They shut their eyes to the probability
that before long no route would be available by
which to retreat from Kliartoum.
I, therefore, telegraphed to Lord Granville on
March 26: "I cannot say whether it will be
possible for me to communicate your Lordship's
message to Gordon, but in any case I cannot
reconcile myself to making the attempt to forward
* Vide ante, p. 477, note.
544 MODERN EGYPT pt. m
such a message without again addressing your
Lordship. Let me earnestly beg Hor Majesty's
Government to place themselves in the position of
Gordon and Stewart. They have been sent on
a most difficult and dangerous mission by the
English Government. Their proposal to send
Zobeir, which, if it had been acted on some weeks
ago, would certainly have entirely altered the
situation, was rejected. The consequences which
they foresaw have ensued. If they receive the
instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram
of the 25th, they cannot but understand them
as meaning that they and all with them are to be
abandoned and to receive no help from the British
Government. Coetlogon, who is here, assures me
that so long as the rebels hold both banks of the
river above the sixth cataract, it will be quite
impossible for boats to pass. He does not believ^e
that Gordon can cut his way through by land. He
ridicules the idea of retreating with the garrison to
the Equator, and we may be sure that Gordon and
Stewart will not come away alone. As a matter
of personal opinion, I do not believe in the
impossibility of helping Gordon, even during the
summer, if Indian troops are employed, and money
is not spared. But if it be decided to make no
attempt to afford present help, then I would urge
that Gordon be told to try and maintain his
position during the summer, and that then, if he is
still beleaguered, an expedition will be sent as early
as possible in the autumn to relieve him. This
would, at all events, give him some hope, and
the mere announcement of the intention of the
Government would go a long way to ensure his
safety by keeping loyal tribes who may be still
wavering;. No one can regret more than 1 do the
necessity of sending British or Indian troops to the
Soudan, but, having sent Gordon to Khartoum, it
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appears to me that it is our bounden duty, both as
a matter of humanity and pohcy, not to abandon
him."
On March 28, Lord Granville replied : " We
cannot accede to the proposals in your telegram.
We have given it our most serious consideration, and,
vi^ith the greatest wish to assist General Gordon, we
do not see how we can alter our instructions of the
25th. Communicate them as soon as possible to
General Gordon. We are not prepared to add to
them until we hear what is General Gordon's
actual condition and prospects as to security, and
also, if possible, his plans of proceeding and his
desires under present circumstances." ^
It was evidently useless to continue the
correspondence any further. I endeavoured to
communicate to General Gordon the views of the
British Government, as explained in Lord Gran-
ville's telegrams of the 25th and 28th of March, but
I do not think that he ever received my message.
On March 27, Sir Gerald Graham telegraphed
from Suakin : " I consider that my active operations
are now completed and that I can at once dispense
with the services of the regiments Mhich came
from India." On JNIarch 29, he was informed by
the War Office that the Sinkat expedition was not
to be undertaken, and that the British troops were
to leave Suakin as soon as they were relieved by
* On March 29, Lord Granville wrote to me privately: "You shot
a heavy cannon-ball, — your last protest as to our instructions to
Gordon. Although your proposals were a complete reversal of our
policy, we quite understood your feelings. We could not agree to
pledge ourselves to a promise to Gordon to send a military expedition
to Khartoum in the autumn. We hope that the victories of Graham
may have corrected the bad effects of Baker's defeat. 'ITie military
authorities assure us that, unless the garrison rebels against Gordon,
the Arabs cannot take Khartoum. He is known to have six months'
provisions. The only incident, as aifecting the original views with
which Gordon set out, and upon which we consented to send him, waa
the restriction upon Zobeir joining him, the objections to which wer«
chiefly furnished by you and him."
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Egj^tian troops from Cairo. Shortly afterwards,
the greater portion of the British garrison of Suakin
was withdraAMi.
Were the British Government right or wrong
in refusing to send a portion of Sir Gerald
Graham's force from Suakin to Berber ? As in
the case of the proposed employment of Zobeir
Pasha, it is impossible to give more than a
conjectural answer to this question. If it be
admitted that the operation was practicable from
a military point of view, there can scarcely be
any doubt that the Government made a serious
mistake. It appeared probable at the time that
the decision not to send a small expeditionary force
to Berber in the spring of 1884 would lead to the
despatch of a larger force at a later period, and
this, in fact, is what actually happened. The
arguments based on the alleged necessity of obtain-
ing " a better knowledge of General Gordon's
actual position, his resources and his requirements,"
appeared to me at the time valueless, and I regard
them in the same light on reading the correspond-
ence over again after a lapse of many years. But
it carmot on that account be stated positively that
the decision of the Government was unwise. The
question was wholly military. Was the operation
practicable or not ? On this point, the military
authorities were not all of one mind. Sir Frederick
Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood, whilst acknow-
ledging the risks and the objections on the score
of cHmate, thought that the operation should be
undertaken. I believe that I am correct in stating
that the military authorities at Suakin were less
favourably disposed to undertaking the expedition
than tliose at Cairo. I have always understood
tliat it was not only the objections as regards the
effect of the climate on the health of the British
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troops, but also the difficulties of providing
transport sufficient even for a small force, which
rendered them averse to the expedition. It is
possible that they erred on the side of caution, but
if they did so they can quote the higli authority of
Colonel Stevi^art to justify the advice which they
gave. In the last letter which he wrote to me from
Khartoum, dated March 11, Colonel Stewart said:
"Notwithstanding our telegrams, I really fail to
see how you can at this season of the year send an
expedition from Suakin to Berber. The road is
bad enough in the winter, but how any soldiers,
but particularly English soldiers, could get along it
in summer, I cannot conceive. I cannot picture to
myself the English soldier getting over that awful
plain between Obok and Berber. Also, from the
time Ariab is left, there is no water. Of all
animals in the world, I think the English soldier
the least suited for the effort. Turks, Indians, etc.,
might do it, but it would be tough work." General
Gordon also recognised the difficulty of employing
British troops during the summer. The following
entry occurs in his Journal, dated September 18,
1884 : " One cannot help seeing that it is quite im-
possible to keep British troops after January.
. . .
I certainly will, with all my heart and soul, do my
best, if any of Her Majesty's forces come up here,
or to Berber, to send them down before January."
My personal opinion at the time was that a very
lightly equipped force of from 1000 to 1500 men
might have been sent on camels from Suakin to
Berber, and that, in spite of tlie risks and
difficulties, the attempt should have been made.
I remain of the same opinion still. On the other
hand, it must be admitted that, in view of the
conflicting nature of the military opinions laid
before them, the Government had some fairly
good grounds for rejecting the advice tendered by
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Sir Frederick Stephenson, Sir EveljTi Wood, and
myself. However this may be, it is certain that
from the moment the proposal to make a dash to
Berber with a small force was rejected as being
impracticable, the despatch of a larger expedition
at a later period became an almost unavoidable
necessity. Some while was, however, yet to elapse
before the Government fully realised the facts of
the situation.
On April 8, Lord Granville telegraphed to me
:
" General Gordon has several times suggested a
movement on Wadi Haifa which might support
him by threatening an advance on Dongola ; and
under present circumstances at Berber, this might
be found advantageous." I was instructed to
consult Sir Frederick Stephenson and Sir Evelyn
Wood with regard to this proposal. This matter
had been already fully considered. On receipt of
Lord Granville s telegram, however, a further
consultation took place between Nubar Pasha, Sir
Frederick Stephenson, Sir Evelyn Wood, and
myself General Stephenson thought the " step was
open to great objections on account of the climate
during the summer months, and he also considered
it unwise to leave a detachment at so great a
distance from its base." " On the whole," 1 tele-
graphed to Lord Granville on April 10, " we are
disposed to think that the objections to undertak-
ing the movement outweigh the benefits Ukely
to accrue from it. Those benefits are of a very
doubtful nature."
I am inclined to regret that I expressed an
opinion adverse to this proposal, but my regret s
solely based on the feeling that, situated as General
Gordon then was, any suggestion emanating from
him, especially if he reiterated it, should have been
acted on if it was possible of execution. I did not
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believe at the time, and I do not believe now, that
the despatch of a small body of men to Korosko or
Wadi Haifa would have affected the position of
General Gordon at Khartoum. When, at a later
period, a British force was at Dongola, and was
preparing to march on Khartoum, General Gordon
wrote (November 8, 1884) : " It is curious what a
very little effect all our immense preparations at
Dongola, etcetera, have had on the course of
events ; one may say that they have not had up
to the present time the least."
On April 9, I received about thirty telegrams,
which had been delayed in transmission, from
General Gordon. They brought news from Khar-
toum up to April 1. In one of them he said : " I
wish I could convey to you my impressions of the
truly trumpery nature of this revolt, which 500
determined men could put down. Be assured that,
for the present, and for two months, we are as safe
here as at Cairo. I break my head over our im-
potence, and the more so when I feel that, once
the Soudan taken, you may expect such a crop of
troubles in all Moslem states. The only worry I
have is that you will dawdle away your time, and
do nothing till too late. If you would only put
your pride in your pocket and get by good pay
3000 Turkish infantry and 1000 Turkish cavalry,
the affair, including the crushing of the Mahdi,
would be accomplished in four months."
General Gordon attached great importance to
this proposal. He constantly alluded to the subject
in his Journal. " If," he said, " the Soudan is given
back to Egypt, in a couple of years we would have
another JNIahdi ; therefore, our choice lies between
Zobeir and the Turks. Now, the time has gone
by when Zobeir, almost alone, would suffice. . . .
Therefore, give the country to the Turks. If I
was Lord Wolseley, / would make Her JNIajcsty's
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Government send the Turks here. . . . The Turks
are the best sohition, though most expensive.
They ivoicid keep the Soudan; give them two
milhons." " The more I think of it, the more the
Turk sohition appears Hobson's choice. ... I get
out of all my troubles if the Turks come, for 1 shunt
them on the Turks, and so do you." The Soudan
"should be handed over to the Sultan with a sub-
sidy." " The only possible solution is the Sultan,
let the subsidy be what it may." The reasons why
General Gordon made this proposal may be gathered
from his telegrams and his Journal.
In the first place, he thought any solution was
better than allowing the country to fall into the
hands of the Mahdi. " To give up countries," he
said, " which are to some extent civilised, which, if
properly governed, are quiet and orderly, to the
Turks or to Zobeir, and to allow the Slave Trade
to flourish again in tenfold intensity, is not a very
high 7-0/e, but quoi faire ? We have not the men
to govern these lands, we cannot afford the money
;
consequently, I advise what I have said. ... It
would be nobler to keep the Soudan, but is too
much to ex,pect our taxpayers to agree to." His
whole energy, therefore, was devoted, not so much
to evacuating the Soudan as to " smashing up " the
Mahdi. In two imdated telegrams, which were
received in Cairo on September 18 and 20, 1884,
respectively, he said : " It would be the best course
to negotiate with the Porte for the despatch of
Turkish troops. ... It is impossible to leave
Khartoum without a regular government estab-
lished by some Power. . . . Perhaps tlie British
Government will be displeased with the advice
which I have given. The people of the Soudan
are also displeased with me on account of my
fighting against them, and on account of their not
attaining their object in following the JNIahdi. I
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wish for negotiations with the Sublime Porte, so
that the necessary assistance may be quickly sent
here, so asy to render it possible to extinguish
the flame of this false Mahdi before it becomes
difficult."
In the second place, General Gordon was greatly
irritated with the Soudanese for continuing the
revolt. On April 12, 1884, he telegraphed to me
:
" I wonder you do not give the Soudan to the
Sultan with a subsidy of £150,000 a year. He
would finish the rebellion in three months, in-
cluding the Mahdi. After the way these people
have rejected my terms, I would be inclined to let
the Turkish harrow go over them. The Sultan
would need only 3000 men."^
These extracts are sufficient to show that
General Gordon underrated the serious nature of
the revolt with which he had to deal ; it was by no
means a "trumpery revolt which 500 men could
put down." On the contrary, from the local point oi
view it was a revolt of the most serious description,
for the suppression of which a far larger force than
that indicated by General Gordon would have been
required. On the other hand, he overrated the
consequences, which would ensue in Eg^^pt and
elsewhere, if the JNlahdist movement were crowned
with local success. He spoke of the Mahdi re-
ceiving " lots of letters from Cairo, Stamboul, and
India." "What," he asked, "is to prevent the
Mahdi's adherents gaining Mecca, where there are
not 2000 men ? Once at Mecca, we may look out
for squalls in Turkey, etcetera." He spoke of the
necessity of eventually " smashing up " the Malidi
if "peace were to be retained in Egypt." If the
Mahdi took Khartoum he felt sure that "a rising
would occur in Egypt." We now know that these
fears were exaggerated. The Malidi obtained
* I did not receive this telegram till March 26, 189.0.
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supreme power in the Soudan, but the effect ol
the rebelhon was entirely local. It did not cause
any trouble in other JMohamniedan countries. Even
at that time, it was clear that, if the Mahdists
attempted the invasion of Egypt, their onward
march would be arrested when once they came in
contact with British troops.^
The reply of the British Government to General
Gordon's proposal was contained in a despatch
addressed to Mr. Egerton by Lord Gran\'ille on
May 1 : '* The employment of Turkish troops in the
Soudan," Lord Granville wrote, " would be contrary
to the views advocated by General Gordon on
former occasions. I need not remind you that in his
Proclamations issued at Berber and Khartoum, he
declared that he had averted the despatch of troops
by the Sultan, and had come in person to prevent
further bloodshed. JSIoreover, such a course would
involve a reversal of the original policy of Her
Majesty's Government, which was to detach the
Soudan from Egypt, and restore to its inhabitants
their former independence. ... It is clear . . .
that General Gordon's object in asking for these
troops is to effect the withdrawal of the Soudan
garrisons by military expeditions, and to bring about
the collapse of the Mahdi. . . . With respect to
General Gordon's request for Turkish troops with
a view to offensive operations. General Gordon
cannot too clearly understand that these opera-
tions cannot receive the sanction of Her Majesty's
* Tliere can be no doubt tbat tbe alleged necessity of "smashing
the Mahdi" on the ground that his success in the Soudan would be
productive of serious results elsewhere, exercised a powerful influence
over British public opinion throughout the whole of this period. Never-
theless, the best authorities on Eastern politics were at the time well
aware that these fears were groundless, or at all events much exagger-
ated. Thus, on March 21, 1884, Sir Alfred Lyall wrote to Mr. Henry
Reeve : " The Mahdi's fortunes do not interest India. Tlie tali< in
some of the papers about the necessity of smashing him in order to
avert the risk of some general Mohammedan uprising is futile and
imaginative."
—
Memoirs of Henry Reeve, vol. ii. p. 329.
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Government, and that they are beyond the scope
of his mission."
So long as General Gordon confined himself to
making proposals which could, even with a certain
amount of straining, be made to harmonise with the
general line of policy which lie had been sent to
carry out, a strong moral obligation rested upon
the British Government to adopt his suggestions.
The proposal to hand over the Soudan to the
Sultan and to utilise Turkish troops in order to
crush the revolt of the INIahdi was, however,
opposed both to the spirit of his instructions, and
to the views which he had himself persistently
advocated up to that time. From whatever point
of view the question be regarded, the Government
were, therefore, fully justified in exercising their own
discretion as to whether so complete a change of
policy as that recommended by General Gordon was
either possible or desirable. It cannot be doubted
that the Government exercised a wise discretion
in declining to follow General Gordon's advice in
this particular connection. I doubt whether the
execution of the policy recommended by General
Gordon was possible. I have no doubt that,
supposing it to have been possible, its execution
was undesirable.
I base my doubts as to the possibility of the
execution of the policy on the difficulties of nego-
tiating with the Sultan on a matter of this sort,
difficulties which were exemplified when there was
a question of sending Turkish troops to suppress
the Arabi revolt ; on the special difficulty of
moving the Porte to speedy and vigorous action, such
as would have been required to ensure success in
this particular instance ; on the impecuniosity of the
Ottoman Treasury ; on the impossibility of tlu'ow-
ing the charge of the expedition on the Egyptian
Treasury ; and on the gravity of the rebeUion,
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the suppression of which would have required a far
larger force than General Gordon estimated.
1 base my opinion on the undesirability of adopt-
ing the policy recommended by General Gordon
on the fact that the occupation of the Soudan by
Turkish troops would assuredly have brought in its
train a continuance, and not improbably an aggra-
vation of the misgovernment which was the primary
cause of the rebelHon ; and on the further fact that
a Turkish occupation would not have afforded any
final settlement of the Soudan question. As a
choice of evils, indeed, it was preferable in the
interests of England, of Egypt, of the civilised
world in general and of the people of the Soudan,
that the Mahdi should obtain possession of the
country rather than that it should be handed over
to the Sultan. Dervish rule in the Soudan was,
without doubt, an evil, but even at that time it
could be foreseen that the evil would in all proba-
bility only be temporary. A Turkish occupation
would have been an evil of a more permanent
nature. It was almost irreconcilable with the idea
of future Egyptian reconquest. It would have
caused endless political and financial complications.
It is well, therefore, that the British Government
declined to follow General Gordon's suggestions
in this connection.
In the meanwhile, the situation at Khartoum
was daily becoming more critical. On March 29,
I received a telegram from General Gordon, dated
the 17th, giving an account of an action which had
been fought in the neighbourhood of Khartoum on
the 16th, and in which, owing apparently to the
treachery of two Pashas, who were subsequently
executed, the Egyptian troops suffered a severe
defeat. Shortly afterwards, a panic occurred at
Berber. Every one who could get away left the
place. Hussein Pasha Khalifa, who was in com-
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mand at Berber, telegraphed : " The Government
having abandoned us, we can only trust in God."
General Gordon had not received all the tele-
grams which had been sent to him from Cairo. But
he was aware that the Government had negatived
his proposal to employ Zobeir Pasha, and that there
was no intention of sending a relief expedition
from Suakin to Berber. He was greatly irritated
at the rejection of these proposals. On April 7, he
sent me a telegram which, Mr. Egmont Hake
observes, "at once became historical." It was as
follows : " As far as I can understand, the situation
is this : you state your intention of not sending any
rehef up here or to Berber, and you refuse me
Zobeir. I consider myself free to act according to
circumstances. I shall hold out here as long as I
can, and if I can suppress the rebellion I shall do
so. If I cannot, I siiall retire to the Equator, and
leave you the indelible disgrace of abandoning the
garrisons of Sennar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola,
with the certainty that you will eventually be
forced to smash up the Mahdi under great diffi-
culties if you would retain peace in Egypt."
The strong expressions employed in this telegram
were caught up by political partisans, who dwelt
with rapturous emphasis on the " indelible dis-
grace " which the British Government was said to
have incurred. For my own part, I caimot under-
stand how any impartial person can consider that
the British Government were responsible for the
difficulties which at that time beset the garrisons
of Sennar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola. Those
who dwelt on the disgrace which Avould be incurred
if the garrisons of those places fell into the hands of
the Mahdi, should have had the courage of their
opinions. They should have urged the only pos-
sible remedy for preventing the consummation
which they deplored. That remedy was the
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despatch of a strong British expedition, or
perhaps I should rather say, several expeditions,
to the relief of the garrisons. For the most part,
however, the critics shrank from adopting the
logical consequences of their own criticisms.
Although tlie British Government were under
no moral obligation to relieve the Egyptian garri-
sons, they were under a strong obligation to prevent
General Gordon and Colonel Stewart from falling
into the hands of the Mahdi. It was becoming
more and more probable every day that a military
expedition would have to be sent to Khartoum to
bring them away. I was so impressed with the
necessity for timely preparation that, on April 14, I
wrote the following despatch to I^ord Granville:
" I wish again to draw your Lordship's attention
to General Gordon's position at Khartoum. In
doing so, I wish particularly to state that I have
no sort of wish to urge that an expedition should
be sent to relieve General Gordon, unless, after
very full consideration, it would appear that no
other alternative can be adopted. No one can
entertain stronger objections than I do to the
despatch of a force to Khartoum, but, at the
same time. Lord Hartington has declared in the
House of Commons that Her Majesty's Govern-
ment feel that ' tliey are greatly responsible for
General Gordon's safety,' and, even if no such
declaration had been made, tiie fact is in itself
sufficiently obvious.
" I think it my duty, therefore, to lay before
your Lordship the following remarks, more with
a view to showing what the actual situation is, so
far as can be ascertained, than with the object of
making any very definite proposals in connection
with it. That situation is one of such very great
difficulty that I frankly confess that I hesitate to
advise very positively on it.
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"Your Lordship will observe that in one of
General Gordon's most recent telegrams, which
are enclosed in my despatch of the 9th instant,
he says that for the next two months to come,
that is to say, to the end of May, he is as safe
at Khartoum as at Cairo.
" I am not quite sure whether this statement
is to be read as signifying that General Gordon
can hold out for two months and no more. I
trust this is not his meaning, for it would, I
conceive, be impossible for an expedition to reach
Khartoum by the end of JNIay.
*' Former telegrams had led us to suppose that
General Gordon had provisions for six months, and
if the Mahdi makes any advance, it is not probable
that he will do so before September or October.
I have asked him to explain this point more
fully, but the difficulty of communicating with
Khartoum is very great, and in any case a con-
siderable time must elapse before I can get an
answer.
" In the meanwhile, as it appears to me, we
are in this dilemma—as a last resource the Govern-
ment would, I conceive, be obliged to go to the
help of General Gordon. All the authorities
whom I have consulted say that, if any operations
are to be undertaken along the valley of the Nile,
which is by some considered the best route, no
time should be lost in making preparations, so as
to be ready to move directly the water rises.
It may be, and I hope it will be, that General
Gordon will be able to extricate himself without
any expedition. In that case, the preparations
will have been useless. On the other hand, unless
they are undertaken now, it may be that, when
the necessity for moving arises, so long a delay
will ensue as to frustrate the objects of the
expedition. Under these circumstances, I venture
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to think that it is a question worthy of considera-
tion whether the naval and miUtary authorities
should not take some preliminary steps in the
way of preparing boats, etc., so as to be able to
move should the necessity arise. It would be
better, I think, to run the risk of incurring some
unnecessary expenditure rather than to find our-
selves unable to seize the opportunity of moving
when the favourable moment arrives."
1 left Cairo for England on April 21 to attend
the Conference, which was about to sit in London
to consider the financial situation of the Egyptian
Treasury. Mr. (afterwards Sir Edwin) Egerton
was appointed to act as Agent and Consul-General
during my absence.
CHAPTER XXVII
THE RELIEF EXPEDITION
April 21-October 5, 1884
General Gordon's motives— Spirit in which the question should be
approached— Did General Gordon try to carry out the policy of
the Government?—The situation at Herber—Messages to General
Gordon and his replies—Sir Frederick Stephenson instructed to
report on the Relief E^xpedition—The Suakin-Berber Kiiilway
—
The fall of Berber—The vote of credit—Lord Wolseley appointed
to command the Nile expedition—He arrives at Wadi Haifa
Remarks on the above narrative.
Before proceeding further with the narrative, it
will be as well—even at the risk of repeating some
remarks which have been already made—to describe
the motives which, so far as can be judged, actuated
General Gordon's conduct at this time. Did he
make any serious effort to carry out the policy
of the British and Egyptian Governments in the
Soudan ? Was that policy practicable ? More
especially, would it have been possible for him to
have retreated from Khartoum without the aid of
a relief expedition ?
A few preliminary observations are necessary
before entering upon an examination of these
questions.
In the first place, it is obvious that General
Gordon's conduct should be judged with the utmost
generosity. I do not consider that this generosity
need, or, in the interests of liistorical truth, sliould
go so far as to exonerate him from blame if, on a
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careful examination of the evidence, it be found that
blame can fairly be imputed to him. But I do hold
that, looking to the very difficult situation in which
he was placed, to the fact that when he arrived
at Kliartoum many circumstances must have been
brought to his knowledge of which he was ignorant
in London and in Cairo, and to the further fact
that neither he nor his gallant companion are now
alive to answer criticisms or to affiDrd explanations,
it will only be just to his memory to place the
most favourable construction on anything he either
did or said, which may appear blameworthy.
Again, looking to General Gordon's impulsive
character, and to his habit of recording any stray
idea which flashed through his mind, undue im-
portance should not be attached to any chance
expressions which he may have let fall. I have
endeavoured to form an idea both of his motives
and of the opinions which he held during the siege
of Khartoum, based, not so much on any one of his
utterances, as on the general tenor of his Journal,
letters, and telegrams.
The action of the British Government should
also be judged in a somewhat similar spirit. It is
neither possible nor desirable that detailed instruc-
tions should be given to an official engaged in a
difficult work such as that undertaken by General
Gordon. All that the Government could do was to
lay down the general policy which they wished to
pursue, leaving to their subordinate a wide discretion
as to the manner of its execution. In judging both
of the action of the Government and of the conduct
of General Gordon, regard should be had to the
spirit rather than to the text of his instructions.
Did, therefore. General Gordon make any serious
effiart to carry out the policy of the British and
Egyptian Governments in the Soudan ?
There can be little doubt that when General
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Gordon left Cairo he agreed in that policy. Not
only did he repeatedly express his agreement in
expUcit terms, not only did he practically write his
own instructions both in London and in Cairo, but
the policy, which he was sent to carry out, was
in conformity with the opinions to which he had
frequently given utterance ever since his first con-
nection with the Soudan. He was never tired of
dwelling on the iniquities of Egyptian, or, as he
usually called it, Turkish rule in the Soudan.
He acknowledged that the country was a " useless
possession." He exhorted the British Government
"to leave them (the people of the Soudan) as God
had placed them."^ In fact, General Gordon
persistently advocated the policy of " The Soudan
for the Soudanese." But General Gordon said of
himself : " No man in the world is more changeable
than I am."^ There can, in fact, be no doubt that,
when he arrived at Khartoum, a complete revulsion
took place in his views about the Soudan. He had
seen from the first the desirability of endeavourmg
to provide the country with some settled form of
government, and he clung to this policy long after
its execution had become wholly impracticable.
His first intention was to hand the country over
to the local Sultans, but it soon became apparent
that there were no local Sultans available who
could serve as instruments in the execution of this
policy. Then he proposed to set up Zobeir Pasha,
and, had his proposal been promptly adopted, it
is at least conceivable that the attempt to form
an anti-Mahdist government in the Soudan would
have been successful. But the opportunity was
allowed to shp by. For reasons already narrated,
the proposal to utilise Zobeir Pasha's services
was rejected. From that moment, it was evident
* Memorandum of Januurxj 23, 1884.
* Gordons Letters to His tSister, p. x.
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that the Soudan iniist fall into the hands
of the JNIalidi. Tliis General Gordon failed to
recognise, or j)erhaps it would be more correct
to say that the idea of admitting the JNlahdi's
supremacy was so distasteful to him that he
would not recognise the inevitable conclusion,
which could alone be drawn from a consideration
of the facts of the situation. He clung to the idea
of erecting some anti-IMahdist government in the
Soudan when, to use Lord Northbrook's metaphor,
the project had become nothing more than an
ignis Jat 11 us. In order to accomplish this end, he
was prepared to sacrifice his most cherished con-
victions. Over and over again he proposed that
the Soudan should be handed over to the Turkish
administration, against whose malpractices he had
before inveighed so vigorously. He was aware
that the result would be that the people of the
Soudan would be oppressed, but he thought that
Turkish oppression was preferable to a recognition
of the Mahdi. At the same time, with character-
istic inconsistency, whilst he was pressing for the
.country to be handed over to the Sultan, he
admitted that it was preferable to abandon it rather
than allow it to remain "under these wretched effete
Eg^^ptian Pashas." Whatever may have been the
defects of the Egyptian Pashas, there is no reason
to suppose that Turkish Pashas would have been
in any way. superior to them. In fact, as General
Gordon well knew, the Egyptian Pashas were at
that time nearly all Turks or Circassians.
The truth is that General Gordon was above all
things a soldier, and, moreover, a very bellicose
soldier.^ His fighting instincts were too strong to
admit of his working heartily in the interests of
* Sir Samuel Baker, who knew General Gordon well, said to me, some
years after the fall of Kliartoiim : "When 1 lieard that Gordon was
to go to the Soudan, I knew there would be a fight."
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peace. The Arabs, he said, " must have one good
defeat to wipe out Hicks's disasters and my defeats.
... I do not care to wait to see the INIahdi walk in
on your heels into Khartoum. One cannot tliink
that ... it is a satisfactory termination if, after
extricating the garrisons and contenting ourselves
with that, we let the Mahdi come down and boast
of driving us out. It is a thousand pities to give
up Khartoum to the Mahdi when there is a chance
of keeping it under Zobeir.^ So long as the JNIahdi
is alongside, no peace is possible."
In fact, General Gordon wished to " smash up "
the Mahdi. This was the keynote of all his actions
in the Soudan. " If," he wrote on November 7,
" Zobeir had been sent to tlie Soudan, we would
have beaten the Mahdi without any exterior help
;
it is sad, when the Mahdi is moribund, that we
should by evacuation of Khartoum raise him again."
As to his instructions, he threw them to the
winds.^ Both the spirit and the text of his instruc-
tions were clear. " The main end to be pursued,"
he was told in the letter addressed to him on
January 25, 1884, "is the evacuation of the
Soudan." The policy of establishing some sort of
settled government in the Soudan was approved,
but this, though desirable, was considered a sub-
sidiary point. It was specifically stated that it
must "be fully understood that the Egyptian
troops M^ere not to be kept in the Soudan merely
with a view to consolidate the power- of the new
rulers of the country." When it was decided not
to employ Zobeir Pasha, General Gordon sliould
* This was written on September 24, 1884, that is to say, several
months after the Zobeir policy had been i-ejected by the Government,
and had, in fact, become quite impracticable.
^ On May 28, 1880, General Gordon wrote to his sister : " Having the
views I hold, T could never curb myself sufficiently to remain in Her
Majesty's service. Not one in ten million can a^ree witji my motives,
and it is no use expecting to change their views."
—
Letters, etc., p. 158.
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have seen that all that remained for him to do
was to concentrate his efforts on evacuation. He
did nothing of the sort. He thought mainly of the
subsidiary portion of his instructions and neglected
the main issue.
But, it may be said, even if General Gordon had
abandoned the idea of establishing an anti-INIahdist
government in the Soudan, he would still have been
unable to carry out his instructions, for the garrisons
of the Soudan were scattered, and it was impossible
to save all of them. General Gordon appears to
have held that it was incumbent on him to save
the whole of these garrisons. " I was named," he
wrote, "for EVACUATION OF SOUDAN
(against which I have nothing to say), not to run
away from Khartoum and leave the garrisons else-
where to theirfate."" He reverts to this subject over
and over again in his Journal.^ He held that it
was " a palpable dishonour " to abandon the garri-
sons, and that " every one in the Soudan, captive or
hemmed ia, ought to have the option and power of
retreat." On November 19, he wrote: "I declare
positively and once for all that I will not leave the
Soudan until every one wlio wants to go down is
given the chance to do so, unless a government is
established which reheves me of the charge ; there-
fore, if any emissary or letter comes up here ordering
me to come down, I WILL NOT OBEY IT, BUT
WILL STAY HERE AND FALL WITH
THE TOWN AND RUN ALL RISKS."
All that can be said about arguments of this
sort is that they bring to mind General Bosquet's
famous remark on the Balaklava charge : " C'est
magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre."^ We
» Journal, pp. 66, 72, 93, 112, 113, 125, 292, 298, 305, 307.
' This remark is frequently attributed to Marshal Canrobert.
According to Kinglake (Invasion of the Crimea, vol. iv. p. 269), it was
made by General Bosquet to Mr. Layard la the field and at the time
of the charge.
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may admire, and for my own part, I do very much
admire General Gordon's personal courage, his dis-
interestedness, and his chivalrous feeUng in favour
of the beleaguered garrisons, but admiration of
these quahties is no sufficient plea against a con-
demnation of his conduct on the ground that it
was quixotic. In his last letter to his sister, dated
December 14, 1884, he wrote : " I am quite happy,
thank God, and, Hke Lawrence, I have tried to do
my duty."^ The phrase, which must have occurred
to many a countryman of Sir Henry Lawrence
when placed in a position of difficulty or danger, has
become historical. The words, under the circum-
stances in which they were first used by Sir Henry
Lawrence and afterwards "repeated by General
Gordon, are particularly touching. But, after all,
when the emotions are somewhat quelled, and
the highly dramatic incidents connected with the
situation are set aside, reason demands answers
to such questions as these : What was General
Gordon's duty ? Did he in reaUty try to do his
duty ?
I am not now dealing with General Gordon's
character, which was in many respects noble, or
with his military defence of Khartoum, which was
heroic, but with the political conduct of his mission,
and from this point of view I have no hesitation in
saying that General Gordon cannot be considered
to have tried to do his duty unless a very strained
and mistaken view be taken of what his duty was.
He appears to me to have set up for himself a certain
standard of duty without any deliberate thought of
the means by which his objects were to be accom-
plished, or of the consequences which would prob-
ably ensue to the British Government and the
British nation from attempting to accomplish
them. As a matter of public morahty, I camiot
» Lettem, etc., p. 21)0.
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think that General Gordon's process of reasoning
is defensible. The duty of a public servant placed
in his position was to sink his personal opinions,
and to consider the wishes and true interests of the
Government and the nation whom he was called
upon to serve. General Gordon was not sent to
Khartoum with orders that he was to secure the
retreat of every man, woman, and child who wished
to leave the Soudan. He was sent to do the best
he could to carry out the evacuation. Much was
left to his own discretion. It was felt, when he
left Cairo, that it would be very difficult to help
the outlying garrisons, particularly those in the
Bahr - el - Ghazal and Equatorial provinces. In
giving General Gordon his instructions, therefore,
attention ^vas more especially drawn to the garrison
and civil population of Khartoum, which were
numerically larger than those situated in any other
locality, and with whom it was relatively easy to
establish communications. It appears to me that
General Gordon's principal duty was to do his best
to accomplish his difficult mission and, at the
same time, to avoid all the misery, bloodshed, and
waste of money, which would certainly occur if
it became necessary to send a British expedition
to the Soudan. The British Government were
not responsible for the position in which the
Soudan garrisons were placed. They might,
indeed, have been made prisoners, and that was
the worst that could have happened. As Lord
Granville, with great good sense, wrote to me on
March 14: "If Gordon can save the garrisons of
Khartoum, of Berber, and of Dongola, it will be in
itself a great feat. Gordon ridiculed to us the idea
of the garrisons being massacred, and proved to be
right as regarded Tokar." The capture of the
outlying garrisons by the Mahdi would certainly
have been a much less evil than the despatch of a
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British expedition to relieve Khartoum. It must
also be remembered that the presence of a British
force at Khartoum would not have assisted the
distant garrisons in the Darfour, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and
Equatorial provinces. General Gordon, I conceive,
would hardly have proposed to send a British
expedition to those remote regions.^
General Gordon, however, took a different, and,
as I think, a mistaken view of his duty. He wrote
on October 1 : " / think we are bound to extricate
the garrisons whatever it costs." He was aAvare that
these were not the views of the British Govern-
ment, for he added : " they {i.e. the Government)
do noty^ but although his military training had
instilled into him a certain sense of discipline,
which he could not altogether shake off, he had
a singular habit, when he felt that he was acting
insubordinately, of discovering a number of falla-
cious arguments
—
mentis ^ratissimi errores—to still
the prickings of his official conscience. In this
case, he appears to have thought that his personal
responsibility was covered when he suggested
that, as he objected to carry out the \'iews of the
British Government, Abdul Kader Pasha should
be appointed in his place, but he added : " I own
the proposition I make is in some degree a trap,
for I feel confident that there will be no end of
trouble even in placing Abdul Kader Pasha in my
place and trying to evacuate."
The truth is that General Gordon was so eag-er to
" smash the Mahdi," and so possessed with the idea
that it was the bounden duty of the Government
to extricate all the garrisons, that he tried to force
the hand of the Goveriniient and to oblige them to
send an expedition to the Soudan. His personal
' In one passage of his Journal, however, he speaks of the desir-
ability of sending a Biitisli force to Kordofan (p. 86). He appears to
have thought that it would not be necessary " to go fifty miles beyond
Khartoum."
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reputation for good faith towards the people of the
Soudan was involved in the despatch of a British
expedition. So early as February 27, as has been
already mentioned,^ he issued a Proclamation, in
which the following words occurred : " Britisli
troops are now on their way to Khartoum." The
intention in issuing this Proclamation was, without
doubt, to produce a moral effect, for he was at
the time perfectly w^ell aware tliat there existed no
intention of sending a British force to Khartoum.
But the people of tiiat town naturally took him at
his word. They believed for a time that British
troops were really coming, and when they found
that none arrived, they thought that the British
Government had " deserted " them,^ the fact being
that the pledge to afford military assistance had been
given by General Gordon on his own responsibihty
without consultation of any kind with either the
British Government or their representative in Cairo.
That General Gordon felt that he was under an
obligation to carry out the pledges, which he had so
rashly given, cannot be doubted. On October 6,
he wrote : " The appearance of one British soldier
or officer here settles the question of reUef vis-a-vis
the townspeople, for then they know that I have
not told them lies " ; and in an undated telegram,
received on September 18, 1884, he said : " Through
having so often promised the people of Khartoum
that assistance would come, we are now as bars in
their eyes."
Obviously, the best thing General Gordon could
have done, after communication with Cairo was cut
off, would have been to have retreated to Berber with
the Khartoum garrison, and such of the civil popu-
lation as wished to leave the place. But he does
not appear to have made any serious attempt to do
so, because he thought that, if he retreated, there
» Vide ante, p. 490. • Journal, p. 307.
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would be less probability of the British Govern-
ment sending an expedition for the relief of the
outlying garrisons. On October 5, he made the
following significant entry in his Journal : " It may
be argued, Why not retreat on Berber ? I would
rather not do that, for I would wish to show in a
positive way, that I had no part or lot in the
abandoning of the garrisons," etc., etc. A later
entry in his Journal, dated October 29, puts the
case still more clearly : " I wanted to capture Ber-
ber, which was the proper military operation to
undertake. . . . Perhaps if we had taken Berber,
Her Majesty's Government would have said that
no expedition was necessary for the relief of the
garrisons \ but it would not have been correct to
reason thus, for, though Berber might have been
taken, we could not have garrisoned it ; and it
would have been a barren victory, and not have
done much towards the solution of the Soudan
problem, or the withdrawal of the garrisons, while
it might, on the other hand, have stopped the
expedition for their relief^
I think that this was a wrong view to take.
Leaving on one side any question of official sub-
ordination, and leaving aside also the waste of
money, which was subsequently involved, and for
the expenditure of which General Gordon was
certainly in some measure responsible, I consider
that it was of greater importance to the British
' Another instance of the curious arguments by which General Gor-
don sought to justify to himself his own conduct may here be given. On
September 19 lie wrote : " I think 1 say truly, I have never asked for
a British expedition. I asked for 200 men to be sent to Berber at a
time when, Graham having beaten Osman Digna, one might have sup-
posed there was no risk for tbose 200 men." General Gordon, as a
soldier^ must have known that the British Government would never
have agreed to sending so small a force as 200 men to Berber. But, in
truth, General Gordon's contention that he never asked for a British
expedition cannot be maintained. Not only the specific words, but the
whole tenor of his Journal shows that all his actions and opinions
were of a nature to force the Government into sending an expedition.
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nation to have been spared the loss of such valu-
able public servants as General Gordon himself, Sir
Herbert Stewart, General Earle, and the many other
gallant Englishmen who fell during the subsequent
campaign in the Soudan, than to have prevented
the outlying garrisons at Sennar and elsewhere from
being taken prisoner by the iVIahdi.
For these reasons I do not think that it can be
held that General Gordon made any serious effort
to carry out the main ends of British and Egyptian
policy in the Soudan. He thought more of his
personal opinions than of the interests of the State.
He did not adapt his means to his ends. He knew,
or at all events he should have known, what were
the main and w\vdt the subsidiary objects of British
policy, and he deliberately ranked the second before
the first, because his personal predilections tended
in that direction. He was left a wide discretionary
power, and he used it in a manner opposed to the
spirit, if not to the actual text, of his instructions.
However much we may admire his personal hero-
ism, the facts narrated above are, in my opinion, a
conclusive proof that a more unfortunate choice
could scarcely have been made than that of General
Gordon to carry out the policy of evacuating the
Soudan. The execution of that policy should have
been in the hands of a man who could fight if neces-
sary, but who would devote all his efforts to turning
his mission into one of peace rather than of w^ar ; he
should have been cool, self-controlled, clear-headed,
and consistent, deliberate in the formation of his
plans after a careful study of the facts with which
he had to deal, and steadfast in their execution
w^hen once his mind was made up. He should
have had a sufficient knowledge of English public
life to have been able to form some fairly accurate
conjecture of the motives which were likely to
guide the British Government, even if no definite
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expression of opinion had been conveyed to him.
Genera] Gordon possessed none of these quahties.
He was extremely pugnacious. He was hot-headed,
impulsive, and swayed by his emotions. It is a
true saying that " he that would govern others, first
should be the master of himself." One of the lead-
ing features of General Gordon's strange character
was his total absence of self-control. He was liable to
fits of ungovernable and often of most unreasonable
passion. He formed rapid opinions without delibera-
tion, and rarely held to one opinion for long. His
Journal, in which his thoughts from day to day are
recorded, is, even in the expurgated form in which it
was published, a mass of inconsistencies. He knew
nothing of English public life, or, generally, of the
springs of action which move governing bodies.
He appears to have been devoid of the talent, so
valuable to a pubhc servant in a distant country,
of transporting himself in spirit elsewhere. His
imagination, indeed, ran riot, but whenever he
endeavoured to picture to himself what was passing
in Cairo or London, he arrived at conclusions which
were not only unworthy of himself, but grotesque,
as, for instance, when he likened himself to Uriah
the Hittite, and insinuated that the British Govern-
ment hoped that he and his companions would
be killed or taken prisoners by the Mahdi. In
fact, except personal courage, great fertility in
military resource, a lively though sometimes ill-
directed repugnance to injustice, oppression, and
meaimess of every description, and a considerable
power of acquiring influence over those, necessarily
limited in numbers, with whom he was brought in
personal contact. General Gordon does not appear
to have possessed any of the qualities which would
have fitted him to undertake the difficult task he
had in hand.
I now turn to the other questions propounded
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at the beginning of this chapter. Was the execu-
tion of the pohcy laid down by the British Govern-
ment possible? More especially, would it have
been possible for General Gordon to have retreated
from Khartoum if no expedition had been sent to
his relief?
The answer to the first question depends on the
view taken as to the scope of British policy. If it
be held, with General Gordon, that the British
Government were under an obligation to withdraw
every one who vdshed to leave from the most
remote provinces of the Soudan, then there can
be no hesitation in saying that the policy was im-
possible of execution. But, for reasons which have
been already given, I do not think that the British
Government were under any such obhgation.^ If
the garrison and civil population of Khartoum
could have been saved, a great feat would, as Lord
Granville said, have been accomplished, and, con-
sidering the extreme difficulties of the situation,
General Gordon would have done all that could
reasonably have been expected of him.
It is difficult to give a positive answer to the
question of whether General Gordon could have
retreated from Khartoum, if no expedition had
been sent to his relief On March 27, 1884,
Colonel Coetlogon, who was then at Cairo, wrote
to me : " The White Nile to Berber is very low,
and there are only two small steamers that can
make the passage ; the river begins to rise about
the middle of May. I consider that a retreat of a
force by river is now impossible, even if unopposed,
on account of the lowncss of the river."
* The views of the Khedive, when General Gordon started from
Cairo, were thus stated to Baron Malortie : ''I have no douht that
Gordon Pasha will do his best to sacrifice as few as po-sible ; and, should
he succeed, with God's help, in accomplishinf? the evacuation of Khar-
toum and the chief posts in the Eastern Soudan, he will be entitled t«
the everlasting gratitude of my people."
—
Too Lute, p. 4.
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Would it, however, liave been possible to have
effected a retreat by land ?
It is almost certain that after May 26, on which
day Berber fell into the hands of the Dervishes, re-
treat by land was impossible. When General Gordon
was asked his reasons for remaining at Khartoum,
he wrote in his Journal : " The reasons are those
horribly plucky Arabs," and there cannot be any
doubt that at tlie time he wrote these words
(September 19, 1884), the explanation was sufficient.
It is, however, not so certain whether, prior to
May 26, the operation might not have been under-
taken with a fair prospect of success. " I wanted,"
General Gordon wrote, on October 29, " to capture
Berber, which was the proper military operation."
" Had it not been," he wrote on September 19, " for
the defeat of Mehemet Ali Pasha,^ I should have got
out at least two-thirds of those at Khartoum and
Sennar." On the other hand, the passage already
quoted from his Journal ^ shows that he did not
care for the capture of Berber as it would "not
have done much towards the solution of the Soudan
problem or withdrawal of the garrisons, while it
might, on the other hand, have stopped the expedi-
tion for thei?' reliefs
It is impossible to draw any very definite con-
clusions from the evidence which is available on
this subject. All that can be said is that the
operation of retreat would have been one of very
great difficulty, but it is not certain that it would
have been altogether impossible if it had been
undertaken before the middle of May. It is clear,
however, that inasmuch as General Gordon con-
sidered, first, that he was bound to establish some
settled government at Khartoum, and secondly,
* This was the defeat at El-Eilafun on the Blue Nile, which took
place oil September 14.—Wiugate, Mahdiism, etc., p. 167.
* y^ide ante, p. 569.
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that he was under an obligation to save the garri-
sons of Sennar, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and the Equatorial
Province, he never contemplated the possibility of
withdrawing from Khartoum and leaving the other
garrisons to their fate.
To resume the narrative. It has been already
mentioned that by the end of March 1884, ail
regular communication with Khartoum was cut
off. Then followed four or five months of fatal
indecision. It was not till August, or even
September, that it was definitely decided to send a
relief expedition. I will endeavour to summarise
the correspondence which passed during that
period.
On April 21, Lord Granville telegraphed to
Mr. Egerton that '* the danger to Berber appeared
to be imminent." Mr. Egerton was, therefore,
requested, at\er consultation with the authorities
at Cairo, to report " whether there was any step,
by negotiation or otherwise, which could be taken
at once to relieve it." Mr. Egerton replied, on
April 23, to the effect that there was no possibility
of effecting anything by negotiation without the
employment of force, that Nubar Pasha wished to
send two Egyptian battalions at once to Berber,
that Sir Frederick Stephenson and Sir Evehm
Wood objected to sending the Egyptian troops by
themselves, but considered that it woidd be possible
to send an Anglo-Eg}"ptian force to Berber either
over the Korosko desert, or i)id AVadi Haifa and
Dongola, but that, at the most favourable com-
putation, it would take not less than eight weeks
to reach Berber by the Korosko route, or sixteen
weeks via Dongola. " All," JNIr. Egerton said,
" that can be done for the immediate safety of
Berber is to give the assurance that English
material aid shall be rendered as soon as possible."
Lord Granville replied that the British Govern-
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ment could not sanction the attempt to send a
British force to Berber via Korosko, neither would
they allow Egyptian troops to be sent alone. The
Governor of Berber was to be informed that no
immediate assistance could be given to him.
On the same day (April 23), I^ord Granville
telegraphed to Mr. Egerton : " Gordon should be
at once informed, in cypher, by several messengers
at some intervals between each, through Dongola
as well as Berber, or in such other way as may on
the spot be deemed most prompt and certain, that
he should keep us informed, to the best of his
ability, not only as to immediate, but as to any
prospective danger at Khartoum ; that, to be pre-
pared for any such danger, he should advise us
as to the force necessary in order to secure his
removal, its amount, character, route for access to
Khartoum, and time of operation ; that we do not
propose to supply him with Turkish or other force
for the purpose of undertaking military expedi-
tions, such being beyond the scope of the commis-
sion he holds, and at variance with the pacific
policy which was the purpose of his mission to the
Soudan ; that if with this knowledge he continues
at Khartoum, he should state to us the cause
and intention with which he so continues. Add
expressions both of respect and gratitude for his
gallant and self-sacrificing conduct, and for the
good he has achieved."
Various unsuccessful efforts were made to com-
municate this message to General Gordon. It was
not till the third week of May that a messenger was
found who, it was thought, would be able to get
into Khartoum. It was then (JNIay 17) decided to
make the following additions to the message ; ^
^ In the iuterval between April 23 and May 17, Nubar Pasha and
Sir Evelyn Wood asked Mr. Ej^erton " to request Her Majesty's
Government to give their opinion as to whether or not the Moiidir
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"As the original plan for the evacuation of the
Soudan has been dropped, and as aggressive opera-
tions cannot be undertaken with the countenance
of Her Majesty's Government, General Gordon is
enjoined to consider and either to report upon, or
if feasible, to adopt, at the first proper moment,
measures for his own removal and for that of the
Egyptians at Khartoum who have suffered for him
or who have served him faithfully, including their
wives and children, by whatever route he may
consider best, having especial regard to his own
safety and that of the other British subjects.
" With regard to the Egyptians above referred
to. General Gordon is authorised to make free
use of money rewards or promises at his discretion.
For example, he is at liberty to assign to Egyptian
soldiers at Khartoum sums for themselves and
for persons brought ^vith them per head, contingent
on their safe arrival at Korosko, or whatever point
he may consider a place of safety ; or he may
employ and pay the tribes in the neighbourhood
to escort them. Her Majesty's Government
presume that the Soudanese at Khartoum are
not in danger. In the event of General Gordon
having despatched any person or agent to other
points, he is authorised to spend any money re-
quired for the purpose of recalling them or securing
their safety." ^
of Dong-ola should be told to make the best terms he could for his
safety and that of the people with him." Mr. Egerton, in telejfraphing
this request to Lord Granville, added : " I can only explain their askinjr
a question, which has become one of pure humanity, by their belief
that, if some promise be obtained from Her Majesty's Government to
send an expedition later on to relieve General Gordon, the Governor of
Don^ola mi^ht be enabled to ofi'er some resistance to the stream of
rebellion." Tliis was, in effect, the same proposal which I had made
in my telegram of March 2(; {t-idc ante, p. 643-545). On May 13, Lord
Granville replied : " Her Majesty's Government can make no promise
as to future action. The Moudir should be told to make the best
terms he can."
* General Gordon received this telegram. Allusion to it is made on
pp. 39 and 59 of his Journal.
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It was not till July 20 that a message was re-
ceived from General Gordon, dated June 22. It was
evidently not in answer to Mr. Egerton's messages.
It was addressed to the Moudir of Dongola, and
merely stated that Khartoum and Sennar were still
holding out, and that General Gordon wished to
be informed of "the place where the expedition
coming from Cairo is, and the numbers coming."
In forwarding this letter, the Moudir of Dongola
requested to be informed of the nature of the
reply which should be sent. Lord Granville, to
whom the matter was referred, replied to Mr.
Egerton : " Her Majesty's Government desire, in
the first place, that the messages sent to General
Gordon on the 23rd April and the 17th May
should be repeated to him, unless you are con-
vinced that he has already received them ; and
he should further be informed that these com-
munications will show him the interest taken by
Her Majesty's Government in his safety ; that
Her Majesty's Government continue to be anxious
to learn from himself his views and position, so
that if danger has arisen, or is likely to arise in
the manner they have described, they may be in
a position to take measures accordingly."
On August 17, another glimpse was obtained
of what was passing at Khartoum. On that day,
Mr. Egerton informed Lord Granville that the
Moudir of Dongola had received a letter from
General Gordon, dated July 28. This letter stated
that Khartoum and Sennar were safe, and asked for
information as to " the route and the numbers of
the expedition coming from Cairo." By that time,
preparations were being made for the despatch of
a relief expedition. On August 18, Mr. Egerton
asked Lord Granville whether he might inform
General Gordon of the nature of these preparations.
In reply, Lord Granville telegraphed : " Inform
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General Gordon of the preparations for bis relief
in case of need ; refer him to former messages,
with directions from Her Majesty's Government
to conform to them, and ask the causes of our not
having received any reply."
On August 28, a further letter was received
from General Gordon, dated July 13, in which he
said : " We are all well and can hold out for four
months." On August 30, Mr. Egerton instructed
Colonel Kitchener in the following sense : " Tell
Gordon steamers are being passed over the Second
Cataract, and that we wish to be informed exactly,
through Dongola, when he expects to be in
difficulties as to provisions and ammunition."
It was not till the 17th, 18th, and 20th of
September that several messages were received from
General Gordon via Dongola, apparently in answer
to the inquiries made by the British Government.^
A httle later (September 28) some letters were
received from General Gordon, via Suakin, the
latest of which was dated July 31st. The gist of
General Gordon's answer to the Government in-
quiries was contained in the following words :
" You ask me to state cause and intention in
staying at Khartoum knowing Government means
to abandon Soudan, and in answer I say, I stay
at Khartoinn because Arabs have shut us up and
will not let us out." In a telegram to the
Khe(Hve, General Gordon complained that the
English telegrams did not state what were the
intentions of the Government, " and only ask for
information and waste time." He insisted again
on tiie necessity of sending Zobeir Pasha and on
entering into negotiations with the Porte, " so as
to render it possible to extinguish the flame of
this false Mahdi before it becomes difficult." He
* Tliese telegrams are given at length in Egypt, No. 35 of 1884,
pp. 96-99.
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expressed his intention of retaking Berber, burning
the town, and returning to Khartoum. " Stewart
Pasha," he said, " will proceed to Dongola. Then
I will send to the Equator to withdraw the people
who are there. After that, it will be impossible
for Mohamed Ahmed to come here, and please
God, he will meet his death by the hands of the
Soudanese. ... It will be impossible to leave
Khartoum without a regular government estab-
lished by some Power. I will look after the
troops on the Equator, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and in
Darfour, although it may cost me my life. Per-
haps the British Government will be displeased
with the advice which I have given. The people
of the Soudan are also displeased with me on
account of my fighting against them, and on
account of their not attaining their object in
following the Mahdi."
The nature of the military preparations, which
were being made whilst the correspondence summar-
ised above was going on, must now be described.
It has been already explained that, on April 14,
I urged the British Government to prepare for a
relief expedition.^ A few days earlier (April 8),
Lord Wolseley addressed a Memorandum to Lord
Hartington in which he discussed the composition
of the force which would be required, and the route
which it would be advisable to take. In this
Memorandum Lord AVolseley said : " Time is the
most important element in this question. ... I
recommend immediate and active preparations for
operations that may be forced upon us by and by."
In consequence of these recommendations, Sir
Frederick Stephenson was instructed, on April 25,
to report " on the best plan of operation for the
relief of Gordon, if necessary." A long inter\al,
however, elapsed before anything was done. It
• Vide ante, pp. 550-558.
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was at first intended to despatch a force from
Suakin to Berber, and, on June 14, Sir Frederick
Stephenson was directed to take some preliminary-
steps to facilitate the construction of a railway
from Suakin, should one eventually become neces-
sary. But three weeks later (July 4), it was ex-
plained that the Government had no mtention of
undertaking any expedition "unless it should
appear to be absolutely necessary for ensuring the
safe withdrawal of General Gordon from Khartoum."
The Government were still waiting for General
Gordon's replies to the questions which had been
addressed to him. So little was known of what
was going on in the Soudan that, although reports
had reached Egypt of the fall of Berber, which
took place on May 26, all doubts as to their truth
were not removed until a month later, that is to
say, on June 27.
It was not till August 8 that, a vote of credit
for £300,000 having been obtained from ParUa-
ment, Lord Hartington authorised Sir Frederick
Stephenson to take certain preliminary measures
with a view to moving troops south of Wadi
Haifa. A good deal of difference of opinion existed
amongst the military authorities as to whether it
would be desirable to move by Suakin, or to adopt
the Nile route. Lord Wolseley preferred the latter
alternative, and his view was eventually adopted
by the Government.
Whilst, however, authorising these preliminary
measures, the Government only did so under the
following reserve: "Her JNI ajesty's Government
are not at present convinced that it will be impos-
sible for General Gordon, acthig on the instructions
which he has received, to secure the withdrawal
from Khartoum, either by the employment of force
or of pacific means, of the Egyptian garrisons, and
of such of the inhabitants as may desire to leave.
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"The time, however, which has elapsed since
the receipt of authentic information of General
Gordon's ^exact position, plans, and intentions, is so
long, and the state of the surrounding country, as
evidenced by the impossibility of communicating
with him, is so disturbed, that Her Majesty's
Government are of opinion that the time has
arrived when some further measure for obtaining
accurate information as to his position, and if
necessary, for rendering him assistance, should be
adopted."
On August 26, Lord Wolseley was appointed
to command the expedition. He arrived in Cairo
on September 10, with Lord Northbrook^ and
myself. On September 17, Lord Hartington,
whilst complying with a demand made by Lord
Wolseley for reinforcements, said : "In arriving at
this decision. Her Majesty's Government desire to
remind you that no decision has yet been arrived
at to send any portion of the force under your
command beyond Dongola. . . . You are fully
aware of the views of Her Majesty's Government
on this subject, and know how averse they are to
undertake any warlike expedition not called for b}'
absolute necessity."
It was not till October 8, that is to say, more
than five months after communication between
Cairo and Khartoum had been interrupted, that I
was authorised to issue to Lord Wolseley instiTic-
tions, which had been drafted in consultation
between him, Lord Northbrook, and myself The
principal passage in these instructions was as
follows : " The primary object of the expedition up
the valley of the Nile is to bring away General
Gordon and Colonel Stewart from Khartoum.
When that object has been secured, no further
^ Lord Northbrook, as will be hereafter explained (see Chapter XLV. ),
was at the time sent on a special mission to Egypt.
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offensive operations of any kind are to be under-
taken.
" Although you are not precluded from advanc-
ing as far as Khartoum, should you consider such
a step essential to insure the safe retreat of General
Gordon and Colonel Stewart, you should bear in
mnid that Her IMajesty's Government is desirous
to limit the sphere of your military operations as
much as possible. They rely on you, therefore,
not to advance any farther southwards than is
absolutely necessary in order to attain the primary
object of the expedition. You will endeavour to
place yourself in communication with General
Gordon and Colonel Stewart as soon as possible."
Before tliese instructions were issued, Lord
VVolseley had left Cairo. On October 5, he
arrived at Wadi Haifa, and the Nile Campaign
may be said to have definitely begun.
I now propose to make some remarks on the
events narrated above.
The summer months of 1884 constitute the
most gloomy period of the British connection with
Egypt. It would seem, indeed, as if some spiteful
fairy had presided over the deliberations of the
Gladstone Government when Egyptian affairs came
under consideration. Mr. Gladstone said (February
23, 1885) : " The difficulties of the case have passed
entirely beyond the limits of such political and
military difficulties as I have known in the course
of an experience of half a century." Under these
circumstances, it can be no matter for surprise that
mistakes were made. Subsequent events have
shown that the Government were sometimes right
and sometimes wrong in their decisions. In my
opinion, in so far as the broad lines of their general
policy are concerned, they were more right than
their critics. But when it came to a question of
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action, they appear, whether from accident or want
of foresight, to have rarely done the right tiling
at the right moment.
Festinare nocet, nocet et cunctatio saepe,
Tempore quaeque suo qui facit, ille sapit.
The Government were, indeed, remarkably un-
successful in avoiding the extremes of tardiness and
precipitation. If the attack on the Alexandria
forts had been delayed for a day or two, reinforce-
ments would have arrived, and the town would not
have been at the mercy of Arabi's rabble. If the
expedition to Tokar had arrived a day or tw^o
sooner, the Egyptian garrison would have been
reheved. There can scarcely be a doubt that if the
decision to send an expedition to General Gordon's
relief had been taken in April or May, instead of
in August, the objects of the expedition would
have been attained. The main responsibility for
this delay rests on Mr. Gladstone. " I want," Sir
Stafford Northcote said in the House of Commons
on February 23, 1885, "to see the Government a
little inconsistent and to realise facts." INIr. Glad-
stone was slow to recognise facts when tliey ran
counter to his wishes. The natural result ensued.
The facts asserted themselves.
When a vote of censure on the conduct of the
Government was moved in the House of Commons,
Mr. Gladstone acknowledged that errors of judg-
ment might have been committed. " It is not
for me," he said, "to arrogate to myself or my
colleagues infallibility." But Mr. Gladstone laid
claim to "honesty of purpose." Every one who
is impartial ^vill readily admit this claim. The
only question which admits of discussion is
whether the errors of judgment, which \\ere
assuredly committed, were excusable or the
reverse.
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A statesman in the responsible position which
Mr. Gladstone then occupied, does well to pause
before he calls upon a great nation to put forth its
military strength. Can, however, the lengthened
pause, which Mr. Gladstone made before he
decided to send an expedition to Khartoum, be
justified? I will endeavour to answer this
question.
Mr. Gladstone's principal reply to his critics is
contained in the following words, which he used in
the House of Commons on February 23, 1885 :
" Our contention," he said, " was that we must be
convinced that an expedition for the relief of
General Gordon was necessary and practicable.
We had no proof, as we believed, that General
Gordon was in danger within the walls of Khar-
tomn. We believed, and I think we had reason
to believe from his own expressions, that it was in
the power of General Gordon to remove himself
and those immediately associated with him from
Khartoum by going to the south. . . . General
Gordon said himself, speaking of it as a thing
distinctly within his power, that he would in
certain contmgencies withdraw to the Equator."
I proceed to analyse these remarks.
No one will be disposed to contest the state-
ment that, before the Government decided on
sending an expedition, it was incumbent on them
to be convinced that the adoption of this measure
was both " necessary and practicable." It only
remains to be considered whether the evidence in
respect to both the necessity and the practicability
was not sufficient to justify action being taken
before the month of ^iugust.
The practicability argument may be readily
disposed of It was conclusively answered by
Lord Hartington at a later period (February 27)
of the debate in which Mr. Gladstone used the
OH. XXVII RELIEF EXPEDITION 58.5
words quoted above. With characteristic honesty,
Lord Hartington said: "Although the difficulties
of a military decision were great, and although
there was a difference of opinion among military
authorities, I have no hesitation in saying that
the justification or, if you will, the excuse of the
Government has rested mainly on the fact, which
we have never attempted to conceal, that the
Government were not, until a comparatively recent
period, convinced of the absolute necessity of send-
ing a military expedition to Khartoum." This
frank statement, coming from the Minister who
was then responsible for the administration of the
War Office, effectually disposes of the argument
in justification of delay based on the doubtful
practicability of the military enterprise.
I turn, therefore, to the question of necessity.
" We had no proof," Mr. Gladstone said, " as we
believed, that General Gordon was in danger
within the walls of Khartoum." The gist of the
Government case is contained in these words. The
same idea was embodied in all the messages, which-
Mr. Egerton was instructed to send to General
Gordon during the summer of 1884, and which 1
find it difficult, even after the lapse of many years,
to read without indignation. Not only does reason
condemn them, but their whole tone runs, without
doubt unconsciously, counter to those feelings of
generous sympathy, which the position of General
Gordon and his companions was so well calculated
to inspire. Before General Gordon left London,
I had warned the Government that, if he were sent
to Khartoum, he would "undertake a service of
great difficulty and danger." General Gordon,
it is true, had, more suo, been inconsistent in his
utterances on this subject. He had, in the first
place, greatly underrated the difficulties of his task.
So late as February 20, 1884, he had spoken o\
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Khartoum being "as safe as Kensington Park."
But the last messages, which he sent before
telegraphic communication between Cairo and
Khartoum was interrupted, breathed a very
different spirit. He spoke, on jNIarch 8, of " the
storm which was likely to break," of the prob-
ability of his being "hemmed in," and he added,
with something of prophetic instinct, " 1 feel
a conviction that I shall be caught in Khar-
toum." Lord Wolseley, myself, and others had
dwelt on the dangers of General Gordon's
position, and even if no such warnings had been
given, the facts spoke for themselves. General
Gordon and Colonel Stewart were beleaguered
in a remote African town by hordes of warlike
savages, who were half mad with fanaticism
and elated at their recent successes. Yet JMr.
Gladstone wanted further proof tliat they were in
danger. If the proofs which already existed in the
early summer of 1884 were not sufficient, one is
tempted to ask w^hat evidence would ha\'e carried
conviction to Mr. Gladstone's mind, and the only
possible answer is that Mr. Gladstone was well-
nigh determined not to believe a fact which was,
naturally enough, most distasteful to him,^
General Gordon, in a passage of his Journal,
which would be humorous if it were not pathetic,
has himself described what every one of connnon
sense must tliink of Mr. Gladstone's attitude during
this period. " It is," he wrote on September 23,
" as if a man on the bank, having seen his friend in
the river already bobbed down two or three times,
' There is a close aiialosry between Mr. Gladstone's attitude at this
time and that of Lord Aberdeen before the Crimean \\^ar. Hoth prac-
tised the art of self-deception. "Alnidst to the last," Mr. Kinglake
says {Invasion of the Crimea, vol. i. p. 3i)7), " Lord Aberdeen mis-juided
himself. Ilis loathing for vv.ir took such a shape that he could not ;ind
would not believe in it ; and wiien at last the spectre was close upou
him, he covered his eyes and refused to see."
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hails : ' I say, old fellow, let us know when we are
to throw you the life-buoy ; I know you have
bobbed down two or three times, but it is a pity
to throw you the life-buoy until you are really in
extremis, and I want to know exactly, for I am a
man brought up in a school of exactitude.'"
Mr. Gladstone said that General Gordon spoke of
withdrawing to the Equator " as a thing distinctly
in his power." It is true that in two telegrams of
March 9 and of April 7, General Gordon had spoken
of the possibility of retiring towards the E(piatorial
Province, but I had inforined Lord Granville, on
March 26, that Colonel Coetlogon, who spoke with
authority on this subject, ridiculed the idea, and
although Colonel Stewart had sadd at the beginning
of April : " I am inclined to think my retreat will
be safer by the Equator," the context clearly
showed that he only used these words because he
considered retreat via Berber so difficult, unless a
British expedition were sent to open the road, that
he preferred the desperate risk of a retreat in a
southerly direction. It was, in fact, only necessary
to look at a map, to glance at the accounts given
by Generil Gordon himself and by Sir Samuel
Baker of the physical difficulties to be overcome in
moving up the White Nile, and to remember that
both banks of that river for a long distance above
Khartoum were in the hands of the Dervishes, to
appreciate the fact that retreat in the direction of
Gondokoro was little better than a forlorn hope.
For these reasons, the arguments adduced by
Mr. Gladstone do not appear to affi3rd any sufficient
justification for the long delay which ensued before
it was decided to send an expedition to Khartoum.
A different class of argument may, however, be
advanced in favour of the course adopted by the
Government at this time. It may be said that
General Gordon never attempted to carry out the
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policy of the Government, that he was sent to
evacuate the Soudan, that he turned his peaceful
mission into an endeavour to "smash the JMahdi,"
and that he could have retreated from Khartoum,
but that he never attempted to do so. Little was
said about this aspect of the question at the time,
for this line of argument necessarily involved reflec-
tions on General Gordon's conduct, which, under
all the circumstances of the case, would have been
considered ungenerous, and which, moreover, would
have produced little effect, for the pubhc were in
no humour to listen to them. General Gordon, in
Mr. Gladstone's words, was considered a " hero of
heroes," and, at the time, a defence based on
any faults he might have committed would,
for all Parliamentary purposes, have been worse
than none at all. At the same time, the
order of ideas embodied in these arguments did
to a certam extent find expression. Whilst Sir
Stafford Northcote invited the House of Commons
to assert the prmciple that it was incumbent on
England to secure " a good and stable government
for those portions of the Soudan which were
necessary to the security of Egypt," Mr. John
JNIorley, in a powerful speech, moved an amend-
ment which was hostile alike to the Government
and to the Opposition. He invited the House to
express its regret that " the forces of the Crown
were to be employed for the overthrow of the
power of the JNI ahdi."^ Moreover, although Mr.
Gladstone's parliamentary position obliged him to
oppose jNIr. 5lorley's amendment, it is perhaps no
very far-fetched conjecture to imagine that this
amendment embodied an opinion, which did not
differ widely from the views which Mr. Glad-
stone personally entertained. Mr. Gladstone had
formerly spoken of the Soudanese as a "people
* Mr. Alorley's amendment was rejected by 455 to 112 votes.
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rightly struggling to be free." The phrase had
become historical. It was indiscreet in the mouth
of an English Prime Minister, but at one time it
contained a certain element of ti'uth.^ JNIoreover, I
often heard at the time that Mr. Gladstone reasoned
somewhat after this fashion : " The Soudanese wash
to get rid of the Egyptians. The Egyptians, under
pressure from England, are prepared to leave the
Soudan. It is inconceivable tliat, if the matter
were properly explained to the JNIahdi, he would
not agree to facilitate the peaceful retreat of the
Egyptian garrisons." To the logical European
mind this position appears unassailable, but Mr.
Gladstone never realised the fact that he was deal-
ing with a race of savage fanatics to whom
European processes of reasoning were wholly in-
comprehensible. The JNIahdist movement was
not only a revolt against misgovernment. It was
also, in the eyes of its followers, a religious move-
ment having for its object the forced conversion of
the whole world to Mahdiism. There can be little
doubt that it would have been practically impossible
to treat with tlie Mahdi on the basis of a peaceful
withdrawal of the Egyptian troops.
The line of argument to which allusion is made
above, would appear more worthy of attention
than that actually adopted by the Government.
It has been already shown that General Gordon
paid little heed to his instructions, that he was
consumed with a desire to " smash the Mahdi," and
that the view that he was constrained to withdraw
every one who wished to leave from the most
distant parts of the Soudan was, to say the least,
quixotic. The conclusion to be dra^vn from these
facts is that it w^as a mistake to send General
* I mean that the Mahdist revolt would never have taken place if
the people of the Soudan had not wished to throw off the Egyptian
yoke.
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Gordon to the Soudan. But do they afford any
justification for the delay m preparing and in
despatching the rehef expedition ? I cannot think
that they do so. Whatever errors of judgment
General Gordon may have committed, the broad
facts, as they existed in the early summer of
1884, were that he was sent to Khartoum by
the British Go^'ernment, who never denied their
responsibility for his safety, that he was beleaguered,
and that he was, therefore, unable to get away.
It is just possible that he could have effected his
retreat if, having abandoned the southern posts, he
had moved northwards with the Khartoum garrison
in April or early in JNlay. . As time went on and
nothing was heard of him, it became more and
more clear that he eitlier could not or would not,
—
probably that he could not,—move. The most
indulgent critic would scarcely extend beyond
June 27 the date at which the Government should
have decided on the question of whether a relief
expedition should or should not be despatched.
On that day, the news that Berber had been
captured on May 26 by the Dervishes was finally
confirmed. Yet it was not till six weeks later that
the Government obtained from Parliament the
funds necessary to prepare for an expedition.
I began the examination of this branch of the
subject by asking whether the errors of judgment
committed by Mr. Gladstone's Government in the
summer of 1884 were excusable. The points,
which have been previously discussed, such as the
tacit permission given to the Hicks expedition,
the despatch of General Gordon to Khartoum, the
rejection of Zobeir Pasha's services, and the refusal
to make a dash to Berber in March, are questions
as to which it may be said, either that the fact of
any error havdng been committed may be contested,
or that any condemnatory conclusion must in some
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degree be based upon an after-knowledge of events,
which was not obtainable when the decisive step had
to be taken. The same cannot be said of the point
now under discussion. The facts were at the time
sufficiently clear to any one who wished to under-
stand them, and the conclusions to be drawn from
them were obvious. Those conclusions were (1)
that unless a military expedition was sent to Khar-
toum, General Gordon and his companions must
sooner or later fall into the hands of the Mahdi ; and
(2) that prompt action was needed, all the more so
because it was only during the short period while
the Nile was high that rapidity of movement was
possible. If Mr. Gladstone had said that the
expenditure of blood and money which would be
involved in an expedition to Khartoum was incom-
mensurate with the objects to be attained, the
argument would, in my opinion at all events, have
been unworthy of the leader of a great nation, and
to none of Mr. Gladstone's arguments does a
censure of this description in any degree apply.
Moreover, the adoption of this attitude would
have probably sealed the fate of the Ministry in
forty-eight hours. But such a statement would
have had the merit of being comprehensible. The
argument that no expedition was necessary because
General Gordon was not proved to be in danger
was so totally at variance with facts, which were
patent to all the world, as to be well-nigh in-
comprehensible.
On these grounds, I maintain that of all the
mistakes committed at this period in connection
with Egyptian and Soudanese affairs, the delay in
sending an expedition to the relief of Khartoum
was the least excusable.^ The House of Commons
* Lord Northbrook wrote to me subsequently (January 13, 1886)
:
" You gave us very distinct warnings in time that if Gordon was to be
rescued an expedition would have to be sent, and no one regrets more
592 MODERN EGYPT pt. m
practically condemned the conduct of the Govern-
ment. In a full House, the Government only-
escaped censure by a majority of 14. *' If,"
General Gordon wrote on November 8, " it is right
to send up an expedition now, why was it not right
to send it up before ? " The fact that General
Gordon's pathetic question admits of no satisfac-
tory answer must for ever stand as a blot on
INIr. Gladstone's political escutcheon.
than I do that the preparations were delayed from May to August." I
may add that, some ten years later, I sent to Lord Northbrook a type-
written copy of the portion of this work which deals with the Soudan.
He wrote the following words on the margin opposite the passage to
which this note is attached : "I am afraid that all this is quite true.
... As I had the misfortune to be a member of Mr. Gladstone's
Government, I have to bear the blame with the rest But 1 resolved
never to serve under him again I
"
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APPENDIX
Note on the Khedive s telegram to General Gordon of
September 14, 1884.
The following entry occurs in General Gordon'^s Journal
(vol. ii. p. 359), dated November 25, 1884 : " Tewfik, by a
telegram, cancels his Firman, which gives up the Soudan,
which I have torn up.
*' A telegram to the Ulemas from Tewfik says : * Baring
is coming up with Lord Wolseley.'' "
It appears from the numerous discussions which have taken
place in connection with the Gordon mission that some
misapprehension exists with regard to the circumstances
under which the telegrams to which allusion is here made
were sent. I propose, therefore, to state what actually took
place.
On September 14, 1884, the Khedive sent a telegram to
General Gordon. The full text of this telegram is given in a
note to an article written by Sir Reginald Wingate, and pub-
lished in the United Service Magazine of July 1892. For my
present purposes the following extracts will suffice : " We
inform you now that a great change has taken place since
the time that the aforenamed {i.e. the British) Govern-
ment advised the evacuation of the Soudan, and com-
munication with you had been cut.
. . . But the English
troops will shortly occupy Dongola, and Colonel Chermside,
the Governor of Suakin, has been ordered to communicate
with the tribes regarding Kassala ; also Major Kitchener, one
of the officers of my new army, is ordered to confer at
Dongola, and we hope he will shortly be able to open com-
munication with you. Again, it becomes necessary, under
these circumstances, to modify the Firman which we had
granted you, so that your authority will now be confined to
being Governor of the Soudan, including Khartoum, Sennar,
Berber, and their present vicinities.
. . . You will also
receive the 'necessary instructions from the British Govern-
ment, through Sir E. Baring and Lord Wolseley, who has
been made Commander-in-Chief of the English expedition,
and who is at present in Cairo.""
At the same time, a telegram was sent to the Ulema of
Khartoum, urging them to do their utmost to maintain the
honour of the Government.
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So far as I am aware, no British authority was consulted
before these telegrams were sent. I certainly never saw them
until long after General Gordon's death. Inasmuch, how-
ever, as General Gordon could not know that the Khedive
had sent the telegrams solely on his own authority, this
point is of slight importance.
On receipt of the Khedive's message. General Gordon ap-
pears to have published the Proclamation given in Appendix Y
to his Journal (vol. ii. p. 552). This Proclamation contains
the following passage: "Formerly the Government had
decided to transport the Egyptians down to Cairo and
abandon the Soudan ; and, in fact, some of them had been
sent down during the time of Hussein Pasha Yusri, as you
yourself saw. On our arrival at Khartoum, on account of
pity for you, and in order not to let your country be destroyed,
we communicated with the Khedive of Egypt, our Effendi,
concerning the importance and inexpediency of abandoning
it. Whereupon, the orders for abandoning the Soudan were
cancelled."
From a perusal of these documents, it is easy to judge of
what took place. On February 27, 1884, that is to say, nine
days after his arrival at Khartoum, General Gordon had
practically announced to the public the abandonment of
the policy which he was sent to carry out. In a Proclamation
issued on that day he said : " British troops are now on their
way to Khartoum."^ He had many misgivings as to the
correctness of this proceeding. The Khedive's telegram of
September 14, 1884, is worded in such a manner as to render
it possible to misapprehend its meaning. General Gordon,
therefore, readily seized the opportunity to put himself, as he
thought, in the right.
A mere comparison of the dates of General Gordon's
original Proclamation and of the Khedive's telegrams is
sufficient to show that, as evidence as to how far General
Gordon endeavoured to carry out his instructions on his
arrival at Khartoum, the entry in the Journal on November
25, 1884, is valueless.
* Vide ante, p. 490.
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CHAPTER XXVIII
THE FALL OF KHARTOUM
October 5, 1884-January 26, 1885
Murder of Colonel Stewart—Difficulties of the Expedition—News from
General Gordon—Occupation of Jakdul—The battle of Abu Klea
—Death of Sir Herbert Stewart—The column reaches the Nile
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Events at Khartoum—General Gordon's character—Capitulation
ofOmdurman—General Gordon's death—Effect on public opinion.
It is not within the scope of this work to write a
detailed history of the military operations which
took place in the Soudan. Those operations have
been recorded by others who are more competent
than myself to deal with military matters. I pro-
pose, therefore, as in the case of the Egyptian
campaign of 1882, merely to give a brief sum-
mary of the chief events connected with the Nile
Campaign of 1884-85.
Scarcely had the campaign commenced, when
news arrived that Colonel Stewart had been killed.
On September 10, he left Khartoum in a steamer
accompanied by Mr. Power, M. Herbin, the French
Consul, and about forty others. Colonel Stewart
had been instructed by General Gordon to inform
the various authorities concerned of the true nature
of the situation at Khartoum. Berber and Abu
Hamed were passed in safety, and it was thought
that the main difficulties of the voyage had been
overcome, when, on the 18th, the steamer struck
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on a rock near the village of Hebbah, some sixty
miles below Abu Hamed. The boat was hopelessly
disabled. Colonel Stewart and his companions
landed, and were subsequently induced to lay aside
their arms and enter a house in the village, where
they were treacherously murdered by Suleiman
Wad Gamr, the Sheikh of the JNIonasir tribe. It
is singular that Colonel Stewart, who must have
known the treacherous character of the Bedouins,
should have fallen into the trap which was laid
for him. The explanation has probably been
afforded by General Gordon, who said that Colonel
Stewart *' was not a bit suspicious." ^
I have frequently in the course of this narra-
tive alluded to Colonel Stewart's high character,
judgment, and ability. I can only repeat that by
his premature death the Queen and the British
nation lost a most capable public servant. A more
gallant fellow never lived.
The Nile expedition. Colonel Colville says,'
"was a campaign less against man than against
time. Had British soldiers and Egyptian camels
been able to subsist on sand and occasional water,
or had the desert produced beef and biscuit, the
army might, in spite of its late start, have reached
Khartoum in November." The difficulties of
supply and transport were, in fact, very great.
* Journal, p. 281. The whole of this passage is worth quoting, as it
shows what a singularly accurate forecast General Gordon made of the
manner in which Colonel Stewart had been murdered, before he had
learnt any of the details. " I feel somehow," General Gordon wrote on
November 5, ''convinced they were captured by treachery—the Arabs
pretending to be friendly— and surprising them at night. I will
own that, without reason (apparently, for the chorus was that the
trip was safe), I have never been comfortable since they left. Stewart
was a man who did not chew the cud, he never thought of danger in
perspective ; he was not a bit suspicious (while 1 am made up of it).
I can see in imajrination the whole scene, the Sheikh inviting them
to land, saying, ' Thank God, the Mahdi is a liar/—bringing in wood
—men going on shore and dis])ersed. The Abbas with her steam down,
then a rush of wild Arabs, and all is over !
"
' Hiatory of the Soudan Campaign, p. 61.
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But British energy and perseverance overcame them.
By the end of December, Lord Wolseley was ready
to move from Korti across the desert to Metemmeh.
News had been received that suppUes were run-
ning short at Khartoum, and it was clear that, if
General Gordon was to be saved, not a day
would have to be lost in estabhshing communica-
tions with him. It was resolved to divide the British
force into two portions. One division, under Sir
Herbert Stewart, was to take the desert route.
The other, under General Earle, was to follow the
course of the Nile with a view ultimately to the
capture of Berber, which General Gordon had
warned Lord Wolseley "not to leave in his rear."
On December 30, the day on which Sir Herbert
Stewart left Korti, a messenger arrived with a piece
of paper the size of a postage stamp, on which was
written, "Khartoum all right. 14.12.84. C. G.
Gordon." This was in General Gordon's hand-
writing, and his seal was affixed to the back of the
document. The letter was, however, accompanied
by a verbal message from General Gordon which
showed the straits to which he was reduced.
" Our troops," he said, " at Khartoum are suffering
from lack of provisions. The food we still have
is Uttle, some grain and biscuit. We want you
to come quickly. ... In Khartoum there is no
butter, no dates, little meat. All food is very dear."
The force which left Korti at 3 p.m. on December
80, under the command of Sir Herbert Stewart,
consisted of about 1100 British officers and men,
and 2200 camels. It reached the wells of Jakdul,
ninety-eight miles distant, early on the morning of
January 2. A garrison of 422 men was left there
with instructions to rig up pumps and otherwise
improve the water-supply. On the evening of the
2nd, Sir Herbert Stewart left with the remainder
of the force, and reached Korti at noon on the 5th.
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On the 8th, he again started from Korti with the
main body of the desert column, consisting of
about 1600 eiFective British troops, some 300
camp-followers, and about 2400 camels and horses.
His orders were to advance and occupy Metemmeh,
to leave a strong detachment there, and then to
return to Jakdul. Sir Charles Wilson accompanied
the column, and, after the occupation of Metemmeh,
was to proceed to Khartoum at once with a small
detachment of infantry on board the steamers
which, it was known, were in the neighbourhood.
The column reached Jakdul early on the morning
of the 12th. After halting for a day, the march
was resumed. On the night of the 16th, the force
bivouacked about three and a half miles from the
wells of Abu Klea, which were occupied in con-
siderable force by the Dervishes.
On the following morning (the 17th), the force
advanced in square to attack the enemy. A
desperate engagement ensued. The Dervishes
charged the square with the utmost gallantry, and
succeeded in penetrating a gap which had been
temporarily caused in its rear face. The camels,
Colonel Colville says, " which up to this time had
been a source of weakness to the square, now
became a source of strength. The spearmen by
weight of numbers forced back the rear face of the
square on to the camels ; these formed a Uving
traverse that broke the rush, and gave time for the
right face and front face to take advantage of find-
ing themselves on higher ground, and to fire over
the heads of those engaged in a hand-to-hand
struggle on to the mass of the enemy behind.
A desperate conflict ensued in the centre of the
square, but the slaughter caused by the musketry
from the rising ground caused the rearward Arabs
to waver and then to fall back. Within the square,
the din of battle was such that no words of
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command could be heard, and each man was obliged
to act on the impulse of the moment. Officers and
men aUke fought well in this short hand-to-hand
encounter, and many acts of heroism were per-
formed. . . . Before five minutes had elapsed, the
httle band of less than 1500 British soldiers had,
by sheer pluck and muscle, killed the last of the
fanatics who had penetrated into their midst."
The victory was complete, but it had been
dearly bought. Eighteen officers and 150 non-
commissioned officers and men were killed and
wounded. The enemy's loss was heavy; 1100
bodies were counted in the immediate proximity of
the square, and the number of wounded is said to
have been very great. On the night of the 17th,
the troops bivouacked at the Abu Klea wells. The
baggage animals did not arrive till early on the
morning of the 18th. The result was that the
troops passed the night without food, coats, or
blankets.
Sir Herbert Stewart then determined to make a
night march to Metemmeh, about twenty -three
miles distant. At 4 p.m. on the 18th, the column
left Abu Klea. The night was dark. Many of
the men had been without sleep for two nights.
The camels were exhausted. The route lay for a
considerable distance through thick bush. Halts
were numerous. At last, after a toilsome march
of some sixteen hours, the Nile appeared in sight.
It was, however, apparent that the river could not
be reached without further fighting. Whilst pre-
parations were being made for an advance, the
Dervishes kept up a hot fire from the long grass in
which they were concealed. It was at this moment
that the gallant Stewart received his death-wound.
Colonel Burnaby, who it had been intended by
Lord Wolseley should succeed Sir Herbert Stewart
in the event of the latter's death, had been killed
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at Abu Klea. The chief command devolved on
Sir Charles Wilson.
At 3 P.M. on the 19th, the force advanced in
square, and after a sharp engagement, in which an
attack of the Dervishes was successfully repulsed,
occupied a position on the Nile a short distance
north of Metemmeh. The British loss on this day
was 9 officers and 102 non-commissioned officers
and men killed and wounded.
On the following morning (the 20th), the force
moved to Gubat. At 10 a.m. on the 21st, four
steamers, which had been sent by General Gordon,
arrived from Khartoum. They brought his Journal
and several letters, in one of which, dated December
14, he said that he expected a catastrophe in the
town after ten days' time. The latest news was
written on a small scrap of paper. It was to the
following effisct : " Khartoum is aU right. Could
hold out for years. C.G.Gordon. 29.12.84." It was
known at the time that General Gordon wrote this
so that, in the event of his letter falling into the
hands of the Dervishes, they would be deceived. In
reaUty, he was in the greatest straits. Obviously,
the next thing to do was to send the steamers back
to Khartoum with some soldiers on board of them.
It was not, however, until the morning of the 24th
that two steamers, the Bordein and the Telaha-
wiyeh, left. The interval between the 21st and
the 24th was occupied in reconnaissances both up
and down the river, and in making arrangements
for the proper protection of the force at Gubat. ^
Both the steamers carried smaU detachments
of British soldiers, as well as larger detachments of
Soudanese troops. Sir Charles Wilson embarked
* The delay at Gubat has formed the subject of much discussion.
The conclusion at which I have arrived, after a careful examination of
all the facts, is that if the steamers had left Gubat on the afternoon of
the 21st, they would probably have arrived at Khartoum in time to save
the towa.
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on board the Bordein. All went well until, at
6 P.M. on the 25th, the Bordein struck on a rock
in the Sixth Cataract, the navigation of which is
intricate. This caused a delay of twenty-four hours.
On the night of the 26th, the steamers were only
three miles nearer Khartoum than they had been on
the previous evening. An early start was made
on the 27th. The dangerous gorge of Shabluka
was passed without difficulty. The steamers
continued their voyage under a musketry fire
from the banks, and in the evening stopped near
the small village of Tamaniat. During the after-
noon, a man on the bank called out that Khartoum
had fallen and that General Gordon had been killed,
but he was not beheved by those on board. The
steamers started early on the 28th, hoping to reach
Khartoum by the evening. They advanced under a
heavy fire of musketry and artillery until they came
within sight of the Government House at Khar-
toum. An eager search was made through glasses
to see whether the Egyptian flag was still flying.
No sign of it could be discovered. More than
this, as the steamers advanced it was seen that
Government House and the buildings near it
had been wrecked. The Khartoum side of the
White Nile was in the possession of the enemy.
It was clear that the indomitable defender of
Khartoum had at last succumbed. The expedition
had arrived too late. Sir Charles Wilson ordered
the steamers to be put about and to run down
stream. On the return journey, both the steamers
were wrecked, but those on board were rescued
from the perilous position, in which they were at
one time placed, by a party sent out in the steamer
Safieh under Lord Charles Beresford. On the
afternoon of February 4, Sir Charles Wilson and
his companions rejoined the main body of the
British troops, which were encamped at Gubat.
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It is now time to go back to the events which
were passing in Khartoum.
In the course of this narrative, I have alluded
to General Gordon's numerous inconsistencies. I
have pointed out errors of judgment with which he
may justly be charged. I have dwelt on defects
of character which unsuited him for the conduct
of political affairs. But, when aU this has been
said, how grandly the character of the man comes
out in the final scene of the Soudan tragedy.
History has recorded few incidents more calculated
to strike the imagination than that presented by
this brave man, who, strong in the faith which
sustained him, stood undismayed amidst dangers
which might well have appalled the stoutest heart.
Hordes of savage fanatics surged around him.
Shot and shell poured into the town which he
was defending against fearful odds. Starvation
stared him in the face. " The soldiers had to
eat dogs, donkeys, skins of animals, gum and
palm fibre, and famine prevailed. The soldiers
stood on the fortifications Uke pieces of wood.
The civilians were even worse off. Many died
of hunger, and corpses filled the streets—no one
had even the energy to bury them."^ Treachery
and internal dissension threatened him from within,
whilst a waste of burning African desert separated
him from the outward help which his countrymen,
albeit tardily, were straining every nerve to afford.
" All the anxiety he had undergone had gradually
turned his hair to silvery white. "^ "Yet," said an
eye-witness, " in spite of all this danger by which
he was surrounded, Gordon Pasha had no fear."
" Go," he said, " teU all the people in Khartoum
that Gordon fears nothing, for God has created
him without fear."^ Nor was this an idle boast.
* Account given by Bordeini Bey, Mahdiism, etc., p. 166.
" Mahdiism, etc., p. 169. * Ibid. p. 164.
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General Gordon did not know what the word fear
meant. Death had no terrors for him. " I would,"
he wrote to his sister, " that all could look on death as
a cheerful friend, who takes us from a world of trial
to our true home."^ Many a man before General
Gordon has laid down his life at the call of duty.
Many a man too has striven to regard death as a
glad relief from pain, sorrow, and suffering. But
no soldier about to lead a forlorn hope, no Christian
martyr tied to the stake or thrown to the wild
beasts of Ancient Rome, ever faced death with
more unconcern than General Gordon. His faith
was subhme. Strong in that faith, he could meet
the savage who plunged a spear into his breast
with a "gesture of scorn,"^ and with the sure
and certain hope of immortality which had been
promised to him by the Master in whose footsteps
he had endeavoured to follow.
From a military point of view, the defence of
Khartoum was a splendid feat of arms. When
Ismail Pasha tried to use General Gordon as a
pawn on his financial and political chessboard,
kindly laughter was provoked from all who knew
the facts or who knew the man. General Gordon
was too rash and imj.ulsive for the conduct of
political affairs in this work-a-day world. But as
the military defender of a beleaguered city, he was
in his element. The fighting instinct, which was
strong within him, had full scope for action. His
example and precept, his bravery and resource,
encouraged the faint-hearted and enabled him,
even with the poor material of which he disposed,
to keep a formidable enemy at bay for ten long
months. His personal influence was felt by all
the inhabitants of the town, who regarded him
as their sole refuge in distress, their only bulwark
against disaster.
* Letters, etc., p. xiL • Muhdiism, etc., p. 171.
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To return to the narrative. After the defeat
of El Eilafun on September 1, the position at
Khartoum became well-nigh desperate. AU the
tribes in the neighbourhood submitted to the Mahdi
and hurried to Khartoum to take part in the siege.
" They fired projectiles from the guns, rockets, and
fii'earms of all descriptions, which fell on the town
from all sides. From time to time, the troops
made sorties out of the city to drive them off, but
almost each time their efforts proved fruitless, and
they had to return to the garrison, for the pro-
jectiles of the rebels were numerous." On January
5, 1885, Omdurman capitulated. " Khartoum then
fell into a dangerous state. The rebels surrounded
it from all sides, and cut off all supplies. . . . The
soldiers suffered terribly from want of food ; some
of them deserted and joined the rebels. Gordon
Pasha used to say every day, ' Tliey [the English]
must come to-morrow,' but they never came, and
we began to think that they must have been
defeated after all. . . . We all became heart-
broken, and concluded that no army was coming
to relieve Khartoum." The townspeople began to
talk of capitulation. General Gordon appealed to
them, on January 25, to make a determined stand
for another twenty-four hours, by which time he
thought that the Enghsh relief would arrive.
*' What more can I say ? " were his words to
Bordeini Bey. " The people will no longer believe
me. I have told them over and over again that help
would be here, but it has never come, and now they
must see I tell them lies. If this, my last promise,
fails, I can do nothing more. Go and collect all
the people you can on the lines and make a good
stand. Now leave me to smoke these cigarettes.''
The end was very near. Early on the morning
of January 26, by which time Sir Charles
Wilson's steamers had reached the foot of the
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Sixth Cataract, the Dervishes made a general attack
on the lines and met with but a feeble resistance
from the half- starved and disheartened soldiers.
Farag Pasha, the commandant, who was suspected
of treachery, escaped to the Mahdist camp, and met
his death a short time afterwards at the hands of
an Arab with whom he had a blood feud. The
Palace was soon reached. General Gordon stood in
front of the entrance to his office. He had on a white
uniform. His sword was girt around him, but he
did not draw it. He carried a revolver in his right
hand, but he disdained to use it. The final scene,
in which the civilised Christian faced barbarous
and triumphant fanaticism, is thus described by
Bordeini Bey, and it would be difficult, whether in
tales of fact or of fiction, to find a more pathetic,
or, it may be added, a more dramatic passage
:
" Taha Shahin was the first to encounter Gordon
beside the door of the Divan, apparently waiting
for the Arabs and standing with a calm and
dignified manner, his left hand resting on the
hilt of his sword. Shahin, dashing forward with
the curse, ' Malaoun^ el-yom yomak ' (O cursed
one, your time is come !), plunged his spear into
his body.^ Gordon, it is said, made a gesture of
scorn with his right hand and turned his back,
when he received another spear-wound, which
caused him to fall forward, and was most likely
his mortal wound. The other three men closely
following Shahin then rushed in, and cutting at
the prostrate body with their swords, must have
killed him in a few seconds. His death occurred
just before sunrise. He made no resistance, and
did not fire a shot from his revolver. From all
I know, I am convinced that he never intended
* From information subsequently obtained, it would appear that
General Gordon received his death-blow, not from Taha Shahin, as
stated above, but from Sheikh Mohammed Nebawi, who was eventually
killed at the battle of Omdurmau.
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to surrender. I should say that he must have
intended to use his revolver only if he saw it
was the intention of the Arabs to take him prisoner
aUve ; but he saw such crowds rushing on him
with swords and spears, and there being no im-
portant Emirs with them, he must have known
that they did not intend to spare him, and that
was most likely what he wanted ; besides, if he had
fired, it could only have delayed his death a few
moments, the wild fanatical Arabs would never
have been checked by a few shots from a revolver.
Gordon Pasha's head was immediately cut off and
sent to the Mahdi at Omdurman, while his body
was dragged downstairs and left exposed for a time
in the garden, where many came to plunge their
spears into it." ^
Foul creatures were not wanting to kick the
dead lion. Bordeini Bey goes on to say : " I saw
Gordon Pasha's head exposed in Omdurman. It
was fixed between the branches of a tree, and all
who passed by threw stones at it. The first to
throw a stone was Youssuf Mansour, late IMamour
of PoUce at El Obeid, whom Gordon Pasha had
dismissed for misconduct, and who afterwards com-
manded the Mahdi's artillery."
Thus General Gordon died. Well do I remember
the blank feeling of grief and disappointment with
which I received the news of his death, and even
now, at this distance of time, I cannot pen the
record of those last sad days at Khartoum without
emotion. If any consolation can be offered to
those who strove, but strove in vain, to save him,
it is to be found in the fact that it may be said
of General Gordon, perliaps more than of any man,
that he was Jelia^ oppoi'tunitate mortis.
• The best evidence obtainable j2:oes to prove that Bordeini Bey's
account of General Gordon's death is substantially correct. It differs,
however, in many important particulars from the account given by
M. Neufeld in chap. xxv. of ^ l'ri.soner of the Khali/a.
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Could we but choose our time and choose aright,
'Tis best to die, our honour at the height,
When we have done our ancestors no shame,
But served our friends, and well secured our fame.
Then should we wish our happy life to close,
And leave no more for fortune to dispose
;
So should we make our death a glad relief
From future shame, from sickness, and from grief.
Dryden's Imes may well serve as General Gordon's
epitaph. He died m the plenitude of his reputation,
and left a name which will be revered so long as the
qualities of steadfast faith and indomitable courage
have any hold on the feelings of mankind.
Rarely has pubUc opinion in England been so
deeply moved as when the news arrived of the fall
of Khartoum. The daily movements of the reUef
expedition had been watched by anxious multitudes
of General Gordon's countrymen, yearning for news
of one who seemed to embody in his own person the
pecuhar form of heroism which is perhaps most of all
calculated to move the Anglo-Saxon race. When
General Gordon's fate was known a wail of sorrow
and disappointment was heard throughout the
land. The Queen's feelings, as a Sovereign and as
a woman of hvely sympathies, were touched to the
quick. Her Majesty wrote a sympathetic letter
to Miss Gordon, deeply lamenting her "dear
brother's cruel, though heroic fate." On this, as
on other occasions, the Queen's language truly
represented the feehngs of the nation.^ Yet the
* On March 19, 1885, Sir Henry Ponsonby, the Queen's Private
Secretary, wrote to me : " I now quite admit that I did not understand
Gordon, that I did not see what you did, the force and reality of liig
position and requirements. The Government were to hlame in not
understanding? this also, but 1 tliiuk we all here—the people, high and
low— should share the responsibility, for we did not grasp the situation
as we should have done. The Queen was in a terrible state about the
fall of Khartoum, and indeed it had a good deal to do with making her
ill. She was just going out when she got the telegram, and sent for
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British nation had done its duty. Parliament voted
supplies in no grudging spirit to enable an expedition
to be sent to General Gordon's relief, and public
opinion ratified the vote. The British army also sus-
tained its ancient reputation. Mistakes may have
been, and, indeed, were made. But whatevei judg-
ment may be pronounced by competent critics in
connection with some points of detail, the true
reasons for the failure must be sought elsewhere.
They are thus stated by Sir Reginald Wingate
:
'• To innumerable enemies, flushed with victory
and ardent fanaticism, Gordon exposed a skill and
experience in savage warfare which few could equal.
Ill-provisioned in a place naturally and artificially
weak, Gordon for months preserved an undaunted
front. Neither treachery in the besieged nor the
stratagems of the besiegers caused the fall of
Khartoum. The town fell through starvation, and
despair at long neglect. There were no elements
of chance in the expedition to relieve General
Gordon. It was sanctioned too late. As day by
day no Enghsh came, so day by day the soldiers'
hearts sank deeper and deeper into gloom. As day
by day their strength wasted, so that finally gum,
their only food, was rejected, so day by day the
Nile ebbed back from the ditch it had filled with
mud, and from the rampart it had crumbled, and
left a broad path for who should dare to enter." *
me. She then went out to my cottage, a quarter of a mile off, walked
into the room, pale and trembling, and said to my wife, who was
terrified at her appearance— ' Too late ! ' "
Throughout the wliole of this difficult period, I received the utmost
support from the Queen. On March 13, 18R5, the following note,
written by Her Majesty, was communicated to me by my brother (Mr.
Edward Baring, subse(iuently Lord Revelstoke) : ''The concluding
paragraph of Sir E. Baring's telegram" (I am not quite sure to what
particular telegram allusion is here made) " is admirable. Let the
Queen have a copy. She wishes Mary" (Lady Ponsonby, who was
Lady Revelstoke's sister) " would tell Mr. Edward Baring that the
Queen has endorsed everything his brother has said."
1 Mahdiism, etc., p. 15G.
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In a word, the Nile expedition was sanctioned
too late, and the reason why it was sanctioned too
late was that Mr. Gladstone would not accept
simple evidence of a plain fact, which was patent
to much less powerful intellects than his own.
Posterity has yet to decide on the services which
Mr. Gladstone, during his long and brilliant career,
rendered in other directions to the British nation,
but it is improbable that the verdict of his con-
temporaries in respect to his conduct of the affairs
of the Soudan will ever be reversed. That verdict
has been distinctly unfavourable. ** Les fautes de
I'homme puissant," said an eminent Frenchman,^
"sont des malheurs publics." Mr. Gladstone's
error ofjudgment in delaying too long the despatch
of the Nile expedition left a stain on the reputa-
tion of England which it will be beyond the power
of either the impartial historian or the partial
apologist to efface.
* Senancour.
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CHAPTER XXIX
THE EVACUATION OF THE SOUDAN
January 26, 1885-December 30, 1886
Lord Wolseley urges the necessity of an autumn campaign—The
Governmeut hesitate— And then agree— Sir Redvers Buller
retreats to Korti—Battle of Kirhekan—The movement on Berber
arrested—Operations at Suakin— Action at Hashin—And atTofrik
—Suspension of the Suakin operations
—
'l"he autumn campaign
• abandoned
—
Question of holding Dongola—Change of Government
in England—Evacuation of Dongola—Death of the Mahdi—Battle
of Ginniss—Review of British policy.
When Lord Wolseley heard of the battle of Abu
Klea and of Sir Herbert Stewart having been
wounded, he decided to send Sir Redvers Buller to
take command of the desert column, and to rein-
force it by two battalions. Shortly afterwards, news
arrived of the fall of Khartoum. General Earle was
ordered to arrest the forward movement of the river
column on Abu Hamed. Pending the receipt of
instructions from London as to the policy which
was now to be pursued, a discretionary power was
left to Sir Redvers Buller to act according to local
circumstances. General Earle accordingly halted at
Berti, about midway between Korti and Abu Hamed.
Sir Redvers Buller arrived at Gubat on February 11.
He found that there were only about twelve days'
supplies at Gubat, and another twelve days'
supplies at Abu Klea, whilst the camels were in a
weak and emaciated condition. News had been
18
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received that a Dervish force of about 4000 men
and six guns was on its way from Khartoum to
Gubat. Sir Redvers Buller, therefore, wisely
decided to fall back on Jakdul. The retreat began
on February 14. Jakdul was reached on the 26th.
In the meanwhile, the British Government were
in a position of great difficulty. The sole object
of the expedition had been to bring General Gordon
and Colonel Stewart away from Khartoum. This
object had not been attained. Obviously, unless the
policy of the Government was to undergo a com-
plete change, the most logical course to have pursued
would have been to desist from any further inter-
ference in the Soudan, to withdraw the British
troops to some good strategical position in the
valley of the Nile, and there to await the attack
of the Mahdist forces. This was what was
eventually done, and, judged by the light of after
events it can scarcely be doubted that it would
have been better if the Government had at once
decided to take up a defensive attitude. It can,
however, be no matter for surprise that, in the
first instance, the Government decided otherwise.
British public opinion was greatly excited. Both
the natioti and the army were smarting under a sense
of failure. The soldiers were burning to avenge
their comrades, and to show the Dervishes that
they were no match for British troops. It was
certain that the fall of Khartoum would increase
the influence and prestige of the Mahdi ; neither
was it easy to foresee what might be the effect of
his success in Egypt,^ and amongst Mohammedans
in other parts of the world.
^ Directly the news of the fall of Khartoum reached Cairo on
February 6, 1 telegraphed to Lord Granville as follows : " It is too
early to express any opinion worth having as to the effect wl)ich tlie
fall of Khartoum will produce in Egypt proper. Moreover, much will
no doubt depend on the course which Her Majesty's Government now
decide to pursue in the Soudan. But I may say that, so far as I tan
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General Gordon's fame was then at its zenith.
His Journal, which had been received, and was
immediately published, gave a clear indication
of his views. He strongly advocated a policy
of "smashing up" the JNJahdi. The weight of
Lord Wolseley's authority was thrown into the
same scale. He deprecated the adoption of a
defensive policy. " It must never be forgotten,"
he said, *'that the question of whether this war
shall or shall not go on does not rest with us,
unless we are prepared to give up Egypt to the
False Prophet. We shall not bring about a quiet
state of affairs by adopting a defensive poHcy.
The Mahdi has repeatedly declared it to be lus
full and settled intention to possess himself of
Egypt, and his followers look upon themselves as
engaged in a war the object of which is not to rest
contented with the capture of Berber, but to drive
the infidels into the sea." Lord Wolseley thought
that the final struggle with Mahdiism might perhaps
be staved off for a few years, but these years, he
said, "will be years of trouble and disturbance
for Egypt, of burdens and strains to our military
resources, and the contest that will come in the
end will be no less than that which is in front of
us now. This is all we shall gain by a defensive
poHcy." There could, he thought, be little differ-
ence of opinion as to the line of action which was
" most befitting our national dignity and honour."
The Mahdi must be crushed. That, Lord Wolseley
thought, was the only policy, "worthy of the
Enghsh nation."
Tliese views were shared by others on the spot.
The Government had, therefore, to face a strong
at present judjre, I do not anticipate any disturbance so far as the
Egyptian population is concerned. The effect produced upon the
Bedouins on the frontier is more difficult to forecast, and it would be
as well to be prepared to send at short notice another battalion to
Assouan, as proposed some little while ago by Lord ^V'^olseley."
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body of local opinion favourable to offensive action.
At first, the Ministers hesitated, and they might
well do so, for they were asked to embark on a
crusade against Mohammedan fanaticism, to adopt
an adventurous policy of which no one could foresee
the end, and to wage a costly war in a remote
country under conditions of exceptional difficulty
imposed by the climate, by the scantiness of local
supplies, and by the absence of facilities for trans-
port and locomotion. Lord Wolseley had warned
them that "the strength and composition of his
little army was calculated for the relief, not for the
siege and capture of Khartoum, the tM^o operations
being entirely different in character and magnitude.
. . . Khartoum in the hands of the enemy could
not be retaken until the force under his command
had been largely augmented in numbers and in
artillery."
Lord Wolseley's first instructions, which were
issued on February 6, were " to check the advance
of the Mahdi in districts now undisturbed."
"Whether," it was added, "it will be ultimately
necessary to advance on Khartoum or not, cannot
now be decided." I was at the same time told to
give the Khedive general assurances of support,
and to inform Lord Wolseley that it was the
desire of the Cabinet "that if the Mahdi should
make any proposals he should transmit them
immediately to Her Majesty's Government for
their consideration." The Mahdi never made any
proposals, neither was there at this or any other
time the smallest likelihood of his doing so. I^ord
Wolseley replied that Lord Hartington's telegram
gave him " no information as to the policy with
reference to the Soudan which Her JMajesty's
Government meant to pursue." Thus pressed,
the Government yielded. On February 9, Lord
Hartington telegraphed to Lord Wolseley : " Your
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military policy is to be based on the necessity,
which we recognise on the statement of facts now
before us, that the power of the JNIahdi at Khartoum
must be overthrown."
Unquestionably, it was a mistake to issue these
orders. It is easy to see now that both General
Gordon and Lord Wolseley credited the Mahdi with
an amount of strength for offensive purposes which
he was far from possessing. But this was not so
clear then as it became later. Lord Wolseley,
therefore, thanked Lord Hartington for his " ex-
plicit statement of policy," and added : " I am
sure it is the correct one, as the JNIahdi's power
is incompatible with good government in Egypt."
The military arrangements necessary for giving
effect to the policy of the Government had then to
be settled. An immediate advance on Khartoum
was out of the question. Time would be required
for the necessary reinforcements to come from
England. Moreover, the hot season was approach-
ing. Lord Wolseley, therefore, determined to
capture Berber and Abu Hamed by a combined
movement of the forces under Sir Redvers Buller
and General Earle, and to hold those places during
the summer, preparatory to an advance on Khartoum
during the ensuing cool season. At the same time,
a force was to co-operate from Suakin with a view
to keeping open the road to Berber. " The sooner,"
Lord Wolseley telegraphed to Lord Hartington,
"you can now deal with Osman Digna the better."
Sir Redvers Buller was ordered, on February 10,
to take Metemmeh "as soon as he felt himself
strong enough to do so," and then to combine with
General Earle in an attack on Berber. He re-
ceived these instructions late on the night of the
13th, when he had already partly evacuated Gubat,
and had made all the arrangements necessary for
leaving it entirely at daylight on the following
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morning. For reasons which have been already
given,^ Sir Redvers Buller decided to continue the
retrograde movement on Abu Klea. The course
he adopted met subsequently with the approval of
Lord Wolseley.
Orders were issued for the desert column to
move on Merowi, but in the meanwhile it had
become clear that it would be impossible to under-
take operations such as those contemplated by
Lord Wolseley. Sir Redvers Buller wrote several
letters to Lord Wolseley from Jakdul in which
" he not only drew attention to the fact that the
transport of the desert column was completely
exhausted, but further stated that the boots of the
men were thoroughly worn out, and that many of
them were almost shoeless." Sir Evelyn Wood,
who was also at Jakdul, confirmed the views
expressed by Sir Redvers Buller. " I do not
think," he wrote on February 20, " that the debili-
tated state of our transport is reaUsed at Korti."
Manifestly, a retreat on Korti was imposed by the
circumstances of the situation. Lord Wolseley's
original plan, under which a combined movement
of the river and desert columns was to be made on
Berber, was no longer feasible. The last troops of
the desert column arrived at Korti on JNlarch 16.
I now turn to the movements of the river
column. Lord Wolseley's orders to halt reached
General Earle on February 5. On the 8th, General
Earle received orders to push on to Abu Hamed.
These were supplemented later on the same day by
orders to advance on Berber, and to co-operate with
Sir Redvers Buller in the capture of that place.
Shortly after leaving Berti, the enemy were found in
force occupying a ridge called Jebel Kirbckan. On
the 10th, they were attacked and driven from the
position with heavy loss. The British loss was
* Vide ante, p. 18.
24 INIODERN EGYPT ft. in
7 officers and 50 men killed and wounded. It was
in this action that, to the great sorrow of all who
knew him, General Earle lost his life. After his
death. General Brackenbury assumed the command
of the river column.
Subsequently to the action at Kirbekan, the for-
ward movement was continued. On February 24,
when the column was about thirty miles from Abu
Hamed, General Brackenbury received a message
from Lord Wolseley informing him of the retreat
of the desert column. " 1 have," Lord Wolseley
said, "abandoned all hope of going to Berber
before the autumn campaign begins." General
Brackenbury was, therefore, ordered to withdraw
his force to JNIerowi. He arrived there on March 5.
It is now time to describe the operations in
the vicinity of Suakin. Sir Gerald Graham was
appointed to the chief command. His instructions
were to make the best arrangements he could for
" the destruction of the power of Osman Digna."
When this had been done, he was to " arrange for
the military occupation of the Hadendowa terri-
tory, lying near the Suakin -Berber road." He
was further directed to do all in his power to
facilitate the construction of the Suakin -Berber
railway. A force of 13,000 men was placed at his
disposal, consisting of British and British -Indian
troops, and also of a battalion of infantry and a
battery of artillery, which were lent by the Govern-
ment of New South Wales.
By the middle of INlarch, the force was ready for
action, and Sir Gerald Graham proceeded to carry
out the first portion of his instructions, namely, to
crush Osman Digna. It was reported that the
main body of the Dervishes, in number about
7000, occupied Tamai, whilst smaller bodies held
Hashin and Handoub, all places lying within a
few miles of Suakin. It was decided, in the first
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instance, to drive the enemy out of Hashin. This
object was effected on JNlarch 20 and 21, with the
loss of 1 officer and 44 non-commissioned officers
and men killed and womided. The force then
returned to Suakin.
The next step was to crush the main Dervish
force at Tamai. On INIarch 22, a force under Sir
John McNeill left Suakin. Sir John JNIcNciU's
orders were to establish an intermediate post be-
tween Suakin and Tamai. At 10.30 a.m. the
troops halted at a spot named Tofrik, a few miles
from Suakin, and proceeded to entrench themselves
in a stockade. Whilst many of the men were
scattered in the act of cutting brushwood, a sudden
attack was made by a body of about 5000 Dervishes.
A scene of great confusion ensued. Many of the
Dervishes penetrated into the half-formed stockade.
After twenty minutes of confused fighting, they were
driven back with the loss of 1500 in killed besides
many wounded, but the British force suffigred
severely. Fifteen officers and 278 non-commissioned
officers and men were killed, wounded, or missing.
The camp-followers suffered severely. Five hun-
dred camels were killed or missing. Shortly after
this engagement, Osman Digna withdrew his forces
from Tamai, which was occupied by Sir Gerald
Graham on April 3.
According to the terms of his original instruc-
tions. Sir Gerald Graham should now have turned
his attention to opening up the route for the rail-
way. On April 15, however, orders were issued
from London to suspend the construction of the
railway. Suakin was " to be held for the present,
as also any position in the neighbourhood necessary
for protection from constant attacks as last year.'*
Whilst the operations described above were
going on, the policy of the British Government had
undergone a complete change. In the middle of
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February, Lord AVolseley wished to issue a Procla-
mation to the people of the Soudan to the effect
that his mission was " to destroy utterly the power
of the JNIahdi at Khartoum." ^ The Government
agreed to the issue of this Proclamation with a
characteristic amendment, which was made at the
instigation of Mr. Gladstone. It was stipulated
that the word "utterly" should be omitted from
the Proclamation. Two months later, the Govern-
ment had decided to go farther than the omission
of the word " utterly " from a Proclamation. The
Mahdi was neither to be utterly destroyed nor,
indeed, destroyed at all, but was to be left alone
for the time being to rule undisturbed over the
inhospitable deserts of the Soudan.
Many considerations contributed to bring about
this change of policy, or perhaps it should rather
be said, to bring about a return to the original
poHcy of the Government, which in a moment of
excitement had been too hastily abandoned.
Pubhc opinion in England, which had been
violently excited when the news of the fall of
Khartoum arrived, had somewhat calmed down.
It had found its natural and constitutional safety-
valve in the shape of an acrimonious debate in
Parliament, resulting in a division in which the
Government narrowly escaped defeat. The military
operations subsequent to the fall of Khartoum had
shown that any forward movement in the autumn
would be a costly and difficult undertaking. The
' This Proclamation, as it was originally drafted, consisted of short,
crisp sentences, with somewhat of a Napoleonic ring about them, which, it
was supposed, would create a deep impression on the people of the Soudan.
I gave it to a talented Kgyptian friend of mine, after it had been trans-
lated into Arabic, and asked him to give me his opinion upon it. He
said that he thorouglily understood what was meant, but that to the
Soudanese the Proclamation would be quite incomprehensible. At my
ri'(]uest, he prepared a counter project conveying the same ideas in
dirterent language. It was an extremely eloquent document, and
reminded me, more especially in its vituperative passages, of a chapter
in Isaiah.
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voices of politicians and diplomatists, which had at
.
first been hushed by the clang of arms, began to
be heard. The disadvantages of an offensive, and
the advantages of a defensive policy became more
and more clear as the matter was calmly considered.
Further— and this exercised a very material in-
fluence on the views of the Government— affairs
on the Indian frontier gave cause for anxiety.^ It
was, therefore, undesirable to engage in a campaign
in the Soudan, which would in some degree cripple
the military strength of the nation in the event of
the services of the army being required elsewhere.
The sound good sense of the British nation, which
was well represented m the Gladstone Cabinet,
reasserted itself, and a policy based upon a sober
appreciation of national interests was eventually
adopted.^ On April 21, it was announced in both
Houses of Parhament that it was not intended to
advance on Khartoum or to undertake any further
offensive operations in the Soudan. Lord Wolseley
was instructed accordingly.
The question then arose whether the British
and Egyptian troops should continue to hold
Dongola, or whether they should fall back to
some more northerly point along the valley of
the Nile.
Lord Wolseley's opinions were expressed im-
mediately after the Government had decided to
* The news that General Komaroff had attacked and defeated the
Afghans at Penjdeh readied London on April 10.
2 On April 3, I wrote a private letter to Lord Granville in which,
after dwelling' on the ambiguity of Mr. Gladstone's statements in the
House of Commons, I urged the necessity of facing the facts and of
laying down some definite Soudan policy for the future. I concluded
in the following words : "Tlie main question which 1 have propounded
in this letter is as follows :—Do the English Government intend to
establish a settled form of government at Khartoum or not? My own
opinion is that this question should be answered in the negative.
Hence, I am of opinion tliat tlie military decision to advance to
Khartoum should be reversed and that no such advance should take
place."
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abandon the idea of an autumn campaign against
the Mahdi. " If," he telegraphed to Lord Hart-
ington on April 14, " our position is to be ex-
clusively one of defence, I would hold Wadi
Haifa and Korosko as outposts, with a strong
brigade at Assouan." The next day he added
:
" Hold on to Dongola province. As long as
you do this, you prevent Mahdiism spreadLig in
Egypt, secure allegiance of frontier tribes, and
save henceforth trouble, disturbances, and possibly
local risings, which a policy of retreat will prob-
ably entail, and which will necessitate uicreased
garrisons in Egypt and mihtary occupation of
the larger towns."
Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Wilson, and
Colonel Kitchener were asked their opinions.
They all deprecated a retreat from Dongola, but
it was clear that their reason for doing so was
that they wished to revert to the policy of
advancing on Khartoum. " The Soudan," Sir
Redvers Buller said, "will never be quiet till
the Mahdi is disposed of." " I still beUeve," Sir
Charles AVilson said, " as always, that the control
of the Soudan is necessary to Egypt." "The
JNIahdi must advance or disappear," Colonel
Kitchener said, " and I deprecate leaving him
this fresh lease of life and power."
I did not agree in the view that Dongola should
be held with the intention of advancing on
Khartoum. At the same time, I was fearful of
the political effect which might be produced in
Egypt if an immediate retreat were carried out.
I did not like letting the Dervishes come so far
down the Nile valley as Wadi Haifa. I was
inclined to adopt a proposal put forward by Sir
Charles Wilson, to the effect that Dongola should
be held until some black troops could be organised,
and that the government should be entrusted to
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Abdul-Kader Pasha. "I would earnestly im-
press," I said, "upon Her Majesty's Government
that it would be neither politically wise nor
dignified to carry out at once the policy of re-
treat from Dongola and the immediate neighbour-
hood." The Government, however, held firmly
to their original opinions. On May 8, Lord
Hartington telegraphed to Lord Wolseley : " The
Government, after considering all reports received,
adhere to the decision to adopt the proposal for
the defence of the Egyptian frontier at Wadi
Haifa and Assouan contained in your telegram
of April 14."
Whilst measures were being taken to carry out
these instructions, a change of Government took
place in England. On June 24, 188,5, the Ministry
of Lord Sahsbury succeeded that of Mr. Gladstone.
Lord Wolseley urged the new Government to
abandon a defensive and to adopt an offensive
policy. " No frontier force," he said, " can keep
Mahdiism out of Egypt, and the Mahdi sooner or
later must be smashed, or he will smash you. . . .
To advance on Khartoum and discredit the JNIahdi
by a serious defeat on his own ground would
certainly finish him." After a short interval, Lord
Wolseley was informed that the new Government
adhered to the decision wliich had been taken
by their predecessors. The retreat was to be
continued.
There can be little doubt that the British
Government acted wisely in deciding to retreat
from Dongola. The views of the military
authorities were based on the presumed poHtical
necessity of " smashhig tlie Mahdi" at Khartoum.
No such necessity existed in reality. It is possible
that the policy, wliich I recommended, of setting
up an Egyptian semi - independent Governor at
Dongola might have succeeded, if British troops
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had been allowed to remain long enough to enable
a black force to be organised, but I am glad that
tlie experiment was not tried. Indeed, had I at
the time thoroughly appreciated the physical
features of the country between Wadi Haifa and
Dongola, I do not think I should ha\'e made the
proposal. In the autumn of 1889, I visited Wadi
Haifa aiid went as far as Sarras, about thirty miles
south of that place. I saw enough to convince
myself that, as an advanced position, Wadi Haifa
is far stronger than Dongola.
On July 5, the British troops evacuated Don-
gola. In view, however, of the threatening
attitude of the Dervishes, the movement north-
wards took place slowly. The JNIahdi died
suddenly on June 20, and his death exercised
a dispiriting effect on his followers. His place
was taken by the Khalifa Abdullah - el - Taaslii,
who proceeded to carry out his predecessor's
intention of invading Egj^t. It was not, how-
ever, till December 30, 1885, that a mixed British
and Egyptian force, under the command of Sir
Frederick Stephenson, met the Dervishes at Ginniss,
about inidway between AVadi Haifa and Dongola.
The Dervishes were defeated with a loss of about
800 killed and wounded. The British and Egyptian
loss was 41 killed and wounded. This action in-
flicted a severe blow on the Khalifa, and for the time
being allayed all fear of a serious invasion of Egypt
by the Dervishes. By April 13, 1886, the British and
Egyptian troops were concentrated at Wadi Haifa.
\\''adi Haifa was then left to the care of the
Egyptian troops, and the British force retired to
Assouan, which place they reached on May 7.
With the action at Ginniss, purely British inter-
vention in the affairs of the Soudan may be said
practically to have ceased for the time being. The
moment, therefore, is opportune for reviewing the
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results attained by British policy during the pre-
vious two years. My own belief is that the
fundamental principles of tliat policy were sound,
if once the fatal mistake of non-interference prior
to the Hicks defeat be condoned. If a veto had
been placed on the Hicks expedition, the prob-
ability is that the Egyptian Government would
never ha^e lost possession of Khartoum.
When once General Hicks's army had been
destroyed, the policy of withdrawal was enforced
by the circumstances of the situation. The British
Ministers wisely set their faces against reconquest
by British arms. They obliged the Egyptian
Government to look the facts in the face, and in
doing so they rendered a great service to the
Khedive and to the Egyptian people.
But although the fundamental principles of
British policy were, with the reserve stated above,
perfectly sound, the execution of the pohcy was
defective. At almost every point, failure was
incurred.
The British Government endeavoured to assist
the Egyptian Government in effecting the peace-
able withdrawal of the garrisons and Egyptian civil
population from the Soudan. The withdrawal was
for the most part never effected at all. Sir Reginald
Wingate estimated ^ that the total garrisons in the
Soudan, including General Hicks's army and the
force sent under General Baker to Suakin,
amounted to about 55,000 men. Of these, about
12,000 were killed. 11,000 eventually returned to
Egypt, leaving about 30,000 who remained in the
Soudan. This figure is exclusive of civilians,
women, and children, the number of whom Sir
Reginald Wingate roughly estimated at 5000.
These figures speak for themselves.
Again, the Government sent two high officials
* Mahdiism, etc.
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on a special mission to the Soudan. They failed
to accomplish the objects of their mission.
A military force was then sent to save the lives
of the two British emissaries. It arrived too late.
Both General Gordon and Colonel Stewart were
killed.
Lastly, at one time the Government intended to
deal a decisive blow to the power of the Mahdi.
The project was abandoned and, in my opinion,
wisely abandoned. Nevertheless, the impression
was left on the minds of the Dervishes that a
British army had attempted to reconquer the
Soudan, and had failed to do so.
Eventually, the Government fell back en its
original pohcy of withdrawal, from which it had
temporarily drifted.
The Gordon mission and the Nile expedition
were thus mere episodes in Egyptian and Sou-
danese history. They will be remembered as
mistakes accompanied by suffering and sorrow to
individuals, and by failure in an undertaking on
which the British nation had set its heart. It is
melancholy to think of the blood and treasure
which were wasted. Few of those who have sacri-
ficed their hves for their country have done so to
so Httle purpose as the gallant soldiers who fell at
Abu Klea, Kirbekan, and in the neighbourhood of
Suakin. The only practical result of the Nile
expedition was to inspire in the minds of the
Dervishes a wholesome dread of British soldiers,
and to break the force of the Dervish advance
when it eventually occurred. It would be an
exaggeration to say that this result was of no
utility, but it was obtained at a cost altogether
incommensurate with its real value. The same
result would have been more easily and perhaps
more thoroughly obtained by the adoption of a
defensive policy from the first.
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Looking more closely to the details in the
execution of the British policy, the following are
the conclusions at which I arrive :
—
In the first place, it was a mistake to send any
British official to Khartoum. The task he had to
perform was well-nigh impossible of execution, and
his nomination involved the assumption of respon-
sibilities on the part of the British Government,
which it was desirable to avoid.
Secondly, if any one was to be sent, it was a
mistake to choose General Gordon. In spite of
many noble traits in his character, he was wanting
in some of the qualities which were essential to the
successful accomplishment of his mission.
Thirdly, when once General Gordon had been
sent, he should have been left a free hand so long
as he kept within the main lines of the pohcy
which he was authorised to execute. It is, in my
opinion, to be regretted that General Gordon was
not allowed to employ Zobeir Pasha, but any
view held as to the probable results of employing
him must be conjectural.
Fourthly, the question of whether an expedition
should or should not have been sent from Suakin
to Berber in the spring of 1884 depends on the
military practicability of the undertaking, a point
on which the best military authorities differed in
opinion.
Fifthly, a great and inexcusable mistake was
made in delaying for so long the despatch of the
Gordon relief expedition.
Sixthly, the Government acted vdsely, after the
fall of Khartoum, in eventually adopting a defen-
sive pohcy and in ordering a retreat to Wadi
Haifa.
Lastly, it may be said that the British Govern-
ment were extraordinarily unlucky. Whatever
amount of foresight be shown, success in doubtful
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and difficult enterprises, such as the Gordon Mission
and the Nile Expedition, must always depend
a good deal on adventitious circumstances, which
cannot be foreseen, and over which no Govern-
ment can exercise any control. I am far from
saying that in all the matters which are dis-
cussed in these pages, the British Government
exercised a proper amount of foresight, but it must
be admitted tliat whenever the goddess Fortune
could play them a trick, she appeared, with pro-
verbial fickleness, to take a pleasure in doing so.
The British Government made at the time a great
stir in the world. The result in the end was that
no object of any importance was attained.
Gratis anhelans, multa agendo nihil agens.
But the situation was one of inordinate difficulty,
and those who have had most experience in the
conduct of political affairs, and who know how
difficult it is to be right and how easy it is to make
mistakes, will be least of all inclined to criticise
severely the principal actors on the scene.
CHAPTER XXX
THE DEBRIS OF THE SOUDAN
rhe outlying provinces :—1, Darfour : Surrender of the province—The
Senoussieh sect—The revolt of Abu Gemaizeh. 2. Bnhr-el-Ghazal :
Lupton Bey surrenders—His death. 3. Equatoria : Emin Pasha
summoned to surrender—He maintains his position—The Stanley
expedition. 4. Sennar : The garrison surrenders. 5. Ka)s\sula :
The garrison surrenders. 6. The Abyssinian Frontier Garrisons :
The Hewett treaty—The garrisons of Amadib, Senhit, Galabat,
Gera, and Gedaref. 7. Berbera : Its political st<itus—It is occupied
by British troops. 8. Harrar : Withdrawal of the Egyptian garri-
son—Installation of the Emir Abdullah—King Menelek occupies the
province. 9. Zeyla : It is occupied by British troops. 10. Tajour-
rah: The French occupy it. 11. Massowah: Its political stcitus
—
Attitude of the British Government—The Italians occupy Maa-
Bowah.
When the collapse of Egyptian authority in the
Soudan took place, the disjecta mernbra of Ismail
Pasha's huge African estate fell to those whose
interest it was to pick them up, and who had the
power to give effect to their wishes. Those por-
tions which were remote from the coast relapsed
into barbarism. Those which were more easy of
access were pounced upon by various European
Powers, who about this time began what was aptly
called by the British press "the scramble for
Africa." In the present chapter the main facts as
regards all this Egyptian ddbris will be briefly
stated.*
* In the preparation of this chapter I have received great assistance
from Sir Reginald Wingate's work Mahdiism and the Egyptian Soudan.
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1. Darfour,
When the Mahdist rebellion broke out, the
Governor of this province was Slatin Bey, an
Austrian officer in the Egyptian service. His
position was one of great difficulty, for from the
first his own officers were infected with the spirit
of revolt. After the destruction of General Hicks's
army, the position in Darfour became hopeless.
Slatin Bey was at Dara, the capital of the province,
against which a force under the command of one
of the Mahdi's heutenants advanced towards the
end of 1883. The town at once surrendered.
Slatin Bey, writing to General Gordon, described
the capitulation in the following terms : "After the
annihilation of Hicks's army, the demoralised troops
refused to fight any longer. . . . Officers and men
demanded capitulation and I, standing there alone
and a European, was compelled to follow the
majority and compelled to capitulate. Does your
Excellency believe that to me, as an Austrian
officer, the surrender was easy ? It was one of the
hardest days in my life." ^
The events in Darfour during the next few
years turned in some degree upon the influence
exerted over that remote country and its neighbour-
hood by the celebrated Sheikh El Senoussi. 1 take
this opportunity, therefore, to describe briefly the
rise of the Senoussieh sect.
There are two main divisions of Moslems,
namely, the Sunnites and the Shiites. Almost all
the Mohammedan inhabitants of the Ottoman
* After remaining' captive at Omdurman for many years, Slatin Pasha
succeeded in making his escape in March 1895. He was appointed
Inspector-General in the Soudan, and in that capacity rendered very
valuable services to the Government. He is a 2:allant and very capable
officer. Some derogatory remarks made about him by General Gordoo
in his Journal are wholly undeserved.
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dominions and of Africa are Sunnites. They are
divided into four Mezhebs, or principal sects, viz.
the Hanafi, the Shafai, the ]Mahki, and the Han-
bah. These sects differ on points of ritual, and as
regards the interpretation of certain portions of the
JVIohammedan law. The Turks in Egypt belong to
the Hanafite sect. Most of the Egyptians belong
to the Shafai, but some few to the Maliki sect.
Beneath these four main divisions are a number of
Tarikas, or minor sects/ which were called into
existence at a later period of Islamism than the
Mezhebs. They have generally been created, and
are still being created, by persons noted for their
piety and asceticism, who have, for the most part,
recommended some special form of prayer or of
ceremonial as being particularly efficacious. Some
of the Tarikas have risen to considerable import-
ance. Thus, the Wahabi sect caused at one time
great political disturbance by reason both of the
number and of the aggressive spirit of the sectarians.
The Sheikh El Mirghani also founded a large
Tarika in the Eastern Soudan. The Sheikh El
Senoussi is the head of one of the most important
Tarikas which now exist. It has been estimated
that his followers number no fewer than 3,000,000,
who are scattered widely over the whole of Northern
Africa. They are especially numerous in Wadai.
In Egypt, the followers of Senoussi are also fairly
nmnerous.
Mohammed Ben Ah El Senoussi, the founder of
the sect, was an Algerian by birth, and though
originally a Maliki, did not altogether agree with
the recognised leaders of that sect. In one respect
his teaching resembled that of Abdul Wahab, that
is to say, he only recognised the authority of the
Koran and the traditions which are contemporaneous
with the Koran, rejecting the teaching of later
* The literal translation of the word " Tarika" is a " path."
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commentators.' In 1853, he established hhnself in
an oasis of the Libyan desert named Jerhboiib, near
Siwa (Jupiter Amnion). He does not appear at any
time to have hazarded a definite statement that his
son would be the JNIahdi, but he gave several in-
dications during his lifetime that such a contin-
gency was not improbable. For instance, on one
occasion the father took off the son's sandals and
said to those present : " Be witness that I have
served him." It is inferred that he would not have
performed this act of servitude if he had not wished
it to be believed that his son's religious authority
was superior to his own. Further, it is said that the
principal supporters of Mohammed Ben All's son,'^
who succeeded to the headship of the sect on his
father's death, constantly pointed out to others
that their leader possessed many of the quahties
essential to the true Mahdi. On the other hand,
in view of the difficulty, not to say the impossi-
bility of fulfilling the whole of those conditions, it
may be confidently predicted that, whenever and
wherever a Mahdi is proclaimed, a schism will at
once occur. Senoussi was, without doubt, well
versed in Mohammedan tradition, and, in spite of
the aspirations of a few of his over-zealous and
ambitious followers, he must have been aware
that his claims to be considered the true Mahdi
would not meet with general recognition from the
Mohammedan world. He, therefore, wisely resisted
the temptation to proclaim himself as the INIahdi.
It was, however, natural that he should view with
disfavour the pretensions of any rival. Hence,
from the outset, Senoussi's influence was exercised
in a sense antagonistic to the movement of whicli
Mohammed Ahmed was the leader. His views on
* An account of the tenets of the Senoussi sect is given in ch. -\ii.
of Mr. Silva White's book From Sphinx to Oracle. Mr. White visited
Siwa in IBOO. He was unable to go to Jerhboub.
» He died in 1<J02.
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this subject carried all the more weight from the
fact that his reputation for piety and asceticism
was higher than that of Mohammed Ahmed. The
latter was also grasping and avaricious, quahties
which compared unfavourably with the contempt
for worldly riches attributed to Senoussi.^
Several years of internal dissension followed
on Slatin Bey's surrender. As the cruelty and
rapacity of the Dervish rule became more and more
evident, the religious fervour, which had been at
first excited by Mohammed Ahmed, waned. In
1888, a certain Abu Gemaizeh raised the standard
of revolt. His programme was " to overthrow the
Mahdi imposture and to re-establish the true
religion of the Prophet." Abu Gemaizeh was not
a member of the Senoussi order, but he attracted
the Senoussiyeh to him by giving out that his
movement was favoured by the Sheikh of Jerhboub.
At first, he gained some successes. " The whole
Soudan," Sir Reginald Wingate wrote, " echoed
with the wildest reports ; even at Cairo it was
beheved that the end of JNIahdiism was near, and
that a new Ruler had arisen, who would at least
open the roads to Mecca and would no longer be
at war with all the world. Relief seemed near.
Every arrival from the Soudan reported the grow-
ing success of the anti-Mahdist revolt." One of the
weak points in the ISIahdist rehgious programme,
' There is, however, a practical as well as a religious side to tlie
Senoussi movement. Mr. Weld Blundell, who visited Siwa in 18i)4,
writes : " From the practical side, the whole movement may he desciilted
as a very large, well organised, slave-owning and slave-dealing cor-
poration, managed by the heads of the Brotherhood, witli local brandies
and establishments grouped round the various Zau yas or convents
of the order in all ])arts of North Africa, Witliout presumina: to
apportion the real religious sincerity and tlie purely material eleniont
in the movement, it may be taken for granted that, as in similar
religious organisations nearer home, religion and business are liajipily
combined in such a way as to give entire satisfaction to the leaders
who get the principal benefit of it at present, and to foster vague hopes
among the humbler adherents of some great triumph in the future."
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on which Abu Gemaizeh seized, was that the
Khahfa had placed obstacles in the way of JNloham-
medans performing the ordinary Haj, and had
proclaimed that a visit to the shrine of JNIohammed
Ahmed at Omdurman might be substituted for
the time-honoured pilgrimage to JNIecca. When
Senoussi's views were eventually made known, it
was discovered that he gave full moral support to
Abu Gemaizeh, in so far as the latter opposed the
heterodox views put forward by the Ivhalifa on the
subject of the pilgrimage. But beyond this he did
not go. He was, he said, "the peaceful pioneer
of a religious revival, which revolted against the
bloodshed and rapine of the false Mahdi of the
Soudan. He had no intention or desire to inter-
fere. Mohammed Ahmed and his successor must
work their owii salvation or destruction ; he was in
no way responsible."
Thus the great Sheikh of Jerhboub enunciated
a policy of non-intervention in terms which might
have done credit to Lord Granville. The result
of the attitude taken up by Senoussi was that the
influence of Abu Gemaizeh speedily waned. On
February 22, 1889, he was attacked by Osman
Adam, one of the Khalifa's heutenants : the
Dervishes gained a complete victory. Osman
Adam's report of this action, which was unearthed
by Sir Reginald Wingate, may be quoted as a
characteristic specimen of Mahdist official litera-
ture. " The Ansar," ^ he wrote, " not satisfied with
their victory, pursued the retreating enemy till
sunset, and after that the cavalry still continued
pursuing till almost all were killed. They followed
them even as far as the caves and forests, where
they tried to conceal themselves, but they were
• The "Ansar" (literally " Helpers") was the name given to the
first converts to Islam m;ide at Medina after the Ilcij^ira. The applica-
tion bv the Malidi of this name to his followers was calculated to excite
tlie resentment of orthodox Mohammedans.
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all killed ; even those who transformed themselves
into apes, wolves, dogs, and rabbits (for the natives
of the western countries can be so transformed)
were also killed even to the very last. . . . Allah
was with us, and we saw several miracles during
the battle. Allah sent do\Mi fire, which burnt
up the dead bodies of the enemy and also their
wounded, showing how violent was His wrath
upon them. The brethren also saw some sixteen
white flags with green borders waving in the air.
They also heard the sound of drums beating in the
air, and saw objects hke mountains faUing upon
the enemy. The Prophet also revealed himself to
many of the followers previous to the battle. . . .
It had been my intention to send the heads of all
the chiefs to you, but as they have by this time
decayed, and would be heavy for messengers, I
must be satisfied with sending you only two heads,
viz. the head of the devil's agent, and the head of
the son of Sultan Salih. . . . The enemy's devil,
Abu Gemaizeh, died from small-pox in his house
some days ago, and thus Darfour is left without
a head." Father Ohrwalder, who escaped from
Omdurman in 1891, reported that "the Abu
Gemaizeh revolt depopulated almost the entire
district. There were but few men to cultivate,
and the country became infested by quantities of
elephants, hons, and other wild animals."
Further internal dissensions ensued, with the
result that the Khalifa eventually withdrew his
forces from Darfour.
2. Bahr-el-Ghazal.
" The province of Bahr-el-Ghazal," Sir Reginald
Wingate wrote, "may be described as about five
times as big as England. It is a district covered
with forests and mountains, and seamed with
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low valleys subject to inundation. . . . The soil is
exceptionally fertile and there are cattle in abun-
dance, while the population is estimated at between
three and four millions." ^ Gessi Pasha, General
Gordon's Ueutenant, was the first European
Governor of the province. In 1881, he was
succeeded by Mr. Frank Lupton, who had served
in the British mercantile marine, and who subse-
quently joined General Gordon in the Soudan.
When, in 1882, the news of the Kordofan re-
belhon reached the Bahr-el-Ghazal province, many
of the most important Sheikhs sent in their allegi-
ance to the Alahdi. Lupton, however, amidst
many vicissitudes, held his own. Towards the close
of 1883, news arrived of the annihilation of General
Hicks's army. This disaster was as decisive of the
fate of Bahr-el-Ghazal as it had been of that of
Darfour. On April 28, 1884, Lupton wrote to
Emin Pasha : " It is all up with me here. Every
one has joined the Mahdi, and his army takes
charge of the Mudirieh the day after to-morrow.
What I have passed through these last few days no
one knows. I am perfectly alone." On the follow-
ing day, Lupton surrendered to Karam-AUah, the
commander of the Dervish force. He was invited
to embrace the faith of Islam, and to assume
the name of Abdullah. Lupton, an eye-witness
subsequently reported, "replied to Karam- Allah
that he had already adopted the Mohammedan
religion, but Karam -Allah was not satisfied and
insisted that he should openly adopt the creed,
and bade Lupton repeat after him : ' There is
no God but God, and Mohammed is the Prophet
of God,' and while Lupton was repeating this, the
Emirs drew their swords, and when he had finished,
* This was probably an overestimate. The population of the Bahr-el-
Ghazal province, prior to the Dervish rule, was subsequently estimated
at 1,500,000.—See Egypt, No. 1 of 1904, p. 79.
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shouted in one voice : ' Hold to your faith, you are
now one of us (Ansar) as we are of you, we are
brothers in the f^iith.' " Lupton was shortly after-
wards confined as a prisoner at Omdurman, where
he subsequently died.
Thus it was that, in Sir Reginald Wingate's
words, "in this vast province, not a shred of
Egyptian authority remained ; all had been sub-
merged under the waves of JNIahdiism, which now
rolled placidly over its broad plains, bearing on
their way vast bands of slaves for the greatly
enlarged households of Mohammed Ahmed, his
Khalifas, and his Emirs."
The subsequent history of the Bahr-el-Ghazal
province resembles that of Darfour. jNIahdist
misrule brought in its train its natural accom-
paniment of discontent and internal dissensions.
Eventually, the Dervishes withdrew. Few, in 1885,
would have predicted that thirteen years later the
ultimate fate of this remote district would bring
the two great Western Powers of Europe to the
verge of war.^ Such, however, was to be the case.
8. Equatoria.
To the south and south-east of the Bahr-el-
Ghazal province lies that of Equatoria, the creation
of Sir Samuel Baker, whose work was subsequently
carried on by General Gordon. In 1879, General
Gordon named Edward Schnitzler, a native of
Prussian Silesia, better known as Emin Pasha, to be
Governor of the province. The latter, on assuming
office, gave the usual account of Egyptian misride.
* I have purposely omitted any account of what is known as the
" Fashoda incident" from this work. I should be most unwilling- to
do anything which might contribute to revive public interest in an
affair which is now, happily for all concerned, well-nigh forgotten.
The word " Fashoda " has been erased from the map. The place
is now called by its Shillouk name of Kodok.
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"Since 1877," he wrote, "no accounts have been
sent in from or kept by this administration. Though
the Governors receive monies for the payment of
wages, no one has been paid a piastre for years ;
probably, however, the Governors have bought
goods with the funds belonging to the Government
and sold them at three times the amount. Slaves
figure in these accounts as oxen, asses, etc. The
making of false seals and fabricating receipts by
their use complete the picture of what has been
going on here, and with it all the place is full of
prayer-places and Fikis."^
By the end of 1882, the whole country to the
south of Khartoum, with the exception of the
Equatorial pro\dnce, was in open revolt against
Egyptian authority. Towards the end of March
1884, the news of the annihilation of General Hicks's
army reached Emin Pasha. Shortly afterwards, he
was summoned by Karam-Allah to surrender his
province. "Now just think of my position," he
wrote somewhat later. "For fourteen months I
had had no communication with Khartoum, or
news from there. The magazines were quite
empty of clothes, soap, coffee, etc. ... In Lado,
there was a rabble of drunkards and gamblers,
most of them fellow-countrymen of the rebels, the
clerks of my divan. The prospect was not brilliant.
. . . Accordingly, I asked my officers here in open
council whether they considered it more desirable to
submit or to prepare to fight. There could be no
doubt what the answer would be ; the purport of
it was submission."
Emin Pasha did not, however, submit. Karam-
Allah's advance was stayed owing to disturbances
in his rear. Nevertheless, in the anarchy which
prevailed, no effective control could be exercised
over the outlying portions of the province. " At
' A " Fiki " is a man wlio expounds the law of Islam.
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the end of 1885," Sir Reginald Wingate wrote,
"the extent of Emin's province was about 180
miles, a narrow strip from the lake to Lado, and
an area of about one-seventh of the original extent
of the province previous to the revolt."
In February 1886, Emin Pasha received a letter
from Nubar Pasha in which he was informed that the
Egyptian Government had decided to abandon the
Soudan, that they were unable to afford him any
assistance, and that he was authorised to take any
steps he might consider advisable to leave the
country. At the same time, Emin Pasha heard of
the fall of Khartoum and of the death of General
Gordon. The difficulties of his position were thus
increased. He decided, however, to remain where
he was. " The greater part of my men," he wrote,
"especially my officers, have no desire to leave
this country. ... I shall remain here and hold
together, as long as possible, the remnant of the
last ten years."
It is unnecessary to give the detailed history of
all that followed. How, by reason of rebellion and
mutiny, Emin Pasha's position became daily more
difficult ; how his situation attracted the attention
and sympathy of the civilised world ; how an expe-
dition was eventually organised to relieve him
;
how Stanley and his adventurous companions cut
their way through the dense untrodden forests of
Central Africa ; how, when they at last reached
Emin, the latter was unwilling to leave ; how his
hesitation was eventually overcome ; and how he
and his companions were with infinite trouble at
last brought down to the coast,—these are matters
of history, which have been described by others
who are better informed than myself on the subject.^
The Lado Enclave, as it is now termed, was
leased to King Leopold II., as Sovereign of the
* Vide Stanley's In Darkest AJ'rica, 1890.
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Independent State of the Congo, by an Agreement
signed at Brussels on JMay 12, 1894. The Congo-
lese occupation caused at one time a good deal of
friction between the British Government and King
Leopold.^ Eventually, a further Agreement was
signed in London on May 9, 1906. Under this
Agreement, the Lado Enclave has to be handed
over to the Soudanese Government within six
months after the demise of King Leopold.
4. Sennar,
Of the fate of the pro\dnce of Sennar and of its
once celebrated capital, little need be said. In the
spring of 1885, the town was besieged by the
Mahdists. The Egyptian commander, Hassan
Sadik, made a gallant defence. On his death,
which occurred during a sortie, he was succeeded
by Nur Bey, who on several occasions repulsed the
attacks of the Dervishes and inflicted great loss on
them. Eventually, Abdul - Kerim, the Mahdist
commander, " having gathered all the neighbour-
ing tribes, completely cut off communication, and
soon the garrison, weakened by continuous fight-
ing, was at the last stage of famine. As a final
effort, Nur Bey, on August 18, ordered a sortie to
be made by Hassan Bey Osman with 1500 of the
troops, but the rebels falling on them at Kassab
utterly defeated them, and the remnant, with their
leader killed, made their way back to the town.
On the following day, Nur Bey, having exhausted
all the food in tlie town, was obliged to capitulate.
Of the original garrison of 3000 men, 700 only
remained,—strong evidence indeed of the seventy
of the fighting and of the siege." The province of
» The facts are briefly stated in Egypt, No. 1 of lUOU, pp. 121-123,
and E<jiji>t, No. 1 of 1907, p. 119.
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Sermar remained under Dervish rule till the downfall
of the Khahfa's power in 1898.
5. Kassala.
Kassala is the most important inland town in
the Eastern Soudan. Its population numbers about
13,000. In November 1883, it was besieged by-
one of Osman Digna's lieutenants. The siege
continued vdth varying fortunes until July 1885.
Hopes were from time to time entertained that
relief would come from Abyssinia. The garrison
was also encouraged to hold out by the presence of
British troops at Suakin. But no relief came. By
April 13, 1885, all the donkeys in the town had
been eaten. A successful sally, made on June 15,
in which 1000 oxen and 1000 sheep were captured,
enabled the defence to be prolonged. But the
relief was only temporary. By July 30, every
kind of food, including gum and hides, had been
exhausted. The garrison capitulated. They re-
ceived a promise that their hves would be spared,
but the promise was broken. " It Was believed,"
Sir Reginald Wingate wrote, " that the inhabitants
had secreted treasure, and this was made the plea for
every description of torture, cruelty, and robbery.'
In 1894, Kassala was occupied by the Italians, but
three years later (December 1897) was evacuated.
It now forms part of the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan.
6. The Abyssinian Frontier Garrisons.
When, in the winter of 1883, the policy of with-
drawal from the Soudan was adopted, the British
Government decided to send a mission to King
John of Abyssinia, with whom they were on
friendly terms, in the hope that his aid might be
enlisted in facilitating the retreat of the garrisons
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from the Egyptian posts adjoining the frontier of
Abyssinia. Sir WilUam Hewett was accordingly
sent to Abyssinia to act on behalf of the British
Government. He was accompanied by INIason
Bey, an American officer in the Egyptian service,
who was well acquainted with the affairs of the
Soudan, and who acted on behalf of the Egyptian
Government.
The result of this mission was that a Treaty
was signed at Adowa on June 3, 1884. The main
provisions of this Treaty were that the province of
Bogos, which the King had for long coveted, was
to be ceded to him, and that in return he was to
facilitate the withdrawal of the Egyptian frontier
garrisons, and to permit their retreat through
Abyssinian territory.
Public attention at this time was so exclusively
directed to the events which were passing at
Khartoum, that the British Government never got
due credit for the successful efforts which were made
to save the Egyptian garrisons on the Abyssinian
frontier.
On Septeriiber 12, 1884, the province of Bogos
was, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty,
handed over to Abyssinia.
During the spring of 1885, the Egyptian
garrisons of Amadib and Senliit were brought
safely doAvn to Massowah.
One of the most important garrisons was that of
Galabat. In August 1884, Colonel Chermside,
who was at that time Governor-General of the Red
Sea Littoral, despatched Major Saad Rifaat to
Abyssinia to assist in the preparations which were
being made for the relief of Galabat, which was
then besieged by the Dervishes. Leaving Adowa
with a considerable force of Abyssinians on
January 27, 1885, Major Rifaat shortly afterwards
attacked and defeated the enemy, and succeeded in
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bringing the garrison and population, numbering
about 3000 men, women, and children, in safety to
Massowah, whence those who wished to return
were sent back to Egypt.
The garrison of Gera, which had hkemse been
besieged for some months, was also extricated by
the Abyssinians, the Egyptian soldiers being, more-
over, subsequently clothed and fed by King John.
About 5000 men, women, and children were brought
down to Massowah and despatched to Cairo.
In fact, of the posts on the Abyssinian frontier,
the only one of which the garrison fell into the
hands of the Dervishes was Gedaref, called also
Suk Abu Sin. The commandant of this post,
which was garrisoned by about 200 men, capitu-
lated in April 1884, that is to say two months
before the Hewett Treaty had been concluded.
On the whole, therefore, the results of the Treaty
were satisfactory.
7. Berbera.
Ismail Pasha was not content with extending
Egyptian authority to the sources of the Nile.
Pashadorn, with its baneful accompaniments of
misrule and oppression, stretched its tentacles to
the Somali coast and inland to the fertile province
of Harrar. When the parent trunk rotted, the
first of the branches to fall off was Berbera. It
fell at the feet of the Queen of England.
The Egyptian Governor of Berbera was of the
ordinary type. Mr. F. L. James, who had travelled
much in the Soudan and in Somaliland, wrote to
me on April 21, 1884 : " On all hands we heard
nothing but the most bitter complaints as to the
ill-treatment the natives (Somalis) met with at the
hands of the Egyptian Governor of Berbera, Abdul
Rahman Bey. . . . That he is detested by the
people and a very bad Governor is not open to
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doubt ; and after wliat happened two years ago
to myself and party, while travelling in the Soudan,
I am surprised at no enormity on the part of an
Egyptian Governor."
Sir Richard Burton wrote in 1856: "The
occupation of the port of Berbera has been advised
for many reasons. In the first place, Berbera is the
true key to the Red Sea, the centre of East African
trafnc, and the only place for shipping upon the
western Erythraean shore from Suez to Guardafui.
Backed by lands capable of cultivation, and by hills
covered with pine and other valuable trees, enjoying
a comparatively temperate climate, with a regular,
although thin monsoon, this harbour has been
coveted by many a foreign conqueror. Circum-
stances have thrown it, as it were, into our arms,
and, if we refuse the chance, another and a rival
nation will not be so blind." ^ The Indian authori-
ties had always been alive to the desirability of
preventing Berbera from falling into the hands of
any European Power.
The political status of the coast eastward of
Zeyla was on a different footing from that portion
of the coast which extends from Zeyla to the
straits of Bab-el-JNIandeb. The Sultan exercised
rights of sovereignty over the territory between
Bab-el-Mandeb and Zeyla, which rights, although
never formally recognised by the British Govern-
ment, had not been disputed. On the other hand,
the sovereign rights of the Sultan over the Somali
tribes lying between Zeyla and Ras Hafoun had
been repeatedly denied by the British Government.
In' 1877, a Convention was negotiated between
Ismail Pasha and tlie British Government, the
main object of whicli was to recognise the juris-
diction of the Khedive, under the suzerainty of
the Sultan, as far eastward as Ras Hafoun. The
BurtoUj First Footsteps in East Africa, p. xxxiv.
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fifth article of this Convention stipulated that it
was not to come into operation until the Sultan
gave a formal assurance to the British Government
tliat no portion of the territory on the Somali coast
should be ceded to any foreign Power. In spite of
repeated invitations, the Sultan had never given
this assurance. The Convention was, therefore,
invalid, and the hands of the British Government
were free. Lord Granville, accordingly, on being
pressed by the India Office to move in the matter,
instructed Lord Dufferin on May 29, 1884, to
denounce the Convention and to inform the Porte
that " with regard to the coast eastward of Zeyla,
it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government,
on the withdrawal of the Egyptians, to make such
arrangements as they might think desirable for the
preservation of order and the security of British
interests, especially at Berbera, from which Aden
drew its chief supplies." This communication drew
forth some remonstrances from Constantinople
;
they were set aside. In October 1884, a British
official was charged with the administration of
Berbera ; a small force of police and sepoys was
placed at his disposal. A notification of the estab-
lishment of a British Protectorate over this part of
the coast was conveyed to the French Government
by Lord Lyons on April 23, 1885. Thus Berbera,
with the neighbouring port of Bulbar, were peace-
ably absorbed into the British dominions.
8. Harrar.
The fertile province of Harrar Hes about 200
miles south-west of Zeyla. Sir Richard Burton
visited it in 1856. In his time, the province was
governed in a barbarous fashion by Emir ^V limed,
one of a family whicli had for long held dominion
over the country. The fertility of Harrar excited
52 MODERN EGYPT pi. in
the ambition of Ismail Pasha. It was annexed,
and in 1874 the reigning Emir was put to death by
Raouf Pasha, himself a bad specimen of a bad class.
The usual results followed. JNIajor Hunter, who
visited Harrar early in 1884, reported : " The
Khedive's rule is extremely unpopular, and justly
so, for the admitted object of the Governors is to
tax the inhabitants to the utmost. No justice is
obtainable, peculation is rife, trade is stifled, the
soldiery pillage the villages, and the troops are
discontented owdng to deferred payment and pro-
longed expatriation. . . . The Governor, AU Pasha,
is a shaky, garrulous old man of Turkish extraction,
who has no idea beyond filling the Treasury,
presumably for the benefit of the Egyptian
Government."
JManifestly, the only wise course to pursue, both
in the interests of Harrar and of Egypt, was that
the Egyptian Government should abandon a trust
which had been so grossly abused. The evacuation
of the province was pressed upon the Egyptian
Ministers, who, albeit reluctantly, accepted the
inevitable logic of facts.
The withdrawal of the garrison, and of others
who wished to leave, across 200 miles of country,
inhabited by tribes who were far from friendly
to the Egyptians, was no easy matter. The duty
of executing this task was entrusted to Major
Hunter, who was assisted by two other British
officers. Radwan Pasha was sent from Cairo to
act as Egyptian Commissioner ; he co-operated
loyally with Major Hunter. The retreat was
skilfully conducted. The garrison and followers,
to the number of 8359 persons, were marched
down to the coast in detachments during the early
months of 1885, and embarked for Egypt.
The government of the province was then
handed over to Abdullah, a son of the last reigning
CH.XXX DEBRIS OF THE SOUDAN 53
Emir. The new Emir did not maintain his posi-
tion for long. In January 1887, King Menelek of
Shoa attacked and took possession of Harrar.
9. Zeyla.
It has been already mentioned that the political
status of Zeyla was different from that of Berbera.
In the latter case, the Sultan could not put forward
any vaUd claim to suzerainty. Zeyla, on the other
hand, had formed part of the Ottoman dominions
before it came under Egyptian jurisdiction. In
1875, it was farmed by the Sultan to Ismail Pasha,
on payment of a tribute of £13,500 a year.
The British Government, through their Ambas-
sador at Constantinople, invited the Porte on May
14, 1884, "to resume direct jurisdiction over the
ports on the Egyptian coast of the Red Sea and
to occupy them with Turkish troops." On July 17,
the Porte was again invited to take " the necessary
steps, on the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops,
to maintain its authority over Tajourrah and
Zeyla." It was, at the same time, stated that the
British Government were " anxious to receive the
reply of the Porte with as httle delay as possible."
The Porte treated the matter in its usual dilatory
fashion. No definite answer was given. In the
meanwhile, there was an imminent risk of dis-
turbances in the neighbourhood of Zeyla. On
August 1, 1884, therefore. Lord Dufferin was
instructed to "inform the Porte that unless the
Turkish Government were prepared to take imme-
diate steps for the occupation of Zeyla, it would
be necessary for Her 5lajesty's Government to
send a force there to preserve order." Still the
Sultan did not move. Action became necessary
on the part of the British Government. On
August 24, 1884, Major Hunter telegraphed to
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me : " Force landed at Zeyla. Somalis impressed.
Governor oblifj^ino-," The obliu'inf? Governor was
kept in his place for a while, because some dis-
cussion ensued as to the future of Zeyla. A
difference of opinion existed among the British
authorities as to whether it was worth keeping or
not. It is now British territory.
The Egyptian tribute was paid to the Porte for
some while after the British occupation of Zeyla.
Eventually, in connection with certain Custom-
house negotiations, an understanding was arrived
at between Cairo and Constantinople that the
payment of the tribute should cease.
10. Tajourrah.
It was not to be supposed that, whilst this
scramble for Egyptian territory was going on,
the French would remain idle. In 1862, they had
taken possession of Obokh, in virtue of a Conven-
tion made with some local Sheikhs. The French
Government now decided to annex the neigh-
bouring territory of Tajourrah. Early in May
1884, a French ship arrived at Richal, a port near
Tajourrah ; ten sailors, accompanied by the Vizier
of Tajourrah, landed, told the local Sheikhs that
the place belonged to them, and that they would
return to take possession of it. JNI. Barrere, the
French representative at Cairo, " knew nothing of
the matter ; he knew Tajourrah was Egyptian
territory." Mr. Egerton "thought it possible that
there might be some misunderstanding." There
was, however, no misunderstanding. The Porte
uttered some feeble protests, and tried to excite
English jealousy of French extension. The British
Ciovernmcnt, however, wisely remained indifferent.
Since 1884, Tajourrah has been a French possession.
CH.XXX DEBRIS OF THE SOUDAN 55
11. 3fassowah.
Suakin and Massowah were placed under
Egyptian jurisdiction by an Imperial Firman
issued in 1865. The tribute payable by Egypt
to the Sultan was, at the same time, raised by
£37,500 a year.
The same disorder reigned at Massowah as
elsewhere. Colonel Chermside telegraphed from
Suakin on January 22, 1885 : " I do hope you wiU
take a speedy decision as to the Massowah ques-
tion, as, without wishing to reflect on the long
string of my predecessors, it is hard to carry on at
all in the chaos everything is in, police, pensions,
establishment of employes, dues, contracts, water-
supply, public works, military garrison, every-
thing is in indescribable confusion, costly without
efficiency." The Egyptian Government were in-
capable of evolving order out of this chaos. The
only possible course was to let Massowah go the
way of the other lost possessions of Egypt. The
question then arose as to who should step into
possession of the property, which was about to
be abandoned.
" LTtalie," a French diplomatist said at the
time of the Berlin Congress, " rode autour du
monde pour trouver un endroit quelconque ou elle
pourra placer son drapeau." The Italian nation
has, in fact, ever since its creation, shown a good
deal of the restless ambition which often attaches
itself to youth. The desire manifested of late
years in Italy to estabhsh colonies in distant lands
appears to be based to some extent on the plea
that other great Powers have founded colonies,
and that, therefore, Italy must do the same. The
Italians, in all the exuberance of youthful national
life, forgot, in 1885, that the monk's cowl does
not necessarily make the monk, and rushed into
v56 MODERN EGYPT pt. m
African colonisation with all the impetuosity which
characterises Southern nations.
Some years previously, the Italians had estab-
Hshed themselves at Assab Bay, a proceeding wliich
was viewed with a good deal of rather unnecessary
ill-humour by the Indian Government of the day.
When it became apparent that the neighbouiing
territory of JNIassow^ah was hkely to be in the
pohtical market, Italian ambition fired up. It
was thought necessary to acquire this desirable
possession before it could fall into the hands of
any rival claimant. The first thing to do was to
secure the goodwill of England ; Lord Granville was
sounded on the subject. On December 22, 1884,
he wrote to the British Ambassador at Rome : " I
have informed Count Nigra (the Italian Ambassador
in London) that Her Majesty's Government were
desirous of showing their friendly feeling towards
Italy in all ways. The Egyptian Government
were unable, I said, to continue their hold on all
the African Httoral of the Red Sea. Under these
circumstances, the ports naturally reverted to
Turkey. We had for some time been giving
advice to the Porte to retake possession of them.
I was glad, I continued, to observe that M. INIancini
fully recognised that we had no right and made no
pretension to give away that which did not belong
to us. If the ItaUan Government should desire
to occupy some of the ports in question, it
was a matter between Italy and Turkey ; but I
was able to inform him that Her JNIajesty's Govern-
ment, for their part, had no objection to raise
against the ItaHan occupation of ZuUa, Beilul, or
Massowah."
When, at a subsequent period, many sober-
thinking Italians regretted the occupation of
Massowah, it was occasionally alleged that England
had instigated the occupation, and that Italy had,
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in fact, been used as a eatspaw in order to get
the British Government out of a difficulty. These
statements are devoid of foundation. The British
Government never proposed to Italy to occupy
Massowah. All they did was to adopt a friendly
attitude towards Italy, and to abstain from creating
difficulties which might have proved obstacles to
the attainment of Italian aspirations. The British
Government did nothing to thwart the ItaHans ;
but beyond this they did not go. Indeed, I
remember telling M. de Martino, the Italian
Consul-General at Cairo, that my personal opinion
was that the Italians were making a mistake in
occupying Massowah. He was inclined to share
my views, but the matter was not one for him to
decide. The Italian Government and the Italian
Parliament were naturally presumed to be the best
judges of Italian interests. M. INIancini, who was
then Minister for Foreign Affairs, warmly espoused
the cause of occupation, and he was at the time
supported by public opinion in Italy. Dissuasion
or opposition on the part of England would have
been regarded as an unfriendly act dictated by an
unworthy jealousy of Itahan extension.
When the Italian Government were assured of
the absence of objection on the part of England,
they acted with promptitude. Plausible excuses
for action were not wanting. Some Italian
travellers had been murdered in the neighbourhood
of Massowah, and the Italian Government had
failed to obtain adequate satisfaction. Early,
therefore, in the month of February 1885, a
formidable squadron appeared at Massowah and
took possession of the place. The Egyptian
garrison was shortly afterwards withdrawn.
The Sultan was indignant. For a time, the
Foreign Offices of Europe rang with angry but
ineffectual protests from the Porte. The Powers
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who had guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire were implored to interfere. But no one
had any real interest in the matter. The
Cabinets of Europe turned their heads the other
way, and the diplomatic clamour soon died out.
From that time forth, Italy has been in possession
of Massowah. Whether it is worth while for the
Tuscan and Neapohtan peasant to continue to pay
taxes for the maintenance of Itahan authority over
a territory, which will probably never be of any
great value either from a commercial or from any
other point of view, is a matter for the Italian
nation to decide. Nations are not, however,
entirely governed by considerations of material
interests. The national honour and dignity are
supposed to be at stake, and they ^\dll, without
doubt, so far carry the day as to prevent Italy
from abandoning territory v.hich possibly many
Italians now think it was unwise ever to have
seized.
Thus it was that the huge unwieldy edifice,
which Ismail Pasha had sought to erect, fell with a
crash which resounded throughout North-Eastern
Africa. The Englishman, the Italian, the French-
man, the Abyssinian, the Dervish, and the slave-
hunter divided the spoils between them. And why
did the edifice fall ? The destruction of General
Hicks's army precipitated the catastrophe. But
the real reason w^hy Ismail Pasha's empire fell was
that it was eventually overtaken by the fate
inevitably attending all poHtical fabrics wliich are
rotten to the core. It fell because it deserved to
fall. It may be that the light of Western
civilisation will some day be shed over the whole
of Africa, but if this consummation is ever to be
attained, it must be through other agents than
the slave-hunting, corrupt, and tyrannical Pashas,
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who were employed by the Egyptian Govern-
ment, and who, themselves but semi -civilised,
introduced none of the blessings but some of
the curses of civilisation amongst the people
who, by a cruel fate, were for a time placed under
their control
CHAPTER XXXI
THE DEFENCE OF EGYPT
1886-1892
The Egyptian army—Negotiations with the Dervishes—Fighting on
the frontier—The siege of Suakin—Defeat of Osman Digna
—
Wad-el-Nejumi—Nejumi advances—The battles of Argin and of
Toski—Death of Wad-el-Nejumi—Results of the battle—Situation
at Suakin— The reoccupation of Tokar— Defeat of Osman
Although British military aid to a very limited
extent was subsequently on one or two occasions
afforded to the Egyptian Government, it may be
said that from the date of the battle of Ginniss
(December 30, 1885) the defence of Egypt against
the Dervishes practically devolved on the Egyptian
army. That army was now officered by a well-
selected body of Englishmen. Its organisation had
been greatly improved. The men were gaining
confidence in themselves. A small Egyptian Camel
Corps had fought at Kirbekan, and its conduct had
obtained General Brackenbury's commendations.
A more considerable Egyptian force had taken a
creditable part in the battle of Ginniss. Hopes,
therefore, began to be entertained that for the
future the Egyptian army would of itself suffice
to repel any attack which might be made by the
Dervishes. The sequel showed that these* hopes
were destined to be realised.
It has been already sho^vn that a great shrinkage
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of Egyptian territory had taken place. The army
was no longer called upon to defend remote regions
in the centre of Africa. Its task was of a more
modest nature. In the first place, it had to prevent
the Dervishes from descending the valley of the
Nile farther than Wadi Haifa ; in the second place,
it had to maintain whatever was left of Egyptian
authority in the Eastern Soudan. For the time
being, this latter task was confined to the defence
of the town of Suakin, for Egyptian authority did
not extend beyond its walls. For obvious reasons,
based on the difficulties of communication, the
operations in the valley of the Nile and at Suakin
were to a great extent independent of each other.
Before entering upon a description of the
miUtary operations which were about to take
place, it will be as well to allude briefly to an
attempt which was made to negotiate with the
Dervishes. A Convention between the British
Government and the Porte was signed at Con-
stantinople, on October 24, 1885, in virtue of
which two Commissioners, one British and one
Turkish, were despatched to Cairo. ^ The second
article of the Convention provided that the Ottoman
Commissioner was to consult with the Khedive
" upon the best means of tranquillising the Soudan
by pacific measures." After some delay, it was
arranged that Youssuf Pasha Shuhdi should be
sent to Wadi Haifa in order to try his hand at
negotiation with the Dervishes. He left Cairo for
the frontier in May 1886.
It was as weU to make an attempt to negotiate,
if only to show to those who beheved in the
possibility of successful negotiations that it was
hopeless to attempt to come to any arrangement
with the Dervishes. But to all who had any
appreeiation of the true nature of the Mahdist
* This subject is more fully treated in Chapter XLVI
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movement, it was obvious that Youssuf Pasha
Shuhdi's mission was foredoomed to faihire. It
proved, in fact, to be wholly unproductive of results.
A year later, the Khalifa addressed letters to the
Queen, the Sultan, and the Khedive, which
breathed the true spirit of Mahdiism. The letter
to the Queen terminated in the following eloquent,
if somewhat bombastic peroration : " And thou,
if thou wilt not yield to the command of God, and
enter among the people of Islam and the followers
of the Mahdi
—
grace be upon him—come thyself
and thy armies and fight with the host of God.
And if thou wilt not come, then be ready in thy
place, for at His pleasure and at the time that
He shall will it, the hosts of God will raze thy
dwelling and let thee taste of sorrow, because
thou hast turned away from the path of the
Lord, for therein is sufficiency, and salvation is
to him who followeth the JNlahdi."
For three years subsequent to the battle of
Ginniss, desultory fighting continued in the neigh-
bourhood of Suakin, and in the Nile valley.
Notably, a brilliant skirmish took place on April
28, 1887, at Sarras, which resulted in the defeat
of the Dervishes with a loss of about 200 men,
the Egyptian loss being 51 killed and woimded.
It was not, however, until December 1888 that
any serious engagement occurred. By that time,
the indigenous tribes near Suakin had learnt to
appreciate the true character of Dervish rule.
They were either openly hostile to Osman Digna,
or were only prevented by fear from throwing
off tlieir allegiance to the Mahdi. Osman Digna,
however, still terrorised the country with tribal
levies drawn from a distance. He obtained rein-
forcements and laid siege to Suakin. It was
eventually decided that he should be attacked,
and for this purpose more Egyptian troops were
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despatched from Cairo. In addition to these,
owing to pressure brought to bear upon the
Government in Parhament, a small British force
was sent from Cairo to Suakin, though its presence
was quite unnecessary. Sir Francis Grenfell,
who had succeeded Sir Evelyn Wood as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army, conducted
the operations in person. On December 20, 1888,
the Dervishes were attacked and driven from their
entrenchments with a loss of 500 men. The British
and Egyptian loss was 2 officers and 50 men killed
and wounded. The result of this action was to
relieve the pressure on Suakin. Osman Digna,
however, still maintained his hold over the Eastern
Soudan generally. A further result of no slight
importance was that the Egyptian troops acquired
confidence in themselves and inspired confidence
in the minds of the public. Previous to this
action, few believed in the Egyptian army.
Subsequent to the action, the voice of criticism
was to a certain extent silenced. It had been
proved that some reliance could be placed on
Egyptian troops.
Afler this engagement, the valley of the Nile
became the chief centre of interest.
A period of political hurricane, whether the
scene be laid in savage Africa or in civilised
Europe, generally brings to the front some
individual who appears to embody in his own
person the genius of the principles which it is
sought to assert. Arabi, though no hero, was a
fitting representative of the justifiable, but blind,
sullen, and unintelligent discontent which prevailed
amongst the Egyptians at the time of the rebellion
of which he was the leader. The JNlahdist Avatar
was of a different type. The true incarnation of
Mahdiism was not to be found in Osman Diffna.
nor even in the Mahdi himself. Both of these
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men were in some degree strutting on the stage.
It may well be doubted whether either of them
believed in himself. Enlightened self-interest,
more especially in the shape of the acquisition
of wealth, lurked behind the grandiloquent periods
of their Proclamations, and may be traced in the
stage tricks by which it was sought to strengthen
the faith of a credulous and fanatical population.
When a prophet puts pepper under his finger-nails
in order to excite his lachrymal glands^ a safe
indication is given that he has descended from his
prophetic pedestal, and that, by his own confession,
he may be classed amongst P}i:honesses, the mani-
pulators of Delphic oracles and winking virgins.
It was reserved for Wad-el-Nejumi to embody
in his own person the true principles of mihtant
JNIahdiism. He was at once the Peter the Hermit
of the JNIahdist crusaders and the Prince Rupert
of Dervish chivalry. He believed in Mahdiism,
and he believed in himself. When summoned by
Sir Francis Grenfell to surrender previous to the
battle of Toski, he replied, " We are not afraid of
any one ; we only fear God ! " and, ^vithout doubt,
he spoke the truth. Brave, resourceful, and per-
tinacious, Nejumi inspired amongst his followers
a confidence which he carried to his grave, and
which stood the test of mihtary defeat and death.
Few pictures are more touching than that of the
host of wild Dervish prisoners mourning with heart-
felt sorrow in the palm-grove of Toski over the
body of the chieftain who had led them, their
companions, their wives and their children, through
suffering and privation, to the destruction of their
poUtical hopes and to death. Sir Reginald Wingate
* " The Greek who came in told the Greek Consul that the Mahdi
puts pepper under his finjrer-nails, and when he receives visitors then
he touches liis eyes and weeps copiously ; that he eats a few grains of
dhoora openly, but in the interior oi" tlie house he has tine feeding and
drinks alcoholic drinks."—Gordon's Journal, vol. i. p. 32.
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thus describes the character of this picturesque
savage : " Nejumi's career closed only at Toski, when
his devoted bodyguard sold their hves dearly in
defence of his revered corpse. He was a Jaalin,
but one in whom the Baggara recognised warhke
quahties similar to their own, and with whom it
was important to keep on good terms. In early
life a Fiki, like the Mahdi, and his devoted friend,
stern, hard, ascetic, the thin dark man was the
incarnation of a blind sincerity of conviction. He
never transgressed the self-appointed strictness with
which he ruled his conduct. Withal, a spice of
madness entered into his composition. There was
no man but trusted his word, and his was the
distant enterprise, his the forefront of danger
always. Mahdiism was the natural outlet for his
wild temper. He was the Khalid of the Prophet's
wars. He it was who prepared the stratagem
which annihilated Hicks. He it was who crept
silently round through the shallow mud beyond
the crumbled ramparts of Khartoum."
The defeat at Ginniss checked the advance of
the Dervishes, but their leaders were not dis-
couraged. It is probable that the Soudanese
population failed to reahse the fact that any
military reverse had been sustained. The Khahfa
vied with Napoleon in the mendacity of his
bulletins. Moreover, the main facts, as they
must have presented themselves to the minds of
his followers, were that a British force had invaded
the Soudan, that it had failed to accomplish its
object, that the capital of the Soudan had fallen
in spite of British endeavours to save it, and that
the British army had then retired and had assumed
a defensive attitude. It can, therefore, be no
matter for surprise that " general rejoicings " took
place at Khartoum. The Dervishes, confident in
the sacred nature and ultimate success of their
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cause, were stimulated to fresh exertions. As Lord
Wolseley, General Gordon, and others had pre-
dicted, it was decided to invade Egypt. " Nejumi,"
Sir Reginald AVingate says, " burnt his house at
Omdurman, and vowed that he would not return
until he had conquered Egypt. On his departure,
the Khalifa AbduUah assembled the four KhaUfas
and all the Emirs. They all stretched out their
hands in the direction of Cairo, and called out
*Allahu Akbar,' three times. Then the Khalifa
Abdullah called out in a loud voice, ' O Ansar 1
fear not for the fight for the land of Egypt
;
you
will suffer much at the battle of Assouan, after
which the whole of Egypt will fall into your
hands. O Ansar ! you will also suffer much at
the battle of ISlecca, after which the whole country
will be yours.'
"
Some time, however, elapsed before any for-
ward movement was made. A revolt against
the Khahfa's authority took place in Kordofan
;
troubles occurred in Darfour, and considerable
bodies of men bad to be detached for service on
the Abyssinian frontier. Moreover, the important
tribe of Kababish Arabs, who inhabit the territory
west of Dongola, assumed an attitude of hostility
to INIahdiism, nor was it till 1887 that they were
crushed and their chief, Saleh Bey, killed in a
decisive engagement. The Mahdist leaders, there-
fore, had their hands full for the space of three
years. As successive seasons passed and no forward
movement was made, it began to be thought that
Dervish invasion was a mere bugbear.
At last, however, the long-expected invasion
took place. In the summer of 1889, Nejumi
advanced down the valley of the Nile with a motley
force, consisting in all of over 11,000 souls. He
was joined at Sarras by a further body of 1200
fighting men, of whom about 300 were armed with
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rifles, and some 1 000 camp - followers. A short
distance south of W'adi Haifa, Nejumi left the
river. He decided to turn Wadi Haifa, to move
along the west bank parallel to, but at some little
distance from the Nile, and then to strike the river
again at a point somewhere between Wadi Haifa
and Korosko. He hoped and believed that he
would be joined by the Nubian population.
This plan was faulty in its conception. It was
of a nature to facilitate the conduct of defensive
operations. It involved toilsome marches under
a burning sun over a trackless desert devoid of
water. The difficulty of obtaining supplies was
great. Even before leaving the river, many of
the horses, camels, and donkeys had been killed
and eaten. Constant excursions to the river were
necessary in order to obtain water, and the river
was occupied by Egyptian troops, who could be
moved from point to point with comparative ease
by utilising the steamers and barges which were
at the disposal of Colonel Wodehouse, the com-
mandant of the frontier. In the language of
strategists, the Egyptian army was acting on
interior lines. By July 2, Nejumi's force occu-
pied a position in the desert a sliort distance from
Arguin, a village on the river about 3^ miles noilh
of AVadi Haifa. His movements were carefully
watched and followed by Colonel Wodehouse with
a flying column of about 2000 men. The Dervishes
attacked the village and, after a sharp engagement,
were repulsed with a loss of about 900 men,
amongst whom were several important Emirs.
The Egyptian loss consisted of 4 officers and
66 men killed and wounded. This spirited action
reflected great credit on Colonel AVodehouse and
the force which he commanded. It discouraged
the Dervishes, and contributed materially to tlie
final and decisive victory at Toski. ^lany of
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Nejumi's men deserted. Abdul Halim, his prin-
cipal lieutenant, ad\dsed a retreat. It was futile,
he thought, "to attempt an invasion of Egypt
with insufficient men, no food, and enormous
difficulties in obtaining water." Nejumi's indomit-
able spirit was, however, not to be broken. He
made an eloquent appeal to the religious zeal of
his followers, who resolved to go on, and if needs
be to die mth him. Accordingly, the unwieldy
column, dogged at every step by the watchful and
pertinacious Colonel Wodehouse, moved slowly
and laboriously northward. The Der\ashes suffered
greatly. " Desultoiy skirmishes," Sir Reginald
Wingate wrote, "took place daily, and numbers
of camp - followers, women and children, were
captured. One and all gave pitiable accounts of
the state of affairs in the Arab camp. The
numbers of camels, horses, and donkeys were
rapidly diminishing, as they constituted almost
the sole food. Might was right ; so the lion's
share, such as it was, fell to the fighting men,
while the miserable camp - followers subsisted on
powdered date-seeds and the core of the date-palm
tree, which, when ground, is said to have certain
nutritive properties. But many of these un-
fortunate people were reduced to a state of starva-
tion and, flocking to the river-bank in numbers,
were received by patrolling gun-boats, and brought
to the Egyptian camp, where they were fed and
cared for, and, if wounded, admitted to hospital."
In the meanwhile, reinforcements, both British
and Egyptian, were hurrying up from Cairo. The
Eg}^)tians were the first io amve, and Sir Francis
Grenfell, who had assumed the command, seeing
a favourable opportunity, struck the decisive blow
before the main body of British troops came up.^
1 A small body of British cavalry, however, took part iu the battle
of Toski.
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On August 2, the Egyptian force occupied Toski,
a village on the west bank of the Nile, about mid-
way between Wadi Haifa and Korosko. Nejumi
camped, on the night of the 2nd, in the desert
about five miles from the village. Early on the
morning of the 3rd, Sir Francis Grenfell made a
reconnaissance in force, and, on approaching the
Dervish position, at once recognised that the
topographical features of the ground were very
favourable to the Egyptian troops.
I visited the battlefield of Toski a few months
later. Many of the Dervish dead were still unburied.
The empty cartridge cases, which were strewed
about, showed clearly the positions which had been
occupied by the Egyptian troops. It would be
difficult to conceive ground better calculated to
give disciplined, well-armed, and well-equipped
troops every possible advantage over hordes of
courageous but iU-disciphned savages. The soil
of the desert, which is here undulating, is composed
of hard shingly sand, over which infantry, cavalry,
and artillery can move with ease and rapidity.
Here and there, a few rocks and boulders, behind
which shelter can be obtained, rise up from the
plain. Save, however, in these localities, the ground
is completely bare. Once driven from the shelter of
the rocks, it was clear that the arms of precision,
with which the Egyptian soldiers were furnished,
would work with deadly effect on the Dervishes.
Sir Francis Grenfell, therefore, with the eye of a
true tactician, determined to bring on an action
at once. Orders were sent to Toski for the
remainder of the Egyptian troops to come out.
In the meanwhile, the cavalry, under Colonel
Kitchener, headed Nejumi, who at first wished to
avoid an action, and was endeavouring to slip away
to the north. It was evident to Nejumi that
he had to accept Sir Francis Grenfell's challenge.
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He gave his followers an Arab version of Xelson's
order at Trafalgar. " We must all," he said,
" stand prepared to meet our Maker to-day."
It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of
what followed. It will be sufficient to say that
Nejumi's force was routed ; 1200 of his followers
were killed, and the greater portion of the remainder
were taken prisoner, either immediately or during
the next three days. Sir Reginald AVingate
estimates that the total force with which Xejumi
crossed the frontier on July 1, together with the
reinforcements he subsequently received, amounted
to about 5700 fighting men and 8000 camp-followers.
Of these, about 1000 fighting men and 2000 camp-
followers returned to their homes. The remainder
were either killed, died of disease and starvation, or
were taken prisoners. The Egyptian loss at the
battle was 165 killed and wounded.
What, however, became of him who is the one
interesting figure in Dervish history ? AVhat became
of the savage chieftain who had looked down on
the lines of Wadi Haifa but a few weeks previously
and had sworn, in words that bring back Border
minstrelsy to the mind of an EngHshman, that he
would " stable his steed in Wodehouse's chamber " ?
Nejumi was slightly wounded at an early stage of
the fight. One of his relations, who was taken
prisoner at Toski, said : " On the capture of the
first position, one of the Emirs escaped from the
onslaught and rushed breathlessly by, crying to
Nejumi that all was over and that he should fly.
Instead of listening to this advice, Nejumi mounted
his horse and, dashing down to the plain, vainly
endeavoured to rally his men." He was again
^yolUl(led, this time severely, and liis horse was
shot under him, but he reached the shelter of the
hills. He appears then to have been wounded yet a
third time. " During the artillery attack on the
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second position," Sir Reginald Wingate says, "a
well-directed shell brought down the largest banner,
which was subsequently discovered to be Nejumi's,
and it is probable that the shell which broke his
flag-pole also wounded Nejumi again." He was
carefully tended by his faithful bodyguard, who
placed him on a rough camel -litter, and en-
deavoured to carry him to the rear. The party,
" on being observed, was fired on by a troop of
cavalry ; the camel fell, and most of the men
appeared to have been killed ; the cavalry then
followed up, and called on the remainder to
surrender, but as they approached, the Arabs
supposed to have been killed, suddenly sprang
up, and rushing at them, a hand-to-hand encounter
ensued ; a number were killed, and the remainder
returned once more to their camel. They were
again called upon to surrender, but their only
response was a second charge, which resulted in
all being killed except one, who, mounting a
passing horse, succeeded in escaping." It was
then found that the camel carried the dead body
of Nejumi. " One of his sons, a boy of five years
old, was found dead beside the camel, while another
baby boy scarcely a year old was brought by his
iiurse into the camp at Toski on the following
day."
'
There is a rude pathos about the life and death
of this savage warrior, which brings to the mind
an avrjp apt(TTo<i of Homcric, or a Beowulf of Anglo-
Saxon times.
I have already said that the lives lost at Abu
' Of all the sons of earth, few have had their destiny more completely
changed by accident than this child. Instead of being broujilit up to
detest Christians amidst savage surroundings in the Soudan, he was
handed over to the tender care of the English nursing sisters at the
principal hospital at Cairo, by whom he was a good deal spoilt, and
who were more devoted and certainly more willing slaves to him than
any of those whom his father could have captured in the centre of
Africa.
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Klea, Kirbekan, and other previous battles in the
Soudan were wasted, or as good as wasted. The
same cannot be said of those who fell at Toski.
In this case, the soldier was the executive arm of a
wise policy. He was defending the ground secured
to civilisation from the attacks of barbarous fanatics.
He fought in a good cause. He deserved to
triumph, and his triumph was complete. The
victory of Toski brought important political results
in its train. It pricked the Mahdist bubble. It
showed that the Dervishes, although perhaps still
strong for purposes of defence in their own remote
and inhospitable deserts, were no longer to be
feared as aggressors. It gave confidence to the
Egyptian army, to the Egyptian people, and to
Europe. It showed that those who had dwelt
on the necessity of " smashing up the JNIahdi " at
Khartoum, had been in error ; that, although right
in supposing that the Dervishes would invade
Egypt, they had overrated the Dervish power of
offence ; that the Mahdist movement had less
cohesion and was less formidable than was
originally supposed ; and that a small Egyptian
force led by British officers, with merely the moral
support to be derived from the presence of a
British garrison in Egypt, was sufficient to guarantee
the integrity of the Khedive's dominions. With the
defeat at Toski, the aggressive power of Mahdiism
collapsed. Sir Francis Grenfell, and those who
fought under him, gave tranquillity to the valley
of the Nile, and enabled the work of the civilian
reformer to proceed without fear of external
aggi-ession. These were great achievements, which
deserve the acknowledgments of all who are
interested in the welfare of Eg}^t.
Tlie scene must now be shifted back again to
the Eastern Soudan. For more than two years
after the defeat of Osman Digna on December 20,
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1888, no events of importance took place in the
neighbourhood of Suakin. Egyptian authority was
limited to the ground enclosed by the fortifications
of the town. Any isolated wood -cutter or culti-
vator who roamed beyond the range of the guns was
liable to be killed or captured by the stray Dervishes
who infested the environs. The indigenous tribes
became daily more hostile to Osman Digna, but
they had not the strength nor the power of com-
bination necessary to drive him out of the country.
In the meanwhile, a lengthened controversy
took place as to whether it was desirable to
prohibit or to permit trade with the interior.
Considerable difference of opinion existed amongst
the local authorities as to the wisest course to be
pursued under the circumstances. On the one
hand, the mihtary authorities urged that if grain
were allowed to leave the coast, it could not be
prevented from reaching the Dervishes, and further,
that under the cover of legitimate trade, they
would receive munitions of war. Thus, attacks
on Egyptian territory would be facilitated. A
serious attack on Suakin, which was contemplated
in 1890, was, in fact, only prevented by the with-
drawal of the permission to trade, which had been
previously accorded. On the other hand, it was
urged that the Dervishes were few in number, that
they tyrarmised over the rest of the population,
and that it was unjust and impolitic to make the
mass of the people suffer for the faults of a few,
who, moreover, did not form part of the indigenous
tribes of the Eastern Soudan, but were strangers
coming from distant parts, whose presence was
unwelcome to the natives.
A policy, which was almost prohibitive of trade,
as also one which placed no hindrance on trade,
were, therefore, supported with an equal degree of
conviction by competent authorities. Under these
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circumstances, the course of action dictated from
Cairo was necessarily vacillating. At times, trade
was allowed ; at other times, it was wholly or in
part prohibited. Neither could this be any matter
for surprise, for the arguments which the advocates
of both policies were able to advance were vahd,
if considered exclusively on their own merits.
Another question, which grew in importance
during the year 1890, was the Slave Trade, to which
a stimulus was given by the presence of the
Dervishes on the coast. The British cruisers in the
Red Sea were powerless to stop the traffic. Arab
dhows would he concealed amongst the numerous
creeks along the coast, which, owing to the coral
reefs, cannot generally be approached by large
ships. The slave caravans would wait a short
distance inland. A favourable opportunity would
be awaited, the slaves would be brought down to
the shore, embarked at sunset, and by the following
morning, with a fair wind, the dhow would have
well-nigh reached the opposite coast of Arabia.
It was frequently pressed upon me during the
year 1889 that the only remedy for this state of
things was to reoccupy Tokar, which is the granary
of the Eastern Soudan. It was pointed out that,
if Osman Digna were once driven out of Tokar, he
would be no longer able to obtain supplies, and
would perforce be obliged to evacuate the Eastern
Soudan. For some while, I hesitated to move. I
was reluctant to undertake offensive operations of
any kind in the Soudan, and, moreover, I was 'dwnre
that any proposed advance would be viewed with
great dislike in England. At last, however, I came
to the conclusion that the reoccupation of Tokar
was desirable, and that as a military operation
it presented no great difficulty. In the spring
of 1890, I submitted these views to the British
Government.
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Lord Salisbury, who then presided at the Foreign
Office, was not on principle averse to the employ-
ment of force, but, before sanctioning its employ-
ment, he wished to be convinced that the adoption
of such a course was both necessary and desirable.
He habitually viewed military arguments wdth
suspicion. At a later period, when there was a
question of giving up to Turkey some forts garri-
soned by Egyptian troops on the coast of Midian,
Lord Salisbury wrote to me privately : " I would
not be too much impressed by what the soldiers
tell you about the strategic importance of these
places. It is their way. If they were allowed
full scope, they would insist on the importance of
garrisoning the moon in order to protect us from
Mars."
In the case now under discussion, Lord Salisbury
was not convinced of the desirability of departing
from a defensive attitude.^ The matter was, there-
fore, allowed to drop for a while.
* Lord Salisbury's objections to an advance on Tokar were stated to
me in a private letter, dated Marcli 28, 1890, in the following- terms
:
" The arguments against taking Tokar appear to me to be that the
operation must involve some money, and may involve very much, and
that the finances of Egypt, though no lonirer in an embarrassed
condition, are only convalescent, and a very slight imprudence might
throw them back into the condition from which they have been so
painfully and laboriously drawn. Again, when once you have per-
mitted a military advance, the extent of that military advance scarcely
remains witliin your own discretion. It is always open to the military
authorities to discover in the immediate vicinity of the area to which
your orders confine them, some danger against which it is absolutely
necessary to guard, some strategic position whose invaluable qualities
will repay ten times any risk or cost that its occupation may involve.
You have no means of arguing against them. They are upon their
own territory, and can set down your opposition to civilian ignorance ;
and so, step by step, the imperious exactions of military necessity will
lead you on into tlie desert. To these considerations I must add that
tliey will appear infinitely magnified to the terrified minds of peo])le
here at home. They were so deeply impressed with the disasters of
six years ago, and the apparently inexorable necessity which had driven
them into situations where those disasters were inevitable, that they
shrink instinctively from any proposal to advance into the Kg\ptian
desert. I do not say that this is a sufficient argument to prevent such
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In the autumn of 1890, the subject was again
brought to my notice. " I am convinced," Sir
Francis Grenfell wrote, " that the time has come
when, without any strain on the finances of the
country, and without any assistance from Enghsh
troops, the country as far as Tokar could be
pacified." I reconsidered the question care-
fully. The evils resulting from the presence
of the Dervishes in the neighbourhood of Suakin
were daily becoming more apparent. I was more
than ever convinced that, as a military operation,
the reoccupation of Tokar presented no great
difficulties, and that it would not involve any
considerable expenditure of money. INIore than
this, I felt certain that there was no serious risk of
being dragged into offensive operations on a large
scale in the Soudan. No one was more open to
con\dction than Lord Salisbury. Knowing this, I
pressed him to reconsider the matter. Eventually,
on February 7, 1891, Lord Sahsbury telegraphed
to me that the Government sanctioned the
occupation of Tokar.
Reinforcements were now sent to Suakin. On
February 13, Colonel Holled Smith, with a force
of about 2000 men, occupied Trinkitat without
opposition. On the 16th, he advanced in the direc-
tion of El Teb. On the 19th, he came in contact
with the enemy at a short distance from the to^vn
of Tokar. A sharp engagement ensued. " The
Dervishes," Colonel Holled Smith reported, "pushed
home their attack with their usual intrepidity and
fearlessness. The troops, however, stood their
ground, and did not yield one inch throughout the
line." Finally, the Dervishes were routed with
heavy loss. Osman Digna escaped, but most of
an advauce, if there is a clear balance of undoubted advantage in its
favour ; but, in the absence of any such evidence, it must be accepted
as a strong presumption."
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his leading Emirs were killed. The Egyptian loss
was 10 killed, including one English officer, and
48 wounded. Whatever remained of the Dervish
force fled in confusion towards Kassala. The
defeat of the Dervishes was hailed with genuine
satisfaction by the population. The number of
persons found at Tokar who had been subjected to
mutilation of the most cruel description, bore ample
testimony to the barbarity of Dervish rule.
The Tokar expedition was, therefore, a complete
success. It accomplished for the Eastern Soudan
what Toski did for the valley of the Nile. It
cleared the country of Dervishes, and enabled the
work of the civilian reformer to commence.^
To sum up—the three important military events,
which took place, during the years immediately
following the evacuation of the Soudan in 1885,
were, first, the defeat of the Dervishes before Suakin
on December 20, 1888 ; this relieved the pressure
on Suakin, but did not produce any further result
of importance. Secondly, the defeat of Nejumi's
force at Toski on August 3, 1889; this broke the
aggressive power of the Dervishes and tranquillised
the Nile valley. Thirdly, the defeat of Osman
Digna near Tokar on February 19, 1891 ; this
permitted an Egyptian reoccupation of the province
of Tokar, and tranquillised the greater part of the
Eastern Soudan. After many years of painful
transition, therefore, Egypt, reduced to manage-
able dimensions, at last acquired a settled frontier,
which the Egyptian Government were able to
defend with the military and financial resources
at their disposal.
If a regenerated Egypt is now springing up, its
• On February IS, Lord Salisbury wrote to me: "Up to the time
when I write all seems to have gone well with tlie Tokar expedition
;
very little notice is taken of it here. We are thinking of nothing
except strikesj and of the later cantos of the epic of Kitty O Shea.'
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existence is in a great measure due to the fact that,
through good and evil report, the poUcy of with-
drawing from the Soudan and adhering to a strictly
defensive attitude on the Egyptian frontier was
steadily maintained for some years.
CHAPTER XXXII
THE RECONQUEST OF KHARTOUM
October 1895-September 1898
Necessity of reconquering tlie Soudan—Danger of premature action
—
Tlie Italian defeat at Adua—It is decided to advance on Dongola
—Provision of funds—Sir Herbert Kitcliener—Indian expedition
to Suakin—Railway construction—Battle of Firlcet—Capture of
Dongola—The Egyptian Government repay the money advanced
by the Commissioners of the Debt
—
'i'he British Government
advance £800,000
—
Question of a further offensive movement
Capture of Abu Hamed and Berber—Reoccupation of Kassala
British troops sent to the Soudan—The battle of the Atbara—The
battle of Omdurman—Cost of the campaign—The War Office—The
policy of reconquest.
The Soudan had been left derelict, not so much
because the cargo was valueless, but rather because
no hands were available to effect the salvage. It
was, however, certain from the first that the recon-
quest of some, at all events, of the lost provinces
would, sooner or later, have to be undertaken.
To those who were well acquainted with all
the circumstances, it might, indeed, be clear that
England was not responsible for the loss of the
Soudan, but the broad fact, which had sunk into
the minds of the British public, was this—that during
a period when British influence was paramount in
Egypt, certain provinces, which had before been
open to trade, and which might have been subjected
to the influences of civilisation, had been allowed
to relapse into barbarism. The national honour
was touched. It was thought that the British
79
80 MODERN EGYPT pt. m
Government, even if not originally responsible for
the loss of the provinces, would become responsible
if no endeavour were made to effect their recon-
quest. A sense of shame was very generally felt
that, under British auspices, Egyptian territory
should have undergone such severe shrinkage.
The popular sentiment on the subject found ex-
pression in the feeling that " Gordon should be
avenged."
It was from the first obvious that the partial
reconquest of the Soudan was not beyond the
military and financial resources of England, but
little inclination was for some while shown, either
by successive Governments or by public opinion, to
employ those resources in order to attain the object
in view. The problem, which apparently had to be
faced, was how the Egyptian Government, with but
little or no British help, could reassert their authority
in the Soudan. It was a necessary condition to
the solution of this problem that it should not
entail any increase to the fiscal burdens of the
Egyptian people, and that it should not involve
any serious risk that the affairs of Egypt proper,
which were beginning to settle down, should relapse
into disorder.
During the years which immediately followed
the retreat of the troops after the abortive Gordon
expedition, the main danger, against which it was
necessary to guard, was to prevent the British and
Egyptian Governments from being driven into
premature action by the small but influential
section of public opinion which persistently and
strenuously advocated the cause of immediate re-
conquest. During all this period, therefore, I was
careful in all my published reports to lay special
stress on the desirability of inaction. Indeed, my
personal opinion was that the period of enforced
inaction would last longer than was actually the
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case. If, about the year 1886, I had been asked
how long a time would probably elapse before it
would be possible for the Egyptian Government
to abandon a defensive and to assume an offensive
policy in the valley of the Nile, I should have
conjecturally fixed the period at about twenty-five
years. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian army
reoccupied Dongola and Berber about twelve
years, and Khartoum thirteen years after their
abandonment. The main reason why my forecast
proved erroneous was that the conditions of the
problem were changed. The Eg}^tian Govern-
ment were not left to deal single-handed with the
military and financial situation. Valuable assistance,
both in men and money, was afforded by England.
Before any thought of reconquest could be
entertained, two conditions had to be fulfilled. In
the first place, the Egyptian army had to be
rendered efficient. In the second place, not only
had the solvency of the Egyptian Treasury to be
assured, but funds had to be provided for the
extraordinary expenditure which the assumption of
an offensive policy would certainly involve.
The engagements which took place in 1888-89
in the neighbourhood of Suakin and in the Nile
valley, showed that some confidence could be placed
in the Egyptian army,
Financial rehabilitation and material progress in
every direction proceeded at a far more rapid pace
than had been anticipated. By 1895, the recon-
quest of the Soudan had begun to be generally
discussed as an undertaking, which would probably
be capable of realisation at no very remote period.
In October 1895, the question was raised in the
following form. For some while previous, a
scheme for holding up the water of the Nile in
a large reservoir had been under consideration.
By the autunan of 1895, the discussions on the
VOL. II G
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technical aspects of the proposal were so far
advanced as to justify the conclusion that action
might before long be taken. It was at the time
thought that the Egyptian Treasury could not deal
simultaneously with both the reserv^oir and the
Soudan.^ Unless financial help were to be afforded
from England, the wisest plan would be to con-
struct the reservoir, and to postpone sine die
the question of reoccupying the Soudan. Subse-
quently, the increase of revenue derived from the
construction of the reservoir might, it was thought,
provide funds which would enable the Soudan to
be reconquered. I, therefore, asked the British
Government what was their view on this subject.
1 was told in reply (November 15, 1895) that there
was not any present prospect of the Government
consenting to the despatch of a military expedition
into the Soudan, and that, therefore, the financial
arrangements of the Egj^tian Government could
be made without reference to the cost of any such
expedition.
When I received this communication, I thought
that the question of reconquering the Soudan had
been definitely postponed for some years to come.
I was wrong. I was about to receive another
object-lesson on the danger of indulging in political
prophecy. The utterances of the Oracle of Dodona
depended on the breeze which stirred the branches
of the speaking oaks around the temple of Zeus.
Those of the London oracle are scarcely less
uncertain. They depend on the ephemeral indica-
tions of the political barometer. When I pro-
pounded the question of whether the construction
of the reservoir was to be preferred to Soudan
reconquest, a steady breeze of caution was blowing
1 Eventually, an arrangemeut was made under which the Nile
reservoir at Assouan was constructed einiultaneously with the Soudan
operations. Tlie financial difficulty veas met by postponing payment
for the reservoir until it was completed.
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amongst the political oaks of London. The oracle
pronounced, in no uncertain language, in favour of
the reservoir. But a sharp squall was about to
come up from an opposite direction, with the result
that in the twinkling of an eye the decision was
reversed, and the oracle pronounced as decisively
in favour of an advance into the Soudan as it had
previously, under different barometrical indications,
rejected any such idea.
The change was in some degree the outcome of
the rapid growth of the Imperialist spirit, which
about this time took place in England, but the
more immediate cause was the turn which affairs
took at Massowah. The Italians were being
hard pressed by the Abyssinians. Rumours were
afloat that the latter were in league with the
Dervishes, who were about to attack Kassala.
Early in January 1896, some discussion, which
was not productive of any practical result, took
place as to whether a demonstration, which might
possibly relieve the pressure on the Italian forces,
could not advantageously be made either from
Wadi Haifa or Suakin. Eventually, on March 1,
the Italian army under General Baratieri was
totally defeated by King Menelek's forces in the
neighbourhood of Adua.
This brought matters to a crisis. The Italian
Ambassador in London urged that a diversion
should be made in Italian interests. On March
12, therefore, it was suddenly decided to reoccupy
Dongola. It cannot be doubted that this decision
was taken and publicly announced with some-
what excessive haste. The financial and mihtary
difficulties, which would have to be encountered,
were inadequately considered. But it is not on
that account to be inferred that the decision was
unwise. The absence of consistency, which is so
frequently noticeable in the aims of British policy,
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is, indeed, a never-ending source of embarrassment
to those on whom devolves the duty of carrying
that pohcy into execution. A British Prime
Minister appears to be in the position of the steers-
man of a surf-boat lying outside the mouth of an
African river. He has to wait for a high wave to
carry him over the bar. In the particular instance
in point, it appeared at the time that it would on
many grounds have been wiser to have delayed
action. The arguments based on the desirability
of helping the Italians, and of checking any possible
advance on the part of the Dervishes, although of
some weight, were not conclusive. On the other
hand, the policy of eventual reconquest was sound.
It is not always possible in politics to choose
beforehand the time and method of action. The
opportunity must be seized when it occurs.
Whether the British steersman was right or wrong
in selecting the Italian wave to float him over
the Soudan bar, depended in a great measure on
whether the operation was or was not successfully
conducted. At the time, I was mchned to think
the action premature, but there could be no doubt
that, when once it had been decided to act, no
effort should be spared to ensure success. It was
also very necessary to combat the idea, which at first
found some favour in London, that the operations
should be hmited to a mere demonstration so far
as Akasha, a short distance south of Wadi Haifa.
It was manifest that the advance should either not
be undertaken at all, or else that it should be made
with the intention of permanently occupying the
country at once as far as Dongola, and eventually
at least as far as Khartoum. Tliere w;is something
to be said in favour of delay before embarking on
a forward policy. There was nothing whatever to
be said in favour of trifling with the question. It
was essential to discard absolutely the vacillation
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of the past in dealing with Soudan matters. The
idea of limiting the operations to a demonstration
was speedily abandoned.
When once it had been decided to advance, one
of the first questions which naturally arose was
how funds were to be provided for the expenses of
the expedition.
Egj^t has throughout the occupation benefited
greatly by the tendency which exists in England
towards administrative decentralisation. No serious
attempt has ever been made to govern Egypt from
London. It cannot be doubted that this system is
wise. It has enabled us to avoid the numberless
errors which generally result from the highly
centralised systems generally adopted on the conti-
nent of Europe. But even a sound system may
have some disadvantages, although of a nature in
no serious degree to outweigh its merits. One
disadvantage of the British system is that, in-
asmuch as the details of all Egyptian affairs are
managed in Egypt, few, if any, of the officials
employed in the London public offices are in-
timately acquainted with all the intricate wind-
ings of the Egyptian financial and administrative
labyrinth. This ignorance, although ordinarily
beneficent, has at times produced some strange
and even embarrassing results. In this par-
ticular instance, the authorities sitting in London
were aware that Egyptian finance was in a flourish-
ing condition. Moreover, they knew that large
sums of money, the savings of past years, had
accumulated in the Treasury. They considered
that the reconquest of Dongola was an Egyptian
interest, and that the Egyptian Treasury might
justly be called upon to bear the expenses. The
possibihty of any charge devolving on the British
Treasury had not, in the fii-st instance at all events,
been adequately considered. It was held not only
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tliat the Egyptian Government ought to pay, but
that they would be able to pay. The fact that the key
of the Egyptian Treasure-house was in international
keeping had been insufficiently appreciated, even
if it had not been altogether forgotten. It was
impossible to obtain access to the accumulations
of past years without the consent of the Commis-
sioners of the Debt.
Application was accordingly made to the Com-
missioners for a grant of £E.500,000 from the
General Reserve Fund, in order to cover the ex-
penses of the Dongola expedition. By a majority
of four to two, the Commissioners granted the
request. The money was paid into the Egyptian
Treasury. The French and Russian Commis-
sioners, who constituted the dissentient minority,
instantly commenced an action against the Egyptian
Government in the Mixed Tribunal of First In-
stance at Cairo.
The judgment of the Tribunal was delivered on
June 8. The Egyptian Government were directed
to repay the money granted by the Commissioners
of the Debt. An appeal was at once made to the
higher Court sitting at Alexandria, with results
which will presently be described.
Simultaneously with the financial question, the
composition and command of the force had to be
considered.
A British battalion was sent from Cairo to
Wadi Haifa, more as an indication that in case
of need English help would be forthcoming than
for any other reason. Some British officers were
temporarily lent to the Egyptian army, but beyond
this assistance, it was decided to employ only
Egyptian troops in the Nile valley.
The command of the force was left to the Sirdar
of the Egyptian army. Sir Herbert Kitchener. A
better choice could not have been made. Young,
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energetic, ardently and exclusively devoted to his
profession, and, as the honourable scars on his face
testified, experienced in Soudanese warfare. Sir
Herbert Kitchener possessed all the qualities neces-
sary to bring the campaign to a successful issue.
Like many another military commander, the bonds
which united him and his subordinates were those
of stern disciphne on the one side, and, on the
other, the respect due to superior talent and the
confidence felt in the resourcefuhiess of a strong
and masterful spirit, rather than the affectionate
obedience yielded to the behests of a genial chief.
When the campaign was over, there were not
wanting critics who whispered that Sir Herbert
Kitchener's success had been due as much to good
luck as to good management. If, it was said, a
number of events had happened, which, as a matter
of fact, did not happen, the result might have been
different. The same may be said of any military
commander and of any campaign. Fortune is
proverbially fickle in war. The greatest captain of
ancient times spoke of " Fortuna, quae plurimum
potest quum in rehquis rebus tum praecipue in
beUo."^ The fact, however, is that Sir Herbert
Kitchener's main merit was that he left as httle as
possible to chance. A first-rate military adminis-
trator, every detail of the machine, with which he
had to work, received adequate attention. Before
any decisive movement was made, each portion of
the machine was adapted, so far as human foresight
could provide, to perform its allotted task.
Sir Herbert Kitchener also possessed another
quality which is rare among soldiers, and which
v/as of special value under the circumstances then
existing. He did not think that extravagance was
the necessary handmaid of efficiency. On the
contrary, he was a rigid economist, and, whilst
* Caesar, De Bdlo C'ivili, iii. 68.
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making adequate provision for all essential and
necessary expenditure, suppressed with a firm hand
any tendency towards waste and extravagance.
Although it was intended that, with the excep-
tion of one British battalion, only Egyptian troops
should be employed in the advance on Dongola, at
the same time, in view of the uncertainty prevail-
ing as to the amount of resistance Ukely to be
encountered from the Dervishes, it was thought
desirable to reheve the Egyptian army temporarily
of the duty of guarding Suakin, and thus enable
the Sirdar to concentrate all his available forces in
the valley of the Nile. An Indian force of about
2500 fighting men was, therefore, despatched to
Suakin. It arrived early in June, and left in the
following December.
Although these Indian troops merely performed
garrison duties, they rendered services of great
value ; their presence at Suakin relieved both the
British and Egyptian Governments of all anxiety
as regarded the affairs of the Eastern Soudan.
In conformity with the plan adopted throughout
this narrative, no attempt will be made to give
a detailed account of the campaign of 1896. A
brief statement of the principal incidents wiU
suffice.
From the first it was manifest that one of the
main difficulties was how to transport the food
and stores for the army whilst on the march to
Dongola. Few of those who have not been
directly or indirectly concerned with the opera-
tions of war, fully appreciate the fact that at least
three-fourths of the time of a military commander
on active service are taken up with devising
means for keeping his own troops alive. "A
starving army," the Duke of Wellington wrote
from Portugal, " is actually worse than none at
all." When, as in the present case, the march of
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the army lies through a barren and desolate
country, and when, in the absence of roads and
wheeled transport, every pound of biscuit and
every extra round of ammunition has to be carried
on the backs of camels, whose slow uniform pace
no eagerness on the part of the commander of the
force can mend, it may readily be conceived that
the difficulties of supply and transport are greatly
increased. River transport could only be used in
certain localities, that is to say, where the naviga-
tion of the Nile was unimpeded by rapids. The
obvious solution of these difficulties was to con-
tinue in a southerly direction the railway, which
already existed between Wadi Haifa and Sarras,
the most distant outpost held by the Egj^tian
army. Akasha, some fifty miles south of Sarras,
was accordingly occupied without resistance on
March 20. Work on the railway, which was
eventually to terminate at Kerma, a few miles
short of Dongola, was at once commenced.^
The details of the plan of campaign were, of
course, left entirely to the discretion of the Sirdar.
I had, however, fully discussed the general scheme
of operations with him before he left Cairo. The
main point was to bring on an action at an early
period of the campaign. Once victorious, even on
a small scale, the Egyptian troops would acquire
confidence in themselves, and the enemy would be
proportionately discouraged. It was desirable not
to allow the Dervishes to retreat without fiffhtinfif,
and thus delay any action till Dongola was reached.
The smallest check had above all things to be
avoided. It would be magnified in the eyes of the
world, and although perhaps of slight intrinsic
^ This line, which was very roujjhly constructed, lias now been
abandoned. The produce of the Dongola Province will, in future, be
conveyed to Port Soudan partly by water, and partly by a railway
which extcTids from Abu Hamed westwards along the right bank ol
the Nile as far as Kereima.
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importance, would produce a bad moral effect. In
waj', the moral is to the physical as three to one.
Nowhere has the truth of this celebrated Napoleonic
maxim been more fully exemplified than in the
successive petty campaigns which have been
conducted in the Soudan. The Sirdar's general-
ship had, therefore, to be shown in obliging the
Dervishes to fight under conditions as regards
topography and relative numbers, which would be
favourable to the troops under his command.
The general plan of campaign arranged in Cairo
was executed to the letter. By the beginning of
June, the railway had been constructed to within
a few miles of Akasha, A force of about 3500
Dervishes was known to be at Firket, some sixteen
miles south of Akasha. It was determined to
surprise this force. The utmost secrecy was pre-
served. On the night of June 6, two columns,
numbering in all about 10,000 men, marched by
convergent routes, with the object of meeting in
the early morning, and surrounding the Dervish
camp before a retreat could be made. An opera-
tion, the success of which depends on the opportune
concentration of two separate columns at a given
time and place, is always difficult of execution.
The difficulties are enhanced when the march
takes place at night. So skilfully, however, were
all the arrangements planned and conducted, that
the object which it was sought to attain was fully
secured. Early on the morning of June 7, the
Dervishes, completely taken by surprise, were
attacked and routed with heavy loss both in killed
and prisoners. The Egyptian loss was 20 killed
and 80 wounded. The cavalry continued the
pursuit for some miles beyond the battlefield.
Three laborious months followed the battle of
Firket. Cholera broke out in the camp, and, in
spite of the energy and self-sacrifice of the medical
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officers, was not suppressed before many valuable
lives had been lost. Storms of unprecedented
violence occurred, with the result that large
stretches of the railway embankment were washed
away and had to be reconstructed. But these and
many other obstacles were eventually overcome.
The dogged perseverance of the British officers,
and the willing obedience of the sturdy black and
fellaheen troops, were proof against excessive heat,
sandstorms, and other incidents which had to be
encountered in this inhospitable region.
The whole force, from General to private,
deserved success, and they succeeded. After a
sharp conflict at Hafir, on which occasion the gun-
boats, which had been dragged with much labour
up the Cataracts, did excellent service, Dongola
was occupied on September 23. The campaign
was virtually over. At a cost of 411 lives, of whom
364 died from cholera and other diseases, and of
£E.715,000 in money—a figure which bore testi-
mony to the Sirdar's economical administration
—
the province of Dongola had been reclaimed
from barbarism. On September 26, the furthest
Egyptian outpost was fixed at Merowi, the ancient
capital of the Ethiopian Queens of the Candace
dynasty, situated at the foot of the Fourth Cataract.
The financial campaign lasted rather longer than
the military. It was not altogether inglorious.
The Judges of the Court of Appeal—or at all
events the majority of them—could not altogether
shake themselves free from the pohtical electricity
with which the atmosphere of Egypt was at this
time so heavily charged. On December 6, the
Court condemned the course adopted by the
majority of the Commissioners of the Debt as
illegal, and ordered the Egyptian Government to
refund the money.
I had anticipated the judgment of the Court,
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and was, therefore, prepared to act. Immediately
after its delivery, I was authorised to promise
the Egyptian Government pecuniary help from
England. At that time, the Egyptian Treasury
happened to be full. It was desirable to act
promptly and thus bar the way to international
complications. On December 6, four days after
the delivery of the judgment, the total sum due,
amounting to £E.515,000, was— somewhat to the
dismay of official circles in London
—
paid to the
Commissioners of the Debt. Subsequently, with
the consent of Parliament, the British Treasury
advanced a sum of £800,000 to the Egyptian
Government at 2j per cent interest.
Such, therefore, are the main political, military,
and financial facts connected with the reconquest
of Dongola. The episode is one to which both
Englishmen and Egyptians may look back with
pride and satisfaction.
I conceive that in all civilised countries—and
perhaps notably in England—the theory of govern-
ment is that a question of peace or war is one to be
decided by politicians. The functions of the soldier
are supposed to be confined, in the first place, to
advising on the purely military aspects of the issues
involved ; and, in the second place, to giving effect
to any decisions at which the Government may
arrive. It has, however, often been said that the
practice in this matter not unfrequently differs
from the theory ; that the soldier, who is generally
prone to advocate vigorous action, is inclined to
encroach on the sphere which should properly be
reserved for the politician ; that the former is often
masterful and the latter weak, too easily dazzled by
the glitter of arms, or too readily lured onwards by
the siren voice of some strategist to acquire an
almost endless set of what, in technical language,
are called " keys " to some position ; and that when
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this happens, the soldier, who is himself uncon-
sciously influenced by a laudable desire to obtain
personal distinction, practically dictates the policy
of the nation without taking a sufficiently compre-
hensive view of national interests. Considerations
of this nature have more especially been, from time
to time, advanced in connection with the numerous
frontier wars which have occurred in India. That
they contain a certain element of truth can scarcely
be doubted. My own experience in such matters
leads me to the conclusion that in most semi-
military, semi-political afliiirs there is generally an
early stage when the politician, if he chooses to do
so, can exercise complete and effective control over
the action of the soldier, but that when once that
control has been even slightly relaxed, it carmot be
regained until, by the course of subsequent events,
some fresh development occurs bringing with it a
favourable opportunity for the reassertion of civil
and political authority.
Thus, in the case of the Soudan, so long as the
frontier remained at Wadi Haifa, the policy of the
British and Egyptian Governments was well under
control. It was possible to weigh the arguments
for and against an advance, and to deliberate upon
the ultimate consequences, mihtary, political, and
financial, if an advance was undertaken. But
when once the first onward step had been made,
the period for deliberation, even in respect to
matters which were not perhaps fully within the
original purview of the two Governments, or at
all events of the British Government, was at an
end. No one, who had seriously considered the
subject, imagined for one moment that any sure
halting-place could be found between Wadi Haifa
and Khartoum. In the spring of 189G, it was
possible to adduce reasons of some weight in favour
of postponing the reconquest of the Soudan. In
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the autumn of the same year, it was not possible to
adduce a single valid argument in favour of remain-
ing inactive and delaying the completion of the
work, which had been already begun. A certain
amount of hesitation was, however, in the first
instance, displayed before the inevitable conclusion
was accepted that the British Government had
committed themselves to a policy, which involved
the reconquest of the whole of the Soudan. This
hesitation was probably due more to financial
timidity, and to the reluctance always felt by
British INIinisters to decide on anything but the
issue of the moment, rather than to any failure to
realise the true facts of the situation. It was not
till February 5, 1897, that the Chancellor of the
Exchequer (Sir Michael Hicks Beach), speaking in
the House of Commons, publicly recognised that
" Egypt could never be held to be permanently
secure so long as a hostile Power was in occupation
of the Nile valley up to Khartoum," and that the
duty of giving a final blow to the " baleful power
of the Khalifa " devolved on England.
Some months before this declaration w^as made,
the British Government were, however, practically
and irrevocably committed to an offensive poHcy.
Shortly after the capture of Dongola, the construc-
tion of a railway to connect Wadi Haifa and Abu
Hamed was commenced.
Thanks to the energy and skill of the young
Engineer officers to whom this important work
was entrusted, two-thirds of the line were com-
pleted by August 1897. The Sirdar then deter-
mined to occupy Abu Hamed. A column under
General Hunter moved from Merowi up the river.
Abu Hamed was occupied,^ on August 7, after a
' The interval wliich elapsed 1)etween the occupation of Abu Hamed
and the final advance on Khartoum was a period of mucii anxiety. Sir
Herbert Kitchener's force depended entirely on the desert railway for
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sharp combat, in which the Egyptian army lost
27 killed, including two British officers, and 61
wounded. Almost the whole of the Dervish force
was either killed or taken prisoner. Evidence was
steadily accumulating that the Egyptian soldiers
were inspired by a very different spirit from that
which prevailed fifteen years previously, when the
troops of Arabi fled ignominiously almost at the
first cannon shot.
On August 31, Berber, which was evacuated by
the Dervishes, was occupied by the Egyptian
troops. The construction of the railway from Abu
Hamed to Berber was at once taken in hand.
In the meanwhile, the Italians, who but a short
time before had been eager to occupy the Kassala
district, were clamorous to abandon a possession,
which they found expensive and of doubtful utility.
On Christmas Day 1897, Kassala was occupied by
an Egyptian force commanded by Colonel I'arsons.
In the Nile valley, no considerable change took
place in the situation for some months after the
occupation of Berber. It was clear that, without
the aid of British troops, Khartoum could not be
retaken, but nothing definite had as yet been
decided as to their employment. All hesitation
was eventually removed by the force of circum-
stances. Towards the close of the year 1897,
its supplies. I was rather haunted with the idea that some European
adventurer, of the type familiar in India a century and more ago,
might turn up at Khartoum and advise the Dervishes to make frequent
raids across the Nile below Ahu Hamed, with a view to cutting the
communication of the Anglo-Egyptian force with VVadi Haifa. This
was unquestionably the right military operation to have undertaken
;
neither, I think, would it have been very difficult of accomplisliment.
Fortunately, however, the Dervishes were themselves devoid of all
military (]ualities, with the exception of undaunted courage, and did
not invite any European assistance. They, therefore, failed to take
advantage of the opportunity presented to tliem. To myself, it was a
great relief when tlie period of suspense was over. I do not tliiuk
that the somewhat perilous position in which Sir Herbert Kitchener's
army was unquestionalily placed for some time was at all realised by
the public in general.
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reports were rife of an intention on the part of
the Dervishes to take tlie offensive. Whatever
doubt might exist as to the time when a further
onward movement should be undertaken, there
could be but one opinion as to the necessity of
defending the territory already gained. Retreat
was out of the question. The Dervish challenge
had to be accepted. I had encouraged the Sirdar
to ask for British troops directly he thought their
presence necessary. On the first day of the year
1898, he sent me an historic telegram, which
virtually sealed the fate of the Soudan. " General
Hunter," he said, " reports confirming news of
a Dervish advance. I think that British troops
should be sent to Abu Hamed, and that reinforce-
ments should be sent to Egypt in case of necessity.
The fight for the Soudan would appear to be likely
to take place at Berber." Four British battalions
were at once sent up the Nile. The Caii'o garrison
was increased. JNIanifestly, the curtain had gone up
on the last scene in the drama, which commenced
with the destruction of General Hicks's army fifteen
years previously.
A few days after the first demand for troops had
been communicated to me, the Sirdar telegraphed
that, when the final advance to Khartoum was
made, he would require, in addition to the British
troops about to be sent to the Soudan, another
infantry brigade of four battalions, a regiment of
cavalry and a battery of field artillery. His fore-
cast of the force which would be necessary was
wonderfully accurate. The force which eventually
advanced on Khartoum some six months later, was
precisely identical with that which Sir Herbert
Kitchener specified early in January 1898. To
have advanced with a smaller force would have
been dangerous. A larger force would have been
mwieldy, and its employment would have increased
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the difficulties of transport and supply. Amongst
other high military quahties, the Sirdar possessed
the knowledge of how to adapt his means to his
end.
The threatened Dervish advance rendered neces-
sary the despatch of British troops to the Soudan
six months before the rise of the Nile allowed of
free navigation. Climate, it was thought at the
time, might possibly be the most dangerous enemy
which would have to be encountered. Some dis-
cussion, therefore, ensued as to whether it would
not be possible to send up two British brigades
at once, and advance straightway on Khartoum.
The idea was, however, speedily abandoned. The
difficulties of transport and supply would have been
enormous. At least 7000 camels, which it would
have been well-nigh impossible to have obtained,
would have been required. It was, therefore,
decided to stand on the defensive, and to await
the favourable season before striking a final blow
at the Dervish stronghold at Omdurman.
By the beginning of March, a force consisting
of one British and two Egyptian brigades, together
with a regiment of Egyptian cavalry, 24 field and
horse artillery guns, and 12 Maxims, had been
concentrated between Berber and the junction of
the Atbara and the Nile, where a strong entrenched
camp was formed.
About the middle of February, a Dervish force
of about 12,000 men, under the command of the
Emir Mahmoud, which had been stationed at
Metemmeh, crossed to the right bank of the river.
Contradictory reports contmued to be received as
to the intentions of this force. It was known that
dissension existed amongst the Dervish leaders.
Eventually, Mahmoud abandoned the idea of
moving up the right bank of the river. He
struck across the desert, and estabhshed himself
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at Nakheila on the Atbara, some 35 miles from
its mouth. On March 20, tiie Sirdar began to
move slowly up the Atbara to meet him.
A pause of some duration then ensued. It was
hoped that JNIahmoud would attack, but time went
on and he showed no disposition to move.
On April 1, the Sirdar telegraphed to me as
follows :
—
" I am rather perplexed by the situation here.
Mahmoud remains stationary and his army is very
badly off for supplies, and deserters keep coming
in to us, though not in such large numbers as I
expected. He is waiting apparently for instructions
from the Khalifa before advancing or retiring. It
seems to be thought by the deserters that, as a
retirement would be an acknowledgment of fear, he
will eventually advance. Here we are well off and
healthy, with sufficient transport, fresh bread every
second day, and fresh meat every day. Yesterday,
I discussed the situation with Gatacre and Hunter
;
the former was inclined to attack Mahmoud's
present position, the latter to wait here. \Ye
should have great advantage of ground if Mahmoud
will advance, but if he retires without our attacking
him, the opportunity will have been lost of dealing
a blow by which future resistance in the Soudan
would probably be considerably affected. I have
httle doubt of the success of our attack on his
present entrenched position, though it would prob-
ably entail considerable loss. I have decided not
to change present policy for three days, before
which somethinor definite will, I hope, be known. I
should be glad to learn your \iews on the subject."
The point which struck me most in this message
was that General Hunter doubted the wisdom of
attacking. I knew him to be a fighting General.
Moreover, he had seen IMahmoud's position. On
the previous day (JNIarch 31), he had returned from
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a cavalry reconnaissance, as to the results of which
the Sirdar had reported to me : " General Hunter
was able to get witliin 300 yards of the enemy's
trenches. Position is a strong one with Zariba
(stockade) and in heavy bush ; it was so thick that
they were unable to get more than a partial view
of the encampment. Enemy was lying thick in the
trenches, which were in some places in three rows,
one behind the other." I thought it not improbable
that General Hunter, who well knew the strong
and weak points of the Egyptian army, hesitated
to attack because he was unwilling to risk what
might possibly be a hand-to-hand encounter between
the Egyptian soldiers and the Dervishes in the
" heavy bush " to which allusion was made in this
telegram. Past experience in Soudanese warfare
enjoined special caution in respect to this point.
On April 2, therefore, I sent the Sirdar the
following message, which represented the joint
opinion of Sir Francis Grenfell and myself :
—
*' The following observations are not to be
regarded as instructions. It is for you to form a final
opinion on their value, as they are merely remarks
on the position as it strikes me at a distance. lYi
case you should think it desirable to act contrary
to the view to which I incline, 1 have no desire
to cripple your full liberty of action. I wish to
assure you that, whatever you may decide to do,
you will receive full support both from myself and,
I am sure I may add, from the authorities at home.^
" You have the following arguments against an
immediate attack :
—
* I repeated to London the Sirdar's telegram of April 1, and at once
received the following rej)ly from Mr. Aitliur Balfour, who was in
charge of the Foreign Office during tlie temporary absence of Lord
Salisbury :
—
" The Sirdar may count on the support of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment whichever course lie decides on a(loi)ting. Unless he wishes for
a military opinion, we refrain from offering any remarks which would
interfere with his absolute discretion."
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"(1) The extreme importance of obviating, sc
far as is possible, any risk of reverse, both on local
and general grounds.
" (2) That it is rather imprudent to try your
force too high in view of the composition of a
portion of it.
" (3) The great importance, as has been showTi
by all former experience of Soudanese warfare, of
choosing ground for an engagement which will be
favourable to the action of a discipUned and well-
armed force.
" (4) The weight of Hunter's opinion. Though
I have the greatest confidence in Gatacre, Hunter
has more experience in Soudanese warfare, is better
acquainted with the Egyptian army, and has,
moreover, seen the present Dervish position. This
latter is more especially a consideration of the
utmost importance.
" (5) The fact that Mahmoud probably cannot
stay for long where he is, and that he will be
discredited and liis men probably discouraged if
he retires vnthout fighting.
" You have on the other side the argument
that Mahmoud's force, if he now retires without
fighting, will go to strengthen the resistance to
be ultimately encountered.
" The weight of this argument, though un-
doubted, does not appear to me sufficient to
counterbalance the arguments on the other side,
more especially if it be remembered that your
British force will be practically doubled in the
autumn, if the decisive moment is delayed till
then.
"Patience, therefore, is what I am inclined to
advise. I am disposed to think that you had
better not attack for the present, but wait your
opportunity for action and allow events to develop.
The above is fully agreed in by General Grenfell,
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with whom I have discussed the whole question
thoroughly."
Before the Sirdar had received this telegram, he
sent me (April 3) the following further message :
—
" The same story of privation is told by more
deserters who are coming in. There is an increased
desertion of blacks resulting from the capture of
the women at Shendy, which is now known.
" Generals Hunter and Gatacre and myself now
think an attack upon Mahmoud's position advisable.
We shall probably make it on the 6th April.
" I will postpone the forward movement if your
answer to my last telegram, which I have not yet
received, should be against this course."
This was followed by a further telegram sent
on the same day (April 3) after receipt of my
reply to the first inquiry. " 1 will," the Sirdar
said, "for the present postpone the attack on
Mahmoud's position, in view of your opinion as
stated in your telegram. So as to get new ground
and water, we shall to-morrow move about 2^
miles farther on."
When I knew of the change in General
Hunter's opinion, my own hesitation as regards
attacking completely disappeared. I was unable to
consult Sir Francis Grenfell, who was temporarily
absent from Cairo, but I at once telegraphed to the
Sirdar :
—
" With reference to your telegram of yesterday,
our telegrams crossed. Do not be deterred by
my first telegram from attacking if, after careful
consideration, you think it advisable to do so.
It is very difficult to give any valuable opinion
from here. In your first telegram the point which
struck me most was that Hunter, who has seen the
Dervish position, was adverse to an advance. He
has now, I understand, come round to the other
view. The case is, to my mind, materially altered
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by this. I must leave the decision to you, only
again assuring you of full support whatever you
decide."
The next day (April 4) I received the following
reply :—
" The confidence which yourself and the Home
authorities repose in me is greatly appreciated by
me. 1 propose to advance more slowly and with
greater deliberation than was originally my inten-
tion, and to make as sure as it is possible to do by
careful reconnaissances of the success of an attack.
I shall not commit myself to a general attack until
the right moment has, in my opinion, arrived. The
difficulty is at present to know with any certainty
how long the Dervishes can hold out under the
privations they are undergoing. I think that
by getting nearer to them I shall have a better
opportunity of satisfying myself on this point." •
It was clear that a decisive engagement was
imminent. I awaited tlie result with confidence.
Early on the morning of April 8 (Good Friday),
the attack was delivered. After forty minutes'
sharp fighting, Mahmoud was a prisoner, 2000
of his men lay dead in their entrencliments, others
had surrendered, whilst a large number of those
who escaped subsequently died of wounds or thirst
in the thick bush on the left bank of the river.
The victory was complete, but it cost many
valuable lives. Of the British brigade, 4 officers
and 104 non-commissioned officers and men, and
of the Egyptian army, 5 British and 16 Egyptian
officers, as well as 422 non-commissioned officers
and men, were killed and wounded. The brunt
of the Egyptian fighting fell on the black troops.
Some faint hopes were at one time entertained
that the Dervishes would be so demoralised by the
crushing defeat they had experienced on the Atbara,
that no further resistance would be offered, and
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that the capture of Khartoum would be peacefully
effected. These hopes were not destined to be
realised. Had not the impostor who in cruel and
depraved state reigned supreme at Khartoum
promised his credulous followers, whose fate was
about to excite alike pity and admiration, that,
although the infidels would be allowed to advance
to within a few miles of the walls of Omdurman,
their skulls in countless numbers would eventually
whiten the Kereri plain? It soon became clear
that, in spite of the recent victory, a further
application of the Bismarckian blood-and -iron
policy would alone suffice to shake the heroic
steadfastness with which these savage Soudanese
warriors clung to an execrable cause.
I need not describe in detail the measures which
were preliminary to the final effort. It ^\'ill be
sufficient for me to say that the first British brigade
—possibly encouraged by achieved success, and
buoyed up by the hope of coming excitement
—
bore the summer heat of the Soudan well. As
had been pre-arranged, a second brigade was sent
up the Nile in the course of the month of July.
By the end of August, the Sirdar had concentrated
a force of about 22,000 men some 40 miles south of
Khartoum.
As was my custom, I had left Egypt in the
middle of July, intending to return before the final
blow was struck. On all grounds, it was desirable
to expedite matters, but the military movements
depended in a great degree on the rapidity of the
rise of the Nile, a point in respect to which no very
early forecast was possible. Early in August,
however, the Sirdar, whose calculations of time
were never once at fault, warned me that I ought
to be back in Cairo by September 1. I had made
all my preparations for departure, but I was unable
to depart. The first news that the goal which for
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so many years I had striven to reach, had at last
been attained, was conveyed to me in a telegram
whicli the Queen, with her usual thoughtfulness for
others, sent to a remote shooting -lodge in the
north of Scotland, where I was watching the last
moments of her who inspired me to write this book.
The long-expected battle took place under the
walls of Omdurman on September 2. The Dervish
leaders showed no tactical skill. They relied solely
on the courage and devotion of their followers who,
ignorant of the fearful powers of destruction which
science has placed in the hands of the European,
dashed recklessly against the ranks of the Anglo-
Egyptian army, and were swept away in thousands
by the deadly fire of the rifles and the JNIaxims.
" The honour of the fight," said a competent eye-
witness,^ " must still go ^^dth the men who died.
Our men were perfect, but the Dervishes were
superb—beyond perfection. It was their largest,
best, and bravest army that ever fought against us
for JNlahdiism, and it died worthily of the huge
empire that Mahdiism won and kept so long.
Their riflemen, mangled by every kind of death
and torment that man can devise, clung round the
black flag and the green, emptying their poor
rotten, home-made cartridges dauntlessly. Their
spearmen charged death at every minute hope-
lessly. ... A dusky hne got up and stormed
forward : it bent, broke up, fell apart, and dis-
appeared. Before the smoke had cleared, another
hne was bending and storming forward in the same
track."
The Dervish loss was, in truth, terrible. Out of
an army, whose strength was estimated at from
40,000 to 50,000 men, some 11,000 were killed, and
about 16,000 wounded.
* Steevens, With Kitchener to Khartoum, p. 282. Mr. Steevens was
the conespondeiit of the Daily Mail.
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On the British side, 9 officers and 122 men, and
on the Egyptian side, 5 British and 9 Egyptian
officers as well as 241 non-commissioned officers
and men, were killed and wounded.
These brave men fell in a good cause. It will
be the fault of their countrymen, in obedience
to whose orders
—
toi<: Keivwv pij/xaa-c Treido/j^evoi—they
lie in their distant graves, if their blood is shed in
vain.
On the afternoon of September 2, the victorious
army entered the filthy stronghold of Mahdiism,
where, it was said, "the stench ^^^as unbearable."
Two days later (September 4), the British and
Egyptian flags were hoisted with due ceremony on
the walls of the ruined Palace of Khartoum, close
to the spot where General Gordon fell. The sturdy
and reverent Puritan spirit, which still animates
Teutonic Christianity and which makes the soldier,
at the moment of action, look to the guidance and
protection of a Higher Power, found expression in
a religious service in honour of the illustrious
dead.
The Khalifa escaped. For more than a year, he
wandered about the almost inaccessible wilds of
Kordofan at the head of a considerable force. At
length, he approached near enough to the river
to enable a decisive blow to be struck. It was
reserved for Sir Reginald Wingate, who succeeded
Lord Kitchener as Sirdar of the Egyptian army
towards the close of the year 1899, to give the
final cotip de gi^dce to Mahdiism. By a series of
rapid and skilful marches, he surprised the Dervisli
camp on November 24, 1899. The Khalifa and all
his principal Emirs were killed. His whole force
surrendered.
The financial success was no less remarkable
than the military. The total cost of the campaigns
of 1896-98 was £E.2,354,000, of which £E. 1,200,000
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was spent on railways and telegraphs, and
£E. 155,000 on gunboats. The "military ex-
penditure," properly so-called, only amounted to
£E.996,000.
Of the total sum of £E.2,354,000, rather less
than £E.800,000 was paid by the British, and the
balance of about £E. 1,554,000 by the Egyptian
Treasury.
In writing this work, I have throughout
endeavoured to render it as little autobiographical
as possible. If I now depart in some degree from
this principle, my reason is that I am unable to
enforce the military lesson which, I believe, is to
be derived from the Khartoum campaign without
touching on my personal position. The conditions
under which the campaign was conducted were, in
fact, very pecuHar. In official circles it was dubbed
a " Foreign Office War." For a variety of reasons,
to which it is unnecessary to allude in detail, the
Sirdar was, from the commencement of the opera-
tions, placed exclusively under my orders in aU
matters. The War Office assumed no responsi-
bility, and issued no orders. A corresponding
position was occupied by the Head-Quarter Staff
of the Army of Occupation in Cairo. Sir Francis
Grenfell and those serving under him rendered the
most willing assistance whenever it was required of
them, but beyond that point their functions did
not extend. The result was that I found myself
in the somewhat singular position of a civihan, who
had had some little military training in his youth,
but who had had no experience of war,^ whose
proper functions were diplomacy and adminis-
tration, but who, under the stress of circumstances
* I was present for a few weeks, as a spectator, with Grant's army
at the siege of Petersburg in 1864, but the experience was too short to
be of much value.
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in the "Land of Paradox," had to be ultimately
responsible for the maintenance, and even to some
extent, for the movements, of an army of some
25,000 men in the field.
That good results were obtained under this
somewhat anomalous system cannot be doubted.
It will not, therefore, be devoid of interest to
explain how the system worked in practice, and
what were the main reasons which contributed
towards the success.
I have no ^ash to disparage the strategical and
tactical ability which was displayed in the conduct
of the campaign. It is, however, a fact that no
occasion arose for the display of any great skill in
these branches of military science. When once
the British and Egyptian troops were brought face
to face with the enemy, there could—unless the
conditions under which they fought were altogether
extraordinary—be Httle doubt of the result. The
speedy and successful issue of the campaign
depended, in fact, almost entirely upon the methods
adopted for overcoming the very exceptional diffi-
culties connected with the supply and transport of
the troops. The main quality required to meet
these difficulties was a good head for business.
By one of those fortunate accidents which have
been frequent in the history of Anglo-Saxon enter-
prise, a man was found equal to the occasion.
Lord Kitchener of Khartoum won his well-deserved
peerage because he was an excellent man of
business ; he looked carefully after every important
detail, and enforced economy.
My own merits, such as they were, were of a
purely negative character. They may be summed
up in a single phrase. I abstained from a mis-
chievous activity, and I acted as a check on the
interference of others. I had full confidence in the
abihties of the commander, whom I had practically
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myself chosen, and, except when he asked for my
assistance, I left him entirely alone. I encouraged
him to pay no attention to those vexatious bureau-
cratic formalities with which, under the slang
phrase of " red tape," our military system is some-
what overburthened. I exercised some httle
control over the demands for stores which were
sent to the London War Office, and the mere fact
that those demands passed through my hands, and
that I declined to forward any request unless,
besides being in accordance with existing regula-
tions—a point to which I attached but shght
importance—it had been authorised by the Sirdar,
probably tended to check wastefulness in that
quarter where it was most to be feared. Beyond
this I did nothing, and I found—somewhat to my
own astonishment—that, ^dth my ordinary very
small staff of diplomatic secretaries, the general
direction of a war of no inconsiderable dimensions
added but little to my ordinary labours.
I do not say that this system would always
work as successfully as was the case during the
Khartoum campaign. The facts, as I have already
said, were peculiar. The commander, on whom
everything practically depended, was a man of
marked military and administrative abiUty. Never-
theless, I venture to indulge in the hope that some
useful lessons for the future may be derived from
the Soudan campaigns of 1896 to 1898. It is in
no spirit of conventional eulogy that I say that
the British army consists of as fine material as any
in the world. Apart from any question of national
honour and interests, it positively chills my heart
to think that the lives of the gallant young men
of whom that army is mainly composed, may be
needlessly sacrificed by defective organisation or
guidance. I'liis is no place to write a general
essay on our military administration, but I cannot
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refrain from saying that, from what I have seen of
the administration of the British War Office, it stood
at one time in great need of improvement. It was
costly. It was hampered by tradition. It was, to use
an expressive French word, terribly " paperassier " ;
neither, for many years, was sufficient care taken,
in every branch of the military service, to put the
right man in the right place. In order to reform
it, men rather than measures were required. I
should add that there is reason to believe that,
since the South African War, the administration
of the War Office has been greatly improved. It
is, however, impossible to speak positively on this
point until its efficiency has undergone the crucial
test of war.
The elation with which the news of the capture
of Khartoum was received in England was in
direct proportion to the despondency which chilled
the heart of the British nation when, thirteen
years previously, it was known that Mahdiism had
triumphed and that General Gordon had been
killed. Lord Kitchener, on his return to London,
was received with an enthusiastic and well-deserved
ovation. Indeed, one of the principal arguments
in favour of recapturing Khartoum was that the
British public had evidently made up its mind that,
sooner or later, Khartoum had to be recaptured. It
might have been possible to have postponed decisive
action. It would probably have been impossible
to have altogether prevented it. The national
honour was not to be indefinitely baulked of the
salve for which it yearned. An argument of this
sort, albeit it is based on sentiment, is of intrinsic
importance. In the execution of the Imperiahst
policy, to which England is pledged almost as a
necessity of her existence, it is not at all desirable
to ehminate entirely those considerations which
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appeal to the imaginative, to the exclusion of the
material side of the national character. Moreover,
whatever may be thouglit of the undesirabihty of
admitting any emotional lines of thought as guides
to practical action in pohtics, it may be regarded as
certain that the pohtician who endeavours to run
absolutely counter to the impulse of the national
imagination, instead of seeking to guide it, will find
that he is attempting an impossible task.
The policy pursued by the British Government
in 1896 is, of course, capable of ample justification
on other and less sentimental grounds than those
to which allusion is made above. The effective
control of the waters of the Nile from the
Equatorial Lakes to the sea is essential to the
existence of Egypt.
Whatever opinion may be entertained of the
policy itself, or of whether the moment chosen for
its execution was opportune or the reverse, it
cannot be doubted that the capture of Khartoum
did more than appease those sentiments of national
honour which had been stung to the quick by the
events of 1885. The cannon which swept away
the Dervish hordes at Omdurman proclaimed to the
world that on England— or, to be more strictly
correct, on Egypt under British guidance— had
devolved the solemn and responsible duty of intro-
ducing the light of ^^'^estern civilisation amongst
the sorely tried people of the Soudan.
My hope and belief is that that duty w\\\ be
performed in a manner worthy of the best traditions
of the Anglo-Saxon race.
CHAPTER XXXIII
THE NEW SOUDAN
Question of the future political status of the Soudan—Anomalies of the
British position—O'ljections to annexation—And to complete in-
corporation with Efjypt—Intricacy of the problem—The two flags
—Speech at Omdurman—The ria^ht of conquest—The Agreement
of January 19, 1H99— Its unusual nature—Its reception by Europe
—Advantages of a Free Trade policy.
The Soudan having been reconquered, the question
of the future political status of the country naturally
presented itself for solution.
British policy in Egypt since the year 1882 may
be said to constitute a prolonged and, so far, only
partially successful effort to escape from the punish-
ment due to original sin. The ancient adage that
truth is a fellow-citizen of the gods ^ is as valid in
politics as in morals. British statesmen were con-
tinually harassed by a Nemesis in the shape of the
magna vis veritatis, which was for ever striving to
shatter the rickety political edifice constructed at
the time of the occupation on no surer foundations
than those of diplomatic opportunism. At every
turn of the political wheel, fact clashed with theory.
Nevertheless, in the year 1898, of which period I
am now writing, Ottoman supremacy in the
Soudan, whether in the person of the Sultan or
the Khedive, presented a sufficient character of
solidity to necessitate its recognition as a practical
* 'AXrideia OeQiv ofidwoKn.
Ill
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fact. It could not be treated as a mere diplo-
matic wraith. However mucli it tended at times
to evaporate into a phantom, its shape was still
sufficiently distinguishable through the political
mist to enable the outline of a kingly crown to be
clearly traced. Hence, the necessity arose of
cloaking the reality of fact with some more or less
transparent veil of theory.
The difference between the real and the supposi-
titious was brought prominently into relief imme-
diately after the fall of Khartoum. On no occasion
had a greater amount of ingenuity to be exercised
in effecting an apparent reconciliation between the
facts as they existed and the facts as they were,
by a pardonable fiction, supposed to exist. The
problem in this instance might at first sight appear
to have been almost as insoluble as that of squaring
the circle. But, as Lord Salisbury once remarked
to me, when one gets to the foot of the hills, it is
generally possible to find some pass which will lead
across them. I have now to describe the pass
which, with some difficulty, was eventually found
through the political mountains in the particular
instance under discussion. It will be seen that an
arrangement was made which elsewhere might
perhaps have been considered as too anomalous
to stand the wear and tear of daily political
existence. In Egypt, it was merely thought that
one more paradox had been added to the goodly
array of paradoxical creations with which the
political institutions of the country already teemed.
The facts were plain enough. Fifteen years
previously, Egyptian misgoverrmient had led to
a successful rebelhon in the Soudan. British rule
had developed the military and financial resources
of Egypt to such an extent as to justify the
adoption of a policy of reconquest. But England,
not Egypt, had in reality reconquered the country.
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It is true that the Egyptian Treasury had borne the
greater portion of the cost, and that Egyptian troops,
officered, however, by Enghshmen, had taken a
very honourable part in the campaign. But, ahke
during the period of the preparation and of the
execution of the pohcy, the guiding hand liad been
that of England. It is absurd to suppose that
without British assistance in the form of men,
money, and general guidance, the Egyptian
Government could have reconquered the Soudan.
From this point of view, therefore, the annexation
of the reconquered territories by England would
have been partially justifiable. There were, how-
ever, some weighty arguments against the adoption
of tliis course.
In the first place, although in the Anglo-
Egyptian partnership England was unquestionably
the senior partner, at the same time, Egypt had
played a very useful and honourable, albeit auxiliary
part in the joint undertaking. It would have been
very unjust to ignore Egyptian claims in deciding
on the future pohtical status of the Soudan.
In the second place, the campaign had through-
out been carried on in the name of the Khedive.
If, immediately on its conclusion, decisive action
had been taken in the name of the British Govern-
ment acting alone, the adoption of such a course
would have involved a brusque and objectionable
departure from the pohcy heretofore pursued.
In the third place—and this consideration would,
by itself, have been conclusive—it was not in the
interests of Great Britain to add to its responsi-
bilities, which were already world-wide, by assuming
the direct government of another huge African
territory.
These and other considerations, on which it is
unnecessary to dweU, pointed to the conclusion
that the Soudan should be regarded as Ottoman
VOL. II I
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territory, and that, therefore, it should be governed,
in accordance with the terms of the Imperial
Firmans, by the Sultan's feudatory, the Khedive.
A very valid objection existed, however, to the
adoption of this course. If the political status of
the Soudan were to be assimilated in all respects
to that of Egypt, the necessary consequence would
be that the administration of the country would be
biu'thened by the introduction of the Capitulations,
and, in fact, by all the cumbersome paraphernalia
of internationalism, which had done so much to
retard Egyptian progress. It was manifestly absurd
that British lives should be sacrificed and British
treasure expended merely in order to place addi-
tional arms in the hands of Powers, some one or
other of whom might at some future time become
the enemy of England. Moreover, the adoption
of this course would have been highly detrimental
to Eg}^tian interests. Egypt, more than England,
had suffered from the international incubus.
Hence there arose a dilemma, or, if it is permis-
sible to coin so unusual an expression, a trilemma
;
for three arguments, w^hich were in some degree
mutually destructive, had to be reconciled.
In the first place, it was essential that British
influence should in practice be paramount in the
Soudan, in order that the Egyptians should not
have conferred on them a " bastard freedom " to
repeat the misgovernment of the past.
In the second place, British influence could not
be exerted under the same ill-defined and anomalous
conditions as those which prevailed in Egypt with-
out involving the introduction of the baneful regime
of internationalism.
In tlie third place, annexation by England,
which would have cut the international knot, was
precluded on grounds of equity and policy.
It was, therefore, necessary to invent some
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method by which the Soudan should be, at one
and the same time, Egyptian to such an extent as
to satisfy equitable and political exigencies, and
yet sufficiently British to prevent the administra-
tion of the country from being hampered by the
international burr which necessarily hung on to
the skirts of Eg)^tian political existence.
It was manifest that these conflicting require-
ments could not be satisfied without the creation
of some hybrid form of government, hitherto
unknown to international jurisprudence.
The matter was discussed when I was in
London in July 1898. At that time, although
all saw clearly enough the objects to be attained,
no very definite method for attaining them was
suggested. In order, however, to give an outward
and visible sign that, in the eyes of the British
Government, the political status of the Soudan
differed from that of Egypt, Lord Kitchener was
instructed, on the capture of Khartoum, to hoist
both the British and Egyptian flags side by side.^
These orders were duly executed. Amidst the
clash of arms and the jubilation over the recent
victory, this measure attracted but little attention.
It was not until five months later, that its im-
portance was generally understood. On January
4, ] 899, being then at Omdurman, I made a speech
to the assembled Sheikhs. As I intended and
anticipated, it attracted much attention. It was,
indeed, meant for the public of Egypt and Europe
quite as much as for the audience whom I
addressed. In the course of this speech I said :
" You see that both the British and Egyptian
flags art floating over this liouse.^ That is an
^ When Lord Kitchener found liiniself face to face with Capt^iin
Marchand at Fashoda, he very wisely lioistod tlie Ef»-v|)tiaii fla^ only.
2 The house, in tlie courtyard of uiiicli I s|)ol<e, liad hut a short
time before been inhabited by one of the Klialifa's leading Emirs. At
the time of my visit, it was being used as a public office.
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indication that for the future you will be governed
by the Queen of England and by the Khedive of
Egypt." There could be no mistaking the signifi-
cance of these words, and there was no desire that
they should be mistaken. They meant that the
Soudan was to be governed by a partnership of
two, of which England was the predominant
member.
Before making this speech, I had submitted
to Lord Sahsbury the project of an Agreement
between the British and Egyptian Governments
regulating the political status of the Soudan. It
had been prepared, under my general instructions,
by Sir Malcolm Mcllwraith, the Judicial Adviser
of the Egyptian Government. Shortly after my
return to Cairo, I was authorised to sign it. It
was accordingly signed by the Egyptian Minister
for Foreign Affairs and myself on January 19,
1899. I proceed to give a brief summary of the
contents of this document.
The first and most important point was to
assert a vahd title to the exercise of sovereign
rights in the Soudan by the Queen of England,
in conjunction with the Khedive. There could
be only one sound basis on which that title could
rest. This was the right of conquest. A title
based on this ground had the merit of being in
accordance with the indisputable facts of the
situation. It was also in accordance, if not with
international law—which can obviously never be
codified save in respect to certain special issues—at
all events, with international practice, as set forth
by competent authorities. It was, therefore, laid
do\Mi in the preamble of the Agreement that it
was desirable " to give effect to the claims which
have accrued to Her Britannic Majesty's Govern-
ment, by right of conquest, to share in the present
settlement and future working and development
"
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of the legislative and administrative systems of the
Soudan.
This principle having been once accepted, the
ground was cleared for further action. Tlie
shadowy claims of Turkish suzerainty were practi-
cally, though not nominally, swept away by a stroke
of the pen. Their disappearance connoted the
abrogation of all those privileges which, in other parts
of the Ottoman dominions, are vested in European
Powers in order to check an abusive exercise of
the Sultan's sovereign rights. All that then re-
mained was to settle the practical points at issue
in the manner most convenient and most conducive
to the mterests of the two sole contracting parties,
namely, the British and the Egyptian Governments.
The 22nd parallel of latitude was fixed as the
northern frontier of the new state ; on the other hand,
the southern frontier was left undefined. It was
provided that both the British and Egyptian flags
should be used throughout the Soudan ; ^ that the
supreme military and civil command should be
vested in one officer, termed "the Governor-
General of the Soudan," who was to be appointed
by a Khedivial Decree on the recommendation
of the British Government ; that Proclamations
by the Governor-General should have the force
of law; that the jurisdiction of the INlixed Tribunals
should " not extend or be recognised for any purpose
whatsoever, in any part of the Soudan " ; and that
no foreign Consuls should be allowed to reside in
the country without the previous consent of the
British Government.
When this Agreement was published, it naturally
attracted much attention. Diplomatists, who were
* In the first instance, the town of Suakin was excepted from this
and from some other portions of the Agreement, but this arrangement
was found to cause a good deal of practical inconvenience. By a
subsequent Agreement, dated July 10, 1899, the status of Suakin was
in all respects assimilated to that of the rest of the Soudan.
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wedded to conventionalities, were puzzled, and
perhaps slightly shocked, at the creation of a
pohtical status hitherto unknown to the law of
Europe. One of my foreign colleagues pointed
out to me that he understood what British territory
meant, as also what Ottoman territory meant, but
that he could not understand the status of the
Soudan, which was neither one nor the other. I
replied that the political status of the Soudan was
such as was laid down in the Agreement of
January 19, 1899, and that I could give no more
precise or epigrammatic definition. Again, I was
asked what, in the absence of any Consuls, was
to happen to Europeans who were married or
buried in the Soudan ? I could only reply that
any European who considered it essential that his
marriage or burial should be attested by a Consular
representative of his country, would do well to
remain in the territory lying north of the 22nd
parallel of latitude.
But the splutter of amazement caused by British
want of political symmetry soon died out. It is
true that the Sultan murmured some few words
of ineffectual protest, but no serious opposition was
encountered from any quarter.
Why was this ? The reasons were threefold.
In the first place, whatever fine-spun arguments
might be woven from the loom of diplomatic
technicality, the attitude taken up by the British
Government was in substance manifestly both just
and reasonable.
In the second place, their attitude was firm. It
was clear that they intended to carry out their
programme. The inevitable consequence ensued.
No one was prepared to bell the cat, even if he felt
any disposition to do so. A mere platonic protest
would have caused irritation, and would have been
ineflectual.
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In the third place, the Powers of Europe,
possibly without meaning it, paid a compliment
to British rule. However much the Angiophobe
press on the Continent might at times rave, it was
perfectly well known that, under the British flag,
Europeans— albeit they were the subjects of Powers,
some of whom were animated by no very friendly
spirit towards England— would be treated with
perfect justice. Notably, Article VI. of the Agree-
ment, to which at the time I attached great
importance, tended greatly to allay any spirit of
opposition which might otherwise have been
aroused. It laid down that, in all matters concern-
ing trade with, and residence in the Soudan, "no
special privileges would be accorded to the sub-
jects of any one or more Power " ; in other words,
the German, the Frenchman, the ItaHan and others
were placed on a precisely similar commercial foot-
ing to that enjoyed by a subject of the Queen
of England. Even the most militant Angiophobe
could not fail to be struck by the contrast between
this Uberal attitude and the exclusive commercial
policy adopted by other colonising European
Powers. Thus, in laying the foundations of the
new Soudan, a Free Trade policy—which I trust
will never be dissociated from British Imperialism
—formed one of the corner-stones of the political
edifice.
After this fashion, the new Soudan was bom.
It was endowed with sufficient strength to support
existence. Nevertheless, it was of necessity to
some extent the child of opportunism. Should
it eventually die and make place for some more
robust, because more real pohtical creation, its
authors need not bewail its fate.^
* At a later period of this work (vide Chapter LX.) I shall give
a brief account of the results which have so far l)eeu obtained under the
Bystem whose main features are described in this chapter.

PART IV
THE EGYPTIAN PUZZLE
Quand un peuple a soyffert trop longtemps^ c'est tout au
plus si, dans son abaissementy il a la force de baiser la mam
qui le sauve.
P. J. Stahl.
This country is a palimpsest^ in which the Bible is written
over Herodotus, and the Koran over that.
Lady Duff Gordon's Letters from Egypt.
To watch the immemorial culture of the East, slow-moving
with the weight ofyears, dreamy with centuries of deep medi-
tation, accept and assimilate, as in a moment of time, the
science, the machinery, the restless energy and practical activity
of the West is a fascinating employment.
K£NN£TH J. Freeman, The Schools of Hellas,
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CHAPTER XXXIV
THE DWELLERS IN EGYPT
The Englishman's mission— Conditions under which it was under-
taken— Population of Egypt— Its mixed character— Hostility to
England—Main tenets of Islam—Its failure as a social system
—
Degradation of women— Immutability of the law— Slavery—
Intolerance—Incidents of religious belief and ceremonial—Mental
and moral attributes—Seclusion of women—Polygamy—Divorce
Coarseness of literature and conversation—Filial piety—Govern-
ment—Conservatism—Spirit of the laws—Language—Art—Music
—Customs—Obstacles to England's mission.
At the conclusion of Chapter XVIII. of this work,
the narrative was brought down to the time when
Kinglake's Enghshman had planted his foot on
the banks of the Nile, and sat in the seats of the
faithful. He came not as a conqueror, but in the
familiar garb of a saviour of society. The mere
assumption of this part, whether by a nation or by
an individual, is calculated to arouse some degree of
suspicion. The world is apt to think that the saviour
is not improbably looking more to his own interests
than to the salvation of society, and experience has
proved that the suspicion is not unfrequently well
founded. Yet assuredly the Englishman could in
this case produce a valid title to justify his assump-
tion of the part which had been thrust upon him.
His advent was hailed with delight by the lawful
rulers of Egypt and by the mass of the Egyptian
people. The greater portion of Europe also
looked upon his action without disfavour, if not
with positive approval.
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I say only the greater portion of Europe, for
there were two notahle exceptions. In the East of
Europe, the Turk chafed under the reflection that
the precious jewel of political opportunity had been
offered to him, and that, Hke the " bird in the
story " of JNloore's song, he had " cast the fair gem
far away." In the West of Europe, on the other
hand, the Frenchman was looking on askance with
a gradually awakening sense that he had made a
mistake in allowing the Enghshman to assume
alone the part of the Egyptian saviour, and, when
he once woke up to a sense of his error, he mani-
fested his irritation in various ways.
With these two exceptions, which, however, for
the moment hardly caused any discordant note to
be sounded amidst the universal chorus of approba-
tion, the Englishman was able to feel that none,
whether in or out of Egypt, were inclined to gain-
say the righteousness of his cause. More than this,
one of the first qualifications necessary in order to
play the part of a saviour of society is that the
saviour should believe in himself and in his mission.
This the Enghshman did. He was convinced that
his mission was to save Egyptian society, and,
moreover, that he was able to save it.
How was he to accomplish his mission ? Was
he, in his energetic, brisk, northern fashion, to show
the Egyptians what they had to do, and then to
leave them to cany on the work by themselves ?
This is what he thought to do, but alas I he was soon
to find that to fulminate against abuses, which were
the growth of centuries, was Uke firing a cannon-
ball into a mountain of mud. By the adoption of
any such method, he could only produce a temporary
ebullition. If he were to do any good, he must
not only show what was to be dono, but he must
stay where he was and do it himself. Or was he,
as some fiery spirits advised, to go to the other
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extreme ? Was he to hoist the British flag over
the citadel of Cairo, and sweep Pashadom, Capi-
tulations, Mixed Tribunals, and all the hetero-
geneous mass of international cobwebs to be found
in Egypt into the political waste-paper basket ?
Prudence, which bade him think of the peace of
Europe, and the qualms of his political conscience,
which obliged him to be mindful of his plighted
word, albeit it had perhaps been too Hghtly pledged,
stopped the way.
Being debarred from the adoption of either
extreme course, the EngUshman fell back on the
procedure, which is endeared to him by habits of
thought and national tradition. He adopted a
middle course. He compromised. Far be it from
his Anglo-Saxon mind to ask for that " situation
nette " which is so dear to the logical Frenchman.
He would assert his native genius by working a
system, which, according to every canon of political
thought, was unworkable. He would not annex
Egypt, but he would do as much good to the country
as if he had armexed it. He would not interfere
with the liberty of action of the Khedivial Govern-
ment, but in practice he would insist on the Khedive
and the Egyptian Ministers conforming to his
views. He would in theory be one of many
Powers exercising equal rights, but in practice he
would wield a paramount influence. He would
occupy a portion of the Ottoman dominions with
British troops, and at the same time he would do
nothing to infringe the legitimate rights of the
Sultan. He would not break his promise to the
Frenchman, but he would wrap it in a napkin to
be produced on some more convenient occasion.
In a word, he would act with all the practical
common sense, the scorn for theory, and the total
absence of any fixed plan based on logical reasoning,
which are the distinguishing features of his race.
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I propose eventually to answer the question of
how the Englishman fulfilled the mission which, if
it was not conferred on him by Europe, was at all
events assumed without protest from Europe.
Before, however, grappling with this portion of my
task, it will be as well to say something of the
conditions of the problem which had to be solved.
What manner of men were tliese Egyptians over
whom, by accident rather than by design, the
Englishman was called upon to rule without having
the appearance of ruling ? To what influences were
they subject ? What were their national char-
acteristics ? What part must be assigned to the
foreign, that is to say, the European, Asiatic, and
non- Egyptian African races resident in Egypt?
What political institutions and administrative
systems existed when the English stepped upon
the Egyptian scene ? In a word, what was the
chaotic material out of which the Enghshman had
to evolve something Hke order ?
These are important questions. It is essential
that they should be answered before the nature of
the work accomphshed by England in Egypt can
be understood.
Modern Egypt measures about 1000 miles from
Alexandria to Wadi Haifa. Its breadth from Port
Said to Alexandria is about 200 miles. The apex
of the Nile Delta Hes a little north of Cairo. South-
ward from that point, the habitable country narrows
rapidly, and is in places confined to a few yards on
either bank of the river. This habitable area
covers an extent of 33,607 square kilometres, or
about 8,000,000 acres.
AVho are the inhabitants of these eight millions
of acres ? Of what was the raw material composed
with which the Englishman luid to deal ?
It might naturally be supposed that, as we are
dealing with the country called Egypt, the inhabit-
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ants of whom the statesman and the administrator
would have almost exclusively to take account
would be Egyptians. Any one who is inclined to
rush to this conclusion should remember that
Egypt, as Lord Milner has stated in his admirable
work, is the Land of Paradox. If any one walks
down one of the principal streets of London, Paris,
or Berlin, nine out of ten of the people with whom
he meets bear on their faces evidence, more or less
palpable, that they are Englishmen, Frenchmen,
or Germans. But let any one who has a general
acquaintance with the appearance and physiognomy
of the principal Eastern races try if he can give a
fair ethnological description of the first ten people
he meets in one of the streets of Cairo, that " maze
of old ruin and modern cafe, that dying Mecca and
still-born Rue de Rivoli," as it has been aptly
termed by Sir William Butler.^ He will find it
no easy matter, and with all his experience he
may not improbably make many mistakes.
The first passer-by is manifestly an Egyptian
fellah who has come into the city to sell his garden
produce. The headgear, dress, and aquihne nose
of the second render it easy to recognise a Bedouin
who is perhaps come to Cairo to buy ammunition
for his flint-lock gun, but who is ill at ease amidst
urban surroundings, and will hasten to return to
the more congenial air of the desert. The small,
thick-lipped man with dreamy eyes, who has a far-
away look of one of the bas-reliefs on an ancient
Egyptian tomb, but who Chanipollion and other
savants tell us is not the lineal descendant of
the ancient Egyptians,'^ is presumably a Coptic
* The Campaign of the Cataracts, p. 95.
' Maspero, Histoire ancienne des peiqiles de fOrient, p. 16. Cham-
pollion le Jeune's opinion, (juoted by M. Maspero, is as follows : " Le&
Coptes sont le resultat du melange confus de toutes les nations (jui suc-
cessivement ont domine I'Egypt. On a tort de vouloir retrouver chez
eux les traits de la vieille race." Mr, S. Lane Poole, however, sayi
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clerk in some Government office. The face, which
peers somewhat loweringly over a heavy mous-
tache from the window of a passing brougham, is
probably that of some Turco- Egyptian Pasha.
The man with a bold, handsome, cruel face, who
swaggers by in long boots and baggy trousers, must
surely be a Circassian. The Syrian money-lender,
who comes next, will get out of his way, albeit he
may be about to sell up the Circassian's property
the next day to recover a loan of which the capital
and interest, at any ordinary rate, have been already
paid twenty times over. The green turban, digni-
fied mien, and slow gait of the seventh passer-
by denote some pious Sheikh, perhaps on his way
to the famous University of El-Azhar. The eighth
must be a Jew, who has just returned from a tour
in Asia INIinor with a stock of embroideries, which
he is about to sell to the winter tourists. The
ninth would seem to be some Levantine nonde-
script, whose ethnological status defies diagnosis
;
and the tenth, though not easily distinguishable
from the latter class, is in reality one of the petty
traders of whom Greece is so prolific, and who are
to be found dotted all over the Ottoman dominions.
Nor is the Ust yet exhausted. Armenians, Tunisians,
Algerians, Soudanese, INIaltese, half-breeds of every
description, and pure-blooded Europeans pass by in
procession, and all go to swell the mass, if not oi
Egyptians, at all events of dwellers in Egypt.
The compiler of the census of 1897 appears to
have felt a difficulty which must surely have weighed
still more heavily on those amateur politicians who,
like Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, have from time to time
advocated a policy of Egypt for the true Egyptians.
Who, in fact, is a true Egyptian ? The compiler
{Cairo, p. 205) : ** Copts, Gypts, Egyptians, they are, indeed, the true
survivors of the people vvliom Pharaoh ruled j and who built the Pyramids
of Giza."
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of the census very wisely did not attempt to define
the term ; he must have been aware that precise
definition was impossible. At the same time, the
instincts of his craft appear to have rebelled at the
idea of lumping the whole population of Eg\^t,
exclusive of Europeans, into one seething statis-
tical mass and calling them Egyptians. So he
divided the Egyptians as well as he could into,
first, natives ; secondly, persons born in other parts
of the Ottoman dominions, who, as a matter of
fact, are for the most part Syrians and Armenians ;
thirdly, semi-sedentary Bedouins, that is to say,
the hybrid between the fellah and the Bedouin,
who has one foot on the cultivated land of the
Nile Valley, and the other on the desert ; and,
fourthly, Nomad Bedouins, who are Bedouins pure
and simple.
The census of 1897^ informs us, therefore, that
at that time there were, in round numbers,
9,621,000 Ottoman subjects dwelling in Egypt,
who were divided into the following categories :
—
Natives .... 9,008,000
Persons born, not in Egypt, but in
other parts of the Ottoman Empire 40,000
Semi-sedentary Bedouins , , 485,000
Nomad Bedouins . , , 88,000
Total . 9,621,000 2
These, with 113,000 Europeans and protected
subjects of European Powers, brought the dwellers
* I am obliged to use the 1897 figures, as those of the census of 1907
are not yet available. I am, however, informed that the provisional
figures work out to a total of about 11,206,000.
^ According to the census of 1882, the population was 0,814,000.
There was, therefore, including Europeans, an increase of 43 per cent
in fifteen years. It is, however, generally supposed that the census
of 1882, which was conducted with very inadequate machinery, under-
estimated the population at the time.
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in Egypt, male and female, up to a grand total of
9,734,000.
The Englishman, I have said, came to Egypt
with the fixed idea that he had a mission to perform,
and, with his views about individual justice, equal
rights before the law, the greatest happiness of the
greatest number, and similar notions, he will not
unnaturally interpret his mission in this sense, that
he is to benefit the mass of the population. There
lie those nine or ten million native Egyptians at
the bottom of the social ladder, a poor, ignorant,
credulous, but withal not unkindly race, being such
as sixty centuries of misgovernment and oppression
by various rulers, from Pharaohs to Pashas, have
made them. It is for the civilised Englishman to
extend to them the hand of fellowship and encour-
agement, and to raise them, morally and materially,
from the abject state in which he finds them. And
the Englishman looks towards the scene of other
administrative triumphs of world-wide fame, which
his progenitors have accomplished. He looks
towards India, and he says to himself, with all
the confidence of an imperial race,—I can perform
this task ; I have done it before now ; I have
poured numberless blessings on the heads of the
ryots of Bengal and Madras, who are own cousins
to the Egyptian fellaheen ; these latter also shall
have water for their fields, justice in their law-
courts, and immunity from the tyranny under
which they have for so long groaned ; the reign of
Pashadom shall cease.
But the Englisliman will find, when he once
applies himself to his task, that there is, as it were,
a thick mist between him and the Egyptian,
composed of religious prejudice, antique and semi-
barbarous customs, international rivalry, vested
interests, and aspirations of one sort or another,
some sordid, others, it may be, not ignoble but
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incapable of realisation. He will find, in the first
place, that those 113,000 Europeans, although
constituting only 1"16 per cent of* the total popu-
lation, represent the greater part of the wealth
and intelligence, and no small proportion of the
rascality and aggressive egotism of the country ;
further, that whether their views be right or wrong,
just or unjust, these 113,000 elect often have the
power to enforce their behests, for are they not
the salt of the Egyptian earth, the Brahmins of
Egypt, and have they not behind them the diplo-
matists, and it may even be, the soldiers and sailors
of every State of Europe ? In this respect, the
Englishman will find that he has to deal with a
problem for the solution of which his Indian
experience will avail him but little. In the
second place, he will find that a majority of
the large landowners and all the most important
officials are Turco- Egyptians in various stages
of Egyptianisation, who enjoy privileges which
are wholly inconsistent with Benthamite principles,
notably the privilege of oppressing those 9,000,000
Egyptians whose woes wring the heart of their
English would - be benefactor. Obviously, the
Englishman is not hkely to get much sympathy or
support from this quarter. In the third place, he
will find a host of minor officials, many of whom
are of non- Egyptian origin, and who, for various
reasons, are indisposed to co-operate loyally in the
improvement of their country at the hand of the
just, well-intentioned, but somewhat unsympathetic
alien. In fact, the Englishman wiU soon find that
the Egyptian, whom he wishes to mould into some-
thing really useful with a view to his becoming
eventually autonomous, is merely the rawest of raw
material, and that the principal tools, with which
he will have to work, and on which the excellence
of the finished article must largely depend, may be
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British, French, Turkish, Syrian, Armenian, or of
half-a-dozen other nationahties, but they will rarely
be Egyptian.^
This, therefore, is the central feature of the local
situation which the English found in existence when
they took in hand the solution of the Egyptian
question. The Egyptians, properly so called, were
numerous, but were, from the pohtical and superior
administrative point of view, httle more than ciphers.
The main difficulties of the English politician and
of the Enghsh administrator will arise from the
fact that the minority, consisting of non-Egyptians
or of what, for want of a better term, may in some
instances be called semi-Egyptians, were relatively
powerful, and not unfrequently, for one reason or
another, hostile.
I have said that religious prejudice constituted
one of the barriers which were interposed between
the Englishman and the Egj^tian ; for, on the one
hand, besides being one of the European family in
respect to general civilisation, the Enghshman,
amidst many deviations from the path, will strive,
perhaps to a greater extent than any other member
of that family, to attain to a high degree of eminently
Christian civilisation ; that is to say, although he
will in his official capacity discard any attempt
to proselytise, he will endeavour to inculcate a
distinctly Christian code of morahty as the basis for
the relations between man and man. He is, indeed,
guided in this direction by the hghts, which have
been handed down to him by his forefathers, and by
the Puritan blood which still circulates in his veins.
The Egyptian, on the other hand, holds fast to
the faith of Islam, that noble monotheism, behef in
which takes to a great extent the place of patriotism
* I am, of course, speaking here of the state of things which existed
in 1882, Since then, the proportion of Egyptian employes in th«
Government service has very largely increased.
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in Eastern countries,^ and which serves as a common
bond of union to all Moslems from Dellii to Fez,
from Stamboul to Zanzibar, as they turn to pray
towards the cradle of their creed.^
And what are the main tenets of this creed,
which has exercised so mighty an influence on the
destinies of mankind ? They are set forth in the
Sacred Book of the Moslems. They have been
explained in many languages by learned men of
many nations. But their original grandeur and
simpHcity have never been more eloquently ex-
pounded than by those early followers of the
Prophet, who threw themselves at the feet of the
Christian King of Abyssinia to implore his protec-
tion against the persecution of the Koreish Arabs.
"O King," they said, "we lived in ignorance,
idolatry, and unchastity ; the strong oppressed the
weak ; we spoke untruth ; we violated the duties
of hospitality. Then a Prophet arose, one whom
we knew from our youth, with whose descent and
conduct and good faith and truth we are all well
acquainted. He told us to worship one God, to
speak truth, to keep good faith, to assist our
relations, to fulfil the rights of hospitality, and to
abstain from all things impure, ungodly, unrighteous.
And he ordered us to say prayers, give alms, and to
fast. We beheved in him ; we followed him."
'
These are the main tenets of the Moslem faith.*
* Some observers think that association with Europe has to some
extent resulted in substituting the bond of nationality for that of
religion in Moslem countries. Tlius M. Le Cliatelier, in a work
published in 1888, and entitled Islam au XlXeme Siecle, says (p. 180) :
'' L'e'volution contemporaine de I'Europe a introduit dans celle de
rislam un facteur commun,le developpement de I'espritde nationalite',
qu'elle a d'ailleurs propage dans le nioiide eiitier." Recent events,
not only in Egypt but elsewhere, tend rather to confirm M. Le
Chatelier's view.
^ See Studies in a Mosque, p. 96.
' Ibid. p. 48, and Muir's Life of Mahomet, p. 89.
* Mr. Badger, in his admirable article on Mohammed in the Dictionary
of Christian Biography, says: "Surah CXIl., the shortest chapter of
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To the many hundreds of millions who have
embraced Islam, and more especially to the poor
amongst them, the adoption of these tenets has
afforded not only spiritual consolation but material
blessings in this world, as well as the hope of
immortality in the world to come. It cannot be
doubted that a primitive society benefits greatly
by the adoption of the faith of Islam.^ Sir John
Seeley, speaking of what he aptly terms " the state-
building power of religion," says : " Wherever a
barbarous tribe has raised itself at all above the
level of barbarism and taken any development, it
has done so usually through conversion to Islam." '^
Unfortunately, the great Arabian reformer of
the seventh century was driven by the necessities
of his position to do more than found a rehgion.
He endeavoured to found a social system, with
results which are thus stated by a close observer of
the strong and weak parts of Islamism. "As a
religion," Mr. Stanley Lane-Poole says, " Islam is
great ; it has taught men to worship one God with a
pure worshipwho formerlyworshippedmanygods im-
purely. As a social system, it is a complete failure." ^
The reasons why Islam as a social system has
been a complete failure are manifold.
First and foremost, Islam keeps women in a
position of marked uiferiority.* In the second place,
Islam, speaking not so much through the Koran as
the Koran, is regarded by Moslems as containing the essence of the
whole book : 'Say, God is one; God the eternal; He begetteth not,
neither is He begotten ; neither is there any one like Him.' "
^
'' L' Islam est un progres pour le negre qui I'adopte."—Renan,
Hintoire du Peuple d' Israel, vol. i. p. 60.
2 Introduction to Political Science, p. 63. Miss Kingsley {West
AJrican Studies, ch.v.) makes some very apposite remarks on the adapt-
ability of Islamism to the present condition of African society.
2 Studies in a Mosque, p. 101.
* " The degradation of women in the East is a canker that begins its
destructive work early in childhood, ;ind has eaten into the whole system
of Islam."—Stanley I^ane-Poole, Islam, a Prelection delivered be/ore the
University of Dublin.
CH. XXXIV DWELLERS IN EGYPT 135
through the traditions which cluster round the
Koran, crystallises religion and law into one in-
separable and immutable whole, with the result
that all elasticity is taken away from the social
system. If to this day an Egyptian goes to law
over a question of testamentary succession, his case
is decided according to the antique principles which
were laid down as applicable to the primitive society
of the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century.
Only a few years ago (1890), the Grand JNIufti of
Cairo, who is the authoritative expounder of the
law of Islam, explained how bands of robbers
should be treated who were found guilty of making
armed attacks on a village by night. The con-
demned criminal might be punished in six different
ways. He might have his right hand and left foot
cut off and then be decapitated ; or he might be
mutilated, as before, and then crucified ; or he
might be mutilated, decapitated, and eventually
crucified ; or he might be simply decapitated or
simply crucified, or decapitated first and crucified
afterwards. Full details were given in the Mufti's
report of the mode of crucifixion which was to be
adopted. The condemned person was to be attached
to a cross in a certain manner, after which " il sera
perc^ a la mamelle gauche par une lance, qui devra
etre remuee dans la blessure jusqu a ce que la mort
ait Ueu." ^ These terrible penalties could not, how-
ever, for some reason, which at first sight appears
incomprehensible,^ be incurred if a dumb man were
one of the band of robbers. In this latter case the
lex talionis was to be applied. The next-of-kin of
any one who might have been murdered could
demand a Hfe for a life, or could claim blood-
money in lieu of expiation.
• Tlie original was, of course, in Arabic, but the French translation,
which is quoted above, was published in the Official Journal of tlie
Egy])tian (Government.
^ See p. loG, note.
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The rigidity of the Sacred Law has been at
times shghtly tempered by well - meaning and
learned Moslems who have tortured their brains
in devising sophisms to show that the legal prin-
ciples and social system of the seventh century can,
by some strained and intricate process of reasoning,
be consistently and logically made to conform with
the civihsed practices of the twentieth century.^
But, as a rule, custom based on the religious law,
coupled mth exaggerated reverence for the original
lawgiver, holds all those who cUng to the faith of
Islam with a grip of iron from which there is no
escape. "During the Middle Ages," it has been
truly said,^ " man lived enveloped in a cowl." The
true Moslem of the present day is even more tightly
enveloped by the Sheriat.
In the third place, Islam does not, indeed,
encourage, but it tolerates slavery. " Mohammed
found the custom existing among the Pagan Arabs ;
he minimised the evil."^ But he was powerless to
* A curious instance of the processes of reasoning' sometimes adopted
in order to evade the rigidity of the Sacred Law is to he found in the
provision, to which allusion is made above, tliat the barbarous punish-
ments of mutilation and crucifixion cannot be inflicted on a band of
brigands if a dumb man forms one of the band. The reason is rather
abstruse. It appears that certain classes of ofl'ences, such as robbery,
adultery, etc., are specially provided for by the Koran, the penalties
being generally excessively severe, and, as no mitigation is permissible,
those penalties have to be applied in tlieir entirety. Thus, for brigand-
age the penalty is mutilation, crucifixion, etc., as described by the
Mufti. But, in order, in some degree, to leave a loophole for escape
from the compulsory infliction of these punishments in all cases, the
law doctors discovered that it was only intended that they should be
inflicted when all the parties were quite sound and in a state to speak
in their own defence. For this reason, the presence of a child, au
idiot, or a dumb man enables the Sacred Law to be put aside and a
milder kind of punishment inflicted on the whole party under the
ordinary law, i.e. the will of the Sovereign or of his delegate, the Kadi.
If I understand rightly, the Mufti did not mean that the dumb man
saved all his associates from punishment, but only that they were
thereby transferred from the province of the Divine law to that of their
human authorities.
2 Symfflnds, Renaissance in Italy, p. 14.
' Sj-ed Ameer Ali, Personal Law of the Mohammedans, p. 38.
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abolish it altogether. His followers have forgotten
the discouragement, and have very generally made
the permission to possess slaves the practical guide
for their conduct. This is another fatal blot in
Islam.
TJfiiav yap t aperrj<; aTToaivvrat, evpvoTra Zey?
dvepo<i, evT av /jllv kutcl BovXiov rffjuap e\r)cnv.
The Christian, to his shame be it said, has before
now been not only a slave-owner, but, which is
much worse, a slave-hunter. The Christian reHgion
has, however, never sanctioned slavery.
Lastly, Islam has the reputation of being an
intolerant religion, and the reputation is, from
some points of view, well deserved, though the
bald and sweeping accusation of intolerance requires
quahfication and explanation. The followers of
the Prophet have, indeed, waged war against those
whom they considered infidels. They are taught
by their religious code that any unbelievers, who
may be made prisoners of war, may rightly be
enslaved.^ Moreover, sectarian strife has not been
uncommon. Sunni has fought against Shiah. The
orthodox JNloslem has mercilessly repressed the
followers of Abdul Wahab. Further, apostasy from
Islam is punishable with death, and it is not many
years ago that the sentence used to be carried into
effect.^ On the other hand, the annals of Islam are
* The Hidayah, which is regarded by the Sunn is as the standard
commentary on the Sheriat, or religious code, says: "The Imam,
with respect to captives, has it in his choice to slay them, because the
Prophet put captives to death, and also because slaying them terminates
wickedness ; or, if he chooses, he may mal<e them slaves, because by
enslaving them the wickedness of them is remedied, and at the same
time the Moslems reap an advantage."
2 Lane saw a woman stripped, strangled, and thrown into the Nile
for apostasy {Modem Egj/ptitins, vol. i. p. 13(5). To the best of my
belief, the last person executed for apostesy in virtue of a decision of an
Ottoman law-court was an Armenian, who in 1843 adopted the faith of
Islam, subsequently repented, and returned to the Christian Church.
Lord Stratford, who was then Ambassador at Constantinople, rose in
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not stained by the history of an Inquisition.* More
than this, when he is not moved by any circum-
stances specially calculated to rouse his rehgious
passions, the JNIoslem readily extends a half-con-
temptuous tolerance to the Jew and the Christian.'^
In the villages of Upper Egypt, the Crescent and
the Cross, the Mosque and the Monastery, have
stood peacefully side by side for many a long year.
Nevertheless, the general tendency of Islam is to
stimulate intolerance and to engender hatred and
contempt not only for polytheists, but also, although
in a modified form, for all monotheists who will
not repeat the formula which acknowledges that
all his wrath, and, after some sharp diplomatic passages, extracted a
declaration from the Porte that for the future no apostate should be
put to death. The incident is related in Chapter XV^III. of the Li/e
of Stratford Cmming. Relifi;ious freedom was further assured by
Articles X.-Xll. of the Khatt-i-Humayoun of February 28, 1856, which
was issued after the Crimean AV^ar.
1 once asked a hig^h Moslem authority in Cairo how he reconciled
the fact that an apostate could now no long^er be executed with tlie
alleged immutability of the Sacred Law. The casuistry of his reply
would have done honour to a Spanish Inquisitor. The Kadi, he said,
does not recognise any change in the Law. He would, in the case of an
apostate, pronounce sentence of death according to tlie Law, but it was
for the secular authorities to carry out the sentence. If they failed in
their duty, the sin of disobeying the Law would lie on their heads.
Cases of apostasy are very rare, but during my tenure of office in
Egypt, I had to interfere once or twice to protect from maltreatment
Moslems who had been converted to Christianity by the American
missionaries.
' Mr. Pickthall {Folk-Lore of the Holy Land, p. xv), speaking of the
capture of Jerusalem by the Khalif Omar, says : " Omar's severity
towards the Christians was so much below their anticipations that he
figures in the popular memory almost as a benefactor of their religion.
They were deprived of their church-bells, but kept their churches ; and
if large numbers of them embraced El Islam, it was through self-interest
(or conviction) and not at the point of the sword, as has been repre-
sented. Indeed, the toleration displayed by the Moslems towards the
vanquished, though less than we should practise nowadays, is without
a parallel in Europe till many centuries later. It was not emulated by
the Crusaders, who, rushing to wrest the Holy Sepulchre from the
clutch of the ' foul Paynim,' were astonished to find it in the hands
of Christians, whom, to cloak their disconcertion, they denounced as
heretics."
2 Upon the toleration accorded to the Jews by Moslems, see Milman'a
History of the Jews, bk. xxiii.
CH. XXXIV DWELLERS IN EGYPT 139
Mohammed was indeed theProphet of God. Neither
can this be any matter for surprise. The faith of
Islam admits of no compromise. The Moslem is
the antithesis of the pantheistic Hindoo. His faith
is essentially exclusive. Its founder launched fiery
anathemas against all who would not accept the
divinity of his inspiration, and his words fell on
fertile ground, for a large number of those who
have embraced Islam are semi-savages, and often
warlike savages, whose minds are too untrained to
receive the idea that an honest difference of opinion
is no cause for bitter hatred. More than this, the
Moslem has for centuries past been tauglit that
the barbarous principles of the lex talion is are
sanctioned, and even enjoined by his religion. He
is told to revenge himself on his enemies, to strike
them that strike him, to claim an eye for an eye,
and a tooth for a tooth. Islamism, therefore, unlike
Christianity, tends to engender the idea that re\'enge
and hatred, rather than love and charity,^ should
form the basis of the relations between man and
man ; and it inculcates a special degree of hatred
against those who do not accept the Moslem faith.
" When ye encounter the unbelievers," says the
Koran, " strike off their heads until ye have made
a great slaughter among them, and bind them in
bonds. . . . O true believers, if ye assist God, by
fighting for his religion, he will assist you against
your enemies ; and will set your feet fast ; but as
for the infidels, let them perish ; and their works
God shall render vain. . . . Verily, God will intro-
duce those who believe and do good works into
gardens beneath which rivers flow, but the un-
believers indulge themselves in pleasures, and eat
as beasts eat ; and their abode shall be hell
^ "\jQ Christianisme a ete intolerant, mais I'intolerance u'est pas
un fait essentiellement chretien. C'est un fait juif."—Renan, Vie de
Jesus, p. 425.
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fire." ^ It is true that when Mohammed denounced
unbehevers he was alluding more especially to the
pagans who during his lifetime inhabited the
Arabian Peninsula, but later commentators and
interpreters of the Koran appUed his denunciations
to Christians and Jews, and it is in this sense that
they are now understood by a large number of
Mohammedans. Does not the word " Ghazi," which
is the highest title attainable by an officer of the
Sultan's army, signify " one who fights in the cause
of Islam ; a hero ; a warrior ; one who slays an
infidel " V Does not every MoUah, when he
recites the Khutbeh at the Mosque, invoke Divine
wrath on the heads of unbelievers in terms which
are sufficiently pronounced at all times, and in
which the diapason of invective swells stiU more
loudly when any adventitious circumstances may
have tended to fan the flame of fanaticism ? Should
not every non-Moslem land be considered in strict
parlance a Dar-el-Harb, a land of warfare ? ^ When
principles such as these have been dinned for
centuries past into the ears of Moslems, it can
be no matter for surprise that a spirit of intolerance
has been generated.
The Englishman in Egypt will find that, in the
* On the other hand, Surah ii, 257, says : " Let there be no com-
pulsion in religion." Tlie numerous contradictory utterances and
inconsistencies of tlie Koran cannot be reconciled. They are probably
due to the fact that Mohammed's teaching was greatly influenced by pass-
ing events as well as by the personal episodes of his own career.
* Hughes' Dictionarii of Lslum, p. lo9.
3 Tliere is, however, considerable difference of opinion amongst
Moslem authorities as to the precise definition of a Dar-el-IIarb. The
question is one of considerable importance to the rulo-s of India. It
is discussed in Sir William Hunter's work entitled Indian Musulmans.
The highest Moslem authorities liave expressed opinions that India is a
Dar-el-Isl;im, and not a Dar-el-IIarb. Hence, it is not incumbent on
the Moslems of India to carry on a Jihad against the infidels. The
truth is that wlien, twelve centuries airo, these words came into use, it
was never contemplated that sixty millions of Moslems would be living
peacefully under tbe rule of a Christian King or Queen. Hence, some
modus Vivendi had to be found, which would bring the facts of the
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practical everyday work of administration, this in-
tolerant spirit, though it may not always find expres-
sion in word or deed, is an obstacle to the reformer
of which it is difficult to overrate the importance.
He will find that he has not, as in India, to deal
with a body of Moslems, numerically strong, but
whose power of cohesion is enfeebled from their
being scattered broadcast amongst a population
five times as numerous as themselves, who hold to
another and more tolerant creed. He will have to
deal with a smaller but more compact body of
Moslems, who are more subject to the influences
of their spiritual leaders than their co-religionists
in India. The Englishman will do his best under
these circumstances. He will scrupulously abstain
from interference in religious matters. He will
be eager to explain that proselytism forms no
part of his political programme. He will look
the other way when greedy Sheikhs swallow up
the endowments left by pious Moslems for chari-
table purposes. His Western mind may, indeed,
revolt at the misappropriation of funds, but he
would rather let these things be than incur the
charge of tampering with any quasi-religious in-
stitution. For similar reasons, he will abstain
from laying his reforming hand on the iniquities
of the Kadi's courts. The hired perjurer will be
allowed full immunity to exercise his profession,^
{(resent day into apparent conformity with the doctrines of Islam. The
aw doctors of Nortliern India wisely laid down the principle that no
Jihad was justifiable unless it was likely to he successful. This view
was conformable to the worldly interests both of the rulers of India
and of their Moslem subjects, but there is a somewhat secular ring
about an utterance of this sort. It commends itself to the politician
rather than to the uncompromising- divine. Even the exponents of
unbending Islam seem, however, prepared at times to admit tlie
principle quit y a des accomruodevicnts avec le del.
' A number of false witnesses ply, or, at all events, used to ply for
hire about the precincts of the Kadi's court at Cairo. They are pre-
pared, on payment, to swear to anything. I have been informed that
when the British Government took over the administration of Cyprus
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for the Englishman is informed that the criminal
cannot be brought to justice without shaking one
of the props which hold together the religious
edifice founded twelve centuries ago by the Prophet
of Arabia. He did not for many years allow a
murderer, whose offence was clearly proved, to be
hanged because Islam declared—or was supposed
by many ill-informed INIoslems to declare—that such
an act is unlawful unless the murderer confesses
his crime, or unless the act is committed in the
presence of two witnesses ; and he accepted this
principle in deference to JNIoslem sentiment, with
the full knowledge that, in accepting it, he was
giving a direct encouragement to perjury and the
use of torture to extract evidence/ In the work
of civdl juridical reform, he will bear with all the
antiquated formalities of the Mehkemeh Sheraieh.
He will scrupulously respect all Moslem observ-
ances. He will generally, amidst some twinges
of his Sabbatarian conscience, observe Friday as a
holiday, and perform the work of the Egyptian
Government on Sunday.^ He will put on slippers
over his boots when he enters a Mosque. He wall
pay his respects to Moslem notabilities during the
fast of Ramazan and the feast of Bairam. He
will, when an officer of the army, take part in
it was found that the profession of false witness had been officially
recognised by the Turkish Government. Perjurers took out licenses
for the exercise of their profession. A good account of the proceed-
ings of these professional witnesses is given in Senior's Journal in
Turkey and Greece, p. 80.
It ought in fairness to be added that hired perjurers existed at one
time in England. The literature of the Elizabethan period abounds
with allusions to "Knights of the Post," as they were then termed.
• 'Die law on this sulyect was eventually changed. After prolonged
inquiry, it was ascertained beyond doubt that the view commonly held
in Egypt was not in conformity with Moslem law or tradition. In
1897, therefore, a law was passed in virtue of which the special pro-
vision as regards the evidence necessary in order to permit of a capital
punishment being inflicted in a case of murder was abolished.
^ Some British officials have declined to work on Sundays, and have
made up the hours thus lost by working extra hours on week-days.
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Moslem religious ceremonies, fire salutes at religious
festivals, and sometimes expose his life under the
burning rays of an African sun rather than substi-
tute a Christian helmet for the tarboush, which is
the distinctive mark of the Moslem soldier in the
Ottoman dominions. And when he has done all
these things and many more of a like nature, they
will only avail him so far that they may perhaps
tend to obviate any active eruption of the volcano
of intolerance. They will acquire for him a grudg-
ing acknowledgment that he is content to let well
alone, and that he does not endeavour to evangelise
at the point of the bayonet. He will not be able
to inspire any strong feehng of gratitude beyond
this limit. The English engineer may give the
Egyptian fellah water for his fields, and roads
and railways to enable him to bring his produce
to market ; the English financier may afford
him fiscal relief beyond his wildest hopes ; the
English jurist may prevent his being sent to
death or exile for a crime of which he is innocent
;
the English schoolmaster may open to him the door
of Western knowledge and science ; in a word, his
material comfort may be increased, his intellect
may be developed, and his moral being elevated
under British auspices, but the Egyptian Moslem,
albeit he hates and fears the Turkish Pasha,
that he recognises the benefits conferred on
him by the Englishman and acknowledges his
superior ability, can never forget the fact that
the Englishman wears a hat whilst he, him-
self, wears a tarboush or a turban. Though he
accepts the benefits willingly enough, he is always
mindful that the hand which bestows them is not
that of a co-religionist, and it is this which affects
him far more than the thought that the Er.glish-
man is not his compatriot. Do what he will,
through the combined channels of sympathy and
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of reason, the Englishman will never be able to
break down this barrier, that whereas both he and
the Eg}^tian JNIoslems are prepared to aver that
there is no God but God, the Egyptian is, and the
Englishman is not prepared to subscribe to the
latter part of the formula, which lays down that
INIohammed was the Prophet of God. " Islam is all
in all to the fellah ; the unbelievers he looks on as
a miserable minority ; and it is only the unpleasant
fact that they cannot be crushed , at present that
prevents his crushing them, and asserting the
supremacy of Islam." ^
Neither is this the sole barrier which is inter-
posed between the two races. Look, not only to
the leading dogma, but to the incidents of Divine
worship associated with Islamism as opposed to
those of Christianity. Examine the consequences
which the degradation of women brings in its train.
Consider the mental and moral attributes, the
customs, art, architecture,^ language, dress, and
tastes of the dark-skinned Eastern as compared
with the fair-skinned Western. It will be found
that on every point they are the poles asunder.'
It would seem, mdeed, as if even in the most
trivial acts of life some unfelt impulse, for which
no special reason can be assigned, drives the
Eastern to do the exact opposite to that which
the Western would do under similar circumstances.*
* W. Flinders Petrie, Ten Years Digging in Egypt, p. 180.
" Dean Milman says; ''The East, having once wrought out its
architectural type and model, settled down in unprogressive, un-
creative acquiescence, and went on copying that type with servile and
almost undeviating uniformity. In the West, within certain limits,
with certain principles, and witli a fixed aim, tliere was freedom, pro-
gression, invention."
—
Ili.sfon/ 0/ Lit tin Christianity, vol. ix. 270.
3 Sir George Cornewall Lewis {On the Method of Observation and
Reasoning in Politics, voL ii. ch. xvi.) lias some interesting remarks on
this subject.
* An Englishman, who was a keen observer of Eg}^tian manners and
customs, told me that, as a test of intelligence, he once asked a fellah
to point to his left ear. A European would certainly have taken hold
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It will be interesting to dwell on this point at some-
what greater length.
Consider first differences, some of great, some
of trifling importance, which hinge on rehgious
beHef and ceremonial.
The Christian cHngs to the hope that, in the
spiritual heaven to which he looks forward, he will
meet with those with whom he has been associated
in this world. This hope is, indeed, one of the
most beautiful and consolatory features of his
faith. The Moslem's belief in immortality is dis-
sociated from any ideas of this nature. The Houris,
who people the Paradise which he hopes to gain,
were never inhabitants of this world.
The Christian prays for certain quahties to be
granted to him, or for certain specific objects to
be accomphshed. The Moslem generally utters
certain set formulae of adoration ; he rarely prays
for specific objects.
The Christian will say his daily prayers in
private. The Moslem will say them in pubhc.
He has no false shame about bearing public testi-
mony to the fact that, in every act he performs,
he is in the hands of God. " God," said an English
divine who had made a study of Eastern rehgions,
" is present to Mohammedans in a sense in which
He is rarely present to us amidst the hurry and
confusion of the West."^
The Christian, when he fasts at all, fasts
moderately by day and sleeps at night. The
Moslem, during his fast, neither eats, nor drinks,
nor smokes by day, but indulges without restraint
at night.
The Christian religion encourages the fine arts,
of the lobe of his left ear with his left hand. The Egyptian passed hia
right hand over the top of his head and with that hand grasped the
upper part of his left ear.
* Dean Stanley's Lectures on the Eastern Church, p. 334.
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and draws a potent influence from them. The
INlohamniedan religion is iconoclastic. Painting and
sculpture, when they represent any living creature,
are condemned. Music is never heard in a INlosque.
The Christian will sometimes be cleanly because
he thinks that it conduces to his health and com-
fort. He puts cleanliness next to godliness, but
does not associate the two ideas together. The
Moslem will be cleanly after a fasliion because his
rehgion enjoins him to be so.
Turn now to the mental and moral attributes
of the two races. It will be found that the anti-
theses are striking.
Sir Alfred Lyall once said to me : " Accuracy
is abhorrent to the Oriental mind. Every Anglo-
Indian official should always remember that
maxim." Want of accuracy, which easily degen-
erates into untruthfuhiess,^ is, in fact, the main
characteristic of the Oriental mind.
The European is a close reasoner ; his state-
ments of fact are devoid of ambiguity ; he is a
natural logician, albeit he may not have studied
logic ; he loves symmetry in all things ; he is by
nature sceptical and requires proof before he can
accept the truth of any proposition ; his trained
intelhgence works like a piece of mechanism. The
mind of the Oriental, on the other hand, hke
his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in
symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slip-
shod description. Although the ancient Arabs
acquired in a somewhat high degree the science of
* " Pour nous, races profondement serieuses, la conviction sig;nifie
la sincerite avec soi-mcme. iMais la sincerite avec soi-meme n'a pas
beaucoup de sens cliez les peuples Orieiitaux, peu habitue's aux
dc'licatesses de I'esprit critique. Bonne foi et imposture sont des
mots qui, dans notre conscience riifide, s'opposent comme deux termes
iuconciliables. En Orient, il y a de I'un a I'autre niille fuites et mille
detours. ... La verito matcrielle a tres peu de prix pour rOrieiital
;
il voit tout a travers ses prejuges, sea interets, ses passions."—ReuaUi
Vie de Jeaus, p. 263.
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dialectics,^ their descendants are singularly deficient
in the logical faculty. They are often incapable
of drawing the most obvious conclusions from any
simple premises of which they may admit the truth.
Endeavour to elicit a plain statement of facts
from an ordinary Egyptian. His explanation will
generally be lengthy, and wanting in lucidity. He
will probably contradict himself half-a-dozen times
before he has finished his story. He will often
break down under the mildest process of cross-
exammation. The Egyptian is also eminently
unscepticaL He readily becomes the dupe of
the magician and the astrologer. Even highly
educated Egyptians are prone to refer the com-
mon occurrences of life to the intervention of
some supernatural agency. In political matters,
as well as in the affairs of everyday life, the
Egyptian will, without inquiry, accept as true
^ It is well known that the Arabs of the eleventh and twelfth
centuries exercised a considerable influence on European thought by
their teaching of the Aristotelian philosophy. See, inter alia, Milman's
History of Latin Christianity, vol. Lx. ciii. Also Symonds' Renaissance
in Italy, p. 68. Dante (Inf. c. iv. 143) speaks of Avicenna and of
" Avverroes, che '1 gran commento feo."
Renan (Averroes et l'Averroisme, pp. ii. and iii.) makes the following
remarks:—'' Les Arabes ne firent qu'adopter I'ensemble de leucyclo-
pedie grecque telle que le monde entier I'avait acceptee vers le Vlleme
et le Vllleme siecle. ... La philosophie Arabe oflre I'exemple a peu
pres unique d'une tres haute culture supprimee presque iustantanement
sans laisser de traces, et a peu pres oubliee du peuple qui I'a cre'ee.
L'Islamisme devoila en cette circonstance ce qu'il y a d'irremediable-
«ient etroit dans son genie. Le Christianisme, lui aussi, a ete' peu
favorable au de'veloppement de la science positive ; il a re'ussi a
I'arreter en Espagne et a I'entraver beaucoup en Italic, mais il ne I'a
pas etouffee, et meme les branches les plus elevees de la famille
chretienne ont fini par se recoucilier avec elle. Incapable de se
transformer et d'admettre aucun element de vie civile et profane,
rislamisme arracha de son sein tout genre de culture rationelle.
Cette tendance fatale fut combattue tandis que rhe'ge'mouie de
rislamisme resta entre les mains des Arabes, race si fine et si
spirituelle, ou des Persans, race tros portee a la speculation ; mais
elle regua sans contrepoids depuis que des barbares (Turcs, Berbers,
etc.) prirent la direction de I'lslam. Le monde Musulman eutra des
lors dans cette periode d'ignorante brutalite, d'ou il u'est sorti qua
pour tomber dans la morne agonie ou il se debat sous nos yeux."
Averroes is, of course, a Sj)aiiisli corruption of Ibu-Rushd.
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the most absurd rumours.^ He will, indeed, do
more than this. He will often accept or reject
such rumours in the inverse ratio of their prob-
ability, for, true to his natural inconsistency and
want of rational discrimination, he will occasionally
develop a flash of hardy scepticism when he is
asked to believe the truth.
Contrast again the talkative European, bursting
with superfluous energy, active in mind, inquisitive
about everything he sees and hears, chafing under
delay, and impatient of suffering, with the grave
and silent Eastern, devoid of energy and initiative,
stagnant in mind, wanting in curiosity about
matters which are new to him, careless of waste
of time and patient under suffering.
Or, again, look at the fulsome flattery, which
the Oriental will offer to his superior and expect
to receive from his inferior, and compare the
general approval of such practices with the
European frame of mind, which spurns both the
flatterer and the person who invites flattery. This
contemptible flattery, "the nurse of crime," as it
was called by the poet Gay, is, indeed, a thorn in the
side of the Englishman in Egypt, for it prevents
Khedives and Pashas from hearing the truth from
their own countrymen.*
' "The note of the primitive mind is amazing inaccuracy, coupled
with wonderful receptivity."—Lyall, Asiatic Studies, Second Series,
p. ]!)8.
2 Tlie extent to which servile flattery may be carried at an Oriental
court is well illustrated by the account ^iven by Creasy (Ottoman Turks,
p. 2G1) of the relations between Sultan Ibrahim (a. d. 1640-48) and his
Grand Viziers. His first Vizier was Kara-Mustapha, an honest M:.d
couratjeous man, who dared to tell the truth to his Sovereiffn. After
a short career, he was dismissed from office and strangled. His
successor, Sultanzade Pasha, determined not to err on the side of
frankr.ess. Even Ibrahim, who was one of the worst of the degenerate
Sultans, could not help noticing bis servility. " How is it," he said,
" that thou art able always to approve of my actions, whether good or
evil?" "My Padishah!" replied the Minister, "thou art Khalif;
thou art God's shadow upon earth Every idea which thy spirit enter-
tains is a revelation from Heaven. Thy orders, even when they appear
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Perhaps there is no point as to which the differ-
ence between Eastern and Western habits of
thought comes out into stronger rehef than in the
views which are respectively entertained by the
Oriental and the European as regards provision
for the future in this world. The European,
especially if he be a Frenchman, is usually
economical, and his economy will not unfrequently
degenerate into meanness. He will pause before
he gives pledges which, whilst providing for his
immediate wants, may embarrass him or even
reduce Kim to penury at no distant date. He will
usually make provision for his old age, for the
wife, who may, and for the children, who probably
will survive him. The Egyptian generally cares
for none of these things. He takes Httle heed for
the morrow which will dawn on himself, and none
for the days which are in store for those whom
he will leave behind him. He is, perhaps, un-
consciously influenced by the frame of mind
engendered in himself and his progenitors from
having Uved for centuries under a succession of
Governments, which afforded no security to the
rights of property.^ Whether he occupies the
palace or the mud hut, he will often pledge his
future with scarcely a thought of how his pledges
may be redeemed. His life is in the past and
in the present. The morrow must take care of
the things of itself.
unreasonable, have an innate reasonableness, which thy slave ever
reveres, though he may not always understand."
Ibrahim^ Creasy adds, " accepted these assurances of infallibility and
impeccability
; and thenceforth spoke of himself as divinely inspired,
in the midst of the most disgraceful scenes of folly, vice, and crime."
He was eventually deposed and murdered.
* Indications are not wanting that, under the influence of good
government, the improvident habits of the Egyptian papulation are
being sensibly modified. I have alluded to this subject several times
in successive Annual Reports in connection with the scheme which has
been introduced with a view to lending small sums to the fellaheen,
and thus liberating them from the grip of the village usurers.
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But these same habits of improvidence tend
perhaps to develop a quaHty which is worthy of
praise. The Oriental may often be blamed for
prodigahty, but he rarely incurs the charge of
meanness. He is charitable to his neighbours, and
the fact may be recorded to his advantage without
stopping to inquire whether his charity is due to
kindliness of heart, or to the self-interest, which
impels him, at the dictates of his religion, to lay
up riches in the world to come. Moreover, the
Oriental is proverbially hospitable. Indeed, his
hospitality often errs on the side of being too la\ish.
It may be added, whilst on the subject of kind-
hness of heart, that the cruelty to animals, which
so often shocks Wsitors to Egy^pt, is no worse than
that which may be ^^^tnessed amongst Christian
nations in the south of Europe, and is probably,
as Lane observed in 1835, not a plant of indigenous
growth, but is rather due to association with low-
class Europeans. The JNIoslem religion enjoins
kindness to animals. " There is no religion which
has taken a higher view in its authoritative docu-
ments of animal life. ' There is no beast on earth,'
says the Koran, ' nor bird which flieth with wings,
but the same is a people like unto you,—unto the
Lord shall they return.' " ^
Passing on to the consideration of another differ-
ence between the Oriental and the European,
which will prove a perpetual stumbling-block to
the Englishman in Egypt, it is to be observed that
the ways of the Oriental are tortuous ; his love of
intrigue is inveterate ; centuries of despotic govern-
ment, during which his race has been exposed to
the unbridled violence of capricious and headstrong
Governors, have led him to fall back on the natural
defence of the weak against the strong. He
reposes unlimited faith in his own cunning, and
* Bosworth Smith, Mohammed and Mohammedanism, p. 255.
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to some extent his chosen weapon will stand him
in good stead. But its employment will widen the
breach between him and his protectors, for fate
has willed that the Egyptians should be more
especially associated with those members of the
European family who, perhaps more than any
others, loathe and despise intrigue ; who, in their
dealings with their fellow-men, are frank and blunt,
even at times to brutality ; and who, though not
difficult to beguile, are apt unexpectedly to turn
round and smite those who have beguiled them so
hardly as to crush them to the dust. From this
point of view, one of the more subtle Latin races,
had it occupied the predominant position held
by the English in Egypt, would probably have had
more sympathy with the weaknesses of Egyptian
character than the Anglo-Saxon.
Look, agam, to the high powers of organisation
displayed by the European, to his constant endea-
vours to bend circumstances to suit his will, and
to his tendency to question the acts of his superiors
unless he happens to agree with them, a tendency
which is especially marked in Englishmen, and
which is only kept in subjection by the trained
and intelKgent discipline resulting from education.
Compare these attributes with the feeble organising
powers of the Oriental, with his fatalism which
accepts the inevitable, and with his submissiveness
to all constituted authority.
And if it be held that powers of organisation
are only required amongst the educated classes,
look to what, for want of a more appropriate term
to express the idea, may be called the general
muddle -headedness of the ordinary uneducated
Egyptian, of which a few instances may be given.
On more than one occasion, a pointsman in the
Eg}^tian railway service has been known to turn
his points when the passing train had been half
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transferred from one line to the other, with the
natural result that the train was upset. A n Egyp-
tian engine-driver has been known to forget which
handle to turn in order to stop his locomotive.
On several occasions, railway employes have
been killed owing to their having gone to sleep
with their heads on the rail, that special position
having been adopted in order to ensure their
being awakened by the noise of an approaching
train. A European would think that, where a
road and a paved side-walk existed, it required no
great effort of the reasoning faculty to perceive
that human beings were intended to pass along the
side-walk, and animals along the road. The point
is not always so clear to the Egyptian. He will
not unfrequently walk in the middle of the road, and
will send his donkey along the side-path. Instances
of this sort might be multiplied. Compare the
habits of thought which can lead to actions of
this nature with the promptitude with which the
European seizes on an idea when it is presented
to him, and acts as occasion may demand.
Then, again, side by side with the European's
appreciation of arithmetic, consider that in all
matters connected with number or quantity, the
ordinary Egyptian goes hopelessly astray. Few
uneducated Egyptians know their own age. The
usual reply of an Egyptian, if asked the age of
some old man, is that he is a hundred years old.
What importance, he thinks, can be attached to
precision about a matter of this sort, or, indeed,
to any scientific or quasi -scientific subject ? I
once asked a former head of the El-Azhar Uni-
versity whether his professors taught that the sun
went round the earth or the earth round the sun.
He replied that he was not sure, that one nation
thought one way, and another another way,
—
his natural politeness possibly forbidding him to
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express to me what he really thought of the infidels
Kepler and Copernicus and their doctrines,—that
his general impressioti was that the sun went round
the earth, but that he had never paid much atten-
tion to the matter, and that the subject was too
unimportant to merit serious discussion. Tell an
Egyptian cook that he puts too much salt into the
soup. He will abstain altogether from the use of
salt. Or, on the other hand, tell him that he does
not use salt enough ; he will throw in a bucketful.
He cannot hit the happy mean ; moderation in the
use of salt, or in anything else, is foreign to his
nature ; he cannot grasp the idea of quantity.
Again, ask an Arab from the Soudan how many
men were killed at one of the numerous battles
which have taken place in that country. The only
thing which is certain is that he will not state the
precise truth, or anything near it, except by
accident. Neither will he reply that he cannot
answer the question addressed to him. He will,
without hesitation, blurt out the first conjecture,
which flashes across his brain, as a fact coming
within his personal knowledge. He may say 100,
or he mi-y say 2000. He has a very faint concep-
tion of what either figure represents, and he will
be prepared to bring the original 100 up to 2000,
or the original 2000 down to 100, according to the
views which, by the light of subsequent conversa-
tion, would appear gratifying to his interrogator.
Again, consider the manners of the Oriental as
contrasted with those of the European. We hear
a great deal in praise of Oriental courtesy, and the
praise is in some respects well deserved. A high-
class European will be charmed with the manners
of a high-class Oriental, albeit he is aware that the
exaggerated compliments common in the East are
merely figurative, and caimot be taken to represent
the real sentiments of the speaker. But look a
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little deeper and examine the ground on which
these outward forins of courtesy are based. The
examination will bring out a somewhat unpleasant
feature of the Egyptian character. For one of the
main reasons why an Egj^tian, if he is in any
position of authority, is courteous is that he thinks
it his interest to be so. In spite of this outside
courtesy to his superiors, he will not unfrequently
be harsh and tyrannical to his inferiors, to whose
feelings and interests he is often indifferent. There
are, however, exceptions. Slaves are more often
treated with kmdness than severity, although in
this case motives of self-interest may perhaps be
traced. Amongst the middle and lower classes
of Egyptians a spirit of real courtesy, not based
on self-interest, is often to be found in their
hospitality towards strangers. JNIoreover, among
equals of all classes, the outward forms of courtesy
are preserved.
These points have been indicated at some
length because the differences between Eastern
and Western habits of thought constitute a barrier
interposed between the Egj^tian and the Eng-
lishman almost as great as that resulting from
differences of religion, ideas of government, and
social customs. Indeed, this difference of mental
attributes constitutes perhaps the greatest of all
banders. It prevents the Englishman and the
Egyptian from understanding each other. Never-
theless, there is one saving clause, which serves in
some respects as a bond of union between the two
races. Once explain to an Egyptian what he is to
do, and he will assimilate the idea rapidly. He
is a good imitator, and will make a faithful, even
sometimes a too servile copy of the work of his
European teacher. His civilisation may be a
veneer, yet he will readily adopt the letter, the
catchwords and jargon, if not the spirit of
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European administrative systems. His movements
will, it is true, be not unfrequently those of an
automaton, but a skilfully constructed automaton
may do a great deal of usefid work. This feature
in the Egyptian character is of great importance in
connection with the administration of the country.
It is a source of strength, and also a source of
weakness ; for, so long as British supervision is
maintained, the Egyptian will readily copy the prac-
tices and procedures of his English teachers. No
necessity mil, therefore, arise for employing any
large number of English subordinates. On the
other hand, inasmuch as the Egyptian has but Uttle
power of initiation, and often does not thoroughly
grasp the reasons why his teachers have impelled
him in certain directions, a relapse will ensue if
English supervision be withdrawn.
Look now to the consequences which result
from the degradation of women in JNlohammedan
countries. In respect to two points, both of which
are of vital importance, there is a radical difference
between the position of Moslem women and that
of their European sisters. In the first place, the
face of the Moslem woman is veiled when she
appears in public. She lives a life of seclusion.
The face of the European woman is exposed to
view in public. The only restraints placed on her
movements are those dictated by her own sense
of propriety. In the second place, the East is
polygamous, the West is monogamous.
It cannot be doubted that the seclusion of
women exercises a baneful effect on Eastern
society. The arguments on this subject are,
indeed, so commonplace that it is unnecessary to
dwell on them. It will be sufRcient to say that
seclusion, by confining the sphere of woman's
interest to a very limited horizon, cramps the
intellect and witliers the mental development of
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oiie-lialf of the population in Moslem coinitries.
" An Englishwoman asked an Egyptian lady how
she passed her time. * I sit on this sofa,' she
answered, ' and when I am tired, I cross over and
sit on that.'"^ Moreover, inasmuch as women,
in their capacities as wives and mothers, exer-
cise a great influence over the characters of their
husbands and sons, it is obvious that the seclusion
of women must produce a deteriorating effect on
the male population, in whose presumed interests
the custom was originally established, and is still
maintained.
When an Egyptian woman interferes in politics,
her interference is almost always mischievous.
The information she obtains is necessarily com-
municated to her through a variety of distorted
media. The fact of her seclusion renders it well-
nigh impossible for her to hear both sides of a
question. The most trumpery gossip will be
sufficient to set her suspicions ablaze, and to con-
vince her that some danger, which is often
imaginary, hangs over the head of herself or her
relatives. Ignorance of any world beyond that of
the harem renders it impossible for her to dis-
criminate between truth and falsehood, between
what is within the bounds of possibility and what
is so manifestly absurd as to be impossible.
I need not dwell on the causes which, in Egypt,
as in other Oriental countries, have led to the
seclusion of women, nor on the extent to which
this practice is due to the prevalence of the
Mohammedan religion.^ From the point of view of
the politician and administrator, the consideration
of these questions, interesting though they be, is
' Cairo, p. 140.
^ " The system of the harem is, in its orifrin, not Moslem, but simply
Oriental. The only reproach that can be made ag-ainst thj Prophet la
that, by too definite legislation, he rendered subi^equeut development
and reform impossible."—Turkey in Europe, p. 190.
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of little more than academic interest. I am not
endeavouring in this work to discuss the effects
of Islamism upon progress and civilisation in
general. My task is of a more humble nature.
I am merely attempting to describe the state of
things which the English found in existence when
they took in hand the rehabilitation of Egypt.
Amongst other social difficulties it has, therefore,
to be noted that Moslem women in Egypt are
secluded, and that their influence, partly by reason
of their seclusion, is, in all political and adminis-
trative matters, generally bad.
The effects of polygamy are more baneful and
far-reaching than those of seclusion. The whole
fabric of European society rests upon the preserva-
tion of family life. Monogamy fosters family life,
polygamy destroys it. The monogamous Christian
respects women ; the teaching of his religion and
the incidents of his religious worship tend to
elevate them. He sees in the Virgin Mary an
ideal of womanhood, which would be incompre-
hensible in a Moslem country.^ The Moslem, on
the other hand, despises women ; both his religion
and the example of his Prophet, the history of
whose private life has been handed down to him,
tend to lower them in his eyes. Save in excep-
tional cases, the Christian fulfils the vow which
he has made at the altar to cleave to his wedded
wife for life. The Moslem, when his passion is
sated, can if he likes throw off" his wife like
an old glove. According to the Sunnis, whose
* See Lecky, History of European Morals, vol. ii. p. 367. No
Moslem could appreciate the beauty of Wordsworth's sonnet on the
Virgin :
—
Thy image falls to earth. Yet some, I ween.
Not unforgiven tlie suppliant knee might bend
As to a visible Power, in which did blend
All that was mixed and reconciled in thee.
Of Mother's love with maiden purity.
Of high with low, celestial with terrene.
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doctrines are quoted because the Egyptians are
Sunnis, " A husband may divorce his wife without
any misbehaviour on her part, or without assigning
any cause. The divorce of every husband is
effective if he be of sound understanding and of
mature age." ^ There is, however, a good deal of
difference of opinion amongst legal authorities
as to the law of divorce.^ The general principle
inculcated by JVIohammed on this subject is thus
explained in the Traditions : *' The thing which
is lawful, but disliked by God, is divorce."' The
practice of monogamy has of late years been
gaining ground amongst the more enlightened
Egyptians. The late and the present Khedive,
the late Chdrif Pasha, and Riaz Pasha may be
cited as monogamous notabilities. The movement
in this direction may be attributed to several causes.
In the first place, education and association with
Europeans may have induced the conviction that
it is more respectable, and generally more con-
ducive to domestic happiness, to marry one wife
rather than to take advantage of the permission
granted by Mohammed to " marry what seems good
to you of women, by twos, or threes, or fours, or
what your right hand possesses " {Surah, iv. 3).
In the second place, polygamy is expensive. Lane
said, so long ago as 1835, " I believe that not more
than one husband among twenty has two wives," *
and since Lane's time, the practice of polygamy
has certainly diminished. Nevertheless, the move-
ment in favour of monogamy caimot be as yet
called general. The first thing an Egyptian of
the lower classes will do when he gets a little
money is to marry a second wife. A groom in
* Dictionary of Islam, p. 88.
' This question is fully discussed by Syed Ameer Ali in his PersoruU
Law of the Mohammedans, chapters xi.-xiii.
* Dictionary of Islam, p. 87.
* Modem Egyptians, vol. i. p. 231,
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my stables was divorced and re -married eleven
times in the course of a year or two. I remember
hearing of an old Pasha who complained pee\'ishly
that he had to go to the funeral of his first wife, to
whom he had been married forty years previously,
and whose very existence he had forgotten. The
great facility given to divorce necessarily weakens
the strength of the family tie. Further, in the
West, a wife, whose personal attractions have dis-
appeared under the hand of time, can often, in
default of other influences, maintain her hold over
her husband's affections through the children which
she has borne to him.
Femina quum senuit, retinet connubia partu,
Uxorisque decus matris reverentia pensat.
The hold which the discarded or neglected Moslem
wife might maintain on grounds such as these is
weakened by the presence of younger and more
attractive rivals, who have perhaps borne other
children to her husband.
Amongst other consequences resulting from
polygamy and the customs which cluster round
polygamy, it may be noted that, whereas in the
West the elevation of women has tended towards
the refinement both of hterature and of con-
versation, in the East their degradation has
encouraged hterary and conversational coarseness.
This coarseness has attracted the attention of
all who have written on Egyptian manners and
customs.^ It is true that the Moslem may fairly
argue that he started 600 years later than the
Christian in the race to attain civilisation, and that,
apart from the English dramatists of the seven-
teenth century, the writmgs of Boccaccio and of
Rabelais denote a state of society no more refined
than that which at present exists in Egypt ; and
* Lane's Modem Egyptians, vol. i. pp. 260 and 273.
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he may use this argument with all the greater
reason inasmuch as the class of humour which
finds most favour in Egyptian society is very
much akin to that which we may now read in the
Decameron. But, in the first place, it is to be
observed that the Decameron is a model of
refinement as compared mth many works in
Arabic ; and, in the second place, it may be
doubted whether, even in the INIiddle Ages, the
general coarseness of European society was ever
on a par with that of the modern Egyptians.
There is, however, one feature in connection with
family life in the East, where the Oriental contrasts
very favourably with the European. " Paradise,"
the Prophet finely said, "lies under the feet of
mothers." Greater outward respect is, in fact,
shown to parents, and to old age in general,
by Eastern than by Western races. " Thou
shalt rise up before the hoary head and honour
the face of the old man and fear thy God."
Egyptians have from time immemorial acted on
this Levitical principle. Herodotus says : " Their
(the Egyptian) young men when they meet their
elders in the streets, give way to them and step
aside ; and if an elder man comes in where young
men are present, these latter rise from their seats."^
Young Egyptians generally respect and obey their
parents and are well treated by them, unless,
indeed, both parents and children occupy very
high positions, in which case, the principle laid
down by the Prophet Micah rather than that
prescribed by Moses forms the basis of the family
connection : "A man's enemies are the men of his
own house."
Consider also the different standpoints from
which the European and the Oriental approach
the subject of government.
^ Book ii. chapter 132,
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The point of view of the Eastern is wholly
different from that of the Western. I speak, of
course, of the true Eastern, free from European
alloy ; for when once the Eastern, and notably the
E'^yptian, has been semi - Europeanised, he will
often develop with amazing rapidity into a root-
and - branch reformer. He will not understand
moderation in reform any more than the Egyptian
cook, who was recently mentioned, will under-
stand moderation in the use of salt. The true
Eastern is a staunch conservative. He would
probably look upon an Oriental Lord Eldon as a
rash innovator. European affairs appear to him
to be in a constant state of flux ; his frame of
mind is fitly represented by Matthew Arnold's
fine lines :
—
The East bowed low before the blast
In patient deep disdain ;
She let the legions thunder past,
And plunged in thought again.
The mind of the true Eastern is at once lethargic
and suspicious ; he does not want to be reformed, and
he is convinced that, if the European wishes to re-
form him, the desire springs from sentiments which
bode him no good. Moreover, his conservatism
is due to an instinct of self-preservation, and to
a dim perception that, if he allows himself to be
even slightly reformed, all the things to which he
attaches importance will be not merely changed in
this or that particular, but will rather be swept off
the face of the earth. Perhaps he is not far wrong.
Although there are many highly-educated gentle-
men who profess the Moslem religion, it has yet
to be proved that Islam can assimilate civilisation
without succumbing in the process. It is, indeed,
not improbable that, in its passage through the
European crucible, many of the distinctive features
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of Islam, the good alike with the bad, will be
volatilised, and that it will eventually issue forth
in a form scarcely capable of recognition. " The
Egyptians," JNloses said, "whom ye have seen to-day,
ye shall see them again no more for ever." ^ The
prophecy may be approaching fulfilment in a sense
different to that in which it was addressed to the
TsraeUtes.
Look, moreover, not only to the spirit of the
lawgivers, but to the general principles on which
the laws are based. The tendency in all civilised
European States is to separate religious from civil
laws. In Moslem States, on the other hand,
religious and civil laws are inextricably mterwoven.
In the AVest, the law recognises and encourages
the use of credit,^ and protects the creditor. It
may be remarked incidentally that, in respect to
this point perhaps more than any other, the
ignorant and improvident Egyptian suffered when
the Code Napoleon, like a Juggernaut's car, passed
over his back. On the other hand, the Moslem
law condemns usury, and thus discourages the
outlay of capital.^ The lax Egyptian Moslem is
obliged to have recourse to all sorts of subter-
fuges in order to lend money without violating
the letter of the law. The presence of the Chris-
tian usurer, with whom it is at times possible
for the Moslem to form an unnatural alliance
based on a community of interest, facilitates
subterfuges of this sort.
Again, in the East the theory and practice that
the Government is the sole proprietor of tlie soil
survives to a certain extent. In the West, on
1 Exodus xiv. 13.
* It should, however, be remembered that, during- the Middle Ages,
the Christian Church exerted its influence against usury, with the
result that the money-lending business fell into the hands of the Jews.
'
'ITie Moslem depositors in the Government Savings fiauks often
decline to accept interest on their deposits.
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the other hand, the theory has been well-nigh for-
gotten, and the practice no longer survives. Save
in the least civilised portions of Europe,^ land is
held to be the private property of individuals.
So also as regards criminal laws, tlie differences
are striking. The Moslem code is based upon the
principle, long since abandoned in the V^^est, that
it is the business of the State to oblige its citizens
to be religious and moral. A sentence of death
for blasphemy could not, of course, at present be
carried out, but a case occurred in Egypt, shice
the British occupation, of a man who received
eighty blows with a courbash, under sentence
from the Kadi, for smoking a cigarette in the
streets during the Ramazan fast. In general
also, Oriental punishments are cruel,^ whilst Euro-
pean punishments are mild. This fact tends
towards brutalising the population and rendering
them cruel to each other.
Compare, again, the languages, art, architecture,
and music of the Oriental with those of the Euro-
pean. It will be found that on almost every
point the practices and the tastes of the one are
opposed to those of the other.
Oriental alphabets are intricate. The Turk, the
Arab, and the Persian begin to write on the right
side of the page ; the short vowels are almost
always omitted. European alphabets, on the other
hand, are simple. The Eiu'opean begins to write
on the left-hand side of the page.
Orientals continue to copy from one style of art.
European art is various and constantly develops
new forms.
Oriental music, which is much the same in all
parts of the East, is wanting in harmony and
1 See Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace's Russia.
2 Moltke, who wrote in 183G, says (Bric/h, etc., in der Tiirkei, p. iiCy)
that lie had been a personal witness of the barbarous puuishnieut
inflicted in Turkey on uufailhful wives.
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monotonous to the ears of most Europeans.^
European music, on the other hand, generally
fails to please Orientals.
Turn, again, to the most ordinary customs and
expressions, the dress, etc., of the Oriental as com-
pared with the European. It will be found that,
even in the most trivial matters, the Oriental will
generally do or say the opposite to what the
European would do or say under similar circum-
stances. Numerous instances in point will readily
occur to any one who has even a slight acquaint-
ance with Eastern social life.
The ethnologist, the comparative philologist,
and the sociologist would possibly be able to give
explanations as regards many of the differences
which exist between the East and the West. As I
am only a diplomatist and an administrator, whose
proper study is also man, but from the point of
view of governing him rather than from that of
scientific research into how he comes to be what he
is, I content myself with noting the fact that some-
how or other the Oriental generally acts, speaks,
and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the
European. " Tout, chez ce peuple, porte Fempreinte
d'un contraste frappant avec les habitudes des
nations Europeennes. Cette difference est I'ouvrage
du cUmat, des institutions civiles et des pr^jug^s
reHgieux." ^
Many of the observations contained in this
chapter may be considered commonplace. Nothing,
indeed, has been stated which will be new to tliose
who have paid attention to Eastern affairs, or who
are in any degree familiar with the social life of the
East. I have, however, thought it desirable to
make a catalogue—and, I may add, a very incom-
* There can be no doubt that from the earliest times the Arabs have
taken extreme delight in their own music. See Krenier's CulturycAchichte
des Orients, vol. i. p. 149. '^ Description de fEyypte, p. 83-
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plete catalogue—of the main points as to which
Egyptian and European habits of thought and
customs diverge, for, although each detail taken by
itself may be well known, it may be doubted
whether even those Englishmen who have been
actively engaged in the work of Egyptian adminis-
tration have always recognised to the full that, in
taking in hand Egyptian reform, they had to deal
with a society which was not only in a backward
state of civilisation, but which was also, from their
point of view, well-nigh incomprehensible. They
were brought face to face with a population which,
in the eyes of the European, was, morally and
politically speaking, walking on its head. Lord
Dalling, at one time Ambassador at Constantinople,
is credited with saying : " When you wish to know
what a Turkish official is likely to do, first consider
what it would be his interest to do ; next, what any
other man would do in similar circumstances ; and
thirdly, what every one expects him to do. When
you have ascertained these, you are so far advanced
on your road that you may be perfectly certain he
will not adopt any of these courses." Often have I
thought that an Egyptian would take a certain
view of a question based on my idea of the manner
in which he would interpret either his own or
Egyptian interests. And often have I found that
he interpreted those interests in some strange and
fanciful manner, which would never have entered
into the head of any European.
All these considerations, however, affected the
Englishman but slightly when, in 1882, he under-
took the regeneration of Egypt. When it is
remembered that, in addition to the difficulties
arising from the causes to which allusion is made in
this chapter, the country had, for at least a century
previous to 1882, been governed under a system
which exhibited the extremes of savage cruelty and
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barbarity ; ^ that the impulse towards ci\ihsation
%st imparted, and not unintelhgently imparted by
the rough men of genius who founded the Khedivial
dynasty, was continued on principles, which may
almost be characterised as insane, by the incapable
Said, and the spendthrift Ismail ; that under their
auspices all that was least creditable to European
civilisation was attracted to Egypt, on wdiose carcase
swarms of needy adventurers preyed at will ; that, as
a consequence of these proceedings, the very name
of European stank in the nostrils of the Egyptian
population ; that w^iatever European ideas had
taken root in the country had been imported from
France ; that the French Government and French
public opinion w^ere at the outset bitterly opposed
to the action of England in Egj^t ; that, through
the medium of an unscrupulous press. Englishmen
were vilified and their actions systematically misre-
presented ; that, under the pressure of Europe and
the European creditors of Egypt, a variety of com-
pUcated institutions had been created which were
in advance of the requirements and state of civilisa-
tion of the country ; that the Treasury was well-
nigh bankrupt ; that the army had been disbanded
;
that no law-courts w^orthy of the i;iame existed
;
* Bruce, writing of his visit to Cairo in 1768, says: "The Govern-
ment of Cairo is much praised by some. It may perhaps have merit
when explained, but I never could understand it, and therefore cannot
explain it. But a more brutal, unjust, tyrannical, oppressive, avari-
cious set of infernal miscreants there is not on earth tlian are the
members of the Government of Cairo" {Travels to discover the Source of
the Nile, vol. i. p. 26). Volney, who visited Egypt in 1783-5, wrote
:
"Tout ce que Ton voit, ou que Ton entend, annouce (jue Ion est dans
le pays de I'esclavage et de la tyrannie. On ne parle que de troubles
civils, que de misere publique, que d'extorsions d'argent, que de
bastonnades et de meurtres. Nulle surete j)our la vie ou la proprie'te'.
On verse le sang d'un homme comme celui dun boeuf. La justice
mt-me le verse sans formalite. L'officier de nuit dans ses rondes,
I'officier de jour dans ses tourn^es, jugent, condamnent et font executer
en un cliu d'oeil et sans appel. Des bourreaux les accompagnent, et
au premier ordre la tete d'un malheureux tombe dans le sac de cuir, ou
on la re9oit de peur de souiller la place."
—
Voyage en Syrie et en ^gypte,
p. 162.
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that the Englishman's own countrymen, who,
accordmg to their custom, judged mainly by
results, expected that at the touch of his adminis-
trative wand all abuses would forthwith disappear ;
that the fellah expected immediate relief from
taxation and oppression ; that the Levantine con-
tractor expected to dip his itching palm into the
till of the British Treasury; that the Enghshman's
position was undefined, and that he was unable to
satisfy all these expectations at once ; that, having
just quelled a rebellion in Egypt, he was con-
fronted with a still more formidable rebellion in
the Soudan ; and, lastly, that before he had
seriously begun the work of reform, he was con-
stantly pressed by Frenchmen, and by some of his
own countrymen, to declare his conviction that the
work was accomplished,—when all these points are
remembered, the difficulty of the task which Eng-
land undertook may be appreciated in its true light.
But the task was ennobled by its difficulty. It was
one worthy of the past history, the might, the
resources, and the sterling national qualities of the
Anglo-Saxon race. I shall presently endeavour to
show how it was accomplished. Before, however,
dealing with this portion of my task, the component
parts of the population of Egypt require some
further analysis.
CHAPTER XXXV
THE MOSLEMS
Classification of the population—The Turco-Egyptians—The Egyptians
—The hierarchy— 1 he Grand Mufti—The head of the El-Azhar
University—The Grand Kadi—The Sheikh el-Bekri—Mohammed
el-Saadat— Abdul - Khalik el - Saadat — Mohammed Abdu —
Mohammed Beyram—The Omdehs and Sheikhs— Their sub-
missiveness to the Pashas—Their sympathy with Arabi—Their
tyranny over the Fellaheen—Their feelings towards England
—
The fellaheen—The Bedouins.
AccouDiNG to the census of 1897, the dwellers in
Egypt were at that time 9,734,000 in number.
These 9,734,000 souls may be classified in various
ways.
In the first place, they may be considered as, on
the one side, Ottoman subjects, a category which
would include almost every species of semi-Egyptian
hybrid, and on the other side, Europeans, a cate-
gory which would include every nondescript who
could, by hook or by crook, get his name registered
at some European Consulate. Or, they may be
classified as officials and non-officials, a classification,
the discussion of which would bring into relief the
fact that, when the British occupation commenced,
it had not yet been realised by the native officials
of Egypt that they were the trustees of the
non-otficial classes ; rather were the latter considered
to be the legitimate prey of the former. Or, they
may be classified as JNIoslems and Christians, a
distinction wliich, being converted from terms of
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religious belief into those of political and social life,
would differentiate the ignorant, conservative nruiss
from the more subtle, more superficially intellectual,
but, if the true Europeans be excluded, by no
means more virile minority. In the following
remarks, the last of these three classifications will
be adopted.
The Moslems consist, first, of Turks and Turco-
Egyptians ; secondly, of Egyptians ; and thirdly, of
Bedouins. A few Moslems resident in Egypt will
thus remain unclassified ; for instance, there are a
few Algerians and Tunisians, who are French, and
a few natives of India, who are British subjects.
There are also a considerable number of Soudanese,
an element which was found of importance when
the reorganisation of the Egyptian army was taken
in hand. But, for the purposes of the present
argument, it will suffice to deal with the Moslems
under the three main heads given above.
The Turk was the conqueror of Egypt, and
within the memory of persons still living behaved
as such. But there are now but few pure Turks
left. In the absence of fresh importations from
Turkey, a process of Egyptianisation set in.
Absence from the headquarters of Ottoman
thought and action, and intermarriage with Eg}^-
tians, produced their natural results. It is thought
that no such thing as a pure Turk of the third
generation is to be found within the length and
breadth of the land. It is, indeed, a misnomer to
speak of Turks in Egypt. By the time the English
occupied the country in 1882, all the Turks had
blossomed or, as some would say, degenerated ijito
Turco - Egyptians. This is a point which the
English politician had to bear carefully in mind,
for as each year of the British occupation passed
by, the Turco - Egyptian element in Egyptian
society became more Egyptian and less Turkish
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in character and habits of thought. In common
with other Moslems, the Turco-Egyptians looked
to the Sultan as their Pope. But, on the other
hand, they were year by year less inclined to
regard him as their King. When, in 1892, the
British Government stepped in and prevented a
Firman of the Sultan from being promulgated, they
rallied in a half-hearted and platonic manner round
the Commander of the Faithful. They winced at
the spectacle of his humiliation at the hands of a
Christian Power. But, even then, the feelings of
indignation excited in their breasts were probably no
stronger than those which would be felt by an Italian
patriot, who was also a devout Cathohc, and who
saw the Vatican obliged to yield to the Quirinal.
Again, in 1906, when the relations between
England and Turkey were strained by the occur-
rence of what is known as the " Sinai Peninsula "
incident, a strong wave of pro-Turkish feehng
seemed to sweep over Egypt, but it was a purely
fictitious movement, manufactured by the Anglo-
phobe press. It speedily died a natural death.
In truth, religious conviction, backed by racial
prejudices and bythe sympathy generally entertained
amongst Orientals for a theocratic form of govern-
ment, may for a while wrestle with personal interest
and political associations, but the chances are that,
if the struggle is continued, religious conviction will
get a fall. Pro-Turkish sentiment will, therefore,
smoulder and occasionally flicker up sufficiently to
show some feeble light, but it will never burst into
a blaze. For, in fact, many considerations are
constantly dragging the Turco - Egyptian in a
direction away from Constantinople. Although
he may try to deceive others, he cannot deceive
himself. He knows well enough what he would
do if he got the upper hand ; he would plunder
every one he could indiscriminately. He knows
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that his own brethren, whom his ancestors left
behind at Constantinople, are prepared to act on
precisely similar principles, and he feels that if
they, who are certainly the most powerful of the
sons of Islam, were once to step on the scene, his
affinity of race would avail him little ; he would
take rank with the plundered rather than with the
plunderers ; or, at best, he would have to stand by
and see the Egyptians robbed without obtaining
any adequate share of the plunder. Rather than
submit to this fate, it were perhaps better to take
the good things the Englishmen offer to him ; it is
true that they will not let him spoil the Egyptian,
but they will prevent the Constantinopolitan Turk
from spoiling him ; they give him wealth and
security for his life and property
;
perhaps it will
be as well to pause before throwing away these
benefits in order to obtain the doubtful advantages
of being governed by a number of co-rehgionists,
whose community of religion will in no degree
temper their rapacity. Then, again, as time
went on, a few Turco- Egyptians were animated
by sentiments which, however unpractical, were
by no means ignoble. They became identified
with Egyptian aspirations, and wished to estabHsh
a government free from the interference of either
Turk or European. A few also recognised the
benefits conferred on the country by the British
occupation, and loyally co - operated with the
British officials in furthering the cause of reform.
Thus, in 1882, the Enghsh found a body of
Turco-Egyptians who occupied the principal places
imder Government ; who were the chief land-
owners m the country ; who disliked the English,
inasmuch as they knew by intuition that their
intervention would save the Egyptians from being
plundered ; who occasionally cast a glance towards
Constantinople, and were willing enough to try and
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scare theEnglishmanwith the bugbear of the Khalifs
spiritual authority; who would have been bitterly dis-
appointed if their political flirtations with the Porte
had been taken seriously, and if the Mohammedan
Pope, doffing his mitre, had assumed the cro^vn,
handled the sword, and commenced to assert his
authority in temporal affairs ; and who, lastly, in
the presence of the alien and the Christian, showed
a tendency to amalgamate with the other dwellers
on Egyptian soil in the creation of a sort of
spurious patriotism. I say spurious patriotism,
because the alliance between the semi-Egyptianised
Turk and the pure Egyptian is unnatural. The
people of Egypt are not really with the repre-
sentative Turco-Egyptians. The peculiar character-
istic of the typical Turco-Egyptian is his catholic
capacity for impotent hatred. He hates the
Englishman, because the Englishman curbs him.
He hates and fears the pure Turk, because the
pure Turk is difficult to curb. He despises the
Egyptian, whom he regards as his prey, and who,
in fact, would be his prey were it not for the
English watchdog who keeps him off.
Amongst the many vague ideals incapable of
realisation which are floating about in the Egyptian
political atmosphere, nothing is more certain than
that the ideal of the Turco-Egyptian can never
be realised. He can never be restored to the
position of trust, which he formerly occupied and
abused.
But, with all this, the Turco-Egyptian has some
redeeming qualities. The glamour of a dominant
race still hovers as an aureole, albeit a very dimmed
aureole, round his head. He is certainly not more
corrupt than the Eg>^tian ; he is more manly, and
the greater the quantity of Turkish blood running
in his veins, the more will his manly qualities
appear. He is sometimes truthful and outspoken
CH. XXXV THE MOSLEMS 173
after his own fashion. He has a rude standard of
honour. Go where you will in Egypt, if any bit of
administrative work requiring a certain amount of
energy has been well done by a native official, it
will generally be found that the official in question
is a Circassian or a Turco-Egyptian, who is probably
more Turk than Egyptian. The Turco-Egyptian
can, in fact, still to a certain extent command, and
that is why, with all his defects, and in spite of the
fact that the class to which he belongs is generally
Anglophobe— although there are some notable
exceptions,—it will often be found that the in-
dividual Englishman will get on well with the
individual Turk, and better with the Turco-
Egyptian than with the pure Egyptian, the Syrian
or the Armenian. The northerner and the Oriental
meet on the common ground that the Englishman
is masterful, and that the Turco-Egyptian, though
less masterful than the pure Turk, is more so than
the pure Egyptian. The Englishman belongs to
an imperial race, and the Turco-Egyptian to a
race which but yesterday was imperial. The
English, Nubar Pasha once said to me, " are the
Turks of the West."
The second category of Egyptian Moslems may
'
be divided into three heads. These are—first, the
hierarchy ; second, the squirearchy ; and third, the
feUaheen.
The Ulema—the learned men^—of the El-
Azhar Mosque constitute a distinct religious cor-
poration, which is divided into grades, and which
is officially recognised by the Government. A
University is attached to the JNIosque. The
number of Ulema is limited ; in order to qualifv
for the rank of " Alim," which carries with it the
right to wear a pelisse conferred by the Khediv;e,
' "Ulema" is tlie plural of the Arabic word "Alim," signifying
learned, a doUor of laws.
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a candidate must have studied at the University,
and have passed certain examinations to test his
knowledge of the Koran, the Traditions (Hadith),
and the Sacred Law of Islam. Many a Moslem
may be learned in the ordinary acceptation of the
term ; he may, for instance be a " Hafiz," who can
repeat the whole Koran by heart, or, at all events,
is supposed to be able to do so ; but unless he
has undergone the necessary examination at the
El-Azhar University, he is not, technically speak-
ing, considered an "Alim." He may officiate at
religious services, but he will not have acquired
the right to expound either the tenets of Islam
or the Sacred Law at any of the principal Mosques.
The three chief Ulema are the Grand Mufti,
the head of the El-Azhar University, and the
Grand Kadi. The last named takes what is the
equivalent of his degree, not at Cairo, but at
Constantinople.
The Grand JNlufti is the chief law-doctor of the
country. It is his duty to pronounce ex cathedra
opinions (Fetw^as) upon any doubtful points of the
Sacred Law, w^iich may be submitted to him.
He is a magnate of whose spiritual authority the
temporal rulers of the country must take account.
Despotic Khedives and even, it is said, Suleiman
the Magnificent,^ have tried to force the hand or
override the decisions of the Grand Mufti, and hke
their Christian prototype who tried to throw off
• It is related that Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent asked Sheikh
Ahu Saoud, who was one of the f^reatest of the Ottoman Muftis, to issue
a Fetua declaring it lawful to put to death all the inhahitants of con-
quered European pi-ovinces who refused to emhrace the fa,ith of Islam.
ITie Grand Mufti would not comply with this request.
Abhas I. is said to have requested the Grand Mufti (Sheik)i-el-
Abbasi, who died in 18!}.3 at the age of ninety) to issue a Fetwa s(;iting
that the power of ratifying a sentence of death lay not, as was then the
practice, with the Sultan, but with the Viceroy. 'Hie Grand Mufti
refused. He was exiled to the Soudan, hut, in the face of the strong
protests made by many of the leading Mohammedans of Cairo, eveu
^-9spotic Abbas was ol)liged to yield. The Mufti "vas recalled.
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the spiritual yoke, they have generally been
obliged to go to Canossa.^ The English politician
also has to recognise the Mufti's existence. When,
indeed, the venerable old man, who at one time
occupied the post of Grand Mufti, advocated, as
the most natural thing in the world, the crucifixion
of criminals,^ it was scarcely necessary for the
Englishman to raise his httle finger in order to
remind the Egyptian world that, although the
onward tramp of civilisation might be heard but
faintly within the sacred precincts of the Mosque,
he was nevertheless standing outside its walls with
his treaties, his newspapers, and if needs be, his
soldiers, to assert the validity of anti-crucifixionist
principles. But, though in an extreme case such as
this the Englishman could impose a veto on some
barbarous act, he could not do much more. He
could not make the Egyptian horse drink of the
waters of civilisation, albeit the most limpid streams
of social and juridical reform were turned into the
trough before him, if the Mufti condemned the act
of drinking as impious. Popes and other ecclesi-
astical dignitaries have before now shown that they
cannot be dragooned into submission. Neither do
Muftis fear red-coated soldiers. Moreover, they
fear *iie wrath of the European press even less than
the}' fear redcoats.
The head of the famous El-Azhar University
exercises a certain degree of control in temporal
matters over those of the Ulema who lecture in the
mosques, and must himself be, par excellence, an
" Alim." The incumbent of this office during the
first few years of my residence in Egypt was a
worthy old man, with whom I entertained excellent
personal relations, although, as has been already
^ I say " generally" because there have been exceptions to the rule.
Thus, in 1G37, Amurath IV. put the Grand Mutti to death.—Creasy.
Ottoman Turks, p. 253. * Vide ante, p. 136
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mentioned,^ our views as to the movements of the
planets were not identical.
The Grand Kadi is perhaps the greatest of the
Ulema. Up to the present time, he has always
been a Turk from Constantinople. He pronounces
final judgment on all subjects which come within
the domain of personal law, having been bereft of
criminal and civil jurisdiction by the progress
which is constantly kibing the heel of his decadent
system. I well remember the Grand Kadi who
was in office when I first went to Cairo. His
venerable face, long white beard, small hands,
dignified mien, and graceful robes rendered him
a striking figure. Such, I can fancy, were the
Pharisees who were members of the Jewish Sanhe-
drim. His manners were perfect, perhaps more so
than his judgments. His successor was a younger
man with a fine intelliofcnt face. He arrived at
Cairo with excellent intentions ; he was going to
purify his court of false witnesses, and he was
delighted when he found that I was able to talk
to him in Turkish, albeit very bad Turkish, on the
subject. I welcomed an ally, and awaited the
result with interest. I had not long to wait. The
Kadi soon came to the conclusion that the Egyptians
were an uninteresting race. As they appeared to
like the corrupt system to which they were accus-
tomed, why should he kick against the pricks in
trying to reform it ?
Tliese three are, from their official positions, the
most important of the class, who, by reason of their
acquaintance ^vith theological lore and ancient
custom, are termed " learned." It may, however,
be interesting to sketch a few other types of their
class.
The Sheikh el-Bekri is an " Alim," and a notable
one of his class. The first incumbent of the office
* Vide ante, p. 163.
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during my residence in Cairo was a small wizened
man with a pock-marked countenance, who, when I
paid him my Ramazan visit, used to peer at me
through a pair of cunning little eyes, in which fear
and hatred of his visitor seemed to be struggling
for predominance. I always felt that, when I left
his house, he cursed me, my race, and my rehgion,
and I never entertained the least ill-will against him
for doing so. When he died, liis brother, a much
younger man, succeeded him. It soon became
apparent that a new Sheikh el-Bekri had arisen.
When the spiritual head of a variety of Moslem
sects boasted of his acquaintance with Lord
SaHsbury and Mr. Gladstone ; when he quoted
Jean Jacques Rousseau to me on the Rights of Man
in excellent French ; when he indulged in platitudes
on the blessings of parHamentary government ; and
when he asked me to lend him a few books which
might enable him to understand the "philosophy
of the French Revolution,"—then I asked myself
whether I was in a dream. Was this Jin de siecle
Sheildi, this curious compound of INIecca and the
Paris Boulevards, the latest development of
Islamism ? I should add that the combination
produced no results of any importance. The new
Sheikh soon sank into political insignificance.
I can best describe another "Ahm" by relating an
anecdote about him. Sheikh JNIohammed el-Saadat,
as his name signifies, was a Seyyid, a descendant
of the Prophet.^ He was, moreover, w^ealthy and
influential. I happened to hear at one time that
he was raving against the English. My experience
had taught me that political opinions in Egypt are
not unfrequently connected with some personal
grievance. I called on the Sheikh, and asked
him how he thought matters were going on.
* "Saadat" is the plural form of the Arabic word "Seyyid," which
means a descendant of the Prophet, an aristocrat, lord, master.
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Everything, he said, was very bad. I encouraged
him to talk. Then he burst out into a long tirade
about the desperate state of the country. Could
he, I asked, point out any particular abuse, for it
was difficult to deal with generaUties ? Certainly
he could do so ; he had no water for a portion of
his property, whereas he always got water before
the English came into the country. I inquired
into the matter. As I had expected, I found that
the Sheikli's statement was quite correct. He
belonged to the privileged class. Under the old
regime, he always got water, although his neighbours
often went without it. Since the English engineers
had taken the irrigation of the country in hand,
they had recognised no privileges. All were treated
alike. The Sheikh had to await his turn. Naturally
enough, he did not like this levelling process.
Fortunately, shortly after my interview with him,
the Sheikh's turn came. He, of course, attributed
this to the exercise of my influence on his behalf.
I heard afterwards that his language at once
changed. He spoke in terms of warm commenda-
tion of the British administration.
Sheikh Abdul- Khalik el-Saadat, a nephew of
the last-named Sheikh, is the head of one of the
oldest purely Egyptian families in Egypt. Napoleon
made great efforts to ingratiate himself with one of
this Sheikh's ancestors, who was at first decorated
with the Legion of Honour, and on this treatment
proving ineffectual to produce the required results,
was bastinadoed. The present Sheikh is a member
of the Legislative Council. He is ignorant of
public affairs, but, by reason of the respect in
which his family is held, exerts, or at all events
might exert a certain amount of influence. I
used to see a good deal of him at one time, but
eventually, for reasons on which I need not dwell,
I had to drop his acquaintance.
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Sheikh Mohammed Abdu was an *' Alim " of a
different and, I should add, a very superior type
to those of his brethren whom I have so far
described. He was one of the leading spirits of
the Arabi movement. When I came to Egypt
in 1883, he was under a cloud. Good-natured
Tewfik, acting under British pressure, pardoned
him, and made him a judge.^ He did his work
well and honestly. Sheikh Mohammed Abdu was
a man of broad and enlightened views. He ad-
mitted the abuses which have sprung up under
Oriental Governments. He recognised the neces-
sity of European assistance in the work of reform.
But he did not belong to the same category as the
Europeanised Egyptian, whom he regarded as a
bad copy of the original. He was anti-Khedivial
and anti-Pasha, not that he would have objected
to a certain degree of Pashadom if he could have
found good Pashas, but in his experience he had
met but few Pashas who were good. In fact,
Sheikh Mohammed Abdu was a somewhat dreamy
and unpractical but, nevertheless, genuine Egyptian
patriot ; it were perhaps well for the cause of
Egyptian patriotism if there were more like him.
But, regarded from the point of view of possible
politicians of the future, there were some weak
points in the armour of Mohammed Abdu, and
of those who follow his teaching. Mr. Stanley
Lane Poole remarks that an upper-class Moslem
must be " a fanatic or a concealed infidel." ^ This
dilemma, in a somewhat different form, has
presented difficulties to those Christians who look
to the letter rather than to the spirit of Christ's
teaching. It presents far greater difficulties to
strictly orthodox Moslems, who look almost
exclusively to the letter rather than to the spirit
* Mohammed Abdu was, in 1899, appointed Grand Mufti. He died
in 1906. ^ Studies in a Monquef p. 111.
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of their faith. I suspect that my friend Abdu,
although he would have resented the appellation
being applied to him, was in reality an Agnostic.
His associates, although they admitted his ability,
were inclined to look askance at him as a "filosouf."
Now, in the eyes of the strictly orthodox, one who
studies philosophy or, in other words, one who recog-
nises the difference between the seventh and the
twentieth centuries, is on the high road to perdition.
The political importance of Mohammed Abdu's
life lies in the fact that he may be said to have
been the founder of a school of thought in Egypt
very similar to that established in India by Syed
Ahmed, the creator of the Alighur College. The
avowed object of those who belong to this school
is to justify the ways of Islam to man, that is to
say, to Moslem man. They are the Girondists of
the Egyptian national movement. They are too
much tainted with a suspicion of heterodoxy to
carry far along with them the staunch conservative
Moslem. On the other hand, they are often not
sufficiently Europeanised to attract the sympathy
of the Eg}^tian mimic of European ways. They
are inferior to the strictly orthodox Moslem in
respect to their Mohammedanism, and inferior to
the ultra - Europeanised Egyptian in respect to
their Europeanisation. Their task is, therefore,
one of great difficulty. But they deserve all the
encouragement and support which can be given to
them. They are the natural allies of the European
reformer. Egyptian patriots
—
sua si bona norint—
will find in the advancement of the followers of
Mohammed Abdu the best hope that they may
gi-adually carry out their programme of creating
a truly autonomous Egypt. ^
1 For many years, I ^ave to Mohamined Abdu all the encouragement
in my power ; but it was uphill work, for, besides the stronj;^ antagonism
which he encountered from conservati\e Moslems, he was unfortunately
CH. XXXV THE MOSLEMS 181
I give yet one further sketch of a typical
"AHm." Sheikh Mohammed Beyram, who is
now, alas ! dead, was one of my best friends in
Egypt. He was, moreover, one of the most re-
markable t)^es with which I have met in the
course of my Eastern experience. He looked like
a thorough gentleman. I have rarely seen a more
striking figure than that of this grave Oriental,
with his high intellectual forehead, refined features,
melancholy eyes, dignified mien, exquisite manners,
and graceful costume, who would sit mth me by
the hour^ and sing a dirge over the decadence
of Islam. Moreover, Sheikh Mohammed Beyram
not only looked a gentleman ; he was one. In
no country have I come across a man of more
elevated and refined feelings, or one whose
on very bad terms with the Khedive, and vi'as only able to retain his
place as Mufti by relying on strong British support.
In my Annual Reports I frequently spoke of him in high terms, and
no one regretted his premature death more sincerely than myself. At
the same time, I must confess that I experienced a shock in reading
some of the revelations in Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's book. Mr. Blunt's views
on Egyptian affairs appear to have been mainly based on wliat he heard
from Mohammed Abdu, whom he calls (Secret Hhtory, etc. p. 7) a "great
philosopher and patriot." Notably, I read with surprise and regret
(p. 489) the following statement of Mohammed Abdu's: "ISheykh Jemal
ed Din proposed to me, Mohammed Abdu, that Ismail should be assas-
sinated some day as he passed in his carriage daily over tlie Kasr-el-Nil
bridge, and I strongly approved, but it was only talk between ourselves,
and we lacked a person capable of taking lead in the aHair." Without
going into the ethics of tyrannicide, it will be sufficient to say that the
civilised world generally is disposed to look askance at patriots, and
still more at pliilosophers, who are prepared to further their political
aims by resorting to assassination.
' One of the obstacles which lie in the path of the European when
he wants to arrive at the true opinion of the Oriental is that the
European, especially if he be an official, is almost always in a hurry.
If, he thinks, the Oriental has anything to say to me, why does he not
say it and go away? I am quite prepared to listen most attentively,
but my time is valuable and I have a quantity of other business to do
;
I must, therefore, really ask him to come to the point at once. This
frame of mind is quite fatal if one wishes to arrive at the truth. In
order to attain this object, the Oriental must be allowed to tell his
story and put forward his ideas in his own way ; and his own way is
generally a lengthy, circuitous, and very involved way. But if any
one has tlie patience to listen, he will sometimes be amply rewarded
for his pains.
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opinions and actions were less tainted with worldly
self-interest, than this Tunisian aristocrat.^ Few
things have given me a more unfavourable im-
pression of native Egyptian society than that the
fine qualities of this really eminent man—whose
appearance and character /ere alike remarkable,
whose private Ufe was irreproachable, whose
religious faith was fouried on a rock, whose
patriotism was enlightened, and whose public
aims were noble— should have been scarcely
recognised by the herd of Pashas, place-hunters,
and greedy Sheikhs, who were not worthy to un-
loose the latchet of his shoe. When he went
down to his grave, none but a few knew that a
star, which under happier auspices might perhaps
have been of some magnitude, had fallen from the
political firmament of Egypt, or perhaps, it would
be more correct to say, of Islam. Pope's fine lines
well describe my honoured friend :
—
Statesman, yet friend to truth ! of soul sincere,
In action faithful, and in honour clear
!
Who broke no promise, served no private end,
AVho gained no title, and who lost no friend.
Mohammed Beyram was a devout Moslem. His
faith was far more earnest than that of Mohammed
Abdu, and men of a similar type. The subject
which mainly interested him was how to bring
Islam and its ways into harmony with modern
society ; in other words, how to square the circle
;
and in discussing the sundry and manifold branches
of this question with him, any tendency to dispar-
age the Mohammedan religion at once disappeared.
From the point of view of the moralist, criticism
' Mohammed Reyram belonged to the Beylu^l family of Tunis, and,
on his mother's side, was descended from the Moorish kings of Spain.
His ancestors h&i :he highest offices in Tunis without inteiinission for
300 years.
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cannot be directed against the fundamental prin-
ciples of the faith, but only against the abuses
which have sprung up and which now obscure
its primitive simplicity. Mohammed Beyram, re-
garded, not as a practical politician, but as a
believer in the faith of Islam, was, in fact, a
type of the best class of Moslem, a type w^hich is,
unfortunately, of rare occurrence. He looked
sadly out over a world which appeared to him to
have gone mad ; he saw all that was noble in the
faith which he revered stifled by parasitic growths
;
he noted that Islam was tottering to its fall by
reason of internal decay ; he did not so much fear
the advance of needy disreputable Europe, for he
knew that, though the Moslem might be robbed
and cheated, there was still a hope for Islam so
long as its moral code and the material benefits it
conferred were only contrasted with the practice
and principles of adventurers who were the dregs of
European civilisation ; but he knew that the tap
of the northern drum, which had been heard in
the streets of Cairo and might ere long be heard
in those of Stamboul, brought more than the
dragoon and the rifleman in its wake ; his instinct
taught him that the institutions, which his fore-
fathers had cherished, must in time crumble to
the dust when they were brought face to face
with the lofty principles w^hich were inscribed
on the Englishman's banner. He was not blind
to these things and, albeit he still clung tenaciously
to the skirts of the Prophet of Arabia, he crieS
out in the agony of his spirit : " Where shaL
wisdom be found ? and where is the place of
understanding ? " And the answer he gave to
himself was that which was delivered by the
patriarch Job w^hen the world was young : " The
fear of the Lord, that is wisdom : and to depart
€rom evil, that is understanding." On that common
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ground, the Moslem of the Mohammed Beyram
type could meet the Christian, and discuss matters
of common interest without stirring the fires of re-
ligious strife. But when the discussion took place,
how melancholy was the result ! The Moslem and
the Christian would agree as to the nature of the
fungus which was stifling all that was at one time
healthy in the original growth ; they would
appreciate in like fashion the history of its exten-
sion ; but, whilst the sympathetic Christian would
point out with courteous but inexorable logic that
any particular remedy proposed would be either
inefficacious or would destroy not only the fungus
but at the same time the parent tree, the Moslem,
too honest not to be convinced, however much the
conviction might cost him pain, could only utter a
bitter wail over the doom of the creed which he
loved, and over that of the baneful system to which
his creed has given birth. We may sympathise,
and, for my own part, I do very heartily sympathise,
vn^th the Mohammed Beyrams of Islam, but let
no practical politician think that they have a plan
capable of resuscitating a body, which is not,
indeed, dead, and which may yet linger on for
centuries, but which is nevertheless politically and
socially moribund, and whose gradual decay cannot
be arrested by any modern palliatives however
skilfully they may be applied.
I have dwelt on the characters of these few
individuals, not in order to disparage some, or in
order to deliver a panegyric on others, but because
each of those who have been depicted may to some
extent be regarded as one type of the hierarchical
class. It must not, however, be supposed that the
Ulema are the only members of the hierarchy. A
crowd of Imams (preachers), inferior Kadis, and
others may be considered as affiliated to the Ulema.
These are all so many agents scattered over the
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face of the country who keep alive religious senti-
ment and hierarchical influence. The special point
to be noted for the purpose of the present argument
is that the attitude of the whole of the hierarchy,
from the highest " Alim " to the smallest teacher in
a " Kuttab," ^ has generally been more or less hostile
to the work of the British reformer in Egypt.
This was, indeed, inevitable. The hostility of the
hierarchy is, however, based on somewhat different
grounds from that of the Pashas. In respect to
one point, indeed, the sentiments of the two classes
coincide. Both are inspired by an instinct of self-
preservation. At the time when the British occupa-
tion took place, both were in the enjoyment of
privileges which they had abused, and the con-
tinuance of which they thought was threatened.
Both had a pecuniary interest in resisting reform.
Whilst the Pasha feared lest the fellaheen, whom
he had for so long plundered, should, under the
aegis of England, escape from his grasp, the
" Alim," on the other hand, was somewhat nervous
lest the Englishman, in spite of his protestations
that he would not interfere in religious matters,
might some day begin to ask unpleasant questions
about the appropriation of funds belonging to
rehgious endowments and such like matters ; and
the " Alim " would resent this, for although there
are some honourable exceptions, he is but too
often so profoundly self-deceived that he considers
it an essential portion of the relations between man
and his Maker that a few privileged persons should be
allowed to appropriate to their own use funds which
were intended to be applied to the maintenance of
Mosques, the feeding of the poor, or other charitable
objects. But, in addition to this cause of suspicion,
based on self-interest, there is this further point to
be borne in mind that, as guardians of the citadel of
' The school attached to a Mosque, where the Koran is taught.
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Islam, the hierarchy naturally represent the ne
plus ultra of conservatism. Hence, the representa-
tives of the Mohammedan rehgion mistrusted the
English reformer even before he began to reform,
both by reason of his creed, and because they could
not help suspecting him of some sinister intentions
in the direction of shaking the foundations of their
ancient faith. In spite of the Englishman's care
and tenderness in dealing with them, their religion,
and their vested interests, some of them will mis-
trust him all the more, the more he succeeds in
introducing reforms for which they have no
sympathy. They will continually expect that their
turn is coming next.
Turning from the hierarchy to the squirearchy,
it vsdll be found that, as we descend the social
ladder, we enter strata where the prejudice enter-
tained against the alien and the Christian is more
or less mitigated by recognition of the material
benefits conferred by the reformer. The squire-
archy consists, for the most part of Omdehs (village
mayors) and Sheikhs of villages. These are gener-
ally landed proprietors on a small scale. They
occupy a position midway between the Pasha and
the fellah. Many of them are sturdy, honest
yeomen who are well deserving of respect. Others
are inclined to cringe before the Pashas and to
bully the fellaheen. I should add that these
latter tendencies, which were especially marked
in the pre-reforming days, are rapidly disappearing.
As to the submissiveness of the village Sheikhs,
the following picture drawn by a careful observer
of Egyptian social life was, at one time, by no means
exaggerated. The scene is the court of a Mudirieh.
The Pasha is presiding. " Gradually the court
becomes more and more crowded with brown
-
skinned and brown-mantled country people. The
village mayors and village patriarchs (Sheikhs)
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are summoned into the divan. With a deep
obeisance, they go through the usual form of
lifting dust from the smooth marble floor and
pressing it to their lips as a mark of respect. . . .
A Decree is read, and the people are required
*",o signify their assent to it, and bind themselves
to obey it. * Right willingly,' answer the honour-
able village mayors with one voice, 'as your
Excellency commands ; we are thy slaves and
the slaves of our Sovereign ; nothing but good
comes from thee ; thy opinion is our opinion.'
' Then seal the document,' says the Governor ; and
the heads of the communes, one after the other,
give their brass seal to the scribe, who smears it
with ink, and fills the sheet with their important
names. When the Sheikh has sealed, the villager
does so likewise, although he has only a glimmering
of what it is that he has pledged himself to." ^
When the English took Egyptian affairs in
hand, the submissiveness of the Sheikhs to the
Pashas had been somewhat tempered by recent
events, for the backbone of the Arabist party, in so
far as that party represented a national movement
and not a military mutiny, was to be found amongst
this class. The greater part of the yeomanry of
the country were sympathisers with Arabi ; he was
of their kith and kin ; they looked to him to
deliver them from the usurer and the Pasha. Arabi
ruled for a moment. During that short period,
Chaos umpire sat.
And by decision more embroiled the fray
By which he reigned.
Though, at the time of the Arabi revolt, the Sheikh
class suffered from the general disorder, though
even the short experience which they gained of the
maimer in which Arabist principles were put in
• Klunzinger, Upper Egypt, p. 73.
188 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv
practice led the most intelligent amongst the
Sheikhs to doubt whether it was wise to hand them-
selves and their cause over to a mutinous army,
nevertheless, when order was restored, they fell
back on the recollection that Arabi to some extent
represented the ascendency of Sheikhdom in sub-
stitution for that of Pashadom. They never forgot
that, had not England thrown her weighty sword
into the scale, the Turco-Egyptian Pasha and his
satellites would have been swept into the sea, and
that the Sheikh class would have thus been left to
plunder the fellaheen alone, instead of being obliged
to content itself with whatever escaped from the
rapacity of the Pashas. To all outward appearance,
the ancient submissiveness to Pashadom returned
after Tel-el-Kebir. When the Pasha gave the
order, the village Sheikh, with smiles on his lips
and curses in his heart, would pay considerable
sums of money, which the Pasha, after levying a
contribution for his personal use, would devote to
fireworks in honour of a ruler for whom the Sheikh
in reality felt but httle sympathy. AVhen, in 1893,
the relations between the British Government and
Abbas II. were somewhat strained, the Sheikh,
always acting under orders, would form part of a
deputation to congratulate the ruler of his country
on his courage and patriotism.^ But for all that,
his submissiveness was the old submissiveness with
a difference. He was anxious to have it whispered
behind the scenes to the diplomatic representative
of England that, though he was constrained to all
this lip-service, in reality he meant nothing by it
;
that he was in deadly fear ; and that his one hope
was that England would stand firm and save him
from being again cast into the jaws of Pashadom.
* I give in an Appendix to this cliapter one anioufrst many letters
from the Slieikh class, which was shown to me at this time. It 8ho\»\'
• capacity for trimming which is characteristic.
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Moreovei, when Moukhtar Pasha, the representa-
tive of the KhaUf, came to Egypt, very mixed
feehngs were excited in the minds of the village
Sheikhs, who let the British Consul-General know
that, in spite of the spiritual connection, they did
not want to be brought into any closer connection
with their Khalif or his agents ; on the contrary,
that they preferred to receive water for their fields
at the hands of the English engineer. JMoreover,
as time went on, the minds of the squirearchy
underwent some change. In spite of all outward
and visible signs of submissiveness, they are now
no longer mere Egyptian clay in the hands of the
Turkish potter, as in the pre-reforming days. Years
of British rule have taught them that they too
have their rights, and it may be that they would
not remain so passive as of yore if those rights
were infringed.
I have said that when the English came to
Egypt, many of the village Omdehs and Sheikhs,
though they cringed before the Pashas, revenged
themselves by bullying the fellaheen. The latter
part of this statement merits some further develop-
ment.
The village is the administrative unit in Egypt.
The Omdehs and Sheikhs are the corner-stone on
which the edifice of provincial society rests. They
have certain duties to perform. They are con-
sidered responsible for public security. If, in past
times, a crime was committed in the neighbour-
hood of the village, and if the criminal was not
forthcoming, the imperious rulers of the country
had some rude methods for ensuring his arrest.
The usual practice was to make the Sheikhs
suffer vicarious punishment,^ until the criminal was
' Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace [Egypt and the Egyptian Question,
p. 261) tells a characteristic story, which was related to him by au old
fellah, of how Mehemet Ali paid a visit to his village and ordered the
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produced. This generally had the desired effect.
The head of the village was responsible for the
assessment and, to a certain extent, for the collec-
tion of the taxes. He furnished gangs for the
corvee. He was answerable for obtaining recruits
for the army. The exercise of these functions
supplied him with opportunities for illicit gain
,
for, provided the taxes were paid, the corvee gangs
forthcoming, and a sufficient number of youths
delivered annually to feed the vultures of the
Soudan, no questions were asked. The village
Sheikhs were practically uncontrolled. They
naturally abused the privileges of their position,
and developed into petty tyrants.
The village Sheikh, like the Pasha and the
"Alim," felt an instinct of self-preservation alive
within him at the approach of the English reformer.
He foresaw that his privileged position would be
shaken. Neither did his prophetic instinct err.
For, before the Englishman had been long at
work, the corvee was abolished ; the assessment
and collection of the taxes, as well as the recruit-
ing for the army, were taken out of the hands of
the village authorities. So far, indeed, did the zeal
of the English reformer go, that the Sheikli began
to mutter Nolo episcopari. The position of the
head of a \dllage became no longer lucrative. The
Sheikh class began to doubt whether, under these
circimistances, it was worth w^iile to assume
responsibilities from which little or no compensa-
ting advantage was to be derived. The English-
man, on the other hand, found that not the least
Sheikhs to produce two robl)ers, who were supposed to be hidino^ in the
neifrhl)ourhood. The Sheikhs stated that they were unable to do so.
" In the twinkling of an eye, all six Sheikhs were lyinj"^ on the ground,
face downwards, receiviiijj the bastinado from a dozen of His Hij^hness'
stalwart attendants." Hefore the bastinadoinsr process had proceeded
far, one of the Sheikhs said that he knew where the criminals were
'I'wo men were accordingly produced^ and at once hanged.
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difficult part of his administrative task was to
preserve what was good and useful in the village
system, whilst purging it of all that was bad.
It may, therefore, be said that in the pre-reform-
ing days, the tyranny of the Sheikhs over the
fellaheen was only one degree less oppressive than
that of the Pashas. In some respects, indeed, the
oppression of the former was more burdensome
and more irksome than that of the latter ; for the
Sheikh was always present in the village, whilst
the Pasha was distant, and only swooped down
occasionally to plunder and to flog. There are a
number of Arabic proverbs which owe their origin
to the sentiments entertained by the fellaheen as
regards the Pasha and the Sheikh respectively.
For instance, " Let the lion eat me at a mouthful
rather than the mosquito piecemeal." Another is,
" The tyranny of the cat is better than the justice
of the mouse."
The feelings of the Sheikh class towards the
English were, therefore, divided. On the one hand,
they were willing to rely on English aid for pro-
tection against the tyranny of the Pashas ; on the
other hand, they resented the interference which
curbed the exercise of their own time-honoured
tyi-anny over the fellaheen. As time went on, and
the benefits of the British occupation became year
by year more apparent, the former of these two
sentiments probably predominated over the latter
;
but any praise which the Sheikh class might perhaps
otherwise have accorded to English efforts on
behalf of the Egyptian population, was tempered
by the idea that the Englishman was, after all,
only carrying out the original programme of Arabi.
A few of the most observant did, hideed, recognise
that in Arabi's hands the programme would not
have been executed with so much skill and in-
telligence. On the other hand, no inconsiderable
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number regretted that Arabi was not allowed to have
his way, not only because he was then- compatriot
and co-religionist, but also because they thought,
and perhaps with some degree of reason, that whilst
Arabi would have executed that portion of the
EngUsh programme wliich involved placing a
restraint upon the Turco-Egyptian Pasha, he would
have been more careful of their interests in that
he would have allowed the tyramiy of the Sheikh
to continue unchecked.^
I now turn to that class of Egyptian society
which, if not the most interesting, is certainly more
deserving of sympathy than any other. It is un-
necessary to describe at any length the character
and condition of the blue-shirted Egyptian fellah.
Every Nile tourist knows what he is hke. Any
handbook of Egypt can tell all that the practical
pohtician need know of his past history. Every
writer on Egyptian affau's has touched, m a gi'cater
or less degree, on the sufferings which he has
undergone at the hands of a long succession of
despotic rulers. From time immemorial, his main
end in life has been to find some means for evading
the extortionate demands of the tax-gatherer.
" The Romans," Mommsen says, '* assure us that
the Egyptians were proud of the scourge-marks
received for perpetrating frauds in taxation."^ As
it was in the days of Augustus, so was it in the
days of Ismail. " It is a point of honour," Mr.
McCoan wrote in 1877, "to bear any amount of
' stick,' if, by so doing, the impost or any part of
it can be evaded. The fellah, mdeed, who will
^ Tliese remarks were written some few years ago, I leave them
unaltered, as they were at one time quite correct. But they are so to
a less extent now. The recollection of the events of 1882 is rapidly
dying out. Other influences have taken the place of the Arabi myth.
P'urther, whatever defects may still exist generally amongst the Sheikh
class, I have little douht that their moral and intellectual standard is
now considerably higlier tliau was the case in 1882.
* The Provinces of the Roman Empire, voL. ii, p. 268.
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not do so is despised by even his own Avife as a
poltroon, and if, after only a dozen or score of
blows, he disgorges the coin which endurance of
fifty might perhaps have saved, the conjugal
estimate of his spirit is generally shared by his
fellows."^ Next to evading taxation, the fellah
above all things wishes to evade mih'tary service.
His favourite method of attaining this object was,
at one time, not to cut off a finger, as was done by
the poltroons "^ of the Roman army, but to sacrifice
an eye.
In dealing vvdth the fellah, the English politician
had mainly two points to bear in mind. The first
point was that the immense majority of the popula-
tion of Egypt are fellaheen. The fellaheen, there-
fore, deserve consideration on account of their
numbers. This fact would at first sight appear
sufficiently obvious, but it was at one time
frequently forgotten by Pashas and others.
The second point was that, as the fellah, at the
time of the British occupation, possessed no
privileges, unless the Hability to be indiscriminately
robbed and flogged can be called a privilege, there
would be no difficulty in dealing with him on the
ground that the reformer was laying a rash hand
on his vested rights. As he stood on the lowest
rung of the social ladder, there was no one below
him over whom he could tyrarmise.
The main problem which the EngUshman had
to solve was this : How to confer on the fellah the
privilege of no longer being robbed and flogged,
without shattering the edifice, which, rotten as it
was, had still kept Egyptian society together for
centuries past. In dealing with this problem, one
thing was certain. The fellah had everything to
^ Egypt as it is, p. 26.
^ The derivation usually given for the word " poltroon " ^jt>o//ic«
truncus—is, however, more than douhtful. See Skeat's Etymologicai
Dictionary.
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gain and nothing to lose by the work of the English
reformer. There cannot, in fact, be a shadow of
doubt that the fellah has gained enormously owing
to the efforts made on his behalf by the EngUsh-
man. He has gained far more than any other class
of society, because in his case there is absolutely
no disadvantage to throw into the scale against the
immense benefits which he has received.
Does the Egyptian fellah appreciate the benefits
which have been conferred on him ? Does he
entertain any feelings of gratitude towards his
benefactor ? These are questions which are inter-
esting in themselves, and, moreover, are not
altogether devoid of political importance.
After a fashion, the fellah appreciates very
highly the benefits which have been conferred on
him. Ignorant though he be, he is wise enough to
know that he is now far better off than he was prior to
the British occupation. He would shudder at any
notion that the old regime was to be re-established.
Moreover, in a vague sort of way he probably recog-
nises that these benefits have been conferred upon
him by the Anglo-Saxon race. But he is singularly
wanting in the logical faculty. He is incapable of
establishing clearly in his mind that, for the time
being at all events, good administration and the
exercise of a paramount influence by England are
inseparably linked together. It has been the mis-
fortune of the English in Egypt that the classes
who, under their political programme, most bene-
fited by British rule, were those who were least of
all able to make their voices heard. The fellaheen
are, politically speaking, ciphers. They are too
apathetic, too ignorant, and too little accustomed to
take the initiative, to give utterance in any politi-
cally audible form to their opinions even when they
have any. Moreover, in the event of a premature
withdrawal of the British garrison, they would
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probably not form any definite opinion as to the
results of the measure until positive proof had been
afforded to them that a fatal mistake had been
made. Then it is possible that, having tasted the
fruits of good administration and being emboldened
by the freedom conferred on them by the English-
man, they might turn round and rend the Pashas.
As to whether the fellaheen are grateful or the re-
verse, it is to be observed that gratitude is not, gener-
ally speaking, a national virtue. Moreover, many
of those who have mixed in native society in Egypt
consider that ingratitude is one of the predominant
features of the Egyptian character.^ However this
may be, the ordinary fellah is kindly and jovial.
If he were left to himself he would certainly not
entertain any unfriendly feelings towards the
Englishman, in spite of the difference of race or
creed ; indeed, although he might not be effusively
grateful, it may be doubted whether on his own
initiative he would ever do anything to render
himself open to the charge of ingratitude. Unfor-
tunately, he is emotional, ignorant, and credulous.
He is easily led away by lying agitators and
intriguers. Under the influence of ephemeral
passion, his sense of gratitude for past favours would
disappear like chaff before the wind. At such a
moment, the same man, who was but yesterday
blessing the English engineer for watering his
fields, might to-morrow, should the occasion arise,
brain his benefactor with a " nabout " ^ in a fit of
savage passion. It should be added that, imme-
diately afterwards, he would probably be very sorry
for what he has done.
My reason tells me that this is so. Yet I hate
' " The natives of Egypt in general, in common with the Arabs of
otlier countries, are (according to our system of morals) justly charge-
able with a fault, wliich is regarded by us as one of great magnitude
;
it is want of gratitude."—Lane, Modern Egyptians, vol. i. p. 366.
* A " nabout" is a staff, which is sometimes loaded with lead
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to believe it. A diplomatist, and especially a diplo-
matist in Egypt, sees a good deal of the ignoble
side of life. Constant dealings with corrupt Pashas,
scheming adventurers, and other hostile elements,
who tliink that all is fair in business or politics, are
apt to shake one's faith in the goodness of human
nature. JNIore than this, the question of whether
the fellaheen of Egypt are happy or unhappy,
grateful or ungrateful, though a matter of some
interest to themselves and of somewhat more than
philanthropic interest to others, is, after all, only
one of the factors which must contribute to guide
the action of the British diplomatist. He has to
think, or at all events the Government whom he is
serving has to think of the interests of the farmers of
Yorkshire, the fishermen of Yarmouth, the artisans
of Sheffield, and their brother taxpayers, who are
his own countrymen, and he has to ask himself,
what is it to these whether or not the Egyptian fella-
heen are flayed alive by greedy Pashas and tyrannical
Sheikhs ? All this I know. Mais pour ctre diplo-
mate^ on nest pas moins liomme. Even a matter-of-
fact official may be allowed to cherish what is
perhaps an illusion. He may be pardoned, especially
if he has lived much in the inconsistent East, if he
nourishes a trace of inconsistency in the recesses of
his heart, if he struggles against being reasoned out
of a noble hope. Often during the long period
when my countrymen and myself were engaged in
what at one time seemed the hopeless task of
evolving order out of the Egyptian chaos, have I
repeated to myself those fine lines of the Latin poet
which Pitt quoted when he dealt the first blow
to the infamous traffic in slaves :
Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis,
Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper.^
* Stanhope's Life of Pitt, p. 146. The quotation is from the first
Georgic, 260-261.
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Was the prophecy of the Enghsh statesman, I
asked myself, about to be fulfilled ? Is it destined
that, under the guiding hand of England, the rays
of true civilisation shall at last pierce into the oldest
and most interesting corner of the dark African
continent, and lighten with their sunshine even the
mud hut of the Egyptian fellah ? Is the English-
man to show, by precept and example, that usury
and drunkenness are not the only handmaids of
Christian education ? Pray Heaven it may be so !
When Sir Robert Peel committed that great and
wise act of political apostasy for which his name will
ever live in English history, he said that although
he had suffered much in separating himself from
his former political friends, he still hoped that he
would " leave a name sometimes remembered with
expressions of goodwill in those places which are
the abode of men whose lot it is to labour and to
earn their daily bread by the sweat of their brow."
I may perhaps be permitted to paraphrase this
memorable passage. In spite of the ignorance and
alleged ingratitude of the Egyptians, I still dare to
cherish a hope that the present and future genera-
tions of fellaheen, who certainly earn and will
continue to earn their daily bread by the sweat of
their brow, will remember with some feeling akin
to gratitude that it was the Anglo-Saxon race who
first delivered them from the thraldom of their
oppressors, who taught them that they too had the
right to be treated like human beings, who conferred
upon them the material blessings which follow in
the train of true Western civilisation, and who
opened out to them the path which leads to moi^l
progress and elevation of thought. The time, it
may be hoped, is past when Egypt ^ and the
* Hoary Memphis boasts her tombs alone,
The mournful types of mighty power decayed.
Shenstone, Elegy XJY,
108 MODERN EGYPT fi. iv
Egyptians could be cited as one of the most striking
contrasts the world has ever known between past
grandeur and modern decadence.
In any case, whether the Egyptian fellah be
capable or incapable of gratitude, there can be no
doubt that it was the hand of England which first
raised him from the abject moral and material
condition in which he had for centuries wallowed.
If, now that he is beginning to emerge from his
slough of despond, I thought that he would be
permitted to relapse into his former state, and that
the work on which, in common with many of my
countrymen, I have spent the best years of my Ufe
woidd be undone, then would I say rore fioc x'^voi
evpela x^^^- I hasten to add that I not merely
hope, but strongly believe that no such disappoint-
ment of my political hopes is, in the smallest degree,
probable.
The last category of INIoslem dwellers in Egypt
of whom it is necessary to speak is the Bedouins,
semi-sedentary and nomad. Of these, but little
need be said. A number of proverbs are current
in Egypt indicative of the dislike entertained by
the dwellers in the \'alley of the Nile to those in
the desert. Of these, the best known is, " Better
tlie tyranny of the Turk than the justice of the
Bedouins." The Bedouins are, in fact, supposed
to be very cruel and unjust. Another proverb is
in the form of a narrative : " The Bedouin told my
wife tliat there was no water in the well. She at
once went hastily to the well with four buckets."
Tliis is in allusion to the alleged selfishness and
untruthfulness of the Bedouins.^
On the other hand, the Bedouins despise the
fellaheen, whom they consider an unmanly race.
The Bedouins occasionally complain that in the
* Burckhardt (Amhic Prorerhs, p. 123) gives another: "Eutertai
the Bedouin, lie will steal thy clothes."
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matter of military service, from which they are
exempted, the Egyptian Government wish to
"reduce them to fellaheen." It is wise policy to
keep them contented and to encourage them to
settle on the cultivated lands. Otherwise, they
are apt to turn into marauders and to cause
disturbances of various sorts. Their ancient
privileges have, therefore, for the most part, been
preserved to them. This treatment has proved
effective. The figures of the census of 1897
compared with those of 1882 show that, since
the British occupation, there has been a strong
tendency on the part of the Bedouins to abandon
their nomadic habits, and to settle in the villages
bordering on the desert. Broadly speaking, the
Bedouins, for the purposes of the present narrative
and argument, may be considered a quantite
negligeable. They did not exercise any consider-
able influence on the course of British policy in.
Egypt.
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APPENDIX
Translation of a Letter from a Sheikh of Keneh to a
Sheikh of the Mosque of Seyyidna-Hussein at Cairo.
February 2, 1894.
During these days, the talk has been great among the
people, and tongues have wearied as to the difference which
had sprung up, so they said, between our Lord the Khedive
and Barino;. There were those who said : " The English
have many soldiers, and must prevail." Others said, and
among these many of the Ulema : " HE has said (Grace be
on Him !) how often hath a small force overcome a great one
by the aid of the Almighty, be His name exalted !
"
Then it was reported in our districts : " Behold the Infidel
is overcome, and Baring has fled in haste to his own country.
The days of Abbas shall be like those of his forefathers ; the
people and the Pashas shall be bread for him to eat ; the
foreigner will be his servant,"
So we took counsel, and thought to send a mission from
Keneh to say : " Good news ! Effendina has returned to his
fit place ! " For the poet has said : " The wise man gives
honey to the bear in the day of his fatness, but the fool
smites him on the head with a pole."
Then, while we still pondered, came a message from Cairo
that Baring and his English walked in the city like leopards
among dogs, and that Abbas had withdrawn into his
castle and sat scowling, for the Government of Baring had
said : " Be meat that we may devour you ! " So we were
hushed, and resolved to say nothing of any deputation.
And, of a truth, I think that it is not easy, and will be less
30 in time to come, to send deputations of good tidings to
our Lord the Khedive.
Now, I had myself thought that the end could only be
thus, for I have seen the English and I know them. But
aloud 1 said : " The blessing of God on the deputation, and
the aid of His mighty arm ! for are we not all Moslems and
brethren ? (God increase the might of Islam !) "
But, O my friend ! I beg you to keep this letter very
secret, for the poet has said: "III is his lot in the court
whom the Kadi has heard to whisper, ' There is justice
amongst the unbelievers,"' "^
' A change has been made in the last paragraph without alteriug
the general sense. The o:iginal was too course to be reproduced.
CHAPTER XXXVI
THE CHRISTIANS
TTie Copts—The conservatism of their religion—TTieir character
—
Thrir attitude towards the Eiif^lish—The reform movement
The Syrians—Their position—Their unpopularity—Their attitude
towards the Eng:lish—The Akmenians—Tlieir subserviency to the
Turks—Nubar Pasha—His son Boghos—Yacoub Pasha Artin
Tigraue Pasha—The Egyptians should not be weighed in European
scales.
The Egyptian native Christians may be divided into
three categories, viz. (1) the Copts ; (2) the Syrians ;
and (3 ) the Armenians. Of these, the most important
in point of numbers are the Copts. The census of
1897 showed that there were at that time 608,000
Copts in Egypt. Of these, some few are Cathohcs
and some Protestants, but by far the greater number
belong to what is termed the Orthodox Church.
Beyond mentioning that the Orthodox Copts
are Monophysites, and that they separated from
the main body of the Christian Church subsequent
to the Council of Chalcedon in a.d. 451, it is
needless to dwell on the special tenets of the
Coptic creed. One point in connection with the
religion of the Copts should, however, be men-
tioned, inasmuch as it is intimately connected with
an understanding of tlie general cliaracteri sties of
the Coptic community. The Christianity of the
Copt has been as conservative as the Islamism
of the Moslem. "The Eastern Church," Dean
Stanley says, "was, like the East, stationary and
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immutable ; the Western, like the West, pro-
gressive and flexible. . . . The theology of the
East has undergone no systematising process. The
doctrines remain in the same rigid yet undefined
state as that in which they were left by Constantine
and Justinian." If a religious belief cannot adapt
itself to the requirements which are constantly
cropping up as the world grows older, one of
two things will probably happen. Either society
advances and the religious belief is stranded and
eventually forgotten, or the creed holds society in
its grip and bars the way to advancement. It is
the proud boast of the Christian religion, and
more especially of the Protestant variety of that
religion, that it is not obliged to choose between
either of these alternatives. It possesses sufficient
elasticity to adapt itself to modern requirements.
It is true that the Coptic Christian has remained
stagnant, but there is this notable difference between
the stagnation of the JNIoslem and that of the Copt.
The Moslem stands in everything on the ancient
ways because he is a Moslem, because the customs
which are interwoven with his religion, forbid him
to change. " Swathed in the bands of the Koran,
the Moslem faith, unlike the Christian, is powerless
to adapt itself to varying time and place, keep
pace with the march of humanity, direct and purify
the social life, or elevate mankind."^ The Copt,
on the other hand, has remained immutable, or
nearly so, not because he is a Copt, but because
he is an Oriental, and because his religion, which
admits of progress, has been surrounded by associa-
tions antagonistic to progress. In the case of
the Copt, it is not necessary, as in that of the
Moslem, to strike off any rehgious shackles before
he can proceed along tlie path of political and
social advancement. The reformer in temporal
* fcjir William Muir, T}ie Caliphate, p. 594.
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matters does not at every turn find himself face
to face with the priest, who in tlie name of rehgion
or rehgious custom bars the way to progress.
From the point of view of principle, the difference
is immense. From the point of view of practice,
the difference has so far been slight. In spite of
his religion which, as the history of the world has
shown, admits of progress, the Copt has been arrested
by barriers very similar to those which have appUed
in the case of the Moslem. It is, indeed, natural
that such should have been the case. The minority
must of necessity submit to the influence of the
majority. In India, the Moslems have to a certain
extent become Brahminised. In spite of the
unbending tenets of their creed, custom and asso-
ciation have been too strong for them. The
Hindoos, being in a majority of five to one, have
copied nothing from the Moslems. The INloslems,
on the other hand, have insensibly assimilated
certain Hindoo ideas, notably the idea of caste.
The Indian Moslem will not eat with the Chris-
tian, although there is nothing in his religious code
which forbids him to do so, and although his
brother- Moslem, who is not exposed to Hindoo
association, does so willingly. The same principle
has applied in the case of the Egyptian Copts.
The Moslem has in no way become Christianised.
The Copt, on the other hand, has, without know-
ing it, assimilated himself to the Moslem. " The
modern Copt has become from head to foot, in
manners, language, and spirit, a Moslem, however
unwilling he may be to recognise the fact."^ Coptic
women are almost as secluded as INIoslems. Coptic
children are generally circumcised. The marriage
customs and funeral ceremonies of the Copts are
very similar to those of JNloslems.
Much has been written about the general
* Upper Egypt, etc., p. 89.
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characteristics of the Copts. All generalisations
about the attributes of a nation or of a class are
apt to be imperfect, and must necessarily do
injustice to exceptional mdividuals. The Copts
have somewhat specially suffered from hasty
generalisation. Until of recent years, when by
reason of the British occupation a flood of Hght has
been thrown on everything connected with Egypt,
most Englishmen who paid any attention to the
national characteristics of the "Modern Egyptians"
took their ideas from the classic work, which
has immortalised the name of Lane. Now Lane
was a strong Mohammedan sympathiser. He knew
but little about the Copts. All the information he
supplies about them appears to have been based on
the testimony of one " respectable Copt " whose
acquaintance he happened to make,^ and who
certainly gave a most unfavourable account of his
co-religionists. " One of the most remarkable
traits," Lane says, " in the character of the Copts
is their bigotry. They bear a bitter hatred to all
other Christians, even exceeding that with which
the Moslems regard the unbelievers in El- Islam.
. . . They are, generally speaking, of a sullen
temper, extremely avaricious, and abominable
dissemblers ; cringing or domineering according to
circumstances. The respectable Copt, to whom I
have already acknowledged myself chiefly indebted
for the notions which I have obtained respecting
the customs of his nation, gives me a most
unfavourable account of their character. He avows
them to be generally ignorant, deceitful, faithless,
and abandoned to the pursuit of worldly gain, and
to indulgence in sensual pleasures."'^
* " I had the g'ood fortune to become acquainted with a character
of which 1 had doubted tlie existence, a Copt of a liberal as well as an
intelligent mind ; and to his kindness I am indebted for the knowledge
of most of the facts related in the foUowiiiir brief memoir."
—
Modem
Egyptians, vol. ii. p. 273. ^ Modern Egyptians, vol. ii. p. 295.
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This judgment appears to err greatly on the side
of severity. Even if it be admitted that the un-
pleasing quahties, which I^ane indicates, are some-
times to be found amongst the Copts, it is to be
observed that the Copts have no monopoly of those
qualities. Bigotry, ignorance, dissimulation, deceit,
faithlessness, the pursuit of worldly gain, and in-
dulgence in sensual pleasures, may, to a certain
extent, be Egyptian, but it can scarcely be held
that they are especially Coptic attributes. They
are to be found in an equal degree amongst
Egyptian JMoslems.
Sir John Bowring, who next to Lane is probably
the best of the less recent authorities on Egyptian
national characteristics, passes a more kindly judg-
ment on the Copts. Although, he says, the Turks
have always considered the Copts as "the parialis
of the Egyptian people, yet they are an amiable,
pacific, and intelligent race, whose worst vices
have grown out of their seeking shelter from
wrong and robbery."
Lane appears to me to be prejudiced in this
matter. His statement is, to say the least, much
too highly coloured as regards the present race
of Egyptians, whether Moslems or Copts. Bow-
ring, on the other hand, hardly states the whole
case. My own experience leads me to the follow-
ing conclusions : first, that, owing to circum-
stances uncomiected with the difference of religion,
the Egyptian Copt has developed certain moral
attributes which also belong to the Eg3^ptian
Moslem ; secondly, that, owing to circumstances
which are accidentally connected with, but which
are not the consequences of his religion, the Copt
has developed certain in^tellectual qualities, in
which, mainly from want of exercise, the Egyptian
Moslem seems to be deficient ; thirdly, that for
all purposes of broad generalisation, the only
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difference between the Copt and the Moslem is
that the former is an Egyptian who worships in
a Christian church, whilst the latter is an Egyptian
who worships in a IMohamniedan mosque.
The question now under discussion is one of
great interest, for it involves nothing less than
this—has the Christian religion, taken by itself
and apart from all other influences, been able in
the course of centuries to develop moral qualities
in the Coptic community superior to those
generally attributable to the non-Christian com-
munity by which the Copts have been surrounded ?
I am reluctantly constrained to answer this
question in the negative.^ It is, so far as I am
aware, impossible to mdicate any moral quality
in respect to which the Copt, with his 1500 years
of Christianity behind him, is notably superior
to the Moslem. The moral code by which the
relations between man and man are regulated is,
in the case of the Copt, no more ele\ated than
in the case of the Moslem. In spite of his religion
and his monogamous habits, the Copt has developed
no high ideal of womanhood. More than this,
in respect to one important point the Moslem
occupies a more elevated moral position than the
Copt. The former, when untainted by European
association, is distinguished for his sobriety—
a
moral quality which is noticeable to a less
extent amongst the Copts. ^ It is, of course,
true that the defects of Coptic character are not
attributable to their religion. It is also true that
* It is, however, to be rememljered, looking' to the past history of
the Copts, that they deservi' ufieat credit for the steadfastness with
whicli they liave adhered to tlieir faith in tlie face of persecution. As
to the persecution see, inter uliu, Makrizi's //?5/or// (Maian's transhition),
p. 88. lu Dr. Butler's admirable work, The Arab (.'onqnext of Egypt, a
full account is given of the persecution to which the Copts were at cue
time subject.
^ " Intoxication is a frequent vice amongst the Copts."— Bowring'g
Report, p. 8. See also Cairo, p. 206.
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the Copt has been exposed to the influence of a
somewhat debased form of Christianity ; that
that influence has been exerted under specially
unfavourable conditions ; and that the defects in
the Coptic character are, more often than not,
"the vices of servitude."^ Nevertheless, to those
who beheve in the morahsing and civihsing
influence of the Christian religion, it is dis-
appointing to find that, in differentiating the
Egyptian Copt from his compatriots who are
Moslems, it is not possible to indicate any one
special virtue, and to say that, in spite of every
adventitious disadvantage, the Christian religion
has fostered and developed that virtue, and has
thus given a certain moral superiority to the
Christian over the Moslem. Such, however,
appears to be the case. I fear it must be admitted
that so far the Copt has stood before the world
as a Christian who, by reason of adverse circum-
stances, has been unable to profit to any great
extent by his Christianity.
Turning from moral attributes to mental quali-
ties, it cannot be said that, in any of the higher
branches of intellectual life, the Copts have shown
any superiority over the Moslems. But, under the
stress of circumstances, they have developed certain
mediocre aptitudes. As compared with the un-
bending Moslem, they have shown a greater degree
of flexibility m adapting themselves to a few of
the elementary requirements of civilisation. They
have seized on those crumbs from the Moslem
table which the Moslem was too proud, too
careless, or too unintelligent to appropriate to
himself They made themselves useful, indeed
almost indispensable to their oppressors, aj d
the aptitudes which they thus acquired during
the period of oppression, ought to have stood them
1 Cairo, p. 208.
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ill good stead when the flood -tide of European
civilisation set in. For the European will recog-
nise that the Copt possesses in some degree that
accurate habit of thought which is wanting in
the JMoslem, and which is the god at whose altar
the logical European is an unceasing devotee. He
will accord a lukewarm welcome to the Copt, not
on account of his religion, but because the Copt
can add and subtract, because he knows his
multiplication table, because he can measure the
length and breadth of a plot of ground without
making any gi'oss error in the measurement, and
because, although his system of accounts is archaic,
at the same time it is better to be in possession
of a bad system of accounts than, like the Egyptian
Moslem, to have scarcely any system at all. " The
Copts," Bowring said, " are the surveyors, the
scribes, the arithmeticians, the measurers, the
clerks, in a word, the learned men of the land.
They are to the counting-house and the pen what
the fellah is to the field and the plough."
What, however, was the attitude of the Copts
towards the English reformer ?
The question is of some interest and import-
ance, for although the Englishman, strong in the
righteousness of his cause, was confident of the
ultimate result, at the same time, looking to all
the obstacles in his path, to the inertia of the mass
of the population whom he wished to befriend,
and to the activity of various hostile elements of
Egyptian society, who would assuredly never cease
from harrying him, he would have been glad to
welcome the most humble allies. And where
would the Englishman more probably find allies
than amongst a body of persons who were bound
to him by a general community of religion, who
had suffered from the oppression of the Moslem
and notably from that of the Moslem Pasha, and
CH. XXXVI THE CHRISTIANS 209
who possessed various humble aptitudes, which it
would be in the interest of the Englishman to turn
to account, and in that of the Copt to display to
the best advantage in the presence of the Enghsh-
man ? The premises of this argument were seem-
ingly correct ; the inference was plausible ; but, as
we are dealing with the illogical East, we need not
be surprised to find that it was erroneous. For,
in fact, the Copt was, in the first instance at
all events, animated by no very friendly feehngs
towards the English reformer.
The principles of strict impartiality on which
the Englishman proceeded were foreign to the
nature of the Copt. When the British occupation
took place, certain hopes began to da^^ii in his
mind. I, said the Copt to himself, am a Christian
;
if I had the power to do so, I would favour
Christians at the expense of Moslems ; the English
are Christians ; therefore—and it was here that the
Copt was guilty of a sad ignoratio elenchi—as the
English have the power, they will assuredly favour
Christians at the expense of Moslems. When the
Copt found that this process of reasoning was
fallacious, and that the conduct of the Englishman
was guided by motives which he had left out of
account, and which he could not understand, he was
disappointed, and his disappointment deepened into
resentment. He thought that the Enghshman's
justice to the Moslem mvolved injustice to liimself,
for he was apt, perhaps unconsciously, to hold that
injustice and absence of favouritism to Copts were
well-nigh synonymous terms.
The Copt, moreover, had another cause of com-
plaint against the Enghsh reformer. Not only
was he disappointed that no special favours were
accorded to him, but he saw with dismay that,
under British auspices, he was in danger of being
supplanted by his rival, the Syrian Christian.
VOL. II P
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When the English took Egyptian affairs in hand,
the accountants in the employment of the Egyp-
tian Government were ahuost exclusively Copts.
Their system of accounts v^^as archaic. Moreover,
it was well-nigh incomprehensible to any but
themselves. All tendencies in the direction of
reform were resisted, partly from conservatism,
and partly from instincts of self-preservation, for
it was clear that if the system were simplified to
such an extent as to be comprehensible to the
uninitiated, the monopoly, which the Copts had
heretofore enjoyed, would be endangered. Finding
that he could not untie the knot, the Enghshman,
with characteristic energy, cut it. The Coptic
system of accounts had manifestly to be abolished,
and as the Copts either could not or would not
assist in the work of abohtion, they had to give
way to other agents. In the early days of the
English occupation a good many Syrians, there-
fore, took the places of Copts. The reform was
necessary, but it naturally caused much dissatis-
faction amongst the Coptic community.
The English, therefore, found that the Copts
were, during the early days of the occupation,
generally unfriendly, but they did not show their
unfriendliness in any very overt form, for there is
one quahty in which the Copt excelled. He was
an accomplished trimmer. He wished to pose both
as Anglophobe and as an Anglophile according to
the requirements of his audience, and according
to the part which for the moment appeared to
be most in harmony with his personal interests.
His remarkable powers of intrigue, which were
developed in the days of Moslem oppression, here
came to his assistance. I should add that, as the
occupation was prolonged, the benefits derived
from the British administration of Egypt were
gradually more and more recognised by the Copts.
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They began to understand that they had to rely
mainly on their own efforts, and those efforts were
often crowned with success. Many of the Copts
now in the Government service are very capable
men. A Copt of marked ability (Boutros Pasha
Ghali) has occupied for a long time, and with
great credit to himself, the post of Minister of
Foreign Affairs.
Before leaving this branch of the subject, it
should be mentioned that for many years past a
large number of Copts have been educated in the
excellent schools established throughout Egypt by
the American missionaries. Many of the younger
generation speak English, and show a tendency to
develop moral and intellectual qualities greatly
superior to those of their fathers, to whom the
description given above mainly applies. This pro-
cess of education has produced its natural result.
The young Copts see that, unless they wish to be left
behind in the race of life, they must bestir them-
selves. Once having eaten of the tree of know-
ledge, they begin to recognise the decrepitude of
their antique hierarchical and educational systems,
and they are stimulated in the acquirement of this
knowledge by the fact that the Syrian, by reason
of his superior intellectual attainments, is taking
away the birthright of the Copts. The young
Copt, starting with Christianity developed by
Western education in his favour, has sufficient
versatility to draw from this fact the conclusion
at which the slow-thinking Moslem, weighted by
his leaden creed, arrives more tardily. If I am to
outstrip the Syrian, the young Copt says, it is of no
use simply cursing him ; I must abandon my ancient
ways, and strive to be his equal. So a movement
has been developed, the object of which is to apply
Coptic religious endowments to useful purposes
;
to question the necessity of devoting funds, dru^vn
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from the general body of the community, exclu-
sively to the maintenance of a number of priestly
sinecures ; to establish seminaries, where those who
wish to enter holy orders may learn something
more than how to mumble a few set formulse
expressed in an archaic language, which has been
dead for the last two centuries ; ^ to devote any
surplus funds to secular education ; and, generally,
to instil life into a body which has been stagnant
since its earliest creation. The movement natur-
ally meets with resistance from the hierarchy. At
first, it appeared as if this resistance would be at
once overcome. The crisis happened to take
place at the moment when Abbas II. succeeded
to Tewfik I. An enlightened Prime JMinister
(JNIustapha Pasha Fehmi), acting in general con-
formity mth English ideas, favoured the views of
the Coptic reformers. The Coptic Patriarch, who
was the incarnation of the most stolid form of
conservatism, was sent to one of those desert
monasteries, where in the early days of Christianity
the misguided anchorites of Egypt tortured their
bodies m the behef that they were doing God
service. But a turn in the political wheel brought
about a different order of things. Riaz Pasha, who
was a conservative Moslem, succeeded to power.
Moslem opinion was adverse to the cause of the
Coptic reformers. This opposition was based on
two grounds. In the first place, the staid INIoslem
was shocked at rebellion against legitimate hier-
archical authority, neither did he care to inquire
whether that authority was wisely or unwisely
^ M. Cogordan, at onetime French Consul-General in Egypt, whose
premature death was deplored by all who were privileged to know him,
wrote : " Le Pere Vansleb a vu a Assiout, en 1(572, un vieillard qu'on
lui pre'sentait comme le dernier Egyptien parlant le Copte. Mais il
est probable que bieu d'autres le jKirlcrent apres celui-ci ; la petite
ville de Nagadeh passe pour etre celle on cet idiome se conserva le
plus tard, jusqu'a la fin du XVIlIe siede probablemeut."
—
Relation du
Voyage /ait au Convent de Saint Antoine, p. 116.
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exercised. In the second place, the Moslem, con-
scious of his own defects, was alarmed at the
appearance of a new rival in the shape of a Coptic
progressionist. These influences being in the
ascendart, the Patriarch was recalled from his
eremitic retreat. The British diplomatist, who
alone could have prevented this consummation,
stood aside. However much he might sympathise
with the cause of Coptic reform, his worldly know-
ledge told him that he would act unwisely in
thrusting himself into the midst of a quarrel
between the temporal and spiritual authorities of a
creed which was not his own. For the time being,
therefore, the anti-reformers triumphed. But the
triumph is assuredly but temporary. Time is on
the side of the reformers ; they must eventually
gain the day in spite of Patriarchal opposition.
The reformers themselves are not without the
faults which belong to political youth and inexperi-
ence. Their self-esteem is somewhat inflated.
Nevertheless, we may wish them well. " The
Copts," Bowring said, "will probably occupy no
small part of the field in the future history of
Egypt." Until recently, there appeared but little
prospect of this prophecy being fulfilled ; but this
latter-day movement of the young Copts affords
ground for hope. If it be continued, the Coptic
community may in time develop attributes which
win generate and foster self-respect. When they
have done this, they will deserve and will obtain
the respect of others. They will be carried on by
the stream of social and political progress, instead
of being engulfed or remaining stranded on the
shore.
Turning from the Copts to the Syrians, it is to
be observed that there are a certain number of
Moslem Syrians resident in Egypt, but, from a
political point of view, the Christian Syrians are
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far more important than the Moslems. In the
following remarks, therefore, attention will be
confined to the Christians.
It is not possible to state how many Syrian
Christians there are in Egypt. Without doubt, the
Syrians constitute a very small community as com-
pared with the Copts. They derive their import-
ance, however, not from their numbers, but from
the positions which they occupy. Considerable
numbers of upper and upper-middle class Syrians
are Government employes. In almost every
village in Egypt, a usurer is to be found who,
if he is not a Greek, is generally a Syrian.
There are numerous Jews in Egypt ; nevertheless,
it is correct to say that the Syrians occupy to a
great extent in Egypt the positions held by the
Jews in many countries of Europe. Thus, on the
one hand, the Syrians encounter the jealousy of
those JNloslems and Copts who are aspirants for
public employment. On the other hand, they are
regarded by the mass of the population with those
feeUngs of dislike which improvident debtors
usually entertain towards creditors who hold them
in their grip. The Syrian moneylender has the
reputation of being singularly grasping and merci-
less. Moreover, his exactions have been facilitated
by the onward march of civilisation in Egypt, for
the Code Napoleon, which was suddenly applied
without sufficient modification to the regulation of
the monetary transactions of the country, affords
little protection to the poor and ignorant debtor,
whilst it is capable of becoming a terrible engine
for legalised oppression in the hands of a grasping
creditor.
It is only of recent years that the Syrians have
acquired their present position in Egypt. Lane
and Bowring scarcely allude to them. When,
however, Ismail Pasha began to Europeanise the
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Egyptian administrative services, it was natural
that a demand should arise for intelligent em-
ployes, who could speak both Arabic and French,
in which latter language most of the European
work of the country was conducted, and who, from
their training and habits of thought, possessed some
aptitude for assimilating European administrative
procedures. It was at the time hopeless to expect
much assistance from the ordinary unassimilative
Moslem who, as the movement swept by him,
merely looked up for a moment with a scowl
from the Koran, and then relapsed into a
state of political torpor. The Copt was a Httle
more helpful, but he also had developed no high
degree of versatiUty, and, moreover, was rarely
acquainted with any foreign language. When the
demand for employes was first felt, the supply
of Europeanised Egyptians was insufficient, and
further, the Europeanised Egyptian was often a
less useful agent than his social and political kins-
man, the Syrian. The Syrian's opportunity, there-
fore, came, and he profited by it. He possessed all
the quahfications required. Arabic was his mother
tongue. He was generally familiar with French,
having been educated at some French college in
Syria. He was versatile, pushing, and ambitious.
His confidence in his own capacity was as bound-
less as that of the esurient Greek of the Roman
satirist. He possessed in no small degree the
talent, which was particularly useful in a cosmo-
pohtan society, of being all things to all men. He
found, therefore, little difficulty in jostling himself
into some position of authority, and once there,
being animated by strong feelings of race affinity,
he opened the door to others amongst his country-
men, and took little heed of the charges of nepotism
which were brought against him.
When the English took Egyptian affairs in
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hand, circumstances again favoured the Syrian.
For the Englishman, himself generally ignorant of
Arabic and only semi - conversant with French,
looked over the Eg^^tian administrative chaos, and
said to himself: Where am I to find subordinates
who will assist me ? The Moslem is for the time
being, useless ; the Copt is little better. I am
debarred by political and financial reasons from
employing Europeans. Under these circumstances,
the Syrian was a godsend.
It is probable that the employment of Syrians
did at one time more towards rendering the British
regime unpopular amongst certain classes in Egypt
than anything else. For the more intelligent
Moslem, when he gradually woke up to what was
going on around him, said to himself: The Eng-
lishman I understand ; I recognise his good qualities
;
he brings to bear on his work, not only knowledge,
but energy superior to my own ; I do not like him,
but I am aware that he means well by me, and I
see that he confers certain material benefits on me,
which I am very willing to accept ; but what of
this Syrian ? Am I not as good as he ? If native
agents be required, why should not my kinsman
be employed rather than this alien, who possesses
neither the advantages of the European nor those
of the true Egyptian ? Accordingly, the Moslem,
followed at no great distance by the Copt, poured
forth all the vials of his wrath on the Syrian.
Even Tewfik Pasha, whose views were habitually
temperate, warmed to fever-heat when he spoke of
the Syrians, whilst the same subject roused Riaz
Pasha's more sturdy Islamism to the boiling-point
of vituperation. In 1890, Riaz Pasha proposed to
issue an edict, wliich virtually prohibited all Syrians
from entering the Egyptian service. Then the
British diplomatist had to step forward and to
point out in a cold-blooded, accurate, European
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fashion that, so long as red-coated soldiers were
walking about the streets of Cairo, no absolute
proscription on the ground of race or creed could
be tolerated ; moreover, that, from the point of
view of equity and common sense, a distinction
should be drawn between those Syrians whose
families resided in Syria, and who had merely come
to Egypt to make their fortunes, and those who,
though of Syrian origin, had been born and bred in
Egypt, and who were, therefore, to all intents and
purposes, Egyptians. The result was a compro-
mise. Syrians who had hved for fifteen years in
Egypt were admitted to the pubUc service on the
same terms as Egyptians.
The JNIohammedan sentiment on this subject is
very natural. The Egyptian Moslems are, in fact,
now in the transitionary phase through which their
co-religionists in India have already passed. When,
after the events of 1857, all the paraphernalia of
European administrative systems were introduced
into India, the more subtle and assimilative Hindoo
everywhere got the better of the slow -moving
Moslem. In course of time, however, the latter
woke up to the fact that there was need for self-
exertion ; and accordingly, if all accounts be true,
he is now running neck and neck with the Hindoo,
having possibly cast aside some of the obstructive
customs which hang on to the skirts of his creed
before he could attain the goal. The Egyptian
'Moslem must of necessity undergo the same pro-
cess. He will find that protective laws against
Syrian and Coptic encroachments will be of little
avail, but, if he braces himself to the work, he
may yet beat the Syrian with the latter's o\\ti
weapons. He must, however, bestir himself, or
he will be outstripped in the race. It is difficult
to predict what will become of the JNIoham-
medan religion if the Moslem wins. It will
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possibly suffer slightly in the excitement of the
contest.
The Syrian, equally with the Copt, has to a
certain extent developed "the vices of servitude."
He has been obliged to bend before Moslem
oppression or European intellectual superiority,
and the process of adapting himself to Moslem
caprice, or of imitating European procedures and
habits of thought, is not calculated to develop
the manly qualities. Nevertheless, whether from
a moral, social, or intellectual point of view, the
Syrian stands on a distinctly high level. He
is rarely corrupt. There are many gradations of
Syrian society. A high-class Syrian is an accom-
plished gentleman, whose manners and general
behaviour admit of his being treated on a footing
of perfect social equaUty by high-class Europeans.
His intellectual level is also unquestionably high.
He can do more than copy the European. He
can understand why the European does what he
does, and he is able to discuss with acuteness
whether what is done is wisely or unwisely done.
He is not by any means wanting in the logical
faculty. It would, in a word, be wholly incorrect
to say that he merely apes civilisation. It may
be said with truth that he really is civilised. In
this respect, he is probably superior, not only to the
Copt, but also to the Europeanised Egyptian, who
is but too often a mere mimic.
There is yet one further point to be considered
as regards the Syrians. AVhat was the attitude
of the Syrian towards the British reformer ? This
question was at one time a never-ending source
of difficulty to the Syrian himself, for he was
torn with conflicting emotions. His French
education had predisposed him to look askance
at everything English. The Englishman's direct,
common-sense mode of procedure, and his scorn
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for formalities, were foreign to the subtle, formal-
istic mind of the Syrian, whose tendencies were
ultra -bureaucratic. These considerations, coupled
with a certain amount of resentment at insular
haughtiness, led the Syrian to dislike the English-
man. On the other hand, was it not possible
that in the long run it would pay better to
show English rather than French prochvities ?
Amidst the doubts which hung over the future
of Egypt, it was difficult to give any positive
answer to this question. Under the circum-
stances, the best thing the Syrian could do was
to be Anglophile or Francophile according to the
requirements of the moment. He would even,
under the pressure of self-interest, occasionally emit
sparks, which to the uninitiated might appear to
emanate from the forge of Egyptian patriotism.
But in reahty his heart, or perhaps it should rather
be said his head, was attracted by the theoretical
perfection of French administrative systems. He
had no sympathy with the English or with English
methods, though he rendered lip-service to the
Englishman and gladly accepted anything which
the Englishman had to give him. This view
held good more especially at the commencement
of the British occupation, for, as time went on,
the Anglophobia of the Syrians was, to say the
least, greatly diminished in intensity.
Lastly, something should be said of the
Armenians. The Armenian community in Egypt
is small. It consists for the most part of shop-
keepers. The political importance of the Armenians,
however, is derived from the fact that, almost ever
since the dynasty of Mehemet Ali was founded, a
few Armenians of distinction have occupied high
positions under the Egyptian Government. The
Copts have, for the most part, never occupied
any but subordinate posts in the Egyptian adminis-
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tration. The Syrians, in spite of their abiUty,
have so far never been able to push beyond places
of secondary, though considerable, importance.
Armenians, on the other hand, have attained the
highest administrative ranks, and have at times
exercised a decisive influence on the conduct of
public affairs in Egypt.
The number of upper-class Armenians in Egypt
is insufficient to justify my attempting any broad
generalisation of Armenian characteristics based on
personal observation. But I may say that those
few Armenians with whom I have been brouofht in
contact appear to me to constitute, with the Syrians,
the intellectual cream of the near East.
There is one point about the Armenians which is
worthy of note. Observe a middle-class Armenian
enter the room of a Turkish Pasha. On arriving at
the door, he will make several profound obeisances.
The Pasha, without rising from his seat, will, with
contemptuous condescension, motion to him to sit
down, but the Armenian will not do so at once
;
he will cross his hands in front of his body, cast his
eyes on the ground, sidle along the wall or shuffle
gradually forward without ever lifting his feet from
the floor ; at last, he will sink slowly down on the
edge of a chair or divan, join his knees in front
of him, cross his hands on his breast, and in this
attitude of profound humility will wait until the
lordly Pasha thinks fit to address a few words to
him. A highly educated or highly placed Armenian
will not, indeed, go through all this pantomime.
Moreover, the younger Armenians are less defer-
ential to the Turks than their fathers. But no
Armenian, in the presence of a Turkish Pasha, can
ever forget that he is a Christian raya and that the
Turk is his oppressor ; neither can this be any matter
for surprise, for the oppression of the Turk has, in«
deed, in the case of the Armenians, been extreme.
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The most distinguished of the present generation
of Armenians in Egypt was unquestionably Nubar
Pasha, to whose character and aptitudes incidental
allusion has ah'eady been made, and of whom it
will become necessary to speak more fully at a
later period of this narrative.
Nubar Pasha's son, Boghos Pasha Nubar, is a
man of marked ability. He at one time occupied,
with great credit to himself, the post of Egyptian
member of the Railway Administration, and, since
his retirement from the service, has taken a most
useful and intelligent interest in public affairs.
Yacoub Pasha Artin is a highly cultivated gentle-
man, who has done excellent work in the cause of
educational reform.
But perhaps one of the most typical Armenians
in Egypt was Nubar Pasha's son-in-law, Tigrane
Pasha, who for a long time occupied the post of
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and who sub-
sequently became Foreign JNIinister.^ He was a
highly educated gentleman of polished manners.
He spoke French perfectly ; in fact, French was
the language in which he was most at home.
He spoke English well. He knew no Arabic,
and but little Turkish. Without being, from a
political point of view, a Gallophile, his habits
of thought were cast in a French mould. Most
of the young Egj^tians of the early days of the
occupation, although by no means always sjtii-
pathisers with the aims and pohcy of the French
Government, were saturated with ideas which had
their origin in French education, in association with
Frenchmen, and in the fact that they were more
conversant with French than any other European
literature.
' Tigrane Pasha, to the great regret of all who knew him, died in
1904. Although I often disagreed with him, I preserve the most
pleasant recollection of our long and intimate personal relations.
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One of the peculiarities of the Anglo-Saxon
race is that when they take possession or semi-
possession of a country, which does not belong to
them, they are apt in one respect to forget the
position which they occupy towards the inhabitants.
They are conscious of their own good intentions
;
they earnestly desire to govern the people of the
country well and justly ; they cannot understand
how any one can question the excellence of their
motives ; and they look with much disUke and
suspicion, which is not at all unnatural, on all who
place obstacles in the way of their praiseworthy
designs being executed. Thus, forgetful of the
fact that they are not dealing with the mhabitants
of Kent or Norfolk, the English speedily apply the
term " loyal " to those who co-operate with them,
and the term " disloyal " to those who display
hostility or merely lukewarm friendship.
From this point of view, Tigrane Pasha was far
from being "loyal," neither can any moral blame
be imputed to him for the degree of disloyalty
which he at times displayed. He was not an
Anglophobe in the ordinary sense of the term,
but he disagreed with the broad lines of British
poHcy in Egypt. Personal ambition may have
had something to do with this mental attitude.
It is possible that the class to which Tigrane Pasha
belonged,—unless, indeed, as is not improbable, it
was swept away at the first breath of discontent
from the alumni of the El-Azhar University,
—
would occupy positions of greater importance in
the world of Egyptian poHtics if British influence
were diminished than those to which they can
attain whilst that influence remains paramount. It
may be, also, that, in order to remove the taint
of being a Christian and an alien ignorant of the
vernacular language, Tigrane Pasha was obliged
to display a somewhat more ardent degree of
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patriotism in the cause of his adopted country
than would have been necessary had he been, in
fact as w^ell as in name, a real hall-marked Egyptian
struggling for the cause of Egypt. But it is
doubtful whether Tigrane Pasha was consciously
influenced by either of these considerations. It
is more probable that he honestly thought that
the Egyptians, that is to say, the Europeanised
Egyptians, of whom for all practical purposes he may
be said to have been one, were capable of governing
Egypt without any considerable degree of British
assistance, and certainly without the presence of
a British garrison in the country.^ In holding
this opinion he was certainly wrong, but the fact
that he did entertain an opinion of this sort, though
it may have afforded ground for criticising his
reasoning powers, afforded no ground whatever for
moral reprobation. Tigrane Pasha was, in fact,
a perfectly honourable and straightforward gentle-
man, with somewhat doctrinaire views, whose
standard of public and private morality was in
no way inferior to that of men of honour in any
European country.
It is, however, from the intellectual and not
from the moral point of view that the study of
Tigrane Pasha's character was mainly of interest. It
is here that his national—that is to say, Armenian,
not Egyptian—characteristics came out in strong
relief. Tigrane Pasha's mind may be characterised
as having been Franco-Byzantine, that is to say, the
foundation was Byzantine, whilst the superstructure
was French. He was, intellectually speaking, the
direct descendant of those Orientals who, in the
* There is some reason for believing that Tigrane Pasha's political
views were a good deal modified before his death. During the last few
years of his life, he was not in office, and, moreover, suffered from
very bad health. The consequence was that, to my great regret, I saw
less of him than at previous periods. I cannot, therefore, speak with
confidence on this point.
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early days of Christianity, engaged in endless dis-
putes over barren and almost incomprehensible
points of theology. He would have revelled in
the subtleties submitted to the decision of the
Council of Nice, but he would probably never
have come to any definite conclusion as to whether
Arius or Athanasius was in the right. He was
very intelhgent, particularly about matters of
detail, and quick-witted, but was often incapable
of grasping the true point at issue. When any
plain, practical question had to be decided, he
would sometimes rush off into an a piiori dis-
cussion of some principle, which was only remotely
connected with the matter in hand. On the other
hand, when some broad question of principle was
at stake, Tigrane Pasha would spht hairs over a
minor issue, which was almost incomprehensible, or
which was at all events devoid of importance to
the non-Byzantine mind. In political affairs, he
had but little idea of proportion. He endeavoured
to understand European, and especially British
politics,—a rock on which many Orientals have
split,—and as the result of his studies, he was
generally able to give the most plausible reasons
for arriving at conclusions, which were usually
erroneous. To make use of a French expression,
Ilprenait des vessies pour des lanternes. His minor
premiss appeared to him to be of such importance,
that he was apt to forget the existence of liis major
premiss. His mind refused to accept a simple
inference from simple fsicts, which were patent
to all the world. The very simplicity of the
conclusion was of itself enough to make him reject
it, for he had an elective affinity for everything
that was intricate. He was a prey to intellectual
over-subtlety
—
Graecorum ille morbus, as it was
termed by Seneca.
Tigrane Pasha was the dme damnee of a succession
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of Egyptian Ministries. He always proffered
advice, which he honestly considered was in the
best interests of Eg3^t ; yet on most occasions
of importance, the result of following his advice
was to produce an effect the opposite of that
which he had intended. His main desire for many
years was to diminish the power of the English
in Egypt, and he became instrumental in aug-
menting their power. From time to time, he
laboriously constructed a diplomatic house of
cards, which he thought must produce the required
result. When one house of cards was overturned
by a movement of the Englishman's little finger,
he was not dismayed. He did not see that the
way to get rid of the Englishman was, not to
oppose him, but to co-operate with him. Untaught
by experience, he set to work to construct some
other flimsy fabric, which also disappeared at the
first tiny blast of the British diplomatic horn. The
motives, which led Tigrane Pasha into a number
of honest but very palpable errors, are worthy of
respect. Those errors were due to the Franco-
Byzantine frame of mind, which is hypercritical,
and which is, moreover, unwilling to adopt a
severe process of inductive reasoning. In politics,
it is essential to ascertain the facts correctly before
coming to any conclusion. This Tigrane Pasha
was apt to forget. His sympathies drove him to a
certain conclusion ; he was wont to accept that
conclusion, and to let the facts, on which the con-
clusion ought to have been based, take care of
themselves.
With one exception, to which allusion \^^ll
presently be made, the various elements which
make up native Egyptian society have thus been
described. Some of the judgments which have
been passed may appear harsh. They have,
VOL. II Q
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however, been written with an object, which will
now be explained.
At the period of history of which this narra-
tive treats, it happened that Egypt had to be
Europeanised. The Englisli were the main agents
in this process of Europeanisation. It is true that
the English reformers attempted in some measure
to Egyptianise themselves. They were possessed
of little social, but of much political and adminis-
trative elasticity, which enabled them to adapt
themselves and their procedures to strange circum-
stances more readily than would have been the
case with some other members of the European
family. At the same time, the Egyptian had to
meet the Englishman more than half-way.
European civilisation, though not absolutely a bed
of Procrustes, is not very elastic. Broadly speaking,
in spite of every effort, the bed could not be made
to fit the Egyptian ; the Egyptian had to adapt
himself to lying on the bed. Viewed in this light,
it is more important to know what the Egyptian is
from the point of view of the educated European,
than it is to inquire what Europeans, whether
educated or the reverse, are from the point of
view of the Egyptian. I have, therefore, en-
deavoured to depict the Egyptians of different
classes of society as they appear in the eyes of
an educated European. I have attempted to show
how little suited the Eg}^:)tian is to lie on the
bed which, as an incident of modern progress, has
been prepared for him. I have wished to bring
into relief how his religion, his history, his moral
and intellectual attributes, and his social customs
contribute to establish a gulf between him and his
European guides. But I have no wish whatever
to blame the individual Egyptian, be he Moslem
or Christian, for being that which I find him to be.
An Englishman who had been long resident in
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China, once said : " It is the misfortune of the
Chinese Government and people to be weighed in
a balance, which they have never accepted, and to
have their shortcomings, so ascertained, made the
basis of reclamations of varying degrees of gravity."^
This observation holds as gOod about Egypt as it
does about China. I am aware that in the remarks
made in this and the two preceding chapters, the
Egyptian has been weighed in a balance which he
has never accepted, and in which, moreover, it is
somewhat unjust to weigh him ; for, from whatever
point of view we look at the Egyptian, we should
never forget that he is what the accidents of his
history, climate, religion, and geographical position
have made him. It is useless and, indeed, hurtful
to hide his defects, or to disguise from ourselves
the fact that the reception of true European
civilisation by a population such as that which is
described above must be the work of generations.
But there is no occasion to poipt the finger of
Pharisaical scorn at the Egyptians, whilst any feel-
ing of self-congratulation that we are not as these
less fortunate political publicans should surely be
checked by the reflection that some, at least, of the
defects in the Egyptian character are due to associa-
tion with European civilisation in a debased form.
Rather let us, in Christian charity, make every
possible allowance for the moral and intellectual
shortcomings of the Egyptians, and do whatever
can be done to rectify them.
* Mr. Alexander Michie, China and Christianity, p, 1, 1892.
CHAPTER XXXVII
THE EUROPEANISED EGYPTIANS
rhe Europeanised Egyptians are generally Agnostics—Effects of
Europeanising the East—Gallicised Egyptians—Attractions of
French civilisation—Unsuitability of the French system to form
the Egyptian character—The official classes generally hostile to
England,
A moment's reflection will show how it is that,
in the peculiar political phase through which Egypt
is now passing, the Europeanised Egyptian occupies
a position of somewhat special importance. If the
country were still governed on the lines of the old
Oriental despotisms, a small number of educated
Egyptians might perhaps be employed in sub-
ordinate positions, but they would be mere
adjuncts ; they would not truly represent the spirit
of the Government. If, on the other hand, the
Government and society of Egypt were farther
advanced on the road to civiUsation, the Euro-
peanised Egyptian would probably be something
different from what he actually is ; he would have
become in spirit, though not necessarily in senti-
ment, less Egyptian and more thoroughly European.
But inasmuch as Egyptian society is in a state of
flux, the natural result has been to produce a class of
individuals many of whom are, at the same time, de-
moslemised Moslems and invertebrate Europeans.
In deahng with the question of introducing
Eurv^)ean civilisation into Egypt, it should never
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be forgotten that Islam cannot be reformed ; that
is to say, reformed Islam is Islam no longer ; it is
something else ; we cannot as yet tell what it wiU
eventually be. " Christian nations," Sir William
Muir says, " may advance in civilisation, freedom,
and morality, in philosophy, science, and the arts,
but Islam stands still. And thus stationary, so far
as the lessons of history avail, it will remain." ^ But
little assistance in the work of reform can, therefore,
be expected from the steady orthodox Moslems, who
cling with unswerving fidelity to their ancient faith,
and whose dislike to European civilisation often
increases as that civilisation advances. The Syrians
and Armenians are foreigners. The Copts, besides
being Christians, are—or, at all events, in 1882,
were—but little better educated than the ordinary
Moslems. Having regard, therefore, to the dis-
qualifications of his competitors, the Europeanised
Egyptian naturally becomes, if not the only possible,
at all events the principal agent for administering
the country, except 'in so far as it is administered
by Europeans.
Nominally, the Europeanised Egyptian is in the
majority of cases a Moslem. In reality, he is
generally an Agnostic. The gulf between him
and Jthe " Alim " of the El-Azhar University is as
great as between the " Alim " and the European.
Indeed, it may be doubted whether the gulf is not
in reality greater in the former than in the latter
case. For a thoughtful European will not only
look with interest at the *' Alim " as the representa-
tive of an ancient faith, which contains much that
is highly deserving of respect ; he will, if the
"Alim" is a worthy specimen of his class, sympathise
with him because he is religious, albeit his religion
is not that of Christ. The Europeanised Egyptian,
on the other hand, will often look on the *' Alim "
» The Caliphate, p. 697.
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with all the pride of an intellectual paTvenu. From
the pedestal of his empirical knowledge, he will
regard the " Alim " as a social derelict, who has to
be tolerated, and even occasionally, for political
purposes, to be utilised, but who need not be
respected.
The truth is that, in passing through the
European educational mill, the young Egyptian
Moslem loses his Islamism, or, at all events, he
loses the best part of it. He cuts himself adrift
from the sheet-anchor of his creed. He no longer
believes that he is always in the presence of his
Creator, to whom he will some day have to render
an account of his actions. He may still, however,
take advantage of the least worthy portions of his
nominal religion, those portions, namely, which,
in so far as they tolerate a lax moral code, adapt
themselves to his tastes and to his convenience in
the affairs of this world. Moreover, in losing his
Islamism, the educated Egyptian very rarely makes
any approach towards Christianity. There are
practically no cases of Christian converts amongst
the educated classes. INIore than this, although
the Europeanised Egyptian is no true Moslem, he
is often as intolerant, and sometimes even more
intolerant of Christianity than the old orthodox
Moslem, who has received no European education.
He frequently hates Christians with a bitter hatred,
and he does so partly because many of the Christians
with whom he has been brought in contact deserve
to be hated, and partly because the Christian, in
his capacity of being a European, is a rival who
occupies positions, which tlie Europeanised Egyptian
thinks he should himself occupy.
It is doubtful whether the price which is being
paid, or which, at all events, may have to be paid
for introducing European civilisation into these
backward Eastern societies is always recognised
CH. XXXVII YOUNG EGYPT 231
so fully as it should be. The material benefits
derived from Europeanisation are unquestionably
great, but as regards the ultimate effect on public
and private morality the future is altogether
uncertain.^ European civilisation destroys one
religion without substituting another in its place.
It remains to be seen whether the code of
Christian morality, on which European civilisation
is based, can be dissociated from the teaching of
the Christian religion. This question can only
be answered by generations which are now un-
born. For the present, there is little to guide
us in any forecast as to what the ultimate result
will be.
It may, however, be noted that there is an
essential difference between the de-moslemised
Moslem and the free-thinker in Europe. The
latter is surrounded by an atmosphere of Chris-
tianity : he will often, sometimes with a pang of
envy, admire trustfulness and faith, in which
qualities his reasoning faculties forbid him to share
;
if he is a politician, he will, or at all events he
should recognise the utilitarian side of Christianity
;
he will, more often than not, reject the idea that
there is no alternative presented to him but that
of being either an atheist or a full believer in the
Christianity of the schools ; the fact that he is a
free-thinker does not cut him off from association
and co-operation with his friends, who may not
share his disbelief or his doubts ; his reason, his
associations, and his hereditary qualities alike impel
him to assert, no less strongly than the orthodox
Christian, that the code of Christian morality must
* The whole of this question has been admirably treated, from the
Hindoo point of view, in the second series of Sir Alfred Lyall's brilliant
Asiatic :^tiidies. Every European wlio occupies a high position in
the East should study Sir Alfred Lyall's works. They display a pro-
found knowledge of Eastern habits of thought, and a remarkable
gra,s^ of the difficulties underlying the treatment of Eastern problems.
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form the basis to regulate the relations between
man and man in modern society. That morality
has, indeed, taken such deep root in Europe that
if, as would appear probable, the hold which
revealed religion and theological dogma has on
mankind is destined to be gradually relaxed, no
moral cataclysm is to be anticipated.
Far different is the case of the Egyptian free-
thinker. He finds himself launched on a troubled
sea without any rudder and without any pilot.
Neither his past history nor his present associations
impose any effective moral restraint upon him. He
finds that, amongst many of his own countrymen,
the cause of religion is often identified with opposi-
tion to the most reasonable reforms, and in trampling
indignantly on the particular religion which can lead
to such results, he is disposed to cast aside religion
altogether. Having cut himself loose from his
creed, no barrier, save that of cynical self-interest,
serves to keep him within the limits of the moral
code which is in some degree imposed on the
European, whose system he is endeavouring to
copy. The society in which he moves does not
seriously condemn untruthfulness and deceit. The
social stigma with which vice of various kinds is
visited is too feeble to exercise much practical effect.
As he leaves the creed of his forefathers, he casts no
lingering look behind. He not only leaves it, but
he spurns it. He rushes blindfold into the arms
of European civilisation, unmindful of the fact that
what is visible to the eye constitutes merely the
outward signs of that civilisation, whilst the deep-
seated ballast of Christian morality, which regulates
the occasionally eccentric movements of the vessel,
is hidden beneath the surface, and is difficult of
acquisition by the pseudo-European imitator of the
European system. He calls Heaven to witness
that he has cast aside all prejudices based on
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religion, and that he despises the teachings of his
forefathers. See, he says to the European, I have
my railways, my schools, my newspapers, my law-
courts, and all the other things which, as I can
plainly see, go to make up your boasted civilisation
;
in what, then, am I inferior to you ? Alas ! the
de-moslemised Moslem, although he is wholly un-
aware of the defect, is inferior in one respect wherein
his inferiority cannot be removed by a stroke of the
pen, for the civilised European, as we understand
him, though he may not be an orthodox Christian,
is in spite of himself to a great extent the outcome
of Christianity, and would not be what he is had
he not 1900 years of Christianity behind him. " No
hostility to Christian doctrine can justify indiffer-
ence to the truth, that the world owes to Chris-
tianity the matured idea of Progress, and the one
serious attempt to realise it." ^
It is at present useless to speculate on the
ultimate product of the forces which are now
being brought into play in the Moslem world.^
That any great accession of strength wiU accrue
to Christianity is improbable. A revival of Islam,
that is to say, the Islam of the Koran and the
Traditions, is nothing but the dream of poetic
natures whose imaginations are carried away by
the attractions which hover round some incidents
of this faith. Yet, as has been often observed,
history records no instance of a nation being
without a religion. " Man everywhere shows
' Liddon, University Sermons, 1873, p. 33.
2 M. Leroy-Beaulieu makes the following remarks as regards the
dissolvent effect exercised by Western civilisation on Judaism : " Qu'est
ce qui a conserve le juif a travers les siecles et I'a empeche de dispa-
raitre au milieu des nations ? C'est sa religion. Or, ces rites protecteiiis,
cette cuirasse ou cette carapace d'ol)servances qui I'a defendu duiant
deux mille ans, et que rien ne pourrait traiispercer, notre esprit occi-
dental I'a entamee.
. . . Si le judaisme, dcbilite', vcnait k se decomposer
et a se dissoudre, qu'advieudrait-il du juif? Forme et saufgarde par sa
religion, le juif ne risque-t-il point de s'e'vanouir avec le judaisme?"
—
Israel chez les Nations, p. 77.
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invincible religious tendencies." ^ It is conceivable
that, as time goes on, the Moslems will develop a
religion, possibly a pure Deism, which will not
be altogether the Islamism of the past and of
the present, and which will cast aside much
of the teaching of Mohammed, but which will
establish a moral code sufficient to hold society
together by bonds other than those of unalloyed
self-interest. The Europeanised Egyptian, as we
now see him, is the first, not the last, word of
reformed Moslem society. It is possible that, in
course of time, some higher moral and intellectual
ideal will be developed. In the meanwhile, let the
European politician bear this in mind, that in the
process of his well-intentioned and very necessary
reforms he will do well to abstain, on utilitarian
grounds, from any measure which is calculated to
undermine the Moslem faith more than the strict
requirements of the case demand. The missionary,
the philanthropist, the social reformer, and others
of the same sort, should have a fair field. Their
intentions are excellent, although at times their
judgment may be defective. They will, if under
some control, probably do much good on a small
scale. They may even, being carried away by the
enthusiasm which pays no heed to worldly pru-
dence, effect reforms more important than those of
the administrator and politician, who will follow
cautiously in their track, and perhaps reap the
results of their labours. Nevertheless, let those
who have to guide the machine of state beware
how they wittingly shake the whole mQral fabric of
Eastern society. It is dangerous work, politically,
socially, and morally, to trifle with the religious
belief of a whole nation.
The first point, therefore, to be borne in mind
in dealing with the Europeanised Egyptian is that
' Boyd Carpenter, The Permanent Elements of Religion, p. 77.
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he is generally an Agnostic. The second point is
that the term Europeanised, when applied to the
Egyptian educated in Europe, though not a mis-
nomer, is lacking in precision. For the majority
of Europeanised Egyptians at the commencement
of the British occupation, and for some years
subsequent to that event, were, in truth, Gallicised
Egyptians.
When Mehemet Ali took some tentative steps
towards introducing European civilisation into
Egypt, he naturally turned to France for assist-
ance. He was haunted with the idea that
England would one day take possession of
Egypt. ^ An increase of French influence in
Egypt would, he thought, constitute some barrier
against British aggression. A number of young
Egyptians were, therefore, sent to France to be
educated, and several schools were established in
Egypt at the heads of which French professors
were placed. Thus, the first impress of civiUsa-
tion given to Egypt was through the medium of
the French language, which, it may be added, has
during the latter part of the last century been
supplanting Italian as a common language for the
use of divers nationalities throughout the Levant.
The French thus obtained a start which they have
never lost. The Government and the people of
France, being gifted with more political foresight
of a certain kind, and being more capable of
grasping a general idea than the English, saw
their advantage, and followed it up. They were
aware that, if the youth of Egypt learnt the
French language, they would, as a necessary con-
sequence, be saturated with French habits ofthought,
and they hoped that sympathy with France and
* Vide ante, vol. i. p. 16, note. Sir Charles Murray, in his Short
Memoir (p. 5), says that Mehemet All's sympathy for the French was in
some degree due to the kindness shown to him when a child by a French
resident at Cawala^ named Lion.
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French political aims would ensue. For half a
century prior to the British occupation, therefore,
during ^vhich time the British Government were
wholly inactive in respect to Egyptian education,
no effort was spared to propagate a knowledge of
French in Egypt. The agents for the accomplish-
ment of this object have been mainly Catholic
priests. The great apostle of anti- clericalism in
France, INI. Gambetta, was careful to explain that
his anti-clerical ideas were only intended for home
consumption ; they were not meant for export.
The French Republic claims to be the defender of
the Catholic Church in the East, and is very sensi-
tive if its rigiit to do so is in any way questioned.
A Republican Go^'ernment and their agents, be
they never so anti-clerical at home, are fully alive
to the advantages of taking clericaUsm by the hand
abroad as a useful instrument to further their
political aims.
Apart, however, from any consequences re-
sulting from the action taken either by Mehemet
Ali or by the French Government, it is to be
observed that French civilisation possesses a
special degree of attraction, not only to the
Asiatic, but also to the European races of the
Levant. This point is one of considerable im-
portance, for amongst the obstacles, which have
stood in the way of the British reformer in Egypt,
none is more noteworthy than that both Euro-
peanised Egyptians and Levantines are impregnated
with French rather than with English habits of
thought.
The reasons why French civilisation presents a
special degree of attraction to Asiatics and Levant-
ines are plain. It is, as a matter of fact, more
attractive than the civilisations of England and
Germany, and, moreover, it is more easy of imita-
tion. Compare the undemonstrative, shy EngUsh*
CH. XXXVII YOUNG EGYPT 237
man, with his social exclusiveness and insular habits,
with the vivacious and cosmopolitan Frenchman,
who does not know what the word shyness means,
and who in ten minutes is apparently on terms of
intimate friendship with any casual acquaintance
he may chance to make. The semi -educated
Oriental does not recognise that the former has, at
all events, the merit of sincerity, whilst the latter
is often merely acting a part/ He looks coldly on
the Enghshman, and rushes into the arms of the
Frenchman.
Look, again, to the relative intellectual attrac-
tions which the two Western races present. The
Englishman is a follower of Bacon without knowing
it. Inductive philosophy has become part of his
nature. He instinctively rejects a priori reasoning.
He will laboriously collect a number of facts before
arriving at any conclusion, and, when he has
collected his facts, he will limit his conclusion to
the precise point which is proved. Compare this
frame of mind with that of the quick-witted
Frenchman, who, on the most slender basis of fact,
will advance some sweeping generalisation with an
assurance untempered by any shadow of doubt as
to its correctness. Can it be any matter for
surprise that the Egyptian, with his light intel-
lectual ballast, fails to see that some fallacy often
lies at the bottom of the Frenchman's reasoning, or
that he prefers the rather superficial brilliancy of the
Frenchman to the plodding, unattractive industry
of the Englishman or the German ? Look, again,
at the theoretical perfection of French administra-
tive systems, at their elaborate detail, and at the
^ Shortly after the Franco-German AVar, in defending the French
against General Blumenthal, I said, "You must admit. General, that
the French are good actors." The sturdy old Gallophobe replied, " It
is the only thing they can do. They aie always acting." I do not at
all agree with the first part of the distinguished General's view. 'ITi©
French can do a great many things besides act welL
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provision which is apparently made to meet every
possible contingency which may arise. Compare
these features with the Englishman's practical
systems, which lay down rules as to a few main
points, and leave a mass of detail to individual
discretion. The half-educated Egyptian naturally
prefers the Frenchman's system, for it is to all
outward appearance more perfect and more easy
of application. He fails, moreover, to see that
the Englishman desires to elaborate a system
which will suit the facts with which he has
to deal, whereas the main objection to applying
French administrative procedures to Egypt is
that the facts have but too often to conform to
the ready-made system. From whatever point of
view the subject be regarded, the same contrast will
be found. On the one side, is a damsel possessing
attractive, albeit somewhat artificial charms ; on
the other side, is a sober, elderly matron of perhaps
somewhat greater moral Morth, but of less pleasing
outward appearance. The Egyptian, in the heyday
of his political and intellectual youth, naturally
smiled on the attractive damsel, and turned his
back on the excellent but somewhat ill-favoured
matron.
In some respects it is, for his own sake, greatly
to be regretted that he did so. What the Egyptian
most of aU requires is, not so much that his mind
should be trained, as that his character should be
formed. It is certain that a \^ery high tone of
morality pervades those admirable educational
institutions which spring, Pallas-like, from the
fertile brain of tlie \'atican, and most of which, in
Egypt, are under French control. It is also certain
that those who base their opinion of French
character and morals on the light French literature
of the day are wholly in error. I believ^e that ij;
no country are the domestic virtues more generally
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cherished than in France. It has, however, to
be remembered ^ that the Oriental has a remark-
able capacity for assimilating to himself the worst
and rejecting the best parts of any European
civilisation with which he may be brought in
contact. It is not from the best, but rather from
the least admirable traits in the French character
that those young Egyptians who have been brought
under French influences, have generally drawn
their moral inspirations.
It is not to be supposed that the educated
Egyptian fails to note the defects of his European
monitors, be they French or English. He often
sees those defects clearly enough, and the result
not unfrequently is that, even though he may
himself become partially Europeanised, he will
despise European civilisation. In what respect,
he says to himself, are we Egyptians morally
inferior to our teachers ? We may be deceitful,
untruthful, and unchaste, but we are not one
whit worse than those whom we are told
to regard as the ultimate product of European
civilisation.^ The result is that the Europeanised
Egyptian often returns to Egypt in order to
become, both by precept and example, an apostle
of anti-European ideas. The conservatism of older
Moslems, who regard him as a living warning that
they should beware of European civilisation,
^ Vide ante, vol. i. p. 59.
' The moral superiority of English over French training is recognised
by the Egyptians themselves, and has at times been recognised by culti-
vated Frenchmen. Senior (Conversations, etc., vol. i. p. 213) relates the
following conversation : " Uekeki/an. It is remarkable that all the
Egyptians and Asiatics whom Mehemet Ali sent to England for
education came back, like myself and young Stephan, Anglonianiacs
;
while all whom he sent to France returned disgusted with Europe.
. . .
Clot (the founder of the Egyptian School of Medicine). I have niade
the same remark. . . . Our students see only bad company in Paris,
and are disgusted with it. In London they get, if not into the fashion-
able world, at least into a respectable world, infinitely superior in
•morals, knowledge, and intelligence to anything in the East."
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becomes stereotyped on observing his behaviour
and on hearing his language ; whilst he himself, in
spite of his partial Europeanisation, will, with an
inconsistency which would be strange were we not
dealing with the " Land of Paradox," hate the
Europeans quite as much as the less educated
sections of his own countrymen.
The question of the effect of European, and
notably French education on the rising generation
of Egyptians has to be considered from another
point of view. The tendency of every Egyptian
official is to shirk responsibility. He thinks less
of what should be done than of acting in such a
manner that no personal blame can be attached
to himself. This habit of thought makes the
Egyptian official instinctively shrink from the British
system of administration, for under that system
much is left to the discretion of the individual, who
is, therefore, obliged to think for himself. He
flies for refuge to the French system, and there
he finds administrative procedures prescribed which
exactly suit his character and habits of thought.
He finds that provision is apparently made for
everything, to the most minute detail, in a series
of elaborate codes. Entrenched behind these
codes, the Europeanised Egyptian is, to his joy,
relieved in a great degree from the necessity
of thinking for himself. Some emergency may,
indeed, occur which requires prompt action and
the exercise of common sense. The Europeanised
Egyptian, however, but too often does not recog-
nise emergencies, and he spurns common sense.
He refers to some article in his regulations, and
maintains that he cannot depart from the provisions
of that article by one hair's -breadth. The result
may be disastrous, but he is indifferent as to the
result ; for, having conformed strictly to his orders,
he caimot be blamed by his superiors. The
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Egyptian official was always predisposed to be an
automaton/ Once Europeanised—more especially
if he be Gallicised—his automatic rigidity becomes
more wooden than it was before.
It can scarcely be doubted that, from this point
of view, French training has done little to rectify
the defects of the Egyptian national character. In
everything, it has tended to stereotype the Egyptian
predisposition to look to the letter which killeth,
and neglect the spirit which giveth life.
Scores of cases could be mentioned illustrative
of the tendency to which allusion is here made.
One or two instances will, however, suffice.
A case occurred of a stationmaster declining to
send a fire-engine by a train which was about to
start, in order to help in putting down a serious
fire. He pointed with inexorable logic to the
regulations, which did not permit of trucks being
attached to that particular train. No exception
was to be found in the code, with which he had
been furnished, to meet the case of a burning town
to which a fire-engine had to be despatched.
Again, at one time it was the practice, if an
accident occurred in the streets, not to transport
the individual who had been injured at once to the
hospital, but to leave him lying on the ground,
whatever might be his condition, until the proper
official had arrived to make a " Proces-verbal " of the
facts connected with the accident. On one occasion,
a doctor was sent to examine into the condition
* It has been conclusively shown by Taine and others that many of
the administrative methods generally practised on the continent of
Europe are not, as is very commonly supposed, the result of the French
Revolution, but that they existed—often under a different form—in
pre-Revolutionary days. Similarly, the idea, whicli is somewhat
prevalent, that the extreme formalism which characterises Egyptian
official life is the result of contact with Europe, though it may be
partially correct, does not convey the whole truth. Mr. St. John
{Egypt and Mohammed AH, vol. ii. p. 419) gives a remarkable instance
of the extreme formalism with which Egyptian official work was con-
ducted in his time.
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of a stationmaster, supposed to be insane. On
entering the room, he was attacked and nearly
strangled by the madman. He was able, after a
sharp struggle, to call on two orderhes, who had
been present all the time, to seize the man. They
saluted and did so. On being asked why they had
not interfered sooner, they replied that they had
received no orders to that effect. Without doubt,
they considered that the struggle on the floor,
which they had witnessed, was part of some strange
European process, with which they were unfamiliar,
for dealing with insane stationmasters.^
I may mention that a subordinate Egyptian
official, notably a policeman, regards the prepara-
tion of a " Proces- verbal" as a proceeding of
peculiar sanctity. It matters little what the docu-
ment contains. Provided he can get a "Proc^s-
verbal " prepared in due form, the Egyptian official
considers that he is free from responsibility, and he
is, therefore, happy. Other^dse, he feels that a
certain amount of personal responsibility weighs
upon him, and he is miserable. This plethora
of " Proces - verbaux " has done a good deal to
nip in the bud any feeble tendencies towards
individualism which might otherwise have been
developed.
In a word, the French bureaucratic and legal
systems, although there is much to be said in their
favour when they are carried into execution by a
highly civilised and intelligent race such as the
French, are little adapted to the formation of either
competent officials or useful citizens in a country
such as Egypt.
Such, therefore, is the Europeanised Egyptian.
His intellectual qualities have, of late years,
^ These cases have already been cited in my Report for the year
1903 {Egypt, No. 1, of 190-1, p. 7^)- An endless number of similar
illustrations of the tendency to which allusion is made above, might
be given.
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certainly been developed. His moral attributes
have generally been little, if at all, improved by
contact with Europe. The old orthodox Moslem
is bound hand and foot by ancient custom based on
his religion. The Europeanised Egj'ptian is often
bound almost as fast by a set of rigid formulas,
which he mistakes for the substance, whereas they
are in reality but some fortuitous hicidents of
European civilisation.
Although the description given above holds
generally good as regards the class now under
discussion, it is to be noted that there are excep-
tions, and, moreover, that the exceptions are year
by year becoming more numerous. Some of the
younger generation of Egyptians are turning into
excellent officials, especially those employed under
the Department of Justice. In view of the
character of the modern Egyptian, it is obviously
more easy to develop a certain amount of judicial
capacity than it is 'to train good executive officers.
The judge merely has to interpret his code. The
executive official must of necessity rely to a greater
extent on his individual resource and judgment.
One point remains to be considered. What
was the attitude of the Europeanised Egyptian
towards the British reformer ? After what has
been already said, it is needless to dilate on this
subject. Envy, dislike of British administrative
systems, ignorance of the English language,^ jesent-
ment at the stand-off manners and at the airs of
conscious superiority which the Englishman, some-
what unwisely, is prone to give himself, and want
of appreciation of the better side of tlie Enghsh
character, all drove the Europeanised Egyptian
in one direction. With a few exceptions, the whole
* This fertile source of misunderstanding is, it may be hoped, rapidly
disappearing. The number of young Egyptians who understand Knglish
is steadily increasing, as also the number of Britisli officials who speak
Arabic.
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class was, at the commencement of the British
occupation, Anglophobe.
It may be doubted whether of late years this
Anglophobia has diminished. Indeed, indications
are not wanting that, mainly by reason of the
misrepresentations of the vernacular press, it has
somewhat increased in intensity. It is the duty of
the British officials in the service of the Egyptian
Government to use their utmost endeavours to
mitigate feelings of this description by sympathetic
treatment, and by abstaining from passing too harsh
a judgment on whatever defects they may find to
exist amongst the rising generation of Egyptians.
Those defects are the natural outcome of the pecu-
liar political conditions under which the country is
governed, and of the unhealthy influences to which
the young Egyptians are often exposed.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
THE EUROPEANS
Number of Europeans—The Levantines—Their characteristics—The
Greelis—Their commercial enterprise—The English—The Army
of Occupation—Anglo-Egyptian officials—Feelings entertained by
other Europeans towards the English—Summary of the classes
friendly and hostile to England.
According to the census of 1897, there were at that
time about 113,000 Europeans resident in Egypt.^
These 113,000 persons were divided as follows :
Greeks...,,. 38,000
Italians ..... 24,000
French. ..... 14,000
Austrians ..... 7,000
English (including Maltese and other British
subjects, as well as the Army of Occupation) 20,000
Other nationalities .... 10,000
Total . . . 113,000
The classification by nationalities, though im-
portant in many respects, is misleading to this
extent, that when it is said that there are 24,000
Italians, 14,000 Frenchmen, 7000 Austrians, and
so on in Egypt, it is not to be supposed that there
are that number of Italians, Frenchmen, or Aus-
trians in the country possessing the special national
^ There can be no doubt that since the census of 1897 was taken, the
number of Europeans in Egypt has largely increased. I have already
stated (mde ante, p. 129, note) that the detailed figures of the census
taken in 1907 are not yet available.
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characteristics, which are generally held to belong
to the inhabitants of Italy, France, or Austria.
Apart from the fact that there are a large number of
protected subjects, who are often Orientals, it is to
be observed that in many cases the Frenchman resi-
dent in Egypt is only technically a Frenchman, the
Italian may in reality be only half an Italian in so
far as his national characteristics are concerned, the
Austrian is often merely a subject of the Emperor
of Austria for purposes of Consular protection and
nothing more. For, in truth, many individuals of
these and of other nationalities are, above all
things, Levantines, and the Levantines, though not
a separate nation, possess characteristics of their
own which may almost be termed national.
Every one who has lived in the Eastern part of
the Mediterranean knows what is meant by a
Levantine, though a precise definition of tliis term
is difficult, if not impossible. The Levantine can,
of course, be described as a European resident in
the Levant, generally in the Ottoman dominions
situated in the Levant. This definition is, how-
ever, not satisfactory, for some Europeans may be
born and bred in the East and pass all their lives
in the Levant, without losing the special character-
istics of their country of origin, or acquiring in any
considerable degree those of the Levantine. In
the case of others, a short residence in the Levant
will suffice to produce t}^ical Levantine character-
istics. Others, again, already approached so nearly
to Levantines in their country of origin, that they
may almost be said to have been Levantines before
they emigrated to the Levant. In fact, inasmuch
as the Levantines are more or less Orientalised
Europeans,^ just as Egyptian Moslems educated in
* The process of manufacturing Levantines is at least as old as the
Crusades. Thus, Mr. Stanley Lane Poole says (S'a/«iym, p. 28): "The
early Crusaders, after thirty years' residence in Syria, had become very
much assimilated in character aud habits to the people whom they had
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France are Gallicised Egyptians, they necessarily
present every gradation of character, from the
European v^ath no trace of the Oriental about him,
to the European who is so thorouglily orientalised
as scarcely to have preserved any distinctive
European characteristics. A considerable number
of Levantines lie midway between these two
extremes. Starting sometimes with national char-
acteristics which bear some resemblance to those
of Easterns, they develop those characteristics to a
still greater degree by residence in the East. They
become semi-orientalised Europeans. If compared
with the northern races of Europe, the predomi-
nance of the Oriental portion of their characters
will come out in strong relief. If, on the other
hand, they are compared with the southern Euro-
pean races, any process of differentiation will bring
out their distinctive Oriental characteristics in a less
striking manner. The majority of Levantines are
recruited from the southern races of Europe, and,
in respect to these more especially, their technical
nationality is, from the point of view of the present
argument, of slight importance. The particular
Consulate at which the Levantine is inscribed is a
Aiere accident. He is, above all things, a Levan-
tine, though he dislikes to be designated by that
appellation ; for, partly because he is aware that the
Levantines do not generally bear a high character,
partly because he dislikes to merge his national
individuality in a cosmopolitan expression, and
partly because he is sensible of the material benefits
which he derives from his foreign nationality, the
Levantine will often develop a specially ardent
degree of patriotism for the country which affords
him Consular protection.
partly conquered, among whom they lived, and whose daughters they
did not disdain to marry ; they were growing into Levantines ; they
were known as Pullani or Creoles."
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Germans and Englishmen, however long they
may reside in the Levant, rarely become typical
Levantines. Starting with strongly marked national
characteristics, they generally preserve those char-
acteristics more or less intact. As a class, they do
not differ materially from their fellow-countrymen
of the same social standing in Germany or England,
The case of the Italians, of whom there are a
large number in Eg}^t, is different. Many of the
skilled artisans in Egypt, the bricklayers, masons,
carpenters, etc., are Italians. They are, as a rule, a
steady, industrious race, whose presence is very use-
ful to the Egyptians, as it enables the latter to learn
various crafts requiring skill in their application.
As a body, these Italians do not differ from their
countrymen of the same social position in Italy.
On the other hand, there are some middle-class
Italians, who, with their famihes, have been long
resident in Eg}^t, and who may, as a class, be con-
sidered representative Levantines. The transition
from being Italian to being Levantine is, in these
cases, more easy than in the case of the Englishman
or the German.
Much the same may be said of the Austrians,
who do not generally come from Austria proper,
but from the neighbourhood of Trieste. Many of
these are Jews. Their language is generally not
German but Itahan.
The French occupy a pecuHar position. The
French colony contains every gradation of type,
from the most GaUic Gaul to the ultra-Levantinised
Levantine. In respect to the latter class, however,
the question arises of whether the Frenchman has
become Levantinised, or whether the counter-
process has not taken place ; whether it is not
that the Levantine has become Gallicised. The
fact is that both processes are constantly in
operation.
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Next, what are the main characteristics of the
Levantines ? There are, of course, many Levan-
tines—merchants, professional men, shopkeepers,
and others—who are higlily respectable members
of society, and who carry on their business upon
the same principles as they would adopt were they
living at Trieste, Genoa, or Marseilles. But these
are not representatives of the class, which is con-
jured up in the mind of the Egyptian JNIinister
or his British adviser, when the word Levantine
is mentioned. It is the misfortune of the Levan-
tines that they suffer in reputation by reason of
qualities which are displayed by only a small
minority of their class. It cannot, in fact, be
doubted that amongst this minority are to be
found individuals who are tainted with a remark-
able degree of moral obliquity. These are the
Levantines who regard the Egyptians, from prince
to peasant, as their prey. In days now happily
past, they brought all their intellectual acuteness,
which is of no mean order, to bear on the work
of depredation. Whatever national defects they
may have possessed in their country of origin,
appear to have been enhanced when, on arrival in
Egypt, they had to deal with a people who were
ignorant, credulous, and improvident, and, there-
fore, easily despoiled ; who, by reason of their oviTi
low moral standard, seemed, to a perverted mind, in
some degree to justify reciprocity of low morals in
dealing with them ; and who, being weak and
defenceless, invited spoliation at the hands of the
unprincipled adventurer armed with all the strength
which he drew from intellectual superiority, diplo-
matic support, and intimate acquaintance mth all
the forms and back-alleys of the Civil Code. This
is the class which has to a certain extent made
European civilisation stink in the nostrils of the
Egyptians. The Levantines of this description
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have done a small amount of good by introducing
European capital on a limited scale into the
country. They have done a vast amount of
harm by associating the name of European in
the minds of the Egyptians with a total absence
of scruple in the pursuit of gain. The upper-class
Levantine naturally used to consider the upper-
class Egyptian as his prey. The lower-class
Le\'antine tricked the fellaheen.
The Greeks are so numerous that they deserve
consideration by themselves. In 1897, there were
38,000 Greeks in Egj^t. The question of who is
and who is not a subject of the King of the
Hellenes is a never - ending cause of dispute
between the Ottoman and Greek Governments.
Under what conditions of birth and residence are
the Greeks, who were born and bred outside
Greece and who have only casually lived in that
country, to be considered Greek subjects ? It is
needless to dwell on the details of this wearisome
question. It will be sufficient to say that, in spite
of the resistance of the Egyptian authorities, most
Greek-speaking Greeks generally manage to produce
sufficient evidence to enable them to claim the
privileges attaching to Greek nationality.
In Alexandria, which may almost be said to
be a Greek town, a gi-eat many influential and
highly respectable Greeks are to be found. Their
presence in Egypt is an unmixed benefit to the
country.^ More than this, many of the smaU
' I wish to insist very strongly on this point. None have suffered
more tlian the Greeks from the practice, which is but too common, of
coinleiimiiijr a whole class or community because the conduct of certain
individuals belonging to it is worthy of condemnation. I have the best
reasons for knowing that none regret more than the very numerous
high -class Greeks established in Egypt the fact that their national
reputation should at times be tiirnished by the behaviour of some
individuals belonging to their nation. In spite of the blemishes
recorded in these pages, it may be said with truth that the Greeks
in Egypt have, as of old, carried high the torch of civilisation in their
adopted country.
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Greek traders are fully deserving of respect. Still
the fact remains that a portion of the Greek colony
in Egypt consists of low-class Greeks exercising the
professions of usurer, drink-seller, etc. The Greek
of this class has an extraordinary talent for retail
trade. He will risk his life in the pursuit of
petty gain. It is not only that a Greek usurer
or a bakal (general dealer) is established in almost
every village in Egypt ; the Greek pushes his way
into the most remote parts of the Soudan and of
Abyssinia. Wherever, in fact, there is the smallest
prospect of buying in a cheap and selhng in a dear
market, there will the petty Greek trader be found.
In 1889, I visited Sarras, some thirty miles south
of Wadi Haifa. It was at that time the farthest
outpost of the Egyptian army, and is situated m. the
midst of a howhng wilderness. The post had only
been established for a few days. Nevertheless, there
I found a Greek already selling sardines, biscuits,
etc., to a very limited number of customers, out of
a hole in a rock in which he had set up a temporary
shop.
We may, therefore, give the low-class Greek
credit for his enterprising commercial spirit.
Nevertheless, his presence in Egypt is often hurtful.
Whatever healthy moral and political influences
remain untouched after the Turco-Egyptian Pasha,
the tyrannical Sheikh, and the fanatical "Alim"
have done their worst, these the low-class Greek
seeks to destroy. He tempts the Egyptian peasant
to borrow at some exorbitant rate of interest, and
then, by a sharp turn of the legal screw, reduces
him from the position of an allodial proprietor to
that of a serf. He undermines that moral quality
of which the Moslem, when untainted by European
association, has in some degree a speciality. That
quality is sobriety. Under Greek action and
influence, the Egyptian villagers are taking to
252 MODERN EGYPT pt. iv
drink. Mr. Gladstone, in a speech which has
become historical, once said that it would be a
good thing if the Turks were turned " bag and
baggage " out of Europe.^ This may or may not
be the case. But there can be no doubt that a
counter-proposition of a somewhat similar nature
holds good. It would be an excellent thing for
Turkey and its dependencies if some of the low-
class Greeks, who inhabit the Ottoman dominions,
could be turned bag and baggage out of Turkey.
Before passing on to a consideration of the
sentiments entertained by the Europeans resident
in Egypt towards the English reformer, it will be
as well to say something of the English themselves.
The English in Eg}^t may be divided into
three categories, viz. (1) the non-official residents;
(2) the army of occupation ; (3) the officials in the
Egyptian service.
The permanent British colony in Egypt is
small. It consists mainly of a few merchants
who reside at Alexandria, and who employ a
small number of subordinate English agents to
watch over their business in the provinces. The
greater part of the export trade is in the hands
of British firms. The Alexandrian Englishman,
like most of his countrymen, is somewhat exclusive.
He mixes Uttle in foreign society. The general
standard of probity in business matters amongst
• Mr. Gladstone was guilty of an unconscious plagiarism. Few
people probably know that the expression, as applied to the Turks,
originated with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, whose opinions have passed
down to posterity as representing the ne p/ua ultra of Turcophilism.
Such, however, is the case. Writing to Mr. Canning on September 29,
1821, Lord Stratford said : "As a matter of humanity, I wish with all
my soul that the Greeks were put in possession of their whole patri-
mony, and that the Sultan was driven, bag and baggage, into the lieart
of Asia" (77(« Life of Stratford Canning, vol. i. p. 307). Canon
MacCoU says {Fortnightly Rei^iew, June 1808) : " \Vhat Mr. Gladstone
proposed was that the Turkish administration should 'all, bag and
baggage, clear out '—not ' from Kurope, but from the provinces
which they had desolated and profaned.'" The difference does not
appear very material.
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the English in Egypt is high. The Enghsh are,
for the most part, eminently fair and reasonable.
They never give any trouble. They have the
great merit of attending exclusively to their own
affairs. During the many years that I was' Consul-
General in Egypt, I do not remember an instance
in which I was asked by an Englishman resident in
Egypt to support any manifestly unfair or pre-
posterous claim. The Englishman knows his rights
;
he knows that if they are infringed he has his legal
remedy, and that it is unnecessary to apply for the
support of his Consul-General. I doubt whether
the representative of any other Power in Egypt
could say the same.
Passing to a different stratum, there are a
certain number of Englishmen in Egypt, who are
employed in various unofficial capacities, and who
are generally vigorous, honest, straightforward
specimens of humanity, but who in exceptional
cases sometimes make the British race unpopular
by their bad manners and self-assertion. Their
conduct is in this respect highly reprehensible.
Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the English
dwellers in Egypt are a sturdy, self-respecting,
and, therefore, respected race, who do credit to
their country of origin, and whose presence is useful
to their country of adoption.
Little need be said of the army of occupation.
The discipline and good conduct of the British
army in all its ranks are recognised by the most
bitter Anglophobes. The worst that can be said
of the soldiers is that some of them disgrace them-
selves by getting drunk off the vile liquor supplied
to them in the bazaars. From the political point
of view, the main characteristic of the British
officer is his exclusiveness. In whatever clime he
may serve, he carries his uisular habits and national
pastimes with him. In Egypt, he rarely mixes in
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any society which is not English, and he abstains
from doing so, partly because of his ignorance of
any language but his own, and partly because his
social habits differ from those of the cosmopolitan
society of the Egyptian towns. A\"hat does the
Frenchman or Italian care for horse-races, polo,
cricket, golf, and all the other quasi -national
institutions, which the British officer establishes
wherever he goes, whether his residence be in the
frigid or the torrid zone ? This exclusiveness has
its advantages and also its disadvantages. If a
French army had been in Egypt, the officers would
have fraternised mth the European residents.
They would have been seen sitting outside every
cafe. The result would have been, on the one
hand, the creation of greater social sympathy
between the army and certain classes of the urban
population, and, on the other hand, the occurrence
of more fi-equent quarrels. The British officer does
not attract the sympathy, but he avoids the quarrels.
He is respected. On the other hand, he does not
excite any lively sentiment of sympathy or friend-
ship. On the whole, it may be said that, from the
point of view of the politician, the advantages
predominate over the disadvantages. Tlie British
officers obey orders ; they neither know, nor care
to know anything about local politics ; they rarely
cause any trouble ; they behave for the most part
like English gentlemen. Under all the circum-
stances of the case, these are ideal qualities. They
are qualities which were appreciated by the most
astute of Egyptian statesmen, Xubar Pasha.
I was once talking to a Levantine in a Cairo
street when a young British officer rode by. ]\Iy
friend stopped in the middle of his conversation
and said : " Che bella razza ! Come sono forti e
puliti I " That was what most struck him—that
the British officers were physically strong, and,
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moreover, that they were washed. I was struck
with the expression. I fancy it represents the
opinions of a good many Southerners.
At a later period of this narrative, the positions
held by the British officials in the Egyptian service
will be more fully treated. For the present all
that need be said is that, being for the most part
better linguists, they are generally less exclusive
than the officers of the army of occupation. At
the same time, the society in which they move is
mainly English.
The next point to consider is the attitude of the
Europeans resident in Egypt towards the English,
and more particularly towards the small band of
Englishmen who were instrumental in carrying out
the work of Egyptian reform.
Enough has been already said to show that
there is little social sympathy between the English,
and any class of Europeans in Egypt. The best
amongst the Europeans respect the British officials
;
they admire their good qualities—their honesty,
their energy, and above all their tenacity. But
few like them. Moreover, few understand them.
To the European resident in Egypt the British
officials were, in the first instance at all events,
somewhat of an enigma. Being generally accus-
tomed to Continental official procedure, they could
not understand a member of a bureaucracy who
rather despised forms and had no bureaucratic
tendencies, and who, moreover, did his work in an
unobtrusive way without any unnecessary fuss.
But as the occupation was prolonged, and the
effects of British predominance became year by
year more apparent, the ways of the British official
became better understood.
The usurer, the drink - seller, and others of
the same species, naturally looked askance at
the Englishman and his reforms from the very
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first. Though these classes recognised that the
presence of a British army in Egypt afforded
security to their Uves and properties, and though
they were aware that, in the event of an ebullition
of Moslem fanaticism, they would be the first to
suffer, still they would not readily forgive the
Englishman for standing between them and their
prey ; they could not forget that, had British
influence not been predominant, the rate of interest
would have been quadrupled ; they, therefore, at
one time looked back regretfully to those halcyon
days before the British occupation, when they
were able to plunder the Egyptian Government at
will, and when they and the Egyptian Government
agreed together to plunder the Egyptians.
The political sympathies of the various nation-
alities count also for a good deal in the formation
of European public opinion as regards the action
of the British officials in Egypt. On these, I
need not dwell. Inasmuch as they depend on
the occurrence of political events outside Egypt,
they naturally varied greatly during the period of
my tenure of office.
In this, and in the four preceding chapters, an
attempt has been made to describe the principal
elements of Egyptian society with special reference
to the attitude which each section assumed towards
the English reformer, more especially in the early
days of the occupation. It is now possible to
marshal the opposing forces and to distinguish
between friends and foes. Some were avowedly
hostile. Some vacillated between lukewarm friend-
ship and covert hostility. Others, constituting a
large numerical majority, were friendly, but dared
not give expression to their friendship, and were,
moreover, powerless to help the cause of their
benefactors. Lastly, a small minority were friendly
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and had the courage of their opinions, but the
occasion for asserting them was generally wanting.
The Turco - Egyptian Pashas, the jMoslem
hierarchy, the Europeanised Egyptians, and the
French were, in the first instance, for various
reasons hostile.
The squirearchy, the Copts, the Syrians, and
the Levantines hovered between friendship and
hostility, being torn by conflicting sentiments and
driven hither and thither by every passing breeze of
self-interest.
The mass of the population, that is to say, the
fellaheen, were certainly from the very first friendly,
but they were politically speechless, and, moreover,
were so credulous and ignorant that, had they
attempted to make their voices heard, they
would just as hkely as not have fallen into the
hands of frothy demagogues or unprincipled news-
paper editors, who would have made them say the
opposite of what they really thought.
A small body of respectable and intelligent
Europeans were friendly, but their friendship was
platonic. They took little part in local politics,
and were, for the most part, mere spectators of
what was passing on the political stage.
It will be seen that the hostile, quasi -hostile:
and apathetic forces, though less numerous, were
more powerful than those who were friendly. On
the one side, stood the stolid conservatism of the
East, religious prejudice, ignorance, international
jealousy, and a number of powerful vested interests,
some of an ignoble type. On the other side, stood
the force derived from an honest endeavour to
secure the well - being of a whole population,
which had been trodden under foot for centuries.
The battle seemed in some respects unequal.
Vet the Englishman took heart of grace. He
proceeded with caution and he won the day.
VOL. II s
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He felt from the first that he was fighting
in a good cause. He liad the goodwill of
intelligent and impartial Europe. He had a mili-
tary force behind him to prevent any premature
upset of the whole machine. He was able to
employ agents of experience trained in all the
intricacies of Oriental government. Ten years after
the battle of Tel-el-Kebir a competent observer
was able to write : " Even our superb administra-
tion of India is hardly a brighter jewel in our
imperial crown than the marvellous regeneration of
Egypt." ^ More than this. As the occupation
continued, a great change came over the opinions
of various sections of Egyptian society. The
benefits conferred by the exercise of British
influence were, indeed, so palpable that they could
not be denied. Amongst both European and
Eg}^tian society, all but a very small class ranged
themselves, either actively or passively, on the side
of England.^ Notably, both ItaUan and Greek
sympathy was on many occasions displayed in a
very remarkable degree. The representatives of
the various Christian conmiunities resident in
Egypt seized every possible opportunity for ex-
pressing their friendliness to England. With a
few exceptions, even the Moslems acquiesced in
the policy of reform.
The open or covert hostility of various sections
of society in Eg}^t has not been the only, neither,
indeed, has it been the principal difficulty which
has beset the path of the English reformer. Under
» Cairo, p. 243.
* I wrote tliese remarks in 190,3, and, in spite of any appearances to
the contrary, my conviction is that they still (1907) lioid good. During
the last three or four years, a strong and very legitimate desire to take
a greater part than heretofore in the administration of tiie country has
made itself felt among intelligent Egyptians, hut my belief is that the
number of those who would really wish the reforming work of England
in Egypt to be brought prematurely to a close still comprise a "very
small," and, 1 may sJiA, a wholly unrepresentative, class.
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the combined influences of rival diplomatists,
bondholders, foreign jurists, and others, who have
from time to time borne a part in Egyptian affairs,
a variety of fantastic institutions grew up, many of
which were originally devised to check misgovern-
ment, but wliich, under altered circumstances,
have, as a matter of fact, acted as powerful obstacles
to reform. An endeavour will now be made to
guide the reader through some of the intricate
windings of this administrative labyrinth.
CHAPTER XXXIX
THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT
Nature of the machinery—Parts of the machine—1. The Suttan—
The Firman of 1892—The Sinai Peninsula—2. The Khedive—
Rescript of August 28, 1878—Constitutionalism of Tewfik Pasha
—3. The Ministers—^The Departments—Position of an Egyptian
Minister—4. The Organic Law of May 1, 1883—The Provincial
Councils—The Leg'islative Council—The Legislative Assembly.
If any one unacquainted with mechanics enters a
factory where a quantity of steam machinery is at
work, he is for a moment deafened with the noise,
and his first impression will not improbably be one
of surprise that any delicate bit of workmanship
can result from the apparent confusion which he
sees before him. Gradually, however, he comes to
understand that the rate at which each wheel turns
is regulated to a nicety, that the piston of the
steam-engine cannot give a stroke by one hairs-
breadth shorter or longer than that which it is
intended to give, that the strength with which the
hammer is made to descend is capable of the most
perfect adjustment, that safety-valves and a variety
of other checks and counterchecks exist which are
sufficient guarantees against accident, and that,
generally, each portion of the machinery is adapted
to perform a certain specified bit of work and is
under such perfect control that it cannot interfere
with the functions of any other portion. He will
then no longer be surprised that, with a little care
in oiling the difTcrent parts of the machinery, a
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highly finished piece of workmanship is eventually
produced.
If, on the other hand, he finds on examination
that the confusion is even worse than at first sight
appeared, that the movement of each wheel is
eccentric in the highest degree, that the piston is
hable at any moment to stop working, that there is
no adequate machinery for adjusting the strength
of the stroke to be given by the hammer, that
safety-valves and other guarantees against accident
are wanting, that the work to be performed by
each separate portion is uncertain and variable,
that some portions are of the latest and most
improved patterns whilst others are old, rusty, and
obsolete, that a strong centrifugal force is con-
stantly at work impelling the different parts of the
machinery to fly out of their own orbits, and that
a mistake on the part of the engineer in not
removing any small particle of grit betimes, or not
applying the right amount of oil at the right
moment, may bring about a collapse of the whole
fabric,—he will then no longer look for the
production of any highly finished article. Indeed,
he will be surprised that the mechanical chaos
before him is capable of producing any article
at all.
The Egyptian administrative system bears to
the administration of any higlily civilised European
State much the same relation as the second factory
described above bears to the first. In Europe, we
know what a despotism means, and we know what
constitutional government means. The words
absolute monarchy, limited monarchy, republic,
parliamentary government, federal council, and
others of a like nature, when applied to the
government of any country, will readily convey
to an educated European a general idea of how the
government of the particular country in question
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is conducted. But the political dictio!iary may be
ransacked in v^ain for any terse description of the
Government of Egypt.
In the first place, tliat Government is, in
reality, not a Government at all. Nubar Pasha
frequently said : " Ce nest pas un Gouvernement
;
c'est une administration." This is quite true. The
Khedive is deprived by the Egyptian constitutional
charter of all rights of external sovereignty, neither
does he possess to the full those rights of mternal
sovereignty which are inherent in the rulers of all
independent, and even of some semi-independent
states.
In the second place, the manner in which the
legislative power is exercised in the Ottoman
dominions, of which Egypt forms a part, is unique.
We readily ufiderstand what a Ukase issued by
the Czar of Russia means. An intelligent foreigner
will at once seize on what is meant when it is said
that the King of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland has given his assent to a Bill
which has passed through both Houses of Parlia-
ment. But the Khedive's power is dissimilar to
that of either a despotic or a constitutional ruler.
He cannot, on his own authority, issue any Decree
the provisions of which will be binding on all
the inhabitants of Egypt. Legislation has to be
conducted by diplomacy. The President of the
United States and the King of Sweden have to
give their consent before the provisions of any new
law can be applied to the subjects of the Emperor
of Austria or the King of the Belgians, for in
legislation by diplomacy unanimity amongst the
diplomatic legislators is required ; otherwise no
legislation can take place. The system, as Lord
Salisbury once wrote to me, "is like the liherum
veto of the Polish Diet, without the resource of
cutting off the dissentient's head."
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In the third place, the executive power is so
disseminated as to render it impossible to say
where it resides. In certain matters, the Khedive
and his Ministers are practically vested with
despotic power. .In others, their hands are tied to
a greater extent than those of the Governors of
the most democratic States. Moreover, it often
happens that, although the text of the document
which confers some special power may be clear,
it will be found, on closer inspection, that some
international or other hgament exists, which is
apparently so flimsy as to be only visible to the
eye of a trained diplomatist, but which is in reality
of so tough a texture as to place an effectual
obstacle in the way of the practical exercise of the
power.
In the fourth place, the judicial system is a
tangle of conflicting jurisdictions. The law is at
times apphed by a body of foreign judges who,
being free from the restraints of any legislature,
are practically a law unto themselves. At times,
again, the law is administered by Eg}^tian judges.
Each Consul judges his own countrymen for crimmal
offences according to the laws of his own country,
whilst close by the Kadi is endeavouring to settle
some dispute over a will according to the rusty
principles laid down thirteen centuries ago by
Mohammed.
The complicated machinery, whose general nature
is described above, will now be explamed in detail.
It will be as well, in the first instance, to enimierate
the parts of the machine. They are as follows :
—
1. The Sultan. 2. The Khedive. 3. The
Ministers. 4. The Legislative Council and As-
sembly. 5. The superior European officials, mostly
British, who are attached in various capacities to
the different JNIinistries.
The above constitute the Turkish, Egyptian, and
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Anglo-Egyptian, as opposed to the International
portions of the administration. The International,
or, as they are usually called, the IMixed Administra-
tions were created in virtue of arrangements made,
from time to time, between the ^Egyptian Govern-
ment and the Powers. Neither their functions nor
their constitution can be changed without the
assent of the Powers. In 1882, when the British
occupation commenced, they were as foUows :
—
1. The Commission of the Public Debt. 2. The
Railway Board, under which was also placed the
administration of the Telegraph Department and
of the Port of Alexandria. 3. The Daira Ad-
ministration. 4. The Domains Administration.
Lastly, justice is administered by the following
law-courts :—1. The Mixed Tribunals. 2. The
Native Tribunals. 3. The Consular Courts. 4.
The Mehkemeh Sheraieh.
1. The Sultan,
The relations between the Sultan and the
Khedive are laid down in a variety of Firmans
dating from 1841 to 1892. Of these, the most
recent is naturally the most important. It was
issued to Abbas II. on March 27, 1892. Save in
respect to one point, to which allusion will presently
be made, this Firman does not differ from that of
August 7, 1879, granted to Tewfik Pasha.
The main provision of the Firman of 1892 is
that under certain restrictions, the civil and financial
administration of Egypt is confided to the Khedive
Abbas II. and his male descendants taken in order
of primogeniture. The restrictions are as follows :
—
In the first place, it is laid down that all
Egyptians are Ottoman subjects. The taxes are
to be levied in the name of the Sultan. There can,
therefore, conformably with the Firman, be no
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such thing as a separate Egyptian State, or a
separate Egyptian nationality.
In the second place, it is taken for granted that
the Khedive has no right to make political Treaties
with foreign states. Conventions dealing with com-
mercial affairs, or with those which relate solely to
matters of purely internal administration, may,
however, be made. Mr. James Scott, the lecturer
at the Khedivial School of Law, says : " In regard
to the right of the Egyptian Government to make
International Conventions, it would appear that it
has power to make Conventions in reference to
every question except the cession of territory, or
the making of peace or war."^ As a natural
result of this political relationship, the Khedive
has no right to appoint a diplomatic repre-
sentative to any European court. Further, as
a general rule, when the European Powers meet
in conclave, Egypt is represented by the Ottoman
delegate. Separate Egyptian representation has,
however, been allowed at Conferences assembled
to deal with special subjects, in which Egypt
is interested. It is not easy to lay down any
very precise rule on this subject. Thus, when,
in 1884, a Conference was assembled in London
to consider the financial affairs of Egypt, the
Egyptian Government were denied any separate
representation. Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Am-
bassador in London, sat, and often slept at the
Council table,^ whilst the Egyptian delegates,
• The Law affecting Foreigners in Egypt, as the Result of the
Capitulations, p. 145.
2 I cannot refrain from relating a somewhat amusing incident which
happened at this Conference. At that time, all the Powers, except
perhaps Italy, were acting in concert against England. England was
defending Egyptian interests. Count Munster proposed that the
quarantine question, in which Germany at that moment took much
interest, should be discussed. Lord Granville pointed out that, if once
the Conference went beyond the limits for which it had been assembled,
there was no reason why every description of Eastern question should
not be brought within its cognisance. Thus, an undesirably wide
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Tigrane Pasha and Blum Pasha, occupied a side
table, and were not allowed to take any direct part
in the discussions. On the other hand, at the
Conference, which met at Venice in 1892 to discuss
quarantine affairs, the Egyptian Government were
accorded the right of separate representation to
this extent, that the Egyptian delegates could
speak but could not vote. A further step in
advance was made at the Sanitary Conference held
at Paris in 1904. The Egyptian delegates were
accorded the right of voting in Committee, but not
at the plenary sittings of the Commission.
In the third place, the Khedive cannot abandon
to a third party any of the territorial rights of the
Sultan. In respect of this matter, theory and fact
came into collision when the Italians occupied
Massowah.
In the fourth place, traditional Turkish jealousy
of Egypt is shown by the provision that the
Egyptian army cannot, under ordinary circum-
stances, exceed 18,000 men. If, however, Turkey
is at war, the Egyptian army may be called upon
to fight in the cause of the Sultan, in which case it
may be increased according to the requirements of
the moment. Following on the same order of
field would be opened up for discussion. The French and Russian
representatives pointed out that no dang-er of this sort was to be feared,
for that no one wished to raise any other question save that of
quarantine. Tlie question was put to the vote, which proceeded on
what ma)' be termed strictly party lines, until it came to the turn of
Musurus Pasha. A true emblem of the country which he represented,
Musurus Pasha was fast asleep, and had heard nothing of the discussion
which led to the vote. He was awakeneil, and was informed that he
had to vote on the question of wliether quarantine matters should or
should not be brought before the Conference. He was at the time
acting in general concert witli tlie anti-Knglish j)arty, but, as he had
not been told beforehand wliat he had to do, he gave utterance to a
perfectly independent opinion. " Parfaitement," he said, "je suis de
cet avis ; mais alors j'ai bcaucoup d'autres questions que je voudrais
porter a la coniiaissance de la Conference." Lord Granville had found
an unconscious and involuntary ally. He curried his point. (Quarantine
affairs were not discussed.
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ideas, it is provided that the Khedive cannot
construct any ironclads {bdtiments hlindcs) without
the authority of the Sultan. The Turkish flag
is to be the Egyptian flag. The distinctive marks
of mihtary rank are to be identic in the two armies.
The Khedive may grant the rank of Colonel to
military, and that of Sanieh (second-class Bey) to
civil officials, but he may not confer any higher
titles.
In the fifth place, the coinage of Egypt is to be
issued in the name of the Sultan.
In return for concessions made at various times
by the Sultans, Ismail Pasha undertook to pay a
Tribute of £682,000 a year to the Porte.' The
original sum paid in 1841 by JNlehemet Ali was
£377,000, but under the combined influence of
ambitious Khedives and of impecunious Sultans,
the figure was nearly doubled at subsequent
periods.
It has been already stated that, save in respect
to one point, the Firman of 1892 was a repro-
duction of that of 1879. It will be as well to
allude briefly to the exception.
The Firman of 1879 laid down that the
Khedivate of Egypt was to be " tel qu'il se trouve
forme par ses anciennes hmites et en comprenant
les territoires qui y ont ^te annexes." When the
Firman of 1892 was in course of preparation, the
British Ambassador at Constantinople was assured
that it was identic with that of 1879. There w^as,
however, reason to believe that this statement was
incorrect. The Porte had always been sensitive
as regards European interference in or near the
Hedjaz. Indeed, the law allowing foreigners to
acquire real property in the Ottoman dominions
forbids any European to settle in the Hedjaz.
* Practically the whole of the Tribute is mortgaged to the Ottoman
bondholders.
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More than this, the Sultan's suspicions had been
aroused by two recent incidents. One was tliat
Turkish misgovernment had produced a revolt
in the province of the Yemen, which was, without
a shadow of foundation, attributed to British
intrigue. The second was that a well-intentioned
German enthusiast, named Friedmami, of Jewish
origin, was, at the moment when the Firman
was under discussion, endeavouring to establish
a settlement of some couple of dozen Jews,
who had been expelled from Russia, on the
eastern shore of the Gulf of Akaba. This was
suspicious. INIoukhtar Pasha pointed out that the
Jews had always been waiting for a Messiah to
reconquer Jerusalem, and that, without doubt, they
would think he had now appeared in the person of
Mr. Friedmami. It was not difficult to convince
Moukhtar Pasha that Mr. Friedmann was devoid of
any such pretensions.^ But the suspicions of the
Sultan were not so easily calmed. The result was
that the Firman laid down the Egyptian frontier
as drawn from Suez to El-Arish. The Peninsula
of Sinai, which had been administered by the
Khedives of Egypt for the last forty years, would
thus have reverted to Turkey. It was undesirable
to bring Turkish soldiers down to the banks of the
Suez Canal. When, therefore, the Firman arrived,
the British Government interposed and placed a
veto on its promulgation. After a short dela} , the
Grand N^izier telegraphed to the Khedive accepting
a proposal, which had been offered to the Sultan
some weeks previously, but which His Imperial
Majesty had then refused to entertain.^ Under
* Mr. Friedmann may be known to some Englishmen as the author
of a history of Anne Boleyn.
^
'I'he settlement of this question was in a great measure due to the
skill with which the negotiations at Constantinople were conducted by
the late Sir Edmund Fane, who was at the time in charge of the
Embassy.
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this arrangement, the frontier of Egypt was drawn
from El-Arish to the head of the Gulf of Akaba.
The incident was thus for the time being termin-
ated, and tlie Firman was promulgated with all
customary pomp. Occasion was taken to lay down
again the prmciple that "no alteration could be
made in the Firmans regulating the relations
between the Sublime Porte and Egypt without the
consent of Her Britannic JNIajesty's Government."
In 1905, another and more determined effort
was made by the Sultan to occupy the Sinai
Peninsula, but after a brief, and somewhat stormy
negotiation, the arrangement made in 1892 was
confirmed. Shortly afterwards, the Turco-Egyptian
frontier was delimitated by a Joint Commission.
Such, therefore, are the official relations between
the Sultan and the Khedive. From the observa-
tions which have been made in the course of this
narrative, it will have been gathered that the
constant endeavour of the Sultan has been to
encroach on the rights of the Khedive. On the
other hand, the sentiments of the ruling classes in
Egypt towards the Sultan may be described as a
compound of fear, religious sympathy, and political
dislike. Which of these sentiments is predominant
depends on the fleeting circumstances of the
moment.
2. The Khedive.
It was explained in the first part of this work
how an unwilling recognition of the principle of
ministerial responsibility was wrung from Ismail
Pasha. Ismail's Rescript of August 28, 1878,^ was,
indeed, violated almost immediately after its issue.
Nevertheless, it forms to this day the JMagna
Charta of Egypt.
Naturally enough, more depends on the spirit
* Vide ante, vol. i. p. 62.
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in which the Rescript is applied than on the terms
of the document itself. By a fortunate accident,
Ismail Pasha was succeeded by a Khedive who
had a natural turn for constitutionahsm. Tewfik
Pasha acted up to the spirit of his father's declara-
tions. He asserted his legitimate prerogatives, but
he governed " through and with his Council of
Mmisters." The terms of the Rescript are, how-
ever, sufficiently elastic to enable all the most
objectionable abuses of personal government to be
re-established without any apparent violation of
the letter of Ismail Pasha's declaration. So long
as the British occupation lasts, a solid guarantee
exists that any tendency towards the re-establish-
ment of a bad form of personal government will be
checked before disastrous consequences ensue.
3. The Ministers.
The Egyptian administrative machine is divided
into seven Departments, over each of which a
Minister presides. These are Foreign AHairs,
Finance, Justice, War, Pubhc Works, Education,
and the Interior.
The Post Office, the Customs, and the Light-
houses are under the Financial Department. The
Sanitary Department and the Prisons are attached
to the Interior. The Wakfs (religious endowments)
are administered by a Director- General, who in
practice takes his orders direct from the Khedive.
The proceedings of the Council are conducted
partly in Arabic and partly in French, the latter
language being em})loyed to suit the convenience
of those European officials who have a right to be
present at the meetings of Council, and of Egyptian
Ministers^ who are not acquainted with the Arabic
language.
* E.g. Nubar and Ti^raiie Paslias.
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The position of an Egyptian Minister is difficult
and delicate. There are usually in his Department
one or more high European officials, who are
subordinate to him. The ideal state of things
would be if the INIinister showed no jealousy of his
subordinate, worked cordially with him, followed
his advice when it was sound, and stated his objec-
tions intelligently when he thought it was question-
able ; and if, on the other hand, the European
official was careful never to be aggressive, or to press
unduly for the adoption of his views in doubtful
cases. It has not always been easy to find Egyptian
Ministers who will carry out the first, or Europeans
who will carry out the second part of this pro-
gramme. Nevertheless, the system has on the
whole worked smoothly. More especially of late
years, the relations between the Egyptian Ministers
and their British coadjutors have been most cordial
and friendly.
4. The Organic Law ofMay 1, 1883.
Briefly stated, the provisions of the Organic
Law of May 1, 1883, which was framed under
Lord Dufferin's auspices, are as follows :
—
A Provincial Council, composed of from eight
to three members, according to the size of the
province, is established in each Moudirieh. The
Moudir is the President. The functions of these
Councils are to deal with local matters, such as the
alignment of roads and canals, the establishment
of markets, etc. The total number of Provincial
Councillors is seventy. When we are liberal in
Egypt, we do not content ourselves with half-
measures. The members of the Council are elected
by universal suffi-age.
The Legislative Council is composed of thirty
members. Of these, fourteen, including the
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Tresident, are named by the Egyptian Government.
Of the remainder, fourteen are elected by the Pro-
vincial Councils from amongst their own members,
one is elected by the town of Cairo, and one by
Alexandria and some other less important towns.
No Law or Decree " portant reglement d'adminis-
tration publique" can be promulgated without its
having been previously submitted to the Council.
The Government are not obhged to adopt the views
of the Council, but, in the event of their not doing
so, the reasons for the rejection must be com-
municated to the Council. " L'exposition de ces
motifs ne pent donner lieu a aucune discussion."
The Budget has to be submitted to the Council,
who may "emettre des avis et des vceux sur
chaque chapitre du Budget." The Government are,
however, not obliged to conform to any views
which may be expressed by the Council in connec-
tion with the Budget, nor may tlie latter discuss
any financial charge incumbent on the Egyptian
Treasury, which results from an international
arrangement. The Egyptian Ministers may take
part in the discussions of the Council, or may
cause themselves to be represented by any high
functionaries of their respective Departments.
The Legislative Assembly consists of eighty-two
members, viz. : The six Ministers, the thirty members
of the Legislative Council, and forty-six delegates
who are elected by the population. Certain (juali-
fications are necessary in order to become a candidate
for election to the Assembly. The candidate must
be not less than thirty years old, he must be able
to read and write, and he must pay direct taxes
to the amount of not less than £E.30 a year. No
new direct tax can be imposed without the approval
of the Assembly. The Assembly must also be
consulted about any public loans, about the con-
struction of canals and railways, and about the
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classification of lands in connection with the pay-
ment of the land-tax. The Assenibl} may also
spontaneously express its views on all economic,
administrative, and financial questions. As in the
case of the Legislative Council, the Government
are not under any obligation to adopt the opinions
of the Assembly in such matters, but the reasons
for not adopting them must be stated. The
Assembly must meet at least once in two years.
The public are not admitted to the sittings either
of the Council or of the Assembly.
In the last Report I wrote before leaving Egypt *
I expressed myself favourably to the proposal that
reporters should be admitted to the sittings of the
Council. If this proposal encounters opposition,
it will come, not from any European authority,
but from the members of the Council themselves.
I have reason to believe that, amongst these, a
good deal of difference of opinion exists as to the
desirability of effecting this reform.
Besides these institutions, the Organic Law of
May 1, 1883, provided for the establishment of a
Council of State (Conseil d'Etat) whose organisa-
tion and functions were to be explained in a
subsequent Decree. This institution was borrowed
from France. Its alleged object was to prepare
draft laws for submission to the legislature. When
I arrived in Egypt, in September 1883, I found
that the formation of the Council of State was a
burning question. It very soon became apparent
that, under cover of this institution, international
government was to be introduced into every branch
of the Egyptian administration. The discussion
went on for several months until, on January 19,
1884, I informed Lord Granville that the Council
of State would be a useless and expensive body.
Nubar Pasha was of the same opinion. Egypt
1 Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, p. 29.
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was thus mercifully saved from this particular
form of international plague.
Such, therefore, are the constitution and func-
tions of the Egyptian Houses of Parliament.
Lord DufFerin's law was conceived in a liberal
and statesmanlike spirit. The leading idea was
to give the Egyptian people an opportunity of
making their voices heard, but at the same time
not to bind the executive Government by parlia-
mentary fetters, which would have been out of
place in a country whose political education was
so little advanced as that of Egypt.
The question of the extension of representative
institutions in Egypt has recently formed the
subject of much public discussion. I do not
propose to deal with this question at any length.
The main object of this work, which will, I fear,
extend to greater length than I originally intended,
is to narrate the history of the past, rather than to
discuss questions which now occupy the attention
of the public, and of the responsible Egyptian
authorities. Moreover, my views on this particular
issue have already been fully and publicly ex-
pressed.* My remarks will, therefore, be very
brief.
In the first place, I vdsh to say that Lord
Dufferin was under no delusion as to the time
which would elapse, and as to the difficulties which
would have to be encountered before free institu-
tions could take root in the somewhat uncongenial
soil of Egypt. All he hoped to do was " to erect
some sort of barrier, however feeble, against the
intolerable tyranny of the Turks." He hoped that,
"under British superintendence," the legislative
bodies which he created "might be fostered, and
educated into fairly useful institutions, proving a
* Vide, inter alia, Egypt, No. 1 of 1906, pp. 11-13 ; Egypt, No. 1 of
1907, pp. 3-8, 26-d2, and 66 ; and Egypt, No. 3 of 1907.
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convenient channel through which the European
element in the Government might obtain an
insight into the inner mind and the less obvious
wants of the native population." ^ There cannot
be a shadow of doubt that, far from considering
that progress had been objectionably slow, Lord
DufFerin was not merely gratified, but also some-
what astonished at the extent to which, up to the
time of his death, the services of the institutions,
of which he was the creator, had been utilised.
Next, I have to observe that, if anything is to
be done in the direction of a further development
of the institutions created in 1883, by far the
wisest course will be to begin at the bottom of
the legislative ladder. " It is certain," Lord
Dufferin very truly said in his Report, " that local
self-government is the fittest preparation and most
convenient stepping-stone for anything approaching
to a constitutional regime." During the last twenty-
four years, a good deal more has been done in the
way of developing local self-government than many
of those who write on Egyptian affairs seem to be
aware of.^
In many of the most important provincial towns.
Mixed Municipalities— that is to say, municipal
bodies of which some of the members are European
and others are Egyptian—have been estabHshed.
The difficulty of extending the system lies in the
fact that whilst, on the one hand, no very great or
rapid progress can be made unless the JNIujiicipal
Commissioners are invested with certain powers of
local taxation, on the other hand, no local taxes
can be imposed on Europeans without the consent
of the Powers. Hence, until the regime of tlie
* These passages are quoted from a letter addressed to me by Lord
Dufferiu. It is given in Sir Alfred Lyall's Life of the Marquis of
Dufferin, vol. ii. p. 260.
* This branch of the subject is more fully treated in my Report for
the year 1906. See Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, pp. 29-32.
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Capitulations is modified, it will not be possible to
create Mixed Municipalities in any towns unless
the whole of the population are willing to submit
to a system of voluntary taxation.
In a large number of other towns, Local Com-
missions have been appointed who administer the
funds placed at their disposal by the Egyptian
Government.
It is, I think, in the direction of increasing the
numbers and extending the powers of the Munici-
palities and Local Commissions that the principal
development of local self-government is, in the near
future, to be anticipated. Care, however, will have
to be taken in dealing with this matter. One of
the greatest errors into which Europeans employed
in the East are liable to fall is to imagine that
Orientals are as much impressed as they are them-
selves with the necessity of speedily providing
roads, drains, lighting, and all the other parapher-
nalia of civilisation. The present race of Egyptians
are, indeed, willing enough to profit by all these
things, if they are provided for them from the pro-
ceeds of general taxation, but the crucial ques-
tion is whether they are themselves willing to
pay additional taxes in order to attain these
objects. They have not, up to the present time,
shown much disposition to do so. It will be wise,
therefore, not to force the pace. It should always
be remembered that what the mass of tlie popula-
tion in a backward Eastern country care for above
almost all things is that taxation sliould be light.
As regards the Provincial Councils, a detail
which slipped into the Organic Law of 1883—very
possibly without its effect being fully realised—has
done a good deal to nnpair their utility. It was
hiid down tliat no I'rovincial Council could meet
without being convoked by the Moudir, and that
the latter could not convoke the Council without the
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issue of a Khedivial Decree, laying down both the
time and duration of the meeting. The practical re-
sult of this arrangement has been that the Councils
have never met more than once a year. The time
has certainly come when the whole of this question
may usefully be considered. One of the last pro-
posals I made before leaving Egypt ^ was that the
Provincial Councils should be reorganised, their
powers somewhat increased, and that steps should
be taken to carry out more fully what was unques-
tionably Lord DufFerin's intention, viz. that the
Councils should be real working bodies, acting as
advisers to the Moudir. Sir Eldon Gorst has this
matter in hand, and will, I do not doubt, with the
help of the British and Egyptian officials, be able
to devise a scheme suitable to the requirements
and present condition of the country.
The question of whether the powers and con-
stitution of the Legislative Council may advan-
tageously be changed is one of far greater difficulty.
As I have already said, I do not propose to discuss
it at length. I will, therefore, only say that whilst
I am not prepared to maintain that some cautious
steps in this direction might not before long be
prudently taken, I am very strongly of opinion
that any attempt to confer full parliamentary
powers on the Council would, for a long time to
come, be the extreme of folly and would be highly
detrimental to the true interests of the Egyptians
themselves. The facts that many of the members
of the Council are men of unquestionable honesty
and intelligence, and that some are personal friends
, of my own, cannot blind me to the fact that, as a
whole, the Council,—as would, indeed, be the case
with any similar body which could, under present
circumstances, be constituted in Egypt,
—
possesses
two great defects.
» See Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, pp. 29-32.
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The first is one which they share with repre-
sentative bodies in some other countries. It is
that, acting under pubHc pressure, they are too apt
to propose important changes in tlie fiscal system,
and, at the same time, to advocate large additional
expenditure on public objects, without sufficient con-
sideration of the financial results which would ensue
were effect given to their proposals. It should
never be forgotten that any extension of repre-
sentative institutions, which was obtained at the
risk of again plunging Egypt into all the financial
embarrassment from which the country has been
so hardly and so recently rescued, would be far too
dearly bought.
The second defect, which in the eyes of any one
acquainted with the past history of modern Egypt is
extremely pardonable, is that the most enlightened
members of the Council have not, as yet, acquired
all those qualities necessary to give them the moral
courage to assert their true opinions fearlessly.
Notably, many of them are terrorised by the local
press. To the European mind, it may seem a con-
tradiction in terms to say that freedom of speech is
checked by the freedom of the press. But in the
Land of Paradox all things are possible. I have
no doubt whatever that a large number
—
probably
a majority— of the members of the Legislative
Council would welcome the enactment of a rigorous
press law as a measure calculated to free them from
the moral shackles which now hamper their liberty
of speech and action.
Of all the institutions created by Lord Dufferin,
the Legislative Assembly has, in practice, turned
out to be the least useful and efficient. It was,
and still is, too much in advance of the require-
ments and political education of the country. No
real harm would be done if it were simply abolished,
and, indeed, the cause of representative government
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would, I believe, benefit if, simultaneously with
its abolition, the Legislative Council were re-
organised, and its powers somewhat increased.
Without doubt, however, the adoption of this
course would be regarded by many— erroneously,
in my opinion—as a retrograde measure. It ma)',
therefore, be politically desirable not to entertain
the idea. In that case, I hold that, for the time
being, the Legislative Assembly should be left
alone. I deprecate any attempt to enlarge its
powers, and I think it would be extremely difficult
to amend its constitution.
The purely Egyptian portion of the machinery
of government has now been described. This part
of the machinery would, however, never get into
motion were it not impelled by some strong motive
power. That motive power is furnished by the
British officials in the service of the Egyptian
Government. The special functions of these
officials will be described in the next chapter.
CHAPTER XL
THE BRITISH OFFICIALS
Qualifications required of an Ang-lo-E^yptian official—Positions of the
civil and military officials—The French in Tunis—The Financial
Adviser—Sir Edg^ar Vincent—Tlie Judicial Adviser—History of
his appointment— Sir Raymond West—Justice under Eg-yptian
management—Sir John Scott—The Public Works Department
—
Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieif—Sir William Garstin—The Financial
Secretary— Blum Pasha— Lord Milner—Sir Eldon Gorst— Sub-
Departments of Finance—The Interior— Public Instruction—
European and Egyptian officials.
It is related that a lady once asked Madame de
Stael to recommend a tutor for her boy. She
described the sort of man she wished to find. He
was to be a gentleman with perfect manners and a
thorough knowledge of the world ; it was essential
that he should be a classical scholar and an accom-
plished linguist ; he was to exercise supreme
authority over his pupil, and at the same time
he was to show such a degree of tact that his
authority was to be unfelt ; in fact, he was to
possess almost every moral attribute and intellectual
faculty which it is possible to depict, and, lastly,
he was to place all these qualities at the service
of Madame de Stael's friend for a very low salary.
The witty Frenchwoman listened with attention
to her friend's list of indispensable qualifications
and eventually replied : *' INla chere, je comprends
parfaitement bien le caractcre de I'homme qu'il
vous faut, mais je dois vous dire que si je le trouve,
je I'epouse."
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This story is applicable to the qualifications
demanded of an ideal Anglo-Egyptian official.
The Anglo-Egyptian official must possess some
technical knowledge, such as that of the engineer,
the accountant, or the lawyer ; otherwise, he will
be unable to deal with the affairs of the Depart-
ment to which he is attached. At the outset of
his career, he is usually ])laced at a great disadvan-
tage. He must often explain his ideas in a foreign
language, French, with which he has probably only
a limited acquaintance. Unless he is to run the
risk of falling into the hands of some subordinate,
often of doubtful trustworthiness, it is, at all events
in respect to many official posts, essential that he
should acquire some knowledge of a very difficult
Oriental language, Arabic. These, however, are all
faculties to which it is possible to apply some fairly
accurate test. The Anglo-Egyptian official must be
possessed of other qualities, which it is moi-e difficult
to gauge with precision, but which are in reality of
even greater importance than those to which allusion
is made above. He must be a man of high character.
He must have sufficient elasticity of mind to be
able to apply, under circumstances which are
strange to him, the knowledge which he has
acquired elsewhere. He must be possessed of a
sound judgment in order to enable him to distin-
guish between abuses, which should be at once
reformed, and those which it will be wise to
tolerate, at all events for a time. He must be
versatile, and quick to adapt any local feature of
the administration to suit his own reforming
purposes. He must be well-mannered and con-
ciliatory, and yet not allow his conciliation to
degenerate into weakness. He must be firm, and
yet not allow his firmness to harden into dictation.
He must efface himself as much as possible. In
fact, besides his special technical knowledge, he
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must possess all the qualities which we look for in
a trained diplomatist, a good administrator, and an
experienced man of the world.
It is not easy in any country to produce a
number of officials, who have undergone a depart-
mental training, and who at the same time possess
all these qualities. It is especially difficult, when
they are found, to attract them to Egypt on
salaries of £2000 a year and less. The efficient
working of the administrative machine depends,
however, mainly on choosing the right man for the
right place. What often happens when any place
has to be filled is this,—on the one hand, are a
number of candidates who wish to occupy the post,
but who do not possess the qualifications necessary
to fill it with advantage to the public interests
;
on the other hand, are a very small number of
persons, who possess the necessary qualifications,
but who, for one reason or another, are reluctant
to accept the appointment. Under these circum-
stances, it is a matter for congratulation that
administrative successes have been the rule, whilst
the failures have been the exceptions.
Looking to the anomalous positions occupied
by the Anglo -Egyptian officials, it is, indeed,
greatly to their credit that, as a body, they should
have succeeded in performing the several tasks
allotted to them. Without doubt, they have had
diplomatic support behind them. JNIoreover, and
this is perhaps more important than the support
itself, it has been felt by all concerned that the
possibility of stronger support than that which was
actually afforded lay in the background. Neverthe-
less, the British officials in Egypt have had to rely
mainly on their individual judgment and force of
character. The l^ritish Consul-General can occa-
sionally give advice. lie may, when speaking to
the British official, temper the zeal of the latter for
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reform, or, when talking to the Egyptian ^linister,
advocate the views of the reformer. But he cannot
step seriously upon the scene unless there is some
knot to be untied which is worthy of a serious
effort. He cannot at every moment interfere in
matters of departmental detail. The work done
by the Anglo-Egyptian official is, therefore, mainly
the outcome of his own resource and of his own
versatility. If he is adroit, he can make the fact
that the soldiers of his nation are in occu})ation of
the country felt without flaunting their presence in
any brusque fashion before the eyes of his Egyptian
superior. As a matter of fact, the most successful
Anglo-Egyptian officials have been those who have
relied most on their own powers of persuasion, and
have rarely applied for diplomatic support.
In describing more particularly the position of
the Anglo-Egyptian officials, a distinction must be
drawn between civilians and soldiers. The British
officers of the Egyptian army have had to contend
against considerable difficulties, but, as compared
with their civilian colleagues, they have from one
important point of view been at an advantage.
There is a reality about the position of the soldier
which does not exist in the case of the civilian.
The Egyptian Commander-in-Chief, or, to call him
by his Egyptian title, the Sirdar, not only com-
mands the army. It is recognised by the Egyptian
Government and by the public that he commands it.
There is thus no flagrant contradiction between his
real and his nominal position. Most of the superior
officers of the army, whether departmental or regi-
mental, are British. The Sirdar is, therefore,
master of the situation. He can decide on what
orders to give, and he can rely on his orders being
obeyed, not only in the letter but in the spirit.
He is not obliged to trim his sails to every passing
political breeze.
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Far otlier is the position of the Anglo-Egyptian
civilian. Some of the most important civil
functionaries possess no executive functions. They
can only advise. No special system exists to
enforce the acceptance of their advice. All that
can be said is that, in the event of their advice
being systematically rejected, the British Govern-
ment will be displeased, and that they will probably
find some adequate means for making their dis-
pleasure felt. Further, of those Anglo-Egyptian
civil officials who possess executive power, few can
be certain that their power is effective ; they cannot
rely confidently on their subordinates, who are
rarely British, to carry out the letter, and still less
the spirit of their instructions. The Anglo-
Egyptian official is also driven by tlie necessities of
his position into being an opportunist. The least
part of his difficulties lies in deciding what should
be done. That is usually easy. AVlien once he
clearly sees before him the action which ought to
be taken, he has to decide the more difficult
questions of when to act and how to conduct
himself in order to get others to act with him.
And, in deciding on these latter points, he often
has to take into consideration matters which at
first sight appear to be not even remotely connected
with the immediate subject under discussion.
Every Anglo-Egyptian civil official, therefore, has
not only to be guided by the general impulse given
by British diplomacy to Egyptian affairs, but he
also has to do a good deal of diplomatic work on
his own account.
Comparisons have been occasionally instituted
between the position of the English in Egypt and
that of the French in Tunis. In 1890, a report on
Tunisian affairs was prepared by IVI. Ribot. A
glance at this report is sufficient to show that, for
all practical purposes, the French Government have
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annexed Tunis. Scarcely a semblance of native
authority remains. The French officials have a
free hand in dealing with the administration of the
country. The French Resident-General presides
at the Council of Ministers and directs the Ministry
of Foreiffn Affairs. No law is valid which has not
been countersigned by him. The Ministry of \Var
is in the hands of the General in command of the
French army of occupation. All the important
offices of the State are held by Frenchmen. A
French Secretary-General receives all the letters
addressed to the Tunisian Government and pre-
pares the answers. "Ainsi," it is said, "aucune
affaire ne pent echapper a sa surveillance, et dans
toutes, il peut donner ses conseils et faire prevaloir
la pensee du Protectorat." By the side of each of
the " Caids," who answer to the Egyptian Moudirs,
is placed a French Controller who, amongst other
functions, has the Police under his command.
M. Ribot concluded his account of the system
of administration in the following terms : " II
fallait ensuite qu'aucun detail dans I'application de
ces decisions ne put nous echapper. Aucun docu-
ment n'entre dans les bureaux de I'Administration
centrale ou n'en sort, aucune lettre n'est presentee
a la signature du Premier JNIinistre, aucune corre-
spondance n'est envoyee aux destinataires sans
passer par Tintermediaire du Secretaire general et
etre sou mis a son examen. Tout ce qui arrive
aux Caids ou dmane d'eux est de la meme maniere
soumis a I'examen des Controleurs civils. Rien ne
peut done se faire dans la Regence qui ne soit
approuve par nous." This is sufficiently explicit.
In point of fact, Tunis is just as much a part
of France as the Department of the Seine. A
qualified Tunisian has explained the position of
the Bey of Tunis in the following terms : " Les
attributions du Bey de Tunis se reduisent seule-
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ment a la nomination de quelques employes sub-
alternes et meme ces nominations sont soumises
a Tapprobation du JNIinistre Resident de France, ou
de son premier secretaire, qui est en meme temps
Secrdtaire-General du Gouvernement Tunisien."
More than this, the attitude of the other
Powers, and notably of England, towards the
French administration of Tunis has been per-
sistently friendly. The British Government
speedily abandoned the Capitulations at the
instance of France, an example which was followed
by Italy and other Powers.^
It is, therefore, clear that no analogy exists
between the conditions under which France took
in hand the Tunisian problem and those which
obtained, and still obtain, in respect to the Anglo-
Egyptian administration of Egypt.
The most important British official in Egypt is
the Financial Adviser. After the Arabi revolt, the
question of how to place the financial administra-
tion of Egypt under European control had to be
reconsidered. It was decided to appoint a British
official with the title of Financial Adviser. He
was to have no executive functions, but he was
to be present at the meetings of the Council of
Ministers. No attempt has ever been made to
define his duties in any very precise manner.
Broadly speaking, however, it may be said that,
as his official title implies, he has to advise on
all important financial matters, without unduly
encroaching on the prerogatives of the Finance
Minister. Outside his special duties, his position
is also of importance. As he is present at all the
meetings of the Council, he has the best oppor-
tunities for knowing what is going on in Egyptian
^ The friendly attitude of England and Germany towards France in
I'unis has been recognised in a work entitled La Politique Franfaise en
Tiinisie (p. 374), wliicli, though published anonymously, was, it is well
known, written by a member of the French diplomatic corps.
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ministerial circles. He can often guide the INIinis-
ters on matters which are unconnected with finance.
He can keep the British Consul-General well in-
formed. Being an Egyptian official, he can often
give advice on his own behalf in a form which is
more palatable than if it were tendered with all
the weight of the British diplomatic representative
speaking on behalf of his Government.
Sir Auckland Colvin was the first Financial
Adviser. In the autumn of 1883, he was succeeded
by Sir Edgar Vincent. At the time, some doubts
were expressed as to whether Sir Edgar Vincent
was not too young for the post. These doubts
were soon removed. A more fortunate selection
could not have been made. Sir Edgar Vincent
possessed in a high degree the quality specially
necessary for the performance of his duties. He
was eminently resourceful ; he never despaired
daring the blackest period of the Egyptian financial
chaos. He was sanguine of ultimate success, and
as at every turn new and unexpected difficulties
had to be encountered, he was always ready with
some ingenious device to stave off the evil day of
bankruptcy, and thus to gain breathing time during
which the financial ship would, at all events, have
a chance of righting herself. He stayed long
enough to see that his labours had not been in
vain. The rehabilitation of Egyptian finance is
in a large degree the work of Sir Edgar Vincent.
After his departure in October 1889, he was
succeeded by Sir Elwin Palmer, who again was
succeeded in 1898 by Mr. (afterwards Sir Eldon)
Gorst. In 1904, Sir Eldon Gorst's place was taken
by Sir Vincent Corbett. On the latter's resigna-
tion in 1907, he was succeeded by Mr. Harvey.
I now turn to the Judicial Department. When
I arrived in Egypt, in September 1883, I found
that Native Tribunals, based on a French model,
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were about to be establislied, and that Sir Benson
Maxwell had been a])pointed to the post of
Procureur- General. He did not remain long.
JNIr. (afterwards Sir) Raymond West, an Indian
judge of distinction, was named to succeed him.
He was a man of great learning and capacity.
No one could be better qualified to devise a sound
judicial system for Egypt. For several months,
he studied his subject, and then produced a
voluminous report. It contained many valuable
suggestions, some of which were, after a consider-
able lapse of time, carried into execution. Nubar
Pasha, who was at the time in office, did not,
however, concur in Mr. West's views. The result
was that the latter returned to India.
This happened in 1885, that is to say, at the
most involved period of Egyptian history since the
British occupation. It was necessary to throw
overboard a certain amount of cargo in order to
lighten the political ship. Nubar Pasha enjoyed a
reputation as a judicial reformer. There was much
to be said in favour of leaving the Department of
Justice in Egyptian hands. It was resolved, there-
fore, not to press for any British successor to Mr.
West, but to see what the Egyptians could do in
the way of judicial reform if left to themselves.
The experiment had a fiiir trial, and proved a
complete failure. For the next five years, con-
stant complaints were made as regards the adminis-
tration of justice, but it was desirable to give
public opinion time to mature before taking any
definite action in the matter. In the meanwhile,
Nubar Pasha, fearful of English interference,
named a Belgian, M. Le Grelle, to be Procureur-
General.^ M. Le Grelle brought to light the
* M. Le Grelle resip^ned his appointment in 1895, and was succeeded
by an Ep:yptian. In 1897> an Englishman (Mr. Corbet) was appointed
• to the place.
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existence of some serious abuses. Notably, he dis-
covered that for several years past the ordinary
Tribunals had not been dealing with the most
important cases of crime which occurred in the
country. They had been practically superseded
by certain " Commissions of Brigandage," which
were in reality Courts -Martial sitting under the
presidency of the Moudirs. Under the auspices
of these Commissions, every species of abomina-
tion had been committed. Witnesses had been
tortured. Some 700 or 800 people had been con-
demned to imprisonment, and a certain number had
been hung. In many cases, the evidence was wholly
insufficient to justify a conviction ; it cannot be
doubted that a good many innocent persons were
punished. After a good deal of rather acrimonious
discussion, the Commissions of Brigandage were
abolished. The evidence in the most doubtful
cases was re-examined ; some of the prisoners were
released, either at once or subsequently.^
* Mr. Morice, an English official attached to the Department of
Justice, who was subsequently deputed to inquire into the cases of
these prisoners, reported as follows :—" I may here state that in tlie
126 cases examined, I have never once come across any witnesses I'oi
the defence ; it would, therefore, seem to have been generally decided
that this was not of any importance ; individuals once arrested and
brought before the Commission seem to have had very little chance of
regaining their liberty. 1 was so struck by the total absence of any
defence being set up by the accused, apart from a denial of the charge,
that 1 closely questioned those men in whose cases, after a careful
examination of the documents, I had formed a conviction tliat they
had been most unjustly sentenced, and I was invariably informed that
although they, at the time of their trial, stated that they could produce
witnesses to prove their innocence, their demands were never listened
to, but they were informed that one thief's word was as good as
another's, and that witnesses produced would be treated as accomplices,
etc. Indeed, it was sufficient for one man, whose guilt was fully
established, either by recognition on the part of tlie victim of the
assault or robbery, or by the finding: of stolen property in his posses-
sion, to accuse another, for tliis latter to be sentenced to a very severe
term of imprisoimient. I have been told the most pitiful stories by
convicts I have interrogated concerning the horrible treatment they
received when in prison, a treatment which, it is needless to say, in-
variably ended in a confession being obtained. One has only to
examine the preliminary inquiries in order to be convinced of this."
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This episode is very Egyptian, and is illustrative
of the extent to which an Egyptian Minister often
cares more for theory than for practice. An
elaborate system of justice existed in aj)pearance.
In reality, the system was inoperative. Persons
accused of crime were condemned to death or to
lifelong imprisonment at the will of some ignorant
and tyrannical Moudir.
With the suppression of the Commissions of
Brigandage, crime of a serious natin-e increased.
This had been anticipated. It became daily more
and more clear that no Egyptian Minister was
capable of coping with the situation. The Egyp-
tian Government, therefore, reluctantly consented
to appoint an Englishman to the post of Judicial
Adviser. It was not easy to find a competent
man, for few English lawyers have made a study
of the French legal system. A fortunate selection
was, however, made in the person of Mr. (after-
wards Sir John) Scott. His appointment created
a flutter in the Egyptian political dovecot. Riaz
Pasha shortly afterwards resigned, and his resigna-
tion was in some measure due to his dislike to
Sir John Scott's nomination. The establishment
of a sound judicial system in Egypt may be said
to date from the time of Sir John Scott's assump-
tion of the office of Judicial Adviser. In 1898,
Sir John Scott resigned his place to take up an
appohitment in London. He was succeeded by
Sir Malcolm Mcllwraith.
Previous to the British occupation, the Public
Works Department had been mainly in French
hands. In 1883, it was resolved to appoint a
British Under-Secretary to this Department, and
to brin": a staff of British officials from India to
superintend the improvements in the canalisation
of the country. Sir Colin Scott -Moncrieff was
named Under - Secretary. The selection was a
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most happy one. Apart from his very remarkable
technical attainments, Sir Colin Scott- Moncrieff
was a man of the highest character. The most
prejudiced Pasha respected qualities which were
so dissimilar to any which he himself possessed.
The most venomous journalist paused before he
threw his political vitriol over a character so trans-
parently honest. No Englishman employed in the
Egyptian service during the early days of the
occupation did more to make the name of England
respected than Sir Colin Scott-MoncriefF, who, by
the way, is not an Englishman, but one of that
race which so frequently succeeds in foreign parts
by virtue of its sterling good qualities. Sir Colin
Scott-MoncriefF comes from well north of the
Tweed.
In 1892, Sir Colin Scott-MoncriefF found a
very worthy successor in the person of Sir William
Garstin, under whose intelligent auspices very large
sums of money were, to the great advantage of
the country, spent on public works of various
descriptions. It would be difficult to exaggerate
the debt of gratitude which the people of Egypt
owe to Sir William Garstin.
The Financial Secretary also occupies a post of
great importance. He is an executive officer. He
performs the duties of the Financial Adviser when
the latter is absent. During the early days of the
occupation this post was held by Blum Pasha, a
very intelligent Austrian, who had the rare merit
of having served the Egyptian Government during
the lax and corrupt rule of Ismail Pasha without
the most censorious critic being able to whisper a
word against his honesty. He was a most capable
official and worked cordially with the English.
On his retirement in 1889, he was succeeded by
Mr. (now Lord) Milner, the well-known author of
England in Egypt. Of Lord Milner all that need
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be said in this place is that he is one of the most
able Englishmen who have served the Egyptian
Government. Not only was he versed in all the
technicalities of his own Department, but he had
a wide grasp of the larger aspects of Egyptian
affairs. On his being named, in 1892, to an
appointment in England, he was succeeded by Sir
Eldon Gorst, who belonged to the diplomatic
service. Sir Eldon Gorst had occupied his leisure
time in acquiring a knowledge of Arabic. Being
endowed with a singular degree of tact and
intelligence, he generally managed to get all he
wanted done without applying for diplomatic
support. Since 1894, when Sir Eldon Gorst was
appointed Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior,
the post of Financial Secretary has changed hands
more than once, but it has always been held by a
very carefully selected British official.
There are three sub -departments attached to
the Ministry of Finance. These are the Customs,
the Lighthouses, and the Post Office. The first
two of these are under superior British super-
vision. The Post Office was reorganised by an
English Director- General, who was eventually
succeeded by an extremely competent Syrian,
Saba Pasha, under whose direction various postal
reforms of great importance and utility have been
introduced.
Until 1894, the Police was commanded by an
English Inspector-General who had a small staff
of British officers under him. In the autumn of
1894, a change of system was effected. The
post of Inspector- General was abolished and an
Adviser (Sir Eldon Gorst) was appointed to the
Ministry of the Interior. In 1898, Mr. Machell
was appointed to succeed Sir Eldon Gorst. The
duties attached to the post of Adviser underwent,
at the same time, some modifications of no great
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importance. The head of the Sanitary Depart-
ment is EngUsh, as is also the Director-General of
Prisons.
The supreme direction of the Educational
Department has always been in Egyptian hands,
but, in 1906, an English Adviser (Mr. Dunlop)
was appointed to this Department. A considerable
number of Europeans are employed as school-
masters.^
Allusion has so far only been made to the
highest appointments. It will, however, be as well
to speak briefly of the total number of Englishmen
employed in Egypt. The subject is one of
importance, for it has at times given rise to much
exaggeration, and, moreover, the employment of
Europeans is naturally viewed with jealousy by
those Egyptians who are aspirants for official
positions.
It is generally recognised that European assist-
ance, to a certain extent, is necessary to carry on
the work of government in Egypt. Differences
of opinion, however, arise when any attempt is
made to lay down with any degree of precision the
extent to which recourse should be had to European
agency. Weighty arguments may be advanced on
both sides. On the one hand, it is frequently
urged that the efficiency of the service suffers by
reason of the inadequacy of the European staff
;
that the welfare of the mass of the population must
be placed before all other considerations ; that the
vast majority of voiceless Egyptians prefer good
administration to national government ; and that,
therefore, for the present, and probably for a long
time to come, the employment of a large number
of Europeans is absolutely necessary. On the
other hand, it is stated that the Egyptians prefer
* The numbers were, in 1896, Egyptians, 631 ; Europeans, 92 ; and,
in 1906, Egyptians, 794 ; Europeans, 160.
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a defecth e system of government administered by
their own countrymen to a relati\ ely perfect system
administered by aliens ; that it is in the highest
degree impolitic to push on education and at the
same time to close the door of hi<>h Government
employment to the educated classes ; that the
Egyptians can n^ver learn to govern themselves
unless they are allowed to make the attempt ; that
any causes which tend towards maladministration
will be temporary and will gradually disappear as a
result of the experience which will be gained ; and
that, therefore, the number of Europeans in the
service of the Government should not merely
be reduced to the lowest limit compatible with
efficiency, but that that limit should be exceeded,
and that temporary inefficiency, even in a somewhat
marked degree, should be tolerated in order to
attain the desired end.
There is not much to be gained by dwelling at
length on the abstract principles enunciated above.
The subject under discussion is eminently one as
to wliich, for all purposes of practical politics, a
compromise has to be effected between the extremes
of the conflicting principles invoked on either side.
What is quite clear is, that if AVestern civilisation
is to be introduced into Egypt, it can only be done
by Europeans, or by Egyptians who have imbibed
the spirit of that civilisation, and have acquired the
knowledge necessary in order to apply Western
methods of government. The extent to which
Europeans, or Egyptians who have received a
European training, should respectively be employed,
depends mainly on the supply which is available of
the latter class. The main difficulty of dealing
with the question is that, for the present, the
demand for qualified Egyptians of this class is
greatly in excess of the supply.
The general policy which has been pursued since
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the British occupation of the country took place,
in 1882, has been to hmit the number of Europeans
in the employment of the Government as much as
possible, to employ Egyptians in the very great
majority of the subordinate and in a large number
of the superior administrative posts, and gradually
to prepare the ground for increasing the number of
Egyptians in high employment. This policy is
thoroughly understood by all the leading British
officials in Egypt. Some, possibly, have been more
successful than others in training their Egyptian
subordinates. Some, again, may be inclined to insist
on a rather excessive standard of efficiency on the
part of the Egyptian before they will readily
acquiesce in foregoing the appointment of a Euro-
pean. But the higher British officials in Egypt
have never shown any tendency to question the
wisdom of the policy, or the least reluctance to
give effect to it when once they were convinced
that a qualified Egyptian could be found to take
any post which might happen to be vacant.
This matter is frequently discussed on the
assumption that a number of places under Govern-
ment are now occupied by Europeans for which
competent Egyptians could, without difficulty, be
found. I will not go so far as to say that this
assumption is absolutely unfounded, but it certainly
gives a very incorrect view of the facts of the
situation. I do not doubt that there are a few
cases as to which it may be said that, if the
European occupant of some post vacated his place,
a competent Egyptian might at once be found to
replace him. But, in the very large majority of
cases, the reason why the European holds the post
is that to which I have already alluded, namely,
that the supply of competent Egyptians is not
nearly equal to the demand.
To any one who will calmly and impartially
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consider the recent history and the present situation
in Egypt, the state of things which I have described
above can be no matter for surprise. Rather would
it be astonishing if the difficulties to which I have
alluded had not occurred.
European agency is required in Egypt for two
reasons : in the first place, to supply the technical
knowledge, which, until very recently, the Egyptians
liave had no opportunity of acquiring ; in the second
place, to remedy those defects in the Egyptian
character which have been developed by a long
course of misgovernment.
In so far as numbers are concerned, the first is
by far the more contributory cause. The rapidity
with Which the material prosperity of Egypt has
advanced during the last fifteen or twenty years
is probably without a parallel in history. The
suddenness of the movement has proved by no
means an unmixed blessing to the country. I will
not dwell on the moral aspect of this question
beyond saying that it is a commonplace of economics
to hold that a great and sudden accretion of wealth,
without any corresponding increase of knowledge
as to how the newly acquired wealth should be
used, is a very doubtful benefit, whether to an
individual or a nation.
From the point of view of the question im-
mediately under discussion, it cannot be doubted
that this sudden leap from poverty to affluence
greatly increased the difficulties of executing the
policy of employing Egyptian rather than European
agency in administrative work. For, when once
the full tide of prosperity set in, demands arose on
all sides for the employment of agents possessing
technical knowledge of all sorts. European lawyers
were re({uired to deal with the numerous legal
questions which arose, and in which a knowledge
of Europeans and their laws was indispensable.
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Hydraulic engineers were required to deal with
irrigation questions ; medical men, to look after the
hospitals and the sanitary condition of the country ;
veterinary surgeons, to arrest the cattle plague
;
trained surveyors, to map the fields ; mechanical
engineers and mechanics, to perform a great variety
of work— and so on. All these demands fell
suddenly on a country almost wholly unprepared
to meet them. Neither, although the difficulties
which have subsequently arisen were in some
degree foreseen, were the British advisers of the
Egyptian Government able, during the early years
of the occupation, to do much towards providing
for them. For at least six years, all that could be
done was to struggle against bankruptcy, to throw
off the incubus of the Soudan, and by scraping
together funds in order to improve the system of
irrigation, to lay the foundations of the prosperity
which the country now enjoys.
I shall, at a later period of this work, deal more
fully with the question of education. Here I will
only say that, for some years, educational progress
was, owing to tlie financial difficulties against which
the Government had to contend, necessarily slow.
Recently it has been more rapid, and I now take
a somewhat sanguine view of the possibility of
gradually substituting Egyptian for European
agency in those offices wiiere the necessity for
employing Europeans is at present based on the
want of technical knowledge on the part of tiie
Egyptians. But any attempt to hurry can only
lead to disappointment, and, eventually, in all prob-
ability, to a reaction which will be to the detriment
of Egyptian interests.
I liave said that, besides those Europeans who
are employed on the ground that their technical
knowledge is indispensable, the services of others
are necessary to act as some corrective to the
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defects of the Egyptian character. The number
of those who may be classed in this category is
comparatively small. On the other hand, they
often occupy positions of greater importance than
those who are employed merely by reason of their
technical skill. The substitution of Egyptian for
European agency must necessarily take even more
time in these cases than in those where the transfer
depends on the acquisition of technical knowledge
by the Egyptians. National character is a plant
of slow growth. Such instruction as can be afforded
in schools and colleges only constitutes one of the
elements which contribute to its modification and
development. All that can be said is that no effort
should be spared to foster the growth of all those
moral and intellectual qualities which, collectively,
tend to the formation of character. I may add
that amongst the defects which, for purposes of
administration, appear most of all to require recti-
fication, are, the fear of assuming individual re-
sponsibility ; the absence of adequate capacity to
exercise with firmness, intelligence, and considera-
tion for others, such functions as are usually vested
in responsible agents ; and the tendency, so common
amongst Egyptians, of running to extremes both
in thought and action.
Before leaving this branch of the subject, it may
be as well that I should give some figures showing
the extent to which Europeans are now employed
in the Egyptian service.^
The following table shows the composition of
the Egyptian Civil Service at the close of the years
1896 and 1906 respectively :—
* A more detailed analysis of tliese figures was given in my Report
for the year 1006, Egypt, No. 1 of 1!)()7, pp. 33-44. The remarks
made above are quoted almost textually from this Report.
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One observation may be added before leaving
this branch of the subject. It is that in countries
such as India and Egypt the best poHcy to pursue
is to employ a small body of well-selected and well-
paid Europeans, Everything depends on finding
the right man for the right place. If he can be
found, it is worth while to pay him well. It is a
mistake to employ second or third-rate Europeans
on low salaries. They often do more harm than
good. Public opinion generally condemns high
salaries, but on this particular point the European
administrator in the East will do well to follow
his own judgment and not to be unduly influenced
by outside criticism. It is worth while to pay
something extra in order to secure the services
of a really competent and thoroughly trustworthy
official.
CHAPTER XLI
THE INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS
Internationalism—1. The Commission of the Public Debt—Functions
of the Commission—The Egyptian Accounts—The Reserve Fund
—Uselessness of the Commission—2. The Railway Administua-
TioN—3. The Daira Sanieh—4. The Domains Administration.
Cosmopolitanism, as opposed to exclusive patriot-
ism, has ever been the dream of theorists and the butt
of practical statesmen. Probably, few lines of any
British poet have been more frequently quoted
—
especially of late years—than those in which Can-
ning ridiculed the "friend of every country but his
own." Of recent years, although there has been
no diminution but rather a recrudescence of inter-
national rivalry, a tendency towards the inter-
national treatment both of European and of
extra -European questions has become manifest,
not only amongst theorists, but amongst practical
statesmen. This tendency is the natural outcome
of the circumstances Avhich obtained in the latter
part of the nineteenth century. There appears
little prospect that the Utopia of the early free-
traders will be realised. Trade, with its hand-
maids, the railway and the telegraph, does not so
far appear to have bound nations together in any
closer bonds of amity than existed in the days of
slow locomotion and communication. On the
other hand, the European body politic has become
801
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more sensitive than heretofore. National interests
tend towards cosmopoHtanism, however much
national sentiments and aspirations may tend
towards exclusive patriotism. The whole world is
quickly informed of any incident which may occur
in any part of the globe. Not only in the cabinet
of every JNIinister, but in the office of every news-
paper editor the questions to which its occurrence
instantly give rise are, how does this circumstance
affect the affairs of my country ? What course
should be taken in order to safeguard our interests ?
It is more difficult than heretofore to segregate a
quarrel between any two States. In a certain sense
Europeans, in spite of themselves, have become
members of a single family, though not always of
a happy family. They are all oppressed by one
common dread, and that is that some accident may
precipitate a general war, of which not the wisest
can foretell the final issue. If any minor State
shows a tendency to light the match which may
lead to a general conflagration, the voice of inter-
national rivalry is to some extent hushed in
presence of the danger, and the diplomatic fire-
engine is turned on from every capital in Europe
in order to quench the flame before it can spread.
A certain power of acting together has thus been
developed amongst the nations and Governments
of Europe, and it cannot be doubted that the
world has benefited by the change. In all the
larger affairs of state, internationalism constitutes
a guarantee for peace. It in some measure obliges
particular interests to yield for the general good of
the European community.
Internationalism has, however, done more than
group together certain States and ensure common
or quasi-common action on occasions of supreme
importance. Semi-civilised countries, in which the
rulers are sometimes only possessed of incomplete
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sovereign rights, open up a wide field for the de-
velopment of internationalism. In such countries,
some European Powers have interests which they
wish to safeguard without arousing the jealousy of
their rivals by too open an assertion of strength,
whilst others are led to claim a seat at the inter-
national table in order to assert their political exist-
ence and to remind the world that their interests,
albeit they are of relatively slight importance, cannot
be altogether neglected. Cases sometimes arise
which involve prolonged supervision and control in
the interests of the European Powers, but which do
not justify exclusive action on the part of any one
of them, or which, if they justify it, are of a
nature not to allow of exclusive action without
a risk of discord in respect to the particular nation
by whom it is to be exercised. What can be
more natural in cases of this kind than for the
Powers to say—we are agreed as to all that is
essential ; certain points of detail remain to be
settled locally ; let us each appoint an expert
who will represent our interests and see that
they get fair play, but who at the same time
will have no very marked political bias, and
who will treat the technical questions which come
under his consideration on their own merits ?
Nothing could in appearance be more equitable
or more calculated to obviate the risk of serious
friction.
But alas ! however much exclusiveness may in
appearance be expelled by the cosmopolitan pitch-
fork, it but too often comes back apain to its
natural resting-place. The experiment of adminis-
trative internationalism has ]:)robably been tried in
the No Man's Land of which this history treats to
a greater extent than in any other country. The
result cannot be said to be encouraging to those
who believe in tlie efficacy of international action
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in administrative matters. What has been proved
is that international institutions possess admirable
negative qualities. They are formidable checks to
all action, and the reason why they are so is tliat,
when any action is proposed, objections of one sort
or another generally occur to some member of the
international body. Any action often involves a
presumed advantage accorded to some rival nation,
and it is a principle of internationalism, which is
scornfully rejected in theory and but too often
recognised as a guide for practical action, that it is
better to do nothing, even though evil may ensue,
than to allow good to be done at the expense of
furthering the interests, or of exalting the reputa-
tion of an international rival. For all purposes
of action, therefore, administrative international-
ism may be said to tend towards the creation of
administrative impotence.
1. Commission of the Public Debt
The Commission of the Public Debt originally
consisted of four members, an Englishman, a
Frenchman, an Austrian, and an Italian. In
1885, a German and a Russian Commissioner
were added, thus bringing the total number
of Commissioners up to six. Until 1904, the
functions of the Commission were briefly as
follows.
The officials responsible for the collection of
the revenues pledged to the service of the Debt
were under an obligation to pay all monies
collected by them into the hands of the Com-
missioners, and to furnish them with the informa-
tion necessary in order to enable an effective
financial control to be exercised. The Commis-
sioners had a right to name and dismiss their
own employes. No loan could be contracted
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without their consent. Lastly, and this was a
provision of the higliest imj)ortance, the Com-
missioners, in their capacity of legal representatives
of the bondholders, were empowered to sue the
Egyptian Government in the Mixed Courts in
the event of any infringement of the Law of
Liquidation taking place.
It will be seen that the powers thus conferred
on the Commissioners were extensive. Neverthe-
less, those portions of the Law of Liquidation to
which allusion has so far been made, did not in
practice give rise to much difficulty subsequent to
the British occupation. They were provisions in-
tended to guard against an act of bankruptcy, and
inasmuch as the result of the British occupation was
to place the Egyptian Treasury in a state of assured
solvency, any preventive action on the part of the
Commission of the Debt became unnecessary when
once the first few years of acute crisis were passed.
Other functions were, however, vested in the
Commissioners, which were of greater practical
importance.
The Law of Liquidation, coupled with the
Decree of July 27, 1885, which was promulgated
on the occasion of the issue of an Egyptian Loan
of £9,000,000 guaranteed by the Powers of Europe,
laid down a method for balancing the accounts of
the Egyptian Treasury at the end of each year
which was a triumph of financial cumbersomeness
and ineptitude. At the time of the London Con-
ference, the French, who were supported by some
other Continental Powers, were politically hostile
to England, and, moreover, looked almost ex-
clusively to the interests of the bondholders.
The British Treasury officials could see but one
point, namely, that the Government of Egypt were
embarrassed by having spent too much money in
the past ; therefore, it was held, a stringent control
VOL. II X
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should be exercised to prevent extravagant ex-
penditure in tlie future. The argument was
sound, but it was forgotten at the time that the
expenditure was being incurred under conditions
wholly different from those which had obtained in
the past. A wise foresight would have given greater
latitude to the British advisers of the Egyptian
Government than could have been prudently
accorded to Ismail Pasha. It was, however, im-
possible to obtain a hearing for arguments of this
nature. The Egyptian Government did, indeed,
manage to obtain a sum of £1,000,000 to spend on
Irrigation, but beyond this it was found impossible
to shake the mistrust of the French and the pre-
conceived ideas of the British Treasury officials.
The latter aided in establishing a system which
proved subsequently to be a fertile source of
embarrassment to their own countrymen in Egypt.
It had been laid down by the Decrees of 1876
that certain revenues should be pledged to the
service of the Debt, whilst other revenues should
be left at the disposal of the Egyptian Govern-
ment to provide for their administrative expenditure.
AVhen the Guaranteed Loan of 1885 was contracted,
the distribution of what, in Gallicised English, are
called the "affected" and the " non - affected "
revenues, had to be reconsidered. Care was taken
to increase the relative amount of the former, so
that the bondholders should not run any risk, with
the result that the amount of the latter was rela-
tiv^ely diminished. The administrative expenditure
was fixed at a certain figure, the only concession,
which was with difficulty obtained, being that the
working expenses of the Railway administration
should not be unalterable, but should be taken at
45 per cent^ of the gross receipts. If the non-
* In 1902, after prolonged negotiations, this figure was increased to
a maximum of 55 per cent.
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affected revenues did not yield the sum at which
the administrative expenditure was fixed, the
deficit had to be made good from the affected
revenues. The surpkis on the whole account con-
sisted of the money remaining in the hands of the
Commissioners of the Debt from the affected
revenues after the deficit in the non - affected
revenues, if any, had been made good. This
surplus was divided into two portions. One
portion remained in the hands of the Commis-
sioners ; the other was paid to the Egyptian
Government. The result was that, if the Govern-
ment wished to spend £lO in excess of the adminis-
trative limit prescribed by international agreement,
revenue to the extent of £20 had to be collected
in order to meet the expenditure. As the country
progressed, legitimate demands for fresh expendi-
ture arose, but under the system devised in 1885,
the anomaly was presented that the Government
had to pay double for everything in the nature of
an improvement involving fresh expenditure ; that
the administration was starved ; that money was
plentiful ; but that no one benefited in any
adequate degree from its abundance.
It would be tedious to describe in detail
the involved calculation which had to be made
before the true surplus at the disposal of the
Egyptian Treasury could be ascertained. It will
be sufficient to quote the figures of one year
as an example of the results obtained under the
system.
In 1892, the revenue of the Egyptian Govern-
ment amounted to £E. 10,304,000, and the expen-
diture to £E.9,595,000. It would naturally be
supposed by any one unacquainted with the intri-
cacies of Egyptian finance that a surplus remained
at the disposal of the Government amounting to
the difference between these two sums, namely,
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£E. 769,000. Any such conclusion would have
been altogether erroneous.
After winding through the financial labyrinth,
which was constructed by the Powers, and which
is a typical instance of the results of international
administration, it was found that the real surplus
in the hands of the Egyptian Treasury was only
£E. 179,000, a difference of no less than £E.590,000.
Appearances in Egypt are deceptive.
It was originally intended that any surplus
remaining in the hands of the Commissioners
should be applied to the extinction of debt. For
the first few years of the British occupation, this
matter was not of much ])ractical importance, as no
surplus was available. But when financial affairs
became more settled, Sir Edgar Vincent's inven-
tive mind gave birth to a scheme under which
the surplus at the end of each year was to be
allowed to accumulate in a Reserve Fund. Extinc-
tion of debt was not to begin until the Reserve
Fund amounted to £E.2,000,000. Thus, the
Treasury would, it was hoped, eventually have a
large sum of money in hand to guard against any
unforeseen contingencies which might occur.
The idea was excellent. It obtained the assent
of the Powers, and was embodied in a Decree dated
July 12, 1888. Article 3 of this Decree described
how the money belonging to the Reserve Fund
might be spent. Inter alia, it was to be applied
to " extraordinary expenditure undertaken with
the previous assent of the Commission of the
Debt." This was a provision of great importance,
for as the Reserve Fund increased, it was found
possible to turn the money over, and, by making
advances to the Government, to allow various
works of public utility to be constructed. As,
however, it rested with the Commission to decide
whether any advance should be made, it is obvious
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that, under the Decree of 1888, the powers vested
in the Commissioners were notably increased.^
Such, therefore, were the attributes of the
Commission of the Pubhc Debt. During Ismail
Pasha's time, this institution, though its organisa-
tion was in many respects defective, played an
important and useful part in Egyptian affairs.
Subsequent to the British occupation, the inutility
of the Commission became, year by year, more
apparent. It cost the Treasury some £E. 40,000
a year. All the necessary work of a National Debt
Office could have been done by one official and a
small staff of clerks.
In blaming the institution, however, it would
be unjust to cast indiscriminate blame on the
individuals concerned. Some of the Commis-
sioners have been intelligent and capable men who
have performed their duties in a reasonable spirit
of impartiality. Indeed, the Egyptian authorities
have always preferred dealing with the Commission
of the Debt to dealing with the Powers. The
Commissioners, being on the spot, are exposed
to local influences, and possess a certain amount
of local knowledge. They are, therefore, more
likely to judge financial matters on their own
merits than those who, sitting at a distance,
look at Egyptian affairs from a wholly political
point of view. It is, however, none the less true
that whatever reforms have been accomplished
with the co-operation of the Caisse could have
been equally well and probably better accomplished
had the Caisse not existed. The only purpose
which this institution eventually served was to
act as an obstacle to progress, and occasionally
as an agency for the manifestation of hostility
* Tlie question of how this Decree should be interpreted gave rise to
a lawsuit when, in 189G, a majority of the Commissioners of tlie Debt
made a grant of £E. 500,000 to meet the expenses of the Dougola
campaign.— Vide p. 85 et seq.
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towards England. It often happens that an
institution survives after the circumstances to
which it owes its origin have passed away. The
result is that the institution becomes hurtful,
although the individuals associated with it may-
be deserving of respect. This is what took place
with regard to the Commission of the Public
Debt
In 1904, as a result of negotiations with the
Powers, the functions of the Commission of the
Debt underwent a radical change. Without
going into any elaborate detail, it may be said
that the Commissioners are now merely receivers
on the part of the bondholders. They cannot in
any way interfere with administrative affairs.
In 1912, the Egyptian Government will be free
to convert the whole of the Debt. If the con-
version takes place, the Commission of the Debt
will presumably disappear altogether.
2. Railway Administration,
Under the Decree of November 18, 1876, a
Board was constituted to administer the Railways,
the Telegraphs, and the Port of Alexandria. It
originally consisted of two Englislmien, of whom
one was President, a Frenchman, and two Egyp-
tians. Subsequently, the number of English and
of Egyptian members was reduced to one of each
nationality.
The English and French members were named
on the proposal of their respective Governments.
The Board made appointments to all subordinate
places in the administration. The superior officials
were nominated by the Khedive on the proposal
of the Board. Changes of tariff were made
by the Board with the sanction of the Egyptian
Government.
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Two very competent Englishmen, Colonel
Marindin and Mr. (now Lord) Farrer, were em-
ployed in 1887 to report on the Egyptian Railways.
This is the judgment which they passed on the
system of administration :
—
" The administration of the Egyptian Railways,
as at present constituted, differs considerably from
any with which we are acquainted. The control
is vested in three members whose functions are
midefined as regards the different branches of the
working of the railway. We understand that
there is no one individual who is separately
responsible for the management of the railways.
It is obvious that the result of this divided
responsibility has been especially injurious to the
working of a commercial business such as railways
must necessarily be, and we are of opinion that it
is absolutely essential for the satisfactory working
of the Egyptian Railways, and for the maintenance
of discipline upon them, that the management of
them, as a whole, together with the control of
heads of Departments, should be vested in one
person with a position analogous to that of the
Managing Director or General Manager of Rail-
ways in other countries."
Obviously, the management should have been
vested in one person, but internationalism abhors
the one-man system as much as nature abhors a
vacuum. The sheet-anchor of internationalism is,
indeed, that several men should be set to do the
work of one.
It was, however, said of Richelieu, by one of
his enemies, *'il est capable de tout, meme du
bien." So also it may be noted that international
administration, although it can never yield fruits
at all comparable with those which may be
obtained under more rational administrative
systems, may at times be forced into some
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degree of action, and will then produce results
which the casual observer may think are due to
the excellence of the system, whereas they are
in reality for tlie most part obtained by the
occurrence of adventitious circumstances in spite
of the system. Administrative internationalism,
like Richelieu, is occasionally capable, if not of
absolute good, at all events of assuming a fictitious
appearance of goodness.
Thus, the Egyptian Railways benefited by the
increase of prosperity and by the general reform-
ing impulse which was imparted to the Egyptian
administrative macliine by the predominance of
British influence in the country. They would
have benefited still more had the British reformers
been from the first allowed a free hand in dealing
with their administration.
In 1904, as a consequence of the arrangements
with the Powers, to which allusion has already
been made, the Egyptian Government acquired
full right to deal with the Railway Administration
in any way they might think fit.
Few, save those behind the scenes, have prob-
ably recognised fully that the Anglo - French
Agreement was only signed just in time to prevent
a complete breakdown of the Railway Administra-
tion. Such, however, is unquestionably the case.
If means had not been found to spend a large
amount of capital on developments and improve-
ments, the railways of Egypt would have been
wholly unable to cope with the growing require-
ments of the country.
Towards the close of 1905, Sir Charles Scotter
visited Egypt and made a full report on the con-
dition of the Egyptian Railways.^ His suggestions
are now being carried out. The Railway Adminis-
tration is being thoroughly reorganised. Capital
» See Egypt, No. 1 of 1906, pp. 110-113.
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expenditure to the extent of £3,000,000 has been
sanctioned, of which £1,635,000 was ex])ended
before the close of 1906. It is probable that an
additional grant of £1,000,000 will be eventually
required. Thus, it may be hoped that before long
the Egyptian Railway Administration will be in
thoroughly good order.
Looking back to one of my earliest Reports ^ I
notice that in 1890, the Egyptian Railways carried
4,700,000 passengers and 1,683,000 tons of goods.
In 1906, they carried no less than 22,550,000
passengers and 20,030,000 tons of goods. These
figures serve as a striking illustration of the im-
mense improvement in the material condition of
the country Avhich has taken place during the last
few years. They also afford an ample justification
for the large reductions which have been made in
the rates.
^
In addition to the State Railways, a network of
1145 kilometres of Agricultural Railways, which
are owned by private companies, exists in Egypt.
These railways are largely used. In 1906, they
carried 6,924,000 passengers and 929,000 tons of
goods.
3. Daira Sanieh.
The Daira properties formed part of the huge
estates which Ismail Pasha contrived, generally by
illicit and arbitrary methods, to accumulate in his
own hands. They originally extended over an
area of more than half a million of acres. When
Ismail got into financial difficulties, he borrowed
> Egypt, No. 1 of 1802, p. 20.
2 1 may remark that the same lesson is to be learnt from an
examination of the statistics of the Post Office and Teleji^raph Depart-
ments, in both of which the rates liave been largely reduced. In 1885,
only 12,500,000 letters and 83,000 parcels passed throuj^h the Post
Office. In 1905,the figures were : letters, .50,700,000 ; parcels, 250,000.
In 1906, no less than 1,925,000 telegrams, of which 1,248,000 were io
Arabic, passed over the lines, as compared to about 311,000 in 1890.
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£9,500,000 on the security of these properties.
They were administered by a Board of Directors,
consisting of an Egyptian Director-General, and
two Controllers, one British and one French. The
Director-General was the executive officer, but the
Controllers had ample powers of supervision and
inspection. They alone were the legal representa-
tives of the bondholders.
Until the year 1891, the Daira expenditure
was always in excess of the revenue. On several
occasions the deficits exceeded £200,000. With
the exception of the year 1895, when there was a
deficit amounting to £102,000, the accounts of
every year subsequent to 1890 showed a surplus.
In the two years 1904-5, the revenue exceeded
the expenditure by no less than £817,000.
In 1898, an arrangement was made under which
the Daira estates were sold to a company, who
again resold them in lots. The sales are now com-
plete. Most of the purchasers were Egyptians.
The Government share in the profits of the
liquidation amounted to about £3,280,000.
4. The Domains Administration,
The properties, known by the name of the
Domains, comprise the estates ceded, under pres-
sure, by Ismail Pasha in 1878.^ On the security
of these estates, a loan of £8,500,000 was negoti-
ated with Messrs. Rothschild. It was, at the same
time, arranged that the Domains should be ad-
ministered by a Commission consisting of an
Englishman, a Frenchman, and an Egyptian.
Up to the year 1899, the reveinie yielded by
the estates was invariably less than the expendi-
ture. In one year (1885) the deficit amounted to
no less than £275,000. From 1900 onwards, a
* Vide ante, \o\. i. p. 63.
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surplus, varying from £26,000 to £150,000, was
always realised.
By gradual sales ^ the extent of the Domains
properties, which originally consisted of nearly
426,000 acres of land, was reduced by the close of
1906 to about 147,000 acres. Simultaneously, the
outstanding capital of the loan was reduced from
£8,500,000 to about £1,316,000.^ It cannot be
doubted that the whole of this loan will be paid
off before long, and that, when this is done, some
very valuable lands will remain at the disposal of
the Government.^
With the sale of the Daira and Domains lands,
almost the last traces of the injury which Ismail
Pasha inflicted on his country, by accumulating
1,000,000 acres of the best land in Egypt in the
hands of himself and his family, will disappear.
Some comprehension of these institutions is
necessary in order to understand the extent to
which the freedom of action of the British officials
in Egypt was at one time crippled. A brief
examination of that curious mosaic termed the
Judicial System of Egypt will tend to bring into
still stronger relief the anomalous position occupied
by the Anglo-Egyptian reformer. In the case of
those institutions of which I have so far treated, the
shackles have now been, for the most part, struck
off. In the case of those with which I am about to
deal, they still remain and bar the way to reform.
^ The great majority of the purchasers have been Egyptians. The
land was, for the most part, sold in small lots.
2 On November 30, 1907, the outstanding capital of this loan
amounted to only £1,050,940.
^ If the present price of land is maintained, the value of the estates
which will remain over after the complete liquidation of the loan will
probably be about £6,000,000.
CHAPTER XLII
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The ?/Hxed Courts—Nubar Pasha's objects in creating them
—
Attributes
and composition of the Mixed Courts—Defects in the institution
—
Tlie Consular Courts—The Native Tribunals and the Kadi's Courts
—Summary of jurisdictions in Egypt.
In creating the International Tribunals, or, as
they are more frequently called, the Mixed Courts,
Nubar Pasha had two objects in view. In the
first place, he was struck with the fact that,
inasmuch as the European adventurers who flocked
to Egypt during the reigns of Said and of Ismail had
no legal means for obtaining a redress of any real or
imaginary grievances, they fell back, in case of need,
on diplomatic support, with results that were not
unfrequently disastrous to the Egyptian Treasury.
Nubar Pasha, therefore, conceived the statesmanlike
project of creating law-courts, which should com-
mand the confidence of Europe, and which should
be empowered to try civil suits between Europeans,
on the one hand, and Egyptians or the Egyptian
Government, on the other hand. In the second
place, although in dealing with Ismail Pasha this
aspect of the case was kept in the background,
Nubar Pasha wished to erect a legal barrier between
the population of Egypt and the capricious
despotism of the Khedive. His original intention
was to place all the inhabitants of Egypt, whether
Europeans or Egyptians, under the jurisdiction of
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the Mixed Courts. This part of the project,
however, fell to the ground owing to the strong
opposition which it encountered at Constantinople,
and perhaps it was as well that it did so, for the
complete realisation of Nubar Pasha's idea would
have entailed the internationalisation of the whole
judicial system of the country.
Nubar Pasha's first object was, however, attained.
From 1875 onwards, any European who has had a
claim either against an Egyptian or against the
Egyptian Government, has no longer been under the
necessity of seeking diplomatic support. He has
been referred both by the Egyptian Government
and by the diplomatic agent of his country to a
properly constituted law-court in which it was com-
petent for him to make good his claim, if it was a
just one. From every point of view, the result has
been beneficial. The claimant, with the Egyptian
code before him, has been able to form a fair idea of
what he might expect from the law-courts. The
Egyptian Government have, on the one hand, been
obliged to acknowledge their legal and contractual
obligations ; on the other hand, they have been re-
lieved from capricious diplomatic pressure on behalf
of individuals, and they have not unfrequently in-
voked the law with success in order to be saved from
the exorbitant demands of contractors and others.
The diplomatic agent has been relieved from the
unpleasant obligation of supporting claims, which
were often of doubtful validity from a technical,
and of more than doubtful morality from an
equitable point of view.
By the irony of fate, the institution to which
Ismail Pasha was induced to assent, probably with
only a half knowledge of what it meant, was the
instrument which dealt him his political death-
blow. When the law-courts, to whose creation
the Powers of Europe had been parties, condemned
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him to pay certain sums of money, and wlien he
found himself unable to pay them, the cup of his
iniquity overflowed, and Europe—legally outraged,
and politically timorous of what the future might
bring forth—spoke out and said, " You must pay
or go." Ismail Pasha could not pay. After a few
ineffectual struggles, he went.
It is unnecessary to describe at length the attri-
butes and composition of the Mixed Courts. It
will be sufficient to say that a Court of Appeal
sits at Alexandria, and that three Courts of First
Instance exist, one at Cairo, one at Alexandria,
and one at Mansourah. Egyptian judges sit on
all these Courts, but most of the real work is done
by Europeans. The European judges of the
Court of Appeal are for the most part chosen from
amongst the subjects of the Great Powers. All the
Powers, without distinction, are represented on
the Courts of First Instance. The choice of judges
rests nominally with the Egyptian Government.
In reality, the judges have until quite recently
been nominated by their respective Governments.
The jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts extends over
all civil cases between Europeans and Egyptians,
whether the European appears as plaintiff or
defendant ; also, over civil cases between Europeans
of different nationalities.
The principal defect of the Mixed Courts is
that the judges are not merely interpreters of the
law ; they are also to a great extent makers of it.
They are not under the effective control of any
legislature. If, as is both natural and occasionally
almost unavoidable, they attempt, by a some-
what strained interpretation of their charter,
to usurp functions which do not belong to them,
there is no one to restrain them. In order
that any new law should be recognised by the
Mixed Courts, it must receive the assent of all the
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Powers, and experience has shown that it is
generally impossible, and always dijEficult and
tedious, to ensure the required unanimity. Legis-
lation by diplomacy is probably the worst and
most cumbersome form of legislation in the world.
Under these circumstances, it is easy to understand
that the judges of the Mixed Courts are practically
a law unto themselves.
When the Indian code was framed, some of
the most acute intellects of the time devoted
themselves to a lengthy examination of the
subject with a view to deciding what provisions
of European law and procedure, whether British
or Roman, could be adapted to the circumstances
and requirements of India. The result was the pro-
duction of an admirable code, which was essentially
Indian. No such care was taken in Egypt. The
Egyptian code was originally little more than a
textual copy of the French code, and, moreover,
it was applied by judges who, although in some
instances men of ability, were necessarily ignorant
of Egyptian manners and customs. The result
was that great hardship was at times inflicted,
more especially in respect to the application of the
laws regulating the relations between debtor and
creditor. The ignorant Egyptian debtor found
himself, before he was aware of it, gripped in the
iron hand of the law, which was mercilessly applied
by his Levantine creditor. Eventually, some
modifications were made, but even now the law
and procedure are too European for the country.
The Mixed Courts only exercise criminal juris-
diction over Europeans in a certain number of
specified cases, most of which are of rare occurrence.
For the most ])art, any European resident in Egypt
who is accused of crime is tried by his Consul
according to the laws of his own country.
The Native Tribunals instituted under Lord
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Dufferin's auspices exercise civil and criminal
jurisdiction over Ottoman subjects, save in respect
to matters relating to personal status, which are
decided by the Kadi according to the system of
ecclesiastical jurisprudence embodied in the Sacred
Law of Islam. The working of these Tribunals
will be discussed at a later period of this work.
To sum up, if an Egyptian and a European
wish some civil cause of dispute between them to
be decided, they go to the ^lixed Courts. If an
European commits a criminal offence against an
Egyptian, he is tried by his Consul, with an appeal
possibly to Aix, Ancona, Odessa, or elsewhere,
according to the nationality of the accused.
If an Egyptian brings a civil suit against another
Egyptian, or if he commits any criminal offence
whether against a European or another Egyptian,
he comes under the jurisdiction of the Native
Tribunals, which administer the French code,
modified in some respects to suit Egypt. If an
Egyptian wishes to prove a will or to dispute a
succession, he has to go to the Kadi, who will
decide according to the Sheriat.
Enough has now been said to give an idea of
the main features of the judicial labyrinth which
time and international rivalry have built up in
Egypt.
CHAPTER XLIII
THE WORKERS OF THE MACHINE
Importance of persons rather than of systems—The British Consul-
General—Tewfik Pasha—The Prime Ministers— Cherif Pasha
—
Nubar Pasha—Riaz Pasha—Mustapha Pasha FehmL
An endeavour has been made in the four preceding
chapters to give some idea of the machinery of
Government in Egypt in so far as the different
parts of the machine can be described by reference
to documents setting forth the official functions
which are assigned to the various individuals and
corporations who collectively make or, at one time,
made up the governing body. This description is,
however, incomplete ; indeed, in some respects it
is almost misleading ; for allusion has so far only
been made to those portions of the State machinery
whose functions can be described with some deo-ree
of precision. There are, however, other portions
of that machinery whose functions are incapable oi
exact definition, but whose existence is none the
less real. Whether, in fact, the whole machine
works well or ill depends in no small degree upon
the action of those parts of the machinery which,
to a superficial observer, might appear unnecessary,
if not detrimental to its efficient working. In the
Egyptian body politic, the unseen is often more
important than the seen. Notably, of late years
a vague but preponderant power has been vested
in the hands of the British Consul-GeneraL The
VOL. II 821 T
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defects in this system of government are obvious.
Its only justification is that, under the existing
condition of affairs in Egypt, it is impossible to
substitute anything better in its place.
I proceed to give a sketch of the duties of the
British Consul-General, but inasmuch as during the
greater portion of the period of which this history
treats, I occupied the post of Consul-General, I
must, for obvious reasons, leave it to others to
appreciate the manner in which those duties were
performed.
Looking to the general condition of Egyptian
society ; to the unscrupulous methods by which it
was customary to advance personal aims ; to the
untruthfulness, corruption, and intrigue with which
Egyptian society was honeycombed ; and finally, to
the fact that whatever pseudo-civilisation existed
in Egypt was often tainted by reason of its having
drawn its inspirations from those portions of the
European social system which are least worthy of
imitation,—it always appeared to me that the first
and most important duty of the British representa-
tive in Egypt was, by example and precept, to set
up a high standard of morality, both in his public
and private life, and thus endeavour to raise the
standard of those around him. If I have in any
way succeeded in this endeavour ; if I have helped
to purge Egyptian administration of corruption ; if
it is gradually dawning on the Egyptian mind that
honesty is not only the most honourable but also
the most paying policy, and that lying and
intrigue curse the liar and intriguer as well as his
victim,—I owe the success, in so far as public
matters are concerned, to the co-operation of a
body of high-minded British officials who have
persistently held up to all with whom they have
been brought in contact a standard of probity
heretofore unknown in Egypt, and, in so far as
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social life is concerned, T owed it, until cruel death
intervened to sever the tie which bound us together,
mainly to the gentle yet commanding influence of
her who first instigated me to write this book.
The duty of a diplomatic agent in a foreign
country is to carry out to the best of his ability
the policy of the Government which he serves.
My main difficulty in Egypt was that the Britisli
Government never had any definite policy which
was capable of execution ; they were, indeed, at
one time constantly striving to square the circle,
that is to say, they were endeavouring to carry out
two policies which were irreconcilable, namely, the
policy of reform, and the counter-policy of evacua-
tion. The British Government are not to be blamed
on this account. The circumstances were of a
nature to preclude the possibility of adopting a
clear-cut line of action, which would have enabled
the means to be on all occasions logically adapted
to the end.
I never received any general instructions for my
guidance during the time I lield the post of British
Consul-General in Egypt, and I never asked for
any such instructions, for I knew that it was
useless for me to do so. IMy course of action was
decided according to the merits of each case with
which I had to deal. Sometimes I spurred the
unwilling Egyptian along the path of reform. At
other times, I curbed the impatience of the British
reformer. Sometimes I had to explain to the old-
world Mohammedan, the Mohammedan of the
Sheriat, the elementary differences between the
principles of government in vogue in the seventh
and in the nineteenth centuries. At other times, I
had to explain to the young Gallicised Egyptian that
the principles of an ultra-Republican Government
were not applicable in their entirety to the exist-
ing phase of Egyptian society, and that, when we
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speak of the rights of man, some distinction has
necessarily to be made in practice between a Euro-
pean spouting nonsense through the medium -of
a fifth -rate newspaper in his own country, and
man in the person of a ragged Egyptian fellah,
possessed of a sole garment, and who is unable to
read a newspaper in any language whatsoever. I
had to support the reformer sufficiently to prevent
him from being discouraged, and sufficiently also
to enable him to carry into execution all that was
essential in his reforming policy. I had to check
the reformer when he wished to push his reforms
so far as to shake the whole political fabric ^ in his
endeavour to overcome the tiresome and, to his
eyes, often trumpery obstacles in his path, and
thus lay bare to the world that measures which
were dictated in the true interests of Egypt were
opposed by many who had, by accident or by
the political cant of the day, been elevated to the
position of being the putative representatives of
Egyptian public opinion. I had to support the
supremacy of the Sultan and, at the same time,
to oppose any practical Turkish interference in the
administration, which necessarily connoted a relapse
into barbarism. I had at one time to do nothing
inconsistent with a speedy return to Egyptian self-
government, or, at all events, a return to govern-
ment by the hybrid coterie of Cairo, which flaunts
before the world as the personification of Egyptian
autonomy ; whilst, at the same time, I was well
aware that, for a long time to come, European
guidance will be essential if the administration is to
be conducted on sound principles. I had at times to
1 Sir John Seeley (Growth of British Policy, ii. p. 323), speaking of
William III., says: "The main reason why his work has proved so
stranii^ely durable is that it was never excessive. He had a wise
parsimony in action. . . . The masterpieces of the statesman's art are
for the most part not acts, but abstinences from action." A somewhat
eimilar view was frequently advanced by Burke.
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retire into my diplomatic shell, and to pose as one
amongst many representatives of foreign Powers.
At other times, I had to step forward as the
representative of the Sovereign whose soldiers held
Egypt in their grip. At one time, I had to deftnd
Egypt against European aggression, and, not un-
frequently, I had in the early days of the occupa-
tion to defend the British position against foreign
attack. I had to keep in touch with the well-
intentioned, generally reasonable, but occasionally
ill-informed public opinion of England, when I
knew that the praise or blame of the British
Parliament and press was a very faulty standard
by which to judge the wisdom or unwisdom of my
acts. I had to maintain British authority and, at
the same time, to hide as much as possible the fact
that I was maintaining it. I had a military force
at my disposal, which I could not use save in the
face of some grave emergency. I had to work
through British agents over whom I possessed no
control, save that based on personal authority and
moral suasion. I had to avoid any step which
might involve the creation of European difficulties
by reason of local troubles. I had to keep the
Egyptian question simmering, and to avoid any
action which might tend to force on its premature
consideration, and I had to do this at one time when
all, and at another time when some of the most
important Powers were more or less opposed to
British policy. Lastly, the most heterogeneous
petty questions were continually coming before me.
If a young British officer was cheated at cards, I had
to get him out of his difficulties. If a slave girl
wanted to marry, I had to bring moral pressure on
her master or mistress to give their consent. If a
Jewish sect wished for official recognition from the
Egyptian Government, I was expected to obtain
it, and to explain to an Egyptian Minister all I
326 MODERN EGYPT va. iv
knew of the difference between Ashkenazian and
Sephardic practices. If the inhabitants of some
remote village in Upper Egypt were discontented
witli their Sheikh, they a})pealed to me. I have
had to write telegrams and despatches about the
most miscellaneous subjects—about the dismissal
of the Khedive's English coachman, about pre-
serving the lives of Irish informers from the Clan-
na-Gael conspirators, and about the tenets of the
Abyssinian Church in respect to the Procession of
the Holy Ghost. I have been asked to interfere
in order to get a German missionary, who had been
guilty of embezzlement, out of prison ; in order to
get a place for the French and Italian Catholics to
bury their dead ; in order to get a dead Mohammedan
of great sanctity exhumed ; in order to prevent a
female member of the Khedivial family from striking
her husband over the mouth with a slipper ; and in
order to arrange a marriage between two other
members of the same family whom hard-hearted
relatives kept apart. I have had to take one
English maniac in my own carriage to a Lunatic
Asylum ; I have caused another to be turned out of
the English church ; and I have been informed
that a tliiid and remarkably muscular madman was
on his way to my house, girt with a towel round
his loins, and bearing a poker in his hands with the
intention of using that implement on my head. I
have been asked by an Egyptian fellah to find out
the whereabouts of his wife who had eloped ; and
by a German professor to send him at once six live
electric shad-fish, from the Nile. To sum up the
situation in a few words, I had not, indeed, to
govern Egypt, but to assist in the government of
the country without the appearance of doing so
and without any legitimate authority over the
ajxents with whom I had to deal.
Under these somewhat bewildering circum-
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stances, the only general principles which I was
able to lay down for my own guidance were,
first, to settle all purely local matters on the spot,
with as little reference as possible to London
;
secondly, to refer for instructions in respect to any
matter which was calculated either to raise diplo-
matic questions outside the local sphere of interest,
or to attract serious attention in Parliament. On
the whole, I think it may be said that this system
worked as well as could, under the very peculiar
circumstances of the situation, have been expected.
A middle course was steered between the extremes
of centralisation and decentralisation.
It is clear that the working of a nondescript
Government, such as that which has existed in
Egypt since 1882, must depend mainly on the
personal characteristics of the individuals who are
at the head of affairs. The principal person who
figured on the Egyptian stage during the first
nine years of the British occupation was the late
Khedive, Tewfik Pasha.
The best friends of Tewfik Pasha would probably
not contend that he was a great man or an ideal
Khedive. There was, in fact, no real greatness
about him. He was a monogamist, and thus set
a good example to his countrymen. He was an
indulgent and well-intentioned father who en-
deavoured to educate his children well. He acquired
a reputation for devotion, whilst he was devoid of
any tinge of the intolerance with which devout
Islamism is sometimes tainted. His piety kept
him in touch with his Moslem subjects, and thus
constituted a political factor of some importance.
Judged by the standard of his surroundings, he
was loyal and straightforward. Like most of liis
countrymen, he would shirk responsibility, and
would endeavour to throw as much as he could on
the shoulders of others, He would complain of the
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number of Europeans in the Egyptian sen ice, and
when any European asked him for a place, he
would reply that personally he would be delighted
to grant the request, but that some British
authority prevented him from following the
benevolent dictates of his heart. He was apathetic,
and wanting in initiative, but, when forced to take
a decision, would not unfrequently show a good
deal of dignified common sense and shrewdness.
He was kind-hearted, and even at times displayed
some signs of gratitude for services rendered to
him, a quality which is rare in an Oriental ruler.
Warned by the example of his father, he shunned
extravagance to the extent, indeed, of being
occasionally accused of avarice, but he sometimes
performed acts of real generosity. There was
little of the typical Oriental despot in Tewfik
Pasha's character. He professed a deep, and,
without doubt, genuine dislike to all arbitrary,
oppressive, or cruel acts. He was never personally
responsible for the commission of any such act,
although it may well be that from apathy and
negligence he allowed injustice to be occasionally
perpetrated in his name. He was not highly
educated. He rarely, if ever, read a book, but he
studied the newspapers ; he conversed with all
sorts and conditions of men ; he was fairly quick
in mastering any facts which were explained to
him, and in picking up the thread of an argument.
From the point of view of intellectual acuteness,
he was probably rather above the average of his
countrymen. He obtained, not by study but by
practical experience in dealing with men and things,
a fair education of a nature which is useful to a
man occupying a high public position. I^ike most
of his countrymen, he would yield a ready assent
to any high-sounding general principle. In practice,
he would often fail to see that some action, which
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it was proposed to take, was at variance with the
principle to whicli he had assented ; nevertheless,
when the dissonance between the particular act
and the principle was brought home to him, he
would generally, by some process of reasoning,
which would be unfamiliar, if not incomprehensible,
to the clear-cut European mind, arrive at the
conclusion that the commission of the act
was reprehensible. His conduct during the events
of 1882 showed that he was not wanting in
courage. On the whole, it may be said that, if
Tewfik Pasha's virtues were mediocre, his faults
were of a venial character. If he excited none of
the admiration due to moral greatness or to high
intellectual qualities, neither did he excite repro-
bation by sinking below the moral and intellectual
standard of his surroundings. He was morally
and intellectually respectable, and, considered as a
man rather than as a ruler of men, he met with the
qualified commendation which is usually meted
out to respectability. His character and conduct
were not of a nature to excite enthusiasm on his
behalf. On the other hand, they rarely formed
the subject of severe condemnation. In the
majority of cases which attracted })ublic attention,
the faint praise, which is scarcely distinguishable
from an implication of blame, was accorded to him.
He probably deserved more praise than he ever
obtained. He honestly wished to do his duty.
He was really interested in the welfare of his
subjects, but he was bewildered by the involved
nature of his position, and did not see clearly how
his duty could best be performed. For this he
may be pardoned, more especially when it is
remembered that he had no ex])erience of the
world outside Egypt. Tewfik Pasha never visited
Europe.
If he was not a great man, neither was he an
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ideal Khedive. If he had been a man of excep-
tionally firm will, high character, and acute
intellect, he would have put himself at the head
of the policy of reform in Egypt ; he would have
asserted his own authority ; he would have shown
no jealousy of the Englishmen who were employed
in his service ; he would have co-operated actively
with them in the cause of reform, and he would
have forced the Egyptians in his service to yield
a similar loyal co-operation. Tewfik Pasha did
not possess the strength of character to adopt a
bold policy of this sort, and perhaps it would have
been Utopian to expect that he should have
done so.
Although, however, Tewfik Pasha was not an
ideal Khedive, nevertheless, looking to all the
circumstances of the time, and to the character-
istics of Oriental rulers generally, it may be said
that he possessed, in a somewhat exceptional
degree, many qualities which singularly fitted him
to occupy the post he held during the time
he held it. Under the regime of a fanatical
Moslem, or of a man of arbitrary temperament
and despotic tendencies, or of a feeble voluptu-
ary indifferent to everything which did not
minister to his own pleasures— all types which are
common in the history of Oriental countries—the
difficulties in the way of launching Egypt on the
path of progress would have been greatly increased.
Tewfik Pasha possessed the negative virtue that he
answered to none of these descriptions, and, under
the circumstances, this was a virtue of incalculable
value. But he possessed more than negative
virtues. He could lay claim to some good qualities
of a positive character. If he did not take any
active part in initiating reforms, he was content
that others should do so for him. If he could not
lead the reformers, he had no objection to follow-
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ing their lead. If he did not afford any very active
assistance to the small band of Englishmen who
were laying the foundations of a prosperous future
for Egypt, neither did he interfere actively to
place obstacles in their path ; indeed, he often
used his influence to remove obstacles. His
position was one of great difficulty. On the one
hand, it was dangerous to oppose the English, and,
moreover, he was sufficiently intelligent to see that
it was contrary to his own interests and to those of
his country to do so. On the other hand, if he
threw himself into the arms of the English, he was
sure to lose popularity amongst certain influential
sections of his own countrymen. The natural
result was that Tewfik Pasha developed a consider-
able talent for trimming. The circumstances of
the time were, indeed, such that he could scarcely
with prudence adopt any other line of policy ; and,
as a trimmer, he played his part remarkably well.
He afforded an admirable link between the
Englishman nnd the Egyptian, and he often per-
formed useful work in moderating the views of
either side. In the performance of this task, he
naturally came in for a good deal of criticism from
both quarters. He might often have said :
In moderation placing all my glory,
While Tories call me Whig, and Whigs a Tory,
Moreover, Tewfik Pasha possessed another very
valuable quality. He knew his country and his
countrymen well. It was not in vain tliat Arslbi
had marched with horse, foot, and artillery into the
square of Abdin Palace, and had imposed his will
on his reluctant Sovereign. It was not in vain that
he had listened to the inflated rubbish talked by
would-be patriots about free institutions, which were
uncongenial to the soil of Egypt. He had laid
these matters to heart. He knew the ignorance
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and credulity of the mass of the population. He
recognised the danger of fanning the smoulder-
ing embers of Moslem fanaticism. He apj^reciated
the difficulties of his position, and he knew that if he
did not lean on the strong arm of England, many
of those who knelt at his feet would be ready,
should the occasion arise and should they see their
own profit in doing so, to turn on him and rend
him. He was deeply impressed with the fact
that he owed his position to British interference.
He recognised his weakness, and he knew that,
should he ever incur the serious displeasure of
England, that two-handed engine at the door, in the
shape of the British fleet and the British army,
stood ready to strike once and strike no more.
Thus, though he would coquette with those who
urged him to oppose the English, he never allowed
himself to be pushed too far in this direction. I
once had to remind him that Ismail Pasha was on
the shores of the Bosphorus, and that his return
to Cairo was not altogether outside the verge of
practical politics, upon which Tewfik Pasha made
the significant remark: "Un JSIinistre on pent
toujours changer, mais le Khedive— c'est autre
chose." A change of INlinistry shortly afterwards
occurred, for Tewfik Pasha was wise enough never
to identify himself fully with the policy of any
Minister. He knew that a change of JNIinistry was
an admirable political safety-valve, and when he
felt his own ])osition in any danger, he very wisely
did not hesitate to send a ministerial scapegoat
into the wilderness.
I bear Tewfik's name in kindly and respectful
remembrance, for thougli I daresay he winced under
the pressure, which I occasionally brought to bear
on him, my relations with him were very pleasant
and friendly, neither did tliey in any way redound
to his discredit. The idea, which under the influence
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of the Anglophobe party took some root in Egypt,
to the effect that he was a mere tool in my hands,
is wholly untrue and most unjust to his memory.
I used to discuss matters with him. When any
difference of opinion occurred, I yielded to him
quite as often—indeed, I think more often—than
he yielded to me. We generally came to some
equitable compromise between our conflicting
views.
When he died, he was just beginning to reap
the fruits of the reforming policy. He had become
popular by reason of the reforms, although, as a
matter of fact, he had not taken any leading part
in effecting them. He acquiesced in them of his
own free will, but sometimes with an unwilling
mind,
—
eK^v aeKovri ye Ovfxw. His death was a
great loss to Egypt. Whatever may have been
his faults, he deserves a somewhat prominent niche
in the Valhalla of Oriental potentates. Posterity
will be unjust if they forget that it was during the
reign of Tewfik Pasha that Egypt was first started
on the road to prosperity, and that he took not,
indeed, the most leading part in the rehabilita-
tion of his country, but still ii part of which his
descendants may well be proud ; for, without his
abstention from opposition, and without his sup-
port, albeit it was at times rather lukewarm, the
efforts of the British reformer would have been far
less productive of result than has actually been the
case. Had he been a man of stronger character
and more marked individuahty, it is possible that
his country would have progressed less rapidly. He
should be remembered as the Khedive who allowed
Egyj)t to be reformed in spite of the Egyptians.
The leading personage in the Egyptian political
world is the Khedive. The Prime JNIinister, how-
ever, also occupies a position of great import-
ance. After the bombardment of Alexandria in
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1882, Cherif Pasha was named to this office. In
January 1884, he was succeeded by Nubar Pasha,
who remained in office till June 1888. On
Nubar Pasha's fall, Riaz Pasha became Prime
Minister. His INIinistry lasted till May 1891.
His successor was Mustapha Pasha Fehmi. On
January 7, 1892, Tewhk Pasha died. His son
and successor, Abbas Pasha, kept Mustapha Pasha
Fehmi in office till January 1893, when he was
succeeded by Riaz Pasha, who, again, in April
1894, was succeeded by Nubar Pasha. In the
autumn of 1895, Nubar Pasha's failing health
obliged him to quit office. He was succeeded by
Mustapha Pasha Fehmi.
Of Cherif Pasha little need be said. He was
a Minister of the pre - occupation days rather
than of the occupation. His character is almost
sufficiently described in the narrative given in a
previous portion of this work. To what has been
already said it is only necessary to add that Cherif
Paslia was the least Egyptian of any of the Moslem
Prime Ministers of recent times. He was a pure
Turk who, in early life, had come from Constanti-
nople. The ordinary Turco-Egyptian is generally
more Egyptian than Turk. Cherif Pasha, on the
other hand, was a Turco-Egyptian in the first stage
of Egyptianisation. It is true that he favoured
Egyptian semi -autonomy, and that he viewed
with dislike any increased interference by the
Sultan in Egyptian affiiirs ; but he was out of
sympathy with the pure Egyptians, whom he
regarded as a conquered race ; he was, in fact,
the incarnation of the ])olicy of " Egypt for the
Turco- Egyptians." Whatever was not Turkish
in his character, was French. He had assimilated
a good deal of the bonhomie which sometimes, and
of the keen sense of the ridiculous which more
frequently is to be found amongst the French, but
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tie never lost the predominant characteristics of a
Turkish aristocrat. He was proud, courageous,
honest after his way, and, in his public life, always
negligent of detail and sometimes of principle.
Occasionally, he would emit flashes of true states-
manship, but he was too careless, too apathetic,
and too wanting in persistence to carry out his
own principles in practice. With all his faults, he
was, on the whole, one of the most sympathetic
figures on the political stage of Egypt during
recent times.
Nubar Pasha was by far the most interesting of
latter-day Egyptian politicians. Intellectually, he
towered above his competitors. Bearing in mind,
however, the intellectual calibre of those com-
petitors, he deserves more than such faint praise
as this. He was, indeed, a bad administrator, and
this defect detracted from his political usefulness,
more especially by reason of the fact that, according
to his own admission,^ Egypt stood in need of
administrators rather than of statesmen. Never-
theless, even in Egypt some statesmanlike qualities
are demanded from those who are at the head of
affairs, and Nubar Pasha could unquestionably lay
claim to the possession of qualities, which can be
characterised as statesmanlike.
He was a thorough Oriental, but, unlike many
Orientals, his foreign education had not resulted in
his assimilating the bad and discarding the more
worthy portions of European civilisation. He
was far too great a man to be atti-acted by all tlie
flimsy tinsel and moral obliquity which lie on the
surface of European civilisation, that is to say,
the civilisation of the Paris Boulevards, whose
principal apostles are usually European or Levant-
ine adventurers. He saw all these things, but
unlike the Gallicised Egyptian, who is too often
» Vide ante, p. 262.
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lured to his moral destruction by them, the only
effect which they produced on his more elevated
mind was to make him ask himself—how can I
protect my country of adoption against the inroads
of the quick-witted but unscrupulous European ?
It is clear that Egypt is to be Europeanised ; how
can this process best be effected ?
The answer which Nubar Pasha gave to these
questions was worthy of a statesman. He rightly
differentiated the divergences between Eastern
and Western systems of government. Personal
rule, he said to himself, must give way before a
reign of law. The Egyptians must learn from
Europe how to protect themselves both against
the arbitrary caprices of their rulers, and against
the advancing and somewhat turbid tide of Euro-
peans with whom they are destined to be associated.
They can only do so by assimilating that respect
for the law which forms the keystone of the arch
on which European systems of government rest.
It cannot be contended that this idea was very
original, or that any great mental effort was
required for its conception. But to Nubar Pasha
belongs the credit tliat he was the first Egyptian
statesman who conceived it, or, at all events, who
endeavoured to carry it into practice. Whatever
may have been the blemishes in Nubar Pasha's
character, and whatever may be the defects in the
judicial institutions which he created, it should
never be forgotten that he first endeavoured to
bring home to the Egyptian governing class and to
the Egyptian people that, whereas might, whether
in the person of despotic Khedives or dictatorial
di])lomatists, had heretofore been right in Egypt,
the foundation of good government in any com-
munity pretending to call itself civilised is that the
maxim should be reversed, and that might should
yield to right.
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Nubar Pasha had, therefore, no difficulty m
grasping a European principle. Indeed, the wider
the principle, the more readily he grasped it,
for he dearly loved dealing in generalities. His
defect was that, having once got hold of a sound
principle, he would not unfrequently ride it to
death. He did not sufficiently adapt it to the
circumstances with which he had to deal. Or,
again, he would sometimes think that, having
enunciated the principle, he had done all that was
required of him. He rarely endeavoured to acquaint
himself thoroughly with facts, or to see that the
practice was made to conform with the principle
which he had adopted. Moreover, he would some-
times readily assent to some wide general principle
without any serious intention of applying it at all,
and he was led to do this all the more because
his subtle intellect was not slow to perceive that
Europeans, and especially Englishmen, are liable
to be soothed by plausible, albeit often fallacious
generalities.
Nubar Pasha was a brilliant conversationalist.
He possessed a marvellous power of imparting a
character of perfect verisimilitude to the series of
half-truths, bordering on fiction, which he was
wont to pour into the ears of his interested listener.
The educated European was struck by his ap-
parently wide grasp and bold generalisations, the
fallacies of which could often only be detected by
those who had a perfect acquaintance with the
facts. The European would readily fall a victim
to the fascinating manners, the graceful diction,
the subtle reasoning, and deferential deportment,
which distinguish the peculiar type of Oriental
of whom Nubar Pasha was perhaps the most
typical representative. It was only after experi-
ence and reflection that he would perceive that,
the premises being hicorrect, the conclusions of his
VOL. II z
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teacher in Egyptian affairs were often erroneous,
and tliat the broad enunciations of principle with
which he had been charmed were intended more
for academic discussion in the closet than for
practical decision in the Council Chamber.
Nubar Pasha's readiness, his versatility, the
audacity with which he would defend the most
glaring fallacies, and his great command of
language, acquired for him some reputation as a
diplomatist. To a certain extent, this reputation
was well deserved. On many occasions, he showed
himself to be a skilful negotiator. He was especi-
ally skilful in throwing a cloud of ambiguity over
his meaning and his intentions. He was a master
of the French language, and one of the peculiarities
of that language is that, although it is eminently
precise when the writer or speaker wishes to give
precision to his thoughts, on the other hand, it
is full of ambiguous expressions, which afford a
powerful help to a diplomatist who wishes to leave
open some back door through which to retreat
from the engagements which he is apparently
taking, and this was not unfrequently Nubar
Pasha's case. He would probably have been more
successful as a diplomatist in the eighteenth than
in the nineteenth century. Modern diplomacy is
not mere jugglery, neither is the most successful
diplomatist he who can best throw dust in the eyes
of his opponent. Under the influence of publicity,
and perhaps to some extent of Prince Bismarck,
the whole art, if diplomacy can be dignified by
such a name, has been simplified ; perhaps some,
including Nubar Pasha himself, would say that it
has been brutalised. The affairs between nation
and nation are now conducted on more business-like
principles than heretofore. A plain answer is
required to a plain question, and although some
tricks of the trade still survive, they are, by com-
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parison with the past, of little practical utility. It
was Nubar Pasha's misfortune that, during the
latter part of his career, he had to deal princi-
pally with a European nation whose members are
distinguished for their straightforward mode of
conducting business. In a way, he understood
the English character. He once made a signi-
ficant and characteristic remark. ** L'Anglais,"
he said, " est tres naif, mais lorsqu'on pense qu'on
I'a tromp4 tout d'un coup il se tourne et il vous
flanque un terrible coup de pied quelque part."
But although he knew that intrigue was of little
real use against the Englishman, he could not
resist the temptation of intriguing. He could
not abandon his favourite weapon of offence
and defence. The natural result ensued. In
spite of his real talents, his suavity, his earnest
devotion to civilised principles of government, and
his profuse professions of friendship and esteem,
he inspired but little confidence amongst those
Englishmen with whom he was brought in con-
tact. They mistrusted him, perhaps more than he
deserved to be mistrusted. He could never under-
stand the feelings which his behaviour excited
in the minds of Englishmen. He went to his
grave with a hardy and unimpaired belief in the
political virtues of finesse bordering on duplicity.
Nubar Pasha's political views during the early
period of the British occupation of Egypt were
characteristic. He was in favour of the occupa-
tion. He saw that a British garrison was necessary
to maintain order. '* If," he frequently said, *' the
British troops are withdrawn, I shall leave Egypt
with the last battalion." But, on the other hand,
he was opposed to what he termed the "adminis-
trative occupation." In other words, what he
wanted was a military force, in whom perfect
reliance could be placed, to keep him in power,
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whilst he was to be allowed a free hand in every-
thing connected with the civil administration of
the country. Hence his extreme civility to all
British military officers, whose praises he was
never weary of singing. AVhat, indeed, for all
the purposes which he had at heart, could be
more perfect than the presence in Egypt of a
thoroughly disciplined force, commanded by young
men who took no interest in local politics, and
who occupied themselves exclusively with polo
and cricket ? Hence, also, his constant opposition
during his first period of office (1884-88) to the
British civilians in the Egyptian service and to
myself, as the British diplomatic representative
who supported them. Our action jarred terribly with
the Nubarian programme. It is strange that a really
able man, such as Nubar Pasha, should have thought
his programme capable of realisation, and that he
should not have seen the impossibility of the British
Government looking on as passive spectators whilst
a British force was in Egypt, and allowing the
maladministration of the Egyptian Pashas to remain
practically unchecked. And this would certainly
have been the result of acquiescence in Nubar
Pasha's system of government.^
With any ordinary degree of prudence, Nubar
Pasha could have remained Prime Minister for
an indefinite period, and it is a pity that he did
not do so, for his talents were far superior to those
of his competitors. His fall in 1888 came about in
this fashion. For some four years, I got on fairly
well with liim. On many occasions, I afforded
him strong support. I shut my eyes to a good
deal of intrigue, which I knew was going on
around me. In an evil moment for himself, Nubar
^ In illustration of the truth of this remark, I may refer to what
happened about the Commissions of Brigandage {vide ante, p. 289 and
infra, p. 405).
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Pasha went to England. He had an interview
with Lord Salisbury at wliich I was present. To
my surprise, for he liad not giv^en me any warning
of his intentions, he burst out into a violent tirade
against the British officials in Egypt in general,
and against Sir Edgar Vincent and myself in
particular. All this produced very little effect on
Lord Salisbury, but the ultimate result—for this
was only the beginning of a breach which sub-
sequently widened— was such as Nubar Pasha
hardly anticipated. He thought he was' doing a
clever stroke of business. What he really did
was to bring about his own downfall. He thought
to pose as the defender of Egyptian rights against
British aggression, and thus to mitigate the pre-
judices entertained against him by the JMohammedan
population by reason of his race and creed. What
he really did was to open the mouths of all his
numerous enemies in Egypt, who had only remained
silent because they thought that, strong in the
support of England, his position was unassailable.
Nubar Pasha failed to see that which was apparent
to others possessed of none of his intellectual
subtlety, namely, that the English were his natural
allies, and that directly he broke up the alliance
his fall was inevitable. When once it became
apparent that he could no longer rely on British
support, Tewfik Pasha seized on some trivial
pretext for dismissing him.^
* I did nothing to hasten the downfall of Nubar Pasha. The
European situation was at that time (1888) somewhat critical. Lord
Salisbury, who was then in office, was, therefore, rather desirous of
postponing any crisis in Egyptian affairs. On February 17, 1888, he
wrote to me : ''I have asked you by telegraph to try and manage to
postpone any breach with Nubar to a more convenient season. ... I
believe you are right in this controversy, but if I thought you wrong,
I should still think it impossible to retreat before Nubar in the face
of the whole East. It is not, therefore, from any doubt about support-
ing you that 1 urge you to keep the peace for the present, but because
I do not wish our administration in Egypt to be the cause to which the
long European war is to be ascribed by the future historian."
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I really believe that I regretted Nubar Pasha's
fall more than he did himself. His Protean changes,
his emotional character, and his ignorance of the
rudiments of many of the administrative questions
with which he had to deal, were at times exasper-
ating. Nevertheless, I could not help liking him.
It was pleasant to have to deal with a man of real
ability, who could converse rationally and who, if
he did not understand much which should be
familiar to any politician and administrator, could
at all events grasp the main lines of action which
should guide the Government of a civilised com-
munity. Moreover, there was an indescribable
charm about Nubar Pasha which was almost
irresistible. I have never known any one more
persuasive, or more skilled in the art of making the
worse appear the better reason. I used often to
half believe him, when I knew full well that he was
trying to dupe me. I felt towards him much what
Shakespeare felt towards his faithless mistress :
—
When my love swears that she is made of truth,
I do believe her, though I know she lies.
I admired his talents, and I never could forget
that, in spite of his defects, he possessed some
unquestionably statesmanlike qualities. If he had
only recognised the fact that in the government of
the world mere intellectual gifts are not all-powerful,
and that high character and reputation also exercise
a potent influence over mankind, he would have
been a really great man.
I find some difficulty in writing about Kiaz
Pasha, not only because, I am glad to say (1907),
he is still living, but also because he is a
personal friend for whom I entertain the highest
regard and esteem. I may say, however, that
Nubar Pasha and Riaz Pasha were the Egyptian
representatives of two wilely different schools of
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political and social thought. NubarPasha recognised
the fact that there was only one true civilisation in
the world, and that was the civilisation of Europe.
Accordingly, he set to work to Europeanise the
main framework of Egyptian institutions by means
which were sometimes wise, and sometimes, possibly,
the reverse, but he never entertained any doubt as
to the nature of the object to be attained. Riaz
Pasha, on the other hand, represented the apotheosis
of Islamism. AVhy, he thought, should not the
Saturnia regna, when Moslems were really great,
return ? He would barely recognise the necessity
of the least European assistance in the process
of Egyptian regeneration. " Seul," he said to
himself, "je ferai le bonheur de mon peuple."
He held that Mohammedans and Mohammedanism
contain within themselves all that is needed for
their own regeneration. It would be both unjust
and ungenerous not to extend some sympathy to
views of this sort. It would be too much to expect
that a fervid Moslem and a sincere Egyptian
patriot—and Riaz Pasha answers both of these
descriptions—should readily accept the facts, which
are almost certainly true, namely, that Islamism
as a social and political system—though not as a
religion—is moribund, that the judicial and admin-
istrative procedures common amongst Moslems are
so closely interwoven with their religion as to be
almost inseparable the one from the other, and that
for many a long year to come the Egyptians will
be incapable of governing themselves on civilised
principles.
Riaz Pasha's political life may be divided into
four different phases ; first, as a INIinister and as
a Commissioner of Inquiry under Ismail Pasha;
secondly, as Prime Minister under Tewfik Pasha
during the period of the Anglo-French Control
;
thirdly, as Prime Minister under Tewfik Pasha
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during the time of the British occupation; and,
fourthly, as Prime Minister under Abbas II.
He appeared to most advantage in the first
phase. He was indignant at the ruin which Ismail
Pasha brought on his country. He stood out
boldly as a reformer at a time when a reforming
Egyptian could not state his true opinions without
risk to his life and property. Whatever faults Riaz
Pasha may have subsequently committed, it should
never be forgotten that during this phase of his
career he showed a great deal of real courage and
foresight.^
In the early portions of the second phase, that
is to say, the period of the Anglo-French Control,
Riaz Pasha also showed to advantage. He was
placed in such a position that his dislike to
European interference was of necessity tempered
by the consideration that the Europeans, with
whom he was principally associated, were very
useful. The Controllers stood between him and
the hungry creditors of the Egyptian Government,
and Riaz Pasha was aware that he did not possess
sufficient technical knowledge to evolve order out
of the existing financial chaos without European
assistance. During the later portion of the Control
period, he had to deal with a question which possibly
required higher qualities, and a greater degree of
political insight, tlian any that he possessed. He
was swept off his legs by the Arabi movement, of
which he failed to see the importance until too late.
The third phase of Riaz Pasha's political career
was when, in succession to Nubar Pasha, he was
made Prime Minister by Tewfik during the period
of the British occupation. At first matters went
fairly well. Riaz had some advantages over Nubar
Pasha. He was by far the better administrator of
the two. He knew Egypt well ; lie was himself a
* Vide utile, vol. i. p. 45.
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first-rate practical agriculturist, and could discuss all
matters bearing on tiie condition of the agricultural
classes with a thorough knowledge of his subject.
He exercised great authority over the Egyptian
officials. The fact that a devout JMohammedan was
at the head of affairs produced a tranquillising
effect on Mohammedan public opinion. On the
other hand, he was too inelastic to manage so
delicate a machine as the government of Egypt
during the occupation period. He did not altogether
appreciate the change which time and the political
situation of the day had effected in the system of
governing the country. He failed to see that,
under a reign of law, he could not always have
his own way, for Riaz Pasha, although he had a
certain rough idea of justice, had but little respect
for the law. He thought that when laws or
regulations clashed with his ideas of what was
right and wrong, they should be broken. The
result of his peculiar temperament and habits
of thought was that, after a while, he quarrelled
with almost every one, European and Egyptian, and
produced a state of administrative friction, which
rendered his retirement frcmi office inevitable.
The fourth phase of Riaz's career was when he
was Minister under Abbas II.—a period with the
history of which I am not attempting to deal in
the present work.
To sum up, Riaz Pasha is a staunch Moslem,
possessed of intellectual qualities which are certainly
equal, and of moral qualities which are decidedly
superior to those of the class to which he belongs.
Notably, his physical and moral fearlessness deserve
high commendation. It were well for the cause of
Egyptian patriotism, if there were more ]Kitriots
endowed with the sterling qualities which are
cons})icuous in Riaz Paslia's rugged, yet very
sympathetic character.
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The simplicity of Mustapha Pasha Fehmi's
character renders it unnecessary to allude to him
at any length. Loyal, thoroughly honest, truthful,
and courteous, he possesses all the qualities which
Englishmen usually associate with the word gentle-
man. He has been statesmanlike enough to see
that the interests of his country would best be
served by working loyally with the British officials,
instead of opposing them. During his tenure of
office, Egypt has made greater progress, both moral
and material, than at any previous period.
Having now described the machinery of the
Government, and the principal individuals who
were entrusted with its working, it would appear
logical to deal with the work whic^) the machine
produced. Before, however, describing what the
English did in Egypt, it will be as well to say
something of what they wished to do. The next
chapters will, therefore, be devoted to describing
that strange phantom which, under the name of
British Policy in Egypt, was constantly eluding the
grasp both of those to whom it owed its being and
of others who endeavoured, from time to time, to
understand its true significance. It was not until
1904 that this phantom disappeared, and that a
more substantial political creation was substituted
in its place.
PART V
BRITISH POLICY IN EGYPT
We trust it may he granted to tis to lahoiirfor maintaining
the interests of the Empire, foi' pj'omoting the welfare of the
Egyptian people^ and for doing honest work towards the
establishment of the peace and order of the world.
Speech of Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons^
July 27, 1882.
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CHAPTER XLIV
THE STRUGGLE FOR A POLICY
1882-1883
Intentions of the British Government—Proposal to reduce the garrison
—Sir Edward Malet's opinion—Difficulty of combining reform
and evacuation—I recommend reduction and concentration at
Alexandria—The Government approve of this recommendation
—
The reduction is countermanded.
It is probable that, if any one had told Lord Gran-
ville on the morrow of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir
that twenty-five years later a British force would
still be garrisoned in Egypt, and that for twenty-
two out of those twenty -five years the Egyptian
question, in its political aspects, would remain
unsettled, he would have ridiculed the idea. For,
in truth, in 1882 the British Government had a
tolerably clear policy. Its execution was very
difficult, but at the time the difficulties did not
appear absolutely insurmountable. Their policy
was to restore order, to introduce some elementary
reforms, and then to withdraw the British troops.
The sound of the guns at Tel-el-Kebir had scarcely
died away, when Lord Granville requested Sir
Edward INIalet to send " as soon as possible, sugges-
tions as to the army, finances, and the administration
for the future." At tliat time, "Her JNLijesty's
Government contemplated shortly commencing
the withdrawal of tlie British troops from Egypt."
During the summer of 1883, the British force
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numbered about 7000 men. On August 25, 1883,
Chdrif Pasha addressed a Memorandum to Sir
Edward Malet urging, on grounds of economy,
that the force should be reduced to 2000 men.
Sir Edward Malet agreed that there could be no
doubt as to the necessity of economy. "The
question," he added, "which unfortunately presents
itself, and to which there can be no decisive answer,
is whether the existing tranquillity is not mainly
due to the presence of the troops." He was unable
to recommend so large a reduction as that proposed
by Cherif Pasha. "An immediate reduction of
2000 men was," he thought, " the most that should
be effected."
On September 6, Lord Granville wrote me a
despatch, which reached Cairo simultaneously with
my arrival from India. In this despatch, after
alluding to Sir Edward Malet's communication,
which is quoted above, he went on to say :
—
" Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in
the desire to reduce the force as far as is consistent
with the preservation of public order, but they
have been unwilling to take any fresh step for the
purpose until they could have the advantage of
your opinion. Sir Evelyn Wood has expressed to
me personally his belief that the British garrison
might be entirely withdrawn from Cairo without
disadvantage. The number of troops to be retained
elsewliere and their disposition, would be matter
for careful consideration. I have to request that
you will consult the military authorities, and report
fully to me on the subject."
From recollection, and from a perusal of con-
temporaneous despatches and private letters, I am
able to give an accurate account of my frame of
mind at this time. I was deeply penetrated with
the importance of the step taken by the British
Government in sending a military force to Egypt,
LH.XLIV STRUGGLE FOR A POLICY 351
and I doubted whether the Ministers themselves
fully realised its gravity. They saw, indeed, the
obvious objections to a permanent occupation of
Egypt ; they held to the broad lines of Lord Palmer-
ston's policy ; ^ but they underrated the difficulties
of getting out of the country. Nevertheless, all
history was there to prove that when once a civilised
Power lays its hand on a weak State in a barbarous
or semi-civilised condition, it rarely relaxes its
grasp. I was in favour of the policy of evacua-
tion, and I saw that, if the British troops were to
be withdrawn, no long delay should be allowed
to ensue ; otherwise, the occupation might drift
insensibly into a condition of permanency. Total
and immediate evacuation was, indeed, impossible
for the reason given by Sir Edward Malet, that is
to say, that by the adoption of such a measure,
public tranquillity would be endangered. But
although the maintenance of public tranquillity
stood first in the order of importance, the question
of the withdrawal of the garrison could not be
decided with reference to a consideration of this
point alone. The question had to be considered
in another aspect. What would be the effect
of the withdrawal on the ftiture of the country ?
What prospect was there of Lord Duffigrin's
programme being carried out if the British troops
were withdrawn ? I did not see so clearly as at a
later period that the alternative policies of reform
and evacuation were absolutely irreconcilable, but
I had some fairly clear perception of the fact, I
saw that the system of government in Egypt had
been shaken to its base, and that, if once the British
troops were withdrawn, it would be necessary to leave
to the Khedive a tolerably free hand in the govern-
ment of the country. I saw more esi)ecially that
the Egyptian Government should be allowed full
* Vide ante, vol. i. p. 92.
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freedom in the direction of suppressing any attempt
to disturb public tranquillity. AVhat at the time
I most feared was that the British Government,
under the influence of public opinion in England,
would first withdraw their troops and then cry out
if the use of the courbash increased, and, generally,
if the rough-and-ready means dear to the hearts of
Oriental rulers were employed for the maintenance
of public order. I wished to warn the Government
that if they decided on a policy of evacuation, they
must be prepared to turn a deaf ear to the cries,
which would, without doubt, be raised both in
Parliament and in the press, when the Egyptian
Government proceeded to govern according to their
own lights.
It was with these feelings uppermost in my mind
that on October 9, that is to say, about a month
after my arrival in Cairo, I answered the question
which Lord Granville had addiessed to me on Sep-
tember 6. I began by stating that, after consultation
with Sir Frederick Stephenson, I had come to the
conclusion that the British garrison could safely
be withdrawn from Cairo, and that the total force
in Egypt might be reduced to about 3000 men,
who should be concentrated at Alexandria. I did
not express any opinion on the question of when it
would be possible to withdraw the whole of the
garrison, but in a private telegram to Lord Gran-
ville, dated October 8, I told him that "for the
present there could be no question of total with-
drawal from Egypt." I dwelt at some length on
the state of the country, and, writing with a view to
ultimate publication, I indicated in a manner which
was sufficiently clear that, if the Egyptian Govern-
ment were to be left to themselves, they must be
allowed to maintain order in their own way.
When my despatch reached London, it created
a considerable stir in official circles. It became
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apparent that, although perhaps the Ministers were
themselves aware that they could not attain two
irreconcilable objects, they thought it undesirable
to place this view of the case before the public.
Lord Granville telegraphed to me asking that my
despatch should be divided into two, and that
the portion which spoke of non-interference with
vigorous measures after the withdrawal of the
British garrison should be treated separately and
confidentially.
I accordingly wrote two despatches. The first,
which was very short, dealt with the proposed
reduction of the garrison and the withdrawal of
the troops from Cairo. This was published.^ The
second, which was longer, dealt with the probable
consequences of withdrawal. This was not
published. It is, from a historical point of view,
a document of some interest. It is reproduced
in an Appendix to this chapter.
On November 1, Lord Granville wrote to me
that the British Government approved of my
recommendation that the British force in Egypt
should be reduced to 3000 men, who were to be
concentrated at Alexandria. "The British garrison
being thus withdrawn from Cairo," it was added,
*'the main responsibility for preserving order
throughout Egypt will, as you point out, devolve
upon the Government of the Khedive, and in the
execution of that task they may rely upon the full
moral support of Her JNIajesty's Government."
Three weeks later, and before any practical
steps had been taken to withdraw the garrison
from Cairo, news arrived of the annihilation of
General Hicks's army. Lord Granville telegraphed
on November 22 directing me, after consultation
with Sir Frederick Steplienson and Sir Evelyn
Wood, to state my opinion as to whether the existing
» See Egypt, No. 1 of 1884, pp. 60-51.
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state of affairs in the Soudan was a cause of danger
to Egypt. In that case, I was requested to state my
views as to what measures were desirable. In my
reply, dated November 24, I said that Sir Frederick
Stephenson, Sir Evelyn Wood, and myself were of
opinion that *' the recent success of the Mahdi was
a source of danger to Egypt," that the withdrawal
of the garrison from Cairo should be postponed,
and that for the time being no reduction should be
made in the strength of the British force. On
November 25, Lord Granville telegraphed that
"the preliminary steps for the withdrawal of the
British troops were to be postponed." The post-
ponement has lasted until the day on which I am
writing.
It will be observed that during all this time there
was no question of total and immediate evacuation.
Every responsible authority on the spot was opposed
to any such measure, and the Government, although
anxious to withdraw entirely, saw that it was im-
possible to carry the policy of total withdrawal
into execution at once. The only question
under discussion was whether the garrison should
be reduced and the British force concentrated at
Alexandria with a view to eventual withdrawal
at no remote period. It may be doubted whether,
even if the Hicks disaster had not occurred, it
would have been possible within a short while to
have withdrawn the whole of the British troops.
This, however, is mere conjecture. What is more
certain is that, when the military power of Egypt
in the Soudan was crushed, the last chance of
immediate, or nearly immediate, evacuation dis-
appeared. Moreover, it is historically interesting
to note that the deathblow to the policy of speedy
evacuation was dealt by a statesman who was
earnestly desirous to withdraw the British troops.
If Lord Granville had not been so fearful of
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incurring any responsibility in respect to the
Soudan on the oround that, in doing so, he might
prolong the British occupation of Egypt, and if he
had placed a veto on the Hicks expedition, it is
conceivable that the British garrison might have
been withdrawn after a short time. As it was.
Lord Granville, in his desire to shorten the occupa-
tion, contributed by his action to its prolongation.
Before leaving this branch of my subject, I
should mention that on October 28, that is, between
the time when I recommended the concentration
at Alexandria, and the arrival of the news of the
Hicks disaster, I again urged on Lord Granville,
in a private letter, the impossibility of reconciling
the two policies of speedy evacuation and reform.
I reproduce the whole of this letter. It was as
follows :
—
" I have now been here long enough to take
stock of the main elements of the situation. There
is an immense deal to be done, and there are many
difficult questions to be solved. Looking at these
questions from the point of view of their intrinsic
merits, there is no reason why most of them, at all
events, should not be solved within a reasonable
period. But there is one obstacle which stands in
the way of almost every move forward, and that is
the necessity of consulting every Power in Europe
before any important steps can be taken.
"To take a single instance, the Blue Book on
the appointment of the Indemnity Commission
last year is a positive curiosity in its way. This
question was so simple that three or four people
sitting round a table ought to have been able to
settle it in half an hour. Yet a voluminous corre-
spondence ensued, and endless delays occurred
before Stockholm, Brussels, etc., could be got to
agree.
"As matters stand, it will be scarcely possible
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to carry out the whole of our programme. On the
one hand, we are bound before we go to start
Egypt on the high road to good government. We
ought not to leave the Egyptian Government in
such a position as that they may plead as an excuse
for future bad government that their hands are so
tied as to render them powerless to execute reforms.
On the other hand, we must not, for European,
Egyptian, and purely English reasons, stay too
long.
" Under present conditions, it is scarcely con-
ceivable that both of these objects should be
attained. In fact, the one is almost a contradiction
in terms to the other. If we are to wait until all
the essential reforms have been carried out by the
slow process of consulting each Power separately
on every question of detail, we shall wait a very
long time, and there will be danger of drifting into
a policy of annexation, or something tantamount
to it.
" If we cut the knot by withdrawing without
having done our work, and leaving Egypt to stew
in its own juice of administrative, financial, and
economic anarchy, there will be a very considerable
risk that something will occur before our backs
have long been turned, which will raise up the
whole Egyptian question again. I confess I do
not see my way out of this dilemma.
"We may, indeed, before long retire without
any absolute danger to public order and tranquillity
in the immediate future. But surely more than
this is, under all the circumstances, expected of us
both by Europe and by English public opinion. If
we leave a crop of unsettled burning questions
behind us, we can never feel any confidence that
our hands will not be forced, that is to say, that we
may again find ourselves in the position of being
obliged to interfere or stand aside whilst others.
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probably the French, take up the work which we,
as it would then appear, had failed to acconi])lish.
" Getting out of Egypt is a very different
problem from getting out of Afghanistan. In the
latter case, we had to deal with a country in whose
internal administration no one but the Afghans
was, to any very considerable extent, concerned.
There was no very great difficulty in leaving this
quasi-barbarous people to be governed after their
own fashion by their quasi-barbarous Governors.
Here the foundations of the edifice, which are to
be found in the moral and material condition of
the people, are scarcely less barbarous than in
Afghanistan. But, on these foundations is built
a top-heavy and exotic superstructure, such as
an enormous external debt, Western law-courts,
complete liberty of contract, and, in fact, all the
paraphernalia of European civilisation with some
of its worst and not many of its best features. I
do not suppose that Europe will stand by and let
this superstructure fall to pieces.
*' We are making very fair progress in all matters
which fall within the competence of the Egyptian
Government, such as prison reform, local tribunals,
etc.
" But as regards international subjects—and all
the most important subjects are international—we
are almost at an absolute standstill.
"In spite of every effort, we have not yet
succeeded in getting the house tax through. After
the house tax, comes the professional tax and the
stamp duty, each with its own peculiar difficulties.
" The reforms in the Mixed Tribunals and the
abolition of the Consular jurisdiction in criminal
cases, will probably involve interminable negotia-
tions.
" Then there is the great question of the Law
of Liquidation, with all its attendant political
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difficulties. There is not, I fear, the least chance
of our being able to regulate the financial situation
without modifying that law. I thought at one
time we might manage to arrange matters by
getting the consent of the Commissioners of the
Debt, but the political objections to the adoption
of this course are scarcely less great than if we tried
to get the Powers to consent to alter the law itself.
" The question of the debts of the fellaheen
cannot be settled without going to the Powers, for
whatever is done will almost certainly hivolve some
changes in the code administered by the Mixed
Tribunals.^
'* There are several questions connected with
the Daira Sanieh and the Domains which ought to
be settled, but here again the international difficulty
bars the way.
"Even some subjects which have no direct
international character, depend indirectly upon the
concord of the Powers. Thus, a considerable capital
expenditure on irrigation is almost a necessity ; so
also is the Soudan Railway. But for both of these
money is wanted, and it will be very difficult to
find any money until the financial situation is placed
on a sound footing.
" You may well ask me why I say all this, which
you already know, INly reason is to ask you to
consider whether it is not possible to apply some
remedy to this state of things. Would it not be
possible to issue a Circular to the Powers explaining
our difficulties, and saying that we did not propose
to consult them any more on each detail, but that,
when we had put matters straight, we should ask
them to accept the settlement eii bloc, and that we
should then at once withdraw our troops ?
^ This question was, many years subsequently, settled without
reference to the Powers. An Agricultural Bank was established (see
p. 452). In 18y3j it would have been scarcely possible to have called
such an institution into existence.
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" Give me 2000 men and power to settle matters
between the English and Egyptian Governments,
and I will guarantee that in twelve months there
sliall not be a British soldier in Egypt, and that tlie
country is put in such a position as to render it
very improbable that any Egyptian question will
be raised again for many years to come at all
events.^ But if we adhere to our present procedure,
I really despair of doing much within any reasonable
time—I mean, of course, as regards international
questions. As regards purely Egyptian questions,
there are plenty of difficulties, but they are not
insurmountable.
" I put forward this suggestion with much
hesitation. I am aware that the matter cannot
be regarded wholly from the point of view of
Egyptian internal reform. The general political
situation has to be considered, and from this point
of view there may be insuperable obstacles to the
adoption of any course such as that which I
suggest. Anyhow, I think it right to submit to
you the aspect of the case which I have set forth
in this letter. Your wider knowledjxe and
experience may possibly be able to hit upon
some other plan superior to my
—
possibly crude
—
suggestion.
" I may add that I am confident that I could, by
developing the arguments I have briefly stated
here, make out a very strong case for taking a new
point of departure, but it would, of course, be
useless for me to write a public despatch in this
sense, unless I thought that some practical good
might come out of it."
In other words, what I proposed amounted to
the temporary assumption on the part of England
of the task of governing Egypt. On November 9,
* This forecast of what was possible was unquestionably much too
Banguiue.
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Lord Granville acknowledged the receipt of this
letter. "It would require," he said, "some time
to consider and answer your powerful but gloomy
view of the situation in Egypt. I am afraid the
remedy you suggest is too drastic, but I will reflect
over what you say, and let you know my impres-
sions, and those of others. I have escaped the
Lord Mayor's dinner. Gladstone will speak
sliortly, and will only deal with generalities on
Egyptian questions."
On November 14, Lord Granville again wrote
to me as follows : " I go to Stratton ^ on Saturday,
when I hope to talk over with Gladstone and
Northbrook your very important letter of, I think,
the 24th October. I hope you will think what
Gladstone said in concert with me about Egypt at
the Mansion House was harmless."
Finally, on November 30, Lord Granville
wrote : " I have talked over your views on the
Liquidation Law with Gladstone and with North
-
brook. We do not see our way to acting en bloc,
but it might be possible, particularly after recent
events, for you to perfect a scheme on any of
the most important subjects, with a view to our
getting the consent of the Powers."
This was, of course, tantamount to a rejection of
my proposal. I did not for many years make any
other having for its object a radical change in the
political status of Great Britain in Egypt. Hence-
forward, I devoted myself entirely to the task of
evolving order out of chaos, under such political
and administrative conditions as existed at the time
when the occupation took place. It was not tor
some years that I felt at all sanguine of success.
From the time when the orders for concen-
tration at Alexandria were countermanded, all
idea of s})eedy evacuation was abandoned. Tiie
* Lord Norllibrook's country seat iu Hampshire.
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attention of the British and Egyptian Govern-
ments was for the next two years almost wholly
directed to the affairs of the Soudan. During
this period, the British officials in Cairo were slowly
and laboriously taking some tentative steps in the
direction of reducing the Egyptian administrative
chaos into order. By the time the Soudan question
had passed out of an acute stage, Egypt had been
fairly launched on the path of reform. The policy,
which as a pis aller I had suggested as possible in
1883, of allowing the Khedive and the Turco-
Egyptians to govern after their own fashion, had
become more than ever difficult of execution, for
the country had advanced, whilst the intelligence
and governing capacity of the ruling classes had
almost stood still. The Turco - Egyptians, who
might perhaps have been able to govern the country
after a rude fashion in 1883, were incapable of doing
so when once the full tide of civilisation had set
strongly in. Before long, we had drifted into a
position which necessitated the presence of a Britisli
garrison, not in order to admit of reforms being
initiated and carried out, but in order to prevent a
relapse into the confusion which existed in the pre-
reforming days. That is the present stage of the
Egyptian question.
Two efforts were made subsequent to 1883, one
by Mr. Gladstone's Government, and the other by
the Government of Lord Salisbury, to deal with
the larger aspects of the Egyptian question. To
these reference will now be made.
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APPENDIX
Despatch from Sir Evelyn Baring to Earl Granville
Cairo, October 9, 1883.
My Lord—It may be advisable that in a separate
despatch I should offer some further observations on the
question of the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt
beyond those which are contained in my separate despatch
of this day"'s date.^
I propose, in the first instance, to make some remarks
upon the question of the total withdrawal of the Army of
Occupation. The frequent declarations which have been
made by Her Majesty's Ministers on this subject, have
weakened, but have not altogether eradicated the belief
entertained by some sections of the community in Egypt
that the country will be permanently occupied by British
troops. I have lost no opportunity of stating that there is
no intention whatever of departing from the policy in pur-
suance of which the whole of the British troops will eventu-
ally be withdrawn from Egypt. In spite, however, of the
very cordial sympathy with which I regard that policy, 1
regret that I am at present unable to recommend the total
withdrawal of the Army of Occupation. I consider that it
would be at present premature to discuss the question.
Under these circumstances, the only practical questions to
be considered are those which are discussed in my separate
despatch. In making the proposals contained in that
despatch, it may be desirable that I should add some
observations of a general nature on the political situation of
the moment.
It would be difficult to conceive of the existence of a
worse Government than that of the late Khedive, Ismail
Pasha. But that Government possessed one single merit—it
preserved order. The methods by which it preserved order
were cruel and oppressive in the highest degree, but the general
* This was the despatch to which allusion is made on pp. 352-353,
and in which it was recommended that the British garrison should be
reduced and the troops concentrated at Alexandria.
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result was that life and property were secure from all attacks
save those dictated by the action of the Government them-
selves. Recent events have completely shattered the system
of government which prevailed under Ismail Pasha and his
predecessors. The use of the " courbash " has been nearly, if
not completely, abolished. Measures are being taken under
which it may be reasonably hoped that arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment will no longer be possible. Properly con-
stituted tribunals are about to be established, under whose
jurisdiction it may be hoped that but few persons will suffer
for crimes of which they are innocent, although possibly in
the first instance some guilty persons may escape punishment.
In a word, a reign of law is being introduced.
The period of transition from the old to the new order of
things would, under any circumstances, have been somewhat
critical. It is rendered more so from the fact that recent
events must have imbued the people with the idea, hereto-
fore unfamiliar to them, that properly constituted authority
may, for a time at least, be successfully resisted.
The present position of the country is that the old order
of things has either passed or is rapidly passing away.
On the other hand, the new systems of administration or
of judicial procedure are either in process of organisation, or
have not yet acquired the stability which time alone can
give to them.
I believe His Highness the Khedive and his Ministers to
be sincerely desirous of introducing the reforms, whose main
features were set forth in Lord Dufferin's report, and of
which the country stands so much in need. But the intro-
duction of those reforms must necessarily occupy some time.
During the period of their introduction it may be anticipated
that many persons, imperfectly appreciating the difficulties
of the situation, may be impatient that more rapid progress
is not made. On the other hand, the turbulent and lawless
portion of the community may not improbably learn to dis-
respect a Government which does not manifest its authority,
or impose its legitimate orders, by the use of those arbitrary
methods to which the country has for generations been
accustomed. If the system of government in Egypt is to
be reformed, it is above all things necessary that order should
be preserved during the process of reformation, and that any
changes, whether in the existing laws or in the form of
government or in the composition of the ministry, should be
effected by legal and constitutional methods. Force should
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be put down by force, and inasmuch as the lesson has scarcely
yet been learnt in Egypt that the arm of the law is as strong
as that of arbitrary and capricious power, it might, under
certain circumstances, become desirable in the interests of
the country that a greater degree of severity should be
exercised in the suppression of disturbance than would be
necessary amongst a population which had for long been
accustomed to a law-abiding and orderly system of govern-
ment.
The main responsibility for preserving order throughout
Egypt will, as I have said in my separate despatch, devolve
on the Egyptian Government. Under these circumstances,
I venture to think that, within any reasonable limits, full
freedom should be left to the Egyptian Government in the
exercise of that power, the possession of which is a necessary
condition to the assumption of responsibility.
I have no reason to suppose that, should any disturbance
occur at Cairo or elsewhere, the Egyptian Government would
be disposed to use excessive or unnecessary severity in its
suppression. The personal character of the Khedive is,
indeed, of itself almost a sufficient guarantee that no such
tendency exists. At the same time, it cannot be denied that
the events of the last few years have shaken the authority of
the Government in Egypt, a result which is not, I believe,
due to any change in the personal character of the individuals
who compose the Government, but to the change of system,
which, most fortunately for the country, has been in
course of progress since the abdication of Ismail Pasha.
In order to reassert that authority, the existence of which
is essential to the progress of orderly reform, it might be
deemed necessary by the Egyptian Government to exercise a
degree of severity in the suppression of disturbance which
might possibly not commend itself to public opinion in
England.
Under these circumstances, I venture to think that it
would be desirable that both the Egyptian Government and
the public in Egypt should fully understand that, whilst
Her Majesty's Government would view with serious dis-
pleasure any attempt to return to the system of government
which prevailed in the past, they would not, save in some
very exceptional case, be inclined to interfere with the dis-
cretion of the Egyptian Government in the adoption of such
measures as the latter might consider desirable for the pre-
servation of public order and tranquillity.
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I make these observations not because I have any reason
to suppose that any disturbance is likely to ensue upon the
partial withdrawal of the British force, but because it
appears to me desirable that, before the British garrison
is reduced, the responsibility and the power of the Egyptian
Government should alike be somewhat clearly defined.
The considerations which I have thus ventured to lay
before your Lordship will, of course, apply with even greater
force when the time eventually arrives for dealing with the
question of the total withdrawal of the British garrison.
—
I
have, etc., E. Baring.
CHAPTER XLV
THE NORTHBROOK MISSION
September-November 1884
It is decided to send a Special Commissioner to Cairo—The policy of
reporting—Lord Nortlihrook arrives in Egypt—His financial pro-
posals—His General Report—The Government reject his proposals.
The difficulties and complications of the Egyptian
question were, of course, greatly increased by the
events in the Soudan. Amongst other causes for
anxiety, the bankruptcy of tlie Egyptian Treasury
appeared imminent. A Conference of the Powers
assembled in London in the summer of 1884 to
consider the financial situation, but separated with-
out arriving at any practical conclusions.^ Under
the circumstances, what was a well - intentioned
Government, which had drifted into a position
which it very imperfectly understood, to do ?
Undoubtedly, the question was difficult to answer.
After a short period of hesitation, Mr. Gladstone
resorted to his favourite device. He determined
to send to Cairo a Special Commissioner to *' report
and advise Her Majesty's Government touching
the counsel wliich it might be fitting to offisr the
Egyptian Government in the present situation of
affairs in Egypt, and as to the measures which
* Subsequently, some decisions were taken as regards the matters
discussed at the Conference. They were embodied in an Agreement
signed in London by the reprosentatives of all the Great Powers ou
March 17, 1B85. See Egypt, No. G of 1886.
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should be taken in connection with them." The
Commissioner's special attention was to be directed
to the '* present exigencies of Egyptian finance."
There was really little about which to report.
The main facts with which the Government had
to deal were patent to all the world. Only a year
previously, a Special Commissioner of great ex-
perience and ability had compiled an elaborate
Report on the condition of Egypt. Since then, a
detailed Report on the financial situation had been
prepared by a Committee of experts sitting in
London. The subject had also been thorouglily
discussed at the Conference. No further collection
of facts was, therefore, required. Any detailed
information which might have been necessary
before deciding on what policy to adopt, could
easily have been furnished by the various authorities
on the spot. What was required was the decision
of character necessary to arrive at a definite con-
clusion, when once the facts had been collected.
Lord Northbrook was designated as the Special
Commissioner. A better choice could not have
been made. His high character, his wide adminis-
trative experience, the knowledge of the East
which he had gained as Viceroy of India, his
power of rapidly acquiring a mastery over com-
plicated financial questions, and the breadth and
statesmanlike nature of his views—all pointed him
out as exceptionally qualified to fulfil the duties
entrusted to him. To myself, the appointment
was especially pleasing. The relationship between
Lord Northbrook and myself, and the mutual
esteem and affection which we entertained for each
other, were of themselves a sufficient guarantee
that we should work cordially together. It was,
without doubt, the knowledge that the ap})oint-
ment would not be displeasing to me whicli to
some extent led Lord Granville, with that
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courteous consideration for others which nevei
failed him, to nominate Lord Northbrook.
Lord Northbrook possessed another, and very
important quahfication for successfully carrying out
the duties assigrned to him. He did not blind him-
self to facts. He had the courage of his opinions.
When he had studied his facts and come to some
definite conclusions, he was in the habit of stating
them without reference to whether they harmonised
with any preconceived theories.
The policy of reporting, which was so dear to
Mr. Gladstone's Government, appears always to
have brought about results which were in each
case somewhat similar. Under the graceful diction
of Lord Dufferin's Report, in spite of the apparent
ease with which the skilled diplomatist glided over
difficulties and eluded burning questions, it was easy
to observe that the main facts of the situation did
not escape the statesmanlike eye of the author, and
that he in reality expected the Government to
recognise them. Connected, as I was, by general
political sympathy with a Liberal Government,
and by ties of long-standing family friendship and
relationship with some members qf Mr. Gladstone's
Cabinet, I came to Egypt with a hearty desire to
aid to the best of my ability in the successful
execution of his Egyptian policy. I thought I
understood that policy, and, if I understood it
rightly, I felt sure that it met with my general
concurrence. I soon found, however, that I was
pursuing a phantom which constantly eluded my
grasp, and that, even when I understood something
of the general principles which were guiding the
action of the Government, the vacillation shown
in the execution of the detail was simply heart-
breaking. I could not blind myself to facts to
please ISIr. Gladstone, and directly I stated the
facts and pointed out the inevitable conclusions to
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be drawn from them, I found that, however clear
they might be, they were ignored. To cite another
instance, General Gordon was sent to the Soudan,
not to act, but to report. General Gordon had
failed to recognise the real facts in connection with
the Soudan when he undertook his mission. After
his arrival at Khartoum, he recognised them, but
he could not enforce their recognition on Mr.
Gladstone ; the latter's blindness to facts, which
were patent to all the world, eventually resulted in
the death of General Gordon, of Colonel Stewart,
and of many other brave men. Every one knows
the reluctance which many men feel about making
a will. Inability to recognise that death is the
common lot of all has from time immemorial formed
the text alike of the divine and the satirist. Mr.
Gladstone appears to have lain under a similar dis-
ability in dealing with Egyptian affairs. He ignored
all unpleasant facts. Lord Northbrook's fate was
to be that of his predecessors. He was asked to
" report and advise." It was almost certain, before
he began his work, that his report would pass
unheeded and that Mr. Gladstone would turn a
deaf ear to his advice, unless, which was improbable,
it happened to be such as he had wished to receive
at the time when, ex hypothesis the Government
were in partial ignorance of the facts.
Lord Northbrook arrived in Egypt on September
9, 1884. He remained in the country about six
weeks, during which time he laboured strenuously
to master all the complicated facts connected with
the situation. Before he left Cairo he prepared
the draft of his report, but, inasmuch as when he
arrived in London, it appeared that his views were
distasteful to Mr. Gladstone, his proposals were
modified before they assumed their final shape.
Eventually, he sent in two reports, both dated
November 20, 1884. One of these dealt exclusively
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with the financial situation. The other 'was of a
more general nature.
It is unnecessary to dwell at length on Lord
Northbvook's financial proposals. It will be suffi-
cient to say that they involved : (1) adequate
provision being made for the improvement and
extension of the system of irrigation ; (2) a prospect
of the abolition of the corvee; (3) the acquisition
by the Egyptian Government of greater freedom
in the matter of imposing taxes on foreigners
;
(4) the abolition of the dual administration of the
Daira, Domains, and Railways
; (5) a reduction of
the land-tax, and of the taxes on the export and
transit of produce; and (6) the issue of a loan for
about £9,000,000, the interest of which was to be
guaranteed by the British Government.
" The effect of the proy)osals which I have
made," Lord Northbrook said in concluding his
report, '*will undoubtedly be to substitute the
financial control of England for the international
control which was proposed by the Conference
but the alteration seems to me to be an advantage
both to the Egyptian and to the English Govern-
ments. Nor do I see what objections the other
Powers of Europe can entertain to this control
being exercised by Great Britain after the sacrifices
which have been made in maintaining the peace
and safety of Egypt, and the financial liability
which has now to be undertaken."
In his general report, after dwelling on the
reforms which had already been accomplished.
Lord Northbrook added : " The progress, in order
to be solid, nuist necessarily be gradual in a country
where the people have had to be taught to compre-
hend the first elements of decent government. . . ,
" I cannot recommend Her Majesty's Govern-
ment to fix any date at wliich the British troops
serving in Egypt shall be withdrawn. In my
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report, I have stated my reasons for anticipating
that their strength may be reduced before long to
about 4000 men, b it it is my duty to express my
decided opinion that it would not be safe or wise
to fix any definite time for their entire withdrawal,
because the safety of such a step must depend on
the internal state of the country, and upon the
political position of Egypt, which has been left in
uncertainty in consequence of the failure of the
Conference of London."
It will be seen that Lord Northbrook did not
attempt to solve the Egyptian question in so far as
its solution depended on the continuance of the
British occupation. He expressed a strong opinion
that the garrison could not be at once withdrawn
from Egypt, and there he left the matter. But he
made some excellent proposals in respect to the
finances of the country. Had these proposals been
accepted by the Cabhiet and carried into execution,
internationalism, which has been the bane of
Egypt, would have received a heavy blow, and the
paramount power of Great Britain, as the guide and
protector of Egypt, would have been asserted.
Lord Northbrook's views were, however, too
thoroughgoing for INlr. Gladstone, who was not
prepared to guarantee the interest on an Egyptian
loan. The proposals also did not receive the
support which they deserved from the English
press. The result was that nothing was done
in the direction of carrying Lord Northbrook's
policy into execution. His mission was a failure.
Mr. Gladstone's Government, which fell in June
1885, made no subsequent attempt to settle the
Egyptian question in its larger aspects. It is now
necessary to deal with an endeavour to arrive at
a solution which was made under the auspices of
Mr. Gladstone's successor. Lord Salisbury.
CHAPTER XLVI
THE WOLFF CONVENTION
August 1885-October 1887
Sir Henry Wolff appointed Special Commissioner—Convention of
October 24, 1885—Moukhtar Pasha—Convention of May 22, 1887
—Comparison of the two Conventions—Frontier aiFairs—The
army—Civil reforms— Evacuation—France and Russia oppose the
Convention—The Sultan refuses to ratify it—Moukhtar Pasha
permanently located iu Egypt—Results of the Wolff mission.
It might have been thought that a sufficient
number of Special Commissioners, diplomatists,
and others had already reported on the affairs of
Egypt. Such, however, was not the view of the
British Government. Lord Salisbury determined
to take a leaf out of the book of his predecessors.
It was decided to send Sir Henry Wolff, who had
been a prominent member of what was then known
as the Fourth Party, and who had lost his seat in
Parliament at the General Election which had
recently taken place, on a mission to Constantinople
and Cairo. He was given a sort of general com-
mission to examine into Egyptian affairs. He was
to invite the co-operation of the Sultan in the settle-
ment of the Egyptian question ; more especially it
was thought that it was " in His Majesty's power
to contribute materially to the establishment
of settled order and good government" in the
Soudan.
Sir Henry Wolff arrived in Constantinople on
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August 22, 1885. On October 24, he signed a
Convention with the Turkish Minister for Foreign
Affairs. All that this first Convention settled was
the nature of the subjects which were to be discussed.
It provided that the British and Turkish Govern-
ments were each to send a Special Commissioner
to Egypt, where the Ottoman Commissioner was
to consult with the Khedive " upon the best means
of tranquillising the Soudan by pacific means."
The two Commissioners, in concert with the
Khedive, were to reorganise the Egyptian army,
and also to "examine all the branches of the
Egyptian administration, and introduce into them
the modifications which they considered necessary,
within the limits of the Imperial Firmans." The
sixth and most important article of the Convention
was couched in the following terms : " So soon as
the two High Commissioners shall have established
that the security of the frontiers and the good
working and stability of the Egyptian Government
are assured, they shall present a Report to their
respective Governments, who will consult as to
the conclusion of a Convention regulating the
withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt in a
convenient period."
In a despatch, dated October 24, Sir Henry
Wolff pointed out the advantages which, he
thought, had accrued, or were likely to accrue,
from the signature of this Convention. "The
conclusion of an arrangement," he said, " of any
kind has done much to allay the irritation that has
existed for some time in the minds of the Turks
towards England. . . . The experience of the
Sultan's Commissioner, if wisely chosen, will be
useful in the elaboration of institutions which must
combine both Eastern and Western elements. The
same reason will hold good with respect to the
regulations in the Soudan. It mvist, doubtless.
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have been very difficult for English gentlemen,
however able and conciliatory, to come to terms
with races who had suffered so severely at our
hands. The regulations which are to be under-
taken, with our assent and countenance, but
between the Khalif and those who recognise his
autliority, are more likely to lead to a rapid and
satisfactory result."
Sir Henry Wolff arrived in Cairo on October 29.
The departure from Constantinople of Ghazi
Moukhtar Pasha, a distinguished soldier, who was
named Turkish Commissioner, was delayed; he did
not arrive in Cairo till December 27.
It is unnecessary to describe the lengthy negotia-
tions which ensued. It will be sufficient to say
that, after eighteen months of discussion, a further
Convention was signed at Constantinople, on May
22, 1887, between Sir Henry Wolff and two
Turkish Plenipotentiaries acting on behalf of the
Sultan.
The two Conventions may now be compared
with a view to ascertaining how far the latter
accomplished the objects proposed by the former.
As regards the tranquillisation of the Soudan,
Sir Henry Wolff's efforts were foredoomed to
failure from the commencement. He spoke of
negotiations being undertaken *' between the
Khalif and those who recognised his authority."
Moukhtar Pasha and other Turks were naturally
slow to believe that any JNIohammedans refused to
recognise the authority of the Sultan as Khalif.
But every one in Egypt knew that tlie Mahdi con-
founded Christians and Turks alike in one common
anathema, and that the idea of conjuring witli the
Sultan's name in the Soudan was a dehision.
On this particular point, therefore, the negotia-
tions conducted by Sir Henry Wolff and Moukhtar
Pasha ended in failure. It was reserved for Sir
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Francis Grenfell and Colonel Wodehouse to arrive
at some settlement of the frontier question by
methods which were efficacious because they were
based on the true facts of the case, and not on the
imaginary facts evolved from the brains of Turkish
diplomatists. The defeats which the Dervishes sus-
tained at Arguin and Toski in the summer of 1889,
gave peace to the frontier. Powder and shot proved
more effective agents than the "authority of the
Khalif"
Much discussion took place about the reorganisa-
tion of the Egyptian army. At one time, a
proposal was put forward to recruit troops in
Turkey, an idea which did not find favour with the
Sultan. At another time, the notion of importing
a number of Turkish officers into Egypt was
started. Eventually, however, nothing was done.
The British officers were fortunately left to re-
organise the Egyptian army after their own
fashion. On this point also, therefore, the Con-
vention of October 24, 1885, was unproductive of
result.
Much the same may be said as regards admin-
istrative reforms. A Protocol annexed to the
Convention of May 22, 1887, provided that the
British and Ottoman Governments should jointly
address the Powers with a view to modifying the
Capitulations in the sense of bringing all residents
of Egypt "under a local and uniform jurisdiction
and legislation." A second Protocol provided that
joint representations should be made to the Powers
with a view to reforming tlie administrations of
the Domains, Daira, and Railways, defining the
powers of the Commissioners of the Debt, and
enacting laws relative to the press and to quarantine.
But beyond making an enumeration of the points
which required the attention of the reformer,
nothing was done.
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There remains to be considered the sixth and
most important article of the Convention of
October 24, 1885, namely, that which provided
that the Commissioners should discuss the ques-
tion of the withdrawal of the British garrison from
Egypt. It was perhaps rather a bold flight of the
official imagination to indulge in the hope that any
possible steps taken by the two Commissioners
would assure "the good working and stability of
the Egyptian Government." The good working
and stability of that Government are still assured
by the presence of the garrison whose speedy
withdrawal from Egypt formed the main subject
of the discussions which took place in 1885-87.
Too much attention should not, however, be
attached to the wordinor of the Convention ofo
October 1885. Diplomatic instruments of this
sort usually abound hi euphemisms and picturesque
conventionalities. In plain English, the first Con-
vention signed by Sir Henry Wolff meant that
England and Turkey were to endeavour to come
to terms over the Egyptian question, and, although
nothing practical came of the endeavour, some
cautious and intelligent steps were taken in the
direction intended.
Article V. of the Convention of May 22, 1887,
laid down that "at the expiration of three years
from the date of the present Convention, Her
Britannic Majesty's Government will withdraw its
troops from Egypt." This clause seemed explicit
enough, but it was followed by another clause,
under the provisions of which the British troops
were not to withdraw at the end of three years
if there was any "appearance of danger in the
interior or from without." It was not specifically
stated who was to judge whether the internal or
external danger was sufficient to justify the reten-
tion of the British garrison in Egypt, but in the
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absence of any specific arrangement on this point,
it was obvious that the decision rested with the
British Government. One important definition
was, however, given to the words " danger from
without." Article VI. of the Convention laid down
that, after the ratification by England and Turkey,
the Powers, who were parties to the Treaty of
Berlin, should be invited to adhere to it. The
ultimate execution of the Convention depended, in
fact, on its acceptance by the Powers. In a letter
attached to the Convention, which was addressed
by Sir Henry Wolff to the Turkish Plenipoten-
tiaries, he said : " If, at the expiration of the three
years stipulated in the Convention of this day for the
withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt, one
of the Great Mediterranean Powers shall not have
accepted it. Her Britannic Majesty's Government
would consider this refusal as the appearance of a
danger from without, provided against by Article
V. of the Convention, and the means of executing
the aforesaid Convention shall be again discussed
and settled between the Imperial Ottoman Govern-
ment and Her Britannic Majesty's Government."
More than this, Article V. provided that if, at
any time subsequent to the evacuation, " order and
security in the interior were disturbed, or if the
Khedivate of Egypt refused to execute its duties
towards the Sovereign Court, or its international
obligations," both the Ottoman and British Govern-
ments would have the right to occupy the country
with troops, and, moreover, that if, "by reason of
hindrances," the Sultan did not avail himself of
his right of occupation, the British Government
could none the less take military action on their
own account, and that, in that case, the Sultan
would "send a Commissioner to remain durin<r the
period of the sojourn of the British troops with their
Commander."
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So long as the negotiations which were pre-
Hminary to the signature of the Convention were
going on, the embers of diplomatic opposition
smouldered. Directly it was signed, they burst
into a flame. M. de Nelidoff, the Russian Ambas-
sador at Constantinople, at once *' sent to the
Palace his remonstrances, and reproached the
Grand Vizier with having gratuitously sacrificed
the rights of the Sultan to England." " Similar
language," Sir Henry Wolff reported on May 27,
"had been used to the Turkish Ambassador at
St. Petersburg by M. de Giers, who said that Russia
would probably refuse her adhesion, and thus act
in the interests of the Sultan."
The French Government also took strong excep-
tion to the right of re-entry into Egypt, which the
Convention conferred on England. On June 7,
the Count de Montebello, who represented France
at Constantinople, addressed a minatory letter to
the Sultan in which he stated that the " French
Government had definitely decided not to accept
the situation which would result from the ratifica-
tion of the Egyptian Convention."
The Sultan was perplexed. On July 9, the
Turkish Plenipotentiaries called on Sir Henry
Wolff. "They said that the recent language of
the French and Russian Ambassadors, both at the
Palace and the Porte, had much disturbed the
Sultan. His INIajesty had been told that if he
ratified the Convention, France and Russia would
thereby be given the right to occupy provinces of
the Empire, and to leave only after a similar Con-
vention had been concluded. France might do so
in Syria, and Russia in Armenia. Religious feel-
ing had also been excited in the same direction."
Under these circumstances, it was asked, could
not Sir Henry Wolff " advise as to some formula
by which these difficulties might be met ? " Sir
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Henry could not advise the distracted Plenipo-
tentiaries as to any formula. He "had exhausted
his powers of reference " to Lord Salisbury. What
was an unfortunate ruler who was torn hither and
thither by rival diplomatists to do ? He could at
all events fall back upon his favourite device and
try to gain time. Under Article VH. of the
Convention the ratifications were to be exchanged
within one month of the date on which the Con-
vention was signed. The British Government were
implored to prolong this period. On June 26, that
is to say four days after the prescribed period of
a month had expired, the Turkish Ambassador
represented to Lord Salisbury that "the Sultan
was much fatigued after Bairam," and wanted time
to consider the whole question. A short delay
was granted, but the Sultan was still unable to
make up his mind as to whether he would or
would not ratify the Convention. Sir Henry
Wolff then announced his intention of leaving
Constantinople. He at once received a letter
from the Sultan's Grand JNIaster of the Cere-
monies which was to the following effect : " His
Majesty is at this moment occupied with questions
of the greatest importance for his Empire. In
view of these occupations, which will last all next
week, he is anxious tliat you should remain at
Constantinople until Friday, July 15." Sir Henry
Wolff's departure was according' y fixed for July
15. At 8.30 P.M. of that day he telegraphed to
Lord Salisbury: "Just as I am leaving, Artin
EfFendi has come with a personal message from the
Sultan urgently pressing me to stay. I have told
him that this is quite impossible." At midnight
on July 15, Sir Henry Wolff left Constantinople.
Shortly after he left, the Sultan, through his
Ambassador in London, made an unsuccessful
attempt to renew the negotiations with the British
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Government. He was informed by Lord Salis-
bury "that so long as the Sultan was so much
under the influence of other advisers as to repudi-
ate an agreement which he had himself so recently
sanctioned, any fresh agreement would obviously
be liable to meet with the same fate as the late
Convention."
It should be added that one practical conse-
quence of an unfortunate nature resulted from the
Wolff mission. Before that time, the Egyptian
administrative machine was sufficiently compli-
cated. Henceforth, an additional complication
was added. A Turkish Commissioner was left
in Egypt. When once the negotiations had broken
down, there was no plausible excuse for the con-
tinued presence in Egypt of a high Turkish official,
whose functions could not be defined, whose presence
would naturally be resented by the Khedive, and
who at any moment might become the centre of
intrigue. JNIoukhtar Pasha was, however, allowed
to remain. In spite of his high personal character,
the presence of a Turkish Commissioner in Egypt
has served no useful purpose, and has at times
caused some trouble.
Although the negotiations conducted by Sir
Henry AVolff failed to effect their object, the
British Government were in a better diplomatic
position at their close than they had been at their
commencement. They could henceforth point to
the fact that they had made an endeavour to come
to terms with the Sultan on the Egyptian ques-
tion ; that they had, moreover, succeeded in their
endeavour ; and that it was no fault of theirs if
the Sultan, under the pressure of France and
Russia, had refused to ratify an arrangement to
which at one time he had agreed. Strong in this
argument, the British Government could feel that
the Wolff negotiations, although for the time being
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unproductive of result, had fortified their posi-
tion as against both Mohammedan and European
critics.
The neutralisation of the Suez Canal, to which
allusion was made in Article III. of the Convention
of May 22, 1887, formed the subject of further
discussion, with results which will now be
described.
CHAPTER XLVII
THE NEUTRALISATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL*
Neutralisation of Egypt— Neutralisation of the Canal— The word
neutrality—Circular of January 3, 1883—The Suez Canal Com-
mission of 1885— The Commission dissolved— The Wolif Con-
vention—Signature of the Canal Convention—Its application.
At one time, politicians in search of an idea
flattered themselves with the belief that the
solution of the Egyptian question was to be found
in neutralising Egypt. Why, it was sometimes
asked, should not Egypt become an " Oriental
Belgium " ? A point is already gained by the
advocates of any political idea when they can label
their pet theory with an epigrammatic ticket of
this sort. The mere appellation gives their ])ro-
posal the appearance of involving some sound
and statesmanlike principle. Catchpenny phrases
exercise a good deal of influence in tlie government
of the world. In the Sturiri und Drang of public
life in this busy century, large numbers of people
who are engaged in politics are often too much
occupied with other matters to inquire carefully
whether the particular phrase in question embodies,
as may at first sight appear, the elements of a
sound policy based on the true facts of the situation,
or whether, as is not unfrequently the case, it is a
mere tinsel covering beneath which some glaring
fallacy may lurk
^ See further remarks on this subject on p. 66&
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The proposal to neutralise Egypt belongs to
the latter of these two categories. Its tinsel
covering consists of an argument, which may
conveniently be stated in the form of a syllogism
thus : The most serious aspect of the Egyptian
question is that it may, under contingencies which
are easily conceivable, bring about a rupture
between France and England. The principal
element of danger consists in the two facts that
England would resent a French occupation, whilst
France resents a British occupation of the country.
Therefore, the danger will be removed and all risk of
a rupture will disappear if both France and England
agree that neither of them shall occupy Egypt.
This appears at first sight a compact and
plausible chain of argument. Unfortunately, it is
fallacious, for the main question to be decided is
not whether both England and France shall
abstain from occupying the country, but whether,
inasmuch as some foreign occupation is necessary,
the occupiers shall be French or British. The
analogy between Belgium and Egypt breaks down
on this essential point, that whereas Belgium is
inhabited by a highly civilised population capable
of self-government, the population of Egypt is
for the present incapable of governing itself
on principles which would commend themselves
to the civilised world. This bald fact, namely,
that a foreign occupation was, and still is neces-
sary in order to prevent anarchy in Egypt, and,
therefore, in order to obviate the resuscitation of
an Egyptian question which would be a source of
constant trouble to Europe, has been frequently
forgotten by those who have from time to time
discussed Egyptian affairs. Nevertheless, I am
convinced that it is true, and, moreover, that it is
of a nature to quash all ideas of neutralisation.
Oriental Belgiums, and similar phantasies.
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Most responsible and impartial authorities who
have studied the Egyptian question appear so far
to have arrived at the conclusion stated above. It
is true that Article V. of the Convention of
May 22, 1887, provided that the Great Powers
were to be '* invited to sign an Act recoo-nisinsr
and guaranteeing the inviolability of Egyptian
territory " ; but this was immediately followed by
a provision which enabled Turkey and England to
occupy the country in case any foreign occupation
should become necessary. For all practical purposes,
it may, therefore, be said that the idea of neutral-
ising Egypt, in the true sense of the word, has never
got beyond the stage of academic discussion.
It has been otherwise with the question of
neutralising the Suez Canal. This subject attracted
the attention of the Powers of Europe in 1882,
notice having been more particularly drawn to it
by the fact that, during the period which preceded
the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, Lord Wolseley used the
Canal as his base of operations. Before proceeding
to state what was done in this matter, it may be as
well to describe what, in this particular instance,
was meant by the word neutrality.
In the words of Lord Pauncefote, an excellent
authority on this subject, the word as applied to
the proposals made in connection with the Suez
Canal, " had reference only to the neutrality which
attaches by international law to the territorial
waters of a neutral state, in which a right of
innocent passage for belligerent vessels exists, but
no right to commit any act of hostility."
The definition of the term is important. Lord
Granville was evidently apprehensive lest the mere
use of the word "neutrality" should carry him
farther than he intended. With commendable
prudence, therefore, he directed that, in dealing
with this subject, its use should be avoided and
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that the words "freedom" or "free navigation"
should be substituted in its place.
Some three months after the battle of Tel-
el -Kebir, Lord Granville addressed a Circular to
the Powers in order to give them " full information
on all matters, which were immediately connected
with the peace, security, and social order of Egypt,
and on which, accordingly, they {i.e. the British
Government) had thought it their duty to advise
the Khedive as to the best mode of exercising his
governing power."
In this Circular, a prominent place was given to
the arrangements which it was proposed should for
the future be adopted in connection with the free
navigation of the Suez Canal.
The question was then allowed to sleep till
early in 1885, when, at the instance of the French
Government, it was decided to assemble a Com-
mission in Paris composed of representatives of the
Great Powers, as well as of Spain and Holland, in
order to discuss the question of neutralising the
Canal. The British Government would have
preferred "that all the Maritime Powers who
applied should be permitted to send delegates,"
but to this proposal the French objected. The
purpose for which the Commission was convoked
was to " establish by a conventional act a definite
system for guaranteeing at all times and to all
Powers the free use of the Suez Canal."
The first meeting was held on March 30, 1885,
the proceedings being opened by M. Jules Ferry,
the French Prime Minister.
M. Billot, the Director- General of the French
Foreign Office, then assumed the presidency of the
Commission, but the real work was delegated to
a Sub -Commission, over which M. Barrere, the
second French representative, presided.
It is needless to describe the proceedings of the
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Commission in detail. It will be sufficient to say
that the object of the majority of the Powers was
to internationalise rather than to neutralise the
Canal, and that the British Government were
opposed to the adoption of this course.
The British delegates were obliged to fight the
ground inch by inch. Although they made some
concessions, they were unable to come to terms
with their adversaries. Eventually, after some ten
weeks of wearisome discussion, a draft Treaty
was drawn up representing the views of the
majority. It is unnecessary to dwell in detail
on the points at issue between France and her
allies on the one side, and England, supported to
a certain extent by Italy, on the other. It will
be sufficient to say that they were of a nature to
exclude, for the time being, the possibility of any
common understanding.
On June 13, the Commission held its last sitting.
A few days later, Mr. Gladstone's Ministry fell. The
question of neutralising the Canal was again allowed
to sleep for a while. Shortly afterwards, Sir Henry
Wolff started on his mission. The question of the
free navigation of the Canal formed the subject of
negotiation at Constantinople, with the result that
an Article (III.) on this point was inserted in the
Convention of May 22, 1887. Briefly it may be
said that this Article embodied the views which
had been maintained by the British delegates in
Paris in June 1885.
Although the Convention of May 22, 1887, was
not ratified by the Sultan, the idea of neutralising
the Canal was not allowed to drop. It was one
to which the French attached great importance.
Eventually, after some lengthy negotiations, which
need not be described in detail, a Convention, the
text of which is to be found in Kg^ijpt, No. 2 of
1889, was signed on April 29, 1888. The British
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Government stipulated that the Convention was
not to come into force so long as the British
occupation of Egypt lasted.
Nothing further was done in this matter until
1904. Under the Anglo-French Agreement, signed
on April 8 of that year, the British Government
agreed to put the Suez Canal Convention, of April
29, 1888, into force, with the exception of those
portions which provided that a Local International
Board should be created at Cairo to watch over
the execution of the Convention.
Thus, another important step was taken in the
direction of settling the Egyptian question.
The actual working of the Canal Convention
was put to the test during the Russo-Japanese
War. On the whole, it may be said that it worked
well, but, as usually happens in such cases, a number
of questions of detail arose in respect to which the
wording of the Convention was wanting in precision.
It would be desirable that an opportunity should
be taken to revise the Convention by the light of
the experience which has now been gained.
CHAPTER XLVIII
THE ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT OF 1904
Apparent insolubility of the Egyptian question— Gradual change in
public opinion—Statement of Lord Elleuborough—The business of
diplomacy—The main facts of the problem—The events of 1904
—
Morocco—Signature of the Anglo-French Agreement—Remarks on
the Agreement.
For some years subsequent to the Wolff nego-
tiations, no attempt was made to deal with the
larger aspects of the Egyptian Question. When-
ever the British Government were reproached by
the French, or by British partisans of evacuation,
with not having fulfilled their pledge to evacuate,
the reply persistently given, by both Conservative
and Liberal statesmen, was that England's work in
Egypt was not yet completed. This reply, though
regarded by some as a mere subterfuge, was
perfectly true
;
yet it did not convey the whole
truth. It encouraged the inference that England's
work would be completed at some period, which
would not be very remote, whereas not one of the
British statesmen wlio gave the reply had any
precise idea as to whether the period would be
remote or proximate. The better was his acquaint-
ance with the facts, the stronger would his
conviction be that the period would be remote,
even to the extent of giving a distinctly permanent
character to the occupation, which was originally
intended to be temporary.
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For more than twenty years, therefore, poU-
ticians. whether professional or amateur, French
or English, wandered aimlessly in a labyrinth to
which there was no clue. They sought for the
solution of a question which was in reality
insoluble on any basis which had, during that
period, been formulated. Eventually, Englishmen
relaxed their attempts to make a pyramid stand on
its apex; whilst Frenchmen gradually recognised
two facts. One was that the British occupation
of Egypt was beneficial rather than hurtful to the
material interests of France, whilst general French
political interests suffered from the prolonged
estrangement of the two countries, which was
caused by the Egyptian Question. The other
was that, unless the evacuation of Egypt was
to be made a casus belli with England, the British
view of the facts had to be accepted.
An English politician, writing in 1844, had said :
" It is impossible for any statesman who carries his
views forward a few years not to see that there
must be eventually a contest among European
Powers for the possession of Egypt." ^
That contest, if it ever came, could only be
between England and France. It was the business
of diplomacy to be on the watch for any opportunity
to settle the question, and thus avoid any such
calamity as that predicted by Lord EUenborough.
The main facts connected with the Egyptian
Question were in reality very simple.
It was certain that, in the early days of the
occupation, the British Government stated publicly
their desire to withdraw the British garrison, so
soon as circumstances admitted of the adoption of
such a course.
It was equally certain to all who considered the
subject impartially, and with a full knowledge of
* Letter from Lord EUenborough, Sir Robert Peel, voL iii. p. 269.
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the circumstances, that the British Government
could not, with a due regard to all the interests
involved, carry out their declared intention.
Gradually, the truth of this latter statement
came to be generally recognised, and when once it
was recognised, all that was required to set diplo-
matic action in movement was an opportunity for
negotiating with a fair prospect of success.
Such an opportunity occurred in 1904. The
visits of King Edward VII. to Paris, and of the
President of the French Republic to London,
prepared the public opinion of both countries for
a general settlement of all outstanding differences.
Moreover, at this moment the affairs of Morocco
acquired some prominence.
That State had been for some while past travers-
ing the various stages on the road to ruin, which
would appear to be normal in the case of Oriental
countries. The final stage had nearly been reached.
The exercise of unbridled personal power by the
ruler of the State led to misgovernment, culminating
in revolution. European intervention had become
inevitable. The only practical question at issue
was to decide on the nationality of the Europeans
who were to intervene.
The choice practically lay between three nations,
Spain, England, and France.
Spain, still staggering under the effects of a
disastrous war with America, was manifestly in-
capable of assuming the task of regenerator.
England was unwilling to add to her already
heavy burthen of world-wide responsibilities.
The duty of dealli.g with Morocco devolved,
therefore, naturally on France.^ But, in order that
* Tlie difficulties which suhseciueiitly occurred between France and
Germany, as also the proceedinjrs of the Algeciras Conference, lie
obviously outside the sco])e of this work. Moreover, those dirticulliea
did not arise until a period sul)so(|uent to the signature of the Anglo-
French Agreement of April li, ILIU-i.
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the task should be taken in hand with a fair
prospect of success, the goodwill of England was
necessary. What, therefore, could be more natural
than to barter British support in Morocco for
French support in Egypt ?
Negotiations on this basis were commenced in
tlie summer of 1903, with the result that, on
April 8, 1904, three Conventions were signed by
Lord Lansdowne, who then presided over the
British Foreign Office, and by M. Cambon, the
French Ambassador in London.
Two of these Conventions dealt with the affairs
of Newfoundland, Nigeria, Siam, JMadagascar, and
the New Hebrides. The consideration of these
questions lies outside the scope of the present work.
As regards Egypt, it has been already explained
that the Egyptian Government acquired financial
liberty, and also that the British Government
recognised the Suez Canal Convention of 1888.
Further, a "Declaration" made on April 8, 1904,
contained the following very important provision :
—
*' His Britannic INIajesty's Government declare
that they have no intention of altering the political
status of Egypt.
" The Government of the French Republic, for
their part, declare that they will not obstruct the
action of Great Britain in that country by asking
that a limit of time be fixed for the British Occupa-
tion or in any other manner."
In other words, the occupation was recognised,
and the British Government were left a far freer
hand than formerly to deal with Egyptian affiiirs.
The Governments of Germany, Austria, and
Italy subsequently adhered to this declaration.
Thus, the '* Egyptian Question," in the sense in
which that phrase had heretofore been used, was
partially settled. It is rare that an arrangement
of this kind is of a nature to give satisfaction to
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all those who are directly or indirectly concerned.
Such, however, was the case as regards the Anglo-
French Agreement.
As to the advantages which are likely to accrue
to the residents in Egypt, both European and
Egyptian, there cannot be a shadow of doubt.
Apart from the fact that the financial restrictions,
which by a change of circumstances had become
obsolete and unnecessary, have been removed, it is
to be observed that Egyptian progress will now, it
may be hoped, continue to advance without being
hampered by that somewhat acute stage of inter-
national rivalry which has been productive of so
much harm in the past.
Both England and France gained in the removal
of a difference of opinion which had for long
embittered the relations of two nations whose
common interest it is to strengthen the bonds of
close friendship.
England gained by obtaining a practically valid
sanction to a position which was previously, to
some extent, irregular. I had for long been
convinced that the early withdrawal of the British
garrison from Egypt was quite impossible, but
I never regarded lightly the non-fulfilment of the
engagement to withdraw. Neither did I ever
think that a good deal of provocation in local
matters constituted a sufficient plea to justify the
annulment of that engagement. It is a distinct
advantage for a nation, which is bound to a
scrupulous respect of international obligations by
every consideration of public morality and self-
interest, that it can no longer be accused of any
apparent disregard of those obligations.
France also gained. The large French interests
at stake in Egypt are secured by specific engage-
ments, and are still more am})ly secured by the
traditional character of British predominance.
CH.XLVIII AGREEMENT OF 1904 393
wherever it has been acquired. On the other
hand, any apparent loss of French political
influence in Egypt received compensation else-
where.
Lastly, the civilised world—whose principal
interest I conceive to be the maintenance of peace
—gained by the re-establishment of very friendly
relations between two of the most important
members of the European family.
Such, therefore, is the view I venture to submit
of this very important and auspicious transaction.
I began my connection with Egypt twenty-eight
years previous to the signature of the Anglo-French
Agreement, when England and France moved
hand in hand together in that country. I rejoice
that my connection lasted long enough to enable
me to see the friendly relations of the past
re-established after an interlude of misunder-
standing which was detrimental alike to British,
French, and Egyptian interests.
A further Egyptian Question remains behind.
It consists in gradually adapting the institutions
of the country to the growing needs of the popu-
lation. Possibly, time will also solve that problem,
but, unless disaster is to ensue, it must be a long
timCi

PART VI
THE REFORMS
In the Edsty toe are attemj)tmg to put new wine into old
bottles, to pour what ice can of a civilisation whose spirit is
progress into the Jbrm of a civilisation whose spirit isfixity
;
and whether we succeed or not is perhaps the most interesting
question in an age abounding almost beyond example in
guestions ofpolitical interest.
Bagehot, Physics and Politics.
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CHAPTER XLIX
THE COURBASH
CTniTersal use of the courbash— Lord Dufferin's Circular—It was
partially inoperative—Final abolition of the courbash.
Reforms in all countries, which are in a backward
state of civilisation, can be divided into two
categories, namely, first, those which are manifestly
possible if the reformer is provided with the money
and the administrative agency necessary to their
execution ; secondly, those dealing with long-
standing abuses or faulty habits of thought, which
are ingrained to such an extent into the minds of
the population as to require a social almost as
much as an administrative revolution in order to
ensure their eradication.
The present and the two succeeding chapters
will deal with the most prominent instances of
Egyptian reforms belonging to the second of these
categories. These are the three C's—the Courbash,
the Corvee, and Corruption.
It was formerly the custom of the governing
classes in Egypt to practise many cruel forms of
torture on the population. One case which came
under my personal notice may be mentioned as an
example of the perverse ingenuity which was
occasionally exhibited in discovering recondite
means for the infliction of bodily pain. A Moudir
was in the habit of causing a burning rag steeped in
spirits of wine to be held close to the mouth of any
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recalcitrant taxpayer, who then received a blow on
the chest, the consequence of which was that, the
air being expelled from his lungs, he was obliged
to take a deep breath to refill them. The flame
was thus drawn into his mouth. The official who
was guilty of this particular act of barbarity was
by no means a bad specimen of his class. He
simply followed certain caste traditions, which led
him to be callous to the pain inflicted on a fellow-
creature. It was with the aid of administrative
material such as this JNIoudir that the English had,
in the first instance, to create the New Egypt.
Refined forms of torture were, however, com-
paratively rare. On the other hand, the use of the
courbash, a strip of hippopotamus hide tapering at
tiie end, was universal. When such a simple and
effective form of torture as flogging with this imple-
ment could readily be applied, there was, indeed,
no need for refinements in cruelty. The courbash
was employed on every occasion when coercion or
punishment was required, but notably for the col-
lection of taxes and for extracting either the
evidence of witnesses or the confession of persons
accused of crime.
Confession forms an important part of the
Mohammedan law of evidence. If, the Moham-
medan lawgiver argued, a man confesses his crime,
he must surely be guilty. What, then, added the
Turco- Egyptian I'asha with medigeval logic and
assurance, can be more just and natural than that
when I see that he will not inculpate himself, and
when I know that either he or some one else must
be guilty, I should flog him to see if he will con-
fess ? It is true that he may afterwards retract his
confession, but no im])ortance can be attached to
his retractation ; for, if he is not guilty, why did he,
ni the first instance, confess his crime ? Moreover,
if some glimmering of doubt entered into the mind
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of the old-fashioned Pasha as to the soundness of this
process of reasoning, he would change his tactics. He
would bid avaunt to the argumentative subtleties
of the Frank, and would triumphantly point out
that, even supposing the confession to have been
made in order to obtain relief from bodily pain,
no injustice was committed, for, ere one stroke of
the courbash had been administered, he, the
Pasha, knew that the man was guilty, and that
the flogging was, therefore, a mere formality in
order to obtain the confession necessary to give
legal sanction to the punishment, which the criminal
had richly deserved. The Pasha, having complied
with the text of the law, to which, oblivious of its
spirit, he attached the utmost importance, no valid
complaint could be made ; nor, indeed, was it
necessary to ask any useless questions as regards
the method adopted to ensure compliance.^
When Lord Dufferin came to Cairo, one of his
first resolves was of a negative nature. It was not
at that time clear how Egypt was to be governed
for the future, but Lord Dufferin determined that
in any case the country should not, if he could
prevent it, be ruled by an indiscriminate use of
the whip. Under his auspices, a Circular was
issued forbidding the use of the courbash. It was
signed by Ismail Pasha Eyoub, who was then
Minister of the Interior, and is a curious and very
characteristic document. Like many Oriental
state-papers, it assumed a condition of things
which was wholly at variance with the reality.
Any one unacquainted with the ways of the East
might, on reading it, suppose that the rulers of
Egypt had on frequent occasions used their utmost
* I wish to explain that here, and elsewhere, I am speaking of the
''old-fashioned Pasha," that is to say, the Pasha who existed some
twenty-five years ago. This type has now almost entirely disappeared.
The modern Pasha may have his defects, but he is generally au
educated and enlightened geutleniau.
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endeavours to suppress the use of the courbash,
and that they were scandaUsed to learn that, in
spite of all their humane efforts, that implement
was still very generally employed. Any such con-
clusion would have been wholly erroneous. No
real effort had ever been made by the Egyptian
portion of the administration to abolish torture.
It is, however, proverbially unnecessary to look
a gift horse in the mouth. If the thistles of
Pashadom could, under pressure, be made to pro-
duce figs, the business of the British statesman was
to make the most of the figs, and not to dwell on
the circumstances by which the change of produc-
tion had been effected. Whatever Ismail Pasha
Eyoub and his coadjutors may have thought on the
subject of government by torture, their sentiments,
as expressed in the Circular, were unimpeacbably
orthodox when judged by the standard of modern
civilisation. It was stated, in terms of indignant
remonstrance, that, in spite of reiterated Circulars
in past days, the JNIinister of the Interior had heard,
to his unspeakable regret, that recourse was still
had by some perverse officials to the "repre-
hensible use of the bastinado." This practice
was denounced as "horrible and infamous." It
"degraded humanity, and violated in the gravest
manner the principles of social rights." Further, it
was "absolutely useless and witliout justification,"
for the Minister, who here indulged to a certain
extent in a flight of his imagination, pointed out
that the Government had instituted law-courts,
whose business it was to deal with all litigious
affairs, both civil and criminal. As to the collec-
tion of the taxes, what need could there be of the
whip when the series of Decrees issued by the
Government laid down with commendable precision
the nature of the measures to be taken to ensure
their payment ? The various officials were, there-
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fore, solemnly warned that "the only object of
their mission was to secure, as much as possible,
the welfare of the people, their prosperity, and
their moral and material development, by dispensing
to individuals equality of justice whilst defendhig
them against all aggression and protecting their
interests and their rights." They were all, down
to the lowest village Sheikh, who was sometimes
courbashed and sometimes courbashed others, ad-
jured in language which, to those acquainted with
the peculiar ways of the Pashadom of the time, is
almost comic in its deceptive pathos, to abstain
in the future from the abominable and barbarous
practice of flogging.
Ismail Pasha Eyoub probably stated the truth
when he said that on previous occasions orders had
been issued prohibiting the use of the courbash.
It is needless to inquire into this point, for, if any
such orders were issued, no adequate steps were
taken to enforce obedience to them. But when
the Circular of Ismail Pasha Eyoub was published,
the population of Egypt, and more especially that
portion of it which was in the habit of being flogged,
woke up to the fact that they no longer had to deal
with a few meaningless platitudes intended to throw
dust in the eyes of humanitarians. It was felt that,
although the signature to the Circular might be
that of an oflScial who had little real sympathy
with its spirit, the contents of that document had
been dictated by the British Envoy, who meant
what he said, and who, moreover, possessed both
the will and the power to enforce, his behests.
One instance will suffice to show the spirit which
the new order evoked. A British officer was
present, shortly after the issue of the order, when a
man who was accused of some crime was brought
before the Moudir of the pro\ince. The man
declined to answer the questions which were put
VOL. n 2d
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to him. The Moudir directed that he should be
flogged. All the steps which were usually pre-
liminary to the infliction of flogging were taken.
The man, however, was in no way impressed.
"The English are here," he said to the Moudir;
"you know that you cannot flog me." And
accordingly, he was not flogged. It may well have
been that the unwonted audacity displayed in this
case was due to the presence of an Englishman.
Nevertheless, the mere fact that an Egyptian fellah
should have dared to assert his right not to be
flogged was a striking innovation. A reflective
Pasha would have noted that a new spirit was
abroad.
Lord Dufl*erin's Circular constitutes a land-
mark in the administrative history of Egypt. To
him belongs the credit of having dealt the first
decisive blow to the system of government by
flogging. He has, however, often been criticised
for his action in this matter. The people of Egypt,
it has been said, had from time immemorial been
governed by the whip. Was it safe to abolish this
system by a stroke of the pen, without substituting
anything in its place ? The reign of law, which
Lord Dufferin held should take the place of the
courbash, would necessarily be a work of slow
creation. A month after the issue of the Circular
he himself wrote : " At this moment, there is no
real justice in this country. What passes under
that name is a mockery." Would it not have been
wiser to have accepted the facts of the situation, to
have aimed at the gradual abolition of the courbash,
and to have postponed its total suppression until
some progress had been made in the direction of
establishing properly constituted law-courts ?
These criticisms are perhaps, to some extent,
justified. There need have been no hesitation in
abolishing at once the system of flogging in so far
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as the collection of taxes was concerned. That
system had been shaken by the reforms introduced
under the auspices of the Dual Control. The
burthen of taxation, though still heavy, had been
alleviated, and the legal process for the recovery
of taxes, being a matter in which the governing
body was directly interested, was in sufficiently
good order to ensure the Treasury against serious
loss. It was, however, otherwise in respect to the
procedure of the law-courts. The principle on
which the Government had heretofore acted a\:is
to mete out punishment without entering into
any fine discrimination as to whether those who
incurred the punishment were guilty or innocent
of the crimes laid to their charge. The confessions
extracted under torture, though often false, were
sometimes true. The idea that any witness would
voluntarily appear to give evidence was foreign to
the habits of the Egyptian people. Justice, such
as it was, was almost as much a terror to the
innocent witness as to the accused person against
whom testimony was borne. Under these circum-
stances, there was, without doubt, a risk that as a
result of the sudden and complete abolition of tlie
courbash, crime and lawlessness would be inade-
quately checked, and that Egyptian society in
general would be in danger of dissolution.
It is probable, indeed, that when Lord Dufferin
decided that the use of the courbash in Egypt
should suddenly cease, he did not fully realise the
importance of the step which he was taking. This
view is confirmed by a perusal of the despatch
which he wrote to Lord Granville forwarding the
Circular. It was very brief. It did not contain
anything from which it can be inferred that I^ord
Dufferin realised that he had initiated a social and
administrative revolution. ** The new Minister of
the Interior, Ismail Pasha Eyoub," Lord Dufferin
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wrote, "has signalised his entry into office by
peremptorily forbidding the application of tliis
instrument of chastisement {i.e. the courbash).
I cannot but regard such an act as significant
of the introduction of a more humane and civil-
ised spirit into the civil administration of the
country."
In other words, when Lord Dufferin came to
Egypt he found that the poorer classes of the popu-
lation were habitually flogged by the agents of the
Government. He naturally thought that they
ought not to be flogged. What, therefore, could
be simpler than to issue an order that flogging
should cease, and to insist on the execution of the
order? There is a " scorn of consequence" and a
breezy lightheartedness in the conduct of the
courageous Irishman which excites alike admira-
tion and amusement. It is probable, however,
that, after all that can be said, he was quite
right. The action of any one who knew Egypt
well would perhaps have been more cautious, but
it might not improbably have been less effective.
Lord Dufferin threw the Egyptian administrator
into the water and called out to him from the
bank that he must learn to swim as well as he could
without the help of his time-honoured support.
Did the Egyptian administrator at once learn
to swim ? He did not. In fact, the main reason
why no dissolution of provincial society took place
in consequence of the Circular was that it was
partially inoperative. Lord Dufferin dealt a
staggering blow to the use of the courbash
;
nevertheless, that implement was plentifully used
for some years after the issue of his epoch-making
Circular. In the early days of the British occupa-
tion, crime increased to sucli an extent that Nubar
Pasha thought it necessary to create the Com-
missions of Brigandage to which allusion has been
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already made.^ These Commissions virtually took
the place of the ordinary Tribunals. Recourse was
had to the old system of torture. To quote one
out of many passages which occur in a report pre-
pared by M. Le Grelle, the Procureur-G^neral of
the Native Courts, dated April 6, 1889 :
—
"En Septembre, 1888, un acte de brigandage se
commit a Manchite Gouzour (Menoufieh). Une
enquete amena I'arrestation d'une serie de prdvenus.
Quatre firent des aveux. Sur les ordres reiteres
d'un Mouavin du Minist^re de I'lnterieur venu a
Chibin-el-Kom, la torture fut employee pendant
six jours de suite, en pleine seance de la Commis-
sion Criminelle, devant le Moudir, le Juge, et le
Substitut du Parquet. Les malheureux etaient
frappes jusqu'au moment ou ils avouaient ou
satisfaisaient par leurs reponses les enqueteurs.
Parmi les tortures, figurait une femme appel^e
Fatmah."
Eventually, the Commissions were abolished and,
at the same time. Sir John Scott was named
Judicial Adviser to the Egyptian Government.
Then the work, which Lord 13 ufFerin commenced,
was completed. Torture ceased.
» Vide ante, p. 289.
CHAPTER L
THE CORVEE
Connection between the courbash and the corvee—Merits and demerits
of the corvee system—The corvee law—Dredging the canals
—
Proposed reduction of the land-tax— Proposal to abolish the
corvee instead of reducing the land-tax—The Powers object
Action of the British Government—The corvee is not called out
A Decree is issued partially abolishing the corvee—Final settle-
ment of the question in 1892.
The gods, we know, are just, and of our vices,
pleasant or otherwise, make instruments to scourge
us. The Egyptian Government, not only that of
the Pashas who ruled the country in these latter
days of which this history treats, but that of their
predecessors from the days of the Pharaohs onwards,
was vicious in this respect, that it had held that the
only way to govern the Egyptians was perpetually
to flog them.^ This special form of administrative
vice was suddenly arrested. A superior authority
decreed that flogging was to cease. Then the
scourge of the gods, whose time for avenging past
misdeeds had come, was at once applied in the
following practical shape. The people of Egypt
could not live unless they were supplied with
water to irrigate their flelds. The water could
not be placed on the fields unless the mud, which
' The employment of the corve'e dates from very ancient times.
See, for instance, the description of Solomon's " bond -service" in
1 Kings ix. 16-22.
It is said that 100,000 men were made to work three months in the
year for eighteen years to build the great Pyramid.
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the rise of the Nile leaves at the bottom of the
canals, was annually removed. It was in the
interests of the people themselves that the nmd
should be removed in due time and season. But
the majority of the people were blind to their own
interests. They had always been accustomed to
coercion. For centuries past, the practice had
been to call on them to work in order to remove
the mud, and, in case of need, to flog them unless
they responded to the call. They now learnt that
they were not, under any circumstances, to be
flogged. In that case, they said, we need not,
and we will not remove the mud. " The Ministry
of Public Works," Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff' wrote
on January 14, 1885, "finds by certain indications
that the corvee system, which was enforced by
the courbash, is becoming no longer possible
under a milder regime. The peasantry refuse to
go to the works at the bidding of the Moudirs, and
they can no longer be compelled. The result is
that the clearance of the canals is imperfectly
performed."
Clearly, some means other than flogging had
to be found in order to get the mud removed.
That was one of the first problems which had
to be solved by the British administrators of
Egypt, and a very difficult problem it was. How
was a torpid, semi-civilised Government to get on
when, being suddenly overtaken by the rush of
an imperious civilisation, it was deprived of the
use of the only implement by which the people
had heretofore been governed ? The dilenuna was
one which might well have puzzled more capable
men than these bewildered Egyptian Ministers
who, by no fault of their own, were the last
inheritors of the administrative vices bequeathed
to them by their political ancestors. Indeed, it
may be doubted whether the British Envoy, when
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he dictated the order that flogging was to cease,
reaUsed the fact that it might become necessary
to flog the Egyptian people in order to prevent
them from starving. Yet it is a fact that humani-
tarian diplomacy nearly received a severe check
owing to the difficulty of getting a certain quantity
of mud lifted from the bottom of a number of
ditches and deposited on their banks.
It is in some respects unfortunate that the
word "corvee" has been incorporated into the
English language. The Arabic word is somewhat
eupliemistic ; it is "Aouna," signifying "assist-
ance which is compulsorily rendered." The word
corvee conjures up ideas based on the condition of
the French peasantry, who were *' corveable, tail-
lable et tuable a volonte " in the pre-revolutionary
days. It is, indeed, difficult to get Englishmen
to believe that anything can be said in favour of
a system with which such pitiful tales of suffering
are associated.
From a theoretical point of view, however, the
system of forced labour is capable of defence as
one, amongst several forms of taxation. More-
over, from a practical point of view, it admits in
some cases of justification. It may be that a
country is so exceptionally situated that the
interests of the community oblige the governing
body to force a certain number of its citizens to
fulfil their duties of citizenship by giving manual
labour rather than money payments to the State.
The existence of Holland depends on the dykes
being kept in proper order. So also, the material
prosperity of Egypt may be said to depend on the
clearing of the canals in due season and on adequate
steps being taken to guard against inundation.^
* In the seventeenth century, tlie corvee existed in England.
Macaulay says : " Every parish was bound to repair the highways
which passed through it. The ])e;isaiitry were forced to give their
gratuitous labour six days in the year" (IV'o/A-*, vol. L p. 293). A
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Although, however, recourse may justifiably be
had to the corvee under certain exceptional circum-
stances, the system of exacting taxes in the form
of manual labour is a bad one in this respect, that
it is singularly liable to abuse.
The abuses to which it gave rise in Egypt were
very similar to those which existed in France at
the close of the eighteenth century.^ When Sir
Colin Scott-Moncrieff first examined this question,
he found that the annual clearing of the canals
required the work of one-eighth of the popula-
tion during ninety days. " This number," he wrote
on January 14, 1885, "would be amply sufficient,
but owing to the fact that a large proportion of
the agricultural population sends not a man to
the corvde, the burden falls on the remainder
with extreme severity. Instead of one-eighth of
the whole population working for ninety days, a
much larger proportion from certain poor districts
is employed for 180 days." For instance, in the
province of Gharbieh, " the Wakfs, which own
19,024 acres with a population of 4000 men, and
the large proprietors, who own 83,200 acres with
17,000 men, send no men to the corvee, and pay
no ransom money."
A well-intentioned but unsuccessful effort was
made under the auspices of the Dual Control to
deal with the corvee question. A Decree was
issued on January 25, 1881, under which every
inhabitant of Egypt, with a few perfectly legiti-
mate exceptions, was rendered liable to be called
out for corvde work. In certain cases, a money
payment was accepted in lieu of personal service.
This law was evaded by the rich, and rigorously
enforced on the poor.
Scotch law to a similar effect was passed in 1719 (Social Life in Scotland,
Graham, i. 167). To this day, the corvee is used for the maintenaucfl
of rural roads in France.
* Arthur Young's Travels in France, 1787-89, p. 46.
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During the first two years of the British
occupation, great difficulty was encountered in
getting the canals cleared out. It was, however,
found that scientific knowledge could, in some
degree, serve as a substitute for labour. By
skilful treatment, a portion of the alluvial deposit
of the Nile was floated on to the fields and
prevented from settling at the bottom of the
canals. "By a little manoeuvring of the water
during the flood," Sir Colin Scott- Moncrieff
wrote on January 31, 1885, "INIr. (afterwards Sir
William) Willcocks has got a depth of '80 metres
to take out of a canal this year, where last year
more than two metres had to be cleared. In
Major Ross's hands this year, the clearance of
the Ismailieh Canal (done by dredging, not by
corvee) will cost not more, I hope, than £3000.
Last year, it cost about £15,000. By the use of
the 'Barrage' we raise the water surface in the
canals, and they will not require to be cleared so
deep."
It was, however, obviously impossible to substi-
tute free for forced labour unless money was forth-
coming to pay the labourers. A sum of about
£400,000 annually would, it was estimated, be
required in order to ensure the total abolition of
the corvde in so far as removing the deposit from
the bottom of the canals was concerned. It was
not until the summer of 1885, that there appeared
any prospect of being able to obtahi even a moiety
of this sum. Lord Northbrook, in November 1884,
recommended that the land-tax should be reduced
by £450,000 a year. A budget framed on this
basis was communicated to the Powers by the
British Government on December 6, 1884. After
some diplomatic wrangling, a Khedivial Decree, to
which the Powers had assented, was eventually
signed on July 27, 1885. This Decree indirectly
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involved sanction to the proposed relief from
taxation.
I have already mentioned that, dealing with
Egyptian affairs, appearances are often deceptive.
I have now to explain a remarkable instance of
financial and political mirage. Under the arrange-
ment made with the Powers, it appeared that a
relief of taxation to the extent of £450,000 a
year would be afforded to the Egyptian taxpayers.
When, however, the question of carrying out the
provisions of the Decree of July 27, 1885, arose, it
was found that the boon, which in appearance was
conferred on the people of Egypt, was to a
great extent illusory. The figures had been so
manipulated that a large portion of the money,
which the Powers appeared to give with one hand,
was taken away with the other. On October 1,
1885, Sir Edgar Vincent pointed out that the
deficit of the Domains had been underestimated
by £100,000, that certain taxes on Europeans, to
which the Powers had agreed in principle and
which were calculated to yield £100,000 a year,
had not yet been imposed, and that a further
margin of £100,000 should be left to allow for
unpaid land-tax, for which credit had been taken
in the estimates, but which it would not be
possible to collect. He estimated the sum avail-
able for the relief of taxation, not at £450,000,
but at £150,000.
Apart from the question of the amount of
money really available, another question now arose,
namely, in what form should relief be afforded to
the taxpayers ? The Powers had contemplated a
reduction of the land-tax. Nubar Pasha, supported
by his British advisers, now urged that, instead of
this reduction, relief should be afforded by devoting
the available money to the partial abolition of the
corvee. The proposal was, in fact, most reasonable.
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The abolition of the corvee had become almost a
practical necessity, and the only possible method of
abolishing it was to throw the charge of providing
free labour on the land. It would have been
absurd to reduce the land-tax, and, almost in the
same breath, to reimpose a fresh tax in order to
enable the corvee to be abolished. The Egyptian
Government, therefore, issued a Circular to the
Powers in which it was requested that, instead of
applying the whole of the £450,000—to the
nebulous existence of which no allusion was made
—to the reduction of the land-tax, a sum of
£250,000 should be applied to the partial abolition
of the corvee, and the balance used in reducing the
land-tax. This proposal was supported by the
British Government, who " could not conceive that
there was any doubt as to its acceptance by the
Powers." It was, however, not accepted.
The next six months were spent in international
borrowings of various sorts. The Commissioners
of the Debt were eventually consulted, and on
July 6, 1886, a Decree was submitted to the Powers
under tlie provisions of which permission was given
to add £250,000, which was to be applied to the
partial abolition of the corvc^e, to the limit of
the recognised administrative expenditure of the
Egyptian Government.
In the meanwhile, Sir Colin Scott-IMoncrieff
and his coadjutors had been abolishing the corvee
without awaiting the decision of the Powers. In
July 188G, Sir Colin Scott- JNIoncrieff reported that
the £250,000 devoted to the reduction of the corvee
had enabled the number of men called out to work
for 100 days to be reduced from 234,153 (the
average of the previous three years) to 102,507, a
reduction of 56 per cent. It appeared, therefore,
that whilst the diplomatic agents had been discuss-
ing whether the £250,000 should be spent, the
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practical Scotchman bad to a great extent solved
the question by spending the money. The result,
I remarked in writing to Lord Rosebery, was
" most 2:ratif\ inff," and an echo of satisfaction was
at once wafted back from the Foreign Office.
Here, then, was a solid fact. It was felt that,
if once the fellah was relieved from the obligation
of scooping up mud with his fingers from the
bottom of a clay drain, under penalty of being
flogged if he refused to scoop, it would be difficult
for the united Powers of Europe to make him
resume his former task.
In the meanwhile, regardless of facts, the inter-
national mill was grinding slowly on. It might
have been thought that, as the Powers had made
consultation with the Commissioners of the Debt
a condition of their acceptance of the corvee
Decree, and as the Commissioners had agreed to
the Decree, the goal was not far distant. In reality,
it was as yet scarcely in sight.
A pause then ensued. At one moment, it
looked as if one of two courses was unavoidable
—
either to call out the corvee and thus plunge Egypt
back again into the slough of the old administrative
processes from which the country was just begin-
ning to emerge, or to go on employing free labour
and incur a serious risk that bankruptcy would
ensue. It was questionable which was the worst
of these two evils. There was, however, this much
to be said in favour of the adoption of the first
course, that a public declaration to the effect that
the corvee was to be called out might perhaps
shame the opposition into agreement, and, further,
that it might stimulate the British Government to
afford assistance. It was, therefore, decided to call
out the corvee. A public notice to that effect was
issued. The result was that public opinion, both
in England and Egypt, was moved. A fortnight
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later (February 15), the French Government
intimated their acceptance of the corvee Decree on
condition that a clause should be inserted which
virtually placed the whole of the Public Works
expenditure under the control of the Commissioners
of the Debt. The British Government were con-
sulted by telegraph, and declined to accept the
French proposal.
The situation was, at this moment, very embar-
rassing. Besides the corvee difficulty, the British
Treasury was pressing for large military payments
due by the Egyptian Government. Sir Colin
Scott- Moncrieff, maddened by the opposition he
encountered at every turn, resigned his post,
but subsequently withdrew his resignation. Little
confidence could be placed in the co-operation of
the Egyptians, in whose interests the British
Government and the British officials in Egypt
were working. Nubar Pasha saw the interest
Egypt had in avoiding the appointment of an Inter-
national Commission to deal with the financial situa-
tion, but the Khedive and other leading Egyptians
were indifferent on the subject Some would even
have preferred a Commission in order to break the
exclusive influence of England, and others, for small
local reasons, would not make any serious efforts
to avoid one. It would, however, have been a stain
on the reputation of England if the corvde system
had been re-established. A strong plea for British
assistance was, therefore, telegraphed to London.
In reply, I received the following communication
from Lord Salisbury :
—
** If you will indicate in what way Her Majesty's
(rovernment can assist in extricating the Egyptian
Government from the embarrassments now caused,
they are willing to consider your suggestions in the
most friendly spirit.
" The suspension of the measures for the aboli-
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tion of the corvee would be so disastrous to the
well-being of the fellaheen and the general pros-
perity of the country that it must if possible be
avoided, and Her Majesty's Government will give
their best attention to any proposals that may be sub-
mitted to them for tiding over the present difficulties,
by any temporary measure, or by other means."
After some further communications had passed,
it was agreed that, in case of need, the payment of
the money due to the British Government on
account of interest on the Suez Canal shares should
be postponed in order to provide the funds neces-
t5ary for dispensing with corvee labour. The
following public notification was then issued :
—
"L'adhesion de certaines Puissances au projet
de Ddcret sur la corvde ayant ^te subordonnee k
des modifications consid^rees comme inadmissibles,
le Gouvernement Egyptien s'est vu dans la n^ces-
sit^ d'abandonner ce projet. Mais le Gouverne-
ment de Son Altesse, consid^rant la suppression de
la corvee comme une mesure a laquelle sont attaches
le bien-etre et la prosp^ritd du pays, a consults le
Gouvernement Britannique, qui partage enti^re-
ment I'opinion du Gouvernement Egyptien k ce
sujet.
**A la suite de cet ^change de vues, des arrange-
ments ont ^t^ pris qui permettent I'emploi du
travail r^munerd La decision du Conseil des
Ministres contenue dans ^I'Officiel' du 5 de ce
mois a dt4 par consequent, rapportde ^ et le Ministre
des Travaux Publics a ^t^ invito k sanctionner les
contrats d'entreprises qui avaient ^t^ suspendus."
There are a few important landmarks in the
history of Egyptian administration, and this is one
of them. As the Circular issued under Lord
Dufferin's auspices gave a death-blow to the use
of the courbash, so the notification quoted above
' This decision was the notification calling out the corvde.
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sealed the doom of the corvee system. Although
the battle was not yet over, there could hence-
forward be no doubt as to the side which would
ultimately gain the victory. The fellaheen were no
longer to be flogged unless they scooped up mud
with their fingers from the bottom of a deep ditch.
The British Government had practically pledged
their word that this particular Egyptian abomi-
nation should cease. Retractation was no longer
possible. Nubar Pasha understood the importance
of the step, and in words suitable to the occasion
expressed the feelings of the Egyptian people.
*' L'abolition de la corvee, vous le savez, M.
le Ministre," he wrote, *'a et^ un but que le
Gouvernement de Son Altesse a vise depuis long-
temps, et vers lequel ont constamment tendu tous
ses voeux ; aussi, me fais-je un devoir de vous prier
de transmettre au Gouvernement Britannique
I'expression de la reconnaissance de toute I'Egypte
pour le concours qu'elle a trouve aupres du
Gouvernement Britannique dans la realisation
partielle d'une mesure a laquelle sont attaches le
bien-etre et la prosperite du pays."
Egyptian gratitude is perhaps not always very
heartfelt or very long-lived, but there can be no
doubt that the debt of gratitude Avas really due.
Moreover, thanks—" Ever more tlianks, the ex-
chequer of the poor "—was all the Egyptians had
to give.
Amongst the many achievements which England
has accomplislied in the cause of suffering humanity,
not the least praiseworthy is this act, that in the
teeth of strong opposition, the Anglo-Saxon race
insisted that the Egyptian labourer sliould be paid
for his work, and that he should not be flogged if
he did not wish to work.
As yet, however, the victory was not complete.
It has been already stated that an annual sum of
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about £400,000 was required to abolish the corvde
system in so far as the clearing out of the canals
was concerned. With infinite trouble, £250,000 a
year had been obtained. This enabled the system
of forced labour to be partially abolished. In
1883, the number of men called out for 100 days
was 202,650. In 1886, the number fell to 95,093.
In 1887, only 87,120 men Avere called out. The
corvee system having been virtually doomed, the
question naturally arose of how to dispense with
the enforced services of the remaining 87,000 men.
To complete the reform, a further expenditure of
£150,000 a year was required. The Egyptian
Government wished that this sum should be added
to the amount of the administrative expenditure
authorised by the Powers. This proposal was
not, in the first instance, accepted.
It would serve no useful purpose to narrate in
detail the history of the tedious and, at times,
somewhat angry negotiations which then ensued.
They may well be buried in oblivion. It will be
sufficient to say that, as time went on and the
financial position improved, an immediate settle-
ment became a matter of less urgency. Eventually,
the death of Tewfik Pasha, in January 1892,
afforded an unexpected opportunity for settling
the question. The Egyptian Government, insti-
gated by their British advisers, wished to signalise
the accession of the young Khedive by the adop-
tion of some measures which would be of general
benefit to the population. They proposed to
devote a portion of the economies resulting from
the recent conversion of the Preference debt from
a 5 per cent to a 3j per cent stock, to the abolition
of the corvee, and at the same time to reduce the
salt tax by 40 per cent. The French Government
would not agree to any proposals which involved
touching the economies. On the other hand, they
vol,. II 2 E
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were unwilling to stand in the way of a reduction
of the salt tax. But they coupled a condition
with their acceptance of the Egyptian proposal.
The London Conference of 1884 had agreed in
principle that Europeans in Egypt should pay the
professional tax, which had heretofore been only
paid by Egyptians. After some tedious negotia-
tions, a law applicable to all residents in Egypt,
whether European or Egyptian, had been accepted
by the Powers. At the time of Tewfik Pasha's
death, the tax was, for the first time, about to be
levied on Europeans, amongst whom it was naturally
very unpopular. The French Government decided
to make their assent to the Egyptian proposal
relative to the reduction of the salt tax and the
abolition of the corvee conditional on the abolition
of the professional tax. Ultimately, it was arranged
tliat the salt tax should be reduced ; that the pro-
fessional tax should be abolished both in respect to
Europeans and Egyptians ; and that the recognised
limit of the administrative expenditure of the
Egyptian Government should be increased by
£150,000 a year, thus enabling money to be found
to pay for the free labour which had taken the
place of the corvee.
Thus, after a struggle which lasted for eight years,
this great reform was eventually accomplished.
Begun when Egypt was in the throes of national
bankruptcy, it was continued through a long period
of diplomatic bickerings, which sometimes assumed
an acute form and at other times lapsed into a
chronic state of acerbity, and was at last concluded
by the fortuitous circumstance that it became
possible to drive a bargain over the grave of the
dead Khedive. To Tewfik Pasha may be accorded
the posthumous merit of having by his death
overcome to some slight and temporary extent the
demon of international jealousy, and of having
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thus given a final blow to the hateful system of
forced labour which had existed in the country
over which he ruled since the days of his Pharaonic
predecessors.
So far allusion has only been made to the forced
labour which used to be employed in the work
of clearing out the canals during the period of
low Nile. The corvee has, however, from time
immemorial been employed in Egypt to attain
another object, namely, to guard the banks of the
river during the period of high Nile and thus
obviate any risk of inundation. It is essential to
the well-being and safety of the country that this
work should be performed. It has not as yet
been found possible to abolish completely this
description of corvee, but the number of men
employed every year is small, and is steadily
diminishing.
CHAPTER LI
CORRUPTION
Universality of corruption—Steps taken to arrest it—Example of
British officials—Diminution of corrupt practices.
In no country probably has corruption—the canker
which eats away the heart of most Eastern govern-
ments—been more universal than it was in Egypt
during the reign of Ismail Pasha. Ismail had
inherited from his predecessors an administrative
system steeped in corruption. By his own action,
he made this system doubly corrupt. He believed
in bribery, if not as the only, at all events as the
most effective system of government. Every man,
he thought, had his price. He put into practice
the principles of which Byron, in one of his cynical
moods, has given us a description :
—
'Tis pleasant purchasing our fellow-creatures.
And all are to be sold, if you consider
Their passions, and are dext'rous ; some by features
Are bought up, others by a warlike leader
;
Some by a })lace, as tend their years or natures
;
The most by ready cash—but all have prices.
From crowns to kicks, according to their vices.
Ismail Pasha's subjects followed humbly in the
footsteps of their master. They took and they
paid bribes. From the half- naked donkey -boy,
who in shrill tones demanded " bakhshish " to the
extent of a piastre or two from the winter tourist,
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to the highly-placed Pasha, whose assistance could
only be obtained by the payment of more sub-
stantial sums, all, or nearly all, were venal. The
contractor bribed the Minister to obtain a contract
on terms unduly advantageous to himself, and
would then bribe the Clerk of the Works in order
that he should not inquire too carefully as to
whether the terms of the contract had or had not
been strictly executed. The subordinate official
bribed his superior in order to get promotion.
The landowner bribed the engineer in order that
he should obtain more water for his fields than was
his due. The Kadis were paid by both the plaintiff
and the defendant to any suit, the decision being
usually given in favour of the highest bidder. The
Government surveyors were bribed to make false
measurements of land. The village Sheikhs were
bribed to accord exemption from the corvee and
from military service. The Police were bribed by
everybody who had the misfortune to be brought
in contact with them. The passenger by railway
found it cheaper to give " bakhshish " to the guard
or to the ticket-collector than to pay for a ticket.
As a preliminary to bribing a Moudir to inquire
into any alleged grievance, it was necessary for the
petitioner to bribe the hungry satellites, who hang
about the office of the Moudirieh, before the great
man could be personally informed that any petition
had been presented. The ramifications of the
system were, in fact, endless. Egyptian official
and social life was saturated with the idea that in
Egypt personal claims and interests, however just
on their own merits, could never be advanced
without the payment of '• bakhshish."
It was from the first manifest that the adoption
of more healthy ideas by an administrative service
and by a society so thoroughly diseased as that
described above, would be a work of time. One of
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the main safeguards against corruption in civilised
countries is that society condemns venality. The
act of offering or of taking a bribe is considered
dishonourable. The offender, if discovered, is
visited by a social punishment often more severe
than any which the law can inflict on him. In
Egypt, no restraining public opinion existed, even
if it now exists, on this subject. Bribery was con-
sidered a venial offence. Habits of thought of
this kind cannot be changed of a sudden. They
are but little affected by the passing of laws and
regulations. Nevertheless, it was possible to
adopt certain administrative measures calculated
to diminish the temptation to accept bribes, and
thus both render it less probable that bribery would
obtain the objects for which money had heretofore
been paid, and also facilitate the discovery of the
guilty parties. Measures of this sort were initiated
in Egypt during the period of the Dual Control,
and were subsequently perfected during that of
the British occupation.
In the first place, the inauguration of a proper
system of accounts and of audit did a good deal
towards putting a check on the malversation of funds
belonging to the State. Vouchers were required
for all expenditure. Officials were called upon to
render strict account of all monies which had passed
through their hands. It was no longer possible for
public money to disappear as if by enchantment.
This reform was excellent in its way. It is,
however, a mistake to suppose that the accountant
or the auditor can alone put a stop to the corru})t
dealings of dishonest officials. A hundred ways
exist for eluding their vigilance. To quote a single
instance, a high Egyptian official was, on one
occasion, charged with the sale of certain lands
belonging to the Government. Adjoining these
lands, were others, which were liis private property.
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He sold the two lots together to the same
purchaser. They were of precisely the same quaHty,
but the price obtained for the Government was
very low, whilst that obtained by the official acting
in his private capacity was very high. Thus,
a considerable part of the money, which should
have been paid into the Treasury, found its way
into the pockets of the official who was specially
charged to look after the interests of the Govern-
ment. No system of audit would have succeeded
in preventing a fraud of this description. It
could only have been discovered by some one who
happened to know that the market value of the
land sold by the Government was in excess of the
sum which the Government received.
In the second place, the regular payment of the
salaries due to Government officials has done much
to free them from the temptation to take bribes.
Also, in many cases the salaries of the lowest
classes have been raised. So long as the Govern-
ment allowed inadequate salaries to their servants,
or, as in the days of Ismail Pasha, often left them
for months without paying them at all, it is obvious
that the temptation of the latter to increase their
incomes by illicit means must have been strong.^
In the third place, the system of inviting tenders
for most public works and for the supply of Govern-
ment stores, struck a blow in that quarter where
corruption on a large scale was heretofore most
prevalent.
In the fourth place, the creation of an improved
judicature, the careful choice of judges, and the
more vigilant control which has been exercised over
their conduct, have purified the law-courts.
In the fifth place, with the abolition of the
' It was by raising the salaries of officials that Lord Cornwallis put
a stop to the corruption which existed in India towards the close of the
eighteenth century.
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greater part of the corvee, and the regulation of
whatever remains of the system of forced labour,
the necessity for paying the village Sheikhs in order
to be exempted from the obligation to labour dis-
appeared.
In the sixth place, the organisation of a proper
recruiting service swept away a whole nest of
corrupt practices.
Lastly, the employment of a number of honour-
able and capable British officials has probably done
more than anything else to check corruption.
Their mere example has counted for much. The
Egyptians pay an unconscious compliment to
English integrity by very rarely offering bribes to
British officials.^
It cannot be doubted that these measures have
been effective in checking corruption. Broadly
speaking, it may be said that most branches of the
central administration of the Egyptian Government
and the law-courts are now little, if at all, tainted
with venality. It is not, however, on this account
to be supposed that the " bakhshish " system is de-
funct. It is, of course, im})ossible to state with any
degree of confidence to what extent it still exists, for
the people, in spite of every encouragement given to
them by the superior officials of the Government,
are generally reluctant to complain of illegal exac-
tions, whilst, on the other hand, the corrupt Egyptian
official displays such a singular degree of perverted
ingenuity in the perpetration of fraud as to baffle the
efforts of those whose wish it is to track him down.
On the whole, it may be said that although cor-
ruption is no longer practised on any large scale,
it cannot be doubted that in the provincial admin-
istrations, as also, I fear, in some branches of the
* As a general rule, the integrity of the British officials in Egypt
has been absolutely unimpeachable. There have, however, I regret to
say, been a very few cases of corruptiou and dishonesty amongst the
subordinates.
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Public Works Department, there is still a good
deal of bribery. It will be long before all this
disappears, more especially in view of the extreme
difficulty of obtaining evidence against corrupt
officials.^ In the meanwhile, it can be stated
with confidence that at no previous period in
Egyptian history has so little " bakhshish " been
paid or received as at present.
These, therefore, were the first-fruits of British
interference in the country. Torture and the use
of the courbash ceased. The corvee system was
practically abolished. Administrative corruption
was greatly diminished.
How was it that, in these three cases, the
efforts of the British officials in the service of the
Egyptian Government were crowned with such
signal success ? It was because they were either
free to act, or because, as in the matter of the
corvee, they were able, after a sharp struggle, to
throw off the international shackles by which they
were bound. The more the history of Egyptian
reform is examined, the more will it be seen that
in most cases success was in direct proportion to
the freedom of action of the Egyptian Government,
acting under British control and advice, ^^^here
no such freedom exists, the result has usually been
either failure, or, at best, a modified success.
^ It cannot be too clearly understood that fear of each other has, in
the minds of the mass of the Egyptian population, largely taken the
place of the fear of the Government, which formerly existed. U'his is
a very important feature in the administration of the country. The
latter of these two sentiments tended, at all events, towards the
maintenance of public tranquillity. On the other hand, the fear tliat
vengeance will, in some form or another, be wreaked by any one of
whose conduct a complaint is made, or against whom evidence is
tendered in a law-court, manifestly operates in an exactly opposite
direction. Mr. Machell, the present Adviser of the Interior, has, in
his Annua'. Reports, given freijuent and very striking illustrations in
support or tliis view. As regards the jealousy often entertjiined
amongst the fellaheen for each other, see kgypt, No. 1, 1905, p. 46.
CHAPTER LII
EUROPEAN PBIVILEGE
Origin of the Capitulations—DiflFerence between Turkey and Egypt-
Abuse of the Capitulations
—
Raison d'etre of European privilege
—
Anomaly of the British position—Impossibility of arriving at any
general solution—Minor changes—The right to enact by-laws
The House Tax—The Professional Tax—Proposal to create a local
legislature—Internationalism.
It is unnecessary to enter into any technical dis-
cussion on the rights conferred by virtue of the
Capitulations upon Europeans resident in Egypt.
The subject is complicated, more especially as some
of those rights rest on the text of international
instruments, whilst the precise nature of others,
which have been acquired by custom, is still a
constant source of dispute. Historically speaking,
it is, indeed, incorrect in this connection to employ
the term "rights." The Capitulations were origin-
ally "letters of privilege, or, according to the
Oriental expression, imperial diplomas containing
sworn promises,"^ which were delivered by the
Sultans of Turkey, as also by their Byzantine pre-
decessors, to Europeans who wished to reside and to
acquire real property in their dominions. A legal
fiction had to be created in order to afford a justifica-
tion to strict Moslems, who were guided solely by
Koranic principles, for dealing with Christians on
a basis of equality. Christians were theoretically
deemed perpetual enemies and, as such, unworthy
of peace unless they either embraced Islam or paid
* Van Dyck, Ottoman Capitulations, p. 12.
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tribute to their Moslem conquerors. With un-
behevers, " treaties " were impossible, and indeed
impious, but it was conceivable that the Com-
mander of the Faithful might, of his grace, con-
descend to grant them *' privileges." The Moslem,
unaware that his inelastic faith contained within
itself the seeds of his own political decadence, may
well have thought that the bestowal of these
" privileges " would not undermine his system of
government. In this, he was mistaken. As the
power of the Crescent waned before that of the
Cross, the Frank was graduaHy transformed from
being a humble receiver of "privileges" into an
imperious possessor of "rights." These rights
were to form a potent instrument for good and
also for evil, both to their possessors and to those
by whom they were originally conferred. They
were notably to contribute, as they are still con-
tributing, to shatter the political and social systems
of those who hold to the faith of Islam.
The rights which have been conferred by, or
which have grown out of the Capitulations are not
the same in Egypt and in other parts of the Otto-
man dominions. The Turkish Government have
been watchful of European encroachment, and
have, relatively speaking, been powerful to resist
it. The Khedives of Egypt, on the other hand,
being wanting in vigilance, allowed a plentiful crop
of European privileges, which are not sanctioned
by treaty, to be drifted on the wave of custom into
the position of acquired rights, and if, as at times
occurred, they tardily awoke to the consequences
of their own heedlessness, they were either too
weak to offer resistance, or the impecuniosity,
which was the result of reckless extravagance,
rendered them willing to barter a portion of their
political birthright for the sake of some temporary
concession. Thus it came about that the European,
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who is privileged in Turkey, is ultra-privileged in
Egypt. Abuse of privilege follows in the train
of privilege itself. It happened, therefore, that in
that part of the Ottoman dominions which, more
than any other, has of late years been subject to
the direct control of a European Power, and in
which, consequently, the concession of privilege
has been least of all necessary and its abuse most
of all baneful to the cause of progress, the degree
of privilege granted has been greater, and its abuse
more pronounced, than in any other portion of the
territories of the Sultan.
Although, however, nothing can be said in favour
ofthe abuse, many valid arguments may be advanced
in defence of the use of the Capitulations. At first
sight, it appears monstrous that the smuggler should
carry on his illicit trade under the eyes of the
Custom-house authorities because treaty engage-
ments forbid any prompt and effective action being
taken against him. Those engagements have also
been turned to such base uses that they have
protected the keeper of the gambling hell, the
vendor of adulterated drinks, the receiver of stolen
goods, and the careless apothecary who supplies his
customer with poison in the place of some healing
drug. But when all this, and a great deal more
of the same description of argument has been
stated, there still remains the unquestionable
fact that the smuggler, the keeper of a gambling-
hell, the receiver of stolen goods, and the retailer
of adulterated spirits, represent certain prin-
ciples. They, and their contemptible brethren,
notably represent these principles, that so long as
they have not been proved to commit an offence
at law ^ they have a right to continue without hin-
^ It is to be borne in mind that, before any European can be
adeijuately punished, he must be proved to have committed an offence
not against Egyptian law, but against the law of his country of origin.
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drance in the exercise of their callings, and that
before they undergo punishment or molestation of
any kind, it must be shown to the satisfaction
of some properly constituted and trustworthy
authority that they have transgressed the law.
One of the great battles in the history of English
constitutional liberty was fought over the person
of the disreputable Wilkes. Lord Palmerston's
treatment of the Don Pacifico case is another
instance in point. So likewise, paradoxical as it may
appear, the cause of European civilisation in Egypt
is to some extent unavoidably identified with the
treatment of European ruffians. For, in fact, it
is often difficult to do anything towards sweeping
away the abuse of privilege without incurring a
considerable risk that other equally objectionable
abuses may be created in the process of reform.
It is reasonable that the Egyptian custom-house
official should search the ship of the smuggler for
tobacco or hashish, but what guarantee is there
that the same official will not, in disregard of the
spirit if not of the text of the law, subject the
captain of a vessel engaged in legitimate trade
to endless vexations ? Inviolability of domicile is
one of the corner-stones of European privilege
in the East. It is well that the Police should
be able to penetrate into a gambling-hell and stop
an infamous trade, but what guarantee is there
that, under the orders of an official incapable of
any fine discrimination of character or of circum-
stances, these same Police will not invade the house
of some individual who never in the course of his
life held a playing-card or a dice-box in his hand ?
The careless apothecary should, in the interests
of the public, be prevented from poisoning his
customers, but his more careful rival in trade
naturally requires some valid assurance that he
will not be subjected to unnecessary annoyances
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in the exercise of his profession. Endless illustra-
tions of the same sort might be adduced. When-
ever the question of modifying tlie Capitulations
has been broached, the contending parties have
always used the same arguments. On the one
side, stood the reformer rightly clamouring against
the abuse of privilege which impeded his progress.
On the other side, stood the European who, if
he was politically unbiassed, expressed his willing-
ness to aid in checking the abuse and in furthering
the progress of reform, but who, under the influ-
ence of profound and, to some extent, justifiable
mistrust of Oriental legal and administrative
processes, demanded guarantees against an abuse
of power before he would agree to curtail the privi-
leges of his countrymen. The guarantees which
were demanded were often excessive, and more-
over, they generally took a form which involved
an extension of the international system of govern-
ment. The Egyptian Government either would
not or could not grant them. Hence, not unfre-
quently arose a deadlock.
When the British occupation took place, the
question of the rig! its conferred on Europeans by
the Capitulations entered into a new and singular
phase. The English took Egyptian reform in hand.
They found themselves hampered at every turn by
the privileges which they, in common with other
foreign nations, enjoyed. The English reformer was
able to plead that, under his civilised auspices, there
would be no longer any danger of an abuse of
power, and that, therefore, greater freedom of
action could properly be accorded to an Anglo-
Egyptian than to a purely Egyptian Government.
In the early days of the occupation, this argument
availed him but little either with his friends or
with his foes. His foes scoffed at it. It is true,
they said, that you are here, but you have no right
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to stay. Even supposing the paramount influence
of England to constitute a valid guarantee against
abuse, which we doubt, what is to become of the
guarantee when you leave the country, as you have
promised to do? JNIore than this, are we to abandon
our rights merely to facilitate the work of our
rivals, who have outwitted us ? Heaven forbid.
We will not even make those concessions to an
Anglo -Egyptian Government which we might
perhaps have made to an Egyptian Government,
pure and simple.
The friends of the English reformer came to
much tl>e same conclusion as his foes, but by a
different process of reasoning. If, they said, you
would declare your intention to remain permanently
in Egypt and to undertake the administration of
the country, we should not be unwilling to concede
our privileges, for we should then have some solid
guarantee against an abuse of power. But as
you are constantly asseverating that you are but
sojourners in the land, and" that your occupation is
only temporary, we fail to see what guarantees
against abuse will exist when you carry out your
declared intentions. There could be no question as
to the validity of this argument. JNIoreover, it was
one which the British Government were themselves
obliged to recognise and adopt. Hence, the British
nation had characteristically placed itself in tliis
illogical position—that whilst its official repre-
sentative was obliged at times to maintain privilege
in British interests for fear of eventual abuse by
the Egyptians, he was also called upon by the
British reformer to aid in the abolition of ])rivilege
in order to further that work of reform in which
th,e Government and people of England were
deeply interested. The creation of this singular
position may be regarded as a triumph of Anglo-
Saxon inconsistency. "England," iMontalembcrt
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once said, " fortunately for herself, is not the
pedantic slave of logic." Fully as I recognise the
value of this encomium, I have sometimes, as a
humble agent charged with the execution of
British policy, wished that that policy was a little
more logical.
Under all these circumstances, only one solution
was for many years possible. It was that, in so
far as the main issues were concerned, there should
be no solution at all. Unless the British Govern-
ment were prepared to assume permanently the
responsibility of governing Egypt, it was neither
possible nor desirable to assimilate the legal status
of all the inhabitants of the country. It was,
indeed, painful enough to see the parasitic and
ignoble growths which clung round European
civilisation, but as Egypt was to be civilised on a
European model without being formally placed
under a European Government, it was inevitable
that, together with many blessings, some of the
curses of civilisation should devolve on the country.
Apart from the practical and political difficulties
which stood in the way of radical reform, it was to
be observed that, looking at the matter broadly,
the blessings greatly predominated over the curses.
The material prosperity of Egypt depended in no
small degree on the presence of a numerous
European colony, and on the attractions for the
investment of European capital. The European
would not reside in Egypt unless he could make
money by doing so, and he could not make money
unles's his life and property were guaranteed against
the arbitrary pioceedings of a Government which
but recently was very bad, and which, as he rightly
thought, would probably relapse into its former
condition if the controlling hand of England were
withdrawn.
Broadly speaking, therefore, the question of
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European privilege stood, up to 1904, in much the
same position as it did in 1882. Nevertheless, if
we descend from general principles to detail, it will
be found that a few minor reforms were undertaken
of a nature to mitigate some of the worst abuses of
the system which the English found in existence
when they took Egyptian affairs seriously in hand.
The main blot in the system under which Egypt
was, and, unfortunately, still is governed, is the
absence of any legislative machinery capable of
passing laws binding on all the inhabitants of the
country. As the absence of any properly con-
stituted Tribunals created, to use Nubar Pasha's
expressive phrase, a "judicial Babel," so the
absence of any supreme legislature creates a
"legislative Babel." History affords abundant
examples of countries whose systems of legislation
have been bad. Egypt affords a unique example
of a country well advanced on the road to civilisa-
tion which, for all practical purposes, may be said
to possess no general legislative system whatsoever.
Although, however, the system of legislation by
diplomacy, in so far as its main features are con-
cerned, still holds the field, and although it is true
that the continuance of this system involves an
almost complete legislative deadlock, nevertheless,
after vast travail, the diplomatic mountain did at
last bring forth a small but not altogether ridiculous
mouse, which in some degree mitigated the evils
necessarily attendant on legislative impotence.
Nubar Pasha, to whom must be attributed the
merit of the innovation about to be described,
pointed out that, apart from questions of the first
importance, such as criminal jurisdiction and the
right of taxing Europeans, there remained a
considerable field of petty but not unimportant
legislation on matters relating to what he termed
"la vie journaliere de la population." Questions
VOL. II 2 F
A34 MODERN EGYPT ft. vi
were frequently arising as to the extent to which
Europeans were subject to regulations edicted by
the Egyptian Government on such matters as the
maintenance of dykes and canals, the establishment
of drinking-shops and places of amusement, the
right to carry arms, and a host of other minor
subjects, which in Europe are often treated by
by-laws framed by some subordinate legislative
authority, to whom power has been delegated by
the supreme legislature. After some discussion,
the Powers ag-reed to confer leoislative rijrhts on
the Egyptian Government in respect to these
matters, subject to the condition that the Egyptian
proposals, before acquiring the force of law, should
receive the approval of the General Assembly of
the INIixed Tribunals. It was provided that no
greater punishment than a fine of £l or seven days'
imprisonment could be incurred for infringing these
by-laws.^ The Decree introducing these changes,
which is dated January 31, 1889, is a document of
some importance in so far as it represents the first
faltering steps taken in the direction of a real
Egyptian legislative autonomy.
The arrangement is obviously open to some
objections in principle. It is unusual that judges
should frame the laws, which they have to
administer. But the necessities of the case were
such as to render it impossible to attach much
weight to objections based on the undesirability of
amalgamating legislative and judicial functions.
In Egypt, legislators have to be caught wherever
they can be found. As a legislative machinery
composed of judges was ready to hand, that
1 In very nimuMoiis cases, Uie penalty for infring^in^ the law is
altogether insufliciont to ensure general respect heiug paid to its provi-
sions. Moreover, the procedure of tlie law-courts is often complicated
and unduly slow in action. These defects have become notably
apparent in dealing with the illicit sale of Hashish, the use of which is
a fertile source of lunacy in Kgypt. See Egypt, No. 1 of lUOG, p. 64.
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machinery had to be utilised in default of anything
better.
The fundamental idea of the Decree of January
31, 1889, was, therefore, to transfer a certain
portion of the legislative functions, heretofore
exercised collectively by the Powers, to the judges
of the Mixed Tribunals. Some beneficent measures
have been enacted under its provisions. To quote a
single instance, the Egyptian Government have been
enabled to control the sale of liquor in the agri-
cultural districts, and have thus placed some sort of
check on the demoralisation which the foreign pur-
veyor of alcoholic and often adulterated drinks
spreads around him.^
Passing to another reform, it is to be observed
that when the British occupation took place,
certain direct taxes were paid by Egyptians, but
not by Europeans. These were the house tax and
the professional tax. No valid arguments could
be adduced in favour of exempting Europeans
from the payment of these taxes. The reason why
they did not pay them was because they did not
like paying them. Secure in the support of their
diplomatic representatives, they had succeeded in
maintaining their fiscal privileges intact. The
injustice was so glaring that the Powers were
forced into applying a remedy. On March 17,
1885, they went so far, at the instance of the
British Government, as to sign a Declaration stating
that they "recognised the justice of making their
subjects in Egypt liable to the same taxes as the
natives." They agreed in principle to a Decree
under the terms of which Europeans were rendered
liable to the payment of the house tax ; tliey
'equally declared that they accepted the appli-
cation to their subjects, in the same manner as to
* For further remarks on this very importaut subject, see, inter alia,
Egypt, No. 1 of li)07, pp. 73-7G.
436 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi
the natives, of the stamp tax and Ucence tax ; and
they engaged to undertake immediately, in concert
with the Egyptian Government, the study of the
draft laws establishing these two taxes."
Both before and after the signing of this Declara-
tion, the usual unedifying and wearisome wrangling
took place. It was not till April 15, 1886, that a
Decree was at last issued which rendered Europeans
liable to the payment of the house tax.
Although the Powers undertook, on March 17,
1885, to study " immediately " the draft laws
necessary for the imposition of the licence or
professional tax on Europeans, it is to be borne in
mind that the word " immediate " is, in diplomatic
phraseology, a relative term. Six years elapsed
before, on March 8, 1891, a Decree was issued,
under which Europeans were rendered liable to
the payment of the professional tax. The law had
not, however, been put in operation when, in
connection with the corvee negotiations,^ the
French Government pressed for its repeal. There
was a ofood deal to be said in favour of abolishing
the tax. In spite of the prolonged study which
preceded the issue of the Decree, many of its details
were faulty. JNIoreover, in an Oriental country, a
direct tax is always liable to abuse by reason of
the untrustworthy nature of the agency employed
in its assessment and collection. The Egyptian
Government and their British advisers, therefore,
decided to rest content with the victory which had
been already gained. By dint of strenuous per-
severance, they had remedied an injustice ; they
had asserted the principle that in fiscal matters
Europeans and Egyptians were to be treated on a
footing of equality ; there could be no objection to
a relief of taxation which would be applied to
Europeans and Egyptians alike. The professional
» Vide ante, p. 418.
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tax was, therefore, abolished by a Decree issued on
January 28, 1892.
To sum up. The results of British intervention
in Egypt, in so far as European privilege is con-
cerned, have up to the present time been as
follows :
—
1. A slight advance has been made in the
direction of Egyptian legislative autonomy.
2. Europeans and Egyptians have been placed on
a basis of equality in so far as taxation is concerned.
With the signature of the Anglo-French Con-
vention in 1904, the question of dealing with the
Capitulations entered into a new phase. The
prospects of reform brightened. It became possible
to discuss the subject on its own merits without
the introduction of irrelevant issues.
I have already stated that the main object of
this work is to narrate the history of the past,
rather than to discuss questions which now occupy
public attention. Acting on this principle, I
abstain from entering fully into a discussion of the
method under which the existing regime of the
Capitulations might advantageously be modified.
In my Annual Report for the year 1905 ^ I dwelt on
this subject, and in my Report for the following
year,^ I sketched out the broad features of a plan,
having for its object the creation in Egypt of
a Council invested with powers to enact laws
binding on all Europeans resident in Egypt. I
concluded with the following remarks :
—
" I am well aware of the danger of making
Constitutions which may look well on paper, but
which will not work in practice. It is one against
which Lord Dufferin very wisely uttered a note
of warning when he was framing proposals for the
creation of an Egyptian Legislative Assembly. I
» Egypt, No. 1 of 1906, pp. 1-8.
> Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, pp. 10-26.
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have endeavoured, to the best of my abihty, to
avoid this danger. INIy wish has been to create an
institution which, albeit it will not be free from
anomalies, and may possess many theoretical
imperfections, will, on the whole, be suited to the
present practical requirements of Egyptian political
and administrative life. I have more particularly
endeavoured to utilise such elements as are avail-
able, in order to guard, so far as is possible, against
that danger to which, possibly, Egypt is somewhat
specially exposed—I mean the danger of making
what Burke once called * a stock -jobbing Con-
stitution.' I am far from saying that I have
altogether succeeded, but I trust that what I have
proposed may form the basis for further discussion,
with the result that any defects which may be
discovered in the scheme set forth in this Report
may be remedied.
"Much will depend upon the views taken by
the natural leaders of public opinion in Egypt.
To the Egyptians, I would say that some plan
based on the broad features of that which I have
sketched out is, I am convinced, the only method
by which they can, within any period which it is
now possible to foresee, be relieved of those
portions of the Capitulations which retard the
progress of their country, and of which they so
frequently, and, I should add, so legitimately,
complain. To the Europeans who have made
Egypt their home, I would say that, in my desire
to guard against any reappearance of the arbitrary
methods of government against which the Capitu-
lations were intended to protect them, I am no
less European than they ; that though the rights
and privileges which they very naturally prize are
taken away in one form, they are simultaneously
granted in another form of equal and far less
objectionable efficacy ; and that, in addition, the
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inestimable privilege will be granted to them of
making their own laws, instead of being dependent
on the vicissitudes of European politics and on the
views taken in fifteen different capitals of the
world by others, who, however much they may
be animated by good intentions, must necessarily
be ignorant of local requirements. It is only in
the *Land of Paradox' that the bestowal on a
whole community of the right to manage its own
affairs could be regarded as the destruction of a
privilege.
"Before moving any further in the matter, I
ask the leading Europeans resident in Egypt
whether they wish to support an archaic system
of government which has outlived its time, and
which acts as a clog to all real progress, or whether
they would not rather prefer to assist in reforming
that system in order to ilneet the altered conditions
of the country, and thus lay the foundation-stone
of an Egyptian nationality in the best and only
practicable sense of that much-abused term."
I have now only to express an earnest hope
that this question will not be allowed to drop. By
far the most important reform now required in
Egypt is to devise some plan which will enable
laws binding on Europeans resident in the country
to be enacted. Until this is done, progress in
many directions, where reform is urgently required,
will be barred. I would add that the mere transfer
of criminal jurisdiction over Europeans from the
Consular to the Mixed Courts—a project which
nnds support in some quarters—altogether fails to
meet the requirements of the situation. The main
reform required is legislative, not judicial.^
The abolition of indefensible privileges is part
and parcel of the work of modern progress. In
* Some further remarks on this subject will be found on p. 668.
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the West, the work of destroyhig privilege is well-
nigh complete, and the next generation will
probably see democracy pass from the destructive,
and enter upon the constructive phase of its
existence, with what result we cannot now foretell.
The backward East is still in the stage in which
a privilege destroyed, whether it be of a Western
or of an Eastern type, may be regarded as a battle
won. The constructive period of Eastern political
existence is as yet afar, neither can any one of the
present generation hope to see what will eventually
happen to the curious amalgam of fanaticism and
agnosticism, of old-world despotism and latter-day
republicanism, which in Egypt, as in other Oriental
countries, is now laid on the anvil, and which
receives blows from all quarters of such diverse
strength as to render it a matter of haphazard
conjecture to foretell what will be the shape
which it will ultimately assume. In the mean-
while, assuming the abolition of such privileges
as those enjoyed by Europeans in Egypt to be
an advantage, it may be noted that the Egyptian
Government, under British auspices, made one
considerable step forward. They placed all the
residents in Egypt, whether European or Egyptian,
on a footing of fiscal equality. But they have so far
been unable seriously to attack the Capitulations,
which constitute the main citadel of privilege.
These, as in the days prior to the British occupation,
remain for the present inviolate. Why was this ?
It was because the international system of govern-
ment barred the way to advance.
This work has been written to little purpose
if it has not shown the radical defects of inter-
nationalism, considered as a machinery for adminis-
tration and legislation. In making this remark,
however, I must carefully guard against being
misunderstood. In condemning executive action
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through international agency, I do not in any
degree wish to deprecate the employment of
officials of various nationalities in certain executive
functions. The system which I wish to condemn
is that under which executive officials are practically
nominated by foreign Governments and become, as
experience in Egypt has abundantly proved, the
political agents of their countries of orighi. Not
only is there no objection to the Egyptian Govern-
ment being free to choose their European officials
from any country in Europe, but great advantage
is to be derived from the adoption of this system.
Some solid guarantee is thus afforded that the
individuals nominated will be chosen solely by
reason of their professional merits, and that they
will not be moved by political considerations to
overstep the limit of the functions assigned to
them. The same remark applies, even to a greater
extent, to the case of those in judicial employment.
European judges for the Egyptian law-courts
should continue, as at present, to be chosen from
various nationalities.
The case of legislative internationalism is some-
what different. Egypt is essentially a cosmopolitan
country. It follows, therefore, as a • matter of
course, that if any local legislature is created, it
must, if it is to be truly representative, be cosmo-
politan in character.
The internationalism which I wish to condemn
is, therefore, confined to what may be termed
political internationalism, that is to say, the system
which admits of the employment of political
agents, who, acting under whatever instructions
they may receive from their several Foreign Offices,
are prone to introduce into the discussion of
some purely local question, considerations based
on the friendliness or hostility, in other parts of
the world, of their countries of origin. Political
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passions are—or, at any moment may become—too
strong to allow of an international system of this
latter type working smoothly. "The principles
of true politics," Burke once said, "are those of
morality enlarged, and I neither now do, nor
ever will, admit of any other." An influential
school of English politicians have been zealous
in supporting the principle of action thus advocated
by Burke. "I would not," Mr. Bright said in
1877, "dissociate what is true in morals from what
is true in statesmanship." Few persons would
wish to speak in disparaging terms of these noble
principles. They certainly command my full
assent, and, I may add, that during a long
diplomatic career, I have persistently acted upon
them to the best of my ability. But, whilst our
principles may be elevated, our application of
them must be subordinated to the facts with which
we have to deal. Do not let us imagine that
nations and Governments in general are prepared
altogether to assimilate public and private morality.
Mr. Lecky says with truth : " Nothing is more
calamitous than the divorce of politics from morals,
but in practical politics public and private morals will
never absolutely correspond." ^ Internationalism,
in spite of its fair exterior, which proclaims equality
of governing power and equitable treatment
towards subject races, means but too often in
practice political egotism, a disregard of the rights
of subject races, and, in the case now under
discussion, a decadence in the authority of that
European Power on the maintenance of whose
paramount influence the advance of true civilisation
in Egypt depends. That Power is Great Britain.
» Map o/Life, p. 18L
CHAPTER LIII
FINANCE
The first bankruptcy of Egypt—Risk of a second bankruptcy—The
Race against Bankruptcy
—
The era of reform—Fiscal relief
—
Reduction of taxation— Increase of revenue— Expenditure
Aggregate surplus since 1888—The indebtedness of the fellaheen
—Distribution of land—Importance of the financial question.
"Great," says Carlyle, "is Bankruptcy. . . .
Honour to Bankruptcy ; ever righteous on the great
scale, though in detail it is so cruel. Under all
falsehoods it works unweariedly mining. No false-
hood, did it rise heaven high and cover the world,
but Bankruptcy, one day, will sweep it down and
make us free of it." ^
In Egypt, bankruptcy, of a truth, destroyed
many false gods and pricked many bubbles.
Notably, it dashed down Ismail Pasha, the great
high- priest of Sham, from that false eminence
which he had attained, .and allowed him to be
pulverised by the adventurers who were his former
worshippers. More than this, bankruptcy, riding
roughshod over all who would not recognise the
irresistible nature of its action, brought home to
the minds of a reluctant Egyptian Ministry that
they must needs abandon the Soudan, at all events
for a time, because they could not afford to stay
there. These and many other benefits did bank-
ruptcy, in its ruthlessness, confer on a land whose
* French Revolution, Book iii. c. i.
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government had for many years been one gigantic
falsehood.
When the British troops occupied Egypt in
1882, one act of bankruptcy had ah*eady been
committed. In 1879, the Government of Egypt
declared themselves insolvent. In 1880, a composi-
tion with their creditors was effected. Nevertheless,
under the combined influences of the Arabi re-
bellion and the cataclysm in the Soudan, the
Treasury was again on the high road, to another
act of bankruptcy. There was, however, this
difference between the financial chaos of 1878-79
and that of 1882-83. During the earlier of these
two periods, the hopes of every well-wisher to
Egypt were based on a declaration of bank-
ruptcy. It was impossible to apply a remedy until
the true facts of the case were recognised. In
1882-83, on the other hand, it was in the true
interest of every Egyptian, and of every sympathiser
with Egypt, to stave off" bankruptcy, for the remedy
which would certainly have been applied, had a
condition of bankruptcy been declared, was almost
as bad as the disease. That remedy was inter-
national government in excelsis. Hence, the
Egyptian Government had to enter upon what
Lord Milner has aptly termed " The Race against
Bankruptcy."
The struggle was long and arduous. For some
while, the issue seemed doubtful. The final result
was a complete triumph. It may be said that the
period of doubt lasted till 1888. By that time, the
race had been virtually won.
So long as the Egyptian Government and their
British advisers were in constant danger of being
throttled by bankruptcy, it was hopeless to think
seriously of fiscal reform. More than this, any
improvement in the administrative system which
involved an increase of expenditure—and it may
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be said that practically every improvement required
money—had to be set aside. Attention was con-
centrated on one object, and that was how to make
both ends meet. But when financial equilibrium
was assured, the aspect of affairs changed.
When it became known that the Egyptian
Treasury was in possession of a surplus, all the
various interests concerned clamoured for the
redress of long-standing and often very legitimate
grievances. The inhabitant of the country pleaded
that his land-tax was too high, and pointed with
justice to the fall in the price of agricultural pro-
duce as a reason for affording him relief. The
inhabitant of the town complained of the oppres-
sive nature of the octroi duty. The population in
general urged that the price of salt was excessive.
The possessor of live stock asked why he should
pay a tax for every sheep or goat, on his farm. The
seller of produce at every market or fair dwelt on
the fact that his goods had to be weighed by a
Government official who charged a fee for the
Treasury and another fee for himself. Why, again,
it was urged, should railway, postal, and telegraph
rates be higher in Egypt than elsewhere ? Why
should a boat passing under a bridge pay a toll, whilst
a passenger going over the bridge paid nothing ?
These, and a hundred other arguments and proposals,
were put forward by the advocates of fiscal reform.
On the other hand, each zealous official, anxious
to improve the administration of his own Depart-
ment, hurled in demands for money on a poverty-
stricken Treasury. The soldier wanted more
troops, and painted in gloomy colours the dangers
to which the frontier was exposed by reason of the
proximity of the Dervishes. The Police officer
wanted more policemen to assist in the capture of
brigands. The jurist urged that, without well-paid
judges, it was impossible to establish a pure system
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of justice. The educationalist pointed out with
great truth that, unless the sums placed at the dis-
posal of the Department of Pubhc Instruction
were greatly increased, the execution of the policy
of employing Egyptian rather than European
agency in the administration of the country would
have to be indefinitely postponed. The soldier,
the policeman, the jurist, the director of prisons,
and the schoolmaster all joined in asking for the
construction of expensive buildings. The medical
authorities clamoured for hospitals, and pointed
out that, without improved sanitation, which was
a bottomless financial abyss, there could be no
guarantee against epidemic disease. The engineer
showed that it was false economy not to extend the
system of irrigation, to drain the fields, to make
roads, and to develop railway communication.
Following on the larger demands, came every species
of minor proposal. Would it not be an attraction
to the tourists, who spent so much money in Egypt,
if a theatrical company visited Cairo in the winter ?
How could this be managed unless the Government
gave a subvention to the theatre ? Was it not a
scandal, now that a civilised Power was virtually
governing Egypt, that more was not done to pro-
tect the ancient monuments of the country from
injury ? What report would the winter visitors to
Egypt make when they returned to Europe, if, in
driving to the Pyramids, they were bumped over
a road which had not been repaired since the
Empress Eugenie drove over it some twenty years
previously ? These, and scores of other questions,
were asked, in tones of more or less indignant
remonstrance, by individuals who realised the
desirability of paying attention to some one or
other subject in which they were interested, but
who had no clear perception of the financial
situation considered as a whole.
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Under all these circumstances, it behoved those
who were responsible for the financial guidance of
the Egyptian Government to act with great caution.
It was clear that, as a wave of European civilisa-
tion was to sweep over the land, all the parapher-
nalia of civilisation—that is to say, its judges and
law-courts, its hospitals, its schools, its reforma-
tories for juvenile offenders, and so on—would,
sooner or later, have to be introduced ; but the
main point to be borne in mind was this : that, in
introducing all these reforms, Egypt should not be
allowed to slip back into the slough of bankruptcy
from which it had been so hardly and so recently
rescued. The principal difficulty was to decide
which were the most pressing amongst the many
points requiring attention. It was thought that,
before the sick man was provided with a comfort-
able hospital, before the criminal was lodged in a
prison built on improved penological principles,
before schools w^ere provided, and even before rival
litigants could be provided with an adequate
number of honest and capable judges, or before
the judges could be located in suitable buildings,
it was essential to alleviate the burthens which
weighed on the mass of the population. Fiscal
relief had a prior claim to administrative reform.
It was, therefore, decided that, whilst penuri-
ously doling out grants to the spending Depart-
ments, the principal eff()rts of the Government
should be devoted to devising means for the relief
of taxation.
It is not necessary that I should give in detail
the fiscal history of Egypt since the British
occupation. It will be sufficient to say that
direct taxation has been reduced by little less than
£2,000,000 a year. In the domain of indirect
taxation, the Salt Tax, the collection of which was
attended with great hardship to the poorest classes
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of the population,^ the octroi duties, the bridge
and lock dues on the Nile,^ and the tax both on
river boats and on sea fishing-boats have been
wholly abolished. The Registration dues on the sale
of land have been reduced from 5 to 2 per cent. The
Light dues have been greatly diminished in amount.
So also has the tax on ferries. The Customs duties
on coal, liquid fuel, charcoal, firewood, timber for
building purposes, petroleum, live stock, and dead
meat have been reduced from 8 to 4 per cent.
The inland fishery industry has been relieved
from the vexatious and onerous restrictions which
were formerly imposed on it. The Postal, Tele-
graph, and Railway rates have been largely reduced.
The only increase in taxation has been in the
tobacco duty, which has been raised from P.T. 14
to P.T. 20 per kilogramme. There cannot be a
doubt that the whole Egyptian population is now
very lightly taxed. The taxation is, however, still
unequally distributed. The urban population do
not bear their fair share of the public burdens. In
this, as in so many other matters, the Capitulations
bar the way to reform.
In spite of these large reductions of taxation,
the revenue has grown from £E.8,935,000 in 1883
to £E.15,337,000 in 1906—an increase of no less
than £E.6,402,000.
The expenditure has, of course, increased with
the growing revenue, but it lias been carefully
controlled. In 1883, it amounted to £E.8,554,000,
and in 1906 to £E.12,393,000''—an increase of
£E.3,839,000.
» See Egypt, No. 1 of 1906, p. 33, and No. 1 of 1906, p. 191.
^ The development of Nile traffic has been very remarkable. I give
a single instance. The number of boats passing the Atfeh lock, which
connects the Mahmoudieh Canal and the Nile, in 1900— the year
before the abolition of the toll—was only 4564. In 1905, nearly 22,000
passed.
3 These figures are exclusive of £E. 1,238,000 debited to Special
Funds in 1883, and of £E. 769,000 similarly debited in 1906.
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The following three facts will perhaps bring
clearly home to the mind of the reader the general
nature of the results obtained by the financial
administration of Egypt since the British occu-
pation in 1882.
In the first place, I have to record that, up to
1888, either a deficit was annually incurred, or else
financial equilibrium was preserved with the utmost
difficulty. Then the tide turned. During the
eighteen years from 1889 to 1906, both inclusive,
the aggregate surplus realised by the Egyptian
Treasury amounted to more than 27^ millions
sterling.
The second fact which I have to record is no
less striking. During the twenty years preceding
December 31, 1906, extraordinary expenditure to
the extent of £E. 19,303,000 was incurred on rail-
ways, canals, and public buildings. Of this large
sum, only £E. 3,6 10,000 was borrowed. The
remainder was provided out of revenue. More-
over, on December 30, 1906, a Reserve Fund of
£E.3,050,000 stood to the credit of the Commis-
sioners of the Debt. The Reserve Fund of the
Egyptian Government amounted on the same date
to £E.ll,055,000, of which only £E.2,353,000 had
at that date been engaged for capital expenditure.
Both of these Funds, amounting in the aggregate
to £E.14,105,000, were provided out of revenue.
In the third place, I wish to draw attention to
the facts and figures relating to the indebtedness
of Egypt. In 1883, the capital of the Debt, which
was then held exclusively by the public, amounted
to £96,457,000, and the charge on account of
interest and sinking fund to £4,208,000. Since
then, the Guaranteed Loan, which amounted to
£9,424,000, has been issued ; £4,882,000 has been
borrowed for the execution of public works, and for
the commutation of pensions and of allocations to
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the Khedivial family. The conversion operation
of 1890 added £3,904,000 to the nominal capital of
the Debt. In all, £18,210,000 has been added to
the capital of the Debt. On the other hand, the
Daira Loan, which in 1883 amounted to £9,009,000,
has been entirely paid off. The Domains Loan,
which in 1883 amounted to £8,255,000, has been
reduced to £1,316,000. The Guaranteed Loan
has been reduced to £7,765,000, a reduction
of £1,659,000 from the original amount. On
December 28, 1906, the outstanding capital of
the Debt in the hands of the public amounted to
£87,416,000.^ The charge on account of interest
and sinking fund borne by the taxpayers was
£3,368,000. There has, therefore, in twenty-three
years been a reduction of £9,041,000 in the capital
of the Debt, and of £900,000 in the charge on
account of interest and sinking fund.
These facts and figures speak for themselves.
Considerations of space preclude me from de-
scribing in detail the beneficial results which have
accrued to the population of Egypt in every
direction from the substitution of a sound fiscal
policy for the oppressive and ruinous system of
government to which they were formerly subjected.
I may, however, allude to one point of special
importance.
Lord Dufferin, writing in 1883, alluded to "the
encumbered condition of a considerable proportion
of the fellaheen lands " as " one of the most dis-
tressing subjects connected with the present social
condition of the country." There was a tendency,
he added, " for the land to pass out of tlie hands of
the present owners into those of foreign creditors."
1 In addition to this, stock to the amount of £8,700,000 was held by
the Egyptian Treasury and the Commissioners of the Debt. 'I'his
stock will be gradually sold, and the proceeds of the sales expended on
remunerative public works. In the meanwhile, the interest is, of course,
credited to the Egyptian Government.
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There can be no doubt of the very great im-
portance of the question to which Lord DufFerin
drew attention. In the first place, as Lord
Dufferin very truly remarked, a transfer on a
huge scale of the landed property of the country
to foreign creditors " could scarcely take place
without producing an agrarian crisis (Lord Dufferin
might also have added, a political crisis) which
would prove equally disastrous to the creditors,
the debtors, and the Government." Then, again,
the arguments in favour of small holdings apply
with somewhat special force in Egypt. Owing to
the fact that there is not generally any serious
congestion of the population, competition rents
have not as yet resulted in any grave strife between
landlords and tenants. Nevertheless, as the popula-
tion increases, and the area of cultivable but
uncultivated land diminishes, there will be, to say
the least, a risk that issues will eventually arise
between landlords and tenants, somewhat similar
to those which have caused so much trouble in
other countries—notably in India and in Ireland.
The best way to postpone this strife, as also to
mitigate its intensity should it eventually prove
to be inevitable, will be to avoid the adoption of
any measures which will tend towards the dis-
appearance of the small proprietors.
The political arguments in favour of this policy
are no less strong than those of a purely economic
character. I know of no measure more calculated
to destroy any hopes that the Egyptians will
eventually become really autonomous, and that
they will exercise whatever self-governing powers
they may some day acquire in the interests of the
whole community, than the displacement of the
small proprietors, more especially if the large
landowners, who would take their places, were,
to any excessive degree, of European nationality.
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The policy which has been persistently pursued
by the Egyptian Government of recent years has,
therefore, been to endeavour, by a variety of
indirect but perfectly legitimate means, to main-
tain the small proprietors in the possession of
their holdings, and, whilst affording all reasonable
facilities for the employment of European capital
in land development, to do nothing which would
tend towards ousting Egyptian proprietors and
substituting Europeans in their places.
Of these means, the improvement in the system
of irrigation has perhaps been the most important
and the most productive of result. The establish-
ment of an Agricultural Bank, which has ad-
vanced sums amounting in the aggregate to about
£9,000,000 in small sums to the fellaheen, and of
Agricultural and Horticultural Societies, which
have been the means of spreading a knowledge of
scientific agriculture and horticulture, and have
also facilitated the purchase by the cultivators of
good seed and of manure, have also been potent
influences acting in the same direction.^
There can be no doubt that these efforts have
been crowned with success. On January 1, 1907,
only 665,226 acres were held by 6021 foreign
landowners,^ as against 4,765,546 acres held by
1,224,560 Egyptian proprietors. Of the latter,
the holdings of 1,081,348 proprietors were of less
than 5 acres in extent ; the holdings of 132,198
varied from 5 to 50 acres, thus leaving 11,054
* Full descriptions of the creation and working both of the Agri-
cultural Bank and of the Agricultural and Horticultural Societies
are given in the Annual Reports which have been laid before
Parliament.
2 For further details up to December 31, 1906 see Egypt, No. 1 of
1907, p. 60. A great deal of the laud now held by foreigners belongs
to Land Companies. It will eventually be sold. One of the highest
authorities on this subject in Kgypt (the late iM. Felix Suares) assured
me that he was convinced that, before many years had passed, almost
the whole of the laud in Fgypt would be in the hands of Egyptians.
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proprietors of more than 50 acres. It may, I think,
be confidently stated that the danger, which Lord
Duiferin apprehended, has been averted.
Finance is often considered a repellent subject,
and, because it is repellent, it has gained a reputa-
tion for being more difficult to understand than is
really the case. There are, indeed, some few
economic and currency questions which are abstruse,
but the difficulty of understanding even these has
been in no small degree increased by the cloud of
words with which writers on subjects of this sort
often surround issues in themselves simple. One
merit of the Egyptian financial situation was this,
that no semi -insoluble economic problem lurked
between the leaves of the Budget. The Finance
Minister had not, as in India, to deal with a
congested population, of whom a large percentage
were in normal times living on the verge of starva-
tion. He never had to refer to the pages of
Malthus or Mill, of Ricardo or Bastiat. The
complications arising from a bewilderhig political
situation had done a good deal to obscure the
problems which he had to solve, and to hinder their
solution. But, in truth, all that was required in
Egypt, in order to understand the situation, was a
knowledge of arithmetic, patience to uinavel the
cumbersome system of accounts which was the
offspring of internationalism, and a sturdy recogni-
tion of the fact that neither an individual nor a
State can with impunity go on living for an indefinite
period above his or its income.
The main facts relating to Egyptian finance,
when once the thread of the international labyrinth
had ^ been found, were, in fact, very simple ; when
^ I use the past tense because, witli the practical abolition of the
Caisse de la Dette, the financial situation, and notably the system of
accounts, has been very greatly simplified.
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they were understood, they were not uninteresting.
"Nothing," as Lord JNlihier truly says, "in tliis
strange land is commonplace." The subject cannot
surely be devoid of interest when it is remembered
that the difference between the magic words surplus
and deficit meant whether the Egyptian cultivator
was, or was not, to be allowed to reap the fruits of
his labour ; whether, after supplying the wants of
the State, he was to be left with barely enough to
keep body and soul together, or whether he was to
enjoy some degree of rustic ease ; whether he was
to be eternally condemned to live in a wretched
mud hut, or whether he might have an opportunity
given to him of improving his dwelling-house;
whether he should or should not have water
supplied to his fields in due season ; whether his
disputes with his neighbours should be settled by a
judge who decided them on principles of law, or
whether he should be left to the callous caprice of
some individual ignorant of law and cognisant only
of bakhshish ; whether, if he were ill, he should be
able to go to a well-kept hospital, or whether he
should be unable to obtain any better medical
assistance than that which could be given to his
watch-dog or his donkey; whether a school, in
which something useful could be learnt, should be
provided for his children, or whether they should be
left in the hands of teachers whose highest know-
ledge consisted in being able to intone a few texts,
which they themselves only half understood, from
the Koran ; whether, if he suffered from mental aber-
ration, he should be properly treated in a well-kept
Lunatic Asylum, or whether he should be chained
to a post and undergo the treatment of a wild
beast ; whether he could travel from one part of
the country to another, or communicate with his
friends by post or telegraph, at a reasonable or only
at a prohibitive cost ; in fact, whether he, and the
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ten millions of Egyptians who were like him, were
or were not to have a chance afforded to them of
taking a few steps upwards on the ladder of moral
and material improvement.
This, and much more, is implied when it is stated
that the British and Egyptian financiers arrested
bankruptcy, turned a deficit into a surplus, relieved
taxation, increased the revenue, controlled the ex-
penditure, and raised Egyptian credit to a level only
second to that of France and England. All the
other reforms which were effected flow from this one
fact, that the financial administration of Egypt has
been honest, and that the country, being by nature
endowed with great recuperative power, and being
inhabited by an industrious population, responded
to the honesty of its rulers. It may be doubted
whether in any other country such a remarkable
transformation has been made in so short a time.
CHAPTER LIV
IRRIGATION
Nature's bounty to Egypt— The work of the Pharaohs— Turkish
neglect— Progress under British guidance— Programme of the
future— Causes of the progress— Qualifications of the officers
selected—Absence of international obstruction—Loan of£1,800,000
—Support of the public—Importance of the work.
" If you dispute Providence and Destiny,** says an
ancient author, "you can find many things in
human affairs and nature that you would suppose
might be much better performed in this or that
way; as, for instance, that Egypt should have
plenty of rain of its o^vn without being irrigated
from the land of Ethiopia." ^ It may be doubted
whether nowadays any one would be inclined to
dispute Providence and Destiny on this ground.
Indeed, the extraordinary fertility for which Egypt
has from time immemorial been famous, which
made Homer apply to it the epithet of fe/S^po?, and
which led Juvenal to sing of the divitis ostia N^ili,
is mainly due to the fact that its fields are not
irrigated by the rain which falls within its own
confines, but by the vast stores of water which
sweep down the Nile from the centre of Africa.
In no other country in the world may the agri-
culturist be so surely guaranteed against the
accidents and vicissitudes of the seasons. It is
true that if the Nile is unusually high or low, the
' Strabo, Book iv. c i.
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cultivator is or, at all events, was exposed, in the
one case, to the evils of inundation, and in the other
case, to those of drought. But there is this notable
difference between risks of this nature and those
incidental to the cultivation of the fields in countries
which depend for their water-supply on their own
rainfall, namely, that whereas no human effort can
increase or diminish the quantity of rain which falls
from the clouds, it is, on the other hand, within the
resources of human skill to so regulate the water
of the Nile flood as to mitigate, if not altogether
to obviate, any dangers arising from an insufficient
or an excessive supply of water. In this highly
favoured country, Nature seems to have said to
Man : I grant you the most favourable conditions
possible under which to till the soil,—a genial
climate, an assured supply of water, and a natural
fertilising element, which, with scarcely an effort
of your own, will every year recuperate the pro-
ductive powers of the soil ; it is for you to turn to
advantage the gifts which I have lavished on you.
How did Man utilise his advantages ? In the
early days of Egyptian civilisation, he made great
and creditable eiibrts to turn them to account.
*'It is certain," says Colonel Ross, "that in old
days, there must have been native engineering
talent of the very highest order, and when we
read of such and such a King restoring public
works in a long and glorious reign, there must
have existed a continuous supply of good engineer-
ing talent which had carte blanche from the ruler
of the day." ^
The Pharaohs, it would thus appear, used their
talent according to the best of their lights. The
Turks, who ultimately succeeded them, hid theirs
in a napkin, with the result that Nature, indignant
at the treatment accorded to her, minimised the
* Colonel Ross's Introduction to \Villcocks' Egyptian Irrigation, p. vL
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value of her gifts and exacted penalties for the
neglect of her laws. In later Mohammedan times,
no serious efforts were made to avert drought or
inundation. The general condition of Egyptian
irrigation at the time when England took the
affairs of the country in hand, was thus described
by Colonel Ross :
—
"There can be no manner of doubt that, up
to 1882, Egyptian irrigation was going downhill.
Every year, some false step was taken in spite of
the engineer. Every year, the corvee lost ground
in its out-turn of work, drains were abandoned or
became useless, and canals became less of artificial
and more of natural channels wholly influenced by
the natural rise and fall of the Nile. . . . Owing
to many causes, the native talent has sunk so low
that, without modern scientific aid, the Egyptians
could not work their own canals. They have sunk
into a dead conservatism. . . . The absence of
repairs, so common to all JNIohammedan countries,
and the existence of the corvee, or forced labour,
have also largely contributed to the lowering of the
standard of Egyptian engineers' design and method."
Here was a grand opportunity for the English-
man, and nobly did he avail himself of it. Con-
sidering the importance of the subject, and the
pride which every Englishman must feel at the
splendid results obtained by those of his countrymen
whom Lord INIilner rightly terms "the saviours of
Egyptian irrigation," a sore temptation exists to
deal with this matter in some detail. On the
other hand, it is desirable to abridge this work
;
moreover, the subject has been already treated by
a highly qualified writer. The lassitude wliicli
pervades both man and beast in Egypt during the
hot months, when the land is baked by the fiery
African sun and windswept by the scorching
khamsin ; the general relief experienced when the
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Nile begins to rise ; the anxiety to know whether
the water will pass the level of those "low cubits"
which, it is said, were designated by the Arabs
"the angels ofdeath " ;^ the fear lest Nature should
be too prodigal of her gifts and destroy by excess
what, it was hoped, she would have bestowed by
moderation ; the revival of the whole country when
the waters retire and the earth begins to yield forth
her increase ; all these things have been admirably
related by Lord Milner in a chapter of his work,
entitled TJie Struggle for Water. He has also
described the care, the watchfulness, and the un-
tiring energy displayed by the British engineers
in their endeavours to direct and bridle the forces
of Nature. At one time, water had to be economised
and hydraulic skill exercised to make the most of
a scanty supply. Again, at other times, constant
vigilance was required to guard against inundation.
During the season of low Nile, a system of rotations
was adopted, under which the limited supply of
water was turned to the best advantage in the
interests of the entire population. The privileged
classes learnt to their dismay that the rights of
their humble neighbours must be respected. The
Barrage— a work which owed its origin to the
genius of a French engineer— was, in spite of
strong opposition, repaired and rendered capable
of doing excellent service.^ New canals were
* " With good reason the Arabs desig-nate the low cubits by the
name of the "angels of death," for, if the river does not reach its full
height, famine and destruction come upon the whole land of Egypt."
—Mommsen's Provinces of the Roman Empire, vol. ii. p. 252.
2 When the works at the Barrage were in course of construction,
I visited them in company with Ali Pasha Moubarek. He was at that
time Minister of Public W^orks, and had passed many years of his life
in the service ofthat Department. He strongly opposed Sir Colin Scott-
MoncriefF's plan for repairing the Barrage, and was in favour of the
costly and wasteful alternative of erecting huge pumps. He remarked
to me casually on his way down the river that he had not visited the
Barrage for twenty-seven years. He was quite unconscious of the
criticism on his own conduct which this admission involved.
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dug. A variety of useful works were executed
in Upper Egypt to guard against the effects of a
low Nile. Drainage went hand in hand with
irrigation. Before the British engineers had been
at work ten years, the cotton crop was trebled, the
sugar crop more than trebled, and the country was
being gradually covered with a network of light
railways and agricultural roads in order to enable
the produce to be brought to market.
Much, however, as the British engineer has done
for Egypt, his work is not yet complete. The
whole of the cultivable lands in Egypt are not as
yet brought under cultivation.^ In order to attain
this object, it is estimated that it will be necessary
to store about four million cubic metres of water.
The magnificent dam constructed at Assouan,
which has already rendered invaluable service to
the country,^ is capable of storing one million cubic
metres. Works are now in course of execution
which will increase its storage capacity to about
2j millions of cubic metres. It is not as yet decided
how any further supply will be obtained, but a
general sketch of the projects which are worthy
of consideration has been given in Sir William
Garstin's masterly report of JNIarch 1904.^ Prob-
ably, I shall not be far from the mark if I say
that, in the course of the next fifteen or twenty
years, some twenty millions sterling may profit-
ably be spent in improving the Egyptian and
Soudanese systems of irrigation.
* The question of the extent to which the area of cotton-bearing land
is capable of increase was examined iu some detail in my Report for the
year 1900. See Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, pp. 45-47.
'^ To g'ive one example^ it is estimcated that the conversion, which ia
now nearly complete, of 404,470 acres of land in Middle Egypt from
a system of basin to one of perennial irrigation will increase the rental
value of those lands by no less tlian £'E.2,()22,.'3.50, and the sale value
by £E.28,312,900.—^nnua/ Report of the Irrigation Department, 1906,
p. 178.
8 See Egypt, No. 2 of 1904.
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When, eventually, the waters of the Nile, from
the I^akes to tlie sea, are brought fully under
control, it will be possible to boast that Man—in
this case, the Englishman—has turned the gifts of
Nature to the best possible advantage.
Tlie operations of the Irrigation Department
have, in fact, been singularly successful, perhaps
more so than those of any other Department of the
Government. To what causes may this success be
attributed ?
It has, in the first place, been due to the high
character and marked capacity of the British
engineers, who were chosen with the utmost care.
The superior officials of the Irrigation Department
came from India, a country which affords an
excellent training for the hydraulic engineer.
Armed with the previous knowledge which they
had acquired, they studied the various problems
which Egyptian irrigation presented for solution,
and proposed nothing until they had obtained a
thorough mastery of the facts with which they had
to deal. So far as I know, they have never yet
made a serious mistake.
But the qualifications of the individuals, high
though they were, would have availed but little
had not their labours been exerted in a sphere
where adventitious circumstances were favourable
to success.
The first of these circumstances was that, rela-
tively to some other branches of the Egyptian
service, the Public Works Department was from
the first freed from the incubus of internationalism.
It is not to be supposed that the actions of the
British engineers were not in some degree hampered
by the meshes which an obstructive diplomacy
had, with perverse ingenuity, flung over the whole
governmental machine of Egypt. Any such
supposition would be erroneous. Ubiquitous inter-
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nationalism, by imposing a fantastic financial
system on the country, and by secreting for many
years the economies resulting from the partial con-
version of the Debt, limited the funds which it
was possible to place at the disposal of the British
engineers, and thus diminished their power of
doing good. More than this, that duality, which
was the bane of the Egyptian administrative
system, existed at one time in the heart of the
Public Works Department, but fortunately in a
relatively innocuous form. This duality was, how-
ever, abolished at an early period of the occupation.
It was felt that, in view of the importance of the
Irrigation Department, it should be exclusively in
British hands. " It is evident," Lord Dufferin
wrote in 1883, " that the present irrigation service
of Egypt is wanting in intelligent direction and
honest and efficient inspection. . . . Egypt is so
similar to many of the irrigated districts in India
that it is only natural to turn to that country for
advice."
Thus, the British engineers were left free to design
and to execute their own plans for the canalisation
of the country. They were spared the calamity
of having to deal with an International Board.
They could decide on the construction of a canal
without having to consider whether the policy of
Great Britain in the Pacific or Indian Oceans was
viewed with favour at Berlin or Paris. This was
a great negative advantage. The comparative
freedom of action accorded to the British engineers
contributed in no small degree to the success which
attended their operations.
In one other respect, the British engineers were
fortunate. However remarkable may have been
their professional skill, and however sound their
plans, it is obvious that they could have done
nothing without money. Funds were fortunately
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provided for them. When the London Confer-
ence on the financial affairs of E<4ypt took place
in 1884, it was proposed to borrow £1,000,000, to
be applied to the improvement of tlie irrigation
system of the country. The proposal met with
a good deal of opposition. Doubts were at the
time expressed by competent British authorities
as to the wisdom of adopting this course. Those
doubts were based on reasonable grounds. Exces-
sive borrowing had brought Egypt to the verge of
ruin, and it was pointed out that to increase the
debt of a State which was then in a well-nigh
bankrupt condition was, at best, a hazardous
experiment. Others, who had more confidence in
the future of Egypt and in the elasticity of its
resources, were in favour of a bolder policy. They
supported the view which, it must be admitted,
at the time appeared somewhat paradoxical, that
the best way to relieve the country from the
burthen of a crushing debt resulting from loans,
the proceeds of which had been to a large
extent squandered, would be to contract a further
loan, and to apply tlie money thus obtained to
developing the resources of the country. After a
sharp struggle, this latter view prevailed. A sum
of £1,000,000 for irrigation purposes was included
in the loan contracted for the payment of the
Alexandria indemnities and otiier purposes. In
1890, an additional sum of £800,000 was phiced at
the disposal of the Public Works Department for
irrigation and drainage works.
In my Report for 1891, after describing the ex-
tent to w Inch the productive powers of the country
had been increased by irrigation, I added :
—
" The policy of increasing the debt of Egypt,
which was adopted seven years ago, has been
amply justified. I should be the last to wish that
the facts which I have narrated above should be
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used as a justification for reckless borrowino-, but
they certainly do show that cases may arise in
which a quasi-bankrupt State, if it be possessed of
great natural resources, may be placed in a position
of solvency by adding to its debt, provided always
that the money borrowed be judiciously applied.
In cases of this sort, the main difficulty generally
is to ensure the execution of the proviso. So far
as Egypt is concerned, I have no hesitation in say-
ing that the expenditure of this £1,800,000 on
irrigation and drainage has contributed probably
more than any one cause to the comparative pros-
perity that the country now enjoys. It ensured
the solvency of the Egyptian Treasury, and until
this was done, no very serious effort was possible
in the direction of moral and material progress."
Lastly, when once his value had been recognised
—that is to say, in a very sliort space of time—the
British engineer secured tlie support of Egyptian
public opinion. The facts were, indeed, so strong
as to bring conviction to the minds of the most
prejudiced and sceptical. The fellah might fail
to realise the utility and insignificance of some
of the reforms instituted under British tutelage,
but he knew the value of water to an extent which
can perhaps scarcely be appreciated by inhabitants
of northern countries. No amount of misrepre-
sentation could persuade him that the man who
brought to his fields, in a measure surpassing
his wildest expectations, the element for which he
thirsted, was not his benefactor.
Till taught by pain,
Men really know not what good water's worth.
^
The British engineer, in fact, unconsciously
accomplished a feat which, in the eyes of a
politician, is perhaps even more remarkable than
' Don Juan, ii. 84.
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that of controlling the refractory waters of the-
Nile. He justified Western methods to Eastern
minds. He inculcated, in a manner which arrested
and captivated even the blurred intellect and way-
ward imagination of the poor, ignorant Egyptian
fellah, the lesson that the usurer and the retailer
of adulterated drinks are not the sole products of
European civilisation ; and, inasmuch as he achieved
this object, he deserves the gratitude not only of
all intelligent Asiatics, but also of all Europeans
—
of the rulers of Algiers and of Tunis as well as
those of India.
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CHAPTER LV
THE army'
Disbandment of the army in 1882—History of the army—Mehemot
All's Syrian campaio'ns—Ismail Pasha—The AbJ^ssinian campaign
—Tel-el-Kebir—It is decided to form a fellaheen army officered
by Englishmen—The black battalions—Will the army fight?
—
Reasons why the reorganisation has been successfully conducted.
In leaving the work of the civilian for that of the
soldier, we at once seem to pass from the involved
and cautious language of diplomacy to the out-
spoken behests of the barrack-yard. One of the
first points which had to be considered after the
battle of Tel-el-Kebir had been fought and won
was what should be done with the Egyptian army.
The soldier advisers of the British and Egyptian
Governments answered this question with military
frankness. The Egyptian army, as then consti-
tuted, was worse than useless. It had proved
itself a danger to the State. It could mutiny, but it
could not, or would not fight. The logical conclu-
sion to be drawn from this statement of facts was
that the existing army should be disbanded, and
another army created in its place. Accordingly,
on September 19, 1882, that is to say, six days
after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir had been fought,
the following laconic Decree appeared in the Official
Journal :
—
* In the preparation of this chapter, I have been materially aided by
Sir Reginald VVingate.
466
CH.LY THE ARMY 467
" Nous, Khddive d'Egypte, considdrant la rebellion
militaire,
D^CR^TONS
Art. 1.
L'armde Egyptienne est dissoute.
(Signe) Mehemet Tewfik.*
Out of what material was a new army to
be formed ? Could the fellaheen, who had but
recently shown themselves so destitute of military
qualities, be made into good soldiers ? It was im-
possible at the time to answer this latter question
confidently in the affirmative. Nevertheless, the
past history of Egypt was there to show that the
behaviour of the troops at Tel-el-Kebir did not
constitute a sufficient proof that the answer should
be a decided negative. For centuries past, Egypt
had been ruled by foreign conquerors, who intro-
duced their own or mercenary troops in order to
maintain their authority. The Egyptian fellah
had inherited no warlike attributes ; rather was he
the outcome of a system of serfdom and slavery
well calculated to stifle all military instincts.
It has been the custom to give JNlehemet Ali
the credit of having been the first to realise that
Egypt had ready to hand in the fellaheen the raw
material out of which a national army could be
formed. The defeats which he inflicted on the
Turkish armies in Syria are adduced in proof of
the success of his military policy. To a certain
extent, the praise bestowed on Mehemet Ali in
this connection is justified. What he did was
briefly this. His early campaigns against the
Wahabis (1811-18), and his campaigns in Nubia
and Sennar (1820-22) were conducted with mer-
cenary troops. Subsequently, that is to say, in
1822-24, being carried away by the regnandi dira
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cupido, he required a larger army. It was not
possible to obtain an adequate supply of Albanians
or Circassians. An attempt made to utilise
the blacks of the Soudan resulted in failure, by
reason of the mortality which prevailed amongst
them when they were transported from tropical
Afi'ica to the relatively cold climate of Egypt.
Mehemet Ali had, therefore, to fall back on the
Egyptian peasantry.
The experiment was crowned with some measure
of success. The fellah is hardy and robust. He
soon proved himself to be a docile soldier. In
1824, a battalion of Egyptians was sent to Arabia,
another to Sennar, and four battalions were de-
spatched to the Morea, under the celebrated
Ibrahim Pasha. Then came the first Syrian war,
when the veteran ranks were swelled by crowds of
fellaheen raised under the most tyrannous of con-
scriptions.^ Yet this force carried all before it.
There can be little doubt that, had not European
diplomacy intervened, Ibrahim Pasha might, after
the battle of Konia, have marched to Constantinople
with little or no opposition. It was this success,
followed by the victory at Nezib over the Turkish
troops in the second Syrian war of 1839, which had
the effect of raising the Egyptian soldiery to a
position of some celebrity as a force of acknow-
ledged value.o
Prior to the battle of Konia, the strength of the
Egyptian army and navy, the former of which had
been organised by French officers, consisted, accord-
ing to Clot Bey,' of 277,000 men, of whom 130,000
were regular troops. Of the regular troops, the
bulk of the infantry was nominally composed of
* " Women were hunja^ up by the hair of the head and vvliipped
till they disclosed tlieir sons' ]ii(lini,'--p]aces. Those that were taken
were never seen again. Once a soldier always a soldier, in Ibrahim
Pasha'a jirmy."
—
Life and Letters of Lady Ilenter Stanhopef p. 2G3.
'^ AperfU sur fEyypte, vol. ii. p. 2.35.
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fellaheen, but the system under which they were
recruited leaves little doubt that there was a con-
siderable foreign element in the ranks. Not only
the officers, but also a large proportion of the non-
commissioned officers were Turks, Albanians, etc.
It is said that, as the result of Ibrahim Pasha's
experience in Arabia, it was decided never to pro-
mote an Egyptian above the rank of sergeant. As
regards the composition of the other arms, it is not
possible to obtain accurate statistics, but during
the early years of the British, occupation tliere were
still many living who could remember that a large
proportion of the rank and file of the cavalry were
Turks and Circassians, whilst in the artillery the
proportion of the latter was still greater. It is to
be remembered that when, in 1826, Sultan JNIah-
moud ordered the massacre of the Janissaries, a
large number of the survivors fled to Egypt, where
they accepted service in the newly organised army.
Again, during Ibrahim Pasha's campaign in Syria,
he increased his strength by recruiting locally from
the mountain tribes and Bedouins. It is clear,
therefore, that the army with which Ibrahim Pasha
won his victories was not, in the true sense of the
term, a purely national army. A strong foreign
element existed, not only amongst the officers and
non-commissioned officers, but also amongst the
rank and file.
Moreover, in judging of the importance to be
attached to the military prowess of the Egyptian
troops in the days of Mehemet Ali, account has to
be taken of the state of the Turkish army. Prior
to 1826, the armed forces of Turkey consisted of
the Janissaries. After their destruction and dis-
bandment, there was, in point of fact, no disciplined
Turkish military force left. The disaster of
Navarino, followed by the Ilusso- Turkish war
of 1828-29, left Sultan JNIahmoud in the position
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of having to send against Ibrahim "disaffected
armies of raw recruits, badly officered and worse
generalled." ^ In comparison with these raw levies,
the Egyptian army represented a well-organised and
well -disciplined force, trained by able foreign
officers on Eiu'opean principles, and, moreover,
leavened with a considerable proportion of veteran
troops who had had experience of actual war in
the Morea, Arabia, and elsewhere. More than this,
they had in Ibrahim Pasha a leader possessed of
undoubted military genius, whose actions bore the
stamp of energy, foresight, and skill.
Ibrahim Pashas successes in Syria afford,
therefore, ample proof that a well -disciplined and
well-led force will almost invariably defeat badly
disciplined and untrained levies, however superior
be the numbers of the latter. But to say more
than this would exceed the limits of justifiable
deduction. To make tlie result of the Syrian
battles the standard by which to gauge the per-
manent fighting value of the Egyptians would
involve a generalisation of too hasty and too
sweeping a character. Mr. William Dye, an
American officer formerly in the Egyptian service,
after reviewing the military history of Egypt, says :
'* Ibrahim's successes at Konia and elsewhere were
due to his generalship, certainly not to any peculiar
qualities that the fellah may have possessed as
a soldier." The fact that under Abbas I. the
Egyptians were driven from Nejd, and that the
Wahabite State regained its independence, con-
firms the correctness of this opinion.
Said Pasha, the successor of Abbas I., at first
played with his soldiers, and then disbanded the
greater part of the army. In 1863, it consisted of
only 3000 men. The personnel was disorganised
and the material defective.
* Creasy's History of the Ottoman Turks, vol. ii. p. 437.
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On Ismail's accession, his first care was to
increase the military power of the State. He
believed, or, at all events, he acted as if he believed
in the fighting qualities of the fellaheen. Said
Pasha had been the first to employ men of fellah
extraction as officers, but he did not allow them to
be promoted above the rank of captain. Ismail
Pasha made an important and hazardous innovation.
He allowed Egyptians to be promoted to the
rank of colonel.
The first opportunity of testing the value of
Ismail Pasha's army occurred in 1874, when a
rebellion broke out in Darfour. It was suppressed
by General Gordon, who discarded his Egyptian
soldiers and mainly employed troops raised on the
spot. " The officers and men," he wrote, " are a
cowardly set. They are good marchers, and bear
privation well, but that is all I can say in their
favour. ... I have not the least confidence in my
officers and men. ... I cannot bear these Egyptian
officers. Tliey have no good quality. I like the
blacks ; now, these black soldiers are the only
troops in the Egyptian service worth anything."^
Then came the disastrous Abyssinian campaign
of 1876, when the Egyptians were, on several
occasions, routed with heavy loss. Mr. Dye, in
criticising these operations, says : '* There was no
unity of command, there was no cohesion among
the parts of the army. This was due to the want
of individual interest among the men in the
campaign, a general need of good officers and a
lack of discipline, and of any equitable system of
rewards and punishments."
That the Egyptian army did not suffer any
further reverses during Ismail Pasha's reign is
probably due to the fact that it was not again
seriously involved in warlike operations. Ismail
* General Gordon in Central Africa, p 161.
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was assuredly more successful, during the latter
years of his reign, in disorganising, than he had
been, during his earlier years, in organising an
army. It has been shown in the course of this
narrative how the son reaped, in the shape of overt
mutiny, the whirlwind which the father had sown.
It is impossible for an army to mutiny without
its value as a fighting- machine being impaired.
We are, indeed, so accustomed to connect military
efficiency with military subordination that it is
well-nigh impossible to dissociate the two ideas.
Nevertheless, the greater or less degree of harm
inflicted on military efficiency by any mutiny
must depend in some measure on the causes and
circumstances of the mutiny itself. If, as happened
in India in 1857, the rank and file rebel against
their officers, the mutineers must of necessity take
the field under circumstances of great disadvantage
to themselves. The men are suddenly deprived of
the leaders to whom they have been accustomed to
yield implicit obedience. The case of Arabics army
was different. The men did not mutiny against
their officers ; it was the officers who mutinied
against the Khedive, and who carried the rank and
file with them. It may be said that practically
the army rebelled en bloc. It is true that a few
Turkish and Circassian officers disappeared, the
Arabi movement having been primarily directed
against them. But their numbers were not
sufficient to dislocate the military machine. INIore-
over, their disa])pearance only enhanced the lesson,
wliich was rudely inculcated by Lord AVolseley,
as to the fighting value of an Egyptian army
led by Egyptian officers. Arabi's soldiers had, in
fact, every inducement to fight, and every oppor-
tunity of showing what they could do in the way
of fighting. They represented, or, at all events,
they purported to represent, the forces of indignant
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patriotism calling on the sons of the soil to repel
a foreiijn foe. Their cause was that of the INIoslem
against the Christian, of the native Egyptian
against the upholders of Turkish tyranny. They
fought under local conditions of great advantage.
Arabi occupied at Tel-el-Kebir an entrenched
position of great strength. The attacking force,
which had to advance up a " glacis-like slope," was
numerically only one-half as strong as the defenders.
Yet within twenty minutes of the first shot being
fired, the Egyptian force was in full retreat with a
loss of upwards of 2000 killed, whilst the British
force, which delivered a frontal attack, only lost
459 men killed and wounded. Manifestly, Arabi's
force was, in Dryden's oft-quoted words, nothing
but a rude militia,
In peace a charge, in war a weak defence.
Europe was astonished, and some hostile critics,
being unable to show that Arabi had in reality been
a victor in the fray, found consolation in the fiction
that the battle had been won by British gold.
The subsequent history of the Soudan confirmed
the lesson which was to be derived from the experi-
ence of Tel-el-Kebir. Everywhere the Dervishes
drove the fellaheen soldiers before them.
Such were the historical facts with which Lord
Dufferin and his military advisers had to deal in
1882. They all pointed to one inevitable con-
clusion. It was that an Egyptian army officered
by native Egyptians was worse than useless. The
question of employing mercenary soldiers was dis-
cussed. Lord Dufferin wisely decided to put
aside all idea of enrolling Albanians, Circassians, or
other waifs and strays of the JNIediterranean. He
laid it down as a principle that the army "should
be essentially composed of native Egyptians. . . .
Egypt has had enough of Mamelukes and their
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congeners.** The officers were to be supplied from
England. An experiment was to be made with a
view to ascertaining whether what Lord Dufferin
termed "the metamorphic spirit of the age"
—
aided by a certain number of British officers and
drill-sergeants—could achieve the remarkable feat
of turning the fellah into an efficient soldier.
Sir Evelyn Wood—who was subsequently
succeeded, first, by Lord Grenfell, and, later, by
Lord Kitchener and Sir Reginald Wingate—was
appointed to command the army. The cadres of
battalions were formed by carefully selecting from
the debris of Arabi's army the requisite number of
officers and non-commissioned officers. The rank
and file were taken straight from the plough.
The British officers had an arduous task to
perform. Not only had every branch of the
military administrative machine to be created
afresh ; not only had the oppressive recruiting
System, which formerly existed, to be swept
away and an improved system put in its place
;
not only had the Englishman to wage unremit-
ting war against corruption and against the other
chronic diseases of Egyptian administration and
society ; but, in reversing the old, and entering
upon the new order of things, it was necessary
to implant in the minds of the fellaheen the
fact that discipline could be strict without being
oppressive ; that the ])eriod of service for which
they had been enrolled would not be prolonged
beyond that prescribed by law ; that they would
receive their pay and their food regularly ; that
the former would never be stopped except for
misconduct ; that they would no longer be
subjected to brutal treatment at the hands of their
officers ; that any complaints which they might make
would be impartially investigated, and that, if they
committed any crime, they would be fairly tried and
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would only receive punishment in proportion to the
gravity of the offence. All these difficulties were
overcome. Professional skill was brought to bear
on all administrative questions. High character
and integrity gradually weaned the fellaheen soldiers
from the idea that the exercise of authority was
synonymous with the committal of injustice.
Indeed, the moral reforms which the British
officers achieved rank even higher than their
administrative successes, albeit these latter were
also remarkable. Looking to the past history
and actual condition of Egypt in 1882, it might
well have been thought that confidence in those
placed in authority over him would be a plant
of very slow growth in the mind of the Egyptian
fellah. Yet, the British officers of the Egyptian
army speedily accomplished the remarkable feat
of obtaining the complete confidence of their
men. Not only, moreover, does this spirit of
confidence now pervade all ranks of the army,
but it extends to every family in the country. The
relations of the soldiers understand the altered con-
ditions under which conscription is conducted, and
the regulations of the army enforced. " The re-
appearance of the fellah soldier," Lord Milner
says, **in his native village after an absence of a
year in the barracks—not crawling back mutilated,
or smitten by some foul disease, but simply walk-
ing in as a visitor, healthy, well-dressed, and with
some money in his pocket—was like the vision of
a man risen from the dead."^
Thus, the reconstituted army consisted, in the
first instance, only of fellaheen. About 6000 men
were raised. These were formed into two brigades,
one of which was commanded by British and the
other by Egyptian officers. It was intended that
this force should mainly be used as an aid to
* England in Egypt, p. 176.
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the constabulary in the nmiiiteiiance of internal
tranquillity. The soldiers were to "prevent the
Bedouins from causino; trouble along; the desert
border." They were to suppress " small local
insurrections."^ It was not contemplated at the
time that they would ever be employed in the
Soudan. As, however, events in the Soudan de-
veloped and the power of the Mahdi grew, it became
evident that the southern frontier of Egypt would
either have to be permanently defended by British
troops, or that the Egyptian army would have
to be increased and improved to such an extent
as to render it possible to dispense with British
aid. To have relied wholly on fellaheen troops
would manifestly have been dangerous. The
necessity of stiffening what Lord Dufferin called
" the invertebrate ranks of the fellaheen soldiery "
had arisen. An unsuccessful attempt was made
to raise a brigade of Turks. The nucleus of
a battalion of Albanians was formed. They
mutinied, and were disbanded in a few weeks.
It was then decided to ftiU back on the blacks
of the Soudan. Thus, Lord Dufferin's fellaheen
army was eventually converted into a combined
force of fellaheen and blacks.
The blacks, who join as volunteers, belong for
the most part to the tribes who are found on
the Upper Nile from near Kodok to the Equatorial
Province ; others come from the west beyond
Kordofan, and even from as far as Wadai and
Bornou. JNIany of them are little better than
savages. They are difficult to control, and are
as thoughtless, capricious, and wanting in fore-
sight as children. They are not quick at drill,
nor are they fond of it, affording in this respect
* Some authorities went so far in 1882-83 as to hold that no
Eg'yptian army was required. Lord Duft'erin wisely rejected this
extreme view.
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a contrast to the fellah, who, true to his national
characteristics, is an admirable automaton. The
blacks are very excitable. On the other hand,
their initiative, dash, and instincts of self-defence
make them invaluable as fighting troops.
Before the British officers had been long at
work, it was clear that they had created a small
army superior in quality to anything which Egypt
had heretofore possessed. That army was endowed
with all those outward and visible signs of efficiency
of which note can be taken in time of peace.
Would it, however, fight? That was a question
which for some while remained doubtful. But
all doubts have now been removed. The history
of the Soudan, which has been narrated in this
work, enables the question to be confidently
answered in the affirmative.
The reasons why the endeavours to form an
efficient military force in Egypt have been crowned
with success are clear. The British officer has
been allowed a free hand ; he has had even greater
liberty of action than the British engineer. Even
a devotee of cosmopolitan principles would hesitate
to subject the command of an armed force to the
disintegrating process of internationalism. In spite,
however, of the success which has so far attended
the efforts of military reformers in Egypt, it
should never be forgotten that an army composed
of Moslems and officered to a considerable extent
by Christians is a singularly delicate machine, which
requires most careful handling.
CHAPTER LVl
THE INTERIOR
Uncertainty of British policy—Difficulties of administrative reform
—
Lord Dufferin's Police proposals—Mr, Clifford Lloyd— Chanp;e8
made in the Police organisation—Nubar Pasha's conflict with
Mr. Clifford Lloyd—The latter resigns— Friction in the Interior
Appointment of an Adviser—And of Inspectors—Difficulties of the
present moment.
Cases have so far been discussed in which the
reformer was, to a greater or less extent, crippled
by internationalism, or hampered by the anomalous
nature of an official position in which he was
expected to fulfil many of the functions of a
Minister without possessing ministerial rank or
authority. It is now necessary to deal with a
case in which the evils arising from the uncer-
tainty, which for many years hung over the
future of British policy in Egypt, come into
special prominence. Whether the British occupa-
tion was to be temporary or permanent, there
could be no doubt as to the desirability of relieving
taxation, digging canals, and creating a well-
disciplined army which would be able to repel
Dervish invasion. The financier, the engineer, and
the soldier might, indeed, think that the edifice
which each had reared would either collapse at
once, should British influence cease to be para-
mount, or gradually decay when exposed to the
dry-rot of unchecked Pasliadom. But however
that might be, there could be no doubt as to tlie
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kind of edifice which liad to be constructed ; its
nature was, indeed, indicated by certain well-
recognised professional canons.
The case of internal administrative reform was
different. It might have been thought that the
work of organising the Department of the Interior
would, relatively to other Departments, have
presented but little difficulty to the Englishman,
with his law - abiding tendencies, his practical
common sense, and his freedom from bureaucratic
formalism. The main thing was to organise a
Police force, to appoint a few Police Magistrates,
and to lay down a few simple rules for the relations
which were to exist between the judicial and
executive authorities. Work of this sort could
not surely present any insuperable difficulties to a
nation whose dominion was world-wide, and who
had shown a special genius for the government of
subject races.
Conclusions drawn from general arguments of
this nature are often liable to error from foro-etful-
ness of the fact that certain combinations will not
bring about certain anticipated results unless it be
ascertained that no link is wanting in the chain of
circumstances necessary to fulfil the conditions of
the required combination. Even Euclid had to
assume the truth of his postulates. There can
be little doubt that if the conditions under which
the work of Egyptian administrative reform was
undertaken had been favourable, a success equal
to that of which the British administrative reformer
may boast in India and elsewhere would speedily
have been achieved. But the conditions were not
only less favourable than in other countries, they
were unfavourable even when judged by the
standard of Egyptian intricacy. It was not only
that the British reformer was deprived of liberty
of action to such an extent as to be unable to
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2xecute his own plans. It was not only that he
had to pose as a subordinate and, at the same
time, to act in a great measure as a superior.
Ditficulties even more formidable than these
had to be encountered. He was in the position
of an architect who was told to design a house
without any indication as to whether the build-
ing was to be a king's palace or the cottage of a
peasant. No one could tell him precisely what
was required of him. Was he to allow the
abominable Police system which he found in
existence to remain in force with merely some
slight modifications ? Certainly not. He was
expected to reform, and he was well aware that he
could not make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. Was
he to take the matter vigorously in hand, employ
agents on whom he could thoroughly rely, and intro-
duce a rational system based partly on the experience
gained in other countries, and partly on the special
requirements of Egypt ? From many points of
view this would unquestionably have been the best
course to pursue, but he had to remember—and
here the most important link in the chain of
circumstances necessary to ensure success snapped
in twain—that the British occupation was only
temporary, that the authority of the native rulers
must not be impaired, and that it was useless to
begin the construction of a system which could
not be completed in the limited time at his
disposal, and which would of a surety fall to
pieces directly the Englishman turned his back.
For, indeed, a severe relapse could, in this instance,
be predicted with absolute certainty. Tliere
might be some faint hope that, if the occupa-
tion ceased, self-interest would lead the rulers
of Egypt to employ British engineers to su])ervise
the supply and distribution of water. It was con-
ceivable, though improbable, that the first outcome
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of the withdrawal of effective British control would
not be the reproduction of financial chaos. But it
was altogether inconceivable tliat the cause of in-
ternal administrative reform should prosper in the
hands of the Egyptian governing classes, if they
were left entirely to their own devices. P'or, in fact,
the centre of gravity of Egyptian misgovernment lay
in the Department of the Interior. That Depart-
ment was the very citadel of corruption, the
headquarters of nepotism, the cynosure of all
that numerous class who hoped to gain an easy, if
illicit, livelihood by robbing either the Treasury or
the taxpayers, or, if both these courses were
impossible, by obtaining some well-paid sinecure.
Every vested interest in the country was sure to
be against the reformer, who at each step would
find that his views clashed with long-standing
abuses, perverted morals, and habits of thought
with which he was unfamiliar. Neither could he
hope to gain that degree of support from local
public opinion which was, however grudgingly,
accorded to the engineer. He would be unable
to produce material proofs, which could be visible
to the eye or palpable to the touch, of the good
work he was doing. In order to succeed, he
would have to be a moral, even more than an
administrative reformer. He would have to be
engaged in a succession of conflicts on matters of
detail, the mass of which, taken collectively, were
indeed of great importance, but which, taken
separately, were little calculated to arouse en-
thusiasm or sympathy on his behalf.
Moreover, besides these general causes, other
special hindrances stood in the way of the internal
reformer. It was no easy matter to sweep away
the abuses of the ancient village system of govern-
ment, without wrecking the system itself. Still
less easy was it to establish a modus vivendi between
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British ideas of Police duties and Franco-Egyptian
ideas of judicial functions. The regime of the
Capitulations also barred the way to many useful
reforms.
The work of internal reform presented, therefore,
difficulties of a very peculiar character. They were
the result partly of the actual circumstances with
which the reformer had to deal, but still more of the
want of reality which attended the whole system of
government by reason of the uncertainty of British
policy in connection with Egypt.
The question of the organisation of the Police
force naturally attracted the attention of Lord
DufFerin. He dwelt on the necessity of forming
"an intelligent, active, and ubiquitous provincial
constabulary," which was to partake of a civil
rather than of a military character. The force of
provincial and urban constabulary, including two
reserve battalions of 500 men each, was to consist
of 6500 men. They were to be under a European
Inspector - General, who was to act under the
control of the Minister of the Interior. General
V^alentine Baker was appointed to this post ; a few
European officers were nominated to act as his
subordinates.
When I arrived in Egypt in September 1883, I
found that ]Mr. Clifford Lloyd was in Cairo. He
had come on a vague roving commission to
" superintend internal reforms." Even in Egypt,
the chosen home of lax official nomenclature, it
was found that this definition of Mr. Cliffi)rd
Lloyd's functions was wanting in precision. In
January 1884, he was, therefore, appointed Under-
Secretary to the Department of the Interior.
I have rarely come across any man who, on first
acquaintance, created such a favourable impression
as Mr. Clifford Lloyd. His appearance and de-
meanour, his singularly sympathetic features and
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clear blue eyes, his courteous manner, and the rare
mixture of decision and moderation with which he
was wont to expound his opinions, all bespoke a
man of strong will, who could assert his authority
without bluster, and who could be firm witliout
being unconciliatory. Neither was this first im-
pression erroneous. Mr. Clifford Lloyd possessed
many remarkable qualities. In spite of some
obvious defects of character, this straightforward,
honourable, courageous English gentleman was
always to me a very attractive figure. In a dis-
turbed district of India or Ireland, he would have
been an ideal Government official. But he had
not the versatility and tact necessary for the
work he had in hand in Egypt. He was unable
to adapt himself to local circumstances. More-
over, he wished not only to do the work, but to
let all the world know that he was doing it. To
quote a single instance of how little careful he
was to avoid wounding native susceptibilities, he
would not adopt the ordinary Egyptian custom
of stamping his letters with a seal on which his
signature in Arabic was engraved. He insisted on
signing his name in English to all the letters he
wrote to Egyptian officials. Moreover, he had
never been behind the scenes of a central adminis-
tration, with the result that he had no experience
of how work at the headquarters of government
is really carried on. These defects were sufficient
to mar his finer qualities, and to detract from his
usefulness as a Government official.
One of the first results of his appointment was
the issue of a Decree, on December 31, 1883, laying
down the nature of the relations which were to
exist between the Police and the Moudirs. Egypt
was, for Police purposes, divided into three circles,
to each of which a European Inspector, who was
to be the delegate of the Inspector-General, was
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appointed. European Inspectors were also to be
employed in the principal towns. The Inspector
was to be the intermediary between the Police and
the MoLidir. The investigation of crime was to
be conducted by the Police, independently of the
Parquet.
The adoption of these measures gave rise to a
feud which lasted somewhat longer than the siege
of Troy.
On the one side it was urged, more especially
by Nubar Pasha, who succeeded to office immedi-
ately after the issue of the Decree of December 31,
1883, that whenever a European was placed under
an Egyptian, the former would usurp the functions
of the latter. There can, in fact, be little doubt
that the European Inspectors looked more to the
orders of the Inspector-General than to those of the
INIoudirs, although the latter were nominally their
official superiors. No one, therefore, knew who was
really responsible for the maintenance of public
tranquillity. Nubar Pasha was never tired of
complaining of what he called " la duality dans les
provinces." The authority of the Moudirs had,
in fact, been impaired, and nothing sufficiently
definite had been substituted in its place. They
were not allowed to rule according to their own
rude lights. On the other hand, they could not,
or would not assist in ruling according to the new
methods which found favour with their English
coadjutors. Under these circumstances, although
they were powerless to prevent the change of
system, they were sufficiently strong to counteract
any beneficial results which might have accrued
from its adoption. They fell back on the arm in
the use of which the Oriental excels. They
adopted a system of passive obstruction.
On the other side, it was urged, with much
force, that unless the Moudirs were placed under
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some European control, all the abuses of the past
would reappear. When complaints were made
that the people no longer respected the Moudirs,
it was replied—in the words of Sir Benson
]Maxwell, who was then Procureur- General—that
the old respect "was merely the offspring of
the terror felt by the helpless inhabitants in the
presence of the officer who was armed with the
courbash and the keys of the gaol. If the restora-
tion of the power was not accompanied by fresh
abuses, tlie respect would not revive, since the fear
on which it rested would not."
If Nubar Pasha had been prepared to accept a
certain limited amount of European co-operation
and inspection, both at the Ministry of the Interior
and in the provinces, a compromise might have
been effected. But, although at first inclined to
entertain proposals of this nature, he subsequently
rejected them.
Apart, however, from the merits or demerits of
the new Police system, it soon became clear that
two men so dissimilar in character as Nubar Pasha
and Mr. Clifford Lloyd could not work together
for long. Early in April 1884, the first of a suc-
cession of petty crises arose. The points at issue
were laid before Lord Granville. "The real
question," Mr. Clifford Lloyd said, "is whether
Her Majesty's Government will now face the
inevitable and appoint an English President of the
Council, or by withdrawing me deal a death-blow
to reformation in this country."
Now, if there was one thing in the world which
Lord Granville disliked, it was "facing the in-
evitable." He was constitutionally averse to any
line of policy which, in Mr. Clifford Lloyd's words,
was intended to " clear the way for all that had to
be done, once and for all." Moreover, in this particu-
lar instance, he could give some very valid reasons
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for declining to act on the advice of his masterful
subordinate. Mr. Clifford Lloyd had been sent to
Egypt, not to initiate a new Egyptian policy, but
to do the best he could under the difficult and
abnormal circumstances of the situation. Of
course, if an English President of the Council had
been appointed—in other words, if England had
assumed the direct government of Egypt— all
administrative difficulties would have been solved.
Any one, as has truly been said, can govern in a
state of siege. But Mr. Clifford Lloyd had not been
asked to govern, neither had he been commissioned
to introduce such radical changes as would neces-
sarily involve a complete change of governors. His
task was, partly by persuasion, and partly by a
moderate amount of diplomatic support, to intro-
duce such partial reforms in the existing system of
administration as were possible without shattering
the flimsy political fabric with which he had to
deal. He was constitutionally unsuited for the
performance of this delicate task. He could not
understand half measures. JVil actum credens, dum
quid superesset agendum, was his motto. Never,
probably, did he show his want of discernment
more conspicuously than when he exhorted a
Minister, who was pre-eminently opportunist, to
resort to heroic measures. Lord Granville was
equal to the occasion. He could elude the
point of the ra])ier even when the hilt was
held by a skilled diplomatist and dialectician
;
how much more, therefore, could he escape from
the sledge-hammer blows and wild tlirusts of this
blunt, outspoken tyro in official life. Acting under
Lord Granville's instructions, I ])atched up a truce
between Nubar Pasha and Mr. Clifford Lloyd, but
the feud soon broke out again. Eventually, towards
the end of May 1884, Mr. CHfford Lloyd resigned
his appointment and left Egypt.
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It was a misfortune that his mission did not
prove successful. Had he managed to acquire
a commanding influence over the affairs of the
Interior, not only would much good have accrued
to Egypt, but a great deal of friction, which sub-
sequently ensued, would have been avoided.
I have often asked myself whether, had I
supported Mr. Clifford Lloyd more strongly, a
more favourable result might have been obtained.
If the circumstances of the time had been different,
and if I had been able to devote myself more ex-
clusively to the solution of this particular diffi-
culty, it is possible that the conflict between
Nubar Pasha and Mr. Clifford Lloyd might not
have become so acute as was actually the case.
But the circumstances of the time were ab-
normal. General Gordon was inundating me
with violent and contradictory telegrams from
Khartoum. Whatever time could be spared from
Soudan affairs, had mainly to be devoted to finance,
which was then the burning question of the day.
The representatives of almost every Power in
Europe were banded together in opposition to
England, and to every proposal emanating from
a British source. On the other hand, Nubar Pasha
jauntily threw off all responsibility for Soudanese
or financial affairs, and concentrated all the efforts
of his astute mind on an endeavour to upset the
Clifford Lloyd combination, and to free the Egyptian
Government from all European control in so far as
the affairs of the Interior were concerned. Under
circumstances such as these, the result of the
struggle was almost a foregone conclusion.
Even, however, without the special circum-
stances existing at the moment, I do not think that
Mr. Clifford Lloyd could have remained for long
in Egypt. Despite his high character and un-
questionable ability, he was not the right man in
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the right place. He was not fitted for the delicate
work of Egyptian administration. As well might
it be expected that a brawny navvy should be able
to mend a Geneva watch with a pickaxe.
It would, of course, have been possible to have
appointed an English successor to INIr. Clifford
Lloyd, but at that time the difficulties of the
situation were so great, and the work was so
heavy, that it was desirable to throw a certain
amount of cargo overboard in order to lighten
the ship. INIr. Clifford Lloyd's place was, there-
fore, filled by an Egyptian.
It is needless to describe the minor changes
which the Police organisation underwent during
the next ten years. It will suffice to say that the
system did not work smootlily. The old cause of
complaint always existed, namely, that the presence
of European Police officers in the provinces dimin-
ished the authority of the Moudirs. One Egyp-
tian JNIinister succeeded another, but all adopted
an attitude of hostility to, or at best of surly
acquiescence with the new system.
At last, as generally happens in such cases, an
opportunity came of settling the question. When
Nubar Pasha assumed office in the summer of 1894,
he at once took up the matter. A j)lan, having for
its object the decentralisation of the Police, which
was to be left in Egyptian hands, coupled with the
establishment of an efficient Euro})ean control at
the Ministry of the Interior, was elaborated and
eventually accepted. An English "Adviser" was
appointed, whose functions were to co-operate
with the Minister in charge of the Department.
Subsequently, a very few young Englishmen, who
had been specially trained for Egyptian service,
were appointed to be Ins])ectors.
Since the change in 1894, a great improvement
has unquestionably taken place in the Administra-
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tioii of the Interior. Nevertheless, the old difficulty
still remains. The presence of British Inspectors
in the Provinces tends to weaken the authority
and to diminish the sense of responsibility of the
Moudirs. On the other hand, it is certain that
the total withdrawal of the Inspectors from the
provinces would be attended with a serious risk
that many of the abuses of the past would re-
appear, and, generally, that great administrative
confusion would arise. It is, in fact, impossible to
avoid altoorether the disadvanta":es of over -inter-
ference, without incurring the evils which would
result from total non-interference. The most that
can be done is to effect the best compromise of
which the circumstances admit. But, in working
a system where so much depends upon the
characters and idiosyncrasies of the individuals
concerned, it is inconceivable that complete
success can be attained.
A heroic remedy, which has occasionally been
suggested, would be to appoint British Moudirs.
I greatly deprecate the adoption of this measure.
It would be a very distinct step backwards in the
direction of dissociating the Egyptians from the
government of their own country. Moreover,
although I do not mean* to say that all the In-
spectors are equally tactful and efficient, or that
all the Moudirs possess every qualification which
could be wished, I am convinced that the former
are steadily gaining knowledge and experience of
the country, and that the latter are generally far
more efficient than their predecessors of a few
years ago. If this be so, and if, as I hold, a
policy of complete non - interference is not only
open to great objections, but would also be very
unpopular with the mass of the population, tliere
is nothing for it but to continue to work on the
broad lines of the present system, with all its
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recoofnised defects. All that can be done is to
watch its operation, to choose the Moudirs with the
utmost care, to constantly impress on the European
Inspectors the necessity of dealing in a spirit of
friendliness and sympathy with the Egyptian
authorities, and to move—whenever this can
prudently be done—in the direction of diminishing
rather than of enhancing the degree of British
interference in the details of the administration.*
* I must refer those who wish for more detailed information as
regards the work of the Interior, in connection with village organiaa-
tion and other matters, to my Annual Reports.
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1. Prisons,
Those who have only a slight acquaintance with
the ways of Eastern Governments may perhaps
be astonished to learn of the existence of a Turkish
Habeas Corpus Act. In reality, however, this is
no cause for surprise. Contact with Europe has
led to the adoption of the forms and the incorpora-
tion of much of the jargon of Western civilisation,
but has been powerless to make the East imbibe
its spirit. Oriental rulers have, indeed, discovered
a plan, by the adoption of which, as they think,
they can satisfy European reformers without in-
curring all the consequences which would result
from the execution of a reforming policy. Broadly
speaking, this plan consists in passing a law, and
then acting as if the law had never been passed.^
* ''No reform is clamoured for which does not already figure in the
statute-book ; no complaint is made which cannot be disproved by
statistics. . . . Eastern peoples, not only in Turkey but in many
other countries, form a solid national conspiracy against foreign anil
Christian influences. They know wlien their Government is forced to
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According to Ottoman law, an accused person
must be examined within twenty-four hours of his
arrest by competent officials ; when the charge
against him is formulated, the conditions under
which he may be admitted to bail are clearly laid
down.
So much for the theory. The practice is
different. Sir Herbert Chermside and Mr.
Beaman, who were deputed by Lord Dufferin
to inquire into the state of the Egyptian prisons
in 1882, wrote : " It is impossible, in the face of
the deluge of complaints as to no examination or
trial during months and years of confinement,
which has met us, to avoid concluding that the
present system of arrest and sending to trial is,
in practice, a flagrant injustice, and aggravated by
venality, tyranny, and personal vindictiveness."
Two causes were at work during the pre-
occupation days, one of which tended unduly to
deplete, and the other unduly to crowd the prisons.
On the one hand, a number of offences were
committed for which no one was ever punished.
This immunity from punishment tended to keep
the prisons empty. On the other hand, when
the authorities took cognisance of an offence, it
was their practice to arrest not only every one who
might possibly have been implicated in it, but also
a number of their relations, as well as all the
witnesses, whether they were on the side of the
prosecution or of the defence. The result of this
twofold injustice was that, whilst a number of
persons were free who siiould have been in prison,
at the same time a number of persons were in
give way af!:ainst its will ; tliey know when orders are meant to be
obeyed, and answer the rein in a moment ; they also know when tliey
are not meant to be obeyed^ but are what are called ' watery commands,'
and then they do not obey them. ... In the end, this national con-
spiracy, tliis ' invincible inertia,' nearly always wins the day."
—
Turkey
in Kuroj/r, p. 1.'j8.
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prison who should have been free;' and, once in
prison, no distinction was made between those who
had been convicted, those who were awaiting trial,
and others, such as witnesses, who were detained,
not for any offence, but because it was more con-
venient to keep them in prison, in case they were
wanted, than to set them at liberty. " In the
East," Sir Herbert Chermside wrote, " every man
is treated as if guilty of tlie offence of which he is
accused until he has established his innocence."
The condition of the prisons was horrible in the
extreme. "No report," Mr. Beaman said, "can
convey the feeblest impression of the helpless
misery of the prisoners, who live for months, like
wild beasts, without change of clothing, half-
starved, ignorant of the fate of their families and
bewailing their own. They only look forward to
the day of their trial as synonymous with the
day of their release, but the prospect of its
advent is too uncertain to lend much hope to their
wretchedness. From the moment of entering the
prison, even on the most trifling charge, they
consider themselves lost. It is impossible for them
to guess at the time when a new official may begin
to clear off the cases in his district, or when the
slow march of the administration may reach them.
It may be weeks, it may be months, and it may be
years ; many of them have long since ceased to care
which."
In those days, the only hope of the Egyptian
prisoner lay in the possession of money. A
moderate bribe to the gaoler would insure relatively
good treatment in prison. A further sum to the
judge might hasten the trial. The tariff for an
acquittal was naturally somewhat higher.
' " It is esteemed an act of Imperial clemency when the Sultan
orders the release from prison of ' all persons against whom there is no
charge.' "
—
Turkey in Europe, p. 140.
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There is, however, nothing surprising in all this.
The state of the Egyptian prisons in 1882 does
not seem to have been much worse than that of
the prisons in England before those reforms were
undertaken which have made the name of John
Howard for ever famous.
It is unnecessary to describe in detail the series
of reforms in this Department which have been
effected since 1882. It will suffice to say that,
here as elsewhere, order and justice have taken
the place of confusion and tyranny. The old
prisons have been improved and placed in a sanitary
condition. Large sums have been spent in the con-
struction of new prisons. Special prisons have been
constructed for women. Reformatories for juvenile
offenders have been instituted. The prisoners
have been provided with proper food and clothing.
Many of them are taught trades. These reforms
took time. Even now (1907) the prison accom-
modation can scarcely be said to be adequate to
meet all the requirements of the country.
The only criticism now directed against the
Prison Administration is—to quote the words of
Coles Pasha, to whom the credit of reforming this
branch of the Public Service is mainly due—that,
in the eyes of many " prison life is not sufficiently
deterrent, and that the swing of the pendulum has
carried the Administration too far in the direction
of humanity, if not of luxury." There may
possibly be some truth in this criticism, but there
can, of course, be no question of reverting to tlie
brutal methods of the past in order to make punish-
ment more deterrent. In Egypt, as elsewhere, tlie
tendency of the best qualified penological experts
is to move in the direction of reforming rather tlian
in that of administering very seveie punishment to
criminals.
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2. Slavery.
There is an obvious distinction between the
Slave Trade and Slavery. Both are bad ; but,
whereas nothing can be said in defence of the Slave
Trade, some mitigating pleas may be advanced as
regards domestic slavery, which, although they in
no degree justify the existence of the institution,
are of a nature to temper the zeal of the reformer
who aspires towards its immediate abolition.
Most Englishmen have been made familiar with
the horrors of the Slave Trade. They have been
told how peaceable villages in Central Africa have
been invaded by parties of ruffianly Arab raiders
;
how the older inhabitants, male and female, have
been shot down without mercy ; how the girls and
boys—the latter after undergoing the most cruel
process of mutilation to which any man can be
subjected ^— have been marched long distances
down to the coast; how numbers died of exhaustion
on the way ; and how eventually the survivors
were sold to be the household servants of the
Turkish and Egyptian Pashas.^ Some arguments,
more or less specious, can generally be found to
defend most of the worst abuses which exist, or at
times have existed in the world. The Slave Trade
stands alone as an abomination which is incapable
of any defence whatsoever, unless it be the vicious
plea that Pashas require servants, and that they are
unable to obtain them in sufficient numbers, or at
* The high price paid for these unfortunate boys is due to the fact
that a large proportion of them die under the process of mutilation.
The operation is performed in the most ruthless and barbarous manner
by persons devoid of any surgical skill.
2 It is a mistake to suppose that the black girls from Central Africa
always become the concubines of their masters. It would be an exagger-
ation to say that cases of this sort never occur, but they are rare. 'ITie
wives and concubines of the Pashas come almost exclusively from
Circassia and Abyssinia. The blacks are almost always bought with
the object of being employed as household servants.
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a sufficiently low price, by any other means than
those to which allusion is made above.
The case of domestic slavery, considered inde-
pendently of the Slave Trade, is different. A slave
in the Ottoman dominions lies under certain civil
disabilities which shock the European's sense of
justice; nevertheless, in practice, the disabihties
in question lie lightly on the slaves themselves.
Moreover, under unreformed Ottoman law, the
slave is not free to carry his labour to any market
which he chooses. This is unjust. On the other
hand, as a general rule, slaves are well treated ; ^
they lead an easy life and are not overworked.
On the whole, save that the stigma of slavery is
attached to them—a consideration which is all-im-
portant from the European, but relatively unim-
portant from the Eastern point of view ^—it may
be doubted whether in the majority of cases the
lot of slaves in Egypt is, in its material aspects,
harder than, or even as hard as that of many
domestic servants in Europe. Indeed, from one
point of view, the Eastern slave is in a better posi-
tion than the Western servant. The latter can be
thrown out of employment at any moment. In
Egypt, on the other hand, although under the
existing law, which is the outcome of contact with
* There are, however, exceptions. I remember a case wliich
occurred early in 1885. It was brought to my notice that a white
slave girl in the harem of a lady of high social position in Cairo was
very badly treated, and tliat she wished to escape." With some diffi-
culty, I obtained an interview with her at my house. She declared to
me most positively that she was very well treated, and that she wished
to return to the harem. I had no alternative but to comply witli her
reijuest. Shortly afterwards, I went to England. On my return, tlie
girl had disappeared. There were good reasons for believing that the
statement she made to me was untrue, that she had been promised a
large sura of money if she made it, that she was never paid the money,
and that, on my departure from Egypt, she was beaten to death. But
in cases of this sort it is, of course, impossible to obtain positive proof.
^ Many Egyptians of the highest social classes are the sons of slave
mothers, who are often married to their masters after having borne a
child.
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the West, the slave can, if he chooses, free himself
from his master, no provision is made for the con-
verse case of a master who wishes to get rid of a
slave. Custom, based on religious law, obliges him
to support his slave. Cases are frequent of masters
who would be glad to get rid of their slaves, but
who are unable to do so because the latter will not
accept the gift of liberty. A moral obligation,
which is universally recognised, rests on all masters
to support aged and infirm slaves till they die
;
this obligation is often onerous in the case of those
who have inherited slaves from their parents or
other relatives.
On these grounds, therefore, some distinction
must be drawn between the Slave Trade and
Slavery. It is, however, none the less true that
the one is intimately connected with the other.
Where there is a demand, a supply will follow. If
the institution of slavery did not exist, the Slave
Trade would perish. In order to check the Slave
Trade, if for no other reason, it is necessary to do
all that is possible to discourage slavery. The
object of the English reformer has, therefore, been
twofold. In the first place, he has endeavoured to
prevent slaves from being brought into the country,
and has thus to some extent cut off the supply.
In the second place, he has endeavoured to wean
the slave-owning classes from their ancient habits,
and has thus done much to diminish the demand.
Whether Ismail Pasha was moved by a sincere
desire to abolish an infamous traffic, or whether he
merely wished to throw dust in the eyes of humani-
tarian Europe, it is certain that to him belongs the
credit of having given the first blow to the institu-
tion of slavery in Egypt. In August 1877, a
Convention was signed between the Egyptian
Government and Lord Vivian, acting on behalf of
the British Government. Under the terms of this
VOL. II 2 k
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Convention and the annexes attached to it, the
Slave Trade was formally forbidden on Egyptian
territory. Slave dealers were to be tried by court
martial, and were rendered liable to severe penalties.
The sale of slaves from family to family was to
be tolerated until August 1884, after which time
it was declared illegal. Any slave who chose to
claim his or her liberty could obtain it on applica-
tion to certain Bureaux of Manumission which
were specially created.
It is now necessary to explain a point in con-
nection with the institution of slavery in Egypt,
the importance of which is often insufficiently re-
cognised by those who are specially interested in
this subject. On February 6, 1883, Lord Dufferin
wrote :
—
" Slavery might be abolished by Khedivial Decree,
but a Convention is so much more formal and
binding that it would seem preferable. I would,
therefore, propose that a new Convention be entered
into between Great Britain and Egypt, by which
slavery would entirely cease in Egypt and its
Dependencies seven years after the date of signa-
ture."
It may be doubted whether Lord Dufferin
fully realised the obstacles which must have been
encountered had any endeavour been made to give
effect to his proposal. In 1883, those obstacles
were practically insurmountable. Slavery in the
East does not exist by virtue of any special Decree
or law emanating either from the executive govern-
ments or from the legislatures under which Eastern
countries are governed. It exists because its
existence is authorised by the Sacred Law of Islam,
which is as immutable as were the laws of the
Medes and Persians. That law cannot be abro-
gated by any Khedivial Decree, and still less by
any Convention signed with a Christian Power,
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Kadis, Muftis, and Ulema would regard Decrees
and Conventions, which infringed the fundamental
religious law of Islam, much as devout French
Catholics must have regarded the attempts of
Anacharsis Clootz and other maniacs of the, French
revolution to effect the legal abolition of • the
Christian religion. They would altogether decline
to recognise the validity of a law which, inasmuch
as it altered the Sheriat, would in their eyes be
considered as an attempt to justify sacrilege.
It is true that, some fifty years ago, tlie rulers
of India ignored the Mohammedan relioious law.
In 1843, an Act was passed by the Indian legislature,
which provided that the status of slavery should
not be recognised by any law-court in the country,
criminal or civil. But, although in the abstract, the
Sheriat may be as inviolable at Calcutta as it is at
Cairo, the question of the total and immediate
abolition of slavery presented itself, from a practical
point of view, in a very different aspect in Egypt
under Lord Dufferin from that which obtained under
Lord Ellenborough in India. In 1843, the English
had been for half a century in India. They were
the absolute rulers of the country. The law-courts,
which they had established, inspired confidence.
Moreover, they had to deal, not with one compact
body of JNIohammedans, but with a Mohammedan
population which, though numerous, possessed
little or no cohesion, owing to the fact that it was
merged amongst the members of a more numerous
And more tolerant creed. Under such circum-
stances, a radical reform, such as that effected in
1843, becomes possible. Under the political con-
ditions which prevailed in Egypt in 1883, it would
have been impossible, or at all events in the highest
degree imprudent, to have attempted to follow the
Indian precedent.
Under the Sheriat, a slave cannot marry or
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inherit property without the consent of his master.
When, therefore, it is said that, under the Con-
vention of 1877, any slave was able to obtain his
or her liberty on application to a Manumission
Bureau, it is to be understood that the term
"liberty" is used in a restricted sense. The
Convention gave to the slave the right to go
wherever he pleased, and to work or remain idle
as he pleased. But it did not allow him to marry
or to inherit property without the consent of his
master. To this extent, in spite of nineteenth-
century intervention, Islam of the seventh century
still held the manumitted slave in its grip.
It was inevitable that the British occupation
should give a fresh stimulus to the work of
emancipation which was begun in 1877. One
important consideration, however, tempered the
zeal of the reformer. Almost all the slaves in
Egypt were women. When they left the harems,
having no means of support, they either starved
or fell into a life of vice. Under these circum-
stances, those who were desirous of hastening the
work of emancipation hesitated to act for fear
of producing evils as bad as, if not worse than
slavery. To remedy this defect, money was
subscribed in England with the help of the Anti-
Slavery Society, who, in this connection, did some
excellent work. With the money thus obtained,
which was supplemented by a grant from the Egyp-
tian Treasury, a Home for Freed Female Slaves
was established at Cairo. The manumitted slaves
are now housed and fed in this Home until employ-
ment can be obtained for them.^ This system has
worked well. Respectable Mohammedans con-
stantly apply to the Home for domestic servants.
1 So few slaves now apply to the Mainimissioii Bureaux that it will
proliably soon become a <|uestion wliethcr the Home for Freed Slaves
need be auy longer maintained.
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It would be probably an exaggeration to say
that any public opinion adverse to slavery has been
evoked in Egypt. The purchase and employment
of slaves is not generally regarded with any moral
reprobation, neither, under all the circumstances
which exist, would it be reasonable to expect any
such reprobation. In 1894, no less a person than
the President of the Legislative Council, who was
a Turco-Egyptian, was arraigned before a Court-
martial for purchasing slaves, and only escaped
imprisonment on account of his bad health and
advanced years. Nevertheless, the slavery reforms
instituted under British auspices have produced a
notable change in the behaviour, if not in the
opinions, of the slave-owning classes in Egypt.
There are no longer any slave -markets. The
purchase of a slave is a criminal offence attended
with danger both to the buyer and to the seller.
The slave routes are carefully watched. It is
only with great difficulty that a few slaves are
occasionally smuggled into the country. The
result of these measures has been, not only that
it has become year by year more difficult to obtain
slaves, but that also, when any clandestine purchase
is effected, a price considerably higher than that
which formerly ruled has to be paid. The slave-
owner is, therefore, beginning to ask himself
whether slave labour is not, after all, more ex-
pensive as well as more troublesome than free
labour, and whether it is worth while, besides com-
mitting a criminal act for which he may be severely
punished, to pay a considerable sum for a slave girl
who can, on tlie morrow of her purchase, walk out
of the harem and obtain, not only her freedom,
but also the strong support of the British repre-
sentative if any attempt is made to tamper with her
liberty of action.
Thousands of slaves have, during the last few
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years, been granted their certificates of freedom.
Those who remain in the harems know that they
can obtain their liberty if they choose to ask for it.
In the meanwhile, as very few fresh slaves are
imported, and as the numbers born in slavery
must certainly be inconsiderable in proportion to
the number of those who have been manumitted,
the supply of slaves is gradually falling short of
the demand. Very few eunuchs are now to be
found in Egypt. The objections to their employ-
ment from the Egyptian point of view are that
a very high price has to be paid for them ; that,
on account of their bad physique, they are use-
less as servants ; and that they are liable to die
of consumption. It may safely be asserted that
slavery in Egypt, although it will take a long
time to die out completely, is moribund. It
may be asserted with an almost equal degree of
confidence that both the Slave Trade and slavery
would revive if vigilance were relaxed.
From one point of view, the particular reform
of the Egyptian social and administrative system
now under discussion is remarkable. In view of
the state of the JNIohammedan law, of the fact that
slavery, although discouraged by the founder of
the Mohammedan religion, has, by a perverted view
of his original preaching, become associated with
the disthictive features of the JNIohammedan faith ;
and of the further fact that material interests of
some importance were involved in the abolition of
slavery—it might well have been thought that the
introduction of Western ideas in connection with
this subject would have encountered o})position of
a somewhat specially strong description. As a
matter of fact, the opposition has been mild, and
has been easily overcome. A great change has
been going on insensibly. It has, indeed, been
almost imperceptible to tnose who, it might be
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thought, were most interested in the maintenance
of the existing abuse. No lieroic measures have
been adopted. Nothing has been done to clash
with Mohammedan opinions and prejudices. Never-
theless, a considerable measure of success has been
attained. This result is due to the fact that the
Convention of 1877 was admirably adapted to
achieve, in a prudent and unostentatious manner,
the object for which it was intended. The late
Lord Vivian's name is rarely, if ever, mentioned as
one of the chief initiators of Egyptian reform.
Yet it is due to the wise moderation of the
Convention which he negotiated that slavery has
been gradually disappearing from Egypt. At the
commencement of this work, some words of Bacon
were quoted as an example of the general principles
which should guide the reformer in an Eastern
country : '* It were good that men in their
innovations would follow the example of Time
itself, which, indeed, innovateth greatly, but
quietly and by degrees scarce to be perceived."
That is the principle which has been adopted in
connection witli the abolition of slavery in Egypt.
Lord Vivian's action in this matter was based on
strictly Baconian principles.
In 1895, a fresh Slavery Convention was signed
between the British and Egyptian Governments.
It gave precision to the existing law, and in some
respects altered the procedure. INIoreover, it pro-
vided that it was a criminal offence to interfere
in any way with the full liberty of action of an
enfi-anchised slave. This change is important. It
practically effects by a side wind all that was done
by the Indian Act of 1843. Any one in Egypt
who prevents a freed slave from marrying or from
inheriting property is now liable to imprisonment.
A scholarly writer, who has paid special atten-
tion to this subject, calls slavery the " Nemesis of
504 MODERN EGYPT pt. vi
Nations." "Civilisation," he says, "begins with
the crack of the slave whip."^ It may be placed
to the credit of latter-day civilisation that the
crack of that whip can no longer be heard in
Egypt
3. Medical and Sanitary Administration,
Whatever may be the case at present, it is
certain that but a few years ago the lowest classes
in Egypt rarely souglit for medical aid until the
patient was well-nigh moribund. The recipes of
village barbers and of the old women, who were
sometimes called in to attend the sick, as often
as not aggravated the condition of the patient.^
Great faith was entertained in the healing properties
of written charms. These generally consisted of
passages of the Koran for Mohammedans, or from
the Psalms and Gospels for Copts, which were inter-
mingled with numerical combinations, diagrams,
and symbols. Persons of all creeds, being possessed
of evil spirits, were said to be cured at certain Coptic
convents, notably at the convent of St. Damianus^
near Mansourah, and at that of St. Michael near
Birket-el-Sab.
An operation which was "warranted to cure all
diseases which were not fatal," could be performed
if the sick person was fortunate enough to become
* Paterson's Nemesis of Nations, p. 63.
• The instances of superstition in this chapter are mainly taken from
a pamphlet entitled Medical Matters in Egypt, written liy Or. F. M.
Sandwith in August 1884. Dr. Sandvvith's researches revealed a stajj^e
of medical knowledge amongst the poorer classes not materially in
advance of that reached in I'liaraonic times. M. Maspero {Causeries
d'Egypte, p. 313) says that an ancient Egyptian medical practitioner
was obliged to be "aussi expert en exorcismes qu'en formules de
phannacie."
' St. Damianus and his brother St. Cosmos were both doctors.
They underwent martyrdom during the persecution of Diocletian,
about A.D. 303. Pope Felix IV. built a Basilica ia their honour at
Rome.
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possessed of a brass bowl, made in a peculiar fashion,
and to the rim of which forty-one oblong strips of
brass were attached. On each of these strips the
words " In the name of the most merciful God,"
were inscribed. This bowl had to be filled on a
Friday night with Nile water, into which some
drugs and nuts were thrown. The sick person
was instructed to stand in a basin of water before
sunrise on the following morning, to drink out of
the bowl, and to eat the nuts, throwing the shells
behind his back. This operation had to be repeated
on three consecutive Fridays.
It was, and perhaps still is a common practice
amongst both Copts and Mohammedans to wear
about their persons a bone taken from the body
of a polytheist or of a Jew. This was supposed
to afford immunity from all sorts of fevers. A
bone taken from any ancient Egyptian mummy
was often worn.
The remedy for sterility was for the woman who
wished to become a mother to step over the corpse
of an executed criminal, or into a basin of water
which had been used to wash his corpse, or to tread
on a human skull, or walk between the tombs of
a cemetery, or step over some antique resemblance
of a cat or other relic of old Egypt.
The cure for a stye in the eye was to eat bread
obtained from seven different women, each called
Fatma, the name of the Prophet's daughter.
Headache was cured by driving a nail into one
of the gates of Cairo, called the Bab-el-Zueilah.
For toothache, it was considered necessary to extract
the tooth, and deposit it in a crevice of the same
gate. The latter part of this operation was supposed
to prevent other teeth from aching.
One of the most frequent antidotes for poison
was to write certain texts of the Koran on slips
of paper, which were then thrown into a dish of
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water. The water was stirred and the solution
drunk.
Innumerable remedies existed, and probably still
exist, to counteract the dreaded effects of the Evil
Eye, belief in which has existed from time im-
memorial in Egypt. ^ The most efficacious is to
steal a piece of the dress of the supposed envier, burn
it, and fumigate the envied person with it. Another
common practice is to heat some alum, and to
prick one of the water bubbles, saying at the same
time : " I prick the eye of the envier." Cornelian
and charcoal are worn on the forehead by Moslem
children for the same purpose. Parents also some-
times keep a monkey or a gazelle in the house in
order to avert the Evil Eye.
I may here mention a curious case of super-
stition which came under my personal notice. Some
years ago, my eldest son was dangerously ill with
typhoid fever at Cairo. A short time before his
illness, he had been given a black dog, which used
to live in the house. The pattering of the dog's
footsteps on the floor of the room disturbed the
patient's rest. The dog was, therefore, sent out of
the house. I afterwards learnt that my Egyptian
servants looked on the dog as an *' Afrit " (devil),
that they considered the case hopeless so long as
the dog remained in the house, but entertained no
doubt of ultimate recovery directly the animal was
removed. In this particular instance, as my son
recovered, their belief in the power of "Afrits"
must have been strengthened.
In the instances so far given, the fantastic
remedies applied in cases of sickness have their
* "Abundant testimony exists in the oldest monuments in the
world that among the ancient Ejjyptians belief in and dread of the Evil
Eye were ever present ; their efforts to avert or to bailie it, both as
regarded the living and the dead, who they knew would live again,
were perhaps the most constant and elaborate of any, of which we can
now decipher the traces."—Elworthy's Tlie Evil Eye, p. 6.
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origin in superstition. Instances of prescribed cures
based on complete ignorance of medical science
and dissociated from any religious belief, however
perverted, might readily be added. Thus, Dr,
Sandwith tells of a Coptic bone-setter of celebrity,
who was called in to attend a woman with a dis-
located hip. He "gave instructions that the
woman's hip should be tightly bound to a half-
starved cow, and that the cow should then be fed
until the rapid swelling of the animal had caused
the reduction of the dislocation."^
The credit of having first brought true know-
ledge to bear on all this mass of ignorance and
credulity belongs to an eminent Frenchman. Dr.
Clot Bey, who was the father of Egyptian medical
reform, was summoned to Egypt by Mehemet Ali.
Under his auspices, a School of Medicine and
Pharmacy, as well as a Maternity Hospital for the
instruction of midwives, were created ; a sanitary
service for the interior of the country was also
organised. A European doctor and apothecary,
who were aided by Egyptian medical men and
women, were appointed to every province in Lower
Egypt. Under the intelligent stimulus thus afforded,
considerable progress was made in the direction of
medical and sanitary reform. All the superior
officers possessed a European diploma.
At a later period, Egyptians, possessing only
* The state of things described above was but little, if at all, worse than
that which existed in England and Scotland so late as the eighteenth cen-
tury. During the first half of that century " medicines in common use
contained brains of hares and foxes, snails burnt in the shell, powder of
human skull and Egyptian mummy, burnt hoofs of horses, calcined
cockle-shells, pigeon's blood, ashes of little frogs—like to the diabolical
contents of the witches' cauldron in Macbeth " (Graham's Social Life in
Scotland in the Eighteenth Century, vol. i. p. 51). The Poor Man's
Physician, written by the "famous John Moncrieff of Tippermalloch,"
prescribes the following as a cure for whitlow : "Stop the finger with
a cat's ear, and it will be whole in half an hour." In 1744, Mrs.
Delany sent to her nephew, as an infallible cure for ague, "a spider
put into a goosequill, well sealed and secured^ and hui^g about the
child's neck."
—
Mrs. Delany's Memoirs, p. 138.
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certificates issued locally, were nominated to high
posts. European control was relaxed. The re-
forms, which had begun to blossom, withered under
the misrule of Ismail. The shadow of approach-
ing bankruptcy fell upon the land. Useful
expenditure was everywhere cut down with an
unsparing hand in order to compensate for the
financial vagaries of a spendthrift Khedive. " At
the end of 1878," Dr. Sandwith says, "all sanitary,
quarantine, and hospital buildings had fallen into
ruin for want of funds, and the provincial hospitals
naturally suffered to a greater degree than others."
By the time the British occupied the country
in 1882, three-fourths of the good effects of Clot
Bey's reforms had been obliterated. The School
of Medicine still existed, but the instruction
afforded to the students was very defective. The
greater number of the medical officers serving under
the Egyptian Government were ignorant and in-
competent. They were also underpaid, with the
natural result that they used the numerous oppor-
tunities afforded to them in the exercise of their
official functions to increase their incomes by illicit
means.^ The state of the hospitals was deplorable.
Nothing could be worse than the general adminis-
tration of the Medical Department. Sir Guyer
Hunter, who was sent to Egypt in 1883 to report
on the cholera epidemic which then prevailed,
wrote
:
" The hospitals, as a rule, are in a more or less
tumble - down, dirty condition, impregnated with
* "A dishonest man may occasionally threaten to cause some
sweeping reform to be carried out in a village, unless a sum of money
is immediately collected for him by the headman, or money may be
obtained from a private individual by threatening to perform an
autopsy on the dead body of his relative, on the plea that there is
some suspicion of foul play. To the uneducated Musulman, who
believes that the dead can feel and should be treated with a respect
similar to the living, this idea is naturally repugnant."—Sandwith,
Medical Mutters in Egypt, p. 7-
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foul odours, and containing beds filthy in the ex-
treme ; they are, in fact, noisome places, utterly
unfit for the reception of human beings. . . . The
medical administration is simply deplorable. I
took the opportunity of examining the hospital
registers. Here, as in everything else wliich met
my observation under this administration, matters
were as bad as bad could be."
As to the Lunatic Asylum in Cairo, an English
doctor, who visiter! this institution in 1877, wrote:
" The whole place is so utterly beyond the ken
of civilisation that it remains as hideous a blot on
the earth's surface as is to be found even in the
Dark Continent."
The veterinary art is of special importance in
Egypt owing to the ravages which have at times
been made by the cattle disease. The veterinary
surgeons, however. Dr. Sandwith, speaking of the
early days of the occupation, said, " may be fairly
passed over with the remark that they are more
ignorant, and not more honest, than their medical
brethren."
It would be beyond the scope of this work, and
moreover, would be of little interest to the general
reader, were an attempt made to give the details
connected with the work of reform accomplished
as regards the subject now under discussion. The
results may, however, be briefly summarised.
Modern medicine and surgery are essentially
European sciences. The superiorityof Western over
Eastern therapeutic methods; the cosmopolitan char-
acter of the work performed by the physician and
the surgeon ; the dissociation which exists, or which
at all events should exist between the art of healing
the sick and political, racial, or religious rivalry
;
and the manifest benefits which the Egyptian
people, whether as doctors or patients, are capable
of receiving from European guidance and tuition
—
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are all so clear that it might well have been thought
that, in this instance at all events, the beneficent
co-operation of the Eng-lishman would not only
have been accepted without demur, but would even
have been invited and welcomed. Such, however,
was unfortunately not the case. The best, and,
indeed, the only method of providing for the
medical wants of Egypt without flooding the
country with European doctors, was to take in
hand the work of medical education. It was from
the first evident that a few qualified Englishmen
at the School of JNIedicine would, through the
influence of teaching, be able in a few years to
spread the light of \A^estern science throughout the
country. A cruel fate, however, ordained that, by
a fortuitous and most unfortunate combination
of circumstances, which are not worth relating in
detail, the School of JNIedicine was for some while
a hotbed of ultra-JNIohammedan and anti-European
feeling. This obstacle, though sufficient to retard,
was powerless to arrest the progress of medical
instruction. With characteristic Anglo-Saxon
energy, the Englishman set to work to make
the Egyptian " un medecin malgre lui." His per-
severance was rewarded. The School of Medicine
at Cairo was eventually, in spite of much opposi-
tion, put on a sound footing. A capable staff of
Egyptian doctors, some of whom have European
diplomas, is being gradually created.
The hospitals, the number of which has been
largely increased, are now clean, properly equipped
with beds, bedding, and clothing, and supplied with
medicines, ap])liances, and instruments. The pre-
judice, which formerly existed, against being treated
in a hospital, is gradually disappearing. About
31,000 in-patients and 118,000 out-patients were
treated in the Government Hospitals during 1906.
The number both of in- and out-patients is steadily
CH. Lvn THE INTERIOR 511
increasing every year. A staff of trained English
nurses has been attached to the principal hospital
in Cairo, to the great benefit of the Egyptian
nurses and pupils, whom they train and educate
by precept and example. Dispensaries, where the
poor can obtain gratuitous treatment, have been
opened in several towns.
Vaccination has been carried out on a large
scale amongst the Egyptian population, though
the Capitulations hinder its extension amongst
Europeans.^
A vigorous campaign, initiated in the first
instance by the munificence of Sir Ernest Cassel,
has been commenced against ophthalmia, which
vjas formerly the curse of Egypt.^
A Foundling Hospital has been erected by private
subscription in memory of a European lady who
had endeared herself to the whole population.
The Lunatic Asylum at Cairo, which has been
placed in charge of an English specialist, is now
in perfect order. Another large Asylum is in
course of construction.
Considerable progress has also been made in the
Veterinary Department since 1886, when it was
put under the control of an English veterinary
surgeon. The butchers' shops, dairies, slaughter-
* " Half the cases of small-pox notified occurred among' Europeans,
a proportion which is extremely heavy when we consider the pre-
ponderance of the natives in Cairo, and was, no doubt, due to non-
vaccination, many of the lower-class Europeans neglecting to have their
children vaccinated. Though vaccination is compulsory on all persons
residing in Egypt, the law is evaded by some of the Europeans from
the fact that the births among this class of the population are not
notified at the Public Health Ofliice, but at the respective Consulates,
and the Consuls in many cases do not send in the notifications to this
Department, and the Government are unable to enforce the law on the
parents."
—
Report of the Public Health Department for 1905.
2 Not very long ago Mrs. Ross, the daugliter of Lady Duff Gordon,
visited Egypt. Forty years previously, she had had peculiar facilities
for observing the condition of the people. 1 asked her what was the
change which struck her most. I was pleased, and also surprised at her
reply. She said, "The marked decrease in ophthalmia."
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houses, cattle-sheds, etc., have been regularly-
inspected and controlled, their owners being in-
duced or compelled to maintain them in a satis-
factory sanitary condition. Several outbreaks of
pleuro-pneumonia and other epizootic diseases have
been stamped out. A Veterinary College, as also
an Anti-Rabic Institute, have been established.
On the whole, although of course much remains
to be done, it may be said that, in so far as medical
instruction and organisation, veterinary administra-
tion, and the proper maintenance of hospitals, dis-
pensaries, and lunatic asylums are concerned, an
amount of progress has been realised which is as
great as could reasonably be expected. The very
capable Englishmen who have devoted their
energies to the work of this Department, and
who, like all other British officials in Egypt, have
had great obstacles to encounter, have at all events
succeeded in introducing the first commonplace
elements of Western order and civilisation into the
country.
Sanitary reform has, of course, progressed less
rapidly than improvements in the medical service.
In the former case, the conservative instincts of
the people, and their indifference to sanitation,
constitute an almost insuperable barrier to rapid
progress. At the same time, much has already
been done. The water-supply of the principal
towns has been taken in hand. The Mosque
latrines are no longer drained into the Nile or
the canals, and in most of the towns the JNIosques
themselves have been put in a satisfactory sanitary
condition. Authority has been obtained to remove
cemeteries pronounced to be a danger to public
health. A commencement has been made in
filling up the highly insanitary pools which are
to be found hi close proximity to most Egyptian
villages. As funds become available, it cannot be
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doubted that sanitary reform will, year by year,
occupy a more prominent place in the Government
programme.
Before leaving this branch of my subject, some
brief allusion must be made to the eminent services
rendered by the Sanitary Department in arresting
the progress of the various epidemics which have
visited Egypt of late years. In the cholera epi-
demic of 1883, 58,369 deaths from this disease were
registered, and it is certain that the real number
was far in excess of this figure. In 1896, another
severe epidemic of cholera visited the country.
The number of deaths was limited to 18,105. It
cannot be doubted that the reduced mortality was,
in a great measure, due to the improved efficiency of
the Sanitary Department, under the auspices of
Sir John Rogers and Sir Horace Pinching. This
Department also dealt successfully with the cholera
epidemic of 1902, and, moreover, gained well-
deserved laurels in its treatment of the epidemic
of plague in 1898 and subsequent years.
Some interesting statistics have been drawn up,
showing the relative number of deaths in Alex-
andria from the plague epidemic which lasted from
1834 to 1843, as compared with those for the years
1899 to 1905. The number of deaths in the former
period of ten years was 12,380. The number in
the latter period of seven years was 647. The
statistics of the earlier period are probably very
imperfect. At the same time, they are sufficient
to show the effisct produced by the more stringent
measures recently taken to check the disease, as
compared with the results obtained by the methods
adopted during the earlier of the two epidemics.
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CHAPTER LVIII
JUSTICE
Sir Edward Malet's opinion—The Mixed and Consular Courts—The
Kadis' Courts—The Native Tribunals—Justice prior to 1883—The
French system taken as a model— Tiie judicial machinery
—
Reforms instituted by Sir John Scott and Sir Malcolm Mcllwraith
—Opposition to these reforms—The personnel of the Courts
Result of the reforms.
When Sir Edward Malet left Egypt in 1883, he
declared that the first requirement of the Egyp-
tian population was justice. In the present chapter,
an endeavour will be made to state very briefly
how far this requirement has been met.
It has been already explained ^ that the Mixed
Tribunals deal with all civil cases, in which Euro-
peans are concerned, and the Consular Courts with
all criminal cases in which Europeans are the
accused parties. The latter Courts apply their
national laws. Of these institutions, no more need
be said. Up to the present time (1907) the juris-
diction of the Consular Courts remains unchanged.
The law administered by the Mixed Tribunals has
merely undergone some minor modifications. In
each of these cases, the reasons for this long
immunity from change have, broadly speaking,
been twofold. The first is that neither the Mixed
nor the Consular Courts stood nearly so much in
need of reform as the Egyptian portions of the
> See Chapter XLII.
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judicial system. The second is that, hedged behind
the ahnost impenetrable barrier of internationalism,
both of these jurisdictions have so far been able to
defy the efforts of the reformer.
Neither need much be said about the Kadis'
Courts. These Courts deal with all questions
affecting the personal status of Moslems. If they
are ever to be improved, the movement in favour
of reform must come from within. It must be
initiated by the Egyptians themselves. Any serious
attempt to impose reforms by pressure from without
would be extremely impolitic, and, moreover, would
probably result in failure. The British reformer,
therefore, being partly convinced of the uselessness
of attack and partly impelled by political neces-
sity, turned aside from ^lohammedan law-reform.
Although he made some faltering steps in the
direction of improving the Kadis' Courts, his
energies were mainly applied in other directions,
where better results were to be obtained.
There remain the Native Tribunals instituted
in 1883. These deal with all civil cases in which
both parties are Ottoman subjects, and with all
criminal cases in which an Ottoman subject is the
accused party. It can scarcely be said that these
Courts took the place of any existing institutions.
They were new creations. The judges were the
instruments who gave expression to a phase of
thought which had been hitherto unfamiliar to
the Egyptian mind. Prior to 1883, a system of
punishment existed, or it would be perhaps more
correct to say that a method was in force by which
occasionally somebody was punished for an offence
which as often as not he had never committed,
whilst not unfrequently others were punished
without any offence at law having been committed
at all. Moreover, the existence of some rude code
of Civil Law was so far recognised as to enable the
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worst illegalities to be hallowed by legal sanction.
For instance, when Ismail Pasha confiscated the
vineyard of some Naboth among his subjects, the
transfer was always effected in accordance with
strictly legal forms. But any system ofjustice, pro-
perly so called, was unknown in the country. The
divorce between law, such as it was, and justice
was absolute. It has been already explained ^ how,
in 1883, the Department of Justice was, to some
extent, placed under British management ; how,
during the storm and stress of the years 1884-85,
when the Anglo-Egyptian bark was being tossed
hither and thither by the waves of Soudanese
troubles, bankruptcy, and international rivalry, this
Department, as well as that of the Interior, were
confided to Egyptian hands ; how the experiment,
which was then tried, resulted in complete failure
;
and how eventually, with the nomination of Sir
John Scott to the post of Judicial Adviser, an era
of real reform commenced.
It is true that, prior to 1883, no system of
justice existed in Egypt. It is not, however, on
that account to be supposed that the English were
free to introduce into the country any system which
they preferred. Such was far from being the case.
French law and procedure had already taken root
in Egypt. The codes administered by the Mixed
Tribunals were French. All the young Egyptians
who had received any legal training had been
educated in France. It was, therefore, inevit-
able that the new Tribunals should be based on
a French rather than on an English model.
The necessity was regrettable, for a simple code
of law and procedure, somewhat similar to
that which was subsequently introduced into
the Soudan, would— more especially in criminal
matters—have probably been more suited to the
1 Vide ante, pp. 288-90.
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requirements of the country than that which was
actually adopted.^
Proposals have frequently been made to sweep
away the system of criminal justice inaugurated
shortly after the British occupation took place, and
to substitute something else in its place. Apart
from other and very valid objections to the adoption
of this course, it is to be observed that those who
have urged this radical treatment of the question
have not, perhaps, sufficiently realised that, although
the system is, indeed, by no means perfect, the
main difficulties which have to be encountered in
introducing any improvements are inherent in the
situation, and cannot be removed by any mere change
of system. They arise from the character of the
people, from the impossibility of creating rapidly a
competent judiciary calculated to inspire confidence
and respect, and, generally, from the circumstances
which are the necessary accompaniment of a tran-
sitionary period from arbitrary government to a
reign of law. It was, therefore, decided to make
no radical changes, but to remedy the defects which
existed by gradually introducing such minor reforms
as experience showed were calculated to adapt the
system more fully to the requirements of the
country.
It is unnecessary that I should describe in detail
the nature of the changes which, from time to
time, have been carried out under the auspices of
* The danger of making too faithful a copy of European judicial
institutions is fully recognised by the best French authorities on colonial
affairs. In an interesting article, written by M. de Lavigne Sainte-
Suzanne, and entitled " La Justice Indigene aux Colonies," which
appeared in the Revue Diplomatique, the following passage occurs :
—
'* C'est surtout dans I'organisation de la justice indigene que r&-
trouve son application cette formule qui devrait servir de base a tout
le programme du droit colonial : pas d'assimilation. S'il est absurde
de transporter chez des peuples encore primitifs tous les rouages
administratifs en usage dans la vieille Europe, il devient dangereux et
inique d'imposer aux indigenes notre legislation et notre organisation
judiciaire."
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successive Egyptian Ministers of Justice aided by
Sir John Scott, and his successor, Sir Malcolm
Mcllwraith. The most important of these have
been the establishment of a Committee of Surveil-
lance who, without possessing any power to upset
or revise judgments already delivered, watch over
the proceedings of the Courts of First Instance
;
the partial decentralisation, first of Civil, and
subsequently of Criminal justice; the revision of
the Criminal Codes with the object of freeing them
from useless formalism ; and the establishment of
Assize Courts whose judgments, save on points of
law, are final.
These reforms followed what may be considered
the normal course of all administrative change in
Egypt. When any new measure is proposed, a
certain amount of opposition is sure to be
encountered. This opposition will sometimes be
based on the conservative tendencies of the more
old-fashioned class of Egyptians, who look askance
at any one who aspires to moUri res novas ; or, it
may be based on the mental inelasticity of the
Egyptian reformer, who, albeit somewhat prone to
radical change, finds it difficult to get out of the
special groove into which, by the accident of educa-
tion and association, his intellectual forces have
been directed. When the reform is eventually
accomplished, it is discovered that the fears of the
opposition were groundless, and that the measure,
so far from having done harm, has done much good.
This experience will in no degree act as a pre-
ventive to a repetition of similar tactics on some
future occasion ; but it is a point which the
European reformer should bear in mind that, pro-
vided always that his proposals be reasonable, they
will generally, after a certain amount of murmur-
ing, be accepted. All Easterns carry fatalism into
the practical aflkirs of life ; they readily bow before
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an accomplished fact. In the particular cases
described above, the somewhat fictitious opposition,
which was at one time excited against Sir John
Scott's and Sir Malcolm Mcllwraith's proposals, died
an unusually speedy death. The benefits derived
from the reforms were, in fact, too manifest to
admit of doubt. Experience soon pricked the
theoretical bubbles of which the opponents of
practical reforms in Egypt are at times prodigal.^
So far, the main features of the judicial system
which were introduced have been described. The
chief difficulty in this, as in so many other cases,
has, however, been not to devise a system, but to
find men capable of working it. Sir John Scott,
writing in the early part of 1894, said :
"
' Tant valent les juges, tant valent les lois,'
is a principle which had been overlooked before
1890 ; and judges had been named in Appeal, as
well as in First Instance, who were far from
possessing the necessary qualifications."
In point of fact, when the Tribunals were first
instituted in 1883, few Egyptians were to be found
who were capable of exercising judicial functions.
Moreover, amongst those few, the best men were
frequently not selected. The appointments were
jobbed. Gradually, the least capable men have
been weeded out. It cannot be doubted that the
standard of efficiency in the law-courts is steadily
improving. I should add that the personnel of the
* Perhaps the most striking instance of the collapse of opposition
was in the case of the Assize Courts. Few measures have heen more
violently or more universally condemned. Yet, very shortly after the
change of system had been eflPected, one of the most competent of the
Egyptian judicial officials was able to write : " Nothing sliovvs more
clearly the efficiency and excellency of the new system tlian the absence
of all criticisms upon the results obtained by its adoption, especially
when it is remembered tliat, when the project was under consideration,
it gave rise to much difference of opinion, and to fears as to the con-
sequence which would be entailed from the point of view of justice."
The establishment of these Courts has, inter alia, rendered justice much
more expeditious than formerly.
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Judicial Department is almost wholly Egyptian.
Out of a total staff of 1600, only 36 are Europeans.
Have the changes, whose main features have
thus been briefly described, given to the population
of Egypt a sound system of justice, on the neces-
sity of which Sir Edward Malet insisted in 1883 ?
In a sense, this question may unhesitatingly be
answered in the affirmative. The system, which
I do not doubt Sir Edward Malet wished to advo-
cate, was one under which law-courts should be
placed in a position to protect the most humble
individual of the community against the caprices
of his ruler and of the Government agents, of
whose malpractices Sir Edward Malet had been a
scandalised witness. Law-courts possessing both
the power and the will to attain this object have
been created. Not only are the judges indepen-
dent of the Government, but they are in the
highest degree sensitive of any words or deeds
calculated to call their independence in question.
Justice is no longer bought and sold. It may be
dilatory, and, as in other countries, it may occasion-
ally err. It may perhaps be that, where racial or
religious feelings are evoked, some
—
probably un-
conscious—bias may be discerned. But no more
grave accusation than this can be brought against
the Egyptian law courts. So early as March 9,
1893, I was able to write to Lord Rosebery : '*It
can now be said that justice in Egypt is adminis-
tered on fixed princi})les and, with occasional
exceptions, the decisions are just." The fact that
no more than ten years after the British occupa-
tion commenced a statement of this sort could be
recorded reflects great credit, not only on the
Ministers and their Judicial Advisers, who have
guided the work of reform in this Department,
but also on the European and Egyptian judges
and other officials who have co-operated with them.
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The Anglo-Saxon race have broad shoulders. They
may well pardon a little pedantry, as well as the
Anglophobia which the Egyptian judges have at
times displayed, and which is to a great extent the
result of ignorance and misguidance, if, in dealing
with the litigious affairs of their own countrymen,
their " decisions are just."
The protection of the weak against the strong
is, however, not the sole function of justice. It
should also be able to protect society against evil-
doers. That this protection has, of late years,
been inadequate in Egypt, can scarcely be doubted.
It is easy to indicate the main reason for this
state of things. On the one hand, civilisation
insists on the cardinal principle that no man is to
be punished for any offence unless he is clearly
proved to have committed it. On the other hand,
the peculiar conditions of Egyptian society render
it often a matter of extreme difficulty to obtain
evidence of guilt sufficient to warrant a conviction.
In the last report which I wrote from Egypt
before tendering tlie resignation of my appoint-
ment, I made the following remarks, to which I
have nothing to add :
—
" I have no hesitation in stating that the increase
of crime, to which I have frequently alluded in
former Reports, is the most unsatisfactory feature
in the whole Egyptian situation. The Govern-
ment are frequently being pressed to examine into
the causes which have led to the increase, and to
look to the removal of those causes, rather tlian
to the punishment of the offenders, as the true
remedy for the existing state of affairs. As a
matter of general principle, I entirely agree tliat
when, in any country, it is found that the number
of crimes is increasing', it is most necessarv to
inquire into the cause, but the possibility of apply-
ing any remedy other than that of punishment
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must obviously depend upon the nature of the
cause when once it has been ascertained. It gener-
ally happens that increasing poverty is the parent
of increasing crime. No one with the least know-
ledge of the country will think that the recent in-
crease of crime in Egypt is due to poverty. There
must be some other cause, and, in my opinion,
it is not far to seek. It is, I think, to be found in
the fact that the law does not inspire sufficient
terror to evildoers. Only 43*5 per cent of the
crimes committed last year (1906) were punished.
In the remaining 56'5 per cent, it was found im-
possible to discover the criminals, or, if they were
discovered, to prove their guilt. I was talking a
short time ago to a distinguished Frenchman who
was well acquainted with the affiiirs of Algeria.
He explained to me that certain districts lying in
the Algerian Hinterland, where military law used
to be applied, had recently been brought under the
ordinary criminal codes. The comment of one of
the principal Algerian Sheikhs on this change was
curious. 'Then,' he said, * there will be no justice.
Witnesses will be required.' I commend this
remark to those who are in a hurry to apply
Western methods in their entirety to a backward
Eastern population. The Sheikh was not in the
least struck with the fact that, in the absence
of witnesses, an innocent man might possibly be
condemned. What struck him was that, as no
one could be condemned without witnesses, guilty
people would generally escape punishment. This
is precisely what is happening in Egypt. I have
said over and over again, and I now repeat, that
I strongly deprecate any resort to heroic remedies
in dealing witli this question. There must be no
radical change of system. But there should be
no delusion as to the time which will be required,
or the difficulties which have still to be encoun-
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tered, before a well-established reign of law can
take the place of the arbitrary system under which,
until recently, the Egyptians were governed. In
the meanwhile, let us by all means do everything
that is possible, not merely to improve the Police
and the judicial systems, but also, by indirect
means, such as education and the establishment
of adult reformatories, to diminish crime and check
criminal tendencies. But, simultaneously with all
this, I trust that criminals will receive adequate
punishment when their guilt has been brought
home to them. I deprecate the false sentiment
which expends all its sympathy on the criminal
and reserves none for his victims. I at times
observe symptoms which lead me to believe that
this sentiment prevails to a somewhat excessive
degree in Egypt" ^
» Egypt, No. 1 of 1907, p. 86.
CHAPTER LIX
EDUCATION
Eiducational policy—Obstacles to progress—Want of money—^Th©
Pashas—Intellectual awakening of Egypt—The Mosque schools
—
Primary and Secondary education—Progress made in forming the
characters of the Egyptians—Female education.
The subjects which have so far been treated fall
within the domain of material or administrative
progress. What, however, has been done in the
direction of moral and intellectual progress ? Have
the English made any endeavour to educate the
Egyptians ? " Egypt," a high authority on Eastern
affairs has said, "has always been the servant of
nations."^ Have the English, as some critics of
the baser sort aver, viewed this condition of politi-
cal degradation with ill-disouised favour ? ^ Have
they discouraged the acquisition of knowledge,
with a view to keeping the Egyptians in a position
of servitude to the British nation ? Or has a more
noble policy been adopted ? Have the English, cast-
ing aside all feelings based on a mistaken and ignoble
egotism, endeavoured to educate the Egyptians
and to lead them, so far as was possible, along the
path which may possibly end in self-government ?
1 Muir, The Caliphate, p. 1G8.
2 It was not only with surprise, but also with a feeling of keen dis-
appointment, that I read in a work written by M. de Guerville a letter
from Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, in which that eminent man appeared to
give the weight of his name to iiisinuatiou.s of tliis sort. He must have
known perfectly well that they were wholly devoid of foundation. I
had hoped for better things of him.
.
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In the present chapter an attempt will be made
to answer these questions. They are of vital im-
portance, not only to the Egyptians themselves,
but also to all Europe, and more especially to
England. The reason why they are so important
is that if ever the Egyptians learn to govern
themselves— if, in other words, the full execu-
tion of the policy of " Egypt for the Egyptians
"
becomes feasible—the Egyptian question will, it
may be hoped and presumed, finally cease to be a
cause of trouble to Europe, and the British nation
will be relieved of an onerous responsibility.
Many years ago. Lord Macaulay asked a perti-
nent question in connection with the system under
which India should be governed. "Are we," he
said, *'to keep the people of India ignorant in order
that we may keep them submissive ? " His reply
was an indignant negative. " Governments, like
men," he said, "may buy existence too dear. Propter
vitam Vivendi perdere caicsas is a despicable policy
both in individuals and in States."^
The English in Egypt have acted on the prin-
ciple advocated by Macaulay. They may repel,
with equal truth and scorn, the insinuation that,
for political reasons, they have fostered Egyptian
ignorance and subserviency. If a race of Egyptians
capable of governing the country without foreign
aid has not as yet been formed, the fault does not
lie with the English. It must be sought elsewhere,
neither need any impartial person go far afield to
find where it lies. It lies mainly in the fact that
two decades are but a short time in the life of a
nation. Material progress may, under certain con-
ditions, be rapid. Moral and intellectual progress
must of necessity always be a plant of slow growth.
It takes more time to form the mind of a states-
man, or even to train a competent administrator,
* Speech in the Flouse of Commons^ July 10, 1833.
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than it does to dig a canal or to construct a rail-
way. Wlien the unpromising nature of the raw
material on which the English had to work is con-
sidered, when it is remembered that for centuries
prior to the British occupation the Egyptians
were governed under a system eminently calcu-
lated to paralyse their intellectual and warp their
moral faculties, and when it is further borne in
mind that the circumstances under which reform
was undertaken were of an exceptionally difficult
and complicated nature, it may well be a matter
for surprise, not tliat so little, but that so much
progress in the direction of a real Egyptian
autonomy has been made in so short a time.
Consider what is generally meant by Europeans
when they talk of Egyptian self-government. If
they meant that the Egyptians should be allowed
to o;overn themselves accordin^T to their own rude
lights, the task of educating them in the art of
self-government would not merely have been easy
;
there would have been no necessity that it should
have been undertaken. The indigenous art of self-
government had already been acquired in 1882,
and we know with what results ; no European
instruction would have been able to improve on its
recognised canons. What Europeans mean when
they talk of Egyptian self-government is that the
Egyptians, far from being allowed to follow^ the
bent of tlieir own unreformed propensities, should
only be permitted to govern themselves after the
fashion in which Europeans think they ought to be
governed.
I am not one of those who think that "any
State can be saved, and any political problem
solved, by enlightened administration."^ At the
* This was the view held by Pereo:rino Rossi, who was subsequently
assassinated, during the early strue:gles for Italian unity.—Trevelyan'i
Garibaldi's D^ence of the Roman Republic, p. 74.
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same time, looking to the magnitude of all the
interests involved in Egypt, there is a limit to the
defjree of maladministration which can be tolerated
in order to ensure all the advantao-es of self-(yovern-
ment. It cannot be doubted that that limit would
be passed, if complete autonomy were suddenly
bestowed on the Egyptians.
To suppose that the characters and intellects of
even a small number of Egyptians can in a few
years be trained to such an extent as to admit of
their undertaking the sole direction of one of the
most complicated political and administrative
machines which the world has ever known, and
of guiding such a machine along the path of even
fairly good government, is a sheer absurdity. I
must apologise to those of my readers who have
any real acquaintance with Egyptian affairs for
indulging in platitudes of this description. If I
do so, it is because it would appear that the race
of those who dream dreams of real autonomy in
the very near future is not yet extinct.
The main reason why it is hopeless to expect
that any immediate and important political fruit
can be gathered from the tree of educational
progress in Egypt has been already indicated. It
is now necessary to explain the further obstacles
which have stood in the way of rapid progress in
the work of education. They were mainly twofold.
The first and principal obstacle has been want of
money. In 1877 and 1878—that is to say, during
the worst periods of the financial chaos created by
Ismail Pasha— the Government expenditure on
education only amounted to the paltry sum of
£E.29,000 a year. Under the Dual Control, the
grant was raised to about £E.70,000 a year.
During the eazly days of the British occupation,
that is to say, whilst the issue of the "Race
against Bankruptcy" was still doubtful, the
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utmost economy had to be practised ; and even
when the race was won, it was felt that, however
necessary it might be to provide schools for
Egyptian children, it was still more necessary
to limit the excessive demands which the tax-
gatherer had heretofore made on their parents.
Fiscal relief, therefore, took precedence of every-
thing. It was not until 1890 that the Financial
Department found itself in a position to increase
the sum of money spent by the State on education
to £E.81,000. Since then, it has been steadily
increasing in amount.^ It would long since have
been largely increased had not internationalism,
by depriving the Egyptian Government of the
free use of their own resources, barred the way.
Want of money, therefore, was the first obstacle
in the way of rapid progress. The idiosyncrasies
of Pashadom constituted the second. It was not
that the Pashas did not wish to advance the cause
of education in Egypt. Far from it. JNIany of
them yearned— and very naturally and rightly
yearned—for educational progress. They recog-
nised that the acquisition of knowledge was the
sole instrument by the use of which Egypt might
perhaps eventually be freed from foreign control.
But they were themselves too ignorant of educa-
tional administration to be able to initiate the only
measures which would have satisfied their very
legitimate yearnings. The execution of their own
policy was perpetually leading them to conclusions
which their prejudices forced them to reject The
natural result ensued. The policy of Pashadom
was a mass of inconsistencies. INIoreover, the
* £E.305,000 was expended on education in 1906. The provision made
in the estimates for 1907 amounted to £'E.374,000, and this amount haa
been increased to £E. 450,450 in tlie estimates for 1908. These figures
represent only "ordinary" expenditure. They do not include the
8[)ecial credits for the construction and maiuteuauce of school build'
ings.
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evil effects of those inconsistencies were enhanced
by the fact that, at every turn of the wheel of
nepotism, some fresh individual was, during the
early years of the occupation, appointed to direct
the affairs of the Department of Public Instruc-
tion. "The frequent changes in educational policy
during past years," I wrote in 1892, " have proved
a great obstacle to educational progress in Egypt.
During the past twenty-nine years, the Minister
(or Director- General) of Public Instruction has
been changed twenty-nine times. At each change,
the schools have for a time been more or
less completely upset and demoralised, as it has
been the prevailing tendency of the Minister to
reverse the administrative methods of his pre-
decessor."
At one moment, recourse has been had to the
usual remedy of the Egyptian reformer. A ser-
vile copy was made of some foreign institution.
"On s'etait content^," says Yacoub Artin Pasha,
who is by far the highest Egyptian authority on
educational matters in Egypt, " de copier les
programmes des ecoles de France, et sans se
donner la peine de chercher a les modifier selon
les besoins du pays et de notre culture future."^
At the next moment, the undisciplined mind of
the old-fashioned Pasha, with characteristic want
of moderation, would spring at a bound to the
opposite extreme of anti-European sentiment. He
might own that European knowledge was good,
but he refused to accept the inevitable conclusion
that, at all events until a capable staff of Egyptian
teachers had been trained, Europeans alone could
impart it. Sciences cannot be learnt save in those
languages which possess a scientific literature and
vocabulary. Yet the Pasha, under the infiuence
of prejudices which his powers of reasoning were
* Considerations sur I'Instruction Publique en Egypte, p. 116.
VOL. II 2 M
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too feeble to stem, declared that a science which
could not be taught in Arabic, should not be
taught at all. There was one thing which the
Pasha could do, and which, in fact, he did. He
could multiply schools and scholars without any
regard to the qualifications of the professors, to
the value of the instruction imparted, or to the
schoolroom accommodation which was available.
He could thus practise his favourite art of self-
deception. He could give statistical proof that he
was moving rapidly forward, whilst all the time
he was in reality stationary, if, indeed, his move-
ments were not retrograde. On the whole, it may be
said that one of the chief obstacles to the adoption
of an enlightened educational policy in Egypt in
the early days of the occupation was the presence
of a few leading Pashas who, in theory at all
events, favoured educational progress. There can
be no doubt that, if the English had from the first
had a free hand in this matter, greater progress
would have been made than has actually been the
case.
From one point of view, however, the English
took in hand the work of educating the Egyptians at
a propitious moment. Almost simultaneously with
the occurrence of the British occupation, the country
underwent an intellectual awakening. The people
of Egypt had, in fact, slumbered since the days of
Mehemet Ali. One of the most singular traits in
that remarkable man's character was that, although
he was himself uneducated, although he could never
write, and did not learn to read till he was forty-
seven years old, and then imperfectly, he placed a
high value on European knowledge.^ He establislied
schools in the towns and large villages. JNIehemet
Ali was, however, in some respects, in advance of
* See M. de Lesseps' remarks to Mr. .Senior, Conversations, etc.,
p. 129.
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his time. "Knowledge was then so unpopular
that mothers bhnded their children to keep them
from school."^ JNIore than half a century later,
the population generally appreciated the value of
education almost as little as they did in the days
of Mehemet Ali. Writing in 1894, Yacoub Artin
Pasha said :
—
" II n'y a pas une dizaine d'ann^es que le public
en general, non seulement ne s'int^ressait pas k
I'instruction de ses enfants, main encore y ^tait
oppose, quoique dans une moindre mesure qu'il y a
soixante ans."
It is not to be supposed that the Egyptians
were suddenly inspired with a thirst for know-
ledge for its own sake, or that they awoke to a
keen sense of shame at their own ignorance. The
new spirit was, at all events in the first instance,
rather to be attributed to the fact that, in a country
where a large section of the upper and middle
classes of society depends on Government employ-
ment, parents suddenly realised that, unless their
children were sent to school, they would probably
not be able to gain their livelihood. Contact with
the West, the partial Europeanisation of the ad-
ministrative services, and the emulation inspired
by the presence of European, Levantine, and
Syrian competitors, produced, therefore, at least
one beneficial result.
But whatever be the cause, there can be no
doubt of the fact. The best test of whether the
Egyptians really desire to be educated is to ascer-
tain whether they are prepared to pay for education.
On this point, the evidence is conclusive. In the
early days of the British occupation, nearly all
the pupils who attended the Government schools
were taught gratuitously. Before many years had
* See M. de Lesseps* remarks to Mr. Senior, Conversations, etc.
p. 130.
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passed, by far the greater proportion paid for their
instruction.^
In 1889, I visited many remote vilhiges of
Upper Egypt in which the face of a European
is rarely seen. No request was more frequently
made to me than that I should urge the Govern-
ment to establish a school in the village. "De
differents cotes," Yacoub Artin Pasha wrote at
about this period, " on demande des ecoles, et la ou
il en existe deja on demande quelquefois leur de-
veloppement, sans se rendre bien compte, il est
vrai, de ce que Ton demande." The Egyptians
have, in fact, made one great step forward in the
race for a national existence. They have learnt
that they are ignorant. They wish to be taught.
It is now necessary to explain what measures
were adopted for teaching them.
'* The chief aim and object of education in
Islam," JNlr. Hughes says, "is to obtain a know-
ledge of the religion of Mohammed, and anything
beyond this is considered superfluous and even
dangerous."^ Under these circumstances, it was
clear to the British reformer that the education
imparted at the famous University of El-Azhar
could not be utilised to raise the general standard
of education in Egypt He, therefore, left that
institution alone.
The El-Azhar University stands at the summit
* The policy which has of late years been pursued in connection
with the matter to which allusion is here made, has been vigorously
attacked. The grounds on which, as it appears to me, it may be
successfully defended are stated at some length in Egypt, No. 1 of 1006,
pp. 82-81).
In this work, I have merely endeavoured to give a general sketch
of the progress which has been made in the various brandies of the
administration. It would lead me to too great length were 1 to
attempt to answer all tlie criticisms wliich have, from time to time,
been made on the working of tlie various Departments. 'Ihis remark
applies with special force to the work of the Department of Public
Instruction. It has formed the subject of a great deal of yery unjust
animadversion.
* Hughes's Dictionary of Islam, p. 106.
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of the purely Moslem educational system of Eg}'pt.
The village schools (Kuttabs), which are attached
to most of the JNIosques in the country, stand at
the base of that system. As regards the quality
of the instruction afforded in these schools, JMr.
Hughes makes the following remarks :
—
"The child who attends these seminaries 'is first
taught his alphabet, which he learns from a small
board on which the letters are written by the
teacher. He then becomes acquainted with the
numerical value of each letter. After this, he
learns to write down the ninety-nine names of
God, and other simple words taken from the
Koran. When he has mastered the spelling of
words, he proceeds to learn the first chapter of
the Koran, then the last chapter, and gradually
reads through the whole Koran in Arabic, which
he usually does without understanding a word of it.
Having finished the Koran, which is considered
an incumbent religious duty, the pupil is instructed
in the elements of grammar, and perhaps a few
simple rules of arithmetic. . . . The ordinary school-
master is generally a man of little learning."
It would be an exaggeration to say that these
Mosque schools are absolutely useless. Through
their instrumentality, a certain number of children
are taught to read and write. Organised as they
were at the time the British occupation com-
menced, they were, however, as nearly useless as
any educational establishments could be. Want
of funds at first stood in the way of any attempt
to reform them, but about 1897 the matter was
taken in hand. A reasonable curriculum, based
on the teaching of the three Il's, was adopted.
The teaching of any foreign language was
rigorously excluded. Since 1898, the number of
village schools under Government supervision has
increased year by year.
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In 1906, 4554 village schools were either directly
under Government control or under departmental
inspection for grants-in-aid. They gave instruction
to 165,000 pupils, of whom nearly 13,000 were girls.
It is on every ground of the highest importance
that a sustained effort should be made to place
elementary education in Egypt on a sound footing.
The schoolmaster is abroad in the land. We may
wish him well, but no one who is interested in the
future of the country should blind himself to the
fact that his successful advance carries with it
certain unavoidable disadvantages. The process
of manufacturing demagogues has, in fact, not
only already begun, but may be said to be well
advanced. The intellectual phase through which
India is now passing stands before the world as
a warning that it is unwise, even if it be not
dangerous, to create too wide a gap between the
state of education of the higher and of the lower
classes in an Oriental country governed under
the inspiration of a Western democracy. High
education cannot and ought not to be checked or
discouraged. The policy advocated by Macaulay
is sound. Moreover, it is the only policy worthy
of a civilised nation. But if it is to be carried
out without danger to the State, the ignorance
of the masses should be tempered paii passu
with the intellectual advance of those who are
destined to be their leaders. It is neither wise nor
just that the people should be left intellectually
defenceless in the presence of the hare-brahied and
empirical projects which the political charlatan,
himself but half-educated, will not fail to pour
into their credulous ears. In this early part of
the twentieth century, there is no possible general
remedy agahist the demagogue except that which
consists in educating those who are his natural prey
to such an extent that they may, at all events.
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have some chance of discerning the imposture
which but too often lurks beneath his perfervid
eloquence and political quackery.
Considerations of space render it necessary that
I should abstain—albeit somewhat reluctantly
—
from giving a description of the progress made
of late years in Egypt in the direction of Primary
and Secondary education. For the same reason,
I do not deal with the very important question
of Technical education.^ I must, therefore, confine
myself to stating the bald fact that, in 1906, 505
educational establishments, exclusive of village
schools, existed in the country. These gave
employment to 4341 teachers, and instruction to
about 92,000 pupils, of whom about 20,000 were
girls. Under the enlightened administration of
the present Minister, Saad Pasha Zagloul, and
of his Adviser, Mr. Dunlop, education of every
description is making rapid strides in advance.
It cannot be doubted that the quality of the
instruction afforded at the Government schools
has of late years been greatly improved. The
skilful methods and direct personal influence of the
* Very full explanations have been given on all these subjects in
my successive Annual Reports.
The following remarks made by Mr. Lecky {Democracy and Liberty,
vol. ii. p. 6) apply, with great force, to the Egyptian educational system :
"The great mistake in the education of the poor has in general been
that it has been too largely and too ambitiously literary. Primary
education should . . . teach the poor to write well and to count well
;
but, for the rest, it should be much more technical and industrial than
literary, and should be more concerned with the observation of facts
than with any form of speculative reasoning or opinions. There is
much evidence to support the conclusion that the kinds of popular
education which have proved morally, as well as intellectually, the
most beneficial have been those in which a very moderate amount of
purely mental instruction has been combined with physical or industrial
training."
In a very interesting article published in the Edinburgh Review
for October 1907, and entitled "Signs of the Times in India," tho
disastrous results which have ensued from unduly encouraging a purely
literary education in that country to the neglect of scientific and
technical training are very clearly indicated.
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new European teachers, wlio have been introduced
into the Department of Education, have been
steadily raishig the general level of the schools,
in spite of the numerous obstacles encountered.
W^hilst there has been an increasingly strict super-
vision of the teaching of Arabic and the Koran,
the study of European languages has been placed
on a new basis. Previously, pupils were allowed
to waste their time and addle their brains by
attem])ting the study of an impossible number of
languages. It was a great step in advance when
the time-honoured methods adopted in Egypt of
loading the memory without exercising the mind
were abandoned. English and French are now
no longer merely treated as additional subjects of
linguistic study. Either of these languages is
used as the medium of instruction in certain
subjects, such as history, science, etc. In course
of time, as the number of highly trained Egyptian
teachers increases, instruction will, without doubt,
be given in Arabic to a much greater extent than
heretofore.^
From the political point of view, the most
important educational question is this : Do the
educated Egyptians, whose number is now rapidly
increasing, possess the qualities and characteristics
of potentially self-governing Egyptians ? To put
the same question in another way, if we speak of
education in the broadest sense of the term—that
is to say, if we include the formation, not only of the
intellect, but also of the character—if, in a word,
^ That the absence of an adequate staff of trained E^ryptian teachers
has greatly retarded the progress of education both in Kgypt and in tlie
Soudan cannot be doubted. In my Annual Reports, I have frequently
alluded to this imi)ortaiit subject. The cause has been the same as
tliat which has operated in other Departments of the State, viz. want
of money. It is only since tlie Anglo-French Convention was signed
that it has bec-ome possible to take seriously in hand the question of
rendering the profession of teaching attractive by iuci'easiug the
salaries of the teachers.
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we comprise all those manifold mental and moral
influences which tend towards pre])ari!ig a boy or
girl for a career of usefulness in after life, has any
substantial progress been made ?
It is obviously impossible to give more than a
conjectural answer to this question. Nevertheless,
although no positive proof can be adduced that
such an opinion is correct, it may be stated with a
fair amount of confidence that something has been
done towards forming and elevating the characters
of the Egyptians. The mere acquisition of the
linguistic knowledge, which has enabled a certain
number of young Egyptians to study the literature
and sciences of Europe, must surely have tended
in some degree to engender that accurate habit of
thought which is the main characteristic of the
Western as opposed to the Eastern mind ; whilst it
is difficult to believe that constant contact with a
number of high-minded Europeans, the example
afforded by the elevated standard of thought from
which all social and administrative questions have
for some years past been approached, the aboli-
tion of barbarous punishments, the suppression of
forced labour and of torture, the introduction of
the new ideas that the rights of property are
sacred and that all men are equal in the eyes of the
law, the practical abolition of slavery, the dis-
couragement of nepotism, the stigma attached to
the worst kinds of vice, and, generally, the fact that
the Egyptian social and political atmosphere has
for some years been heavily charged with ideas
which should act as antidotes against moral
degradation—have not in some degree contributed
to a partial assimilation of the best European code
of morals, in spite of the adverse intluence exercised
by the immoral or dishonest acts of individual
Europeans. Whilst, however, it may reasonably
be held that something has been done in the
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direction of imparting rectitude, virility, and moral
equipoise to the Egyptian character, it must be
admitted that there is still abundant room for
improvement in all these directions. If the moral
influences to which the Egyptians are now exposed
were withdrawn, or even weakened, a relapse would
inevitably ensue.
Let any one who is inclined to take a sanguine
view of this subject cast, for a moment, all details
aside, and consider the general nature ofthe problem
which presents itself for solution. It is nothing
less than this, that the new generation of Egyptians
has to be persuaded or forced into imbibing the
true spirit of Western civilisation. Although
Europe was Christianised first and civilised after-
wards, it may perhaps be argued with some degree
of plausibility—more especially with the example
of Japan before us—that the post hoc ergo propter
hoc fallacy would be involved if it were held that
Christianity is the necessary handmaid of European
civilisation, and that it is impossible to assimilate
the true spirit of that civilisation without adopting
the Christian faith. I am insufficiently acquainted
with the state of Japan to draw any precise
inferences from its recent history. I confine
myself, therefore, to arguments derived from facts
and subjects which have come under my personal
observation, merely observing that both the religion
and the social system of Buddhism, and, I believe,
of Shintoism, present greater possibilities for the
assimilation of exotic secular ideas and forms of
government than any which can be claimed for
rigid Islamism. Looking then solely to the
possibility of reforming those countries which have
adopted the faith of Islam, it may be asked
whether any one can conceive the existence of
true European civilisation on the assumption that
the position which women occupy in Europe is
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abstracted from the general plan ? As well can
a man blind from his birth be made to conceive
the existence of colour. Change the position of
women, and one of the main pillars, not only of
European civilisation, but at all events of the
moral code based on the Christian religion, if not
of Christianity itself, falls to the ground. The
position of women in Egypt, and in Mohammedan
countries generally, is, therefore, a fatal obstacle
to the attainment of that elevation of thought and
character which should accompany the introduction
of European civilisation, if that civilisation is to
produce its full measure of beneficial effect.
The obvious remedy would appear to be to
educate the women. The remarkable and con-
tinuous progress of female education in Egypt
within the last few years marks, in fact, very clearly
the changes of custom and alteration of ideas which
are taking place in the country. When the first
efforts to promote female education were made,
they met with little sympathy from the population
in general. When, many years ago, this matter
was first taken in hand, Yacoub Pasha Artin was
the only Egyptian who took the least interest in it.
More than this, most of the upper-class Egyptians
were not merely indifferent to female education
;
they were absolutely opposed to it. They did not
want the women to be educated. Even when girls'
schools were, with much difficulty, established,
parents, in the first instance, sent their daughters
to school reluctantly, and took them away early.
In order to encourage the education of girls, it was
necessary to admit a large number of free pupils.
Most of these came from the poorer classes, and
left early, either to be married or because it was
thought unbecoming for a girl to attend school
after she had passed the earliest years of childliood.
All this has now been changed. The reluctance of
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parents to send their daughters to school has been
largely overcome. Free education in the Govern-
ment Primary Schools has been practically
abrlished. Demands are frequently made for the
estabhshment of other schools in different parts of
the country. The number of private schools for
girls has also greatly increased of late years.
Further, it is to be observed that the steady output
of boys from the Secondary Schools and Higher
Colleges has indirectly stimulated the movement
in favour of female education. The younger
generation are beginning to demand that their
wives should possess some qualifications other than
those which can be secured in the seclusion of the
harem. The interaction of the two branches of
education does not stop here, for not only has the
growth of education among boys stimulated the
desire for instruction to girls, but it has also tended
to improve the quality of the education given
to girls by prolonging the period of instruction.
There appears good reason for supposing that,
where education has made progress, the age of
marriage has risen, and that, in consequence, the
girls are allowed to remain longer than heretofore
at school. The prospects of the future are, there-
fore, distinctly bright in connection with this all-
important question.
It, of course, remains an open question whether,
when the Egyptian women are educated, they will
exercise a healthy and elevating influence over the
men. The few INIoslem women hi Egypt who have,
up to the present time, received a European educa-
tion are, with some very rare exceptions, strictly
secluded. It is difficult, therefore, to form any
matured opinion as to the results so far obtained.
In Christian Europe, the religious faith of
women is generally stronger than that of men.
The woman feels and trusts, the man reasons.
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The faith of ^loslem women, on the other hand,
is probably rather less strong than that of Moslem
men. Neither need this be any matter for
surprise. It is not merely due to the curious
impulse which appears almost invariably to drive
the East and the West in opposite directions.
It is a consequence of the fundamental differ-
ences which separate Christianity from Islamism.
Although it is an error to suppose that Mohammed's
general plan did not involve a future life for
women/ there can be no doubt that not only did
he, by precept and example, relegate women to a
position in this world inferior to that of men, but
also that the religion which he founded is euiinently
one conceived by the genius of a man and intended
for men. It is, therefore, natural that women
should generally be less fervent Moslems than men.
But the Moslem woman is, after all, a woman
first and a Moslem afterwards. She would belie
her sex if she were not impulsive and inclined, even
more than the men, to run to extremes. Although,
therefore, the faith of the INIoslem woman may
perhaps be comparatively weak, her prejudices in
respect to all the customs and habits of thought
which cluster round Islamism are as strong as,
if not stronger than those of the men. A
Europeanised Egyptian man usually becomes an
Agnostic, and often assimilates many of the least
worthy portions of European civilisation. Is
there any reason why European education should
not produce the same effect on the Eurojiennised
Egyptian woman ? I know of none. Indeed, in
so far as the Agnosticism is concerned, the woman,
on the assumption that her faith is relatively luke-
warm, would probably find less difficulty than the
^ Surah III,, verse 193, r.ml Surah IV., verse 123, of the Koran are
conclusive as to Mohammed's teacliing' on this subject. Tliere can he
no doubt that all devout Moslems believe that a future life is resej\ ed
for women.
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man in shaking herself free from the ideas and
associations which have surrounded her from her
cradle.
It would obviously be neither safe nor just
to draw any general conclusion in connection
with this subject from such a limited number of
facts and examples as can at present be adduced.
If it be once admitted that no good moral results
will accrue from female education in Egypt,
then, indeed, the reformer may well despair of
the cause of Egyptian education generally in the
highest sense of the word. The experiment of
female education should certainly be continued
with vigour. Few people now living can hope to
see its results. All that can at present be said is
that those results must necessarily be uncertain.
But whatever they may eventually be, this much
is well-nigh certain—that the European reformer
may mstruct, he may explain, he may argue, he
may devise the most ingenious methods for the
moral and material development of the people,
he may use his best endeavours to "cut blocks
with a razor" and to graft true civilisation on
a society which is but just emerging from
barbarism, but unless he proves himself able, not
only to educate, but to elevate the Egyptian
woman, he will never succeed in affording to the
Egyptian man, in any thorough degree, the only
European education which is worthy of Europe.
What the Egyptian man most requires is the
acquisition of all those qualities comprised in the
expressive Greek term alSax;— poorly translated
by the English word "self-respect"—and those
qualities he can never fully acquire unless, like the
Christian European, he becomes monogamous, and
thus learns to honour the one woman whom he will
also have sworn to love and to cherish until the
hand of death parts him from his life-long helpmate.
CHAPTER LX
THE SOUDAN
Tfce nature of the Soudan problem—Extent—Population—Results
obtained by the Convention of 1899—Executive agency—Finance
—Railways—Slavery.
Having dealt with the affairs of Egypt, I now
propose to give a very brief sketch of the progress
of administrative reform in the Soudan.^
The problems with which the Government has
to deal in the Soudan are not only very different,
but also, for the time being, far more simple than
those which await solution in Egypt. This latter
country has advanced half-way
—
perhaps many
would think more than half-way—on the road
towards Western civilisation. It has certainly
passed beyond the stage in which the undivided
attention of the reformer may be devoted to
financial and administrative questions. It has
entered on a phase where, unless I am much mis-
taken, it will year by year become more apparent
to all but very superficial observers that the further
adaptation and effective assimilation of Western
ideas is quite as much a social as a political or
administrative question. The really vital issues
which the future has reserved for Egypt are not
how exotic political institutions can be forced to
take root in a soil which is uncongenial to their
* Most of the remarks contained in this chapter have already
appeared in my Annual Reports from the year 1890 onwards.
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JTowth, but how the relations of the sexes can be
brought into conformity with modern ideas, how
the moral code on which the laws of all civilised
countries are based can be made to penetrate into
the daily life and manners and customs of the
people, and how, without shattering all that is
worthy and noble in the Moslem religion, the
quasi-religious institutions of the country can be
reformed to such an extent as no longer to con-
stitute an insuperable barrier to progress. The
Government have sometimes been accused of
moving too slowly in Egypt. Does any one who
has reflected on the problems which I have briefly
indicated above, and who really understands the
facts connected with them, consider it possible
that they can be solved with rapidity ? If so, he
must be imbued with an optimism which I am
unable to share. Nevertheless, until they are
solved, the aspirations of the irresponsible advocate
of reforms must always be tinged with a certain
degree of unreality, whilst some disappointment
must inevitably await the well-intentioned efforts
of the responsible man of action.
The case of the Soudan is, for the present, wholly
different. Even the most advanced portions of that
country are still in a very backward condition. For
at least a generation to come, no complex question
of how Western methods may best be adapted to
Eastern minds will probably arise. Political issues
are few in number and relatively simple in character.
The most important, probably, is how slavery may
be completely abolished without causing serious
disorder. The rise and fall of some religious im-
postor may cause some temporary trouble, but the
methods for dealing with cases of this sort com-
mand the assent alike of Westerns and of educated
Orientals. Any danger from religious fanaticism
may be mitigated, and perhaps altogether averted,
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by imposing some reasonable and salutary checks
on the freedom of action of missionary bodies.
Whatever may be the case in Egypt, there can be
no question that what the Soudanese now most of
all require is, not national government, but good
government. Hence, Sir Reginald Wingate and
his very capable staff will be able for the present
to devote their entire attention to overcoming the
physical difficulties with which they have to deal,
and to the introduction of administrative, judicial,
and financial measures suitable to the requirements
of the primitive society whose interests are entrusted
to their care.
The Anglo-Egyptian Soudan covers an area of
950,000 square miles. By far the greater portion
of this large territory consists of what the late
Lord Salisbury once termed "light sandy soil."
The area under cultivation has been steadily in-
creasing of late years. Nevertheless, at the close
of 1906, only about 1576 square miles were culti-
vated. The remainder consisted of desert, swamp,
and primeeval forest.
The researches made by Sir Reginald Wingate
into the past and present population of the Soudan,
bring into strong relief the terrible results which
ensued from Dervish misrule. It is estimated that,
prior to the establishment of the Mahdi's power,
the population of the Soudan was about S^ millions,
that of these about 3J millions were swept away
by famine^ and by disease, notably by small-pox, and
that S^ millions were killed either in the engage-
ments with the British and Egyptian troops, or in
inter-tribal wars. The latter of these two causes
accounted for by far the greater portion ot the
terrible mortality in warfare. Several tribes
opposed to the Baggara, who constituted the
* The Dervish soldiery used to rob the inhabitants of their grain
reserves, with the result that large numbers died of starvation.
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mainstay of the Dervish power, were well-nigh
obliterated. These figures, Sir Reginald Wingate
remarked, "seem almost incredible." Nevertheless,
he considered them substantially correct. He
cited a fact, which came under his personal
observation, in support of their correctness. Prior
to 1882, the district lying along the banks of the
rivers Rahad and Dinder contained upwards of
800 villages. When Sir Reginald Wingate visited
this district in 1902, "not a village remained." In
an official report prepared on the Berber district
towards the close of 1903, it was stated that
"villages, which used to produce 500 fighting men,
have now only fifty to sixty adults, and in some
cases even less." My personal experience is of
a nature to confirm this testimony. Shortly after
the battle of Omdurman, I visited INIetemmeh, a
town formerly inhabited by the Jaalin, and situated
on the Nile between Berber and Khartoum. It
was clear from the buildings which remained that
it had formerly contained a large population. At
the time of my visit, the inhabitants numbered
about 1300, of whom all but 150 were women and
children. The men had almost all been killed by
the Dervishes.
During the last few years, the population has
been increasing, but it is probable that it does not
now exceed two millions.
The Convention between the British and
Egyptian Governments, signed on January 19,
1899, of which a general description has already
been given,^ may be termed the Constitutional
Charter of the Soudan. In spite of many anomalies,
which were mevitable under all the circumstances
of the case, it has conferred an immense boon,
both on the people of the Soudan, and on the
Egyptians, who, whatever some of them may at
* Vide ante, Chapter XXXllI.
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present think, are, and must always be deeply
interested in the development and good govern-
ment of that country. The Convention freed the
Soudan from the incubus of the Capitulations, and it
also obviated the very serious risks which would
certainly have been incurred had the adoption of a
highly civilised system of government been forced
prematurely on the country. I do not suppose
that the most ardent advocate, whether of inter-
nationalism or of equality of treatment to all
creeds and races, would seriously contend that it
would have been possible in practice to have
worked a system under which Kwat Wad
Awaibung, a Shillouk who murdered Ajak Wad
Deng because the latter bewitched his son, and
caused him to be eaten by a crocodile,^ would have
been tried by a procedure closely resembling that
followed at Paris or Berlin, which would have
necessitated a civil action brought by some chance
European, resident on the upper waters of the
Blue Nile, being tried by a body of Judges sitting
at Cairo or Alexandria, and which would not have
allowed the executive Government to close a
liquor shop belonging to a Greek subject at El-
Obeid or Mongalla without the presence of a
Consular janissary.
I need not describe in detail the executive
agency through which effect has been given to the
^ A Shillouk named Kwat Wad Awaibung' was tried on the char^j^e
of murdering Ajak Wad Deng. He pleaded guilty, and made the
following statement : " The murdered Ajak ^Vad Deng owed me a
sheep, but would not pay me. He said he would show me his work,
and next day my son was eaten by a crocodile, which was, of course,
the work of Ajak Wad Deng, and for that reason 1 killed him. We
had had a feud for years, as 1 was a more successful hippopotamus-
hunter than he was, and for that reason he was practising witchery
over me and my family." Mr. Bonham Carter, the Legal Secretary
of the Soudan Government, in reporting on this case, said : "The
accused's belief that the crocodile was acting as agent of the murdered
man in killing the accused's son was supported by several other
witnesses, and represents a common local belief."
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principles embodied in the Convention of 1899. I
content myself with saying tliat the country was,
in the first instance, divided into districts, each of
which was placed under the control of a military
officer. It would, however, be an entire mistake
to suppose that the country is under a military
government in the ordinary acceptation of that
term. The Government, in all its more important
features, is essentially civil, although the Governor-
General and many of his principal subordinates
are military officers. I have frequently rendered
testimony to the very valuable services performed by
these military officers. I need here only add that the
system of education adopted at our Public Schools
and INIilitary Colleges is of a nature to turn out a
number of young men who are admirable agents in
the execution of an Imperial policy. The German,
the Frenchman, and others may be, and sometimes
are better educated, but any defects on the score
of technical knowledge are amply compensated by
the governing powers, the willingness to assume
responsibility, and the versatility under strange
circumstances in which the Anglo-Saxon, trained
in the free atmosphere which develops individ-
ualism, excels beyond all other nations.
I know of only one disadvantage in employing
military officers, and that is, tl.at they are liable to
be removed for service elsewhere, more especially
in times of national emergency. A Civil service is,
therefore, being formed, composed of young men
taken from the British Universities. These will
gradually take the place of the military officers
now employed.
I do not propose to dwell on the progress
made in education, the establishment of a judicial
system, the preservation of forests, and other
administrative matters. Full details on these
subjects will be found in my Annual Reports.
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I confine my remarks to one or two points of
special importance.
Finance is, of course, ttie keystone of the
situation. It was felt from the first that in the
Soudan, as in Egypt, a sound financial position
was the source from which all other reforms and
improvements would have to flow. In the first
instance, the situation certainly did not look
promising. Those who had had most experience
of the country had declared that the Soudan was,
and was likely always to remain, a "useless
possession." The ravages committed by the
Dervishes deepened the sense of its inutility. The
population had, as I have already shown, been
more than decimated. Flocks and herds had been
destroyed. Date- trees, which constitute one of
the principal products of the country, had been
hewn down in large numbers. Neither life nor
property had, for many years, been secure. Under
these discouraging auspices, the Soudan revenue
for 1898 was estimated at the very modest figure
of £E.8000. As a matter of fact, a revenue of
£E. 35,000 was collected. The expenditure was
£E.235,000, thus leaving a deficit of £E. 200,000,
which had to be made good by the Egyptian
Treasury. Eight years later, in 1906, the revenue
was £E.804,000, and the net charge on the Egyptian
Treasury, exclusive of interest on 3^ millions
advanced for capital expenditure, amounted to
only about £E.30,000. Inclusive of interest at the
rate of 3 per cent on the capital advanced, the
charge which had to be borne by the Egyptian
Treasury, in 1906, was only £E. 130,000.' The
amount is trifling in comparison to the unquestion-
able advantages derived by Egypt from the mainten-
ance of a settled government in the Soudan, and
1 From January 1, 1908, the Soudan Government will commence to
pay interest on a portion of the capital advanced.
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from the assured possession of the Nile Valley. I
should add that, at the close of the year 1906, a
Reserve Fund, amounting to over £E. 31 5,000,
had accumulated in the hands of the Soudan
Government.
Thus, a very great and rapid improvement has
taken place. ^loreover, it has been effected with-
out increasing the burden of taxation. The fiscal
legislation of the Soudan has been based on the
unquestionably sound principle that, in the assess-
ment and collection of the taxes, no innovation,
based on Western ideas, should be introduced
unless its introduction is altogether unavoidable.
The main fault of Oriental fiscal administration
has generally been, not so much that the principles
on which the taxation is based are unsound, as
that the method of applying them has been very
defective. On going through the list of the taxes
which were collected under the Khalifa's rule, it was
found that, although the manner in which they had
been levied had been cruel and extortionate to the
last degree, they were based on principles which
are generally recognised in all Moslem countries.
No radical change of system was, therefore,
necessary. Broadly speaking, all that was required
was that the rates of taxation should in each case
be fixed by law ; that the taxes should be moderate
in amount, and that every care should be taken
that no demands were made on the taxpayers save
those which the law allowed.
With every desire, however, to avoid the
premature introduction of Western methods of
administration into the Soudan, it was found
practically impossible to devise any proper system
for the recovery of taxes without having recourse
to some of the principles on which European
procedure in such matters is based. The Dervish
svstem consisted in practice in taking as much as
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the taxpayers could pay. On the other hand, if
the land yielded no crop, the tax collector recog-
nised the futility of making any demands on the
cultivator/ The experience of other Eastern
countries has shown that the elasticity thus
obtained goes a long way to mitigate the rigour
even of the worst fiscal systems.
The European administrator, who has to look
to financial equilibrium, naturally desires to intro-
duce a system which will enable him to know,
with tolerable accuracy, the amount of revenue on
which he can count, not only for a single year, but
for a series of years. It is comparatively easy for
him to rectify the main defect of the Oriental
system. He can substitute a fixed and moderate
demand for one which was capricious and generally
exorbitant. It is far less easy to obviate the
rigidity which is, in some degree, an ahnost
unavoidable accompaniment of the change of
system. Notably, it is impossible to dispense
altogether with the system of legal expropriation
in cases of default, albeit this practice is wholly
foreign to the ideas of a backward Oriental popula-
tion. Sometliing, however, may be done to temper
the comparative rigidity of European modes of
procedure. Thus, in Egypt, although for many
years past expropriation has been legalised, the
best part of the Oriental fiscal system has been
preserved. It has never been the practice, after
imposing a fixed rate on land, to exact the
amount of the taxes in good and bad years alike.
Liberal concessions have been made to the holders
* The execution of a system under which the tax is made pro-
portionate to the crop of the year is, of course, iu some degree
facilitated by the practice, common iu all Moslem countries, of taking
payment in kind. It has been found necessary to continue this
practice in some parts of the Soudan. But it is one which leads to
numerous abuses, and it will be desirable to abolish it as soou M
possible. It was abolished in Egypt some twenty years ago.
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of Sharaki, or uiiirrigated land. In the Soudan,
an attempt has been made to carry this principle
somewhat further. It has been laid down that,
when a summons is taken out against any man for
non-payment of tlie land tax, the INIagistrate, " if
he is satisfied that the crop upon the land has
failed through no fault of the owner or cultivator,
and that the tax cannot be paid without depriving
the owner of the means of earning his living as
an agriculturist," may adjourn the summons, and
report the case to the Governor- General. The
latter can then, if he thinks fit, remit the tax.
The clothing of the owner and that of his wife
and children, the tools of an artisan or the
implements of a cultivator, as well as cattle
ordinarily employed in agriculture, are exempted
from seizure. Further, the process for the recovery
of taxes, though it may perhaps be criticised on
the ground of being somewhat too elaborate, is
manifestly devised with the express object of
obviating a resort to expropriation, save in cases of
absolute necessity.
I make these remarks because the points here
discussed are, in my opinion, of vital importance
in the administration of all Eastern countries.
I explained in a former part of this narrative^
that, at a moment when reckless borrowing had
brought Egypt to the verge of ruin, resort was
had to what at that time appeared the bold
expedient of contracting a fresh loan. The causes
which had led to the creation of a situation in
the Soudan which, at one time, seemed almost
desperate, were different from those which had
operated in Egypt, but the remedy adopted was,
in principle, the same. The country was prac-
tically isolated. It was cut off from the world by
a waste of burning and almost waterless desert.o
> Vide ante, pp. 462-64.
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Manifestly, the first thing to do was to establish
the link through whose agency civilisation could
gradually be introduced into the country. Scarcely
had the sound of the guns of the battle of Omdurman
died away, when works were commenced with a
view to extending the Nile railway, which then
extended only to the Atbara, to Halfaya, opposite
Khartoum. It was, however, obvious that some
port on the Red Sea coast constituted the natural
outlet for the trade of the Soudan. After a full
examination of the various alternatives which were
available, it was decided to create such a port at a
spot, now named Port Soudan, a short distance
north of Suakin, and to connect it by railway with
the Nile Valley. By January 1906, the railway
works were completed. The harbour works are
still in course of progress. Thus, the connection
between the Soudan and the rest of the world was
established.
There is only one further point of special
importance to which I need allude in connection
with the administration of the Soudan. What has
been done to remove the plague-spot of slavery ?
The Soudan, of course, no longer constitutes the
happy hunting-ground of the Arab slave-hunter.
Nevertheless, in spite of every effort, the Slave
Trade has not, as yet, been wholly suppressed.
Slave raids are still, at times, made, more especially
along the Abyssinian frontier. A recent report
from Captain McMurdo, the head of the Depart-
ment for the Suppression of Slavery, contains the
following passage : " Speaking generally of the
repression of slavery in the Soudan, I venture to
state that progress is steadily being made, and that
slavery has turned the corner into tlie high road of
abolition, but it is a very long road, and it will take
years to get to the end of it. It is not in nature
that customs which have existed for centuries can
554 MODERN EGYPT pt. v
be at once put aside. It is only by bringing to
bear a steady pressure on slave - traffickers that
abolition will be obtained."
Domestic slavery in the Soudan itself is
gradually dying a natural deatli. On this subject
Sir Reginald Wingate wrote some two years ago :
" By carefully protecting the interests of those who
were previously slaves, and at the same time
gradually employing them on renumerative work
in other capacities—should they be unwilling to
return to their masters as ordinary servants—we
shall eventually, with the concurrence and assist-
ance of the inhabitants themselves, gradually
transform the status of slavery, and substitute for
it a system of paid labour, which will probably be
acceptable to master and servant alike.'*
Thus, the Soudan has been launched on the
path which leads to moral and material progress.
With reasonable prudence in the management of
its affairs, it should continue, year by year, to
advance in prosperity.
CHAPTER LXI
CONCLUSION
Summary of this work—Changes since the time of Ismail—The British
reformers—Their Egyptian allies—Stability of the reforms
A SHORT account has thus been given of the reforms
which, during the last few years, have been carried
out in all the more important branches of the
Egyptian and Soudanese State administrations.
The description given of those reforms is, indeed,
defective. Several important subjects have not
been even mentioned. No allusion has been made
to the services of many officials who have done
excellent work in their special spheres of action/
All that has been attempted is to give a general
sketch of the progress of Egyptian reform. Even
this imperfect sketch may, however, suffice to
indicate the main features of the work which has
been accomplished. It has been shown how the
extravagance and maladministration of Ismail
Pasha led to his own downfall, and to the im-
position of a qualified European tutelage on the
Egyptian Government ; how, at the moment when
that tutelage was beginning to produce some
* I take this opportunity of testifying: to the excellent services
rendered by the first Secretaries in the Diplomatic Service who acted
for me during my temporary absences from Egypt. These were Sir
Gerald Portal, whose premature death was a great loss to his country,
Sir Arthur Hardinge, Sir Rennell Rodd, and Mr. Findlay. I cannot
speak too highly of the invaluable assistance I received from all of these
gentlemen.
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beneficial results, the country was thrown back
mto disorder by a military mutiny, the offspring
of Ismail's reckless conduct, and by the growth of
national aspirations in a form which rendered them
incapable of realisation ; and how England finally
intervened and bade disorder and administrative
chaos cease. The readers of this book have been
conducted, subject by subject, through the compli-
cated mazes of the Egyptian administrative system.
The degree of progress which has been made in the
direction of introducing Western civilisation into
the country has been described in some detail.
No one can fully realise the extent of the change
which has come over Egypt since the British
occupation took place unless he is in some degree
familiar with the system under which the country
was governed in the days of Ismail Pasha. The
contrast between now and then is, indeed, remark-
able. A new spirit has been instilled into the
population of Egypt. Even the peasant has learnt
to scan his rights. Even the Pasha has learnt
that others besides himself have rights which must
be respected. The courbash may hang on the
walls of the Moudirieh, but the JNIoudir no longer
dares to employ it on the backs of the fellaheen.
For all practical purposes, it may be said that the
hateful corvee system has disappeared. Slavery
has virtually ceased to exist. The halcyon days
of the adventurer and the usurer are past. Fiscal
burthens have been greatly relieved. Everywhere
law reigns supreme. Justice is no longer bought
and sold. Nature, mstead of being spurned and
neglected, has been wooed to bestow her gifts on
mankind. She has responded to the appeal. The
waters of the Nile are now utilised in an intelli-
gent manner. Means of locomotion have been
improved and extended. The soldier has acquired
some pride in the uniform which he wears. He
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has fought as he never fought before. The sick
man can be nursed in a well-managed hospital.
The lunatic is no longer treated like a wild beast.
The punishment awarded to the worst criminal is
no longer barbarous. Lastly, the schoolmaster is
abroad, with results which are as yet uncertain,
but which cannot fail to be important.
All these things have been accomplished by the
small body of Englishmen who, in various capaci-
ties, and with but little direct support or assistance
from their Government or its representative, have
of late years devoted their energies to the work of
Egyptian regeneration. They have had many
obstacles to encounter. Internationalism and
Pashadom have stood in the path at every turn.
But these forces, though they could retard, have
failed to arrest the progress of the British reformer.
The opposition which he has had to encounter,
albeit very embarrassing, merely acted on his
system as a healthy tonic. An eminent French
literary critic^ has said that the end of a book
should recall its commencement to the mind of
the reader. Acting on this principle, I may
remind those who have perused these pages that I
began this work by stating that, although possibly
counterparts to all the abuses which existed, and
which to some extent still exist in Egypt, may be
found in other countries, the conditions under
which the work of Egyptian reform has been
undertaken were very peculiar.^ The special diffi-
culties which have resulted from those conditions
have but served to bring; out in strono; relief one of
the mam characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon race.
Other nations might have equally well conceived
the reforms which were necessary. It required
the singular political adaptability of Englishmen
to execute them. A country and a nation have
* Joubert. 2 yjdg ^nte, vol. i. p. 6.
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been partially regenerated, in spite of a perverse
system of government which might well have
seemed to render regeneration almost impossible.
Yet, when it is said that all these things were
accomplished by the Englishmen who have served
the Egyptian Government, one qualifying remark
should in justice be made. It should never be
forgotten that many Egyptians have themselves
borne a very honourable and useful part in the
work of Egyptian regeneration.
Is the skilled labour, the energy, the persever-
ance, and the patient toil of the English reformers
and their Egyptian allies to be thrown away ? Is
Egypt again to relapse into a semi - barbarous
condition ? Will posterity declare that this noble
effort to elevate a whole nation ended in ultimate
failure ?
I cannot say what will be the future of Egypt,
but I hope and believe that these questions may be
answered in the negative.
According to the Eastern adage, the grass never
grows again where once the hoof of the Sultan's
horse has trod. In the sorely tried country of
which this history treats, the hoof of the Turkish
horse, whether the rider were Sultan or Khedive,
has, indeed, left a deep imprint. Nevertheless, I
would fain hope it is not indelible. We are justi-
fied in substituting a sanguine in the place of a
despondent metaphor. Where once the seeds of
true Western civilisation have taken root so deeply
as is now the case in Egypt, no retrograde forces,
however malignant they may be, will in the end be
able to check germination and ultimate growth.
The seeds which Ismail Pasha and his predecessors
planted produced little but rank weeds. The seeds
which have now been planted are those of true
civilisation. They will assuredly bring forth fruit
in due season. Interested antagonism, ignorance.
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religious prejudice, and all the forces which cluster
round an archaic and corrupt social system, may
do their worst. They will not succeed. We have
dealt a blow to the forces of reaction in Egypt
from which they can never recover, and from
which, if England does her duty towards herself,
towards the Egyptian people, and towards the
civilised world, they will never have a chance of
recovering.

PART VII
THE FUTURE OF EGYPT
Nullum numen abest, si sit p-ude)itia ; nos te,
NosJucirnuSf FortunUy Deam coeloque locamus.
Juvenal, Sat. x. 365.
The essential qtialities of national greatness are morale not
material.
Lecky''s History of England, vol. i. p. 490.
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CHAPTER LXII
THE FUTURE OF EGYPT
Quo Vadisf—The question of the occupation—Its duration—Egyptian
autonomy—The Capitulations—Desirability of training the Egyp-
tians—Importance of finance—Display of sympathy—Conclusion.
It is probable that few Englishmen ever ask them-
selves seriously the question of Quo Vadis in con-
nection with either Indian or Egyptian affairs.
Even fewer are tempted to hazard any confident
answer to this crucial question.
The practical instincts of our race lead us to
deal with whatever affairs we have in hand for the
moment, and to discard any attempt to peer too
curiously into the remote future. That instinct
seems to me to be eminently wise. Whether,
however, it be wise or unwise, it certainly exercises
so powerful an influence over my mind as to pre-
clude me from endeavouring to forecast what will
be the ultimate solution of the Egyptian Question.
That solution, moreover, depends, in no small
degree, on a factor which is at present both
unknown and uncertain, viz., the conduct of the
Egyptians themselves. We cannot as yet predict
with any degree of assurance the moral, intellectual,
and political results likely to be obtained by the
transformation which is at present taking place in
the Egyptian national character.
Although, however, I will not venture to pre-
dict the goal which will eventually be reached, I
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have no hesitation in expressing an opinion as to
that which we should seek to attain. So far as
can at present be judged, only two alternative
courses are possible. Egypt must eventually either
become autonomous, or it must be incorporated
into the British Empire. Personally, I am de-
cidedly in favour of moving in the direction of the
former of these alternatives.
As a mere academic question, I never have been,
neither am I now in favour of the British occupa-
tion of Egypt. Looking at the matter from a
purely British point of view, I believe that the
opinion enunciated by Lord Palmerston in 1857^
still holds good. More than this, however much I
should regret to see the noble work of Egyptian
reform checked, 1 am quite prepared to admit that,
if it be in the interests of England to evacuate
Egypt, we need not be deterred from doing so by
the consideration that it is in the moral and material
interests of the Egyptians, however little some few
of them may recognise the fact, that we should con-
tinue our occupation of the country. It does not
appear to me that we need stay in Egypt merely to
carry out certain administrative reforms, however
desirable they may be, unless those reforms are so
essential that their non-execution would contribute
to produce serious political or financial complica-
tions after the British garrison is withdrawn. All
that we have to do is to leave behnid us a fairly
good, strong, and—above all things—stable Govern-
ment, which will obviate anarchy and bankruptcy,
and will thus prevent the Egyptian Question from
again becoming a serious cause of trouble to
Europe. We need not inquire too minutely into
the acts of such a Government. In order to ensure
its stability, it should possess a certain liberty of
action, even although it may use that liberty in a
* Vide ante, vol. i. p. 92.
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manner wliich would not always be in accordance
with our views. But it is essential that, subse-
quent to the evacuation, the Government should,
broadly speaking, act on principles which will be
in conformity with the commonplace requirements
of Western civilisation. The idea, which at one
time found favour with a section of the British
public, that Egypt may be left to " stew in its own
juice," and that, however great may be the con-
fusion and internal disorder which is created, no
necessity for European interference will arise, may
at once be set aside as wholly impracticable. It is
absurd to suppose that Europe will look on as a
passive spectator whilst a retrograde government,
based on purelyMohammedan principles and obsolete
Oriental ideas, is established in Egypt. The material
interests at stake are too important, and the degree
of civilisation to which Egypt has attained is too
advanced, to admit of such a line of conduct being
adopted. Public opinion would force the most
sluggish Government into action. If England did
not interfere, some other Power would do so. Of
the many delusions which at one time existed about
Egypt, the greatest of all is the idea that England
can shake herself free of the Egyptian Question
merely by withdrawing the British garrison, and
then declaring to the world that the Egyptians
must get on as well as they can by themselves.
Lord Granville pursued a policy of this sort in
dealing with the affairs of the Soudan, and we
know with what result.
It has sometimes been argued that, even if mis-
government were again allowed to reign supreme
in Egypt, British interests would be sufficiently
secured if all danger of occupation by any other
foreign Power were averted. I have already^
alluded to this aspect of the question, but the point
> Vide ante, p. 383.
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is one of so much importance that I need make no
apology for reverting to it.
It cannot be too clearly understood that neutral-
isation, under whatsoever conditions, wholly fails to
solve the Egyptian Question. The solution of that
question would be little, if at all, advanced by
merely obtaining guarantees against foreign inter-
ference in Egypt. The main difficulty would
remain untouched. That difficulty is to decide
who is to interfere, on the assumption that some
foreign interference is indispensable. If it were
thought desirable to prevent competition and
rivalry amongst the different offices of the Metro-
politan Fire Brigade, the object might readily be
obtained by forbidding any one of them to aid in
extinguishing a fire. The practical result would
hardly be considered satisfactory. This, however,
is the political system which would be involved
in the neutralisation of Egypt. Each member of
the European Fire Brigade would be under an
obligation not to turn his hose on to an Egyptian
conflagration, in order to avoid wounding the
susceptibilities of his neighbours. In the mean-
while, the whole edifice of Egyptian civilisation
might, and probably would be destroyed, to the
infinite detriment not only of the indigenous in-
habitants of Egypt, but also of the large number
of Europeans who would be ruined if the country
were allowed to relapse into anarchy and barbarism.
The failure of international action to deal effectively
with misgovernment in other parts of the Ottoman
dominions serves as a warning in dealing with Egypt.
Is it, however, possible to ensure the existence
of a fairly good and stable government in Egypt
if the British garrison were withdrawn ? That is
the main question which has to be answered.
I make no pretension to the gift of political
prophecy. I can only state my deliberate opinion.
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formed after many years of Egyptian experience
and in the face of a decided predisposition to favour
the policy of evacuation, that at present, and for a
long time to come, the results of executing such a
policy would be disastrous. Looking to the special
intricacies of the Egyptian system of government,
to the licence of the local press, to the ignorance
and credulity of the mass of the Egyptian popula-
tion, to the absence of Egyptian statesmen capable
of controlling Egyptian society and of guiding the
very complicated machine of government, to the
diminution of the influence exercised by the British
officials and by the diplomatic Representative of
England in Egypt which would inevitably result
from the evacuation, and to the proved impotence
of international action in administrative matters
—it appears to me impossible to blind oneself to
the fact that, if the British garrison were now
withdrawn, a complete upset would most probably
ensue. It has to be borne in mind that the Egypt
of to-day is very different from the Egypt of the
pre-occupation days. A return to personal rule of
the Oriental type—and it is in this direction that
events would probably trend— would create a
revolution. A transfer of power to the present
race of Europeanised Egyptians would, to say the
least, be an extremely hazardous experiment, so
hazardous, indeed, that I am very decidedly of
opinion that it would be wholly unjustifiable to
attempt it.
It may be that at some future period the
Egyptians may be rendered capable of governing
themselves without the ])resence of a foreign army
in their midst, and without foreign guidance in
civil and military affairs ; but that period is far
distant. One or more generations must, in my
opinion, pass away before the question can be even
usefully discussed.
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The fact, however, that the occupation must
last for a ])eriod which cannot now be defined,
need not stand in the way of a gradual movement
in the direction of autonomy in the sense in which
I understand that term as applied to the special
case of Egypt. The mere withdrawal of the
British garrison would not render E^ypt autono-
mous ; on the contrary, it would diminish the
prospect of eventual autonomy. It is a con-
tradiction in terms to describe a country as self-
governing when all its most important laws are
passed, not by any of its inhabitants or by any
institutions existing within its own confines, but
by the Governments and legislative institutions of
sixteen foreign Powers.^ Such, however, will be
the condition of Egypt until the existing regime
of the Capitulations is altered. There are, so
far as I know, only two methods for effecting a
radical alteration of that regime. One is that
Egypt should cease to form part of the Ottoman
dominions and should be annexed by some foreign
Power—a solution which 1 discard. The other is
that means should be devised for establishing a
local legislature competent to deal with all local
matters. The only real Egyptian autonomy, there-
fore, which I am able to conceive as either practic-
able or capable of realisation without serious injury
to all the various interests involved, is one which
will enable all the dwellers in cosmopolitan Egypt,
be they Moslem or Christian, European, Asiatic, or
African, to be fused into one self-governing body.
That it may take years
—
possibly generations—to
' It has also to be borne in mind that unanimity amongst all the
foreign Powers is necessary before any law can come into force. Prior
to 1867, the German ZoUverein was constituted on a somewhat similar
basis. Every state of the union bad an absolute right of veto on any
proposal submitted for its consideration. The system, Mr. Percy
Ashley says {Modem Tariff History, p. 49), caused " innumerable
difficulties and delays." It has, of course, long since ceased to exist.
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achieve this object is more than probable, but unless
it can be achieved, any idea of autonomy, in the true
sense of the term, will, in my opinion, have to
be aband jned. I stated in the last Report I wrote
from Egypt that it is well for every individual and
every nation to have an ideal. The ideal of the
Moslem patriot is, in my opinion, incapable of
realisation. The ideal which I substitute in its
place is extremely difficult of attainment, but if
the Egyptians of the rising generation will have
the wisdom and foresight to work cordially and
patiently, in co-operation witli European sympa-
thisers, to attain it, it may possibly in time be
found capable of realisation.
In the meanwhile, no effort should be spared to
render the native Egyptians capable of eventually
taking their share in the government of a really
autonomous community. Much has already been
done in this direction, and it may be confidently
anticipated, now that the finances of the country are
established on a sound footing and the most press-
ing demands necessary to ensure material prosperity
have been met, that intellectual, and perhaps moral
progress will proceed more rapidly during the next
quarter of a century than during that which has
now terminated. Only, it should never be forgotten
that the rapidity of the progress must be made
contingent on the means available for ensuring it.
" Sound finance," as has been most truly said, " is
the foundation of the independence of States." ^
Nothing caj. compensate the Egyptians for a
financial relapse.
Lastly, it should never be forgotten that, in
default of community of race, religion, language,
and habits of thought, which ordinarily constitute
the main bonds of union between the rulers and
the ruled, we must endeavour to forge such artificial
* Oliver's Alexander Haniilton, p. 304.
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bonds between the Englishman and the Egyptian
as the circumstances of the case render available.
One of the most important of these bonds
must always be the exhibition of reasonable and
disciplined sympathy for the Egyptians, not merely
by the British Government, but by every individual
Englishman engaged in the work of Egyptian
administration. This sympathy is a quality, the
possession or absence of which is displayed by
Englishmen in very various degrees when they are
brought in contact with Asiatic or African races.
Some go to the extreme of almost brutal antipathy,
whilst others display their ill-regulated sympathy in
forms which are exaggerated and even mischievous.
The Egyptians rightly resent the .conduct of the
one class, and ridicule that of the other. A middle
course, based on accurate information and on a
careful study of Egyptian facts and of the Egyptian
character, will be found more productive of result
than either extreme.
Another bond may, to some extent, be forged
by appealing to the person or the pocket. A
proper system of justice and of police can protect
the former. Material interests can be served by
various means, the most effective of which is to
keep taxation low. Do not let us, however, imagine
that, under any circumstances, we can ever create
a feeling of loyalty in the breasts of the Egyptians
akin to that felt by a self-governing people for in-
digenous rulers if, besides being indigenous, they
are also beneficent. Neither by the display of
sympathy, nor by good government, can we forge
bonds which will be other than brittle. Sir Herbert
Edwards, writing to Lord Lawrence a few years
after the annexation of the Punjab, said : " We
are not liked anywhere. . . . The people hailed
us as deliverers from Sikh maladministration, and
we were popular so long as we were plaistering
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wounds. But the patient is well now, and he
finds the doctor a bore. There is no getting over
the fact that we are not Mahommedans, that we
neither eat, drink, nor intermarry witli them."^
The present situation in Egypt is very similar
to that which existed in the Punjab when Sir
Herbert Edwards wrote these lines. The want
of gratitude displayed by a nation to its alien
benefactors is almost as old as history itself^ In
whatever degree ingratitude may exist, it would be
unjust to blame the Egyptians for following the
dictates of human nature. In any case, whatever
be the moral harvest we may reap, we must
continue to do our duty, and our duty has been
indicated to us by the Apostle St. Paul. We must
not be "weary in well-doing."
I take leave of a country with which I have
been so long associated with the expression of an
earnest hope that, in the future, as in the recent
past, Egypt will continue to be governed in the
interests of the Egyptians, and I commend to my
own countrymen the advice which was given to
Rome by one of the later Latin poets : ^
Quod regnas minus est quam quod regnare mereris.
^ Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. ii. p. 20.
2 Gre^orovius {Rome in the Middle Ages, i. 323) says, speaking of
the rule of Theodorie in Italy : "The unhappy King now learnt by
experience that not even the wisest and most liumane of princes, if he
be an ahen in race, in customs, and religion, can ever win the hearts of
the people."
* RutiliuB.
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BRITISH AGENTS AND CONSULS-GENERAL
IN EGYPT
Name.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS
1875-
\dhesion of the British Government to the
International Law Courts .... July SI.
1876
Mr. Cave reports on the Finances of Egypt . March 23.
The Khedive suspends payment of his Treasury
Bills April 8.
Creation of the Commission of the Public Debt May 2.
Issue of the Goschen-Joubert Decree . . November 18.
Appointment of English and French Controllers
(Mr. Romaine and Baron de Malaret) . December 25.
1877
An English Commissioner (Sir Evelyn Baring)
appointed to the Commission of the Debt . March 2.
Signature of the Anti-Slavery Convention be-
tween the British and Egyptian Govern-
ments August 4.
1878
The Khedive consents to a full inquiry into the
financial position of Egypt . . . April 4.
Treaty of Berlin ...... August S.
First Report of the Commission of Inquiry . August 19.
The principle of Ministerial responsibility is re-
cognised. Nubar Pasha charged with the
formation of a Ministry. Suspension of the
Dual Control. Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de
Bligni^res appointed Ministers of Finance
and Public Works respectively . . , August 28.
Issue of the Domains Loan of £8,500,000 . . October 29
675
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1879
Nubar Pasha and Sir Rivers Wilson assaulted by
a crowd of Egyptian officers . . . February 18.
Resignation of Nubar Pasha '.
. . . February Ip.
Prince Tewfik appointed Prime Minister . . March 10.
Dismissal of the European Ministers. Ch^rif
Pasha appointed Prime Minister . . April 7.
Second Report of the Commission of Inquiry,
and resignation of the Commissioners
. April 10.
The Sultan deposes the Khedive . . . Jiuie 26.
Ismail Pasha leaves Egypt .... June 30.
Chdrif Pasha resigns office .... August 18.
The Dual Control revived. M. de Bligni^res
and Sir Evelyn Baring appointed Controllers September 4.
Riaz Pasha forms a Ministry . . • • September 22>
1880
Repeal of the Law of the Moukabala , • January 6.
Appointment of a Commission of Liquidation . April 2.
Sir Auckland Colvin appointed Controller in
succession to Sir Evelyn Baring . . Jiuie 23.
Promulgation of the Law of Liquidation • • July 17.
1881
Mutiny of the Egyptian Army. The Minister
of War is dismissed ..... February 1.
The Egyptian Army again mutinies. Fall of
the Riaz Ministry. Ch^rif Pasha becomes
Prime Minister...... September 9.
The Sultan sends two Commissioners to Egypt October 6.
At the instance of the French and British
Governments, the Turkish Commissioners
leave Egypt ...... October 19-
M. Gambetta assumes office . • • • November 12.
1882
The British and French Governments address a
Joint Note to the Khedive . . . January 8.
M. Gambetta resigns office. He is succeeded
by M. de Freycinet ..... January 31.
Ch^rif Pasha is dismissed from office. Mahmoud
Pasha Sami api)ointcd Prime Minister, with
Arabi as Minister of War .... February 5-
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M. de Bligni^res resigns his appointment of Con-
troller-General...... March.
The Arabist Ministers resign, but are reinstated
in office ... ... May 23.
The British and French Consuls-General demand
that Arabi should leave the country. The
Arabist Ministry again resigns . . . May 27.
The Arabist Ministry is again reinstated . . May 28.
The Sultan sends Dervish Pasha as Special Com-
missioner to Egypt ..... June 4.
A serious riot, attended with loss of life, occurs
at Alexandria . . . . . . June 11.
Ragheb Pasha is named Prime Minister, with
Arabi as Minister of War .... Jmie 1 7.
A Conference, in which Turkey refuses to take
part, meets at Constantinople . . . June 23.
Bombardment of Alexandria. The Ar^bists set
fire to the town ..... July 1 1.
On the motion of M. Clemenceau, the French
Chamber passes a vote adverse to the
Ministry. M. de Freycinet resigns. M.
Duclerc forms a Ministry .... August 1.
Battle of Tel-el-Kebir September IS.
Cairo occupied by British troops. Ardbi is
arrested ....... September 15.
The Egyptian Army is disbanded . . . September 19.
Lord Dufferin instructed to go to Egypt . . October 29.
Arabi condemned to exile .... December 3.
It is decided not to re-establish the Dual Control December.
Death of M. Gambetta December 31.
1883
Issue of a Circular prohibiting the use of the
courbash ....... January l6.
Capitulation of El-Obeid ..... Januaiy 19.
Sir Auckland Colvin appointed Financial Adviser February 4.
Promulgation of the Organic Law . . . May 1
.
General Hicks's army leaves Duem . . . September 8.
Massacre of Egyptian reinforcements sent from
Suakin to Sinkat ..... October l6.
Sir Evelyn Baring appointed Agent and Consul-
General . September 11,
The British Government agree to the reduction
of the garrison and the concentration of
British troops at Alexandria . . . November 1.
Sir Edgar Vincent appointed Financial Adviser November 4.
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Total defeat of the Egyptian troops sent to
the relief of Tokar. Death of Captain
MoncriefF, R.N. . . . . . November 4.
News of the annihilation of General Hicks's
army arrives at Cairo .... November 18.
Sir Evelyn Baring recommends the abandonment
of the Soudan ...... November 19.
The British Government agree to the policy of
abandoning the Soudan .... November 20.
The reduction of the British garrison in Egypt
countermanded ..... November 25.
Defeat of the Egyptians at Tamanieb . . December 2.
Fall of Dara. Slatin Bey is taken prisoner.
The Province of Darfour falls into the power
of the Mahdi , December 23.
1884
Ch«irif Pasha resigns office. Nubar Pasha forms
a Ministry ...... January 8.
General Gordon and Colonel Stewart leave Cairo
for Khartoum ...... January 26.
Defeat of General Baker's force at El Teb . February 4.
Annihilation of the Sinkat garrison . . . February 8.
General Gordon arrives at Berber . . . February 11.
General Gordon arrives at Khartoum . . February 18.
Sir Gerald Graham defeats the Dervishes at
El Teb February 29.
The British Government finally refuse to employ
Zobeir Pasha in the Soudan . . . March 5.
Sir Gerald Graham defeats the Dervishes at
Tamai March 13.
The British Government refuse to send troops
from Suakin to Berber .... March 25.
Fall of the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province . . . April 9.
All communication with Khartoum is cut off . April 19.
Fall of Berber May 19.
First Meeting of the London Conference on
Egyptian Finance ..... June 28.
Last Meeting of the London Conference . August 2.
The British Government obtain a vote of credit
in the House of Commons on account of the
Soudan Expedition August 8.
Zeyla occupied by British troops . . . August 24.
Lord Wolseley appointed to the command of
the Soudan Expedition .... August 26.
Murder of Colonel Stewart and Mr, Power . September 18.
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Berbera occupied by British troops . . . September 24.
Lord Northbrook reports on the Egyptian situa-
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vital in the best sense."
It is the Outlook which thus commends an earher edition
of this standard work, a commendation which has been
heartily endorsed by all students of history as well as by
the general public. To his previous chapters the author
has now added three new ones which bring the text down
to the period prior to the beginning of the present war.
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York
Travels in the American Colonies,
1690-1783
By NEWTON D. MERENESS
Cloth, 8vo
This book consists of eighteen hitherto unpublished
narratives, some written originally in English, others
being translations from the French or German. They
give accounts of travel on the Atlantic slope from Savan-
nah to Albany ; from Albany to Niagara Falls, Quebec,
Hartford and Boston ; through the Great Lakes from
Detroit to Chicago ; up the Mississippi from New Orleans
to St. Louis ; down the Ohio and the Mississippi from
Pittsburg to New Orleans ; up the Tennessee ; through
the country of the Choctaws, the Creeks and the Chero-
kees and through the backwoods from Pennsylvania to
North CaroHna. The traveler, usually an officer, is either
on a tour of observation and inspection, or is attending to
some other important business. In one instance a party
of immigrants is removing to a new home in the
«
wilderness.
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York
The Life of Andrew Jackson
By JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, Ph.D.
With Illustrations. New Edition. Two Volumes in
One
Cloth, 8vo, $2.^0
This is a one-volume edition of a biography that has,
since its first pubUcation several years ago, come to be
regarded as one of the most faithful stories of Jackson's
life and of its effect on the nation that has ever been writ-
ten. Professor Bassett has not slighted Jackson's faihngs
or his virtues ; he has tried to refrain from commenting
upon his actions ; he has sought to present a true picture
of the political manipulations which surrounded Jackson
and in which he was an important factor. The volume
contributes largely to a clearer realization not only of the
character of a great man but also of the complex period in
which he lived.
The Writings of John Quincy Adams
Volume VI. Edited by
WORTHINGTON C. FORD
Cloth, 8vo
This volume brings Mr. Ford's remarkable series up to
the year 1821. Mr. Adams's last dispatches from London,
while minister there, deal with the matters left undeter-
mined by the Treaty of Ghent and with his association with
the English reformers of the day.
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York
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